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Talking Sense: Guidelines for International Democracy Promotion

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A vigorous debate is underway among foreign policy experts and democracy and human rights advocates in the United States on the ends and means of democracy promotion, especially in the Muslim world. It is taking place at a time of growing doubts about the historically bipartisan consensus on the goal of spreading democracy as an important aim of U.S. foreign policy. The debate has intensified due in part to the counterproductive way in which the Bush administration has pursued its "freedom agenda," principally its decision to invade and occupy Iraq, as well as the alarming results of elections in Palestine, Lebanon and Egypt where parties not friendly to the United States performed well. For some, the U.S. government's approach has given democracy promotion a bad name and has made it even more difficult, practically speaking, for democratic reformers in the Arab world and elsewhere to work cooperatively with the United States government.

Given the controversial nature of the issue, it is worth reviewing some basic assumptions about the topic of international cooperation for democracy promotion in order to move beyond what should be non-controversial aspects of the subject. Then I will try to elaborate some guideposts that, given recent experience with democracy and human rights promotion, should inform the democracy promotion community as well as the larger national security establishment as the United States and its allies embrace the inherently difficult yet worthwhile task of promoting democracy around the world.

Assumptions and Clarifications

Democracy is Understood as a Universal Value. Despite having attended a few too many international conferences on democracy, it still surprises me that democracy promoters are so often asked (and ask themselves) what "democracy" means. Even a prominent institution like the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Sweden, on celebrating its tenth anniversary this year, felt it necessary to explain that "[d]efinitions of democracy differ and evolve."[1] I would argue, to the contrary, that there is widespread agreement at the political level, in countries of all different cultures and religions, about the definition of democracy. Its essential principles, as endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly and over 120 governments participating in the Community of Democracies, are: respect for fundamental civil and political rights including the rights to association and expression, periodic multiparty elections that are free and fair, universal and equal suffrage, an elected parliament, an independent judiciary, a free press, civilian and democratic control of the armed forces, and the rule of law.[2] As United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote in his 2005 report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, democracy has been accepted around the world as a universal value. "Democracy does not belong to any country or region," wrote Annan, "but is a universal right."[3] This language was later echoed by all heads of state and government from every country of the world in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.[4]

Democracy, in Practice, Differs. An essential corollary to the point above is that, in practice, democracy does take different forms in specific national contexts. There is no model democracy or recipe for success. Democratic institutions are molded over time and in response to different historical circumstances. Legitimate democratic systems, for example, can be presidential, parliamentary or mixed. But the variety among these forms of democratic governance does not undermine the universality of democracy, as long as they allow for the expression of the essential elements set forth above. It is time for the international community to put to rest diversionary debates about the definition of democracy. Instead the bedrock principles of democracy already accepted at the intergovernmental level should be used as universal benchmarks for evaluating the *quality* of democracy in any given society, keeping in mind, of course, that there is no such thing as a "perfect" democracy.

Democracy Must Always be a Home-Grown Affair. It should be self-evident that a society's ability to adopt and sustain the basic elements of representative democracy rests in its own hands. A foreign formula imposed by military force, for instance, is tainted by its nature as a victor's demand over its defeated subjects. An occupying power, therefore, can never be genuinely democratic because it does not rule at the request or with the authority of the citizens of that society. Only after the occupying power leaves can a true democratic polity be formed, and it shall rise or fall depending on the freely expressed will of the people in accordance with a democratic constitution. In concrete terms, this means that democratic consolidation in Afghanistan and Iraq is at serious risk of failure due to the way in which these democratic transitions were triggered; they may yet succeed if and when the essential elements of democracy cited above are effectively functioning free from external military intervention or widespread internal conflict.

The International Community's Ability to Influence Political Events on the Ground is Limited but Real. In a globalized, interdependent world, in which communication flows rapidly across borders, there is a growing interplay between internal and external forces which directly affects the process of political change. As noted above, save cases of military invasion, it is always the domestic forces which hold the upper hand in determining the direction and pace of reform, or whether it happens at all. But history shows that external factors—political, social and economic—do play an important role in influencing events on the ground.[5]

At one level, international actors can create an environment that will help facilitate and encourage domestic democratic reforms. This is the long-term work of democracy promotion that, as shown in so many cases, can make a difference *when local conditions allow*. The international community's role in creating an enabling environment involves a variety of tools—direct assistance to civil society groups engaged in civic education and monitoring government activities; support to independent media; international and national election observers; economic and trade incentives; educational exchanges; training and technical assistance for parliamentarians, judges and police; projects to strengthen political parties and women's political leadership; professional military ties that reward military subordination to civilian authority; etc. These kinds of external support facilitate the building blocks necessary to consolidating democracy.

Sequencing of one over the other can play an important role in the democratic transition process, but in practice is usually limited by the lack of control of dynamic political events. In addition, there is growing recognition and urgency behind the need for facilitating economic, financial, trade and debt relief assistance to fragile democracies as a way to help them deliver tangible benefits to citizens who have put their faith in a democratic system.

On a second level, the international community can play a significant role in influencing events in the short- and medium-term by applying its leverage—political, economic, and diplomatic—to favor democratic change. To do so effectively, international actors must have in place the infrastructure necessary to act quickly to prevent democratic backsliding or to take advantage of new opportunities to move authoritarian leaders out of power. This infrastructure includes bilateral and multilateral agreements and mechanisms for deterring threats to democratic, constitutional rule and for rewarding steps toward democratic consolidation.[6] Absent the political will to implement them, however, such agreements are little more than paper tigers.

The Tide of Democracy Continues to Rise, but Erosion Persists. The evidence demonstrating the growth in the number of countries governed according to basic democratic principles is indisputable. In 1983, 36 governments could be categorized as democratic, according to the Polity IV index. In 2003, the number was 64. Comparable data from Freedom House shows a rise from 55 states categorized as "free" to 89 free states during the same 20-year period. Of course the pool of countries in the sample has grown due largely to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, which has spawned both democratizers and entrenched authoritarian regimes.

In the former group, a new surge of democratization appears to be underway as Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan adopt some basic features of a democratic system. At the same time, there is clear evidence that many governments which embarked initially on a democratic path have moved backwards or fallen off completely. Countries such as Russia, Venezuela, Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and Pakistan come to mind. There is not space here for getting engaged in a debate about whether, in fact, the end of history is near or rather the tide is turning against democratization. Let's assume for our purposes that there will always be a number of countries that fail to meet basic democratic standards, and that countries will move up and down a continuum between authoritarianism and liberal democracy. It should

be the task of the democracy promotion community to devise strategies for creating an enabling environment for democratic reformers at the local, national and international levels.

The United States Has a Vital National Security Interest in the Spread of Democracy and the Rule of Law. The United States finds itself in a rare moment of bipartisan agreement that the extension of democracy, human rights and the rule of law around the world is a national security imperative. Prompted in part by the attacks of September 11 by criminal groups given refuge by authoritarian regimes, Washington has identified the absence of freedom and the rule of law as breeding grounds for terrorists and other criminals bent on harming the United States. More generally, the "democratic peace" theory and its corollaries (e.g., democracies with free press do not spawn famine—Sen; democracies do not generate refugees; democracies perform better on social and economic indicators—Halperin and Siegle) have become an article of high national security strategy, although a serious gap remains between its proponents and the traditional "realist" school of foreign policy. This melding of Wilsonian idealism and national security doctrine has taken off under the current Bush administration which, faced with the attacks of September 11, has articulated a new mission: the end of tyranny in the world. As President Bush proclaimed in his Second Inaugural Address, "We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world."[7] Secretary Rice, who is seeking to remold the foreign policy machinery to effect this strategy of "pragmatic idealism," seems determined to reorient U.S. policy to favor small "d" democrats in ways large and small.

The Bush team has set themselves a very high bar and one which, to date, has been carried out in ways that appear counterproductive to the mission at hand. Consideration of the administration's approach to democracy promotion, particularly in the context of radical Islamic terrorism, leads to a set of conclusions and recommendations for next steps.

Guidelines for Democracy Promotion

While many experts in the democracy promotion business are well schooled in the basic approaches to the field, others in the foreign

policy establishment are not as well versed. In any event, the complexity of the task calls for a constant process of learning and relearning some fundamental lessons, some of which I try to lay out below.

1. *Be Prepared for a Fight.* The business of democracy promotion, while noble-minded, in fact can be quite messy and threatening to others, even in its non-violent manifestations. It seeks to upset a status quo which a lot of powerful groups have an interest in maintaining. Moreover, international democracy promoters seek to influence internal political change from the outside, which automatically sets up an us-versus-them dynamic that can often favor the entrenched ruling class. Witness, for example, the handiwork of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, a former bread basket of southern Africa now mired in famine, repression and decay. Despite his authoritarian rule, Mugabe has shored up support at home and in the region by waging an incessant campaign of demonizing "Western neo-colonialist hegemons" seeking to hold his regime accountable to the very standards his government had pledged to uphold as a member of the Commonwealth and the Southern African Development Community. Another example is Venezuela, where President Chavez's regime, which has centralized control in the main governing institutions of the country and is trying to criminalize foreign funding of civil society organizations, has regularly rallied the faithful against the imperialist enemy to the north.

Among authoritarian regimes generally, the American and increasingly European push for democratization has also had the effect of reinforcing the North–South and East–West divisions which theoretically should have receded with the end of the Cold War. At the United Nations, the bloc of non-democracies, often led by China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Algeria, have sought to derail various initiatives to strengthen the U.N.'s ability to promote and protect human rights. Unfortunately, they have won over G-77 and Nonaligned Movement (NAM) democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Jamaica and Colombia which oppose external intervention in internal affairs and find common ground in seeking to hamstring a United States perceived as arrogant and too powerful.

This is not to say that the fight is not worth having. It is. But democracy promoters need to recalibrate their tactics so that our friends in other democracies can find common ground with us rather than with China, Venezuela and Cuba.

2. *The Means Should be Compatible with the Ends.* Given the inherently conflictual nature of the task, the United States and other governments sincerely committed to democracy promotion need to think very carefully about *how* they do it. Democracy promoters have the rhetorical upper hand in this business—it is hard to argue against the principle that all citizens of all nations have the right to govern themselves in accordance with basic principles of human rights, free and fair elections, the rule of law, etc. As cited previously, these principles are well grounded in international law. Similarly, international law and practice increasingly favor external intervention once democratic rule is in place and then reversed by unconstitutional fiat.[8] Nonetheless, perhaps more than in other areas of international relations, the ends cannot justify the means (absent some sort of international legitimacy for intervention). On the contrary, given democracy's essential characteristic as locally owned and driven, one must be especially careful to pursue means which are compatible with democratic standards and supported by democracy activists on the ground. We should, first and foremost, listen to the advocates of non-violent change in country and support *their* efforts in a way that will advance the day when tyrants lose their grip on power. The types of assistance, who should carry it out, at what time and in what degree will be different in every case.

It is in this area where the Bush administration has committed a cardinal sin. By turning to the democracy promotion rationale for the Iraq war, after all the others had proven indefensible, the White House has poisoned the well for both local and international democracy promoters. After all, we are not Denmark or Canada. We are the dominant military and economic power in the world. When we deploy the full arsenal of our powers to remove a serious but not direct threat to our national security, we poke a stick in many other eyes, both friends and enemies. And to justify invasion and occupation of Iraq as the launching pad for democracy promotion not only in that country but throughout the Arab world is only throwing fuel to the fire. This administration seems to have forgotten the first half of Teddy Roosevelt's famous dictum, "Walk softly and carry a big stick."

So our first priority when constructing a democracy promotion strategy should be to "do no harm" to the local advocates of reform. This requires a much more profound level of understanding of local cultures and power structures than previously demonstrated by U.S. embassies and aid agencies. It also means having an honest discussion

with ourselves and our friends abroad about how high a profile the U.S. government should have when supporting democracy-building activities. There is no easy formula—in some places, dissidents want and need the protection of the U.S. embassy in warding off repressive measures by the state. In other environments, association with the United States can spell disaster for a political candidate trying to win office. In either scenario, understanding the local context is essential. A short two-year tour by U.S. embassy personnel or even shorter rotations by USAID experts and contractors cannot provide the kind of education and training our democracy promoters need in the field.

3. *Be Consistent and Lead by Example.* President Bush deserves credit for so boldly laying claim to the cause of democracy promotion as a principal aim of U.S. national security policy. The problem, when grounding the rhetorical appeal in the stark terms the president used in his second inaugural address, is the inevitable exposure to cries of hypocrisy about current and past American behavior which tells another story. I am not calling for a standard of perfection in the business of national security and democracy promotion. However, in the era of modern telecommunications, the reverberations of a bad decision or action, especially when done by U.S. military forces, are magnified and instantaneous and seriously undermine the U.S. government's efforts to be a vocal champion of democracy and human rights.

To make the point, one need go no further than the terrible damage caused by the human rights abuses committed by U.S. forces at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the Guantánamo Bay base in Cuba, actions facilitated by a policy approved at the highest levels of the government which condoned inhumane and degrading treatment. Several other examples more directly related to democracy promotion come to mind: Washington's continued official support of coup-leader Gen. Musharaff of Pakistan or of Islom Karimov, the dictator of Uzbekistan; the call for democratic change in Egypt followed by First Lady Laura Bush's endorsement of President Mubarak's cosmetic electoral reforms; the welcoming of the Vietnamese premier to the White House despite Hanoi's continued violations of democratic norms and human rights; the backing of a military-led coup against democratically elected Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, in direct contravention of the Inter-American Democratic Charter; and the maneuvering behind the anti-democratic ouster of Jean Bertrand Aristide of Haiti.

The problem is compounded by the administration's record on

democracy and civil rights at home. Its policy on detentions, enemy combatant status, warrantless electronic eavesdropping, electoral reforms, criminal justice, indeed the very way in which it came to power in 2000 all combine powerfully to cause both cynics and allies to question the sincerity of our leaders' rhetoric.

Policymakers should take another look at our foreign and domestic policies and consider how to put them in closer conformity with our self-proclaimed call to be a beacon of hope and freedom to mankind.

4. *It's the Process, Stupid.* One of the greatest conundrums facing democracy promoters is the "one man, one vote, one time" hypothesis—that, once elections are introduced in societies not prepared for true political pluralism, non-democratic forces will seize the opportunity to win office, claim a popular mandate and international legitimacy, and then proceed to shut down and repress opposition groups and genuine democratic debate. This phenomenon, also known as the "Algeria problem" for the way in which that country's military violently suppressed the Islamist parties poised to claim victory in 1991–92 elections, haunts the administration's current approach to the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. Political forces calling for fair political competition and other political rights in the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen, for example, are not only the most likely to win but also the most vocally opposed to the United States. A similar phenomenon is taking place in Latin America where populist leaders are winning office on a platform of opposition to U.S. policies of free trade, macroeconomic reform and military responses to drug trafficking and terrorism. When American policymakers try to influence the outcome, by voicing support for one candidate over another, it tends to have the opposite effect, as has been seen in Nicaragua and Bolivia. Putting aside the obvious problems associated with trying to impose democracy by military force in Iraq, the recent revelations that the United States covertly supported Iyad Allawi's campaign in order to diminish the victory of Shiite cleric Ali al-Sistani is another example of the United States' counterproductive use of its leverage in such situations.[9]

To reduce the chance of a "one man, one vote, one time" scenario, policymakers need to pull back on the rush to elections, particularly in places that have not laid the legal, civic education and political party infrastructure for a credible electoral process. This is particularly true in the Middle East where democratic forms of governance

are largely untested. As noted in the recent Independent Task Force Report of the Council on Foreign Relations on Arab Democracy:

> the United States should promote the development of democratic institutions and practices over the long term, mindful that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside and that sudden, traumatic change is neither necessary nor desirable. America's goal in the Middle East should be to encourage democratic evolution, not revolution.[10]

The task force, co-chaired by Madeleine Albright, Chairman of the National Democratic Institute, and Vin Weber, Chairman of the International Republic Institute, has produced an excellent list of sensible policies the United States should follow when designing its strategy toward democracy promotion in the Arab world. Others which have studied the question have also come to the conclusion that U.S. support for democracy in the Arab world must include moderate Islamist parties which are committed to the democratic process, even if they are not entirely friendly to U.S. interests.[11]

5. *It's Better to Do it with Others.* Given its overwhelming economic, military and cultural power, the United States has a responsibility to lead with a very delicate hand. It should go without saying that our interests are best served when we work closely with our allies to pursue common interests.

In the democracy promotion field, the trend is toward greater cooperation as younger democracies, particularly in Eastern Europe, revise their foreign policies to favor more robust support for democratization.[12] This trend is happening both with the leadership of the United States, as in the case of the Organization of American States or the Community of Democracies (which also benefits from the active leadership of Chile, Poland, Korea, Mali, Portugal and others), as well as with the leadership of the European Union, especially through the E.U. enlargement process.[13] Other countries new to this field are coming on board as donors—India has contributed $10 million to a new United Nations Democracy Fund proposed by President Bush; Hungary has inaugurated a new International Center for Democracy Transition; Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland are taking the lead in advocating democratic change in Belarus. In one of the more recent examples of collaboration, both old and new democracies teamed up to support the transition to democracy in Ukraine, by funding the

institutions and civic associations which made the Orange Revolution possible, and by coordinating diplomatic leverage to ease the anti-democratic elements out of power without bloodshed.[14] The African Union is developing a consistent if weak track record against unconstitutional seizures of power, most recently in Mauritania and Togo. Even the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), not exactly a club of democracies, has broken new ground by successfully pressuring Burma to desist from assuming chairmanship of the body.

Institutional arrangements to protect democracy against internal and external threats are well advanced, even if unevenly applied. The political will, however, to take the next step to establish mechanisms to prevent serious backsliding through good offices, mediation and early warning missions is still largely absent. Here again, fears of superpower hegemony are revived as autocrats rally against further erosion of state sovereignty.

"Doing it with others" also means that governments should continue and expand cooperation with nongovernmental forms of democracy assistance. A range of options are available—grants through quasi-governmental foundations like the National Endowment for Democracy or the German political party *stiftungs*; support to grassroots and international networks of civil society institutions; strengthening linkages among professional associations of lawyers, engineers and political scientists; greater cooperation with other nongovernmental donors, etc.

6. *Use Economic Incentives and Rewards.* The international community is increasingly moving away from punitive sanctions, which have been shown to hurt more than help the people intended to benefit from such a policy, and toward economic and trade incentives and rewards as a carrot for governance reform. In this regard, the European Union has led the way through its largely successful enlargement process. The Bush administration also deserves credit for launching the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which is designed to reward poor states with higher levels of development assistance if they can demonstrate a record of ruling justly, fighting corruption, opening their economies and investing in education and health. Unfortunately, implementation of the program has lagged way behind its promise, causing frustration amid potential beneficiaries and allies in Congress. Nonetheless, the approach is the right one from a democracy promotion and development point of view and appears to be gaining ground in Brussels.[15] The administration should seek ways to multilateralize it, in other words to seek agreement from other donors

to tie other grants, loans and trade privileges to a state's ability to govern in accordance with the rule of law. This can be done by building support for changing the rules at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral institutions to allow for consideration of political issues in loan decisions.[16] Alternatively, a new global development fund could be created that is designed specifically to reward states that meet criteria like those used in the MCA program. This not only would advance U.S. interests in democracy and development, but also reduce the chances that terrorist groups would find fertile ground in weak or failed states unable to care for their people or secure their borders.

A Final Word

Assuming the trend of democratization continues around the world, the United States increasingly will face a major challenge in protecting its core interests as a global power. Its friends and allies who govern in democratic systems cannot ignore the opinion of large majorities of voters and expect to get re-elected on a similar platform of close cooperation with the United States. We must take into account the pressures our allies are under as they decide whether and how to work with us in addressing common security challenges. This is more than just a communications challenge, although that aspect alone deserves much greater attention and resources. We need to change our mindset and remember that, if we want cooperation from others, we need to help them keep their publics on board. We can do that by changing our policies and behaviors at home and abroad and by walking softly as we carry that big stick.

Endnotes

1. International IDEA, "Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide" p. 4 (International IDEA, Stockholm, Sweden 2005).
2. See, e.g., Resolution on Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, A/Res/55/96, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 4 December 2000: http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/un_resolutionpromotindem.pdf; Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, 27 June 2000: http://www.demcoalition.org/2005_html/commu_cdm00.html
3. *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (United Nations, New York 2005) p. 52. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
4. "We recommit ourselves to actively protecting and promoting all human rights, the rule of law and democracy and recognize that they are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations, . . . The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question." United Nations General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, A/Res/60/1 (24 October 2005). See also Amartya Sen, "Why Democratization Is not the Same as Westernization: Democracy and Its Global Roots," *The New Republic Online*, (post date: 09.25.03; issue date: 10.06.03).
5. For an interesting discussion of the influence of a country's relationships to the West in its democratization process, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 3 (July 2005) pp. 20–34. For a discussion on the challenges of democratizing authoritarian regimes, see Peter Burnell, "Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies," *International Politics and Society* 3/2004.
6. See Theodore J. Piccone, "International Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy," and Ken Gude, "Case Studies in Collective Response," in Morton H. Halperin and Mirna Galic (eds.) *Protecting Democracy: International Responses* (Lexington Books, Lanham, MD 2005).
7. President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2004).
8. For a comparison of "democracy clauses" of regional organizations' charters and protocols, see Theodore J. Piccone, "International Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy," in Morton H. Halperin and Mirna Galic (eds.) *Protecting Democracy: International Responses* (Lexington Books, Lanham, MD 2005).
9. Hersh, Seymour M., "Get Out the Vote: Did Washington Try to Manipulate Iraq's Election?" *The New Yorker* (July 25, 2005).
10. Council on Foreign Relations, "In Support of Arab Democracy: Why and How," Independent Task Force Report (June 2005) p. 4.
11. See, e.g., Amr Hamzawy, "The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists," Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (August 2005).
12. For an evaluation of the ways in which forty different countries have sought to promote democracy internationally, see Robert Herman and Theodore Piccone (eds.) *Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992–2002* (Democracy Coalition Project, Washington, DC 2002).
13. For a review of policies pursued by six established democracies, see Richard Youngs (ed.) *Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000–2006* (FRIDE, Madrid 2006).
14. See chapter on Ukraine in Theodore Piccone and Richard Youngs (eds.) *Strategies for Democratic Change: Assessing the Global Response* (Democracy Coalition Project and FRIDE, Washington, DC 2006) pp. 97–121; Robert Kagan, "Embraceable E.U.," *The Washington Post* (Oct. 4, 2004); Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 3 (July 2005).
15. The European Commission has recently announced creation of an incentive fund of 2.7 billion euro, in addition to its usual development

funding, to reward countries making tangible efforts to improve governance. "E.U. Seeks Greater Responsibility in Return for Development Aid," theparliament.com (August 30, 2006).

16. For a thoughtful and timely discussion on this subject see Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein, *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace* (Council on Foreign Relations, Routledge, New York 2005) pp. 203–29.