

# The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity

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Although the threat of mass casualty terrorism has altered strategic priorities in the United States, the global community as a whole faces many of the same problems that it faced in the 1990s: civil wars; failed or failing states; and other humanitarian disasters around the world. The Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, and their difficult aftermaths, show the overlap between humanitarian and geostrategic interests. These interventions also demonstrate that demanding military stabilisation missions will be required as much for the 'war on terrorism' as for traditional peacekeeping. Civil conflicts still shape regional and global politics and development, and in many cases are still preventable or at least stoppable. Moreover, trends in demographics, economics, the global weapons market and international politics suggest that they are unlikely to diminish much further on their own.<sup>1</sup>

Several hundred thousand people a year continue to lose their lives directly to war as well as to war-related famine and disease. Almost 90% of the dead are innocent non-combatants. A growing percentage of combatants are now child soldiers, in some wars as high as 60%.<sup>2</sup> But these wars have other costs as well. They provide terrorist groups with havens, as in Afghanistan, and with motivating causes, as in the Middle East and South Asia. Moreover, they not only help keep Africa and other parts of the developing world mired in misery, economic stagnation, and disease, but in a world of globalisation, have implications for public health across the planet. There is also a political cost. The continuation of these wars starkly undercuts the common Western argument that democracies protect and promote human rights. In a world essentially

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run and dominated by the industrial democracies, their continued failure to do much about such conflicts weakens not only their moral authority, but also undercuts their international legitimacy as global leaders. It also breeds cynicism and anger in much of the Islamic world, where Americans in particular are portrayed as indifferent to the suffering of Muslims and focused only on their own security and economic interests.

The wealthy democracies can no longer hide behind the claim that they are somehow prevented from doing something by concerns of sovereignty, international law, or limits placed by the UN Charter. In a marked change from the start of the 1990s, the permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia and China in particular) are now less inclined to veto operations seeking to avert humanitarian catastrophe. (NATO's war against Serbia over Kosovo underscored that difficult cases still can arise. But for the vast majority of the world's most deadly conflicts, most of which are in Africa, legal mechanisms for intervention are generally available.<sup>3</sup>) Even in Iraq, where the world had a huge debate over the need for a US-led invasion, there was little UN disagreement about authorising the United States and its coalition partners to conduct a peacekeeping mission there after Saddam's fall. Indeed, many individuals from developing countries themselves now argue that sovereignty is not an absolute as once voiced. Instead, it requires a sense of responsibility on the part of national leadership towards its own citizenry; ignoring or violating that responsibility is to surrender many of the traditional prerogatives and protections of state sovereignty.<sup>4</sup> A number of developing countries are increasingly willing to play their own part and use national military assets to forcibly reduce the severity of civil conflict within their own regions.<sup>5</sup>

Governments and international institutions have made numerous efforts to mitigate civil conflicts since the Cold War ended. In addition to continuing longstanding peacekeeping missions in such places as Kashmir, Cyprus, and the Sinai, a new and more comprehensive type of approach – involving not only peacekeeping but election monitoring, demilitarisation and state building – has been applied in Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti and the Balkans. The world's handling of a number of African civil wars during the 1990s, notably those in Rwanda, Angola and Liberia, was on the whole unsuccessful. But many missions have been successes – or at least partial successes – in the sense that intervention made conditions better than they would otherwise have likely been. Specifically, missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, Guatemala, Albania, Kosovo and East Timor all made a significant difference for the better. The much-maligned NATO-led mission in Bosnia ultimately helped matters as well, even if NATO's and UNPROFOR's roles in the

first three years of the war were less impressive.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, many of the failures were not absolute. For example, while it was certainly a political disaster, the aborted mission in Somalia mitigated the famine there, saving tens of thousands of lives at a minimum.

Despite over a decade of swerving from crisis to crisis, whenever a new conflict or crisis calls out for assistance, international leaders still must scramble for resources, especially military resources. The UN remains limited in its own resources. In turn, regional organisations are often weakest in the areas of the world where they are needed most. Sometimes, coalitions can be built to respond to crises, but they require time and cohesion, and a willingness and capability to intervene that may not always be there. Even when peacekeeping forces are available, the units are often slow and cumbersome to deploy, poorly trained, under equipped, lacking in motivation, or operating under a flawed mandate. Essentially, if humanitarian intervention were to be conceptualised as a market, there remains a glaring gap between the demand and the supply of capable peacekeeping forces that the international community can mobilise.

*There is a  
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This paper lays out an agenda for increasing the international community's military capacity to stop deadly conflict. It estimates how many troops and police might be needed if the international community took a more comprehensive and rigorous approach to stopping conflict in cases where the prospects for restoring peace were good. It then suggests a plan for sharing the military and policing burden of doing so among key countries and regions, and to a lesser but significant extent the private sector as well. The goal is to show how an improved global pool of fully deployable soldiers and police for humanitarian missions, above and beyond those available today, might be created – and to estimate what equipment and training would be needed to make such a force effective and rapidly deployable.

### **The numbers crunch**

Stopping civil wars and rebuilding the societies that they have destroyed requires substantial numbers of well-trained and well-equipped troops. It is commonly argued that a small UN standing force could make a major difference in reducing civil conflict around the world. Proponents often cite a goal of 5,000 troops, motivated in large part by the claim of Canadian General Romeo Dallaire that such a capability, if added to his small UN force in Rwanda in 1994, could have stopped the genocide there. However, Rwanda is a very small country. And, although there is little doubt that General Dallaire would have used 5,000 more troops

bravely and with some effectiveness, it appears a low estimate even for Rwanda based on standard criteria for sizing intervention forces.<sup>7</sup> In the event of two or more simultaneous conflicts requiring rapid attention – for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia – such a force would certainly be much too small, necessitating a tragic choice about whom to help.

Establishing a dedicated UN force comprising tens of thousands of troops would be very expensive. It would also create multiple political concerns about relinquishing military power to the UN Secretariat, General Assembly, or Security Council. Fortunately, it is not necessary to do so. National armies around the world are already paid and equipped, so building on their existing capacities rather than creating a new army from scratch is almost surely a more efficient way to spend resources. Some efforts are required at the level of multilateral organisations, to be sure, for planning staffs and command and control assets and some logistics and equipment stockpiles. But there is a strong case for keeping physical capacity for intervention primarily at the level of the nation state.<sup>8</sup>

### **Estimating requirements for intervention forces**

It will never be possible to construct a simple, quantitative rule for determining when to intervene and with how much force. It will sometimes not be possible to stop wars if the likely cost in blood is too high, or if the prospects for success are poor. Nonetheless, it is possible to launch a general discussion of the international community's rough needs for intervention forces.

Over the past decade, numbers of blue-helmet peacekeepers (including police) have fluctuated from 70,000 down to 12,000 and then back up to about 40,000.<sup>9</sup> Total numbers remained at about 35,000 as of mid-2003, in missions from Sierra Leone (13,000 peacekeepers) to the Congo (about 6,000 total foreign personnel) to the Ethiopian–Eritrean border, Kosovo, and East Timor (about 4,000 each).<sup>10</sup>

NATO and affiliated nations continue to deploy some 50,000 troops in the Balkans and has roughly 5,000 troops in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. This supply is nowhere near the current demands. For instance, international forces in Afghanistan are almost certainly short by at least 10,000 troops to meet the needs of creating lasting stability and security.<sup>11</sup> In addition, and perhaps even more notably, a major possible mission in Congo has not been seriously contemplated, despite the severity of the conflict there. Some 11,000 UN forces are now in Congo – an increase from 6,000 in spring 2003, partly to replace the 1,200-person EU force deployed to the town of Bunia during the summer of that year).<sup>12</sup> A highly effective peace

enforcement mission in Congo could easily require a force of up to 100,000 troops, using standard force-sizing criteria – two to five troops per thousand local inhabitants – and given the sheer size and challenging topography of that country.<sup>13</sup> As of this writing, therefore, the combination of ongoing missions in the Balkans, West Africa and elsewhere, together with the desirability of a much larger peacekeeping force in Congo than is now being contemplated, suggest a global need that could go as high as nearly 200,000 peacekeepers. That is roughly double the numbers now actually in the field.

Additionally, it is possible to contemplate any number of future operational needs that might occur over the next few years, ranging from Burundi to Zimbabwe.<sup>14</sup> It is also at least remotely possible that the international community could find itself in places that now seem unthinkable – such as Kashmir or Palestine (a few years ago an international presence in Afghanistan or Iraq would have been improbable). If political dynamics in those regions evolved to the point where local parties decided to invite international forces into their neighbourhoods to help stabilise them, the UN, major Western powers and other concerned states would be hard-pressed to respond. Even if operations were limited to smaller countries or localised regions of larger ones, such as Aceh in Indonesia and southern Sudan, serious efforts would generally require at least 10,000–20,000 troops each.<sup>15</sup> Since an operation, once begun, would typically last at least two years, if not longer, it is plausible that several large missions could be operational at the same time, compounding the burden. Indeed, going by the 1990s experience, a typical mission can last anywhere from 18 months to several years.

For the most part, personnel need to be professional soldiers, since establishing basic control and order is the first order of business in countries wracked by extreme conflict. But ultimate success must entail the force's evolution from a combat stance into support for peace-building activities. These include efforts to arrest war criminals, work towards restoring criminal justice systems and generally institute a rule of law that restores stability in the local society and allows other sectors to flourish. The successful departure of intervening forces requires the gradual shift towards a policing function, be it military or civilian. Such policing is a daunting task, particularly so for a multinational force drawn from diverse policing and legal traditions. A sufficiently large and well-trained pool of police officers from which personnel can be drawn when needed is therefore also mandated.<sup>16</sup>

The exact number of required police again depends on the situation, but is certainly far greater than the ready global reserve. One benchmark is that police made up some 10% of the international community's

security presence in Bosnia, or about 2,000 officers.<sup>17</sup> Viewed more broadly, since 1996 police have on average represented anywhere from 10–20% of the UN's total deployed strength in its combined missions. Moreover, the number of police officers actually deployed has often been only 75% of the optimum.<sup>18</sup> Using these benchmarks, a supply of at least 20,000 – ideally 30,000 or more – deployable international police officers would be needed as part of a total pool of 200,000 international peacekeeping forces.

### **Projectable forces in the world today**

The global community spends \$800 billion a year on military forces and keeps more than 20 million men and women under arms.<sup>19</sup> But only modest numbers of those dollars, and only a very small fraction of those troops, translate into military force that can be projected over substantial distances. Leaving aside the United States, with a \$400bn defence budget and hundreds of thousands of troops that can be deployed overseas within months and sustained abroad indefinitely, the rest of the world combined cannot muster more than a few hundred thousand military personnel for such purposes. The United Kingdom has considerable capabilities, particularly in light of its modest size, Russia has at least the shell of a remaining capability and France has a real if limited projection capacity itself. However most countries, even those with strong militaries, are like caged tigers at best: fierce if fought on their home turf, but relatively harmless beyond. Indeed, most forces in the developing world are more appropriately described as toothless tigers, consuming scarce funds, but providing little more than entertainment and a mess to clean up later.

The methodology used here for estimating countries' projectable military capabilities focuses on three elements: strategic lift; logistics assets that allow units to operate in foreign regions; and well-trained, legally deployable military personnel. Focusing on these three issues reveals many constraints on most countries' capabilities. Many do not have long-range airlift and sealift (even if they have some limited tactical transport capabilities for moving over short distances). Most depend on their national economies and civilian infrastructures to provide logistics support – ranging from equipment repair to provisions of fuel and ammunition to medical care to food and water for troops. Away from their home territories, they are often unable to support their troops as a result. Finally, many countries still depend on conscripts to fill out their force structures – and frequently impose legal or political restrictions on deploying such troops abroad. Typically, whatever is the weakest of these three requirements – strategic lift, deployable logistics and deployable troops – determines a country's capacity.



The estimates below focus on forces available for rapid deployment (see table). As a rough rule of thumb, the standard is that forces should be deployable within 2–3 months and then supportable in a foreign theatre for an extended period – at least a year – thereafter. These criteria are similar to those associated with the EU Headline Goals initiative. Many countries could rent sealift, call up reserves, obtain special legal authority to deploy conscripts and take other such measures if time were not a constraint. Given the nature of most humanitarian missions, however, long delays of many months are generally unacceptable. Countries are also usually reluctant, in any event, to take extreme steps for peace and humanitarian operations. For these reasons, the key question of supply is that of promptly deployable and sustainable forces.

### **An agenda for improving intervention capacity**

Our benchmark is that the international community has the capability to deploy up to 200,000 troops at a time for such missions, drawn from a pool of 600,000 personnel. As shown in the above table, in terms of raw numbers, the international community already has about that number of military personnel who can be rapidly deployed and then sustained in overseas theatres. The problem is that two-thirds of the total number now comes from the United States. Thus many humanitarian intervention and muscular peace operations that should be carried out are not being carried out. The simple reason is that the United States is unwilling to provide most of the necessary forces and other countries generally cannot or are unwilling to do enough. The point here is neither to cast blame nor to argue that Americans should not participate in or contribute to such operations. The moral authority of the United States and the legitimacy of US global leadership are reinforced when American security policy has a generous character and serves the global commons. However, neither international nor American public sentiment should be satisfied with either the failing status quo or an alternative future where the US military is somehow deputised as the world's policeman for civil conflicts. Nor is there any realistic chance that American taxpayers, who already shoulder a disproportionate share of global military spending, will agree to the US Army taking on any such role on top of its existing burdens in Central Asia and the Gulf.

For these reasons, if a pool of ready international forces is to be developed to respond to international humanitarian and peace operation needs, the broader international community will be required to step to the fore. For example, if the desired pool is 600,000 deployable military personnel, non-US countries will have to provide in the region of 500,000 troops. This means that countries other than the United States would have to more than double their aggregate power-projection capabilities.

<b>The global supply of projectable military force</b>				
	<b>2001 defence budgets (US\$bn)<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Total active ground strength (in 000's)<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Ground forces deployable in 1–3 months sustainable for a year</b>	<b>Percentage of total quickly deployable</b>
United States	310.5	649	400	62
United Kingdom	34	121	25 <sup>3</sup>	21
France	33.3	152	15 <sup>4</sup>	10
Germany	26.5	212	10 <sup>5</sup>	5
Italy	20.5	138	5	4
Canada	7.3	19	4 <sup>6</sup>	21
Netherlands	6	15	4 <sup>7</sup>	27
Denmark	2.4	13	1 <sup>8</sup>	8
Other NATO	27.3	829	20 <sup>9</sup>	2
Subtotal, non-US NATO	157.3	1,499	84	6
NATO Aspirants	1.7	120.2		
European Neutrals	10.5	95.4	5 <sup>10</sup>	1

<sup>1</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, (Oxford University Press: London 2001).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> UK Ministry of Defence, *The Future Strategic Context for Defence*, London, 2001, p. 21; Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review White Paper*, London, 1998, chapter 5 and supporting essay 6, annex B, available at [http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/wp\\_contents.htm](http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/wp_contents.htm).

<sup>4</sup> French Ministry of Defense, *Report of Activities in 2000*, Paris, 2000, chapter on Armée de Terre, available at [www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/orga/dispos/org\\_2002/index.html](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/orga/dispos/org_2002/index.html).

<sup>5</sup> See Report of the Commission to the Federal Government, *Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, Federal Republic of Germany, May 2000, available at [www.bundeswehr.de](http://www.bundeswehr.de).

<sup>6</sup> Canadian Ministry of Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*, Ottawa, 2000, p. 3–6.

<sup>7</sup> The Netherlands Ministry of Defence, *Summary of the Defence White Paper 2000*, Amsterdam, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> Danish Defence Commission, *Defence for the Future*, Copenhagen, 1997, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> See for example, Greek Ministry of National Defence, *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces, 1998–99*, Athens, 2000, section 4.1.2.8a, available at [www.mod.gr/english/index.htm](http://www.mod.gr/english/index.htm); Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *The Long Term Defence Plan for 2002–05: Short Version*, Oslo, December 2000, pp. 4–5, available at [odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120018/index-dok000-b-n-a.html](http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120018/index-dok000-b-n-a.html).

<sup>10</sup> Council of State, *Report to Parliament*, Helsinki, 1997, pp. 78–79.



Such numbers are sobering. Yet these figures represent achievable goals – if not right away, then over time. To begin, not all troops need be equally well trained and equipped. Some missions will be less demanding than others. Some will not require rapid response or long-range transport. Either the peace accords that precede them will be negotiated over an extended period, allowing ample time for preparations, or the operations will be close to home for countries contributing troops. Even if 200,000 forces might be needed at a time, it is unlikely that it would be necessary to deploy more than 50,000 urgently, and unlikely that more than half to two-thirds would need to operate in extremely difficult surroundings. Most importantly, it is not a question of adding an additional half million men and women under arms. Rather, it is a question of transforming existing forces.

The rough outlines of a greater global capacity for humanitarian intervention and difficult peace operations would require a global effort. The United States would have to make improvements in key parts of its force structure, to facilitate the most common types of deployments it has carried out over the past decade and make possible a greater and more effective level of effort in the future. It would maintain a commitment to excellence in peacekeeping training and doctrine development that has suffered under the Bush administration. It would also add some military police and civil affairs units to its active-duty force (virtually all are in the reserves at present), and develop a government-managed reserve of civilian police who could deploy on international missions, rather than relying ad-hoc on private companies to fill this constant need. However, given America's disproportionate capabilities at present and its huge commitments in Iraq, US armed forces are not where substantial new capabilities should be sought.

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European Union nations would have to more than double their Headline Goal for rapid force deployment from the stated 60,000 to 150,000 and commit to investing in the strategic lift and logistics needed to make those numbers meaningful. These forces could also be useful for other missions, if EU countries so desired.

African countries, with help from the United States and Europe, would seek to develop the capacity for deploying at least 50,000 fully equipped troops abroad – as well as another 50,000 highly trained infantry with solid expertise in peace operations, even if not fully outfitted for autonomous military operations in difficult environments. Middle Eastern and South Asian states would adopt comparable goals.

South American states would be somewhat less ambitious, but pursue an aggregate capacity of close to 50,000 deployable and sustainable troops.

Japan might aim only half as high in terms of troops, but would also invest in strategic lift to transport the forces of its own self-defence forces as well as other militaries. Countries such as Canada and New Zealand would make at least modest improvements in their capabilities. As political dynamics and security concerns potentially shift for countries like Turkey, South Korea, and even Russia and China, they might also be able to contribute meaningfully to such missions down the road.

Finally, the emerging private military market could be used to fill gaps in logistics, transportation and other support tasks that trouble poorer states and regional organisations. The set-up in Liberia, where US support to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took the form of paying for privately hired military logistics from Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) and ICI-Oregon, may provide a future model for leveraging regional willingness, Western backing and private capabilities.

Taken together, achieving these goals would provide the global commons with a ready and capable supply of personnel to meet the demand for humanitarian and peace operations. It would give the international community the resources it needs to make a serious and fairly systematic effort at reducing the human misery and strategic threats associated with global instability.

### **Major Western democracies**

Given their wealth, military proficiency and commitment to human rights, the major Western democracies have a crucial role to play in any global initiative to improve military capacity for humanitarian intervention and for difficult peace operations.

### **Europe**

If interested in playing a greater role on the world stage, European countries could very naturally and comfortably take the step of increasing their global military capabilities. Such an increase would also give European countries the means to be major actors in the one area of left-right consensus in European security policy: the need to support humanitarian military intervention.

Most European members of NATO as well as Canada should be able to increase defence spending. Few of the major powers devote more than 2% of GDP to their militaries; even Britain and France devote only about 2.5% in contrast to the US level of more than 3%. Political realities and budgetary constraints being what they are, however, such desirable steps may prove infeasible. Even so, European countries could still develop adequate power

projection capabilities without increasing their defence budgets, if they cut forces wisely and used the resulting savings to invest in the necessary strategic transport and deployable logistics assets. Those that have not yet done so could also create all-volunteer units for deployment.

A reasonable goal for European members of NATO might be to further reduce the sizes of their armed forces by 10–25% and use the resulting savings to improve the forces they retain. That would essentially entail following Britain's model of keeping a smaller, but better equipped and more professional, military. In addition, the major NATO European countries should purchase more strategic lift and logistics equipment. Were NATO to reorganise its armed forces in such a manner, it could together attain the aggregate goal of 150,000 deployable soldiers.

Put in terms of major military units, this initiative might aim to develop 8–10 deployable and sustainable ground combat divisions. France and Britain might each aim for two such divisions (a goal that Britain has already realised); Italy and Germany would each aim for one to one and a half. Most other countries, including the smaller states of northern Europe, Spain and Portugal, and NATO's new members, could each properly train and equip one brigade or one division depending on their size and available resources. The initiative would involve a comparable number of air wings. Here, however, the need for change would be less onerous because the weapons themselves are largely self-transportable and because the transport requirements for supplies are much less.

The costs associated with making these 10 divisions and wings deployable and self-sustainable are significant but not astronomical. They are too large to be found easily within the normal framework and assumptions of yearly defence budgeting. But they are quite modest when placed in a broader perspective: the \$50bn or so of investments that would be needed to make these forces deployable could easily triple the long-distance warfighting capabilities of countries that are in aggregate already spending \$175bn a year on their defence establishments. A reasonable approach would be to devote \$10bn a year over five years for the necessary equipment and organisational changes. That would represent an average of some 6–7% of total defence spending by the countries in question.

Additional costs for operating outside of Europe would be necessary as well. They would be dominated by substantial amounts of strategic lift for troops, equipment and fuel.<sup>20</sup> The NATO European countries as a group would probably, for reasons of economy, be content to possess one-third as much strategic airlift as the United States but would purchase one-half as much sealift as the US armed forces (sealift being

much cheaper than airlift). If they purchased these amounts of lift, they would exceed the goal established above, for the rest of the world combined, of being able to rapidly deploy at least 50,000 troops on short notice. Adding up the total costs makes for about \$70bn – but some of these programmes are already in the works, meaning that remaining investment requirements may be closer to \$50bn, as noted. Annual operating costs thereafter, again dominated by the airlift fleet, would approach \$750m.<sup>21</sup> Cost savings might also be achieved through exploration of leasing arrangements for lift and logistics. On recent deployments out of Europe, European nations have been forced to make ad hoc arrangements, for example, hiring Ukrainian military air transport firms to support their forces in Afghanistan. There are presently discussions to regularise this into a more formal leasing programme.<sup>22</sup>

### **Japan**

More than half a century after the Second World War and more than a decade after the fall of the Berlin wall, it is time for Japan to do more in the international security sphere. It need not and should not mimic the United States or even Britain. Unilateral power projection capabilities would unsettle some neighbours and displease many Japanese themselves. Nor need it even increase defence spending very much. But Japan should re-examine how it structures and equips its military, a view with which Japan's leader, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, appears to agree.<sup>23</sup> The

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government established momentum in this direction in the early 1990s, when it sent about 700 personnel to Cambodia in 1992–93 for peacekeeping and then 400 to then-Zaire in 1994 for humanitarian relief after the Rwanda genocide.<sup>24</sup> Its recent decision to send forces to Iraq may now reflect a welcome decision to restore that momentum. An agenda for transforming the

Japanese Self Defense Force to play a more active role in global peacekeeping would also be far more popular domestically.

In other Asian countries, many oppose any changes in Japanese security policy out of fear of latent Japanese militarism. Within Japan, that worry exists too. But the alternative force structure outlined below would involve far too few troops to threaten any neighbouring states with invasion. At the same time, the new capabilities would be quite substantial when measured against the demands of global humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.

Japan has options other than becoming a 'normal' power or remaining a 'civilian' and largely pacifist power.<sup>25</sup> The basic idea would be to expand the country's physical capacities for operations abroad, but keep

legal, diplomatic and military checks on these new capacities to reassure Japan's neighbours and the Japanese people about the nature of the effort. Under such a framework, Japan would consider projecting power only in the context of multilateral security missions, preferably if not exclusively those approved by the UN Security Council. And it would not develop the physical capacity for doing more than that.

If Japan chooses to move towards such an alternative national security policy and force posture, it will probably do so out of the recognition that its home islands are now much more secure against possible invasion than was the case during the Cold War. Active-duty ground forces dedicated for territorial defence may not be needed in the numbers currently maintained. Reservists could be used in greater numbers for this purpose if necessary, as in Switzerland and the Scandinavian nations. The Japanese army could reorient itself to a smaller, more mobile organisation, including an expeditionary ground capability of at least 25,000 troops. That would allow sustained deployment of at least two brigades, as well as numerous other capabilities such as military police and translators. The Japanese navy and air force could acquire the long-range transport assets to make their ground self-defence forces mobile. Japan would then make changes to its airlift and sealift capabilities proportionate to those recommended above for Europe. About \$5bn might be needed for this hardware acquisition, using the cost factors assumed in the above analysis for NATO countries – averaging out to \$500m a year over a decade-long period.

### **Developing countries**

Although their situations vary greatly from region to region and country to country, developing countries generally would face daunting budgetary challenges in any effort to expand military capabilities. The costs would follow from the need for more rigorous training and better equipment.

Particularly in Africa, the Western powers will need to provide many of the resources required to expand and improve regional military capabilities. Programmes now underway, such as the US African Crisis Response Initiative – recently renamed the Africa Contingency Operation and Training Assistance (ACOTA) programme – are important steps in the right direction. But they do not involve nearly enough troops or provide sufficiently rigorous training and capable equipment.

The need for more rigorous training is evident. Under current assistance programmes, exercises and classes typically take no more than a few weeks, or at most a couple months. Yet creating a highly ready military, competent across a broad spectrum of operations including combat, typically takes many months if not longer.<sup>26</sup> As a US Army field

manual puts it, 'The most important training for peace operations remains training for essential combat and basic soldier skills'.<sup>27</sup> In addition, troops conducting peace and humanitarian interventions also must work with nongovernmental organisations that provide relief and other services, adding further complexities to any mission.<sup>28</sup> The United States and other foreign militaries cannot be expected to build other countries' armed forces from the ground level, nor would such offers necessarily be well received. But months of training, as opposed to weeks, are needed. So are refresher courses every one to two years. At least a doubling in the intensity of training per unit is appropriate.

There are several ways of estimating the costs of providing an adequate amount and quality of equipment to these countries. One promising proxy is to examine the US Marine Corps budget. Since the Marines are very sustainable abroad, their budget does cover the costs of deployable logistics (though not the costs of strategic transport, which are usually provided by the Navy and sometimes by the Air Force). Cost estimates produced in that way may wind up high, however, given the more costly equipment usually purchased even by the most frugal of the US military services.

Over the past 20 years the Marine Corps has typically spent \$1.5–2bn per year on procurement for nearly 200,000 Marines. Allowing for the fact that some of those funds have gone to aircraft, it has acquired a total of \$25–30bn in equipment for the 150,000 Marines who are deployed in ground combat. These numbers suggest a cost of \$15–20bn per 100,000 ground troops.

Suppose that the world's developing countries in total chose to develop well-equipped deployable ground forces including 100,000 soldiers, as well as comparable numbers of well-trained soldiers with somewhat less equipment and more limited capabilities. The cost for the first 100,000 soldiers might then be \$10–15bn, with the cost of the second group perhaps half as much.

Poor countries, principally in Africa, might receive such equipment as aid; wealthier developing countries might receive rebates or subsidies. All up, the donor community might spend up to \$20bn to make such an arrangement work. The US share might be \$7–8bn, assuming that Europe would provide an equal amount and that countries such as Japan would make significant contributions. If provided during a ten-year initiative, annual aid for this purpose would be about \$750m; operating and training costs could drive the total close to \$1bn.

That figure is ten times the typical spending for the ACOTA programme plus *Operation Focus Relief* combined, and comparable to the entire US assistance budget for Africa. But it is several times less than



current US military aid to the Middle East, most of which is spent on hardware of debatable need. In any event, this calculation is an estimate of what it would cost to create an idealised intervention and peacekeeping capability for the international community. Much more modest, and politically realistic, efforts would themselves be useful.

Such training and cooperation programs need not be limited to Africa. In addition to programmes like ACOTA, opportunities exist for the Western powers to train and exercise with numerous Arab and southeast Asian militaries to develop peacekeeping capabilities, akin to the engagement strategy NATO used with post-Soviet states. This type of military engagement is not only less controversial, but has the dual advantage of building up the international community's resources while also bolstering professionalism and institutional contacts. One potential mechanism is the further expansion of Partnership for Peace, which has already moved beyond the Eastern European states for which it was originally planned.

### **Privatisation opportunities**

Like nature, global security abhors a vacuum. The gap in the 1990s between the global supply and demand for capable military forces did not go unnoticed by private industry; a \$100bn global military services industry has emerged. These private military firms offer a gamut of military services, including tactical combat forces, consultants for training and advice, and military logistics and lift capabilities. The largest client of this industry has in fact been the US military. Over the last few years, it has made over 3,000 contracts with such firms, ranging from weapons maintenance and logistics to military training and recruitment.<sup>29</sup>

The rise of this industry has prompted calls for a twenty-first century business solution to the world's twenty-first century human security problems. If most other formerly state-run services, from prisons to social welfare, have been privatised, goes the reasoning, why not turn peacekeeping over to the private market? Proponents of this idea obviously include the companies who stand to profit from it, but also many traditional supporters of UN peacekeeping, including even former UN Under-Secretary Brian Urquhart, who is considered the founding father of peacekeeping.<sup>30</sup>

The most oft-cited evidence of the benefits of privatisation is the contrast in Sierra Leone between the UN's peacekeeping operation and Executive Outcomes, a military provider firm. In 1995, the Sierra Leonean government was on the verge of defeat by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a warlord group with a habit of chopping off the arms of civilians. Neither the US, the UK nor the UN (all overstretched by the



Bosnia operation) were willing to get involved. Supported by multinational mining interests, the government turned to Executive Outcomes, a private military firm primarily made up of veterans from the South African apartheid regime's elite forces. The company deployed a battalion-sized unit of assault infantry, who were supported by company-manned combat helicopters, light artillery and a few armoured vehicles. Executive Outcomes was able to defeat the RUF in a matter of weeks. Its victory brought sufficient stability for Sierra Leone to hold its first election in over a decade. However, the firm was let go a year later, after a budget dispute, and the war soon restarted. In 1999, the UN was sent in. Despite having nearly twenty times the budget and personnel of Executive Outcomes, the UN force took years and multiple crises to come close to the same results – and required substantial help from the UK.

Similarly, during the Rwanda genocide, Executive Outcomes claimed it would have been able to place armed troops on the ground within 14 days. The firm estimated the cost for a six-month operation to provide protected safe havens from the genocide at \$150m (around \$600,000 a day). This potential private option could have saved tens or even hundreds of thousands of lives and compares favourably with the eventual UN relief operation. By comparison, the UN's rescue operation deployed only after the killing had ended, and still ended up costing \$3 million a day.

Advocates of the industry thus extol these hypothetical alternatives and propose a variety of schemes by which private military firms might aid peacekeeping. The most controversial entail the delegation of military provider forces to serve as representatives of the international community on the ground. One possibility is for hired units to serve as a 'rapid reaction force' within an overall peacekeeping operation. Whenever recalcitrant local parties break peace agreements or threaten the operation, the military firms would provide the 'muscle' role that the blue helmets are unable or unwilling to fill. An industry lobby group, the International Peace Operations Association, has floated several plans for such an effort in Burundi and the DRC.<sup>31</sup>

A more contentious proposal is the complete outsourcing of peacekeeping operations. When genocide or a humanitarian crisis occurs and no intervening state is willing to step forward, the intervention might be turned over to private firms. Upon their hire – by the UN or any one else willing to pay – the firm would deploy, defeat any local opposition, set up infrastructures for protecting and supporting refugees, and then, once the situation was stabilised, hand over to regular UN troops. The most recent such proposal was floated by the military firm Northbridge, which offered to deploy 2,000 troops to Liberia, in lieu of any US or UN role.

Such scenarios sound almost too fantastic to be true, and in many ways they are. While military firms can offer a great range of combat capabilities (from teams of commandos to wings of fighter jets), the numbers simply do not add up. It is yet to be demonstrated that a private firm could mobilise forces to the regimental level or above, fully equipped and integrated, in a matter of weeks – which would require it to have a standing force on retainer, taking away a key cost advantage relative to national armies – and then sustain it over the long-term. Thus, even if the claim of private military firms are taken at face value, the need for a global pool of forces is so great that there is little reasonable prospect, in the foreseeable future, of private firms being able to fulfil it on their own. This is particularly so with the current press on the private military market by demands in Iraq, where some 10–15,000 private military personnel are now employed.

More importantly, there are many concerns about the possible privatisation of peacekeeping that need to be addressed before private military firms can be considered a serious answer to global peacekeeping needs. The question of what body would control such a force outside national authority raises many of the same fears as giving the UN its own standing army. The Secretariat is an unelected bureaucracy, the General Assembly is often biased against certain states and the Security Council is decidedly unrepresentative of the parts of the developing world into which such a force would deploy. Likewise, what standing and accountability such a force would have under international law is disconcertingly minimal, considering that international law has almost no bearing on the private military industry.<sup>32</sup>

The contractual nature of such force also raises concerns. In privatised peacekeeping, troops in the field would not be part of national armies, but private citizens, working for private firms. Thus, security would now be at the mercy of any change in market costs and incentives. For example, a firm hired to establish a safe haven might later find the situation less profitable or more dangerous than it originally anticipated. Thus, the company could find it in corporate interests to cut corners or pull out. Even if the company was kept in line by market constraints, its employees might decide that their own personal risks are too high, relative to what they are being paid. Not bound by military law, they can simply break their contracts without fear of punishment and find safer or better paying work elsewhere. In either case, the result is the same: the abandonment of those who were dependent on private protection, without consideration for the political costs or the client's ability to quickly replace them.

Privatisation also poses certain risks from problems of adverse selection and a lessening of accountability. In short, the industry cannot be

*The key to durable peace is restoration of legitimacy*

described as imbued with a culture of peacekeeping. Military firms are not always looking for the most congenial workforce, but instead, understandably enough, recruit those known for their effectiveness. Many former members of the most notorious units of the Soviet and apartheid South African regimes have found employment in the industry. In the past, these individuals acted without concern for human rights and certainly could do so again. The international community would have to establish a comprehensive system ensuring personnel vetting and corporate transparency before it could move ahead with peacekeeping privatisation.

There would also be a concern over the long-term implications for local parties. The key to any durable peace is the restoration of legitimacy. In particular, this requires the return of the control over organised violence to public authorities. Unfortunately, if the international community privatises peacekeeping, these companies may become a temporary means of preserving peace without any resolution of the underlying issues. Peacekeeping is about more than just putting boots on the ground; it includes activities, ranging from election monitoring to disarmament, that reinforce the shift to peace. Handing over peacekeeping to commercial entities would also send the message that power belongs only to those who can afford it. This may be the sad reality, but it is not a message that the international community should make too obvious.

Finally, the nitty-gritty details of implementation, which often bedevil privatisation in other spheres, have yet to be worked out in the various proposals for privatised peacekeeping. For example, there is no clear resolution of who should have the power to command and control private military firms in such international operations. The firms obviously want to heighten their independence and resist outside interference or supervision, but public interest has never been best served by industry self-regulation. How such better-paid private forces would integrate with lesser-paid public forces is also a concern. These concerns do not mean that the private market cannot be leveraged to improve the global capacity for peacekeeping. The market is a flexible institution, and thus should be viewed as a tool to respond to changing client demands – in this case, those of the international community.

As mentioned above, military support firms are increasingly providing the transport, communications and logistics of operations for many militaries from well-off states. The largest example is Halliburton's multi-billion contingency contract to support the US Army wherever it

deploys. Firm employees have deployed alongside US forces from the Balkans to Central Asia and now Iraq, essentially taking over much of the supply chain. Such functions are usually the most glaring weaknesses among the units from the developing world, who make up the majority of UN forces. Why should they merit less support if they are aiding the overall effort? By outsourcing these services and standardising them over the whole UN peacekeeping system, a synergy of public troops and private support might become possible. A first step in this direction was the recent hire, for \$10m, of the firm PAE to provide logistical support to West African peacekeeping forces in Liberia. Eventually, the UN or regional organisations (with Western backing) could move towards some sort of planned contingency contracting, with vetted support and lift capabilities on retainer, ready to match up with intervening forces.

Likewise, military consultant firms might be able to provide training and assistance that would expand capacities and improve operational output. For example, much of the training in the ACOTA programme and the African Center for Strategic Studies have been outsourced to private companies like MPRI and DFI. Such services could be expanded both within and beyond the African continent. Ideally, Western powers would pick up the tab, as a means of expanding capabilities, so that their own forces' burdens are lightened. These programmes could also be internationalised, perhaps even helping the UN to realise the goals of a global peacekeeping standard (as laid out in the Brahimi Report).<sup>33</sup>

Key to any dealings with the private military industry is for the governments and international bodies involved to ensure to guard the public interest. Too often, these institutions forget their rights and responsibilities as business clients. They fail to carry out a proper contract competition to ensure the market yields the best deal, and do not set up proper oversight mechanisms to ensure that the contract works as planned. The experience with Dyncorp in the Balkans stands out as an example of what to avoid. With minimal competition, the politically connected firm was hired by the US government to provide police to the UN missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. In addition to concerns over employee quality, a number of the firm's employees were involved in the illegal sex and arms trade. With their legal status confused, none of these employees were ever criminally prosecuted. The same company has since been hired to carry out a similar contract in Iraq.<sup>34</sup>

While the industry has offered its own codes of conduct and other forms of self-regulation, these are not sufficient guarantee, given the stakes at play. If the decision is made to hire such firms, a system of international regulation should also be established, which clarifies the firms' and their employees' standing under international law and

accountability for any improper actions they commit. As a first step, the UN should establish a database of fully vetted and transparent firms that are cleared for hire. Such a structure would begin to systematise market incentives to serve the global public interest.

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The upheavals in global security over the last few years, from the war on terrorism to the war in Iraq, have not changed the key needs for sustainable global stability. The gap between the demand for the international community to do something about humanitarian catastrophes and failed states and its ability to respond remains wide. In many ways, the tragedy at the start of the twenty-first century is that we seem to have forgotten the hard-earned lessons at the end of the last century.

The challenge to create a truly global capacity for peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention is difficult, but not so daunting or expensive as to excuse inaction. With minimal investments, which primarily entail states shifting military resources and force structures towards more useful ends, superior global capabilities to make a difference are achievable. The international community would finally have the means. All it would then need would be the will.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), pp. 11–22; National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts* (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 2000), pp. 7–9.
- <sup>2</sup> Singer, P.W. *Caution: Children at War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); International Labor Office, *Wounded Childhood: The Use of Children in Armed Conflict in Central Africa* (Geneva: ILO, 2003); UNICEF, *Adult Wars, Child Soldiers* (Geneva: UNICEF, 2003).
- <sup>3</sup> See Catherine Guicherd, 'International Law and the War in Kosovo,' *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 2, summer 1999, pp. 19–34.
- <sup>4</sup> See Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons (eds), *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1998); and Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and I. William Zartman, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1996).
- <sup>5</sup> See, for example, the comments by various African military officers as summarised in Ericka A. Albaugh, 'Preventing Conflict in Africa: Possibilities of Peace Enforcement', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000), pp. 111–210; see also, Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, 'The Heirs of Nkrumah: Africa's New Interventionists', *Pugwash Occasional Papers*, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2001), pp. 72–86.
- <sup>6</sup> See William J. Durch, 'Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s', in William J. Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 1–34.
- <sup>7</sup> There are various ways of estimating force requirements using generic, standardised, rules of thumb. Some link necessary forces to the size of opposing forces, and suggest that outside troops be at least as numerous as the largest indigenous army. Others tie requirements to the size of the civilian population base needing protection, and assume that 2–10 troops are generally needed for every 1,000 inhabitants of a troubled region or country. By the first measurement, an intervening force in Rwanda would have been sufficient at no more than 5,000 in strength, since that was the size of the Rwandan military at the time (not counting irregular forces). By the second, however, at least 15,000 troops would have been needed to protect a population of 8,000,000. See James T. Quinlivan, 'Force Requirements in Stability Operations', *Parameters*, vol. 25, no. 4, winter 1995–96, pp. 59–69; Michael O'Hanlon, *Saving Lives with Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1997), pp. 38–42.
- <sup>8</sup> For another argument in favour of building up the capacities of states, rather than international organisations, for humanitarian interventions, see S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss, 'Political Interest and Humanitarian Action', *Security Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1, autumn 2000, p. 115.
- <sup>9</sup> The Sierra Leone mission is likely to continue, and in fact may need to become more ambitious in order to establish lasting stability – since doing so may require defeating RUF forces. If the war continues to fester, not only Sierra Leone, but also neighbouring Guinea, where



hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled the conflict, may suffer serious consequences. See International Crisis Group, 'Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy', ICG Africa Report no. 28, Brussels, 11 April 2001.

- <sup>10</sup> See United Nations, 'Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contributions to United Nations Operations', available at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors).
- <sup>11</sup> William J. Durch, 'A Realistic Plan to Save Afghanistan', *Washington Post*, 30 July 2002, p. A17.
- <sup>12</sup> See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html>.
- <sup>13</sup> Some estimates have suggested that the total military manpower involved in the Congo's recent civil war has totalled as many as 150,000 fighters. However, more recent estimates put the size of the two largest rebel groups, Rwandan Hutu (largely the *interahamwe* who led that country's 1994 genocide) and Burundian Hutu, at 15,000 and 10,000 respectively. See International Crisis Group, 'Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War', ICG Africa Report no. 26, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 20 December 2000, p. 4; International Crisis Group, 'Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention', Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001, pp. 2–3. Those latter estimates suggest that, if governments agreed to a ceasefire or peace plan but rebels did not, roughly 25,000 intervening forces might suffice. However, the enormity of Congo's territory and the size of its population – now roughly 50m – point to much higher numbers. A conservative estimate is 100,000, based on the rule that it is usually necessary to deploy at least two security personnel for every 1,000 indigenous civilians.

- <sup>14</sup> For good accounts of ongoing problems in these and other places, see the work of the International Crisis Group at [www.crisisweb.org](http://www.crisisweb.org)
- <sup>15</sup> For example, the secessionist conflict in Aceh, a small and troubled province of Indonesia, involves some 3,000 guerrillas against a population base of 4.3 million. Sizing an intervention force to the guerrilla force would suggest deploying at least 3,000 troops; sizing it relative to the population would suggest at least 10,000. In Burundi, similar force-sizing criteria would suggest that at least 25,000 intervening troops might be needed. See Kelly M. Greenhill, 'On Intervention to Deter Deadly Conflict: A Cautionary Prospective Analysis', *Breakthroughs*, vol. 10, no. 1, spring 2001, pp. 36–44; Rohan Gunaratna, 'The Structure and Nature of GAM', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, April 2001, pp. 33–35; Ali A. Jalali, 'Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict', *Parameters*, spring 2001, p. 92; James T. Quinlivan, 'Force Requirements in Stability Operations', *Parameters*, vol. 25, no. 4, winter 1995–96, pp. 59–69; Michael O'Hanlon, *Saving Lives with Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1997), pp. 38–42.
- <sup>16</sup> 'American Civilian Police in UN Peace Operations', special report by the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 6 July 2001.
- <sup>17</sup> Colum Lynch, 'Misconduct, Corruption by US Police Mar Bosnia Mission', *Washington Post*, 29 May 2001, p. A1; Michael O'Hanlon, *Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 46.
- <sup>18</sup> Brahimi et al., *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 20.
- <sup>19</sup> International Institute for Strategic



- Studies, *The Military Balance 2002–03* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 337.
- <sup>20</sup> See John E. Peters and Howard Deshong, *Out of Area or Out of Reach? European Military Support for Operations in Southwest Asia* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995), pp. 92–105.
- <sup>21</sup> Rachel Schmidt, *Moving US Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility* (Congressional Budget Office, February 1997), pp. 11, 62.
- <sup>22</sup> Henry Ivanov, 'Antonov Favorite to Win NATO Heavy Lift Contract', *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 7 May 2003, p. 4.
- <sup>23</sup> National Institute for Research Advancement, *Japan's Proactive Peace and Security Strategies*, Research Report No. 20000005 (Tokyo, 2001), pp. 15–17.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.
- <sup>25</sup> See also Mike Mochizuki (ed.), *Toward a True Alliance* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1997).
- <sup>26</sup> For a good explanation of how hard the US military needed to work to improve its own standards after Vietnam, see Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 1–38.
- <sup>27</sup> US Army, *Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations* (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 1994), chapter 3, p. 8.
- <sup>28</sup> See for example, Chris Seiple, *The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, 1996);
- <sup>29</sup> P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
- <sup>30</sup> Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Dogs of War', *Lateline*, broadcast 18 May 2000. Transcript available at <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/archives/s128621.htm>
- <sup>31</sup> International Peace Operations Association, [www.ipoaonline.org](http://www.ipoaonline.org)
- <sup>32</sup> P.W. Singer, 'War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Regulation: Privatized Military Firms and International Law', *Colombia Journal of Transnational Law*, Winter 2003.
- <sup>33</sup> *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
- <sup>34</sup> Robert Capps, 'Outside the Law', *Salon*, 28 June 2002, <http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/26/bosnia/>; Antony Barnett, 'British Firm Accused in Sex Scandal', *Guardian*, 29 July 2001; David Isenberg, 'There's No Business like Security Business', *Asia Times*, 30 April 2003, [http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle\\_East/ED30Ak03.html](http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ED30Ak03.html)