

IVO H. DAALDER
JAMES M. LINDSAY

9

*Power and Cooperation:
An American Foreign Policy
for the Age of Global Politics*

THE AGE OF GEOPOLITICS in American foreign policy is over; the age of global politics has begun. Throughout the twentieth century, traditional geopolitics drove U.S. thinking on foreign affairs: American security depended on preventing any one country from achieving dominion over the Eurasian landmass. That objective was achieved with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now the United States finds itself confronting a new international environment, one without a peer competitor but that nonetheless presents serious threats to American security. The terrorists who struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon neither represented a traditional state-based threat nor were tied to a specific geographical location. Nevertheless, nineteen people with just a few hundred thousand dollars succeeded in harming the most powerful nation on earth.

For more than three centuries, the dynamic of world politics was determined by the interplay among states, especially the great powers. Today, world politics is shaped by two unprecedented phenomena that are in some tension with each other. One is the sheer predominance of the United

The authors would like to thank James Steinberg, Strobe Talbott, the participants in the American Foreign Policy Round Table at the Brookings Institution, and the participants in a seminar organized by the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter. The authors are also indebted to the Carnegie Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation for their support.

States. Today, as never before, what matters most in international politics is how—and whether—Washington acts on any given issue. The other is globalization, which has unleashed economic, political, and social forces that are beyond the capacity of any one country, including the United States, to control.

American primacy and globalization bring the United States great rewards as well as great dangers. Primacy gives Washington an unsurpassed ability to get its way in international affairs, while globalization enriches the American economy and spreads American values. But America's great power and the penetration of its culture, products, and influence deep into other societies breed intense resentment and grievances. Great power and great wealth do not necessarily produce greater respect or greater security.

American leaders and the American people are now grappling with the double-edged sword that is the age of global politics: how to maximize its rewards while minimizing its dangers. In this debate, there is little disagreement over whether the United States should be engaged in world affairs. Both America's extensive global ties and its vulnerability to outside forces make disengagement and isolationism impossible. Nor is there much disagreement on the purpose of American engagement. America's interests are best served by a continually expanding liberal international order, one in which increasing numbers of people share the benefits of open markets and democratic governments.

Much of the current American foreign policy debate is about how Washington should achieve the goals of safeguarding and expanding the liberal international order. This debate, in turn, revolves around the relative importance of the two defining features of the age of global politics. One view (which we call *Hegemonist*) maintains that American primacy is the key to securing America's interests—and that it is both possible and desirable to extend the unipolar moment into a unipolar era. Hegemonists emphasize the threats posed by tyrants and terrorists—and the technologies of mass destruction both seek to acquire. They believe the United States should unabashedly exercise its power to defeat these threats, and they see formal international arrangements as impeding rather than enabling this effort. By contrast, a second view (which we call *Globalist*) argues that globalization has greatly expanded the range of foreign policy problems while limiting the effectiveness of the unilateral exercise of American power. Globalists believe that global challenges can be addressed only together with other nations and emphasize the need for international cooperation—especially through formal institutions and organizations.

The debate between Hegemonists and Globalists came to a head in the

months leading up to the war in Iraq. The two views coincided on the desirability of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of ousting Saddam Hussein. But they disagreed over how to accomplish these goals. The Bush administration, espousing a strong Hegemonist view, argued that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorist organizations posed an unacceptable threat to American security, to regional stability, and to international order, and that a change of regime in Baghdad was the only sure way to defeat this threat. America would undertake that effort—if necessary alone—in the confident belief that it could both quickly end Saddam's rule and create a new strategic situation in the Middle East that would be demonstrably better and more stable than what existed before. A brutal dictatorship would be removed from power, weapons of mass destruction would be found and destroyed, and a powerful example would be set for others who might threaten U.S. interests with weapons of mass destruction or support for terrorist organizations. In the end, the Bush administration believed, even those who opposed war would come to believe that it had been worthwhile.

In contrast, Globalists argued that the Bush administration was setting a dangerous precedent by ignoring the concerns of many other nations, including of some of America's closest allies, that a preemptive war against Iraq would prove highly destabilizing. A war and the subsequent American occupation of Iraq could fuel Arab and Muslim resentment of the United States, enhance recruitment of young men to the terrorist cause, and further unsettle already fragile regimes facing strong Islamist opposition to their rule. Globalists also worried that the administration's failure to convince a majority of the UN Security Council, as well as many of its most important allies, that a preemptive war was not merely the right but the only course of action would fatally undermine the international security institutions that had underpinned U.S. foreign policy for more than half a century.

The Hegemonist view triumphed in Iraq. The Bush administration went to war with token international support (only Britain made a militarily significant contribution), yet succeeded in ousting Saddam Hussein swiftly and with relative ease. The full consequences of the war have yet to play out, but one thing is already certain: George W. Bush has embarked on a revolution in foreign policy, abandoning decades-old traditions of how America should engage abroad (we discuss this revolution in our forthcoming Brookings book, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*). His revolution is in many ways compelling. However, it comes with very high risks and potentially very high costs. At the same time, Globalists offer an alternative that is equally unsatisfactory. Not every

problem has an international or multilateral solution—and even those that do require the prudent, but consistent, exercise of power to ensure cooperative endeavors remain effective.

The problem with the current debate about American foreign policy is that it often presumes an either/or choice between the Hegemonist emphasis on power and the Globalist emphasis on cooperation. In fact, however, an effective foreign policy in the age of global politics must *combine* power and cooperation. Power is fundamental to America's ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives. American leaders must be willing to wield it in defense of core interests, even at the price of alienating friends and allies. Yet a policy that rests solely on compelling others to bend to Washington's will is doomed. Many of the most pressing problems cannot be solved by unilateral U.S. action. Moreover, the sustainability of American primacy ultimately depends on the extent to which others believe it is used to further not only U.S. interests, but theirs as well. That requires using America's power in concert with friends and allies to make existing international rules and institutions more effective, to forge new structures of cooperation to deal with emerging challenges and opportunities, and to make sure that agreed rules and norms are effectively enforced. It is only through such cooperative efforts, backed by the judicious use of power, that the United States can create a world order that is conducive to its interests.

The Demise of Geopolitics

For much of the twentieth century, American foreign policy sought as its first priority to ensure that no single country dominated the key centers of strategic power in Europe and Asia—primarily western Europe, Russia, and northeast Asia. (The Persian Gulf was added in the 1970s when the strategic importance of oil became apparent.) That was the purpose of America's entry into two world wars, and that was why it engaged in a four-decade-long cold war with the Soviet Union. But this "Long War," as Philip Bobbitt has called it, was not just about Eurasia's geostrategic centrality in American foreign policy.¹ It also reflected an ideological conflict that pitted liberalism against fascism and communism.² The strategic need to prevent any rival from dominating the Eurasian power centers was therefore coupled to the political need to defeat totalitarian threats to the American—indeed, the Western—way of life.

The collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union thus represented a dual victory for American foreign policy in the Long War. Liberalism won the battle of ideas—even leading to the notion of

“the end of history.”³ With the collapse of the Soviet empire came the end of the last serious challenge for territorial dominion over Eurasia. American foreign policy had thus achieved its primary objective.

During the 1990s, a period now remembered as the post-cold war era, American foreign policy focused on consolidating the victory of the Long War. Together with its European allies, the United States set out to create, for the first time, a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.⁴ That effort is now all but complete. The European Union—which, with the formal accession of ten new members in 2004, will encompass most of Europe—has become the focal point for European policy on issues ranging from trade and monetary policy, through agricultural and immigration policy, to judicial and foreign affairs. NATO has evolved from a collective defense organization into Europe’s main security institution—helping to stabilize the Balkans, transforming military practices with no fewer than twenty-seven partnership countries, and forging new relationships (including by expanding its membership) with erstwhile adversaries. A new relationship with Russia is being forged after ten years of intensive effort.

Progress has been slower, though still significant, in Asia, the other core area of strategic concern. U.S. relations with its two key regional partners, Japan and South Korea, continue to form the foundation of regional stability. Democracy is well rooted in many parts of the region, notably in South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Economic engagement is slowly creating ties that bind a surging China into the global economy.

The success of American policy in consolidating the victory in the Long War means that no power—not Russia, not Germany, not a united Europe, and not China or Japan—today threatens to dominate Eurasia. Geopolitical calculations have not disappeared entirely from American foreign policy, or from the foreign policies of other countries. Washington will continue to assess traditional state threats, and for many countries such considerations will remain dominant. However, the central geopolitical imperative that drove American foreign policy for almost one hundred years is no more. Some analysts, fixated on the old geopolitical context, predict that the United States will retreat from engagement by withdrawing its military forces from Europe and possibly even Asia.⁵ That prediction ignores the profound change that has occurred in world politics: geopolitical considerations have given way to global ones. In the new age of global politics, American foreign policy will no longer pivot on geography. The threat Afghanistan posed to the United States was not tied to its geographical location, and al Qaeda can be just as deadly whether it is located in Pakistan, the Philippines, or Portland, Oregon.

The Age of Global Politics

The age of global politics has two defining characteristics: American primacy and globalization. American dominance means the United States has far greater influence over world politics than any other country. Globalization has been both beneficial (stimulating increased prosperity, greater democratization, and better protection of human rights) and destructive (causing global environmental damage, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of infectious diseases, and the expansion of international crime and terrorist organizations). The United States, perhaps more than any other country, has reaped the benefits of globalization. But despite its unrivaled power, it is not immune from globalization's pernicious effects.

America as the Global Power

The United States is the world's only truly global power.⁶ One key pillar of America's power is its overwhelming military strength, which the war in Iraq vividly demonstrated. Only the United States can send bombers from its heartland on a round-trip mission to attack targets anywhere around the globe and do so with great stealth, precision, and destructive force. Only the United States can quickly dispatch its ground forces in large numbers to any battlefield in the world and defeat any traditional foe. Only the United States can deploy a truly blue-water navy across every ocean—complete with twelve mammoth aircraft carriers, each housing a modern air armada larger than the entire air force of most countries. Such is the cumulative effect of the trillions of dollars the United States has invested in its military over the past six decades.

A huge gap separates the capabilities of the U.S. military from those of other nations. After declining somewhat in the previous decade, U.S. defense spending is once again rising rapidly. Annual spending stood at \$355 billion in 2003 and may reach as high as half a trillion dollars a year by the end of the decade.⁷ As a result, the spending gap between the United States and the rest of the world is great and growing. The United States now accounts for nearly four in every ten dollars the world spends on defense, and its major European and Asian allies account for nearly half the remaining six dollars. In 2003, the United States spent as much on defense as the next eleven countries combined. The 2003 defense spending *increase* of \$37.5 billion was almost as large as Britain's *entire* defense budget and three-quarters the size of China's. U.S. defense spending is forty times

greater than the amount the three “axis of evil” countries—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—spend on their militaries in 2001.⁸

Most remarkably, the United States has attained its military dominance at relatively little effort. Defense spending takes a smaller share of the U.S. gross domestic product than it did a decade ago. Even after the White House and Congress added 12 percent to the defense budget for 2003, U.S. defense spending stood at only 3.5 percent of GDP, or about half the cold war highs. “Being Number One at great cost is one thing,” Yale University historian Paul Kennedy marvels. “Being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”⁹

Another pillar of America’s power is its economy. It is the world’s largest. After nearly two decades of economic expansion, it accounts for 31 percent of the world’s total output, a larger share than in 1950.¹⁰ To be sure, the economic gap is smaller than the military gap, especially if the United States is compared with the European Union (which on economics often behaves as a single actor). Nevertheless, America’s dominance is still remarkable. The U.S. economy in 2000 was equal in size to that of the next four national economies (Japan, Germany, France, and Britain) combined, and it accounted for almost half the GDP of the G-7 countries.¹¹ While China is modernizing rapidly and Russia may have turned the corner, the size of their economies is comparable, respectively, to those of Italy and Belgium—not the United States.

America’s primacy comes at a cost. Its great power means it affects the interests of others, and it often does so without intending to or even noticing that it has. This gives other countries and groups a great stake in what the United States does. Decisions made solely for narrow domestic political purposes often have profound implications for millions abroad. Subsidies for Midwestern wheat farmers mean lower market prices for growers in Argentina, and protection for textile mills in the Carolinas means less employment for shirt makers in Lahore and Capetown. America’s great influence also enables countries to blame it, fairly or unfairly, for many of their ills. But those countries, being far less powerful, are necessarily driven to accept the inevitable or resort to unconventional responses. The same dynamic animates terrorists like those who struck on September 11.¹²

Still, America’s military and economic predominance enables it to exert tremendous influence in world affairs. This does not mean it always gets what it wants. Some objectives may simply exceed American capabilities, while others may entail a price not worth paying. Nevertheless, when Washington really wants something and is willing to work with others, it

often gets its way—witness the UN Security Council’s unanimous vote in November 2002 demanding that Iraq accept tough new weapons inspections. In many cases, moreover, the United States does not need to wield its power overtly to bend others to its will. Countries often calculate that Washington will ultimately get its way, making resistance pointless and potentially costly. Better then to give before Washington takes. Even when countries refuse to concede, because of either principle or domestic politics, their opposition is often more rhetorical than substantive. Despite repeatedly warning that the demise of the ABM Treaty would produce dire consequences, Russia, China, and all of America’s allies did little more than grumble when the Bush administration announced in December 2001 that the United States was withdrawing from the treaty.

There is more to America’s influence than compelling others, by virtue of its hard—military and economic—power to conform their policies to Washington’s liking. The United States also possesses what Joseph Nye has called “soft power.”¹³ This power derives from American values and culture, as well as from its success in using hard power. Soft power enables Washington to set the international agenda, to define the terms of debate, and to structure agreed outcomes by getting others to want what the United States wants. Hard power provides the foundation for soft power, but there can be a trade-off between the two. Relying excessively on hard power can actually diminish America’s soft power. If other countries feel bullied or bossed around by Washington, they are less likely to follow its lead. This is what occurred in the run up to the war in Iraq, when the louder Washington shouted, the more other countries opposed its ways.

Can the United States sustain its international predominance over the next quarter century? By its nature, power is relative—whether America remains dominant depends on what happens to its capabilities and to those of others. Economically, the United States is not likely to maintain its current share of global output indefinitely, but its share is unlikely to shrink substantially any time soon. The U.S. economy has proven itself at least as adept as those of its major competitors in realizing the productivity gains from the revolution in information technology. Europe and Japan face substantially tougher demographic challenges than does the United States. With lower birth and mortality rates, they face labor shortages and severe budgetary pressures.¹⁴ China and Russia both have yet to prove they can develop the political institutions needed to sustain economic growth.

Militarily, there is little prospect that any country or group of countries will spend enough to compete with the United States, let alone surpass it

in the next two or three decades. The reason is not just, or even mainly, that the military gap is so large; instead, it is because few countries have sufficient incentive to try to match the United States militarily, and those that have an incentive lack the resources to succeed. The motivations for challengers are weak because America has no territorial ambitions. Furthermore, it has tended to use its power in ways that serve others' interests in addition to its own. Since many of its potential competitors do not see the United States as a significant threat, they are far more likely to bandwagon than to balance American power.¹⁵ Those who do regard the United States as a threat lack the capacity to match it; their alternatives are to submit or to respond asymmetrically. As long as this continues, America's relative power will remain larger than that of any other country or group of countries—and a return to the age of geopolitics will be unlikely.

Just as important as how much power other countries can wield is how they intend to use the power they do have. Even if Europe unites fully, which will take decades, the extensive transatlantic ties forged by more than a half century of close cooperation ensure that few Americans will see this Europe as a threat to their security, just as few Europeans will have an interest in threatening the United States.¹⁶ It matters that a Soviet Union that defined itself in opposition to the West has given way to a Russia striving to emulate Western ways and developing closer ties to the United States. For the same reason, China's political evolution holds immense consequences for American primacy. A world populated with powerful friends is more hospitable than one populated with powerful adversaries or nations that resent American highhandedness and are reluctant to follow American leadership.

Globalization

The twin, and in significant ways the rival, to the reality of American primacy is globalization. Countries around the globe are now increasingly interconnected, and these ties permeate all of their societies.¹⁷ The consequence for Americans, as September 11 dramatically illustrated, is that distant developments can profoundly affect their security, prosperity, and way of life.

Globalization is not a new phenomenon—nor is it necessarily irreversible.¹⁸ Economic interconnectedness increased rapidly in the decades before World War I, mainly as a result of technological innovations that reduced the cost of transportation (such as the steam engine) and information (the telegraph). The Great War, Great Depression, and Great

(Russian) Revolution disrupted many of these ties, and it was many decades before they were rebuilt.¹⁹ At the same time, globalization is not simply an economic phenomenon.²⁰ Greater interconnectedness among countries can involve sociocultural, military, and environmental links as well as economic ones. These too are not new. The spread of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam across the globe over the millennia created ties that continue to influence world politics today. The Dutch Navy sailed the Seven Seas four centuries ago, and the even mightier British Royal Navy subsequently extended the Union Jack to the far reaches of the globe. Fatal diseases like smallpox spread across borders and continents long ago—from Egypt in 1350 B.C. to China in A.D. 49 and on to Europe (700s), the Americas (1500s), and finally to Australia in 1789.

Although globalization is not unprecedented, two characteristics distinguish what we are witnessing today from anything that preceded it. One is the sheer speed and volume of cross-border contacts.²¹ To take just one example, the United States one hundred years ago received a few million foreign visitors annually. Most traveled by boat for weeks to reach American shores. Today the United States welcomes more than 330 million foreign visitors each year, the vast majority of whom reach America within hours of leaving home.²²

The second, and in many ways more important, characteristic of today's globalization is that it is taking place across multiple dimensions simultaneously. The most well known is growing economic interdependence. The numbers are stunning. Since the early 1970s, economic globalization has exploded. The average daily turnover in foreign exchange markets totaled roughly \$15 billion in 1973. In April 2001, daily foreign exchange flows averaged more than \$1.2 trillion. Total world exports increased nearly eighteen-fold between 1970 and 1999.²³ As a result, trade in 2002 accounted for 25 percent of total global economic output, double its share in 1970.²⁴ Total worldwide inflows of foreign direct investment stood at \$59 billion in 1982. Two decades later, the figure was \$735 billion.²⁵ Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving companies located in different countries surged as well. In 1987 there were 14 cross-border M&As worth more than \$1 billion apiece. These transactions totaled \$30 billion and accounted for 40 percent of the value of all cross-border M&As. Fourteen years later, there were 113 cross-border M&As that exceeded \$1 billion apiece. These deals totaled \$378.1 billion, or 64 percent of all cross-border M&As.²⁶

Economic globalization has been accompanied in recent decades by military globalization. For centuries distance nullified military advantages and provided buffers in geopolitical competition. Modern technology changed that. With the development of ocean-spanning missiles in the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union gained the ability to destroy each other in as few as thirty minutes. Their monopoly on such destructive force proved temporary. With the widespread diffusion of military technology, many states now have the capability to manufacture chemical, biological, nuclear, and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as to build the ballistic and cruise missiles needed to deliver them.²⁷ Equally important, globalization has eroded the monopoly states once had on organized violence. Some international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations now wield sophisticated arsenals, and they have demonstrated an ability to harm even the most powerful states.

The communications revolution ushered in by the development of satellite television, wireless communications, and the Internet has fostered not just military and economic globalization but social globalization as well. The cost of transmitting information instantaneously across the globe has become negligible—thus enabling almost infinite amounts of information to be sent instantly to almost anywhere around the world.²⁸ Political ideas and practices can now spread with a speed once unimaginable as groups and movements emulate what they see elsewhere. States in turn find it harder, though not impossible, to control the information that reaches their citizens.²⁹

In addition to economic, military, and social globalization, we are also experiencing rapid environmental globalization. Global temperatures are rising as modern economies increasingly emit greenhouse gases.³⁰ By 2002, more than 20 million people around the world had died of HIV/AIDS and another 60 million were infected.³¹ The CIA estimates that by 2010 between 50 and 75 million people in just five countries (China, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, and Russia) will be HIV-infected—far outstripping the number of cases in sub-Saharan Africa, where the ravaging effects of the disease have until now been most notable.³² Nor are these isolated developments. As William Clark observes, “More and more kinds of human activities, undertaken by more and more people in more and more parts of the world, are imposing more and more impacts on other people at transcontinental scales. Moreover, those impacts are increasingly interactive.”³³ As if to prove the import of this warning, the virus that causes severe acute

respiratory syndrome (SARS) sprang up in Asia in 2003 and spread rapidly, creating worldwide fears of a global pandemic.

The prophets of globalization have trumpeted its positive features. The increased flow of goods, services, and capital across borders stimulates economic activity and enhances prosperity. Annual growth rates among the more globalized economies averaged 5 percent a year during the 1990s; the less globalized saw their economies contract by an average of 1 percent a year over the same period.³⁴ The spread of ideas across the Internet and other global media has empowered people around the globe to challenge autocratic rulers and seek to advance human rights and democracy. People's cultural horizons are broadened as Texans discover the delights of sushi, and Muscovites, the humor of *Seinfeld*. Growing interconnections can even lessen the chance of war. Fearing that a war with Pakistan would disrupt ties to large, U.S.-based multinationals, India's increasingly powerful electronic sector successfully pressed New Delhi in mid-2002 to deescalate its conflict with Pakistan.³⁵

Globalization also brings new perils and challenges to the United States. September 11 is only the most notable example. A computer hacker in the Philippines can temporarily disrupt the Internet and inflict billions of dollars of losses on e-commerce operations around the world. Speculators can produce a run on the Thai baht, the ripple effects of which can plunge economies as far away as Russia and Brazil into recession, robbing American exporters of markets and costing American jobs. The accumulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere from newly booming economies can warm the globe, possibly flooding coastal plains and turning mountain meadows into deserts.

Foreign Policy Consequences

Whether benign or malign, the effects of globalization demonstrate the wrongheadedness of the neoisolationist argument that American security and prosperity lie in minimizing America's political involvement abroad.³⁶ Much of America's prosperity today rests on a world order made possible by active U.S. engagement. In a globalizing world the United States cannot insulate itself from problems elsewhere. Interconnectedness is most obvious with challenges such as global warming, infectious diseases, and collapsing biodiversity. It also characterizes security problems, where American disengagement can lead to escalating conflict that affects U.S. interests (think Bosnia in the early 1990s or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since

2001) without necessarily easing resentment of the United States. The fact that globalization wears an American face, and will continue to do so even if all U.S. troops come home, means that some abroad will continue to harbor grievances against the United States. In striking the World Trade Center, al Qaeda was signaling its hatred not just of what Americans do but of who they are and the values they represent.³⁷

So America must be engaged abroad. There is actually considerable agreement in the United States not just on the need for engagement, but also on its purpose. America should seek to deepen and expand the existing liberal international order, thereby widening the circle of “winners” that have a stake in a system that has served Americans so well. This, after all, is the sentiment behind both the Clinton administration’s “strategy of engagement and enlargement” and the Bush administration’s pursuit of “a balance of power in favor of freedom.”³⁸ The appeal of these calls is understandable—most Americans are instinctively Wilsonian.³⁹ They believe, for good reason, that an international order based on rule of law, constitutional democracy and human rights, and free enterprise would serve both American values and interests. Such an order would not eliminate conflict; market democracies are perfectly capable of squabbling among themselves. But it would diminish the frequency and severity of violent conflict within and between states, encourage prosperity, and increase the prospects of cooperative action to meet common challenges.

Yet this outward consensus hides vigorous disagreements over how to deepen and expand the liberal international order. Two main schools of thought exist. Each has different policy priorities and offers different assessments of what primacy and globalization mean for American foreign policy. Hegemonists—the word is from the Greek *hegemonia*, which means “leadership”—on the one hand emphasize American primacy. They see a world in which American power is threatened by the combination of terrorism, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction—rather than, as traditionally, by the ambitions of other great powers. They look to America’s preponderance of power to defeat this threat and, thus, to safeguard America’s security as well as the security of its allies and friends. They see the confident exercise of that power—with few constraints on America’s freedom of action—as the essence of American foreign policy. Globalists, on the other hand, emphasize globalization. They see a world in which threats to the security of individuals from problems such as HIV/AIDS, global warming, and international crime now supplement, if not supplant, threats to the security of nations. None of these problems respects national boundaries.

That is why Globalists emphasize international cooperation—preferably in the form of formal institutions, treaties, and international law—as the preferred means of American foreign policy.

Hegemonists

September 11 confirmed what Hegemonists—the dominant voice in George W. Bush’s administration—have long maintained: the world is a dangerous place. Hegemonists believe, however, that unlike the past, when other great powers posed the gravest threat, the danger today derives from rogue states bent on harming America, its friends, and its allies. President Bush explained the threat in his “axis-of-evil” speech: “By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.”⁴⁰ The fundamental priority of American foreign policy therefore must be to defeat this new enemy—by bringing terrorists to justice, removing tyrants from power, and ensuring that technologies of mass destruction do not fall into the wrong hands. Hegemonists often acknowledge that the United States has other foreign policy goals—like promoting democracy and human rights and dealing with environmental and other global challenges. But they generally regard them as secondary to the need to defeat America’s enemies.

Hegemonists see America’s primacy as the key to achieving its foreign policy goals. Preponderant power enables the United States to achieve its goals without relying on others. As Charles Krauthammer, a forceful Hegemonist voice, argues, “An unprecedentedly dominant United States . . . is in the unique position of being able to fashion its own foreign policy. After a decade of Prometheus playing pygmy, the first task of the new [Bush] administration is precisely to reassert American freedom of action.”⁴¹ In short, the flexibility that arises out of the reality of U.S. dominance is the best guarantor of American security. September 11 only underscored the vital importance of maintaining the freedom to act as Washington sees fit. As President Bush argued in rejecting advice that he take account of allied views in conducting the war on terrorism, “At some point we may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me. We are America.”⁴²

The premium Hegemonists place on freedom of action leads them to view international institutions, regimes, and treaties with considerable skepticism. Such formal arrangements inevitably constrain the ability of the United States to make the most of its primacy. This is not to say

Hegemonists rule out working with others. Rather, their preferred form of multilateralism—to be indulged in when unilateral action is impossible or unwise—involves building ad hoc coalitions of the willing, what Richard Haass calls “multilateralism à la carte.”⁴³ Three key judgments underlie this instrumental view of multilateralism.⁴⁴ One is that existing formal institutions do not work when it comes to dealing with tough cases, which are the only ones that truly matter.⁴⁵ Another is that formal institutions do not create significant spillover effects that help American foreign policy more broadly by creating a shared sense of interests among member countries. The third is that different issues can be dealt with separately. Potential coalition partners will not refuse to join a U.S.-led ad hoc coalition simply because Washington has refused to cooperate on issues that matter to them. America should act on the basis of its own interests, and Hegemonists expect others to do likewise.

These views lead Hegemonists to take an unsentimental view of U.S. friends and allies. The purpose of allied consultations is not so much to forge a common policy, let alone build goodwill, as to persuade others of the rightness of the U.S. cause. As Secretary of State Colin Powell told European journalists, President Bush “makes sure people know what he believes in. And then he tries to persuade others that is the correct position. When it does not work, then we will take the position we believe is correct, and I hope the Europeans are left with a better understanding of the way in which we want to do business.”⁴⁶ A better definition of what William Safire has called “consultative unilateralism” would be hard to find.⁴⁷

Because primacy enables the United States to pursue and defend its interests as it pleases, Hegemonists like Krauthammer argue “explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America’s unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future.”⁴⁸ This perspective is not new. Its intellectual predicate was laid out in a 1992 Pentagon study prepared by several people who occupy key positions in George W. Bush’s administration—including Vice President Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz (now deputy secretary of defense), Lewis Libby (the vice president’s chief of staff), and Zalmay Khalilzad (a top National Security Council official). That study, according to a draft leaked to the *New York Times* in March 1992, maintained that U.S. national security policy after the cold war should seek to preclude “the emergence of any potential future global competitor.”⁴⁹ Ten years ago, the public outcry that greeted the leaked report led the first Bush administration to order a new study softening much of the power rhetoric. Today, an equally ambitious statement of American power and priorities

stands at the heart of George W. Bush's *National Security Strategy*: "Our [military] forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."⁵⁰ In other words, the United States can best achieve its objectives if it prevents others from acquiring the power to oppose it when interests clash. A better definition of American hegemony would be hard to find.

Beyond this core objective of preserving and enhancing American power, Hegemonists disagree among themselves, however, over how to use American primacy to extend the reach of the liberal international order.⁵¹ So-called democratic imperialists argue that the United States should actively deploy its overwhelming military, economic, and political might to remake the world in its image. In doing so, they believe, the United States will serve other nations' interests as well as its own.⁵² They call for unseating authoritarian regimes, by force if necessary, and they unabashedly embrace the idea of "nation-building on a grand scale."⁵³ Assertive nationalists, by contrast, scorn nation-building. They doubt that America can create what others are unable to build for themselves. Assertive nationalists see the purpose of American power as more limited—to deter and defeat potential threats to the nation's security.⁵⁴ Because these threats also threaten others, America's willingness to stare them down enhances not only U.S. security but international security as well—thereby making possible a liberal international order.

Despite these differences, Hegemonists agree on one thing: power remains the coin of the realm in world politics. The terrorist threat notwithstanding, their world remains one dominated by self-interested, sovereign nation-states, a world that in important ways has not changed since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. They dismiss complaints about unilateralism. They argue that if the United States leads, others will follow. And they justify all of this on the basis of their belief that America is a unique power and others see it so.

The war in Iraq represented the logical culmination of this perspective. The Bush administration's argument for the war was couched in terms of needing to prevent an even more deadly terrorist attack on the United States than Osama bin Laden had launched on September 11—as would be any attack using weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists were most likely to acquire such weapons from rogue states—which was why going after the states that supported terrorists and possessed weapons of mass destruction became the linchpin of the administration's war on terrorism.

As Bush argued days before he ordered U.S. forces into action, “Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes. He possesses weapons of terror. He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists—terrorists who would willingly use weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-loving countries. . . . Attacks of September the 11th, 2001 showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction.”⁵⁵

Although Bush was willing to address the Iraqi threat by enlisting international support through the United Nations, he was determined to act regardless of whether other countries supported him. So he challenged the United Nations to demonstrate its relevance by enforcing the resolutions the Security Council had passed demanding that Iraq be disarmed completely of all its weapons of mass destruction and all but the shortest-range ballistic missiles. An intensive diplomatic effort produced a unanimous resolution giving Iraq “one final opportunity” to disarm. Within months the administration affirmed what it had believed all along—namely, that Iraq would not voluntarily disarm. And while a majority of the Security Council, close allies, and much of the rest of the world believed that intrusive inspections ought to be given more time, the Bush administration decided that war offered the only viable solution. It refused to be constrained by the views of other countries or the collective view of international institutions of which America was a part. It was utterly convinced that ousting Saddam from power was essential for America’s security. And it had the power to do so virtually on its own.

By going to war in Iraq, ousting Saddam with relative ease, and taking full responsibility for Iraq’s reconstruction, the Bush administration put into practice the Hegemonists’ contention that American power is the driving force of world politics. It is on this point that their critics, the Globalists, dissent.

Globalists

September 11 confirmed for Globalists that globalization has fundamentally changed the nature of the threats the United States faces as well as the means needed to address them. Globalization—including advances in information technology, integrated financial markets, the diffusion of technology, and the permeability of borders—made the attacks possible. Globalists therefore argue that American foreign policy priorities should be reordered to address the nonstate threats arising from globalization.

America should focus on disrupting global terror networks (which have proven capable of spectacular attacks that kill thousands), halting the spread of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS (which each year kills more people than do all the world's many violent conflicts), slowing global climate change (which threatens to flood coastal zones where the vast majority of people live and transform agricultural regions into deserts), preventing the proliferation of the technology of mass destruction (which can make even the weakest a deadly danger to the strongest), and stopping international crime syndicates and narcotraffickers (which are destabilizing many countries around the world and robbing many millions of people of a future). In addition to addressing the dark side of globalization, Globalists argue the necessity of exploiting the opportunities it presents—by securing access to open markets to enhance the prosperity of all and improving the human condition through vigorous efforts to protect human rights and promote democracy.

Whereas Hegemonists focus on how American primacy frees the United States to pursue its interests as it sees fit, Globalists stress how globalization curtails America's ability to use its power to influence events. They argue that globalization creates opportunities and challenges that cannot be harnessed or blocked by American action alone. The cooperation of others is needed to defeat terrorists, preserve biodiversity, stop the spread of infectious diseases, and deal with other new foreign policy problems. But it is not just the issues themselves that limit the usefulness of American power. It is also that globalization is diffusing power away from nation-states. As Jessica Mathews argues, "National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over."⁵⁶ NGOs, which also encompass crime cartels and terrorist groups, are more nimble than states and frequently succeed in frustrating their policies.⁵⁷ What Hegemonists miss by ignoring the changing policy agenda and rise of NGOs, or so the Globalists contend, is that even the most powerful state is losing its ability to control what goes on in the world. As a major Globalist text argues, "Few of today's foreign policy challenges are really amenable to unilateral action—to truly 'going it alone.' In most instances, cooperating with other countries and with international institutions is less an option than a necessity."⁵⁸

While Globalists agree that globalization has made multilateralism essential to a successful foreign policy, they disagree on the nature of multilateral action. Global institutionalists look to supranational institutions as the key to solving problems that cannot be handled at the national level. They favor strengthening existing international organizations and treaties and creating or negotiating new ones where none now exist. They also would make securing international cooperation through such formal channels a precondition for most U.S. action abroad. For most institutionalists the driving idea is that formal international arrangements are needed because the United States cannot achieve its goals without them. For others, though, there is the additional consideration of Lord Acton's famous dictum: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." They worry that American primacy, if left unchecked and unconstrained, would create far more harm than good.

Global populists, who dominate the antiglobalization movement, share this suspicion of unchecked American power. But they are equally suspicious of the existing international order. They believe that foreign policy fundamentally reflects corporate rather than national interests. They argue that globalization moves jobs from countries with high labor costs to countries with low labor costs, spurs volatility and speculation in international financial markets, and encourages the erosion of national health, safety, and environmental standards—all trends that enrich economic elites and harm ordinary people. Rather than providing a solution, global populists argue that existing international institutions amplify the harm because corporate interests helped write their rules. Thus for global populists, strengthening international institutions as institutionalists propose is not only insufficient but also dangerous. Instead, international institutions must be strengthened *and* democratized so that they respond to the needs and interests of those whom globalization is leaving behind. The main vehicles for forcing these changes are transnational networks of protest, which ironically are made possible by the very globalization they are seeking to tame.⁵⁹

Where global institutionalists and populists look to the role that international organizations can play in addressing global challenges, transnationalists emphasize cross-border networks of NGOs.⁶⁰ Although these networks are typically decentralized—having no top, no center, and no hierarchy—they are nonetheless capable of coordinated and effective action. Among other things, they now provide "more official development assistance than the entire UN system (excluding the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund).⁶¹ In pointing to the importance of NGOs, transnationalists do not deny the relevance of international organizations. Contrary to global institutionalists, however, they reject the view that NGOs merely follow in the wake of supranational institutions. Talk of states enlisting the help of “nonstate actors suggests a hierarchical disposition and a measure of state control that may not always match reality or advance effective policy. Often states will and should be the coordinators or main actors in [public-private] partnerships. But in many cases, that pecking order will be neither possible nor desirable.”⁶²

The differences that separate global institutionalists, global populists, and transnationalists pale, however, beside the differences each has with Hegemonists. Globalist criticisms of hegemonist thinking were on display in the months leading up to the war in Iraq. Many Globalists argued that the principal threat to American security was not Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction, but the transnational network of terrorists that operated independent of Baghdad and other state-sponsors of terrorism. The Bush administration sought to counter this criticism by linking al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. Most Globalists found the White House’s evidence to be unpersuasive; hence they remained skeptical that the best way to confront the terrorist threat was to oust Saddam from power.⁶³ Rather, most Globalists argued that invading Iraq would inflame anti-American sentiments in the Middle East and bolster al Qaeda’s recruiting effort. Far from making terrorism less likely, these critics argued, a war against Iraq would increase the chances of future attacks.

Aside from questioning the wisdom of an invasion of Iraq, Globalists strongly opposed the way in which the Bush administration played its diplomatic hand. When the president and his senior advisers challenged the United Nations to demonstrate its relevance, they made clear that meant accepting America’s position that Saddam Hussein had to be removed from power. All along, the administration said it would act alone if necessary. The only choice it offered other nations was to join or get out of the way. Issuing such an ultimatum, Globalists argued, alienated many friendly countries and undercut the effort to build a large international coalition against Baghdad. They recognized that America’s military power would likely enable it to oust Saddam with little assistance from others. However, they believed that broad international support would be necessary to legitimize the invasion, as well as to lessen the burden and enhance the prospects for success of the large-scale nation-building effort that would have to follow the war. In the end, the Bush administration failed to

secure the support of many of its traditional allies. Although the war was easily won, Globalists argued that the Bush administration's diplomatic approach left the United States with few friends eager to help in the rebuilding effort.

In sum, Globalists believe that Hegemonists want to play by rules appropriate for the days of Metternich and not those of the microchip. The array of threats now facing the United States is far broader than and different in kind from those of three decades ago, let alone a century ago, when power considerations dominated all. Unilateral American action will ultimately prove ineffective, if not counterproductive and dangerous, because other countries and nonstate actors have many levers with which to frustrate U.S. policy. Washington can achieve its interests only if it recognizes the limits to what its primacy brings and, rather than dictating to others, agrees to work with them to address the manifold challenges of globalization.

Melding Power and Cooperation

Hegemonists and Globalists are both right in important ways. Hegemonists are right that the threat from terrorism, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction is real and must be confronted. Power remains essential to success in this international endeavor, as in many others. Though five decades of concerted U.S. and allied efforts may have transformed Europe into a Kantian zone of perpetual peace where the rule of law has triumphed, military might continues to hold sway in much of the rest of the world. True, no country, not even China, poses the same sort of geostrategic threat to the United States that first Germany and then the Soviet Union did. Still, threats of lesser order abound, from Pyongyang to Teheran to Damascus, and U.S. military and economic power will be needed to contain, if not extinguish, them.

For their part, Globalists are right that globalization has greatly broadened America's foreign policy agenda and created new opportunities for Washington to lead in efforts to revamp existing international institutions and build new ones. Issues such as infectious diseases, poverty, and poor governance are important not just because they offend our moral sensibilities, but because they threaten our security. Globalists are also right to remind us of the limits of American power. Many crucial problems defy unilateral solutions. Preventing or slowing global climate change requires many countries—not just the United States—to cut their greenhouse gas emissions.

Stemming WMD proliferation entails agreement by those who possess the requisite technologies not to transfer them. Success in fighting terrorism with a global reach hinges on international cooperation in law enforcement, intelligence, and the controlling of financial flows. American power cannot sustain the positive consequences of globalization on its own. Economic globalization rests on an intricate web of international trade and financial institutions. Without the cooperation of others to extend, develop, and improve these institutions, the benefits of globalization, which help to underwrite American power, would erode.

Yet on the whole the Hegemonist and Globalist approaches are both incomplete. Each offers a pinched list of the challenges facing the United States. Few Americans would call American foreign policy successful if it defeated al Qaeda but allowed the international economy to collapse, or vice versa. Both Hegemonists and Globalists think about the foreign policy agenda in selective rather than comprehensive terms. Hegemonists focus on threats to American power, while Globalists worry about the challenges arising from globalization. Neither keeps at the forefront the overarching objective of maintaining and expanding the liberal international order.

America's priorities should flow from that overarching goal. In particular, American foreign policy should give highest priority to those issues that have potentially systemic consequences for the liberal international order, either by drawing the United States back into an age of geopolitics or by determining whether the age of global politics comes to be defined by its opportunities or its dangers. A return to the age of geopolitics would confront America with a peer competitor and greatly complicate efforts to meet the challenges that arise from globalization. At the same time, it matters greatly to the United States whether globalization produces the expanding prosperity and freedom that its prophets trumpet or the apocalyptic nightmare that September 11 foreshadows. As the concluding section discusses at length, this criterion suggests a list of priorities that blends elements of both the Hegemonist and Globalist agendas.

On the matter of means, Hegemonists and Globalists err in assuming that foreign policy must emphasize either power or cooperation. Globalists often forget that the formalized international cooperation they seek demands more than good will. It also requires the willingness and ability to mobilize countries to cooperate and to enforce the agreed upon rules of behavior. However, that requirement, as Mancur Olsen demonstrated years ago, runs into a fundamental collective action problem—if the potential costs of action are great and the benefits are widely shared, few

will be willing to incur the costs. That is where overwhelming power, and a willingness to provide for public goods, makes a crucial difference.⁶⁴ Here the United States is exactly what Madeleine Albright said it was—the “indispensable nation.”⁶⁵ To take just one example, it was only the Bush administration’s willingness to act, unilaterally if necessary, that pushed the members of the Security Council in November 2002 to face up to their responsibility to compel Baghdad to abide by its international obligations to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction. Without American primacy—or something like it—it is doubtful that the rule of law can be sustained.

By the same token, Hegemonists are mistaken to think that the United States can dictate its policy preferences to the rest of the world, confident that others will inevitably follow. The cumulative effects of behaving like the “SUV of nations,” as Mary McGrory puts it—“hog[ging] the road and guzz[ling] the gas and periodically run[n]ing over something”—are substantial.⁶⁶ It spurs resentment among even America’s closest allies, resentment that, as the German and South Korean elections in 2002 demonstrated, prompts efforts to frustrate U.S. policy objectives or to ignore them. By early 2003, Washington’s bullying, rather than Baghdad’s non-compliance, had become the major issue for most members of the Security Council, including close allies like France, Germany, and Mexico. As a result, the Bush administration failed to gain majority support—let alone approval—for going to war against Iraq. All this comes with costs. Increasingly, Europe sees its role not as an American partner but as a brake on the improvident exercise of U.S. power. It has sought to create new international regimes, which in part reflect its own weakness, but are also often designed to limit America’s recourse to its hard power (and disliked by Washington precisely for that reason).⁶⁷

This is not to say that the United States will automatically lose its ability to lead others if it decides to act unilaterally. After all, America’s allies rallied around it after September 11 and despite their irritation over the Bush administration’s dismissal of the Kyoto Protocol and its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Instead, it underscores the degree to which America’s ability to sustain its primacy depends on its own actions. The more others question America’s power, purpose, and priorities, the less influence America has. If others try to counter the United States and delegitimize its power, Washington will need to exert more effort to reach the same desired end, assuming it can reach its objective at all. If others step aside and leave Washington to tackle common problems as it sees fit, the

cost of foreign policy will increase. The American public, always wary of being played for a sucker, might balk at paying the price.

Rather than undoing American primacy, then, cooperation is critical to sustaining it. The most obvious benefit is that by working with others Washington can spread the costs of action over more actors, enabling it to do more with less and reassuring Americans that they are doing no more than their fair share. On a deeper level, however, cooperation diminishes the need to compel others to act in America's interests and convinces them instead that doing so is in their own interest. As Samuel Berger, National Security Adviser to President Bill Clinton, observes:

There is a difference between power and authority. Power is the ability to compel by force and sanctions, and there are times we must use it, for there will always be interests and values worth fighting for. Authority is the ability to lead, and we depend on it for almost everything we try to achieve. Our authority is built on qualities very different from our power: on the attractiveness of our values, on the force of our example, on the credibility of our commitments, and on our willingness to listen to and stand by others. There may be no real threat to our power today. But if we use power in a way that antagonizes our friends and dishonors our commitments, we will lose our authority—and our power will mean very little.⁶⁸

Washington understood this lesson well in the years immediately following World War II, when, as John Ikenberry has shown, "The United States spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated economic and security order."⁶⁹ For nearly half a century, these institutions have been "America's secret empire."⁷⁰

The fundamental task for American foreign policy in the age of global politics is to replicate this success in melding power and cooperation. America needs to use its primacy to increase the capacity of the international community to meet its common challenges by building lasting structures of cooperation. Doing so maximizes the likelihood that Americans will find themselves in a world in which countries will see they can achieve their goals by working with the United States rather than against it. It also maximizes the chances that the world community will share not just America's interests but also its responsibilities.

A successful blend of power and cooperation entails two tasks. The first is to extend and adapt existing international arrangements that have proven effective in meeting common challenges, revitalize those that do not work

well, and create new ones where necessary. Although Hegemonists routinely denigrate international institutions as ineffective, the fact is they can and do promote American interests, as the work of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund (to mention only three) attests. At the same time, developing cooperative arrangements does not axiomatically mean creating formal international organizations or writing new treaties. More flexible structures, such as the Missile Control Technology Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Groups, are also possible. The formality of cooperation matters less than its being regularized, lasting, and thus predictable. Cooperative structures that provide for repeated interactions over time create the opportunity to turn separate national interests into shared ones. NATO, to take another example, helped knit Western Europe together during the cold war and is now extending the boundaries of the European zone of peace. By relying heavily on ad hoc coalitions that disperse once the stated mission is achieved, Hegemonists forfeit opportunities to build on the common interests that exist among the United States and its allies and potential partners—thus risking not having partners when you need them.

The second task facing Washington is to strengthen, where possible, the ability of existing or new institutions and arrangements to monitor and compel compliance. If Hegemonists have been too quick to dismiss regularized structures for cooperation as obstacles to American foreign policy, Globalists have been too quick to declare victory once new rules and institutions are established. Cooperation is not an end in and of itself; it is a means to an end. Rules and institutions that can be ignored at will contribute nothing to shaping or constraining how states behave. Conversely, when robust means exist to monitor behavior, voluntary compliance is more likely to occur and coalitions to compel compliance are easier to build.

The point of using American primacy to build cooperative structures is not to give foreign capitals a veto over American foreign policy, as Hegemonists fear. It is instead to make the most of American power by maximizing the number of potential partners for the United States and deflating the grievances that others have against it. Washington has a strong long-term interest in acting—and being seen by others as acting—cooperatively to create arrangements, institutions, and norms in which everyone has a stake. Nor is it to suggest that multilateral action should always trump unilateral action, as Globalists hope. To argue that American foreign policy should be either unilateral or multilateral is to posit a false

choice as well as to confuse means with ends. Unilateralism can be put to good or bad uses. The Globalists who denounced President Bush for ending American support for the Kyoto Protocol did not criticize the Nunn-Lugar program because it was a unilateral effort. Likewise, multilateralism can produce a modern-day Kellogg-Briand Treaty just as easily as it produces a Gulf War coalition or a World Trade Organization.

In sum, Hegemonists and Globalists have much to learn from each other. The United States does not have the luxury of worrying only about physical threats to its security or the freedom to focus only on human tragedies abroad. Power without willing cooperation veers toward diktat and breeds resentment and resistance. Cooperation without power produces posturing, not progress. A wise foreign policy for the age of global politics would keep these lessons in mind.

A Foreign Policy for the Age of Global Politics

In the age of global politics, American foreign policy should focus as a matter of priority on those issues that will determine Washington's success in sustaining and expanding the liberal international order. Five issues stand out—defeating global terrorist organizations that are able and willing to launch catastrophic attacks; extending the economic and political benefits of globalization to as many people as possible; encouraging the other great powers to work together to support a liberal international order; stemming and ultimately reversing WMD proliferation; and confronting threats to the global environment, starting with climate change. In each instance, the United States should seek to achieve these priorities by melding American primacy and international cooperation.

These priorities do not exhaust the list of issues on the American foreign policy agenda. Problems such as regional conflict and the spread of HIV/AIDS may not have systemic consequences, but Washington will inevitably address (and should address) these and other issues. The impulse to do so will be not merely humanitarian, but also strategic and political. Regional conflicts drive WMD proliferation in most instances, while HIV/AIDS can decimate societies and leave governments incapable of preventing terrorists from operating on their soil. Likewise, when Washington asks for help on issues that matter to it, other countries will naturally ask what Washington is doing on issues that matter to them. The American foreign policy agenda will thus always overflow with tasks to complete. Yet a successful foreign policy ultimately recognizes what its main priorities

should be, and time and energy ought to be invested accordingly, even if that means having at times to make tough choices.

Combatting Catastrophic Terrorism

The first priority of American foreign policy is to disrupt and defeat terrorist organizations bent on catastrophic terrorism. In the 1980s and 1990s, the United States experienced numerous terrorist attacks but never made counterterrorism a top priority. The reason was simple. Most attacks took place overseas and resulted in few American deaths. Al Qaeda changed all that. No one now doubts its desire to inflict catastrophic harm on the United States. Unfortunately, while Operation Enduring Freedom denied al Qaeda a base of operations in Afghanistan, it did not eliminate its ability to operate. Moreover, even if al Qaeda were to disappear, the threat of catastrophic terrorism would remain. Left unchecked, globalization and the diffusion of technology will increasingly enable the angry few to inflict grievous harm on the many. The most feared dangers come with WMD proliferation. However, as we now know, terrorists do not need nuclear warheads or smallpox viruses to kill thousands of Americans. And if such attacks targeted key transportation nodes or brought down other critical infrastructure, the American economy could be sent into a tailspin, taking the world economy down with it.⁷¹

Efforts to disrupt and defeat catastrophic terrorism must emphasize both the shield and the sword. The shield consists of preventive, protective, and responsive efforts at home—starting with better defenses at the borders, expedited information flows among intelligence and law enforcement agencies, improved domestic intelligence capabilities, vigorous protection of the most critical infrastructure, robust consequence management programs, and a more responsive organization to manage all these efforts.⁷² Better defenses at home are not enough, however; they must be complemented by the sword of vigorous U.S. action abroad. That includes destroying terrorist training camps, detaining (or, if necessary, killing) terrorist operatives, stepping up intelligence collection, enhancing bilateral and multilateral intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, and encouraging states to get out of the business of sponsoring terrorism. The latter requires a mix of strategies that will vary depending on the country in question. At times—Afghanistan being the clear case—it may require military action, either alone or in concert with others. More often, it will involve political and economic pressure, which will be all the more effective if Washington succeeds in obtaining the support of other countries.

As Afghanistan has underscored, an effective counterterrorism effort also requires policies aimed at helping failed states. As the Bush administration's *National Security Strategy* wisely points out, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones."⁷³ Failed and failing states give terrorists grievances to exploit and places to operate. Efforts to prevent states from failing—or rebuilding those that have—include diplomatic engagement aimed at helping to resolve civil conflict, aid for postconflict reconstruction, trade and debt relief, and counterterrorism assistance.⁷⁴ Such efforts are most likely to work if they are coordinated, if not conducted jointly, with America's major allies.

Extending the Benefits of Globalization

The United States has a profound interest in seeing the economic, political, and social benefits of globalization extended to as many people as possible. America's prosperity, and hence its power, is intimately bound up with the health of the international economy. Lowering trade barriers, reducing the international financial system's volatility, and helping developing countries become successful market economies benefit the U.S. economy in the long term, as Americans learned to their profit when they helped rebuild Europe and Japan after World War II. At the same time, a world in which the largest possible number of countries are successful market democracies is likely to pose the fewest threats to American security. It is not just that democracies are less likely to wage war against fellow democracies, though the evidence on that score is impressive.⁷⁵ It is also that collapsing economies and the denial of liberty help fuel threats to Americans. Economic failure and dashed aspirations in poor countries breed resentment of the United States, which is often portrayed as causing and benefiting from their misery, and authoritarian regimes frequently encourage anti-Americanism to deflect public criticism of their own misrule. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda gladly exploit the resulting anger to justify their attacks and to secure aid and comfort for their operatives.

Promoting democracy is, of course, easier said than done. It takes decades, if not generations, to achieve the stability and predictability associated with mature democracies like those in North America and Western Europe. Indeed, the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is generally difficult and often offers antidemocratic forces an opportunity to exploit the openness to their own ends. As a result, appeals to nationalism, anti-Americanism, and religious fundamentalism tend to flourish during times of transition.⁷⁶ Moreover, elections alone do not a democracy make.

Absent a concomitant commitment to liberal constitutionalism, elections can produce what Fareed Zakaria has called illiberal democracies.⁷⁷ Early elections often bring to power the very antidemocratic forces that democratic governance is supposed to undermine. However, none of these difficulties should deter the United States from making the promotion of democracy and human rights a top priority. Even if, in the short run, authoritarian governments like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan provide crucial support for other U.S. foreign policy objectives, backing governments like these has significant long-run costs—including, most important, turning alienated local populations from potential friends into actual foes.

Efforts to build democracy must start by recognizing these obstacles. Democracy is not a matter of holding one or even two elections, but instead requires the emergence of a civil society that not only supports but demands to be governed in ways that reflect the desires of all the people. The populace also requires a certain level of education in order to make informed choices. That, in turn, requires the establishment of an independent media and the creation of civic associations of many kinds. Finally, a certain minimal level of economic development will have to be achieved—people concerned solely with getting food on the table for their families have little time for helping build the underlying structures of democracy. All of this will take time and effort, and while outside assistance is important, the crucial effort must be made by the people themselves. The United States can help by encouraging governments—especially otherwise friendly ones—to open up their societies to the democratic aspirations of its people. It should also provide the resources necessary for individuals and groups within these countries to take the educational and organizational steps on which ultimate success depends.

Crucial to the success of any democracy-building effort is a concomitant commitment to economic development and liberalization. As Richard Haass has rightly observed, “Market-based economic modernization helps usher in elements of democracy: the rule of law, transparent decision-making, the free exchange of ideas. Yet it is just as true that these elements of democracy sustain and accelerate economic growth. This need not be a sequential path, such as economic development followed by political liberalization. When political and economic freedom go hand in hand, they strengthen each other.”⁷⁸ How can economic modernization be encouraged?⁷⁹ Part of the answer, for sure, is a much greater U.S. commitment to foreign assistance. The United States still spends only half a penny of every federal dollar on foreign aid, and it ranks dead last among all western

countries in foreign assistance spending as a percentage of GDP. President Bush's proposal to increase U.S. aid spending by 50 percent will help—but that is still a paltry sum given the requirements that exist around the world.

Yet, even a much greater commitment to foreign aid will not guarantee economic development. Equally, if not more, important are changes on the trade front, as Lael Brainard and Robert Litan explain in chapter 10 of this volume. For domestic political reasons, the United States tends to be most protectionist in areas such as agriculture and textiles where developing countries actually have products to sell. In 2000, President Bill Clinton sought to reverse that trend when he signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which opened the U.S. market to African-produced clothing made from non-American textiles. Yet, rather than extending this limited step to other parts of the world and additional products, Washington more recently reversed course by imposing new barriers on textiles and steel and granting huge agricultural subsidies to American farmers. While these protectionist measures help domestic producers, they hurt U.S. consumers and foreign producers—many of them in the poorest countries. Domestic political realities mean that Washington must help American workers and industries most affected by opening markets, but neither subsidization nor protectionism offers a long-term answer. The only way other countries and people are going to embrace the benefits of globalization is if the cost of doing so is not disproportionately borne by the least fortunate in the world.

Encouraging Great Power Support for a Liberal International Order

A third priority for Washington is to encourage Europe, Russia, China, and Japan to work in concert with the United States to support and extend the liberal international order. A return to the era of geopolitics, in which rival powers vied for domination, would doom the chances of expanding the community of market democracies. Not only would geopolitical calculations reclaim their traditional prominence in American foreign policy; the problems that arise out of globalization would be greatly magnified. The war on terrorism would look much different if, say, China were giving sanctuary to al Qaeda. If trade wars among economic giants were to replace the common commitment of the world's largest economies to breaking down the last remaining barriers to the free flow of goods and services across the globe, continued prosperity for all would suffer a mighty blow.

The challenge for American foreign policy is twofold. First, Washington must maintain mutually supportive relations with its allies in Europe and

Asia. The basis for such relations will necessarily differ from what it was in the past, when a common adversary provided the necessary glue for maintaining a united front. Then there was no practical alternative to alliance for America, Europe, or Japan. Now there is. American power gives Washington the ability to achieve many of its goals with little regard for other nations. Europe can, as it has for the past decade, continue to focus on extending the zone of peace and prosperity further eastward largely on its own. Japan will likely continue for some time to focus inward as it figures out how an aging society and stagnant economy can recover its past dynamism.

Nevertheless, the drifting apart of erstwhile allies has both short- and long-term costs. Many of the most important global challenges—terrorism, global warming, poverty—can be dealt with only if the major powers cooperate. Moreover, rancor, especially between the United States and Europe, ultimately could lead to competition for power and global leadership.⁸⁰ Even if America could win such a competition, the inevitable costs suggest that wise policy would work now to avoid it. The value of seeking cooperation from America's most important partners, even when their contribution is not strictly required, lies precisely in maintaining mutually supportive relations and avoiding the drift that over time can turn into destructive rivalry. That is why accepting Europe's offers of military assistance in helping to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan was important and why seeking Europe's support in helping to stabilize postwar Iraq has benefits that extend beyond the limited military contribution Europe can make. Conversely, that is why the Bush administration's early decisions to walk away from cooperative endeavors to strengthen nonproliferation regimes, curtail greenhouse gas emissions, and promote international justice harmed America's long-term interests.

The second, more difficult challenge is to foster the integration of Russia and China into the liberal international order. Fortunately, recent trends have been encouraging. Both Russia and China are embracing free-market economics, Russia has partially democratized, and China's communist rulers have allowed greater political openness at the local level (while continuing to hold power tightly at the national level). Moreover, Moscow and Beijing used September 11 as an opportunity to recast their foreign policies. Both decided early that they had more to gain by cooperating with America's war on terrorism than by resisting it. This cooperation prompted President Bush to argue that "the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century

to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of perpetually prepare for war.”⁸¹

The task is to exploit this opportunity and ultimately make it too costly for Moscow and Beijing to reverse course. That will require that both countries succeed in converting the closed command economies and totalitarian systems of yesteryear into vibrant, open market democracies. The transition will not be easy. Both economies are slowly becoming integrated into the liberal international economic order, and both are experiencing wrenching social change as a result. Russia’s democratization process has been fitful and incomplete. Its appalling human rights abuses in Chechnya underscore just how far Moscow still has to go. China’s communist rulers have allowed greater political openness at the local level, but they have refused to abandon any notion of one-party rule or to open power at the national level. Although Washington has only a limited ability to influence these trends, it should do as much as it can to encourage economic openness and political democracy. As it has with China, the United States should extend the benefits of free trade to Russia through its entry into the World Trade Organization. Washington must also be forthright and uncompromising about the importance of political liberalization and the protection of human rights. Ultimately, however, it will be up to the Chinese and Russian people to press their leaders to provide them with the full benefits of economic and political liberalization.

Stemming WMD Proliferation

American foreign policy must work to stem and, ultimately, reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This objective is obviously related to the goal of stopping catastrophic terrorism. The spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to more nations also poses grave dangers to American interests. Although it often goes unnoticed, one of Washington’s great foreign policy triumphs in recent decades was its success in persuading most countries either not to start nuclear and other weapons programs (think Germany and Japan) or to abandon ones they had (think South Africa and Brazil). Now Washington confronts a small number of holdouts, countries such as Iran and North Korea, that refuse to abide by their international obligations not to develop these weapons. Should these countries develop robust WMD capabilities—especially nuclear capabilities and the means to deliver them—they may become emboldened to threaten the United States or, more likely, its friends and allies. That development

could easily undo the success Washington has had in slowing and in some instances even reversing the spread of WMD as some countries decide that they need them to deter potential attackers. The result could be a rapid acceleration in proliferation, thereby creating more opportunities for WMD to be used or sold to, or stolen by, terrorist organizations.

Washington should take several unilateral steps to diminish the WMD threat. Maintaining a robust military provides a powerful deterrent to rogue state attacks. U.S. political and economic pressure can be wielded against potential proliferators, and preemption can defeat attacks before they occur. Missile defense can backstop a preemptive strategy, both by denying adversaries the potential for blackmail and by defeating any missile launches that actually take place.⁸² Consequence management strategies can mitigate, and in the case of biological weapons perhaps even defeat, an attack. However, such unilateral strategies are inherently limited. Deterrence through retaliation means little to stateless terrorists willing to die for their cause. The political and military feasibility of preemption is often in doubt.⁸³ Missile defenses are hardly perfect, and in any case provide no protection against bombs on trucks or container ships. Consequence management efforts could prove ineffective against nuclear or biological attacks.

As a result, unilateral efforts must be combined with concerted multilateral efforts to stem WMD. Past efforts on this score are a major reason that more countries have shut down their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs during the past two decades than have acquired them. The list of initiatives Washington should pursue is long. It should go beyond the Moscow Treaty and negotiate a new arms reduction accord with Russia that encompasses tactical as well as strategic weapons and that requires and verifies the actual destruction of warheads.⁸⁴ It should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which among other things would create a worldwide monitoring system for detecting nuclear explosions, including sensors in countries such as Russia, China, and Iran that are closed to U.S. intelligence. It should work with U.S. allies to expand the successful Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program beyond Russia to secure stockpiles of fissile and radioactive material elsewhere around the world.⁸⁵ It should seek to strengthen the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and increase the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency to make it harder for countries to cheat.

Treaties alone are not enough, however. They must be backed by the willingness of the international community to insist on compliance. It is

here where power, including the threat or use of force, becomes critical. Violations that go unpunished breed further violations and the collapse of the regime. Here American primacy will be pivotal. It may be the natural order of things that most countries will turn a blind eye to noncompliance, calculating either that someone else will take care of the problem or that the problem will never touch them. U.S. leadership is essential to preventing countries from shirking their obligations. America's willingness to participate in and work through multilateral regimes will provide important legitimacy for its efforts to enforce compliance.

Sustaining the Global Environment

Washington's final priority must be to confront threats to the global environment. The largest problem is climate change. It is now agreed that the earth is warming and humans are at least partly responsible.⁸⁶ No one knows how rapidly the climate might change and with what consequences. It could change slowly and mildly, giving humans ample time to adapt. It could also change rapidly and catastrophically. Even if the United States can adapt to a new climate, much of the rest of the world—and many of its plants and wildlife—may not. That would be a humanitarian disaster of unimaginable proportions. It also would almost surely threaten American security and prosperity. Stable countries could collapse, either because their people migrate in massive numbers in search of jobs and food or because they are overwhelmed with migrants. Markets for American goods could disappear as entire economies crumble. These threats make it critical, if only as a matter of insurance, for the United States to act to limit the extent and consequences of climate change.

There are unilateral actions the United States could take to begin to address the problem of global warming. It should raise fuel economy standards for cars and trucks—which produce roughly one-third of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. It should require firms to reduce emissions of methane and rare industrial gases that are far more potent than carbon dioxide in absorbing heat. And it should invest heavily in technology that promises to reduce emissions—such as bioreactors and fuel cells—and trap them—such as carbon capture, storage, and sequestration technologies. Such steps would have the added benefit of reducing the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to price shocks in the international oil markets—thus helping to sustain American primacy.

However, unilateral action will never be enough to combat climate change. The emissions of heat-trapping gasses from developing countries

will soon exceed those from industrialized countries, negating the benefits of any reduction in U.S. emissions. Moreover, success in promoting the expansion of free-market democracies might actually exacerbate the climate change problem. All other things being equal, economic growth produces higher emissions.

To say multilateral action is necessary is not to endorse the Kyoto Protocol. The Bush administration is right that Kyoto's backers are championing an institutional and multilateral solution that is probably unworkable.⁸⁷ The protocol fails to include the developing world, consider the cost of emissions reductions, provide a reliable enforcement mechanism, or even produce substantial emissions reductions. The Bush administration has failed to deliver on its promises to advance its own proposals for countering global warming, thereby confirming fears that it does not take the problem seriously. But the principles that should guide such a policy can be identified: they should seek eventual global participation and create arrangements that are cost-effective, verifiable, and enforceable.⁸⁸ The policy should encourage the transfer of clean energy technology to developing countries to minimize the emissions produced by their economic growth. And U.S. policy will inevitably need to help developing countries adapt to climate change. The concentration of heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere is so high today that climate change would likely continue for decades even if emissions were reduced drastically.

Conclusion

We live in an age of global politics—an age in which America's foreign policy choices are influenced by America's unprecedented primacy and a globalization that at once sustains and threatens that primacy. Many of the most beneficial consequences of globalization—from opening markets that spread prosperity to opening minds that spread American ideals—help the United States extend its power and influence to the farthest reaches of the globe. However, the same forces that make possible American primacy also unleash potentially catastrophic threats. Rogue regimes now have access to the technologies of mass destruction—not least because the technology trade among them is brisk and uncontrolled. Angry young men, filled with hatred for a country many depict as the Great Satan, can exploit the permeability of borders and ease of modern communications to deliver punishing blows.

The challenge for Washington in this new age is to use America's power to extend the benefits and reduce the dangers of globalization. To succeed in this effort, it will not be enough to rely solely on American primacy, as Hegemonists contend. Too many of the most important challenges facing America now and in the years ahead require the cooperation of others to be tackled successfully. But a stated commitment to multilateral cooperation, as Globalists demand, will not ensure success either. Effective cooperation often is a function of American power—including the power not to work within agreed institutional structures to achieve important foreign policy goals. Instead, the challenges of the global age require a foreign policy that puts America's primacy at the service of cooperative efforts. Used wisely, power begets effective cooperation; in turn, effective cooperation sustains the very power that makes such cooperation possible.

Iraq is a case in point. American power proved crucial in persuading the fourteen other members of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution demanding that Baghdad disarm. Perhaps more skillful diplomacy might have persuaded more countries (including a majority on the Security Council) in early 2003 that war was the only way left to secure Baghdad's disarmament. But there is little doubt that American power was absolutely essential to producing Saddam Hussein's ouster. And now American power is essential to ensuring that Iraq emerges from the war, years of sanctions, and decades of brutal dictatorship as a stable, secure, united, free, and prosperous country.

This is not, however, a task America can accomplish on its own—and to the extent it tries to do so it is bound to fail. The legitimacy of the effort, its acceptability within Iraq and the wider region, requires that others be centrally involved. The United States has neither the capacity nor possibly even the will to ensure success in what will likely be the most difficult and ambitious nation-building exercise since Germany and Japan. Other countries have vast resources and experience, and many international institutions—from the United Nations and NATO to the European Union and the World Bank—can play crucial roles in the effort. American power will be vital to bring these elements together in a cooperative effort to rebuild Iraq, but in no way can it substitute for them.

Ensuring success in Iraq should be a priority for American foreign policy for many years to come. It would vindicate the Bush administration's belief that ousting Saddam Hussein was the right thing to do—even though many at home and most abroad believed it had been done in a profoundly wrong way. Leading a cooperative international effort to rebuild

Iraq would also vindicate those who believe that many of America's foreign policy goals cannot be achieved without effective international cooperation. Most of all, succeeding in Iraq would advance the central goal of American foreign policy: to sustain and expand the liberal international order. That, indeed, must remain the overarching objective of American foreign policy. By that standard, defeating catastrophic terrorism, extending the benefits of globalization, encouraging great power support of a liberal international order, stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and sustaining the global environment are the right priorities for an America astride the global age.

Of course, these priorities will at times conflict with one another. Defeating terrorist organizations may sometimes require that Washington work with governments that do not respect individual liberty or trade in technologies of mass destruction, just as encouraging economic growth could accelerate the emission of carbon dioxide and other gases responsible for climate change. But though trade-offs will have to be made, these five priorities will more often reinforce each other. Stemming WMD proliferation would reduce the chances of catastrophic terrorism. Promoting economic prosperity and democracy could help diminish the popular grievances that terrorists seek to exploit. Stopping catastrophic terrorism and mitigating the potential effects of global warming would diminish the potential for major disruptions of the international economy. And all of these goals will be aided significantly if Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cooperate with rather than obstruct efforts to achieve them.

Notes

1. Philip C. Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (Knopf, 2002), pp. 21–61.

2. This point is developed in Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (Public Affairs, 2002).

3. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *National Interest*, no. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–35.

4. For details, see Ivo H. Daalder, "The United States and Europe: From Primacy to Partnership?" in Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century* (Prentice Hall, 2001), pp. 70–96; Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First," *Survival*, vol. 43 (Spring 2001), pp. 71–91; and Philip H. Gordon, "Bridging the Atlantic Divide," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82 (January/February 2003), pp. 70–83.

5. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Norton, 2001), pp. 392–400.

6. For useful overviews, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81 (July/August 2002), pp. 20–33; Paul Kennedy, "The Eagle Has Landed," *Financial Times*, February 2, 2002, p. 1; Robert J. Lieber, "Foreign Policy and American Primacy," in *Eagle Rules?* pp. 1–15; Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1–40; and William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, vol. 24 (Summer 1999), pp. 9–22. See also Michael O'Hanlon's chapter 11 in this volume.

7. Michael O'Hanlon, "Too Big a Buck for the Bang," *Washington Post*, January 6, 2003, p. A15.

8. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002/2003* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 332–37.

9. Kennedy, "The Eagle Has Landed."

10. *World Development Indicators 2002* on CD-ROM, produced by the World Bank.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 117 (Spring 2002), pp. 19–36.

13. Joseph Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Fall 1990), pp. 153–72.

14. See "Half a Billion Americans?—Demography and the West," *Economist*, August 24, 2002, pp. 19–22.

15. On the importance of threat perceptions in determining balancing behavior, see Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987).

16. For a contrary view, see Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (Knopf, 2002).

17. For an excellent discussion of the globalization phenomenon, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Introduction," in Joseph Nye and John Donahue, eds., *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Brookings, 2000).

18. On globalization as a long-term trend in human affairs, see Nayan Chanda, "Coming Together: Globalization Means Reconnecting the Human Community," *YaleGlobal*, November 19, 2002 (<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/essay.jsp> [accessed January 2003]).

19. For a comprehensive review of the literature on whether globalization today is different from a century ago, see Michael D. Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, and Douglas A. Irwin, "Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?" Working Paper 7195 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1999) (www.nber.org/papers/w7195 [accessed January 2003]).

20. For a good economic analysis of globalization, see Gary Burtless and others, *Globaphobia: Confronting Fears about Open Trade* (Brookings, 1998).

21. Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1999), p. xiv.

22. *The National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Office of Homeland Security, The White House, July 2002), p. 21 (www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html [accessed January 2003]).

23. Nye, *Paradox of American Power*, p. 86; and Bank of International Settlements, Press Release, October 9, 2001.

24. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990*, 110th ed. (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990), p. 829; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001*, 121st ed. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001), p. 829; and "United We Fall," *Economist*, September 28, 2002, p. 24.

25. UNCTAD *World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness*, pp. 3–4.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

27. For an overview, see Joseph Cirincione (with Jon Wolfstahl and Miriam Rajkumar), *Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).

28. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Deborah Hurley, “Globalization of Communication,” in Nye and Donahue, eds., *Governance in a Globalizing World*, pp. 135–51. For a brilliant dissection of the impact of social globalization, see Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*.

29. See Stephen M. Walt, “Fads, Fevers, and Firestorms,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 121 (November–December 2000), pp. 34–42.

30. Robert T. Watson and others, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report* (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001) (www.ipcc.ch/pub/SYRspm.pdf [accessed January 2003]).

31. UNAIDS, *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic* (Geneva, July 2002), pp. 22, 44 (www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/report_july02/english/contents.html [accessed January 2003]).

32. National Intelligence Council, *The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, China* (Central Intelligence Agency, ICA 2002-04D, September 2002), p. 7.

33. William C. Clark, “Environmental Globalization,” in Nye and Donahue, eds., *Governance in a Globalizing World*, p. 94.

34. Bill Emmott, “A Survey of America’s World Role,” *Economist*, June 29, 2002, p. 20.

35. Tom Friedman, “India, Pakistan, and GE,” *New York Times*, August 11, 2002, sec. IV, p. 13.

36. See, among others, Patrick J. Buchanan, *A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America’s Destiny* (Regnery, 1999); Eugene Gholz, Darly G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” *International Security*, vol. 21 (Spring 1997), pp. 5–48; Eric Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton University Press, 1995); and Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “A New Grand Strategy,” *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 289 (January 2002), pp. 5–23.

37. See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (Random House, 2002), esp. chaps. 1–5.

38. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (The White House, July 1994); and *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House, September 2002) (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [accessed April 2003]).

39. See Mandelbaum, *Ideas That Conquered the World*, esp. chap. 1.

40. President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html [accessed January 2003]).

41. Charles Krauthammer, “The New Unilateralism,” *Washington Post*, June 8, 2001, p. A29.

42. Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 81.

43. Quoted in Thom Shanker, “White House Says the U.S. Is Not a Loner, Just Choosy,” *New York Times*, July 31, 2001, p. A1.

44. On the distinction between instrumental and formal multilateralists, see Robert Kagan, "Multilateralism, American Style," *Washington Post*, September 13, 2002, p. 39.

45. As Krauthammer argues, "The history of paper treaties—from the prewar Kellogg-Briand Pact and Munich to the post-Cold War Oslo accords and the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea—is a history of navieté and cynicism, a combination both toxic and volatile that invariably ends badly." Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *National Interest*, no. 70 (Winter 2002/03), p. 13. See also John Bolton, "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" *Chicago Journal of International Law*, vol. 1 (Fall 2000), pp. 205–22; and Charles Krauthammer, "Arms Control: The End of an Illusion," *Weekly Standard*, November 1, 1999, pp. 21–27.

46. Quoted in "Old Friends and New," *Economist*, June 1, 2002, p. 28. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, p. 281.

47. William Safire, "Friendly Dissuasion," *New York Times*, May 3, 2001, p. A25.

48. Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," p. 17.

49. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,'" *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p. A14. On the influence of this study on current administration thinking, see Nicolas Lemann, "The Next World Order," *New Yorker*, April 1, 2002, pp. 41–44.

50. *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 30.

51. For a similar assessment of the strains in Hegemonist thinking, see Stanley Hoffmann, "The High and the Mighty," *American Prospect*, January 13, 2003, pp. 28–32.

52. Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy*, no. 111 (Summer 1998), p. 28. Paul Wolfowitz expressed this sentiment thus: "The way we define our interest there's a sort of natural compatibility between the United States and most countries in the world." See "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with the Los Angeles Times," April 29, 2002 (www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/t05092002_t0429la.html [accessed January 2003]).

53. Robert Kagan, "Iraq: The Day After," *Washington Post*, July 21, 2002, p. B7.

54. For a discussion of the divisions between democratic imperialists and assertive nationalists on the specific question of Iraq, see Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "It's Hawk vs. Hawk in the Bush Administration," *Washington Post*, October 27, 2002, p. B3.

55. "President Bush Discusses Iraq in National Press Conference," March 6, 2003 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html [accessed May 2003]).

56. Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76 (January/February 1997), p. 50.

57. For an excellent analysis of al-Qaida as an NGO, see Tod Lindberg, "How to Fight a Superpower," *Weekly Standard*, December 31, 2001/January 7, 2002, pp. 31–35. See also Moisés Naim, "The Five Wars of Globalization," *Foreign Policy*, no. 134 (January–February 2003), pp. 29–37.

58. Stewart Patrick, "Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S. Ambivalence," in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds., *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 25.

59. See Moisés Naim, "Lori's War: An Interview with Lori Wallach," *Foreign Policy*, no. 118 (Spring 2000), pp. 28–55; and Jay Mazur, "Labor's New Internationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79 (January/February 2000), pp. 79–93.

60. A variant of this idea is "transgovernmentalism," which holds that the key transnational networks involve government agencies linked to their counterparts abroad. See

Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76 (September/October 1997), pp. 183–97.

61. Mathews, "Power Shift," p. 53.

62. P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "From Accord to Action," in P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds., *Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), p. 720.

63. The most extensive attempt to link Iraq and al Qaeda came during Secretary Powell's UN Security Council presentation on Iraq's violations of its international commitments. Colin Powell, "Remarks before the United Nations Security Council," New York, February 5, 2003 (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm [accessed May 2003]).

64. Mancur Olsen, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Harvard University Press, 1965).

65. "Remarks by the President in Announcement of New Cabinet Officers" (Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 5, 1996).

66. Mary McGroarty, "Pit-Stop Presidency," *Washington Post*, October 27, 2002, p. B7.

67. See Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, no. 113 (June/July 2002), pp. 3–28; and Josef Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mister Big?" *National Interest*, no. 64 (Summer 2001), pp. 43–52.

68. Samuel R. Berger, "A Foreign Policy for the Global Age," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79 (November/December 2000), p. 39.

69. John Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right," *National Interest*, no. 63 (Spring 2001), p. 21.

70. Emmott, "A Survey of America's World Role," p. 20.

71. See "America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger" (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) (www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland_TF.pdf [accessed January 2003]); and Stephen E. Flynn, "America the Vulnerable," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81 (January/February 2002), pp. 60–75.

72. For details, see Michael O'Hanlon and others, *Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis* (Brookings, 2002).

73. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 1.

74. See Susan Rice, "The Bush National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States," Brookings Policy Brief 11 (January 2003).

75. The literature supporting this proposition is vast. See especially David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 86 (March 1992), pp. 24–37; John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security*, vol. 19 (Fall 1994), pp. 87–125; and Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton University Press, 1993).

76. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74 (May/June 1995), pp. 79–97.

77. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76 (November/December 1997), pp. 22–43. See also Mandelbaum, *Ideas That Conquered the World*, pp. 241–76.

78. Richard N. Haass, "Towards Greater Democracy in the Muslim World," Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, December 4, 2002 (www.state.gov/s/p/rem/15686.htm [accessed January 2003]).

79. For details, see Lael Brainard and Robert Litan's chapter 10 in this volume.

80. See Ivo H. Daalder, "Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?" *International Affairs*, vol. 77 (July 2001), pp. 553–69; and Kupchan, *End of the American Era*, esp. chap. 4.

81. George W. Bush, "Introduction," *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. ii.

82. See James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense* (Brookings, 2001).

83. On the difficulties of preemption, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Bush National Strategy: What Does 'Pre-emption' Mean?" *Strategic Comment*, vol. 8 (October 2002), pp. 1–2.

84. On the shortcomings of the Moscow Treaty, see Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "One-Day Wonder: The Dangerous Absurdity of the Bush-Putin Arms Treaty," *American Prospect*, August 26, 2002, pp. 13–15; and Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "A New Agenda for Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Policy Brief 94 (February 2002).

85. See Dick Lugar, "Eye on a Worldwide Weapons Cache," *Washington Post*, December 6, 2001, p. A39.

86. See *Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions* (National Academy Press, 2001) (<http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/climatechange.pdf> [accessed January 2003]); and Watson, *Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report*.

87. For criticisms of Kyoto, see James M. Lindsay, "Global Warming Heats Up," *Brookings Review*, no. 19 (Fall 2001), pp. 26–29; and David G. Victor, *The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming* (Princeton University Press, 2001).

88. Warwick J. McKibbin and Peter Wilcoxon, *Climate Change Policy after Kyoto: Blueprint for a Realistic Approach* (Brookings, 2002).