CAADP at 10: Progress Toward Agricultural Prosperity

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Introduction to CAADP: Process, Partners and Progress

Food security remains one of the key challenges that African countries confront today. This problem is most visibly evidenced by frequent food shortages and famines, such as the crisis in the Horn of Africa that lasted from July 2011 to February 2012 and impacted some 13 million people. But it is also illustrated in less visible, but no less dramatic, ways: The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 26 percent of Africa’s population is undernourished. Such a figure is not only tragic, but also has devastating long-term consequences for Africa’s economic development. There is a clear link, for instance, between malnourishment and poor health and low education attainment, both important components of human capital.

Thus, for sustainable development to take root, Africa must attain food security, which should be accomplished largely through increasing its own production. Unfortunately, at present, Africa’s agricultural productivity is extremely low. For instance, in 2010, the continent’s cereal production was roughly 1,300 kilograms per hectare, roughly half of that of South Asia (World Bank, a). This poor performance is a result of a number of factors. First, the percentage of arable land that is irrigated in Africa is low, much smaller than an analogous percentage for Asia, 3 percent versus 47 percent (FAO, 2012). In addition, Africa uses less fertilizer than other regions of the globe; compare its 11 kilograms per hectare of arable land versus South Asia’s 169 kilograms (World Bank, a). It also utilizes less machinery: In 2003, there were 1.3 tractors per hectare of arable land in the sub-Saharan region, while the Asia and the Pacific region averaged 14.9 (Ashburner and Kienzle, 2011).

The African Union (AU) has recognized the challenges these factors and low agricultural productivity present to the long-term development of the continent. In the AU’s Second Ordinary Assembly held in July of 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique, African heads of state ratified an initiative called the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). The program, part of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD), was endorsed as a framework meant to create ambitious institutional and policy transformation in the agriculture sector. It was, and is, an agreed-upon process (the label “program” is, in some respects, a misnomer) that embodies unique goals and principles. For example, CAADP implementers sought to address fundamental obstacles to African agricultural development, including the sector’s reliance on external technical assistance, the lack of African political leadership and commitment, as well as poor planning and coordination between national and regional stakeholders. Other agricultural programs initiated at the same time focused predominately on issues of emergency relief, offering short-term solutions, frequently implemented independent of national systems and protocols (Simmons and Howard, 2009).

The explicit goal of CAADP is to “eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture”\(^1\). In pursuit of this aim, African governments commit to two “targets.” The first is to achieve 6 percent annual growth in agricultural productivity by 2015. The second was to increase the allocation of national budgets directed to the agricultural sector to at least 10 percent. The program also has four stated objectives, or “pillars.” They are:

CAADP Pillars\(^2\)

Pillar 1 “Extending the area under sustainable land and water

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\(^1\) [http://www.nepad-caadp.net/about-caadp.php](http://www.nepad-caadp.net/about-caadp.php)

The process

These pillars support what could be thought of as the heart of CAADP, the country-level process, which has three core elements. The first, “stock-taking,” is a process whereby relevant stakeholders analyze current and previous agricultural conditions, especially as they relate to the pillar issues. The second is “roundtable discussions,” in which broad arrays of actors are assembled to explore and agree upon ways to further the agricultural development agenda. This part of the process culminates in the signing of a CAADP compact, essentially an agreement of consensually identified priorities and a roadmap to implement the country’s strategy for agricultural development. Reflecting CAADP’s emphasis on creating consensus among a wide range of actors, the compact is signed by a number of key stakeholders. Ghana’s compact, for instance, was signed by two of the country’s ministers, representatives from the African Union, the World Bank, civil society, agricultural associations, the private sector, etc. The third and final part of the process is the preparation and implementation of country investment plans, which puts the CAADP compact into effect. It defines the roles of stakeholders, estimates the costs of executing certain actions and identifies sources of funding. However, it should be noted that CAADP is, by design, flexible: Each country generates its own compact and investment plan to achieve its own stated goals. CAADP’s philosophy is not one that calls for a “one size fits all” approach. Finally, CAADP requires that country-level activities are replicated on a regional basis, with each of Africa’s Regional economic communities undertaking stock-taking processes and ultimately executing compacts and investment plans for agricultural development priorities occurring across their member states. These regional processes and the role of the RECs are discussed in detail below.

Apart from these processes, there are other opportunities for stakeholders to convene and improve upon the CAADP framework. There is the CAADP-Africa Forum, which brings together non-state-actors to review the CAADP progress, and the Partnership Platform, which is a more formal body for CAADP implementers to coordinate responsibilities.

Stakeholders

The number of actors involved in the CAADP process is large, and lines of responsibility frequently adapt to the needs of the specific national contexts and country priorities. A CAADP official core document entitled Accelerating CAADP Country Implementation: A Guide for Implementers notes:

“The boundaries and mandates [governing roles and responsibilities on CAADP implementation] are fluid and task-oriented rather than cemented into fixed structures … the clarification of roles and responsibilities is evolving and may change over time and in
different countries and regions, according to who is best placed to do the work.”
(NEPAD, 2010 a)

The report goes on to describe the general principle underlying this division of labor as “subsidiarity.” Decision-making should be made as localized as practically possible. In other words, large actors like the African Union and NEPAD should not exert too heavy a hand in creating policy especially given the emphasis the program places on local priorities and solutions. Due to this principle, the main players, listed below, play varied roles.

The CAADP Country Team takes the lead in managing and coordinating the country-level process. Its membership is appointed by the national government and, ideally, should have strong support it. Typically, the team consists of five to eight individuals, who may be affiliated with the ministry of agriculture, the private sector, NGOs, etc. The team is tasked with garnering political support for CAADP, collecting information for the “stock-taking” aspect of the process, encouraging the engagement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders, disseminating information on the process, etc. Separate from the CAADP country team is the Agriculture Donor Working Group (ADWG), which is tasked with coordinating donor input at the country-level and liaising with the national groups. The ADWG is not operational in all CAADP countries. None of these units, however, are meant to be a substitute for any government agencies. Nor is the CAADP process meant to run parallel with and be held separate from the political system in the country. Rather, ideally, the CAADP process generally should work within such a system, and in the process, complement and improve it.

Stakeholders at the national level—representatives from NGOs, the private sector, farmers associations, etc.—also play an important role in the CAADP process. They provide input in the drafting of the national compact and the investment plan that reflects their own perspectives and agendas. (A more in-depth discussion of issues relating to CAADP’s progress on the national front will be revisited in the second section. Issues relating specifically to the private sector will be addressed in a separate paper from TransFarm Africa.)

There are four “pillar institutions” (one for each pillar) that support the country-level process. These institutions provide expertise and technical guidance in the form of economic analysis, reviews of current public expenditure or studies of options policymakers have on any given decision. The University of Zambia, and particularly its department of soil science, and the Comité permanent Inter-États de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), a research organization that combats food insecurity in the Sahel, leads Pillar 1, providing CAADP stakeholders with guidance on sustainable land and water management. The Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa—a collection of ministers from 20 African countries—leads Pillar 2 and its initiatives relating to market access through improved rural infrastructure and other trade-related interventions. The University of KwaZulu Natal, and particularly the School of Agriculture, Earth and Environmental Sciences, as well as CILSS lead Pillar 3: issues relating to food security, smallholder productivity and responses to food emergencies. Finally, the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, an umbrella body of regional agricultural research organizations, leads Pillar 4 on agricultural research. Performing similar roles of these institutions are other supporting organizations including the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). ReSAKSS is located throughout Africa, with particular centers of operation in West, Southern, and Central/East Africa. This group produces high-level technical assistance for CAADP implementers, including its Annual Trends and Outlook Report, which examines rates of agricultural growth across the continent, supporting efforts to achieve CAADP goals and objectives. NEPAD and the African Union have also contributed support in
many different ways, including knowledge management and information sharing across the program and amongst its stakeholders. Funding for each of these institutions come from a range of sources.

Regional economic communities (RECs) interact with and address the needs of member states participating in the CAADP process as they arise. In particular, they have “monitoring and evaluation” duties, in which they conduct reviews of CAADP’s streamlining of member states’ policy processes. They raise awareness of the program and encourage political leadership to engage with it. Perhaps most importantly, and as discussed above, the RECs work to draft (and coordinate implementation of) the regional compacts and investment plans, which deal with issues that are trans-national in nature, e.g. trade between member states, multinational infrastructure projects, and trans-boundary water management. (The subject of RECs’ involvement with CAADP will be the subject of the third section of the report).

At the continental level, the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA) promotes the exchange of information regarding “best practices” between countries and, like the RECs, conducts monitoring and evaluation studies and reviews. It also identifies areas where additional funding is necessary and creates partnerships with donors to secure such funding. Complementing NPCA in these roles is the African Union Commission, which predominantly works to garner political endorsement and international support for CAADP.

Finally, donor support is used to fund the process itself (roundtables, monitoring and evaluation studies, preparation and technical review of investment plans, etc.) as well as the projects envisioned by CAADP investment plans. Bilateral assistance comes from a range of actors, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). CAADP also receives multilateral assistance. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), a mechanism operated through the World Bank, is charged with building capacity of CAADP institutions and funding its processes (World Bank, 2012 b). For now, the fund has six donors (USAID, the European Commission and the governments of the Netherlands, Ireland, France and Britain) which have committed $50 million, of which $35 million has been disbursed. The recipients of this aid to date —which is given through mechanisms known as child trust funds— have been the AU Commission, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), the Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa and two RECs: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will soon be added to this list as they have recently applied for such funds and been granted these requests (NEPAD, 2011). Altogether, these institutions have been officially granted $17 million, of which approximately $5.5 million has been disbursed.

Though the donors play an important role in the program, their participation should not obscure the fact that CAADP strives to be explicitly “Africa-owned”, and, as such, reflects the visions of African leaders and farmers.
Given that almost a decade has passed since CAADP was established, it is appropriate to provide an analysis on CAADP’s achievement to date. A full review is beyond the scope of this paper, however, progress can be observed through a few stylized facts that are highlighted here.

As of June 2012, 40 African countries have engaged the CAADP process, some 30 have signed CAADP compacts and 23 have finalized investment plans. Furthermore, according to the head of CAADP in NEPAD, Martin Bwalya, there are “about 9 to 15 countries that have had very significant financing ... of their investment plans” (Bwalya, 2012). These totals mean that today a majority of African countries have formalized CAADP compacts, certifying national agricultural development priorities identified through what strives to be a participatory and rigorous planning exercise. This accomplishment stands in strong contrast to what many acknowledge to be inadequate or even nonexistent national strategies that previously governed Africa’s agricultural sector.

Some critics however note that despite this progress, a fair number of African countries have not engaged the process to date. Yet this point should not be seen as critique of CAADP necessarily: In some countries, the agricultural sector is of relatively little economic importance, and thus it’s not surprising that these countries have not engaged with the CAADP process since their incentives to do so are much weaker. Botswana, for instance, has an economy heavily focused on diamond extraction, and, not coincidentally, has naturally prioritized other initiatives over CAADP process, to some extent.

Another metric some use to judge CAADP’s success is its participants’ track record with respect to the program’s official targets. According to the NEPAD 2011 annual report, eight countries have surpassed the 10 percent target of budget allocation to the agriculture sector and 10 countries have surpassed the 6 percent target of growth in agricultural production (NEPAD, 2011). Moreover, the document highlights the fact that even for those countries that haven’t reached these targets, some progress has been made.

CAADP has also helped engender positive paradigm shifts. Increasingly, donors are following CAADP’s lead on issues the process has identified and are working through the program rather than setting up parallel initiatives. For instance, in order to be eligible for support from the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), a country must sign a CAADP compact and comply with all subsequent steps including technical review of the investment plan. In essence, CAADP has had the effect of making African countries to approach agricultural development more strategically. Before CAADP existed, few had what could be described as an overarching agricultural strategy. It is likely that CAADP sparked interest in creating such plans and helped put back agriculture and food security issues higher on their list of economic priorities. CAADP has also created mechanisms that facilitate reviews of agriculture plans, so as to strengthen their content. To a large extent, this is the domain of the pillars institutions, which encountered some degree success; they have authored useful studies and have composed framework documents that have been accepted formally within the CAADP process. But they have also been criticized for a range of reasons, as well. According to one World Bank document, there is still ambiguity as to the roles that each is to play exactly, and a concern that the institutions were chosen without widespread consensus (World Bank, 2012 d). Official CAADP sources have criticized the institutions on a different ground, namely that the institutions have “lacked the financial and management resources to make a major impression on national and regional policies” (NEPAD 2010 b).
One complaint against CAADP is that its implementation has been too slow. The program got off to a late start: “For the first five years or so, not much progress was made” laments the nonprofit ActionAid (Tibbett, 2011). The very first country compact was signed in March of 2007 (Rwanda)—some four years after CAADP came into existence—and the second compact was signed more than a year later, in July of 2009 (Togo) (NEPAD and AU, 2012). Advocates for the program defend this record, however, by pointing out that the process had to be ironed out before countries could draft, sign and implement their own compacts.

Finally, a note of caution: Determining whether CAADP itself is responsible for creating better public policies or for boosting agricultural development in Africa is difficult. Issues of causality often arise. According to an official CAADP review, “most governments committed to CAADP were already subscribing to the types of strategy advocated by” the program. Furthermore, “much of the policy content of CAADP derives from the more successful initiatives in agriculture taken by several African governments before 2003.” (NEPAD, 2010 b) In the same vein, it is interesting to note that four countries that have not signed CAADP compacts (Botswana, Angola, Madagascar, Zimbabwe) surpassed the 6 percent target anyway (World Bank, a).

Of course, neither supporters nor critics would contend that CAADP was meant to be a panacea. Furthermore, both sides would agree that the program is a work in progress and its potential remains largely untapped. This is perhaps to be expected given CAADP’s vast ambition: “to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture.” Achieving such a goal will invariably involve a long-time horizon and a great deal of persistence.

Outline for this report

The following document examines CAADP’s achievements and programmatic challenges. As a full review of CAADP is beyond the scope of this particular report, this document will focus on the following areas:

- Enabling Regional Integration: The Role of Regional Economic Communities
- Perspectives on CAADP Performance in Kenya and Nigeria
Enabling Regional Integration: The Role of the Regional Economic Communities

As a response to food insecurity across the continent, many African nations have instituted various strategies to cushion against food shortages and to protect vulnerable or at-risk individuals. Such strategies include creating national strategic grain reserves, establishing social protection programs and eliminating taxes on food imports. The government of Ethiopia, for example, has established the Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration to manage food reserves in times of emergency and has extended successful social protection initiatives such as the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), which combines cash and work transfer to protect food insecure Ethiopians in times of food crises. Benin’s Emergency Support to Enhance Food Security Project increases food stability by promoting specific varieties of maize and rice, which have shorter growing cycles than traditional crops. However, despite these initiatives and other strong efforts, national strategies alone, especially when they are not harmonized across regions and when there are widespread food shortages, are not sufficient to combat food insecurity.

For example, the tragic famine in the Horn of Africa in mid-2011 affected some thirteen million people in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. At the same time, some parts of these countries and other nations in the region were experiencing bumper harvests and substantial surpluses; however, these excess food stocks did not enter the distribution channels of the affected countries. In some cases, countries with surpluses put in place trade barriers specifically to restrict the movement of consumable goods. For example, in 2011 Tanzania imposed an agricultural export ban, which significantly worsened food shortages in Kenya (Kimenyi, 2011). These extreme examples of regional dynamics in regards to food insecurity sadly correspond with long-term trends. The World Bank’s 2012 report *Africa Can Feed Africa* estimates that “African cereal imports in 2008 were valued at $15.2 billion. However, just 5 percent of all grain imported by African countries originates from regional sources.” Varying regional trade barriers for seeds, fertilizer and other agricultural inputs also create significant transaction costs for farmers and reduce incentives to produce staple crops and supply regional markets.

Thus, Africans increasingly are turning to regional cooperation to deal with food security challenges. These efforts are anchored around the continent’s regional economic communities (RECs) which are the building blocks for wider continental integration. The RECs are uniquely positioned to standardize export tariffs and sanitary regulations which hamper trade and, consequently, increase the incidence of food insecurity. They are, moreover, among the actors best able to initiate the creation of, manage and coordinate large-scale, multi-country infrastructure projects that could catalyze foreign direct investment, employment and greater productivity in Africa’s agricultural sector.

CAADP initiatives acknowledge the importance of regional agricultural dynamics and the critical potential of RECs. RECs play important roles in the program and specifically provide “technical and financial support to help member states produce CAADP compacts” as well as coordinate the “regional implementation of the CAADP framework” (Tibbett, 2011). The NEPAD report *Accelerating CAADP Country Implementation: A Guide for Implementers* elaborates on the RECs’ role, describing their responsibility for “initiating the CAADP process with ministries…and facilitating the establishment of country teams, and formal structures.” Additionally, RECs monitor and evaluate the progress made by member states within CAADP, advocate for the program in many capacities, and help mobilize and coordinate resources from abroad.
Assessing how well the RECs have executed their roles with CAADP is somewhat difficult as different sources present these issues from different perspectives. The Summary Report for the Development Partners Task Team highlights the “good progress” the RECs are making, while a report by NEPAD’s Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) notes, “the RECs have found it difficult to fulfill their responsibilities in supporting CAADP implementation except in a minimal bureaucratic sense” (NEPAD, 2010 c). When evaluating the REC’s performance, it is important to remember that each has a fairly unique set of political, economic and agricultural conditions with which to contend and has encountered varying levels of success in doing so. Thus, it is appropriate to examine their experiences on a case-by-case basis and avoid making broad generalizations. The following summarizes REC progress within specific areas of CAADP and also examines some factors that shape their performance within the program.

National CAADP process

As the RECs are one of the main entities charged with support of country-level CAADP implementation, an important indicator of their success is the performance of their member states within process. The REC that has advanced its member states the most has been the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). At present, all 15 of its member states have signed compacts and investment plans—a result facilitated by the technical support of the REC and its contribution of $450,000 to each nation to push the process along (NEPAD, 2010). A further testament to ECOWAS’s success is that many of its countries have hosted business summits to mobilize private resources for the implementation of these national plans.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has also helped its member states in the CAADP process. Consequently, as of March 2012, 10 of its 19 countries had signed compacts (African Union, NEPAD 2012). The member states in the East African Community (EAC) have a similarly strong track record. All EAC members have drafted and signed compacts and are at varying stages in the creation of investment plans. However, this progress is not necessarily the result of the EAC’s action. The European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) observed that “the EAC Secretariat … was not strongly active in supporting its partner states … at the national level” (Afun-Ogidan, van Seters, and Rampa, 2012). Similar statements could be applied to the roles played by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), L’Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). NEPAD’s Planning and Coordinating Agency states that all three have “been virtually absent from the roundtable process” that define national CAADP efforts (NEPAD, 2010 c).

Regional compacts and investment plans

Under CAADP protocols, RECs are also tasked with developing their own compacts, which seek to address obstacles to food security and agricultural development at the regional level. In 2009, ECOWAS became the first and, to date, only REC to finalize and sign a regional compact, referred to as the Economic Community of West African States’ Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP). A year later, it had signed investment plans as well. Envisioned to cost some $900 million and to span from 2011 to 2015, the investment plan has three main objectives: 1) to diminish the incidence of food crises in the region; 2) to encourage the creation of food supply chains; and 3) to create an environment conducive to agriculture development in a general sense. Upon the signing of these documents, ECOWAS has subsequently shifted focus to implementation, initiating the establishment of the Regional Agency for Food and Agriculture and the Regional Fund for Agriculture and Food as well as an emergency food reserves and agricultural information system.
COMESA has also enjoyed a measure of success in its pursuit of a regional compact. A draft of the document was completed in 2010. The Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN)—a consortium of researchers and advocates in southern Africa—significantly contributed to its creation (Benin, Kennedy, Lambert, McBride, 2010). However, compact documents have not been officially signed. The ministers of agriculture of member countries initially postponed doing so in an effort to more closely align CAADP initiatives with the agenda of the still nascent “tripartite” framework, which ultimately will synchronize the EAC, COMESA and SADC systems. Some observers have criticized this “tripartite” approach, worrying that by hitching its fortune to a broad integrationist agenda, COMESA risks slowing down its own progress on CAADP and more broadly in the agricultural sector. Perhaps reacting to this comment, COMESA re-launched its CAADP efforts in October 2012, initiating a ‘roadmap’ for the executive of its independent Regional Compact and the development of a subsequent Investment Plan. Outside of its CAADP initiatives, COMESA has sought to address regional agricultural priorities. It has enacted a “Strategic and Operational Plan,” which is meant to guide the REC’s interventions in the agricultural sector until 2014. Some partners, such as regional farmers organizations and the ECDPM, have encouraged stronger COMESA action generally, pointing out that some of the REC’s current initiatives seem “… mostly about the process and not the policy substance” (Afun-Ogidan, Rampa, and van Seters, 2012).

The EAC began the process of drafting its compact quite recently, in August of 2011. While there is a consensus among the member states that a regional compact would be useful, a formal document has yet to be produced. Similarly, SADC has not formally launched the process of drafting a compact, but has a similar effort, referred to as the Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP), which, in effect, integrates CAADP within its mandate. It was anticipated that the RAP would be officially adopted by the SADC Council in August of 2012 and would have an investment plan shortly thereafter, but this has been postponed to spring 2013.

Ideally, these regional compacts should align with and complement the compacts of the REC’s member states. The extent to which they do is known as “vertical coherence.” Surprisingly, not much analysis had been conducted into the extent to which the REC compacts adhere to vertical coherence—which is unfortunate given that such a review could guide the work of the RECs currently developing them. Given that ECOWAS is the only REC to have a finalized compact, its experience offers the best point of reference to begin investigating trends in vertical coherence. A report by ECDPM suggests, however, that even for ECOWAS, “… coherence is far from satisfactory” (Afun-Ogidan, Rampa, and van Seters, 2012). Moreover, despite the fact that ECOWAS’ regional pact was signed before any of the member states’ compacts were, the member states’ compacts are “predominantly inward looking.” Unfortunately, this lack of synergy characterizes not only ECOWAS’s experience, but likely that of many other RECs as well.

**Participation of non-state actors**

According to its mission statement, the CAADP process strives to be very broadly inclusive. For example, official CAADP sources indicate that “[i]n essence, CAADP is about bringing together diverse key players” (CAADP website). However, the extent to which non-state actors (private sector, civil society groups, farmer associations, etc.) have been involved is subject to debate. On one hand, CAADP has annual, continent-wide forums, which, in part, are meant to spur the involvement of these groups. In fact, in 2010, farmers associations played a leadership role in driving agenda of the forum. Nonetheless, inclusion is still an area that has posed problems for
many RECs. For instance, some of the COMESA’s non-state actor stakeholders reportedly “felt the preparatory process [of drafting of the compact] was not truly open and multi-actor,” (Afun-Ogidan, Rampa, and van Seters 2012). Anecdotally, there are cases in which actors were given an opportunity to provide commentary on a draft of regional compact only via e-mail and given insufficient amount of time to do so. In other instances, stakeholders like the East African Farmers Federation were allowed to observe the process of developing a regional compact, but not allowed to provide feedback to that process.

A number of factors contribute to RECs’ performance within CAADP. A few specific obstacles are described below.

Integration with existing initiatives

CAADP is not the only process through which regions have tried to address agricultural issues, and integration with these existing initiatives has been in some ways a particular challenge. As described earlier, SADC has the Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP) process. Initiated in 2008, it was perceived by some as in competition with CAADP, as it shares similar themes and an emphasis on cultivating ownership among a broad swath of stakeholders. That said, the relationship between the two is becoming clearer, with SADC currently seeking to make the RAP consistent with CAADP protocols in order to ultimately establish the document as the REC’s official Regional Compact (Rampa, van Seters, and Afun-Ogidan 2012).

Also outside the CAADP framework is the EAC’s Agriculture and Rural Development Policy (EAC-ARDP) and its Agriculture and Rural Development Strategy (EAC-ARDS). Both preceded CAADP chronologically and share similar goals with it, but a major effect of these initiatives has been to divert attention away from CAADP. The EAC only began to develop its CAADP compact in August of 2011, relatively late in the CAADP timeline. At least initially, CAADP failed to adequately take into account ongoing efforts: According to some observers, CAADP assumed “that nothing of value has come before and that earlier programs and projects were inadequately analyzed and always poorly designed” (NEPAD, 2010 c).

The consistency and quality of planning that CAADP seeks to promote can certainly improve agricultural outcomes; however, the extent to which it adds complexity to the implementation of existing initiatives should be examined. Clearly, the challenges associated with implementing multiple planning exercises have in some cases delayed progress toward the actual implementation of measures to address food security on the regional level. The impact that alternate initiatives have on the CAADP process is in part demonstrated in the case of IGAD experience. In the aftermath of the worst drought the Horn of Africa has experienced in 60 years, leaders from IGAD came together to address the issue of food-security. This summit produced a number of plans including the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), the IDDRSI Strategic Plan, the Regional Programming Framework (RPF) and one that dealt with CAADP. These plans share very similar foci, were left without clear instructions as to how they related to each other, and were and still are considered to be works in progress. This lack of harmonization have led to a great deal of confusion among stakeholders and has contributed to the IGAD Secretariat feeling administratively “overstretched.” (Afun-Ogidan, and de Weijer, 2012.).

Regional level coordination challenges

Compounding on these issues and intertwined with them is the low level of trust many member states feel towards their regional blocks. One NEPAD report states,“[i]n some cases, the RECs
have also been handicapped by … the fact that member states do not necessarily acknowledge the mandate of the REC to engage in planning activities that impinge on national interests” (NEPAD 2010 c). Additionally, countries often distrust and are uncooperative towards each other, especially when their interests diverge. Consider the instances of export bans during times of food shortages in neighboring countries as described earlier in this report. While governments usually seek to support domestic consistencies, larger disunity and mistrust of regional efforts ultimately hurt the region.

Summary

Despite these challenges, the role of the RECs within CAADP and within broader efforts to address food security will continue to be important, especially as continental demographics change. The World Bank’s Africa Can Feed Africa report states, “Open regional trade is vital, especially as demand for staples becomes more concentrated in cities, which must rely on food production from throughout the continent” (World Bank, 2012 c). Moreover, it is important to note that the challenges described above are shared broadly across the development community. In a review of the European Union’s engagement with African countries, Maurizio Carbone reports that the development planners have “failed to adequately involve nonstate actors” even after concerted efforts to improve participation within the country strategy paper and national indicative program (Bindi and Angelescu 2010). Finally, CAADP’s engagement at the regional level measures favorable against initiatives that neglect Africa’s regional systems and priorities. U.S. government programs like the Millennium Challenge Account partner exclusively with governments that implement economic and political reforms that qualify their countries for financing. Initiatives like these neglect the reality that the success of African countries is always highly-dependent on the welfare of its neighbors and the outcomes of the region as a whole. Regardless, in the coming period, CAADP leaders should identify mechanism to improve performance at the regional level and better integrate RECs into program mechanisms.
Perspectives on CAADP Performance in Kenya and Nigeria

Perhaps the most important feature of CAADP initiatives over the past decade has been the country-level processes and the extent to which they have supported agricultural productivity and reduced food insecurity. CAADP was built on the premise that rigorous planning exercises combined with reinforced leadership and accountability to continent-wide growth and budgetary targets could promote agricultural development and reverse longstanding trends of neglect. To date, 30 countries have signed CAADP compacts. Of these, 23 have finalized CAADP investment plans, with 8 surpassing the program’s budgetary targets and 10 exceeding sectoral growth rates (NEPAD, 2011).

Despite these tangible results, assessing the extent to which participation in CAADP actually improves agricultural performance at the country-level is in some ways a challenge. Martin Bwalya, the head of CAADP at NEPAD, explains: “we do not see one particular pattern (of CAADP’s influence) across countries. Instead, we find different patterns across countries, across levels, and across issues.” CAADP’s broad scope and ambitious goals resist simple explanations or quick assessments of impact.

A review of performance around specific CAADP goals illustrates this diversity of outcomes. A key aspect of the CAADP process, for example, is that it strives to be very broadly inclusive. Despite this explicit focus, the extent to which certain non-state actors (small-scale farmers, civil society groups, farmer associations, etc.) have been engaged by the framework is subject to debate. Glen Denning, a director at the Earth Institute at Columbia University, sees results from CAADP’s emphasis on participation, stating: “Without doubt, the best proposals submitted to the recently established Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) were those with a CAADP Compact that aligned multiple stakeholders…” (Africa Renewal 2012). Unfortunately, positive reviews on CAADP’s inclusivity are not consistent across the program. CAADP itself reports that lack of sufficient non-state involvement in certain instances contributes to the perception that CAADP is too top-down, that too much power is vested by political leaders as opposed to ordinary citizens.

The challenges of reviewing CAADP’s performance at the country level extend beyond just the issue of participation. In fact, the program’s efficiency in implementation, alignment with existing national agricultural initiatives, engagement with the private sector, and coordination with donor efforts are all subject to discussion. A full evaluation of the impacts of CAADP’s national-level processes, however, is beyond the scope of this brief. However, we sought to get views of the role CAADP is playing in two countries—Kenya and Nigeria—from Brookings think tank partners, the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) and the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER). The idea is to get some indication of how CAADP has supported or failed to support the agricultural planning processes in those countries. The two case studies illustrate the different progress that CAADP has had across countries and regions. In the case of Kenya, although major reforms of the agricultural sector are underway, the role of CAADP appears to be minimal in the reform process. On the other hand, however, CAADP appears to have had important impact in the case of Nigeria. These case studies are informative in that they suggest that while there may be weaknesses in CAADP itself, what is might be more important is the coordination of the CAADP process within nation states.
A Perspective On The Evolution And Impact Of CAADP In Nigeria
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Signed in 2009, Nigeria’s CAADP Compact sets the parameters for long-term partnership in the agricultural sector and enumerates the key commitments from the government and development partners. The process leading to the development of Nigeria’s Compact followed the path enunciated by CAADP, i.e., a review by stakeholders, an examination of the factors of agricultural growth, the creation of strategies to realize future growth, etc. A post-Compact review of programs and activities then ensured that the investment plans are credible, implementable and in perfect harmony with CAADP laid down principles and frameworks.

The government of Nigeria undertook efforts to promote long-term economic and social development, in particular by implementing the CAADP-based Nigeria Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP). This focuses on five strategic areas, namely: Developing Agricultural Policy and Regulatory Systems; Agricultural Commodity Exchange Market; Raising Agricultural Income with Sustainable Environment; Maximizing Agricultural Revenue in Key Enterprises; and Water, Aquaculture, and Environmental Resource Management. The NAIP plan details the approach Nigeria can take to attain the goal of achieving 10 percent agricultural growth. The realization of this plan would deliver poverty relief to many parts of rural Nigeria and increase food security in the country. It would also set the groundwork for Nigeria to become an important food exporter.

Since the NAIP programs are relevant to and support the CAADP pillars, development partners and the donor community have committed to providing and scaling up technical and financial support to Nigeria, in at least the first five years of implementation. The donors also undertook efforts to adopt a multi-year approach to improve the predictability of resource flow and to permit better planning, budgeting and implementation of programs. The African Union, NEPAD, ECOWAS and regional partners equally pledged to mobilize political, financial and technical support for Nigeria. The domestic players—the private sector, NGOs, civil society groups and farmers’ apex associations—have also committed to mobilizing resources and generating enthusiasm towards pursuing the agricultural development agenda.

A first major plank of CAADP implementation in Nigeria is the effort directed at agricultural development reforms. Input-related problems (such as access to land, fertilizer, credit, etc.) plague the Nigerian agricultural sector and require urgent reforms. Consequently, the Ministry of Agriculture changed its fertilizer policy, discontinuing its responsibility for fertilizer importation, distribution and marketing, and ceding those responsibilities to the private sector. Instead, the government promotes the use of coupons as an innovation to guarantee farmers’ access to fertilizer. Government also has turned its attention to output-related problems, such as postharvest losses, which have been devastating to the levels of food availability and accessibility in the country (National Planning Commission). For instance, Nigeria loses 20-30 percent of harvested crops annually. Addressing this issue effectively would reduce poverty, raise incomes and generate off-farm employment (Akande et al. 2011).

Apart from awareness-raising, human capacity development and infrastructural provision (such as expanding storage capacity), efforts have been concentrated on the development and promotion of value chains. Nigeria has already taken an important first step in identifying specific commodities—rice, cassava, cocoa, cotton, palm oil and a few other products—around which value chains and food programs should be anchored. Nigeria is taking tremendous
strides to end costly rice importation, which gulps nearly $3 billion annually, by 2015. Similarly, the country looks to generate about $30 billion annually from cassava exports, while also encouraging the substitution of cassava flour for wheat flour. Through the value chain efforts, Nigeria hopes to generate millions of job opportunities for the youth.

Through the organized investment conference and meetings held on Nigeria’s Compact, CAADP has been able to generate considerable goodwill for Nigeria among donors. This positive outlook has led to enhanced financial and technical support for the country’s agriculture from a host of development partners and multilateral institutions—the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), among others (Declaration of European Commission). Investment funds have been promised by USAID ($60 million), IFAD ($20 million), and the government of China ($134 million). The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has targeted Nigeria as priority country for agriculture intervention. Despite these increases in funding, investments in value chains are not yet commensurate with the potential capacity of Nigerian agriculture. More partnership support is needed in the form of processing machines acquisition, infrastructure enhancement and human capacity development.

It is rather too early to assess CAADP’s performance in Nigeria because the implementation of the Compact only started in 2011, after the general elections and reconstitution of the federal cabinet. Besides, CAADP’s role is not to take over agricultural development in any of the African countries but to complement and enhance it by providing a common vision and shared implementation plan. Thus, we may not be able to attribute any success or failure in performance of agriculture in recent years solely to CAADP.

Nigeria, however, has started to implement its investment plan, the NAIP, which it sees as the panacea to achieving overall economic development goals and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) particularly. CAADP has enabled inclusive participation by relevant players and raised sufficient awareness among policymakers and the political class. The program has encouraged coordinated donor support and investments for Nigeria. (Partners outside the country, in fact, signed a Joint Donor Statement to better align their efforts with those of Nigerians.) A full analysis of CAADP implementation to date, however, should include an assessment of donor funding dispersed in support of the NAIP and how these resources have contributed to national agricultural development goals. This type of review would be timely given that nearly two years have passed since Nigeria executed its Compact and results of the process might be visible.

Nigeria has commenced implementation of CAADP principles and frameworks. Nigeria has shifted its approach towards agriculture as simply a development undertaking to agriculture as a competitive business venture, in which all stakeholders in the value chain (primary producers, processors, service providers, marketers and consumers) derive satisfaction and benefits on their investments. Nigeria has also embraced a strategy to allow the private sector to drive the transformation process. This decision represents an important achievement in Nigeria’s CAADP compact.

In what other ways can changes be manifested? Policymakers need to pay more attention to the need to create proactive trade initiatives that secure sustainable outlets for Nigeria’s agribusiness products as they come on stream. There would be need for greater consistency in policies rather than the piecemeal approaches of the past. Policymakers and authorities need to prioritize the research and development of innovative technology and processing techniques
that are needed to support the emerging agribusiness sector, which will power Nigeria's agricultural transformation currently being pursued.
Among the most important pieces of legislation that Kenya’s parliament are currently considering are four bills dealing with the country’s agricultural sector (The Star, 2012). They are the Agriculture Livestock and Food Authority Bill, the Agricultural Research Bill, the Fisheries and Livestock Bill, and the Crops Bill. Collectively, the provisions of these bills contain are far-reaching and, to some actors, very controversial. Perhaps most significantly, they seek to consolidate a large number of the country’s ministries under fewer governing authorities. The Kenya Meat Commission, the Dairy Board, and Pig Industry Board, for instance, would merge under the aegis of the Livestock Authority. The bills would also privatize and, in some cases, do away completely with many state corporations. The Coffee Board, the Sugar Board and the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation could be eliminated. The functions they perform would eventually be taken over by other bodies, such as the Agricultural, Livestock and Food Authority. Whether one agrees with the thrusts of these bills or not, the scope of these potential reforms constitutes one of the most significant developments with respect to Kenya’s agricultural sector in recent history.

Proponents feel that these efforts are badly needed to simplify the vast and complex regulatory environment that governs Kenya’s agricultural sector. Currently, 131 separate pieces of legislation enacted by the Kenyan Parliament govern the agricultural industry; 41 public institutions ensure compliance; and local authorities implement a myriad of 1,186 by-laws. Most of these pieces of legislations are out-of-date, and many regulatory institutions—which are meant to implement them—have been poorly managed. The result has been poor service delivery, especially for farmers and other stakeholders who could benefit by simplification of the regulatory environment.

Kenya has had a long history in trying to address this issue. Reforms within the agricultural sector began when the government led by President Mwai Kibaki’s National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition, initiated the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA) in 2003. The government specifically identified “Agricultural Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Reform” as a priority within the SRA in 2004 and formed the Agricultural Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Reform Thematic Working Group (TWG) to address these issues in 2006. The TWG was chaired by a private sector representative while Ministry of Agriculture provided the secretariat, with 10 other government ministries participating, including the Attorney General and the Treasury, as well as representatives from 14 donor organizations. Donors established a basket fund through which they channeled resources to the SRA’s Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU) to fund the reform process. By April 2008, these reform efforts had led to the promulgation of the Agricultural Sector Umbrella Bill. It provided for the consolidation of all agricultural legislation and reduced the 41 different regulatory institutions within the sector to just 12. That bill, however, was tabled in the Kenyan Parliament in early 2009. In 2012, the Kenyan Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture amended the legislation, splitting it into the four bills mentioned at the start of this article.

CAADP’s role

To date, the CAADP process in Kenya has not dealt directly with regulatory issues, though they are stressed in the SRA. CAADP initiatives in Kenya have been primarily concerned with public sector investments and sector-wide growth trends, along with work around the programs four
pillars. CAADP efforts, for example, have supported the development of the Government of Kenya’s ‘Medium-Term Investment Plan for Kenya’s Agricultural Sector: 2010-2015’, which describes public agricultural spending strategies within the country and identifies Kenya’s approach for meeting CAADP’s resource and growth targets. Incidentally, Kenya has not met the CAADP goal of allocating 10% of the national budget to the agriculture sector. (However, it did, in fact, meet this standard in the first ten years after the country’s independence. But in the 1980’s, the allocation for agriculture fell to roughly 7%, and in the 1990’s, it fell again to about 3% (Kenya Producers Coalition, 2010).)

This absence of focus on reform processes has had consequences in Kenya. For example, Kenyan policy makers working on regulatory and legal reform in the sector do not directly benefit from one of the key CAADP resources: technical guidance and peer review from CAADP’s pillar institutions and support agencies. (The Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (RESAKSS), a CAADP support institution operated through the International Food Policy Research Institute, produced a strong peer review of Kenya’s CAADP Medium Term Investment Plan in May 2012 (Mabiso, Pauw, Benin, 2012), but, tellingly, one that does not advise the Government of Kenya on regulatory reform efforts, at all.) Other initiatives, like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (LPI), implemented by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations alongside groups such as International Livestock Research Institute, strive to address these policies and regulatory issues that impede growth. In addition to other activities, LPI seeks to support IGAD’s member states with technical advice and research on the “harmonization of legislation and regulations to enhance both quality and safety of livestock inputs and products and market access for the poor” (IGAD website). CAADP could use similar models to support regulatory reform efforts, like those in Kenya.

In the future, CAADP should do more to include such discussion within its pre-existing structure. It can do so in a number of capacities. CAADP’s business meeting processes, for example, could provide a strong forum for the private sector to give input to government actors regarding what a proper regulatory framework and business environment might look like, as well as advice on how these conditions might be achieved. Moreover, the CAADP wing of NEPAD could lend high-level support and ensure accountability of regulatory reform efforts, as part of its mandate is to review and assess promises and actions which countries commit to. Finally, and most fundamentally, CAADP can provide a platform to help countries think through the regulatory reforms they would like to realize. Such a role would not only be beneficial in domestic sphere, it would also be beneficial in the internationally sphere, where programs like the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition have tied agricultural, foreign investment directly to the implementation of political and regulatory reforms. The New Alliance currently works with just three countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania and Ghana), but is expected to expand broadly throughout the continent (Washington Post, 2012). As initiatives like this move forward, Kenya and other countries could benefit from increased CAADP attention to regulatory and policy reform.
Resources


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