

Some Reflections on National and International Responsibility in Situations of Internal Displacement*

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Internally displaced persons have emerged in recent years as one of the most pressing humanitarian, human rights, political and security issues facing the global community. There are an estimated 20 to 25 million persons forcibly displaced within their own countries by conflict and human rights violations, many in acute need of protection and assistance. More than 10 million can be found in Africa, 4 to 5 million in Asia, 3 to 4 million in Europe and more than 2 million in the Americas. More than 40 countries are affected.

Had these persons crossed a border, they would have a well-established international protection system to turn to under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). But for persons forcibly displaced within their own countries, no such predictable international system has been put in place. Although the internally displaced are uprooted for the same reasons as refugees, they remain under the jurisdiction of their governments and therefore are excluded from the international protection afforded to refugees.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has described the problem as "an unprecedented challenge for the international community: to find ways to respond to what is essentially an internal crisis."¹ Put another way, an effective balance needs to be found between the compelling obligation to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to persons at risk and the UN principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Even though primary responsibility for the security and well being of internally displaced populations rests with their governments, when governments are unwilling or unable to provide for the protection and assistance of their citizens, or when there is no government at all, the international community is challenged to become involved. Apart from the humanitarian imperative, internally displaced persons denied access to food, medicine and shelter and exposed to all manner of violence generally fall into a vacuum of responsibility within the state, which can undermine internal stability. If the situation is left "unaddressed," it may "spill across borders and upset external and regional stability," the Secretary-General has warned.² International involvement therefore becomes essential.

This paper examines the relationship between national and international responsibility in situations of internal displacement. First, it looks at the problem conceptually and legally, then turns to specific situations in Asia, and finally seeks to draw some conclusions.

An Emerging International Responsibility

International involvement in situations of internal displacement is a relatively new phenomenon. Traditional notions of sovereignty basically prohibited any international role in internal situations until the last decade of the 20th century. To be sure, UNHCR by the early 1970s had become involved in assisting internally displaced persons in a number of countries, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had also helped displaced persons in the course of protecting victims of armed conflict. But on the whole, the system designed at the end of the Second World War focused on persons who sought refuge across borders. When governments forcibly displaced large numbers of persons within their own borders and subjected them to starvation and abuse, the international community basically stood by.³

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It was not until the 1990s that this gap in the international protection system began to be challenged. One reason for this was that the numbers of internally displaced persons worldwide began to swell dramatically and exceed those of refugees as internal conflicts replaced interstate wars as the main source of forced displacement. In addition, access became easier at the end of the cold war when countries no longer were "protected" by one superpower or another. This was coupled with greater acceptance of the idea that events taking place within a state are a legitimate subject of international concern. The international human rights movement had long championed this view, pointing out that the rights of people transcend frontiers and that when governments fail to meet their obligations under international law they should be held accountable by the international community. Indeed, the vast range of human rights agreements, signed and ratified by UN member states following the Second World War not only obliged states to protect the human rights and welfare of their citizens, but required them to allow other states to scrutinize their records. Failing to fulfill their obligations meant they would open themselves up to a range of international actions.

Humanitarian organizations also began to insist that when governments deny access to populations at risk and deliberately subject them to starvation and other abuses, the international community must find ways to provide the needed assistance. International discussions increasingly focussed on a "right to humanitarian assistance," and UN agencies and NGOs became far more active in hard diplomatic bargaining to persuade both governments and rebel forces to allow food and supplies to reach displaced persons at risk.⁴ In the case of Iraq in 1991, the international community not only demanded access to hundreds of thousands of displaced Kurds but set up a security umbrella to protect them. Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions demanded access to internally displaced populations in other countries as well and at times authorized the use of force to facilitate the delivery of relief and to provide protection to them.⁵ Indeed, internally displaced persons moved to center stage in international debates about how to protect persons caught up in internal conflicts.

Reflecting this shift in attitude, the Secretary-General in 1992 appointed a Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, to monitor internal displacement situations worldwide and identify ways to promote better protection and assistance for displaced populations. Deng sought to reconcile the tension between sovereignty and international intervention by introducing the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility."⁶ Basically, it stipulates that states, as a measure of their sovereignty, have the fundamental responsibility to provide life-supporting protection and assistance for their citizens. If they are unable to do so, they are expected to request and accept outside offers of aid. However, if they refuse or deliberately obstruct access and put large numbers at risk, the international community has a right and even a responsibility to assert its concern. International involvement in such cases can range from diplomatic dialogue to negotiation of access, to establishing international humanitarian presence, to political pressure, to sanctions or, as a last resort, and in exceptional cases, to military intervention. In his dialogues with governments, Deng repeatedly has pointed out that no state claiming legitimacy can quarrel with its commitment to protect all of its citizens. Sovereignty must mean accountability to one's population and also to the international community in the form of compliance with international human rights and humanitarian agreements.

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

To provide the international community with a framework for action, Deng, together with a team of legal experts, developed the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and presented them to the United Nations in 1998 (see Appendix).⁷ The Principles, which bring together into one compact document the relevant provisions of international law applicable to the internally displaced, are based upon the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. They assert that primary responsibility for the displaced rests with their governments, but they also underscore the important role the international community has to play when governments fail to discharge these responsibilities. Indeed, national authorities, according to the Principles, cannot arbitrarily withhold consent when they themselves are "unable or unwilling to provide the required humanitarian assistance." They have an obligation to grant humanitarian organizations "rapid and unimpeded access to the internally displaced."⁸

National responsibility under the Principles thus includes an international dimension when there is a failure at the national level to provide life-sustaining protection and assistance. Although the international community cannot force states to accept outside offers of aid, except in exceptional circumstances, recent resolutions of the Security Council demand access, which denotes that states have an implicit duty to accept international assistance. Moreover, in situations deemed to constitute a threat to international peace and security, the international community may intervene and distribute relief against the will of the country concerned.⁹ People in acute need of humanitarian assistance are increasingly being seen as having certain rights and claims on the international community when their governments do not act responsibly or where there is a disintegration of the state.

The Guiding Principles, although not a binding document, are based on hard law and in a short period of time have gained considerable recognition and authority.¹⁰ They have been formally acknowledged by the United Nations General Assembly, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Secretary-General called them one of the notable achievements in the humanitarian area in 1998, and his report to the Security Council in 1999 urged the Council to encourage member states to observe the Principles in situations of mass displacement. The General Assembly in 2003 welcomed the fact that the Guiding Principles were being used as "a standard" by an increasing number of states.¹¹ The Security Council Presidential statements and resolutions have begun to make reference to the Principles.

Meanwhile, international organizations have been widely disseminating the Guiding Principles. Most notably, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, composed of the heads of all the major international humanitarian and development organizations, welcomed the Principles and called upon their staffs to apply them in the field. Further, the UN has published a handbook to assist these organizations to use them in the field. Regional organizations have also acknowledged the Principles, in particular the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now reconstituted as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Organization of American States (OAS). Many international and local NGOs have begun to use the Principles.¹²

In Asia, regional organizations have not yet acknowledged the Principles, but NGOs, academic institutions and national human rights commissions have begun to disseminate them and convene seminars to focus attention on their provisions. An NGO seminar in the Philippines

in 1999 discussed the application of the Guiding Principles. And in 2000, a non-governmental Regional Conference on Internal Displacement, held in Bangkok, brought together representatives from 16 Asian countries to discuss the Principles. The conference report welcomed the Guiding Principles, noted the positive contribution they could make in promoting protection and assistance and urged their observance by all concerned parties -- governments, insurgent groups, humanitarian and development organizations, international financial institutions, multinational corporations, and NGOs.¹³

Tensions Between National and International Responsibility

Asian governments, with the exception of Japan and the Republic of Korea, have generally exhibited uneasiness about being held to international standards on internal displacement. They have been singularly absent from those speaking out in support of the Guiding Principles or co-sponsoring UN resolutions on their behalf. Several Asian governments in fact have challenged the extent to which they should be bound by the Guiding Principles. In April 2000, for example, at the UN Commission on Human Rights, the government of India, while acknowledging that the Principles "could serve as useful guidelines for States," asserted that they "are not legally binding." In India's view, international action with regard to the internally displaced must "remain within the bounds of the concept of sovereignty, which should not be diluted in any manner. This implies that such action should be at the request of, or with the consent of, the country concerned."¹⁴ And at a UN meeting in Thailand in 2000, a Chinese government official reportedly asserted that the Guiding Principles are not United Nations principles because they have not been officially adopted by the United Nations. Moreover, both the Chinese and Russian governments lobbied heavily to ensure the deletion of most references to the Guiding Principles in a Security Council Presidential statement of January 2000.

At the same time, the UN has moved to embrace the Principles. A unanimously adopted General Assembly resolution in 1999, with the support of these same Asian governments, "welcome[d]" the Representative of the Secretary-General's use of the Principles in his dialogues with governments, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs and requested that he "continue his efforts." It also expressed "appreciation" that UN agencies, regional and non-governmental organizations were making use of the Principles in their work and "encourage[d]" the further dissemination and application of the Guiding Principles.¹⁵ UN resolutions in the area of humanitarian aid also underscore an international responsibility to internally displaced persons. They have legitimized cross border operations and the establishment of relief corridors to reach internally displaced persons at risk and have demanded unimpeded access to these populations. Moreover, the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the official responsible for the coordination of humanitarian assistance to the displaced in emergencies, regularly initiates requests from governments rather than waits to obtain their consent. And in a number of cases, diplomacy and sometimes political pressures are exerted to secure access. So, while it is true that the United Nations system remains based on consent, as emphasized by the government of India, there is a growing recognition that when national responsibility fails, the international community has a right and possibly even an obligation to come to the aid of displaced persons at risk.

Clearly reflecting this emerging international responsibility is the expanding role of international organizations. Over the past decade, a multitude of humanitarian, human rights and development organizations have come forward to provide protection, assistance, and

reintegration and development support to internally displaced persons. These include UNHCR (which currently is assisting some 5 million internally displaced persons worldwide), the ICRC (80 percent of whose caseload now involves the internally displaced), the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and a myriad of NGOs.

Of course, international organizations frequently encounter interference in gaining access. In cases of natural and human-made disasters, most governments are willing - if not always able - to provide assistance to their displaced populations in cooperation with the international community. But when persons are displaced by conflict or political causes, governments often prove reluctant to protect and assist their internally displaced populations. Even those, which invite international assistance, may be suspicious of efforts that reach out to all sides in a conflict. Some may deliberately bar or obstruct humanitarian assistance to rebel areas for fear that the aid will strengthen their opponents and undermine their own authority. Others may not want to admit that insurgent groups control parts of their territory and that the central government is unable to provide for all of its citizens. Frequently, governments justify their obstruction on grounds of defending their sovereignty and claim that humanitarian action is but a cover for the interference of powerful countries in the affairs of weaker states.

The Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, while acknowledging a "resurgence" of concerns about sovereignty, reaffirmed in a recent interview that when large numbers of people "are in desperate need for the basics of life then the international community cannot close its eyes and say this is an internal matter."¹⁶ Likewise, the UN Secretary-General told the General Assembly in April 2000 that while national sovereignty does offer vital protection to small and weak states, "it should not be a shield for crimes against humanity."¹⁷

A tension or tug of war plays out daily at the UN between the defense of sovereignty and the emerging international responsibility toward populations at risk.

Responses in Asia

Because Asian governments have been particularly wary of humanitarian action (the intervention in East Timor notwithstanding), international organizations have often proved hesitant to get involved or to challenge governmental obstruction and denial of access in Asia. Indeed, the Asian experience with internal displacement offers striking examples of the tensions between national and international responsibility.

To a great extent, the government of Sri Lanka is an exception, in that it not only assumes national responsibility toward its displaced populations but also invites in international aid in support of its national efforts. The Sri Lankan authorities, for example, have set up national institutions and welfare centers to provide food to the internally displaced in both government and rebel-held areas, and have also accepted UNHCR's establishment of open relief centers on its territory as well as the presence of other international organizations and NGOs to supplement government programs. At the same time, the government periodically restricts international deliveries of medicines and food to displaced Tamils in conflict areas. Indeed, in recent years, there has been an increasing subordination to military priorities of Sri Lanka's commitment to the displaced.¹⁸ This was noted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which expressed concern to the government that internally displaced persons were still living in

“temporary” shelters even after 15 years.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the government of Sri Lanka is generally considered one of the very few that not only assumes national responsibility for its displaced population but also accepts as part of this responsibility an international role to reinforce national efforts.

The government of India, by contrast, assumes national responsibility only for a portion of its internally displaced population -- those displaced by the Kashmir conflict. When it comes to the estimated 200,000 persons displaced by tribal and ethnic conflict in the northeast, the federal government assumes only marginal responsibility.²⁰ It rarely allows foreigners into these areas, and it remains extraordinarily sensitive even to the hint that outsiders might want to become involved. It does not invite international organizations to assist its internally displaced populations and undoubtedly would oppose any aid if offered, even though reports about their conditions would appear to warrant such attention. The U.S. Committee for Refugees, for example, in a recent publication recommends far greater national attention to internal displacement in the northeast and also calls upon the Indian government to invite international organizations to help provide that assistance.²¹ So too does Subir Bhaumik, a leading Indian journalist, who covers the northeast for the BBC. In a paper presented in Bangkok, he called upon international organizations to develop a "strategy to negotiate access" with the Indian government. The strategy, he said, should begin with the setting up of a network of local NGOs to assess conditions, followed by the introduction of international presence to deliver relief and deter further conflict and displacement. International involvement, in his view, would be in India's best interest and also would bolster the capacities of state governments to help displaced persons. The Indian government, however, continues to deny the existence of the problem. In a statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2000, India insisted that unprotected internally displaced persons can only be found "in those countries where there is no effective State or where the State has collapsed."²²

The government of Burma (Myanmar), unlike the governments of India and Sri Lanka, is directly and deliberately involved in the forced displacement of its own population, in particular ethnic minorities. By means of forced displacement it has sought to break up potential areas of opposition, destroy links between insurgent movements and local sympathizers, and make way for a variety of questionable development projects. There is a complete abdication of national responsibility in Burma, and it is combined with little or no assertion of international responsibility. To be sure, some NGOs have initiated cross border programs to help the internally displaced, and in 1999 the ICRC managed to negotiate limited presence in border areas. But on the whole international humanitarian and development organizations have not pressed for access to the internally displaced. Some understandably fear that any provision of humanitarian or development aid will end up being diverted to the Burmese military government. Others fear expulsion or rebuff should they call attention to the needs of the internally displaced. But there is also plain reluctance to challenge a government that does not request outside aid and denies access to displaced populations.²³ As a result, too little pressure is exerted by the UN to gain access for its humanitarian agencies. Donor governments for their part too readily overlook the humanitarian dimension of the problem, 500,000 to a million internally displaced persons, focusing instead on longer-range efforts to promote democratization.

North Korea offers an even more extreme example of the absence of national responsibility. The People's Republic of Korea is the only country in the world where internal displacement is considered a crime. In this rigidly controlled communist society, persons are punished if they dare leave their homes in search of food.²⁴ The government denies the

existence of a famine (at least two million persons have reportedly died from starvation), but does allow outside aid to come in. However, it refuses to permit the organizations providing that aid to fully monitor its distribution. As a result, the extent to which the aid is being diverted to the military and government can only be guessed. Some claim that as much as 80 percent of the aid is being diverted,²⁵ whereas others believe that a sufficient quantity is "trickling down" to those in need, including the internally displaced, making the overall shipments worthwhile.²⁶ Meanwhile, there are sharp differences on the part of international organizations over whether or not international responsibility can be properly exercised here. Some have walked out in protest, among them the Nobel Prize-winning NGO, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), whereas others, such as the World Food Programme, have decided to remain in the hope that their aid will reach the intended target. Donor governments, for their part, have been criticized for using food aid to achieve political objectives, such as dialogue with North Korea and concessions over nuclear weapons.²⁷

Unlike the cases cited above, in Afghanistan there was no government for a long time. While the Taliban allowed in international aid, its discriminatory and restrictive policies, in particular toward women, violated international standards upon which the international aid was based. Moreover, international staff encountered security problems, including raids on their offices and the harassment and killing of staff. As a result, some international agencies initially withdrew their operations whereas others like the ICRC chose to remain while still others decided to return to try to influence Taliban policies. Indeed, a consensus developed in favor of international presence as an important restraining influence. Not only was it argued that international engagement could help modify existing practices that excluded women from education, medical treatment and economic opportunity but also could assist local populations, including women, become more self-sustaining. International presence, it was believed, would little by little contribute to change.²⁸ At the same time, it must be emphasized that international engagement was predicated on certain compromises. The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the Taliban asserted on the one hand that "men and women shall have the right to education and health care and necessary development activities, based on international standards and in accordance with Islamic rules and Afghan culture." But it acknowledged on the other hand that "the economic difficulties in the specific cultural traditions...make this goal challenging. As a result, women's access to and participation in health and education *will need to be gradual* [italics added]."²⁹ Had the Taliban continued de facto to rule Afghanistan, the concessions agreed to might have proved harmful to women's interests and created a damaging precedent for international involvement elsewhere.

In looking at these Asian cases, it becomes clear that there are limits to the effectiveness of international humanitarian action. The Burma and North Korea cases are in particular exemplary of the difficulties involved.

The tensions between traditional notions of sovereignty and an emerging international responsibility toward populations at risk are not always easily reconciled. The UN Secretary-General, on the one hand, may speak of a "developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter."³⁰ But the Chinese government insists that "No one should interfere with the internal affairs of a sovereign State in the name of humanitarian assistance, nor should humanitarian responses be used as a pretext to use force against a State."³¹ Meanwhile, international organizations face varying degrees of obstruction and denial of access in Afghanistan, Burma, India, North Korea, and even in Sri Lanka.

Nonetheless it is indisputable that international protection and assistance of internally displaced populations remains essential in Sri Lanka, could prove highly valuable in India, and if carefully monitored could doubtless help the displaced in Burma, North Korea and Afghanistan. Accordingly, international organizations are seeking to play an ever-expanding role worldwide to protect and assist internally displaced persons.

Conclusion

In Europe, Africa and Latin America, internal displacement is no longer viewed, even by most governments, as a strictly national problem. Awareness has grown that forced displacement poses a threat to national and regional stability and that people at risk cannot just be abandoned to the whims of their governments. Indeed, international involvement, especially in the form of aid, is seen as warranted when governments are unable or unwilling to address the minimum needs of their own citizens and large numbers are at risk.

This trend, however, continues to be challenged by governments in Asia, although some hopeful signs have become evident. Most significantly, civil society, in particular non-governmental organizations, national human rights commissions, universities and the media in different Asian countries, have become increasingly vocal in support of human rights protection for internally displaced persons and other marginalized groups. At the above-mentioned Regional Conference on Internal Displacement, held in Bangkok in 2000, members of national human rights commissions recommended that the commissions begin to monitor and report on displacement situations, provide legal advice to displaced communities, and engage in advocacy and public information campaigns. In addition, members of academic institutions identified ways that universities could assume a greater role in teaching and educating about internal displacement. And conferences focusing on internal displacement have proliferated in Asia, whether in Thailand, the Philippines, India, Pakistan or Bangladesh. NGOs also have become increasingly active in working with and promoting the rights of displaced communities. Their combined initiatives over time should help influence Asian governments to assume greater responsibility for their displaced populations.

At the international level, the forces of globalization are also making it difficult for states in Asia to continue to barricade themselves behind national borders. Even North Korea has felt obliged to allow in relief workers from abroad. In the case of East Timor, Asian governments have accepted international military action on behalf of the internally displaced and other victims of Indonesia's orchestrated assaults. To Singapore, this action "proved that the UN could fulfil its responsibility of preventing the brutalisation of innocent civilians by armed militia."³² Moreover, a Security Council resolution, adopted in April 2000, with the support of Asian members, expressed the Council's willingness to take appropriate steps when "refugees and internally displaced persons are vulnerable to the threat of harassment," or where "their camps are vulnerable to infiltration by armed elements."³³ Further, Japan and the Republic of Korea, in statements before the Security Council, expressed support for the dissemination and application of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and for the work of the Representative of the Secretary-General on behalf of persons forcibly uprooted in their own countries.³⁴

Sooner or later Asian governments will have to renounce 19th century notions of absolute sovereignty and come to terms with responsible sovereignty - a sovereignty that enhances local and national capacities for dealing with internal displacement but also accepts international support when large numbers are at risk. Governments worthy of the name will find that

sovereignty as responsibility, both to one's population and to the international community, offers the most effective way of dealing with cases of forced displacement and the regional and international instability they spawn.

Notes and References

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- ² Ibid.
- ³ See Cohen and Deng, *opt.cit.*, p.4.
- ⁴ See, for example, "Operation Lifeline Sudan", in Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, *The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan*, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1992.
- ⁵ See Security Council resolutions on Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Azerbaijan, cited in Cohen and Deng, *Masses in Flight*, pp.118-120, and p.277 (note 145).
- ⁶ See Francis M. Deng, "Frontiers of Sovereignty in Africa," in Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons, (eds), *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance*, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1998; & Cohen and Deng, *Masses in Flight*, pp. 275-80.
- ⁷ *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998.
- ⁸ Ibid. Principle 25.
- ⁹ See legal analysis by Robert Kogod Goldman and Walter Kaelin, in Cohen and Deng, *Masses in Flight*, pp.113-120, 276-277, and p.394, note 145. For a detailed survey of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions of humanitarian action in the absence of governmental consent, see Martin Griffiths, Iain Levine, and Mark Weller, "Sovereignty and Suffering," in John Harriss, (ed), *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, Pinter, London, 1995, pp.35-60.
- ¹⁰ See Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons to the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2000/83, 26 January 2000.
- ¹¹ See General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/58/L.57, 17 November 2003.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ See Summary Report, Regional Conference on Internal Displacement in Asia, at Brookings Institution website, <http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/idp.htm>
- ¹⁴ Statement by Mr. A. Gopinathan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India at the 56th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, April 2000.
- ¹⁵ See General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/54/L.68, 11 November 2000.
- ¹⁶ Interview by Francis M. Deng with IRIN news service, New York, 19 May 2000.
- ¹⁷ Statement of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the General Assembly, on presenting his Millennium Report, New York, 3 April 2000.
- ¹⁸ See H.L. Seneviratne and Maria Stavropoulou, "Sri Lanka's Vicious Circle of Displacement," in Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, (eds), *The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced*, Brookings Institution, 1998, pp. 359-398.
- ¹⁹ Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Sri Lanka, UN document E/C.12/1/Add. 24, 11 June 1998, Paras. 7 and 22.
- ²⁰ For the most part, state governments within India are expected to provide assistance, see Hiram Ruiz, *Northeast India's Hidden Displacement*, U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington DC, 2000, and Subir Bhaumik, "Negotiating Access: Northeast India," *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2000.
- ²¹ See Ruiz, *op.cit.*

²² Statement by Mr. A. Gopinathan, *supra* note 13.

²³ See Roberta Cohen, "Hard Cases: Internal Displacement in Turkey, Burma and Algeria," *Forced Migration Review*, 1999; and Jana Mason, *No Way Out, No Way In: Internal Displacement in Burma*, U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington DC, February 2000.

²⁴ See Court Robinson, "Famine in Slow Motion: A Case Study of Internal Displacement in North Korea", *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, UNHCR, Geneva, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2000.

²⁵ According to the *Washington Post*, for example, a North Korean doctor estimated that 10 percent of the medical aid goes to war preparation, 10 percent to the people, and 80 percent to officials. See John Pomfret, "North Korean Refugees Insecure in China," *Washington Post*, 19 February 2000.

²⁶ See Erica Kang, "Relief Without Protection: North Korea," *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2000; and Roberta Cohen, "Aid Meant for the Hungry," *New York Times*, May 16, 2002.

²⁷ See "Fed Up in North Korea," Editorial, *Washington Post*, 9 April 2000.

²⁸ See, for example, Barbara Crossette, "Gentle Negotiations Said to Soften Taliban's Rules for Women," *New York Times*, 23 January 2000.

²⁹ Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the United Nations, 13 May 1998.

³⁰ Address of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the United Nations General Assembly, Press Release, SG/SM/7136, GA/9596, 20 September 1999, p.4.

³¹ Security Council Press Release SC/6818, 14 March 2000.

³² Statement of the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 19 April 2000.

³³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1296, 19 April 2000, para.14.

³⁴ See Statements by the Deputy Permanent Representatives of Japan and the Republic of Korea to the Security Council on protection of civilians in armed conflict, 19 April 2000.