

START Follow-on Treaty Background

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Background Contents

- Previous treaties
 - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
 - Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
- U.S., Russian START reductions, 1990-2009
- U.S. and Russian strategic forces
 - Reconciling U.S. START and SORT numbers
- July Joint Understanding
- Key remaining issues for follow-on treaty

1991 START Basics

- No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) per side
 - ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers
 - Note: START counted ICBM silos and SLBM missile tubes, not actual missiles
- No more than 6000 warheads per side
 - Warheads counted via attribution rules
- START in force Dec 5, 1994-Dec 5, 2009

START Verification Measures

- Non-interference with national technical means of verification, e.g., satellites
- Ban on telemetry encryption
- Provisions for data exchange
- Various notification requirements
- 12 types of inspections

2002 SORT Treaty

- No more than 1700-2200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads per side
- No limits on SNDVs
- No counting rules
- No verification measures
- Expires December 31, 2012

START-Accountable SNDVs



START-Accountable Warheads



U.S. START-Accountable Forces, July 2009

- Per START data exchange, U.S. had 1188 SNDVs capable of carrying 5916 warheads:

<u>SNDVs</u>	<u>Warheads</u>
550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs	1600
96 Trident I SLBMs	576
336 Trident II SLBMs	2688
47 B-1 bombers	47
18 B-2 bombers	18
141 B-52 bombers	987

- U.S. reached SORT limit of 2200 warheads in 2009, even though START-accountable number was 5916

Reconciling U.S. START and SORT Warhead Numbers

- Most ICBMs, SLBMs downloaded (carry fewer warheads than capable of carrying)
- B-1s and four Trident submarines converted to conventional roles
- “Phantom” systems retired, not eliminated per START rules



“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s



“Phantom” Systems – Empty MX Silo Still Counted under START



Eliminated Minuteman Silo



Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009

- Per START data exchange, Russia had 809 SNDVs capable of carrying 3897 warheads:

<u>SNDVs</u>	<u>Warheads</u>
465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs	2001
268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs	1288
76 Bear/Blackjack bombers	608

- Russia's SORT count unknown
 - But START-accountable number likely overstated actual number of Russian strategic warheads

START's Contributions

- First treaty to reduce strategic arms
- Significant verification and transparency provisions, including intrusive measures
- Provided basis for stable U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship

July Obama-Medvedev Joint Understanding on Follow-on Treaty

- Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100
 - Exact numbers to be agreed for treaty
- Follow-on treaty to contain provisions on:
 - Counting rules
 - Elimination and verification (based on START, simplified as appropriate)
 - Interrelationship between offense and defense
 - Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs

Key Remaining Issues at Start of Current Negotiating Round

- Missile defense
- SNDV limit – in July, Russia proposed 500 while U.S. proposed 1100
- Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs
- Verification issues

Missile Defense

- Russia sought to restrict missile defense
- U.S. argued missile defense not a subject for START follow-on negotiation
- Possible compromise: sides acknowledge interrelationship between offense and defense, but no limits on missile defense

SNDV Limit

- Gap between Russian proposal (500) and U.S. proposal (1100) narrowing
- If sides exclude systems converted to conventional-only roles and “phantoms,” U.S. SNDV requirement drops to ~800
- Russia reportedly ready to accept 700

Conventional Warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs

- U.S. “prompt global strike” plan envisages arming some Tridents or ICBMs with conventional warheads
- Russia sought ban
- Possible solution: conventional warheads permitted but count under warhead limit

Verification Issues

- U.S. desire to vary warheads on Trident SLBMs requires actual load counting rule
 - Verification should be soluble problem
- Russia wants to loosen requirements on telemetry and mobile ICBM monitoring
 - Challenge is to simplify measures while still allowing sides to monitor treaty limits