

VOICES OF AMERICA



U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century

KRISTIN M. LORD

November 2008

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THE FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS
and
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Board of Advisers

ABOUT THE BOARD

This report benefited from the expertise of a distinguished board of advisers. This board contributed time, wisdom, and invaluable insights. The author expresses gratitude for their service and underscores that the report, its recommendations, and any errors it may contain are her sole responsibility. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and may or may not be shared by individual members of the board.

CRAIG R. BARRETT

Craig R. Barrett became Chairman of the Board of Intel Corporation on May 18, 2005. He became Intel's fourth President in May of 1997 and Chief Executive Officer in 1998. He was elected to Intel's Board of Directors in 1992 and served as Chief Operating Officer from 1993 to 1997. Barrett began his tenure at Intel as a Technology Development manager in 1974. Prior to joining Intel, Dr. Barrett was an Associate Professor at Stanford University in the Department of Materials Science and Engineering. Dr. Barrett serves as chairman of the United Nations Global Alliance for Information and Communication Technologies and Development, and is an appointee to the President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations and to the American Health Information Community. He is a member of the Board of Trustees for the U.S. Council for International Business.

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Gary Knell is President and CEO of Sesame Workshop. Mr. Knell leads the nonprofit educational organization in its mission to create innovative, engaging content that maximizes the educational power of all media to help children reach their highest potential. He has been instrumental in focusing the organization on Sesame Street's global mission, including groundbreaking co-productions in South Africa, India, Northern Ireland, and Egypt. Previously, Mr. Knell was Managing Director of Manager Media International, a print and multimedia publishing company based in Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Singapore. He also has served as Senior Vice President and General Counsel at WNET/Channel 13 in New York, was Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary and Governmental Affairs Committees, and worked in the California State Legislature and Governor's Office.

ANDREW S. NATSIOS

Since January 13, 2006, Andrew S. Natsios has served on the faculty of the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. From 2001 to January 2006, he served as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). During this period he managed USAID's reconstruction programs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan which totaled more than \$14 billion over four years. President Bush also appointed him Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance and Special Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan. Natsios served previously at USAID. From April 2000 to March 2001 Natsios served as the CEO of Boston's Big Dig while he was Chairman of the Massachusetts

Turnpike Authority. Before that, he served at the chief financial and administrative officer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as Secretary for Administration and Finance. From 1993 to 1998, Natsios was vice president of World Vision U.S. From 1987 to 1989, he was executive director of the Northeast Public Power Association in Milford, Massachusetts. Natsios served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1975 to 1987 and was chairman of the Massachusetts Republican State Committee for seven years. After serving 23 years in the U.S. Army Reserves as a civil affairs officer, Natsios retired in 1995 with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is a veteran of the Gulf War. Ambassador Natsios also serves as a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

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Cokie Roberts serves as a senior news analyst for NPR, where she was the congressional correspondent for more than ten years. In addition to her work for NPR, Roberts is a political commentator for ABC News, serving as an on-air analyst for the network. Roberts was the co-anchor of the ABC News' Sunday morning broadcast, *This Week with Sam Donaldson & Cokie Roberts* from 1996-2002, while also serving as the chief congressional analyst for ABC News. She covered politics, Congress and public policy, reporting for *World News Tonight* and other ABC News broadcasts. Roberts has won numerous awards at NPR and was also the first broadcast journalist to win the highly prestigious Everett McKinley Dirksen Award for coverage of Congress. Roberts is the recipient of numerous other broadcasting awards, including a 1991 Emmy for her contribution to the ABC News special, "Who is Ross Perot?" She is the author of the national bestseller *We Are Our Mother's Daughters* as well as *Founding Mothers: The Women Who Raised Our Nation*.

WENDY R. SHERMAN

Wendy R. Sherman is a Principal of The Albright Group LLC, a global strategy firm, and of

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Strobe Talbott is president of the Brookings Institution. His immediate previous post was founding director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. Before that, he served in the State Department from 1993 to 2001, first as Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, then as Deputy Secretary of State for seven years. Mr. Talbott entered government after 21 years with *Time* magazine. As a reporter, he covered Eastern Europe, the State Department and the White House, then was Washington bureau chief, editor-at-large and foreign affairs columnist. He was twice awarded the Edward Weintal Prize for distinguished diplomatic reporting. His books include: *The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global Nation*; *Engaging*

India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb; *The Russia Hand*; *At the Highest Levels* (with Michael Beschloss); *The Master of the Game*; *Reagan and Gorbachev* (with Michael Mandelbaum); *Deadly Gambits*; *Reagan and the Russians*; and *Endgame*. He translated and edited two volumes of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs in the early 1970s.

CHARLES M. VEST

Charles M. Vest is president of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering and vice chair of the National Research Council, the principal operating arm of the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering. He is also President Emeritus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He was a director of DuPont for 14 years and of IBM for 13 years; was vice chair of the U.S. Council on Competitiveness for eight years; and served on various federal committees and commissions, including the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) during the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Secretary of Education's Commission on the Future of Higher Education, the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy and the Rice-Chertoff Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Committee. He serves on the boards of several non-profit organizations and foundations devoted to education, science, and technology.

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William Walton has been the Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of Allied Capital since 1997 and a director since 1986. Mr. Walton's previous experience includes serving as a Managing Director of Butler Capital Corporation, a mezzanine/buyout firm; the personal investment adviser to William S. Paley, founder of CBS; and a Senior Vice President in Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb's Merger and Acquisition Group. He also founded two education service companies – Language Odyssey and SuccessLab. Mr. Walton currently serves

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A distinguished board of ten advisers contributed time and wisdom, as well as comments on early drafts. These accomplished individuals, listed earlier, deserve my emphatic thanks. Their willingness to volunteer for this effort and make room in extremely busy schedules is testament to the importance of this report's topic.

Interviews and meetings with individuals from the U.S. government, private companies, non-profit organizations, universities, and think tanks informed this report and its recommendations. Other individuals read and commented on earlier versions of this report. These individuals, listed by name at the end of this report, shared their time and ideas. Their support is evidence of the deep wells of generosity, expertise, and talent on which our country can draw. Limited by the short length of this study, I regret that I could not listen even more or follow up on many valuable suggestions these people made. There is much more to learn and many willing to teach.

Given the large numbers that made this report possible, it is difficult to single out only a few. However, the remarkable dedication and commitment of a small group demands recognition. I am indebted to several organizations. Business for Diplomatic Action, the Public Diplomacy Council, and the University of Southern California's Public Diplomacy Center all co-sponsored

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Most importantly, I owe deep and sincere thanks to Brookings, an institution with unparalleled commitment to academic integrity and objective scholarship in service to the national interest. I am particularly grateful to our president, Strobe Talbott, who served on the board of advisers, as well as Carlos Pascual, Martin Indyk, Peter Singer, Hady Amr, and Steve Grand. Charlotte Baldwin, Yinnie Tse, and Ona Dosunmu provided essential support. Numerous other colleagues generously shared knowledge and encouragement.

In 1948, a Brookings scholar named Charles Thomson authored a major work on public diplomacy that informed the U.S. government's strategy for many years thereafter. Though I could only hope this report's conclusions would prove that useful, I am proud to carry on this tradition, exactly sixty years later.

Executive Summary

For generations, America's standing in the world has been a source of strength, security, prosperity, and legitimacy. That standing is now in peril, according to a wide range of studies that span the political spectrum. America's tarnished international reputation carries a price. Whether the United States seeks to draw more allied troops to Afghanistan, win votes in international organizations, or undermine support for terrorists, anti-American attitudes obstruct the achievement of national interests. Winning support is harder; our enemies' missions are easier.

Though America increasingly must engage, persuade, and attract the cooperation of foreign publics in order to achieve national interests, our country must do so in a world that has changed markedly since our public diplomacy institutions were created. Public opinion holds more sway than any previous time in history. Information and communication technologies are cheap and ubiquitous. A dense network of private companies, non-governmental organizations, and social movements exert ever more influence relative to governments. Vicious ideologies sustain violence that puts Americans and our allies in jeopardy both at home and around the globe. In this environment, our country needs new strategies, stronger institutions, and innovative methods.

There is cause for optimism. Our government is built on sound and appealing principles that are widely admired even when our policies are not. We have risen to challenges before, through adaptation, ingenuity, and effort. Our nation has abundant assets. American businesses, universities, media, philanthropy, and technologies touch every part of the world. We lead the world in innovation, communication, education, and research. Our civil servants are capable and dedicated.

Americans themselves are talented and compassionate. America, in short, is well equipped to meet the complex challenges of today and the future. But to do so, we must rediscover and marshal existing strengths, both inside and outside our government.

This report presents concrete steps to strengthen America's efforts to engage, persuade, and attract the support of foreign publics. As part of a comprehensive plan to enhance our government's public diplomacy, it urges the creation of a nimble and entrepreneurial new non-profit organization, the USA▪World Trust, to complement and support U.S. government efforts. The USA▪World Trust will draw on the enormous goodwill, creativity, knowledge, and talent of the American people and likeminded partners overseas to

- present a more accurate and nuanced vision of America to counterbalance the one-sided views sometimes promulgated by popular culture and foreign media
- contribute to an environment of mutual trust, respect, and understanding in which cooperation is more feasible
- promote shared values and their champions
- inform and support our government's public diplomacy efforts through the sharing of knowledge regarding communication, public opinion, foreign cultures, and technology.

To do this, the USA▪World Trust will engage in five sets of activities. First, it will conduct research and analysis, drawing on the knowledge of experts and conveyed in a form useful to public diplomacy practitioners. Second, it will tap the vast potential of the private sector and engage companies,

non-governmental organizations, universities, and others to work on innovative new initiatives. Third, it will provide grants and venture capital to endeavors that advance the USA▪World Trust's objectives. Fourth, it will identify, cultivate, and experiment with new technologies and media products that support U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communication. Fifth, it will bring together practitioners from the U.S. government, scholars, and talented visitors from the private and non-profit sectors to address public diplomacy and strategic communication challenges. In all these efforts, the Trust will engage new voices and talent, serve as a resource to government and private groups that wish to improve America's image, strengthen America's relations with foreign populations, and combat anti-American ideologies.

Interviews with hundreds of experts emphasized that this new organization will not fulfill its potential if it is not part of a comprehensive effort to strengthen our government's efforts to engage the world. Thus, this report also recommends

- an intensified commitment to public diplomacy and strategic communication, at all stages of policy making and at all levels of government
- a major new investment in public diplomacy and strategic communication
- strong leadership, clear lines of authority, and stronger mechanisms to ensure coordination between government agencies
- expanded capacity for public diplomacy within the State Department, including the creation of interagency "hubs" for public diplomacy and strategic communication in major world regions; deputy assistant secretaries for

public diplomacy in every regional and most functional bureaus of the State Department; more and better trained staff, especially foreign service officers in the field; more training and educational opportunities for public diplomacy professionals; and programs to draw outside experts into government

- streamlined policies to facilitate government partnerships with the private sector
- a review of international broadcasting strategy and operations
- a frank discussion of how covert information operations should fit into our government's national security and public diplomacy strategy
- policies and practices that more effectively balance security and engagement at our borders, in immigration and visa policies, and at our embassies overseas.

At this moment in history, America has the opportunity to build the capabilities it needs now and for the future. This report recommends practical steps to achieve that goal. These recommendations will not resolve America's public diplomacy challenges once and for all. However, they represent a first and hopefully important step towards building stronger relations with foreign societies in order to serve American interests.

The underlying philosophy of these recommendations is that Americans themselves are our greatest national asset. Educating, engaging and empowering our own citizens at home and abroad, will do much to underscore the diligent efforts of our government, regain a climate of mutual trust and respect, and rebuild America's image in the eyes of the world.

Introduction

The Internet was a brilliant and bold solution to a national security threat. A researcher named Paul Baran proposed a defense that would protect America’s communication system from a Soviet attack. He recognized the vulnerability inherent in centralization and advocated a distributed network with multiple connections between nodes. If one node in the mesh-like web failed, other links between them would survive, even thrive, unperturbed.

Though Baran was born in Poland, his solution was quintessentially American. It reflected our most fundamental principles of political and economic organization: that decentralized institutions that empower individuals are more efficient, more adaptive, more innovative, less vulnerable to disruption, and ultimately stronger. Individual components may err or falter, but the sum of good connections overwhelms those that fail.

The spirit of Baran’s vision is worth remembering today as we contemplate how America engages the world.

This report examines America’s ability to engage, persuade, and attract the cooperation of foreign publics. It recommends strengthening existing capabilities, in ways that recognize the complex global environment we face now and the evolving threats we must face in the future. It also presents a vision for the future and concrete steps to achieve it. These recommendations draw on extensive research and analysis as well as conversations with hundreds of experts and practitioners from government, private companies, non-governmental organizations, and academia.

What our government does—not what our government says—has the most significant impact on perceptions of America around the world. That is true now and will be so in the future. To protect America’s moral authority, as well as the trust and even power that authority conveys, our policies should be in line with our highest ideals. They must also

be constructed to advance U.S. interests, taking into account the full range of costs and benefits, including foreign public opinion and its implications.

“Anti-Americanism is endangering our national security and compromising the effectiveness of our diplomacy. Not only is the United States at increased risk of direct attack from those who hate it most, but it is also becoming more difficult for America to realize its long-term aspirations as it loses friends and influence.”

—Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,
Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy, 2003

What we say, and how we say it, matters as well. To speak with influence, our government must have a powerful, unified, and persuasive voice,

based on principle, policies that advance U.S. interests, and an understanding of how our voice will be heard by the world. It is a voice with the authority, conveyed by the people, to speak for America as a whole.

But our government is not the only voice of America—and as a nation we cherish that. We are home to business people, scientists, artists, professors, missionaries, musicians, aid workers, soldiers, students, and diplomats who touch the lives of foreign citizens every day. We are home to Hollywood and the Gates Foundation, Camp Lejeune and the Peace Corps, Silicon Valley and McDonalds, NASA and the New York Philharmonic, Wall Street and the NBA. These are forces that carry influence far beyond our shores in a multitude of ways.

“Our shared values are essential because they link America to the world. The belief that American values are universal values—that all men and women are created equal, that all are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, regardless of race, creed, or nationality—connects us to other nations.”

—Anne-Marie Slaughter,
*The Idea That Is America: Keeping Faith
With Our Values in a Dangerous World*, 2007

Our effort to advance national interests will be most successful if it embraces this diversity, advancing the whole by empowering the many. This is in line with our history and our culture. Unlike so many other nations, America has embraced decentralized approaches to higher education, culture, and economic competitiveness and in the process created the finest universities, most creative arts and entertainment, and the most innovative businesses in the world. Accordingly, this report recommends investing in the initiative of these institutions, which will carry America’s values around the globe and construct strong relationships with foreign peoples, built on dignity, respect, and trust.

The core mission of this study is to evaluate calls for a new independent, public-private organization to strengthen America’s relations with foreign societies. It does so below and offers a business plan for a new organization that fills a gap in our national public diplomacy strategy.

However, it is impossible to do this effectively without considering how such an organization would fit into a broader U.S. strategy. A new organization should not be construed as a magic bullet that will address all of America’s public diplomacy challenges. Thus, this study also advocates key changes within current government agencies to strengthen U.S. public diplomacy.

This study does *not* call for two things. First, it does not endorse calls for a new cabinet-level government agency to conduct public diplomacy. Though some now regret the demise of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and we might be pleased with that organization if it existed today, we should not simply recreate it now. Creating a large new bureaucracy would absorb our energy and resources, diverting them from the crucial mission of engaging foreign publics. It would also create competition and overlapping authorities between agencies, which already exist in sufficient number. Instead, we should view the absence of USIA as an opportunity to ask what capabilities our nation will need for the next fifty years and what institutions should house them.

Second, this report calls for relatively little organizational change within existing government structures, choosing instead to focus on bolstering existing government agencies and giving them the chance to work. Our country knows from experience how much energy organizational restructuring can take, how long it takes for organizational cultures to evolve, and how much attention they can sap. We do not need that now. Not all organizational restructurings are ill-advised; many are extremely valuable. But benefits must be weighed against costs and, at this moment, the costs are too high.

“Many of the tools that promote change are not in the hands of government. The dynamic dimensions of life today are largely in the private sector, not in the government. Nongovernmental organizations, private foundations, businesses, universities, and citizens undertake innovative and exciting activities every day that boost the power and attractiveness of the American model.”

—CSIS *Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America*, 2007

There is remarkable consensus on the need to strengthen U.S. public diplomacy, from across the political spectrum, across the federal government, and across American society. The interviews conducted for this study uncovered calls for reform from conservative and liberal think tanks, the business community, academia, the Congress,

cultural institutions, and non-profit organizations. These voices for reform cut across demographic groups and party boundaries.

The changes advocated in this report will aid our nation’s fight against terrorists and their vicious ideologies. Yet this fight is not our only challenge. We also must build international coalitions to address climate change, confront nuclear proliferation, encourage the wavering to choose democracy and freedom, and condemn the territorial invasion of the weak by the strong. Failures of imagination have left us unprepared for threats in the past; we should not make that mistake again.

Tomorrow’s challenges will differ from those of the past, but the methods we should use are tried: strong and wise government by and for the people, that harnesses the ingenuity and effort of Americans, and unleashes the unique vision of opportunity and hope that is America’s gift to the world.

The World America Faces

America benefits when the global environment is conducive to advancing U.S. national interests. That is not the environment we face now. According to 2008 polls by the BBC and the University of Maryland's Program for International Policy Attitudes,

- Publics in 23 countries view America's influence in the world more negatively than the influence of North Korea.¹
- Citizens in closely allied countries believe that America's influence in the world is mainly negative (62% in Canada, 72% in Germany, 58% in Australia, and 53% in Great Britain).²
- Citizens of a NATO ally (64% of Turks) view the United States as the greatest threat to their country in the future.³
- Only 9% of Egyptians, 12% of Pakistanis, 19% of Moroccans, and 23% of Indonesians believe the primary goal of the U.S. war on terror is to protect the United States from terrorist attacks and not to militarily dominate the Middle East or weaken and divide the Islamic religion and its people.⁴

"The perfect battle is the one you do not have to fight."

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

At least in part, these attitudes reflect foreign opinions regarding recent American policies: the Iraq War, the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. position on climate change, and others. Some of these policies may change with the entry of a new presidential administration. Other American policies and characteristics are likely to remain unpopular overseas.

"Achieving our interests is far easier if we do not have to buck a tide of anti-Americanism in addition to considered policy opposition."

—Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World*, 2003

America should not change its policies because of foreign opinion. We do not elect our leaders to win popularity contests overseas. But that does not mean that foreign opinions do not affect America. Understanding, engaging, and shaping foreign opinion is therefore relevant, regardless of what policy choices our country ultimately makes.

There are positive trends as well. In some parts of the world, especially Africa but also in Peru, Poland, and Japan, support for America is strong. Globally, there is growing support for values Americans cherish: racial equality and equal

¹ See "Global Views of USA Improve" BBC World Service Poll (April 1, 2008), available at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr08/BBCevals_Apr08_rpt.pdf>.

² See "Global Views of USA Improve" BBC World Service Poll (April 1, 2008), available at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr08/BBCevals_Apr08_rpt.pdf>.

³ See "Why Turks Feel Threatened by the U.S." BBC and World Public Opinion.Org (September 5, 2007) <<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/393.php?lb=brme&pnt=393&nid=&id=>>>.

⁴ "Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda" from April 24, 2007 <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf>.

rights for women, freedom of expression on the Internet, and governments that reflect the will of their people.⁵ Elements of American society such as science and innovation, higher education, and business practices remain widely admired even where our policies are not.⁶ At the same time, public support for suicide bombing and Osama bin Laden has dropped.⁷

“Our national security strategy depends upon securing the cooperation of other nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out-propagandize al-Qaeda, but rather through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.”

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
Remarks to the 2008 U.S. Global Leadership
Campaign Tribute Dinner, July 15, 2008

Overall, however, the international environment is currently not conducive to promoting American interests. When the United States is not just disliked but also distrusted, when not just our policies but our moral authority is questioned, it is politically difficult for foreign leaders to support U.S. policies and potentially popular to block them. The views of foreign populations matter. Like it or not, the United States needs the support of its friends and allies, and sometimes even its enemies. Whether the United States would like to build international support for stronger sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, revive international trade negotiations, isolate countries

that deny their citizens’ human rights, prevent the spread of pandemic influenza, place missile systems in Eastern Europe or a military command in Africa, convince allies to send troops to Afghanistan, promote the sustainable use of forests and fisheries, or undermine support for terrorist networks, public backing makes success more likely. The current environment also helps our enemies, by creating larger numbers willing to aid, applaud, or acquiesce in their actions.

To advance American interests, defend against threats, and build the kind of international system our nation would like to inhabit in the future, the United States needs to rebuild its relations not just with foreign governments but also with their people. Engaging foreign opinion has always been important but it is increasingly important for four reasons.

“Since 1974, more than 90 countries have made transitions to democracy, and by the turn of the century approximately 60 percent of the world’s independent states were democratic.”

– Larry Diamond, “Democracy in Retreat,”
Foreign Affairs 2008

- 1) *The spread of democracy* has changed the global political calculus. Though democracy is now faltering in some countries, the number of democracies has nonetheless doubled since 1974. In democracies, leaders suffer domestic political costs—a loss of power or authority—based on how well citizens think leaders have protected the country’s interests. For the United States to attract the support of foreign governments, therefore, foreign publics must accept or at least acquiesce. If such

⁵ See recent polls on these topics at World Public Opinion.Org: <<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brglobalmultiregionra/index.php?nid=&id=&lb=brglm>>.

⁶ See *Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey: Global Unease with Major Powers* (Washington DC: Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 27, 2007).

⁷ See *A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World: Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries* (Washington DC: Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 24, 2007).

cooperation is politically poisonous for democratically elected leaders, attracting support will be difficult even when interests align. Of note, authoritarian regimes are also sensitive to public opinion, even as they try to limit its influence. These regimes know that publics have more latent power to mobilize opposition than ever before due to unprecedented access to information and the ability to disseminate it cheaply and widely.

2) ***Today's most pressing challenges transcend boundaries*** and cannot be addressed alone. Climate change, infectious disease, international terrorist networks, reforming international institutions, and the trafficking of goods and people are issues that require the active cooperation of others: allies, international organizations, private companies, non-governmental organizations, competitors, and even enemies. Progress on these issues requires a climate in which such collaboration is possible.

3) ***Ideas and ideologies*** themselves are central to current security threats. As in the Cold War, the ability to win support for a political ideal, attack competing visions, and undermine the people and networks holding those competing visions, is necessary for success. Terrorists and insurgents depend on deep networks of support that may not require any violent or even illegal acts. Success in confronting these groups requires countering repugnant ideologies and presenting a more appealing vision of the future.

"We cannot kill our way to victory."

—General David Petraeus, quoted in
The Washington Post, September 14, 2008

4) ***Many current security threats cannot be confronted effectively with military force alone.*** Force is and will remain an essential element

of statecraft. Nonetheless, when threats are diffuse and asymmetric, when force actually mobilizes support for enemies and thereby strengthens them, states must find additional ways to address national security challenges. Public diplomacy and strategic communication are valuable instruments that expand the range of options available to leaders.

To advance our national interests in this environment, America should redouble its efforts to engage, persuade, and lead with the power of an appealing vision. Traditional diplomacy, the engagement of foreign governments, will always be critical. But it must be bolstered by a comprehensive effort to engage publics.

"Groups and individuals have been empowered, and hierarchy, centralization, and control are being undermined . . . Power is shifting away from nation-states, up, down and sideways."

—Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World*, 2008

The way we engage foreign publics should change to reflect a changing world. After all, the world America faces today is far different than the one our country faced when our major public diplomacy institutions were built. Information and communication technologies are changing not just the way people communicate, but also the way they think and behave. Power is diffusing to new and newly empowered global actors: states, transnational networks, multinational companies, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. America needs to adapt, and continue adapting.

The information and communications revolution created a world in which images and information fly around the world—regardless of their truth or fairness. These new technologies can spread understanding and mobilize publics for peaceful ends. For instance, three individuals used Face-

book to mobilize 1 million people in Colombia, and activists in several other countries, to march in protest against the tactics of the guerilla group known as the FARC. These same technologies can spread violence and hatred, as demonstrated by Al-Qaeda and its disciples.

A key characteristic of the new information and communication technologies is that they grant individuals the power to mobilize global support for their missions. Individuals can now garner support, recruit fighters, raise money, and build social movements—from almost anywhere at any time and at a very low cost. This power is available to a staggering number: more than one billion people now use the Internet, YouTube now serves over 100 million videos per day, and an estimated 184 million bloggers post their opinions. These individuals are not just from the West. Egypt has more Facebook users than all but two other countries.⁸

In this information-rich environment, discrete events can have major strategic implications as they are viewed, circulated, and portrayed as evidence that supports narratives espoused by particular groups. Shocking photos of Iraqis demeaned and tortured by American soldiers in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison lent support to anti-American perspectives and called pro-American voices into question. Images both enhance and detract from power. Consequently, states must actively manage their images and persuade foreign elites and publics that America's vision deserves their support.

However, we should not forget that 21st century technologies coexist with technologies of an

earlier era, fragmenting audiences and complicating efforts to reach them. About one third of the world's population still does not have telephones, but the number of Internet users in China recently surpassed the number of users in the United States. Newspapers are struggling in North America but thriving in India. In Africa, there are 23 radios for every hundred people. In the Middle East and North Africa, some 175 million people watch satellite television every day.⁹

New global powers are rising. These powers include states like China, India, and Brazil; coalitions of states like the European Union; and a re-emerged and aggressive Russia. They include global media giants like Al Jazeera and CNN, which alone reaches 2 billion people in more than 200 countries. Non-governmental organizations number in the tens of thousands and exert powerful influence over governments, international organizations, and global affairs. Multinational companies span the globe, with enormous global impact. More than 5 billion people outside the United States and Canada paid to see Hollywood movies last year alone and the global workforce of the Coca-Cola Company is three times that of the U.S. State Department.¹⁰ The value of private American philanthropy now exceeds official foreign assistance, with annual grants of the Gates Foundation surpassing the gross domestic product of many developing countries. Loose terrorist networks count themselves among the greatest threats to the world's most powerful states.

The existence of transnational actors is not new, but their influence has reached unprecedented levels vis-à-vis the power of national governments.

⁸ Kanupriya Tewari "Facebook Faceoff," OpenNet Initiative (July 21, 2008), see <<http://opennet.net/blog/2008/07/facebook-faceoff>>.

⁹ See "World Internet Usage and Population Statistics," Internet World Stats at <<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>>; Rob Hof, "YouTube: 100 Million Videos a Day," *BusinessWeek* (July 14, 2006); "Power to the People: Social Media Tracker Wave 3," *Universal McCann Comparative Study on Social Media* (March 2008) <http://www.universalmccann.com/assets/2413%20-%20Wave%203%20complete%20document%20AW%203_20080418124523.pdf>; Pascal G. Zachary "Why Jobs Aren't Going to Africa," *GhanaWeb* (April 27, 2004), <<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=56714>>; "An Uncensored Satellite Television Message to Homes in the Middle East," panel discussion at The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, (March 27, 2007), <www.heritage.org/press/events/ev032707a.cfm>.

¹⁰ Viewer numbers and demographics for these companies can be found at CNN's website <<http://www.cnnasiapacific.com/factsheets/?catID=9>> and the Allied Media Corp website <<http://allied-media.com/aljazeera/JAZdemog.html>>. World box office data is from the Motion Picture Association's "MPA 2007 International Theatrical Snapshot" <<http://www.mpaa.org/International%20Theatrical%20Snapshot.pdf>>.

	2007 Annual Budget	Employees	Global Presence ¹¹
Department of State	\$10.2 billion	28,000	over 180 countries
Coca-Cola	\$28.9 billion	90,500	over 200 countries
Citigroup	\$81.7 billion	275,000	over 100 countries

As a result, official engagement with foreign societies is now dwarfed by private engagement, especially the movement of people, capital, goods, services, culture, and images. Barring a major economic depression or global pandemic, this trend is likely to continue.

“Globalization and the information revolution are empowering decentralized networks that challenge state-centered hierarchies.. . power comes not only from the ability to field armies, but also from the capacity to coordinate diffuse actors.”

—Jamie Metzl, “Network Diplomacy,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 2001

These conditions are reshaping the global landscape in ways that challenge American policies and practices. America must now communicate with an incredible diversity of audiences, in new ways, in the midst of an information tempest. The 21st century is not an age of information

scarcity. America must compete for attention and credibility.

America *can* adapt and, in fact, the world is changing in ways that should play to our country’s strengths. We have the most flexible, most competitive, most creative economy in the world and are global leaders in communication and innovation. As a nation, we are skillful, well-educated, and entrepreneurial. While we build on our own strengths, our enemies may weaken. Some argue, for instance, that Al-Qaeda’s quick adaptation to new technologies is not extending to the next generation of communications. We should prepare for the future regardless.

To communicate effectively in this new environment, America needs to reform in ways that strengthen the voice of government, empower our own people, engage the like-minded around the world, and use new media and technologies in agile and innovative ways. This report will explain how to do this, concretely and specifically.

¹¹ All information for the Department of State can be found in its Financial Report for Fiscal Year 2007 <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/97358.pdf>>. The Coca-Cola 2007 Annual Review lists budget information <http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/investors/pdfs/2007_annual_review/Coke_AR07_Financial_Data.pdf>, while employee statistics are on the company website <http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/meet_our_people.html>. Citigroup’s budget can be found in its 2007 Annual Report <http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/fin/data/ar07c_en.pdf>, while information about its employees is found on the company website <<http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/corporate/history/citigroup.htm>>.

The Role of U.S. Public Diplomacy

America, and by extension Americans, will benefit from regaining the moral high ground and pursuing a policy of hard-headed engagement with the world. To do this, we should imagine a new vision of America and how we want others to perceive it. In this vision,

- America once again will be seen as a city on a hill that stands for opportunity and freedom not just for Americans, but for the world.
- This vision of America will be reinvented for a new generation of young people around the world.
- Our actions will be, and be perceived to be, in line with our highest ideals.
- The appeal of our enemies and ideological competitors will wither.
- Nations will cooperate willingly with the United States when they share interests and, when they disagree, will nonetheless respect the legitimacy of policies derived through democratic decision-making and based on legitimate principles.

“To win the war of ideas, the United States must clearly recognize the importance of America’s voice and good standing as elements of its power and influence in the world.”

—Brookings Institution scholars Hady Amr and Peter Singer, “To Win the ‘War on Terror,’ We Must First Win the ‘War of Ideas’: Here’s How,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2008

This vision does not ignore the long history of anti-Americanism or its many forms, which are unlikely to vanish. Nor does it forget that power breeds resentment, a fate of all world powers.

Within these boundaries, however, our own history teaches that there is substantial room for cooperation, even inspiration. Americans *can* move foreign opinion, through what we say and do, how we engage the world, and how we rise to meet circumstance.

How we engage the world is the function of public diplomacy—defined as the promotion of national interests through efforts to inform, engage, and influence foreign publics—and it has become increasingly important. The world is evolving in ways that increase the utility of public diplomacy as an instrument of statecraft and limit the effectiveness of other tools. Yet, public diplomacy is also undervalued, underused, and poorly understood.

Using public diplomacy to its full potential is not an easy task and, indeed, most other major nations are now grappling with this challenge. However, the unique nature of the United States equips us better than any other nation to use public diplomacy well. Embracing that potential should be among our highest foreign policy objectives.

“Some things that were true before 9/11 are still true today. Among them are that the United States, for all our power, cannot be secure in a world that does not trust us and that resents and resists our leadership; that the United States, as any state, needs friends and allies; and that the United States cannot be effective in, much less lead, a world that it neither listens to nor understands.”

—NAFSA Association of International Educators, *International Education: The Neglected Dimension of Public Diplomacy*, 2008

When considering public diplomacy, it is useful to appreciate what public diplomacy can and cannot accomplish. Public diplomacy can be used to accomplish five strategic objectives:

1. informing, engaging, and persuading foreign publics in support of specific policies
2. promoting understanding of America, its institutions, values, and people in all their complexity in order to, at a minimum, help publics to put information about the United States in proper context and—more ambitiously—enhance our nation’s appeal
3. creating a climate of mutual understanding, respect, and trust in which cooperation is more feasible
4. encouraging support for shared values—whether environmental protection, the rule of law, support for free markets, or the illegitimacy of suicide bombing—that support American interests
5. strengthening the dense network of personal relationships between current and future societal leaders, opening channels of communication that can reduce conflict and confusion, creating opportunities for collaboration, and facilitating the achievement of common goals.

As a necessary part of achieving these objectives, it is essential to understand foreign societies, cultures, economies, institutions, politics, communication networks, and values. Building, maintaining, and accessing this knowledge efficiently is a substantial undertaking in itself.

Government agencies are well suited to accomplish some of these objectives and ill suited for others. Policy advocacy, the first objective above, is primarily the purview of government. Government and civil society organizations—each with their own strengths and weaknesses, each holding more appeal with some audiences than with others—can

effectively address the rest. Accomplishing these goals requires operating on different time horizons. Some are short-term goals and some are long-term goals; we need the organizational capacity to pursue both simultaneously and the ability to resist short-term needs trumping long-term strategies. Accomplishing these goals also requires a broad range of public diplomacy instruments: media relations and speeches, town halls and cross-cultural dialogues, exchange programs and broadcasting, cultural diplomacy and science diplomacy, web pages and leaflets, and countless others. This report recommends steps to strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to mobilize the private sector and civil society, in the United States and overseas, to accomplish the full range of these objectives to the best of our national abilities.

“National needs require a proactive and durable means to engage and influence the attitudes and behavior of global publics on a broad range of consequential issues.”

— Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, *Strategic Communication*, January 2008

Within our government, there are many actors in public diplomacy. The President and Vice President are the most visible individual agents of American influence. The State Department, with its many constituent bureaus and network of embassies, is now the lead agency in public diplomacy. The Department of Defense engages in extensive public diplomacy and strategic communication activities. Its vast and increasing resources for public diplomacy and strategic communication exceed civilian resources. The Broadcasting Board of Governors is an independent agency that oversees numerous U.S. government-funded broadcast services. The United States Agency for International Development has increased its public diplomacy and communications activities, especially efforts to promote awareness of American aid overseas. The U.S. Congress influ-

ences public diplomacy through its legislation, oversight, and appropriations but also through its Members' overseas visits and public statements. The Department of Homeland Security has enormous influence on the experience of millions of visitors who enter our country. Numerous other agencies including Health and Human Services, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, and Labor all have significant international activities.

The extent of our government's reach should not blind us to the limits of its impact. Our government's public diplomacy activities are, and increasingly will be, only a fraction of the many images and bits of information citizens around the world receive every day. Moreover, they are only


“International diplomacy in the 21st century will be increasingly nongovernmental in character, due in part to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations . . . ; the rise of charitable giving by foundations and individuals; and the growing role of academia and private business. The involvement of these new actors in what had previously been the domain of the government creates a multitude of opportunities for innovative cooperation to shape the world's development.”

—Advisory Commission on Transformational Diplomacy,
A Call to Action, 2007

	50 Years Ago	Today ¹²
World Population	2.9 billion people	6.7 billion people
International Tourists Worldwide	25 million	898 million
Foreign Exchange Students in the U.S.	48,486	880,482
American Students Abroad	12,536	223,534
Foreign Direct Investment	\$905.3 million	\$2.4 trillion
U.S. Official Development Assistance	\$2.7 billion	\$23.5 billion
U.S. Private Philanthropy to Developing Countries		\$34.8 billion
Telephone Subscribers Worldwide	3% of population	68% of population
Mobile Phone Subscribers Worldwide	0	45% of population
Internet Users Worldwide	0	1.5 billion
Bloggers Worldwide	0	184 million
Have Watched an Online Video	0	83% internet users
MySpace Social Network Users Worldwide	0	100 million

¹² For data on world population, see “Total Midyear Population for the World: 1950-2050,” a database of the U.S. Census Bureau <<http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpop.html>>; Regarding tourists, see “Historical perspective of world tourism,” data from the United Nations World Tourism Organization <<http://unwto.org/facts/menu.html>>; Regarding exchange students, see William D. Carter, ed. “Study Abroad and Educational Development,” United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): International Institute for Educational Planning (1973) <<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000770/077004eo.pdf>> and Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training, FY2007 Annual Report <www.iawg.gov/rawmedia_repository/f6e27cf6_098d_4e9e_b34b_56192079e950> and Open Doors 2007: Report on International Educational Exchange,” a report by the Institute of International Education (January, 2008) <<http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=113744>>; Regarding foreign direct investment, see “U.S. International Transactions Account Data,” a database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis <<http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/table1.xls>> and “U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad,” table by the U.S. Census Bureau <<http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/08s1267.pdf>>; Regarding telephone subscribers, see “Fixed and mobile telephone subscribers, internet users and PCs,” report by the International Telecommunications Union (May 2006) <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/mdg/material/MDGStory_ITU.pdf>; Regarding Internet users worldwide: “World Internet Usage and Population Statistics,” a table by Internet World Stats <<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>> “Power to the People: Social Media Tracker Wave 3,” a Universal McCann Comparative Study on Social Media Trends from March 2008 <http://www.universalmccann.com/assets/2413%20-%20Wave%203%20complete%20document%20AW%203_20080418124523.pdf>.

Total Private, Official, and Remittance Flows from OECD Donor Countries and Multinational Agencies to Developing Countries in billions of \$, 1990-2006



Source: Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD), Development Co-operation Report 1990-2007; World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects-Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration," 2006; World Bank, Migration and Remittances, 2007, InterAmerican Development Bank, Remittances from Spain to Latin America in 2006, 2007; InterAmerican Development Bank, Sending Money Home, 2007; Country surveys and Balance of Payments reports, 2002-2006.

Source: *The Index of Global Philanthropy*, Hudson Institute 2008, p. 19. See <<https://www.hudson.org/files/documents/2008%20Index%20-%20Low%20Res.pdf>>.

one part of the many ways *America*—through its culture, products, services, philanthropy, people, and media—reaches foreign publics. That does not reduce public diplomacy’s importance; perhaps it increases it. But we need to maintain our perspective.

To be most influential, American public diplomacy should tap into and mobilize these private ac-

tors as much as possible—as advocated by countless recent reports. This should happen within our current official structures, as recommended later in this document. Nonetheless, public diplomacy will be even more effective if it finds new ways to engage private actors and new ways to employ technology, media, and private sector expertise. Toward that end, this report recommends a new public-private organization: the USA▪World Trust.

The USA▪World Trust

In the world we now face, America needs the ability to engage foreign publics using a diverse range of methods, a diverse range of voices, and more speed and agility than ever before. Our country needs to understand foreign concerns deeply and appeal to shared interests and values in ways that resonate both locally and globally. Yet, our government need not meet this challenge alone. Americans and other supporters worldwide are ready and eager to help.

As part of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen and re-imagine U.S. public diplomacy, a new non-profit organization would stimulate and harness the vast potential of the American people and foreign partners, engage partners perceived as trusted messengers among target audiences, fill critical gaps that current government agencies are not well suited to fill, and strengthen our government by providing targeted and useful research, analysis, technologies, and strategies drawn from a wide range of experts in a wide range of fields.

More than ten other reports have called for some sort of independent or semi-independent new organization to support public diplomacy, modeled on the U.S. Institute of Peace, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, National Endowment for Democracy, British Council, and the RAND Corporation, among others (see Appendix B). This study carefully evaluated these recommendations, as well as whether a new bureaucracy was needed at all. It concludes that there is a need for a new organization, but one that fills gaps rather than duplicates efforts, amplifies the work of others rather than competes with them, and ultimately strengthens government rather than diverts resources from it. The value of this organization will

not come from a large number of dedicated staff, but rather its ability to mobilize, galvanize, and amplify the ideas and efforts of others.

The USA▪World Trust should be an independent 501(c)(3) organization that serves the national interest but is not constrained by the day-to-day political and diplomatic operations of the United States government. It should be an honest broker, a credible voice that promotes sustained and purposeful global engagement, a nexus for new and even unlikely partnerships, and a center of gravity that attracts the goodwill, creativity, and initiative of the American people and foreign societies. It should be a hub of creativity and experimentation; though there are many creative people in government, large bureaucracies are not the natural habitat of innovation.

“In projecting America’s messages, we must be especially mindful of something that every good salesman understands—if you do not trust the messenger, you do not trust the message. We strongly believe that we can avoid this problem by using private sector partnerships and new approaches.”

—Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, *Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform*, 2002

The Trust must be scrupulously nonpartisan and constructive in tone. Every action must be in line with the highest American ideals: justice, tolerance, democracy, community, and freedom. Its reputation for integrity, objectivity, and commitment to the public interest must be beyond reproach.

The mission of the USA▪World Trust should be to promote U.S. national interests through efforts to


- present a more accurate and nuanced vision of America to counterbalance the one-sided views sometimes promulgated by popular culture and foreign media
- contribute to an environment of mutual trust, respect, and understanding in which cooperation is more feasible
- promote shared values and their champions
- inform and support our government’s public diplomacy efforts through the sharing of knowledge regarding communications, public opinion, foreign cultures, and technology.

The Trust should focus on four key areas of engagement: research and analysis; grants and venture capital; media and technology; and outreach, government relations, and fund-raising. These areas are described in detail below.

Two key elements should characterize these programs. First, the Trust should emphasize partnership, including partnerships between American and foreign groups. Drawing on the examples of Sesame Street, the Asia Foundation, and other organizations, partnerships with local organizations overseas often build trust, increase the likelihood of positive local media coverage, and lead to quality programs that appeal to local populations. Second, the Trust should emphasize collaboration among experts with a wide range of perspectives and talents. A visiting fellows program will draw together practitioners and experts from both inside and outside of the government to support all of these initiatives.

To focus these efforts, the Trust’s president and board of directors should develop both an annual and a three-year plan to identify priority areas of activity, in response to national needs and targets of opportunity.

USA▪WORLD TRUST ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



THE USA-WORLD TRUST: A FOCUS ON ACTION

ASK questions. Where are there unexploited opportunities? Are underlying assumptions based on evidence? What do foreign populations think and why? What means of engaging foreign publics are and are not effective?

CATALYZE the discovery of new solutions to problems through competitions, grants, and bringing stakeholders together

EXPAND successful initiatives to new geographic regions, new audiences, or new media platforms

LEARN through polling, focus groups, interviews, research, and regular consultations with experts and officials about U.S. national needs, foreign attitudes and interests, foreign societies, effective methods of communication, useful models, and best practices

RESPOND to government requests for information, analysis, expertise, and evaluation

SERVE as a resource to government agencies (including but not limited to the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Millennium Challenge Corporation), and the military

ATTRACT talented individuals from government, the military, private companies, universities, and non-governmental organizations to work for short or long term assignments and contribute their expertise

FUND initiatives that provide a more nuanced understanding of America, a climate of mutual understanding and trust, and strong relations between the United States and the world

INCUBATE new programs, engage stakeholders, and spin off projects to be run by operational organizations in the United States or overseas

LEVERAGE resources (whether financial, creative, or intellectual) and networks to create innovative new programs and strengthen and amplify successful programs of government, civil society, and business

SOLICIT funds, expertise, volunteers, and new ideas

BUILD a community of professionals both inside and outside government with expertise relevant to public diplomacy and strategic communication

CONVENE American and foreign experts, practitioners, funders, and stakeholders to create raised awareness, new dialogue, deeper understanding, new solutions, stronger networks, and new partnerships

INFORM U.S. government and military officers about foreign societies and cultures, useful strategies, effective methods of communication and engagement, new technologies, and emerging trends

INNOVATE by creating and adapting new media, methods of communication and engagement, partnerships, and understanding of current and emerging trends and how to respond

SEEK areas of opportunity where national interests and the interests of private companies, organizations, and individuals align

ENERGIZE high-impact programs by bringing new resources, attention, and expertise

SHARE research and analysis, best practices, contacts, and expertise

KEY ACTIVITIES

GRANT-MAKING AND VENTURE CAPITAL

Grants should support the annual strategy as well as core program areas. Of note, grants have power far beyond the programs they fund. As experience with the National Science Foundation and Corporation for Public Broadcasting demonstrates, once grant writers invest effort in developing a proposal, they often seek funding elsewhere if their proposals are rejected. In this way, grant-making spurs action far beyond projects that are funded. Five funds are suggested to advance distinctive objectives.

AMERICA PROGRAM – funds American and foreign initiatives that present a more nuanced, complex, or appealing image of American society, institutions, and values than is normally portrayed in popular culture. Examples include:

- a short Hollywood-style film so compelling that airlines would agree to show it before landing on American soil
- foreign distribution of American news or documentary programs, such as the FX series *Thirty Days* or the documentary *Spellbound*
- extra tour stops and community outreach programs by major cultural shows such as the Alvin Ailey dance theater
- speaking tours and media engagements by American authors, technology leaders, or Nobel prize winning scientists
- translation projects that bring unfamiliar American perspectives to foreign audiences
- tours of multi-media museum exhibits about American history or political philosophy
- translation and dissemination of core documents such as the Constitution and Declaration of Independence
- a short program on U.S. foreign policy for the nearly 3,000 foreign researchers who already visit the National Institutes of Health on exchanges each year

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM – funds partnerships between American and foreign organizations that promote mutual understanding as well as shared interests or values. Most programs should include media outreach. Examples include:

- co-produced news broadcasts for foreign distribution
- co-developed social networking sites that link American and foreign communities to promote understanding
- co-produced fundraisers, e.g. American and foreign musicians hosting a major televised concert to raise funds for an issue of common concern, such as AIDS or polio
- co-developed initiatives to advance women's role in the global scientific community
- exchange programs that link local elected leaders, especially those with future leadership potential
- programs that link Americans and foreign societies where relations are poor through commonalities that transcend politics, religion, or ethnicity, e.g. lawyers, journalists, historians, and scientists all have strong professional codes or interests that bind them globally
- co-produced films and television programs
- co-written textbooks that present information in an objective manner

VOICES FOR COMMON VALUES FUND – supports foreign voices that advocate shared values, as identified by the Board of Trustees. Examples include:

- grants to foreign filmmakers who wish to document the atrocities of radical Islamist extremists, in local languages for local audiences overseas
- funds to disseminate books or other media by foreign authors whose values and interests align with broad American values
- support for platforms for foreign opinion leaders, who may not agree with U.S. foreign policy, but support core values and interests
- foreign photography competitions that disseminate compelling or inspiring images

MICRO-GRANTS PROGRAM – quickly funds expenses of \$10K or less to support initiatives that promote USA▪World Trust objectives. Examples include:

- travel grants to support new university exchange programs, cross-cultural dialogues, or international initiatives by professional societies
- matching funds for small conferences or workshops
- translation expenses to extend the reach of valuable publications, websites, or radio or television programs
- video recordings of inter-faith dialogues that allow mosque or church members to see programs in which their faith leaders participated
- funds to allow a foreign journalist to report on a valuable initiative that supports the Trust's mission
- support that allows documentary crews already filming overseas to bring in local filmmakers and film students for consultation or training

VENTURE CAPITAL FUND – invests in the launch of new organizations or projects with sufficient promise to be self-sustaining and long-lasting. The returns on this investment would be social and political rather than financial. Examples include:

- investment in expanding the operations of profit-generating enterprises into desired markets, where interests coincide with national interests e.g. the expansion of social networking sites that engage desired audiences
- investment in new business associations that engage American businesses in emerging economies
- investment in new educational NGOs with a promising business plan for fee-for-service English instruction
- projects incubated at the Trust then spun off to partner organizations that can sustain them
- matching funds that encourage new corporate or foundation support for educational or professional exchanges
- prizes for the best new technological application to accomplish a particular government agency's public diplomacy challenge
- the translation and sale of relevant children's book in new markets

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The USA▪World Trust should conduct independent research and analysis, distribute relevant knowledge in a form useful to public diplomacy and strategic communication professionals, lead external evaluation teams by request, and collect and disseminate best practices. It should not simply be a passive repository for information. Rather, it should set a research agenda and then actively commission, collect, and disseminate useful analyses to its constituents in government. To set that agenda, it should consult regularly with practitioners and policy leaders to diagnose their needs. Research and analysis may be performed on a contract basis for government agencies, but all research should be unclassified and public.

“Advanced public opinion and market research skills are critically underdeveloped in the U.S. government agencies responsible for our international relations . . . The State Department spends only about \$5 million each year on global opinion research to understand what foreign publics think about our country, our people, and our policies. The Microsoft Corporation alone spends more than five times that much to research its global customer base.”

—Business for Diplomatic Action, *America’s Role in the World: A Business Perspective on Public Diplomacy*, 2007

A central problem is not that useful information and insights do not exist, but rather that they are not in a form useful to practitioners. Thus, a key function of the Trust will be not only to collect and analyze information but also to work with practitioners to translate that information into actionable programs. As one government official put it, “I know how many people ages 18-25 use the Internet in the Middle East. That is different from knowing the best way for public diplomacy officers to use that information.” Examples include:

- weekly electronic publication that summarizes new research on communications, public opinion, foreign societies and cultures, best practices, and successful programs or initiatives and distills it into a form useful to practitioners in the military or government
- in-depth studies of particular issues or regions
- analysis papers that examine key issues such as the relationship between development assistance and public opinion, whether those who speak English as a second language get news from a more diverse range of sources, how to evaluate the impact of public diplomacy programs, where citizens of particular countries get their news and information, and new trends among the youth of particular countries or regions

- polling and focus groups
- detailed case studies intended to teach practitioners as well as case studies designed to capture lessons learned after major crises (for instance, the public affairs activities surrounding the provision of disaster assistance); this knowledge is often lost
- useful training materials developed in consultation with the State Department’s National Foreign Affairs Training Center, National Defense University, and the war colleges
- papers that analyze trends and suggest practical responses, such as how to tap into the power of diaspora or expatriate communities, how to leverage respect for American science and technology, how to effectively engage foreign tourists, and how to develop media campaigns that cross platforms (e.g. printed books, television, media outreach, and online fora)
- on-line collections of resources contributed by stakeholders. In interviews for this study, companies and non-governmental organizations both volunteered to grant access to non-proprietary research if they had an easy way to share it.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The USA•World Trust must be at the cutting edge of efforts to evaluate the impact of public diplomacy and strategic communication. Drawing on experts in the private sector, NGOs, universities, and government, the Trust should create toolkits to develop and evaluate metrics of success. The Trust should set an example by applying these metrics to its own programs, requiring grantees to adopt these measures of performance, and also aggressively disseminating best practices to its constituencies. All too frequently, funds for monitoring and evaluation are unavailable or the first to be cut. The Trust should eschew this practice, supporting monitoring and evaluation for all initiatives.

CONVENING AND NETWORKING

The Trust should support activities that bring together people, resources, and ideas. These activities could include conferences, workshops, on-line discussions, and conference calls. Again and again, study contributors argued that simply introducing the right partners to each other was an under-supplied public good and a powerful contribution to their success. The Trust should be especially mindful to support new initiatives that promote the mission, for instance helping successful diaspora groups in Silicon Valley that wish to reach out to compatriots worldwide, or introducing content developers to content distributors. It should also seek to bring groups with valuable knowledge together with those who would benefit, for instance commercial market research experts with government political analysts, or experts on foreign cultures together with government experts on post-conflict reconstruction. As appropriate, it should also support dialogues with civil society leaders in societies where formal diplomatic relations are poor but where greater understanding would benefit American interests: Syria, Iran, Cuba, or Venezuela. Finally, it should bring together those with ideas and contacts, those with staff and experience, and those with resources. Examples include:

- convene government agencies, marketing experts, pollsters, and NGOs to draft a multi-dimensional strategy for engaging Arab youth
- network with public diplomacy professionals in the field to learn what information or tools they would need to be more successful
- convene members of the tourist and travel industry to identify collaborative initiatives to attract more visitors to the United States, for longer periods of time
- network with the independent public diplomacy institutions of allied countries (e.g.

the British Council and Germany's Goethe Institute) and identify areas of possible collaboration in pursuit of shared interests.

VISITING FELLOWS PROGRAM

The Trust should host visitors from private companies, universities, non-governmental organizations, the armed services, and government agencies for short- or long-term assignments. Whether detailed for three months or two years, visitors would contribute new ideas, expertise, and contacts to the task of improving America's relations with the world. Visitors could work on research projects, address technology challenges, develop new media products, or assist with public opinion polling. These positions should be competitive and at the discretion of the Trust. This program should require active outreach to find talented individuals and liaise with existing programs like the IBM Corporate Service Corps.

Bringing together subject experts and public diplomacy practitioners will allow the Trust to extend its network, craft programs that are useful to policy makers and practitioners in the U.S. government and military, and ensure access to cutting-edge knowledge, communication techniques, and technology.

The visitor program will also provide needed professional development opportunities for talented employees in the U.S. government and build a network of public servants in this field.

MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

The media and technology program should seek effective communication tools, compelling media content, and appealing new applications in support of the USA▪WORLD Trust mission. In some circumstances, the program should commission products for radio, television, mobile phones, podcasts, on-line games, DVDs, print publications, web pages, or other vehicles of engagement. More commonly, the program should search for

existing products, test them with overseas audiences, and adapt them for wider use by the Trust itself, government agencies, or appropriate third parties in the United States or overseas. The Trust should also monitor new and emerging technologies, what technologies are employed in different world regions, and where new technologies could be deployed effectively. This effort will require a deep knowledge of foreign cultures and preferences and how they differ. What appeals in Moscow may not appeal in Muscat.

COMMUNICATIONS, OUTREACH, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AND FUNDRAISING

To be effective, the Trust must reach out to, energize, and engage new constituencies in the United States and overseas, understand and support national strategic communication needs, and bring new people and resources to the mission. This will require an effective communications office, able to attract broad attention and participation, and disseminate useful information electronically, in print, and through person-to-person exchanges. It will also require a concerted and proactive government relations effort to ensure that the needs and interests of Congress, the full range of executive branch agencies (including overseas embassies and USAID field offices), and the military (including the combatant commanders) are served. Finally, it should have a professional fundraising office able to marshal private funds from corporations, foundations, and major individual donors. Funds need not be raised for the Trust itself. For instance, in response to foreign university requests for professorships in American Studies (reportedly a common request from foreign universities), the Trust could raise funds for that initiative, perhaps using its own funds as leverage.

ASSESSING AND ACHIEVING IMPACT

Faced with an important task and limited resources, the USA■World Trust must focus, relentlessly and unequivocally, on impact. This impact will be earned through initiatives that influence either

mass publics or highly targeted opinion leaders. In all organizations, but especially this one, public diplomacy programs should pass the “drop in the bucket” test. No matter how good the program’s quality or how much the participants or organizers like it, its worth should be measured against how much impact it is likely to have in an absolute sense, and how much it advances the mission at hand.

Success should also be measured in terms of how much impact can be bought with a given investment of time, energy, and funds. Taking a lesson from social entrepreneurs and new approaches to philanthropy, it should seek out opportunities to invest small amounts for big returns. For instance, instead of commissioning expensive documentaries, the Trust would identify appropriate documentaries that already exist, test them in target audiences, and ask what incentives would be sufficient to encourage private companies to distribute them in key countries overseas—a more efficient, market-based approach than traditional public diplomacy.

GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The USA■World Trust should be governed by a non-partisan board of directors, held in high regard for their integrity and knowledge. Modeled on the National Endowment for Democracy, the Board should include members of Congress from both major political parties and representatives of relevant sectors of American society. This study recommends that the initial board of directors be appointed by an esteemed bipartisan group representing a variety of stakeholders. This appointment committee should include senior representation from the State Department, Defense Department, and USAID as well as representatives from higher education, the media, business, the entertainment industry, science and technology, and other relevant sectors. Once a board is selected and establishes its legitimacy, future vacancies should be filled by a majority vote of the directors then in office and each director chosen should be of the same distinction and represent a

similar constituency as the departing director (for instance, a university president should be replaced by another university president, a CEO should be replaced by another CEO, and so on).

The Trust should be led by a senior individual selected by a majority vote of the board of directors plus the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The President of the USA World Trust should be an individual of distinction, respected across party lines, with a deep knowledge of American foreign policy and national security interests, and of sufficient stature to engage key stakeholders. Ideally, the president should have worked both inside and outside of government in senior positions.

The Trust should have a clear mandate, charter, and by-laws to guide its operations. This mandate should make clear that the Trust should not engage in policy advocacy. The Trust's mandate, relatively small size, governance structure, and lack of posts overseas should ensure there is no confusion about which organizations are vested with the authority to represent official U.S. foreign policy to foreign governments and societies. Government agencies, not the Trust, bear that responsibility.

The Trust should be easy to monitor due to its diligent commitment to transparency. It should publish a detailed annual report, submitted to Congress and made public on the Trust's website. It should be subject to Freedom of Information Act requests, guaranteeing access to its inner workings and decisions. The Trust should not engage in covert activities or handle classified material for any reason.

To ensure responsiveness to national needs, the Trust should be required to convene a semi-annual meeting of senior government leaders from the State Department, Department of Defense,

USAID, and other government agencies. Moreover, as part of its annual report, it must solicit letters of evaluation from the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the equivalent representatives of USAID and DoD. These letters should comment on the extent to which the Trust is providing the services for which it was intended. These letters should not bind the funding decisions of the Congress but they would present a useful metric.

Careful oversight of the Trust should be paramount. The Trust should be evaluated annually through an external audit in its first several years, and then regularly thereafter. This study recommends a mandatory U.S. Government Accountability Office review for at least the first three years of the Trust's existence. The Trust should also be subject to oversight from one or possibly two Congressional committees (unlike the Department of Homeland Security which reports to 86).¹³

To ensure the Trust commits time and energy to current public diplomacy needs as defined by a given Administration, the Congress should create a \$10 million annual fund (equivalent to 20% of the Trust's budget) for the U.S. government's leading official in charge of public diplomacy and strategic communication. That fund, controlled by the Under Secretary, should ensure that executive branch agencies are able to contract with the Trust to conduct research and analysis, pilot programs, acquire or test new technologies, and attract experts to work on particular problems.

Together, these measures are designed to ensure that government has sufficient levers of "soft power" to ensure the Trust remains responsive to national needs while retaining the independence it needs to provide substantial added value to our nation's public diplomacy efforts.

¹³ See Jena Baker McNeill, *Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security in Dire Need of Overhaul*, Backgrounder #2161 (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, July 14, 2008).

THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE

In hundreds of conversations with experts and practitioners inside and outside government, the only significant area of disagreement was how close or far away from government the Trust should be. After careful consideration and analysis, this study concludes that the Trust should be independent *but* there should be many mechanisms in place to ensure the Trust remains accountable and in service to the national interest. Through a formula of formal independence, extreme transparency of operation, and potent instruments of “soft power” provided to government agencies and leaders, the Trust attempts to strike the balance that would serve our nation’s needs in the area of public diplomacy and strategic communication.

“It often behooves governments to keep in the background and work through private actors.”

—Joseph S. Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,”
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008

Formal independence is recommended for the following reasons:

- Government needs an honest broker that can provide objective analysis and research, ask tough questions, and provide unpopular answers when necessary.
- Independence will free the Trust from day-to-day policy concerns and crises. Staff in Washington and overseas report that they have little time for deep reflection and are often pulled from long-term projects to meet pressing short-term needs. The freedom to be ahead of the curve or move counter to current trends, e.g. developing programs in Russia or Latin America when most funding in government is directed at the Middle East, would be a valuable contribution to our nation’s comprehensive public diplomacy effort.
- A current gap in our nation’s capabilities is the ability to take risks, a task that is understandably difficult in executive agencies charged with the responsibility of representing our nation to the world. The Trust must be free to make mistakes and experiment, without the risk of embarrassing senior officials or the U.S. government. Like a good venture capital fund, if the Trust does not make mistakes, it is being too cautious to generate the desired return on investment.
- Some formal distance from government allows the Trust to engage new or controversial groups (such as former terrorists now willing to speak out against terrorism), reach out to politically sensitive audiences (the Syrian public), experiment with new methods (how to best use tools like YouTube and social networking sites), or work with “edgy” media like MTV that can engage young people but provide awkward fora for dignified officials. Any of these projects might have the strong support of our government, but they may be delicate or ungainly for senior diplomats to embrace publicly. The Trust can provide a “heat shield” for such projects, where there is a high potential return but also the risk of embarrassment.
- The ability to be nimble and circumvent bureaucratic hurdles would be a valuable addition to our nation’s capabilities. For instance, this study learned of an innovative and seemingly uncontroversial public-private partnership led by the State Department that required clearances from 30 different offices before it could even get started. This is not atypical and the requirements for such clearances exist for extremely valid reasons. However, this process is also cumbersome and impedes action.
- Independence allows the Trust to accept and pool funds from multiple sources, including

government agencies, and create multi-stakeholder partnerships with greater ease. Even where there are common interests, it is illegal to simply move money from one agency to another as needed. Moreover, according to some government officials, there is a need for a “central bank” for some public-private partnerships.

- Independence will enable the Trust to work with groups that are reluctant to work with any particular administration or government agency due to political or policy disagreements, a desire to appear independent of government, or a desire to appear “multi-national” rather than tied to a particular national government. Again and again, corporations and nongovernmental organizations reported that they would be happy to help the government if they could avoid association with core government agencies. For instance, one major technology company volunteered to send staff to help the government make better use of the Internet and social networking technologies, but did not feel comfortable sending them to the State Department, Defense Department, or intelligence community. Scholars too sometimes shy from public association with government agencies for fear that they will lose their credibility in the region they study.
- Showcasing America’s vibrant marketplace of ideas, one of the greatest and most effective symbols of our democracy overseas, presents public diplomacy practitioners with the challenge of striking a delicate balance between appearing not to contradict American policy and showcasing American diversity. This

challenge is longstanding in American public diplomacy. Our country has struck this balance most comfortably when the functions of advocating policy and presenting a wide range of American voices have been separate. The USA▪World Trust will not resolve this tension entirely, but it will offer government an alternate venue to accomplish these dual and sometimes competing objectives when it deems appropriate.

- An independent organization provides a neutral forum to convene short and long-term visitors from U.S. government agencies, the military, the non-profit sector, universities, and the private sector to work as equals, regardless of their rank or status in home organizations.
- Finally, the Trust would be free of the many restrictions that (in many cases, correctly) impede the work of government: Federal Advisory Commission Act (FACA) restrictions,¹⁴ restrictions on accepting and moving funds, restrictions on sole source contracts, ethical restrictions on requesting assistance directly from companies and other organizations, requirements to gain clearances from multiple government agencies and offices, restrictions on hiring employees to meet short-term needs, the need to engage lawyers about any potential partnership, a lack of expertise about key issues, and a general culture of caution. To be clear, the Trust must adopt ethical practices, comply with its by-laws, and be subject to rigorous oversight. However, a small non-governmental organization should not need the same level of bureaucratic constraints as major U.S. government agencies

¹⁴ The 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act stipulates that “No advisory committee shall be established unless such establishment is (1) specifically authorized by statute or by the President; or (2) determined as a matter of formal record, by the head of the agency involved after consultation with the Administrator, with timely notice published in the Federal Register, to be in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on that agency by law.” Advisory committee meeting schedules must be published in the Federal Register and officials are also responsible to make other efforts “to insure that all interested persons are notified of such meeting prior thereto.” Meetings must be open to the public, with opportunities for public comment at the meeting or in writing, and detailed minutes must be published.

tasked with using lethal force or presenting the official position of the United States government overseas.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The culture of this organization will influence its success. The USA▪WORLD Trust will prove its worth if it can

- focus on making others successful instead of claiming credit
- leverage its own resources to multiply the impact of its investments
- claim “not invented here” as a badge of honor
- take pride in being proactive, agile, and forward-looking
- become a hub of innovation and excellence
- meld the talents and insights of those in government and the private sector in service to government and the national interest
- be sensitive to changing technologies and trends
- maintain a balance between asking hard but constructive questions and being of service to government, and
- emerge as a resource for leaders and public diplomacy professionals in all agencies of government.

To create the appropriate organizational culture, staff should be drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds and welcome into their ranks a regular cadre of visitors from sectors across our society. Like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), program staff should be required to leave after a determined period of time to ensure the constant injection of fresh ideas. To remain nimble, the organization should build a staff of approximately 150 full-time professionals in the short-term, with a large pool of visitors from

government, the private sector, academia, and non-profit organizations. The Congress and executive branch may wish to re-evaluate this size over time, but should be wary of under-cutting the Trust’s ability to be nimble.

The Trust should be allowed to evolve. As it grows and develops, it may require representatives in several U.S. cities and perhaps in regional hub offices overseas. It should be allowed to shift resources, close programs and start new ones, and fire and acquire expertise as needed.

A NOTE ON THE NAME

Like all of the new organization’s efforts, the name of this organization should be subject to rigorous scrutiny and testing both in the United States and overseas. The USA▪World Trust is suggested as a starting point, but it has not been tested sufficiently.

COST AND JUSTIFICATION

This report recommends that the Congress provide the USA▪World Trust with a \$50 million annual budget, guaranteed for two years at a time to facilitate planning and good use of funds. This budget is expected to be supplemented by government contracts, foundation grants, private gifts, or other fee-for-service projects. As a 501c(3) organization, the Trust should be able to accept charitable donations, as does the British Council. To ensure these funds are spent effectively, the budget should build to this level over a three year period. The Trust should give away at least half of its annual budget through grants and spend the rest on staff, operations, and in-house research and projects. The Trust should establish a branding policy, ensuring that the American taxpayers’ investment is recognized appropriately.

If the Trust is successful, additional sources of revenue are likely to exceed this core operating budget many times over. Federal contracts, especially from the Departments of State and Defense, may be substantial if the Trust earns a reputation

for good work. Private donors may also provide funding. As just one example, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars now receives only 30% of its budget from the Congress. Other federally funded organizations like the Asia Foundation, East-West Center, and U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation also combine federal funding with non-governmental sources of funds.

Taxpayers benefit when the target of their investment is ready to absorb that investment fully. Over time, our government may choose to invest more, perhaps even substantially more, in the USA■World Trust if the organization proves its worth. That path has been followed before with the National Science Foundation, DARPA, the National Endowment for Democracy, and many other federally funded organizations. This approach holds merit. Good organizations learn, developing the capacity to spend more money well over time.

This investment is important because the Trust will serve the national interest and contribute to a climate in which the success of specific foreign policy or national security objectives is more likely now and in the future. A tiny fraction of the defense budget, it would do much to support the national security interests of the United States by engaging a different range of audiences, voices, and tools. With the Iraq War costing an estimated \$434 million a day and the annual U.S. Information Agency budget in the 1990s reaching well over \$1 billion, this investment seems—if anything—too modest in comparison.¹⁵ The next section of this report recommends additional expenditures on public diplomacy functions in existing government agencies, but even these investments are unlikely to approach the sums spent on other instruments of policy.

Some have argued for the Trust to be entirely funded by private money. While desirable in the abstract, that funding model generates three concerns:

- This organization must serve the national interest in order to justify its very existence. Private funders have their own interests, which may or may not align with national public diplomacy or strategic communication priorities. If this organization followed, by necessity, the interests of funders instead of the national interest, a great opportunity would be lost.
- The history of U.S. public diplomacy is marked by large swings in funding, tactics, and geographic focus. A goal of the Trust is to reduce these swings, focusing a significant portion of its activities on long-term interests in addition to short-term needs.
- Private funders experience their own evolving fashions. As many non-governmental organizations and universities will attest, donors often wish to fund exciting new initiatives, not core operations or boring but effective old standards. Moreover, even dedicated donors wish to move on to other projects over time, leaving good projects without support.

Sustained funding with a course dictated by the national interest would be a more desirable outcome. This sustainability is critical. To have the desired long-term impact, the USA■World Trust should have a dependable and non-earmarked revenue stream to avoid the large swings in resources and focus that have plagued U.S. public diplomacy for the last fifty years. Government funds should not be the only source of revenue, but they are an essential foundation. Private funds

¹⁵ David M. Herszenhorn and Eric Lipton, "As War's Costs Rise, Congress Demands That Iraq Pay Larger Share," *New York Times* (April 19, 2008). For the USIA budget, see Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, "State Department and Related Agencies FY1998 Appropriations" (December 10, 1997) available at <<http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/1997/upl-meta-crs-441/meta-crs-441.ocr>>.

fluctuate with current fashions and interests; public diplomacy should not. Indeed, a key purpose of this organization shall be to fill gaps—what should be done but is not happening—and move ahead of the curve.

	Total Grants Awarded 2007¹⁶
United States Institute of Peace	\$3 million
National Endowment for Democracy	\$90 million
Rockefeller Foundation	\$123 million
Carnegie Corporation	\$132 million
Ford Foundation	\$632 million
Gates Foundation	\$2 billion
National Science Foundation	\$4 billion

Investing in the creation of the USA▪World Trust, while worthy, should only be undertaken if it does not draw already limited resources away from civilian international affairs agencies or other public diplomacy efforts. Though reforms and reallocation are needed, resources are already in short supply, especially within the State Department. Moreover, a new organization should be created only if it is given enough resources to truly make an impact. A shell organization, with resources only sufficient to sustain itself, will not dent the substantial challenges America faces and would waste taxpayer dollars.

¹⁶ Figures for the U.S. Institute of Peace and National Science Foundation were obtained through correspondence. Remaining information is available publicly in 2007 Annual Reports of the National Endowment for Democracy <http://www.ned.org/publications/07annual/PDFs/AR_Financials07.pdf>, the Rockefeller Foundation <http://www.rockfound.org/library/annual_reports/2007rf_ar.pdf>, Carnegie Corporation <<http://www.carnegie.org/pdf/CCNY-AR07.pdf>>, and the Gates Foundation <<http://www.gatesfoundation.org/nr/public/media/annualreports/annualreport07/AR2007GrantsPaid.html>>. For the Ford Foundation data, see <<http://www.fordfound.org/grants>>.

Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy

Interviews and extensive research underscored that any new organization could not be successful unless it is couched in a broader set of reforms and a new vision for U.S. public diplomacy. Consequently, this report recommends numerous reforms to our government's strategy, leadership, organization, and methods of public diplomacy and strategic communication.

This report denies neither progress nor shortcomings in U.S. public diplomacy since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The vast majority of public diplomacy professionals, at every level, are hard-working and dedicated. They deserve credit for what has gone right. Many programs—the Fulbright program, the International Visitor Program—have withstood the tests of time while many new initiatives—the digital outreach team, which seeks to engage foreigners in dialogue on blogs, as well as expanded use of public-private partnerships—show ingenuity and an ability to adapt. Other reports have chronicled both longstanding successes and new reforms, distributing praise where praise is due. More have criticized past efforts with gusto and had ample examples from which to draw. There is no need to duplicate those efforts here. Instead, this report looks forward, drawing on the excellent work of others, particularly reports by the Defense Science Board, CSIS Smart Power Commission, Council on Foreign Relations, Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Government Accountability Office, and more than thirty other groups (see Appendix C for examples).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

SYMBOLISM

The next president should take bold and immediate acts to redefine the image of the United States in the eyes of the world. Long-term strategies, carefully constructed policies, and effective day-to-day management are important, but a few bold strokes by a new president would do much to symbolize that a page in history has turned and create a welcoming environment for a new president's foreign policy.

A new president should select actions that will reflect his deep personal convictions and symbolize the aspirations of his presidency. Though this decision should be made personally by a new president, a few illustrative examples follow. First, a new president should take steps to symbolize that America will live up to its own principles. For instance, he should announce a specific date for the closure of the U.S. prison at Guantanamo and sign an executive order to that effect in a public event. Second, he could travel to the Middle East and address a gathering of young people, speaking not about politics directly, but rather to learn about their hopes and to discuss what America hopes for them. He should be honest about what America can and cannot do, and what they must ultimately do for themselves. Third, he should engage in symbolic acts that reflect what America stands for and reflect our hope for a better future for all, not just ourselves. Research for this study led to the following suggestions.

- Show commitment to education and international understanding by tripling the number of Fulbright awards granted every year, from 3,200 new and continuing student fellows to 10,000 per year.
- Lay the groundwork for future communication and prosperity by investing in a dramatic new effort to increase the number of world citizens with access to the Internet.
- Maximize the potential of the Internet and World Wide Web by
 - creating a Global Virtual Science Library that gives nations access to the knowledge they need to engineer earthquake safe buildings, perform modern dentistry, research worm-resistant crops, and treat life-threatening diseases
 - supporting the Library of Congress's World Digital Library initiative to digitally preserve the world's cultural heritage and make manuscripts, maps, rare books, photographs, and other significant cultural materials available to all
 - creating on-line open-source portals to teach English, reading, and other essential skills.

STRATEGY

To be effective, the U.S. government needs a comprehensive interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication. Per the Smith-Thornberry Amendment in the 2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658), this strategy should include overall objectives, goals, actions to be performed, and benchmarks and timetables for the achievement of these goals and objectives. The strategy should also be closely aligned with the National Security Strategy. It should include, but not be limited to, countering terrorism and the extremist ideologies that nourish and sustain terrorist networks.

“A real effort at developing a grand strategy requires thinking about the kind of world that is most conducive to American interests and how to set a course that, over several decades and multiple administrations, stands a good chance of helping to bring such a world about.”

—Shawn Brimley and Michèle Flornoy, *Finding our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*, Center for New American Security, 2008

To implement this strategy, our government's most senior leaders must be able to assess the nation's many interests, including an assessment of foreign public opinion and its implications, and make choices accordingly. America's foreign policy needs are complex and no one interest, even security, should trump all others. The United States must have borders that both welcome and deny entry, export controls that both share and deny access to technology, embassies that both engage and protect, and a foreign policy that advances our goals while also protecting the legitimate interests of others. Addressing these needs requires structures that can cope with complexity and manage risks accordingly.

In addition to considering foreign public opinion in policy-making, our government should consider how to use communication and public diplomacy strategically in order to implement policy. We must have the capacity to look ahead, shape the public debate, and lay the groundwork for future success. Public diplomacy should not be conceived as something done only after decisions are made.

To advance these objectives, the President should

- require a public diplomacy and strategic communication plan, updated annually, to illustrate how public diplomacy will be used to support the national security strategy
- conduct a comprehensive review of what each agency is doing in the realm of public diplomacy and strategic communication and set clear guidelines for each agency's role

- require each agency to submit a plan for implementing the strategy.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership comes from the top. The new president should make public diplomacy a priority and maintain a personal awareness of global public opinion and how it will affect the success of policy. This leadership must be reinforced by the Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. The President should also set an example for all senior officials, recalling that statements made for domestic consumption will echo around the globe.

- In keeping with this study's recommendation to strengthen existing government agencies instead of creating new ones, the president should reiterate that the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs leads the U.S. government's efforts in public diplomacy and international strategic communication and hold the Under Secretary personally accountable for developing and implementing a government-wide strategy. He should issue a formal and public order that the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is authorized and expected to lead the U.S. government's public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts on behalf of himself and the Secretary of State.
- A new Under Secretary should be selected based on his or her ability to lead this inter-agency mission and guide its complex and multifaceted elements. That person should then be held accountable for accomplishing this mission.
- The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should be responsible for convening the interagency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication regularly. This PCC should ensure

that resources, programs, and activities are proactively and effectively coordinated to support the government's foreign policy objectives and that every agency and department places high priority on public diplomacy and strategic communication. To lead effectively, the Under Secretary should have access to knowledge regarding all covert and overt operations related to strategic communication and public diplomacy in all agencies; greater policy, budgetary, and personnel authority within the U.S. State Department; and additional resources as outlined below.

- Foreign public opinion and its repercussions should be factored into American foreign policy making at its earliest stages. Ultimately American policy must serve the U.S. national interest regardless of what foreigners think. However, foreign opinion has an impact on the costs and benefits, success or failure, of foreign policies. Analyzing the repercussions of policy choices in advance is simply good statecraft.

**"If they want me in on the crash landings,
I better damn well be in on the take-offs."**

—Former U.S. Information Agency Director Edward R. Murrow,
tasked with communications after the Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961

Some will argue that there must be an even higher level position in the White House to ensure the prominence of public diplomacy and strategic communication in foreign policy making. These recommendations are understandable given the importance of public diplomacy and its history of undervaluation as a policy instrument. However, the creation of such positions carries its own complications. That position would also draw responsibility and accountability away from the State Department, complicate lines of authority in the National Security Council and U.S. government generally, and create potential competition

and another layer of bureaucracy. The solution presented here is also imperfect, but its imperfections are manageable through good personnel appointments, clear mandates from the highest authorities, and a president and cabinet secretaries who place due value on public diplomacy and strategic communication.

ORGANIZATION

Our government has not fully adjusted to many recent organizational changes: the absorption of the U.S. Information Agency into the State Department and creation of an Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the creation of the Office of Support for Public Diplomacy within the Department of Defense, the marriage of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, and the creation of a new Directorate of National Intelligence and National Counterterrorism Center.

Given pressing current needs and the fact that many organizational reforms are still in process, the next administration should focus on making what exists work better, not creating major new organizations.

The most pressing changes are to ensure stronger interagency coordination, substantially enhance the State Department's capacity to carry out its mission, and to ensure that public diplomacy gets due consideration at every level and in every part of foreign policy making and implementation. Interviews and research conducted for this study exposed again and again the lack of resources in public diplomacy, particularly in the State Department. This lack of resources creates a vicious cycle. The Department has insufficient resources to do its job, so it does not always perform the range of duties some would expect. This creates dissatisfaction with the Department, leading the Congress to invest more resources in other agencies that are equipped to carry out the mission, most notably the Department of Defense. DoD, however, is not always the ideal agency to be the

most visible face of the United States in many parts of the world, especially where publics feel threatened by American power.

- The National Security Council should maintain a senior position at the level of Deputy National Security Adviser to coordinate U.S. government efforts in public diplomacy and strategic communication. That person should continue to serve as Vice Chair of the Policy Coordinating Committee on Strategic Communication within the National Security Council and ensure that committee meets at least monthly. This person should also ensure that public diplomacy and strategic communication are considered seriously in the foreign policy making process and across issues.
- The next administration should embrace the concept of a Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), the renamed and repurposed Counterterrorism Communication Center. This newly created center, which reports to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, is designed to be the secretariat of the interagency PCC, with staff appointed from relevant agencies. The GSEC should facilitate interagency activities below the level of the PCC members and generally support the PCC. In addition, the U.S. government needs a web of networks connecting relevant actors across agencies at every level in Washington and overseas.
- The State Department should also create interagency regional hub offices for public diplomacy, with a special coordinator (holding the rank of Ambassador) that reports to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. These regional hubs will provide a home for the existing but skeletal media relations hubs, a nexus for coordinating relevant interagency activity, and a direct and regular point of contact for the Combatant Commanders. They should have

a dedicated staff to promote long-term relationships, manage educational and cultural exchanges, and house the existing State Department regional officers focused on Environment, Science, Technology and Health (ESTH). Finally, the hubs should have the staff and resources necessary to understand and analyze public opinion in each region. They should conduct polling, focus groups, and other activities to inform the government's interagency public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts.

- The State Department should appoint a full-time Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy in every regional bureau of the State Department as well as functional bureaus focused on oceans, environment and science; democracy, human rights and labor; economic, energy, and business affairs; and other bureaus as appropriate and resources allow. Routine public affairs duties such as scheduling and preparing talking points for media interviews should be handled by more junior staff, freeing time for strategic planning, advising the Assistant Secretary in charge of the regional bureau, liaising between the bureau and the regional hub, and engaging with groups outside the Department.
- Embassies should receive a significant increase in the number of foreign service officers that staff them generally, and particularly in public diplomacy. There should be separate officers to deal with long-term relationship building on the one hand and short-term public affairs work for the ambassador on the other. The latter is important, but it should not eclipse the former. This recommendation echoes Secretary of State Rice's request to the Congress for 1,100 new foreign service

officers and calls by the American Academy of Diplomacy and Stimson Center to increase public diplomacy staff by over 800 American and locally employed professionals by 2014.

- The State Department, Defense Department, and other relevant agencies should create an interagency program to bring outside experts into government for one-to-two year periods. Modeled on the American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellowships, Jefferson Science Fellowships, and Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowships, this program would bring new perspectives and expertise to the task of public diplomacy.
- The U.S. government should embark on reforms to make itself more nimble. Red tape is thick, the bureaucracy is slow, and good initiatives are frustrated. Every agency should have clearer and streamlined processes for engaging in public-private partnerships, speaking with the media, convening outside experts, and sharing information. Unclear or overly complex regulations lead to undue caution and lost opportunities.
- The State Department should train its people more effectively and give them more opportunities for professional advancement. In contrast to Defense Department personnel, State Department officers receive far less training and education. Whereas the Department of Defense has a 10% "float" and funds to send staff out for training, the State Department faces a personnel shortfall of 2,400 staff.¹⁷ Foreign Service officers need a wide variety of skills and knowledge to be effective public diplomacy officers including better foreign language skills, knowledge of

¹⁷ *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness* (Washington DC: American Academy of Diplomacy and Stimson Center, October 2008).

foreign societies and cultures, and better understanding of the techniques necessary to engage foreign publics effectively. In addition to formal education, promising officers should be encouraged to spend a year at a relevant business, NGO, or university.

- The State Department should reconsider its staffing policies in the field. Public diplomacy officers in particular need the ability to build in-depth knowledge of and long-term relationships with local opinion leaders. This is extremely difficult when diplomats rotate frequently, especially in unaccompanied posts where assignments last only one year. Though changing these policies will be challenging, the outcome will be more effective public diplomacy, especially in countries of critical importance like Pakistan.
- The National Security Council should create a strategic planning council, as recommended by other studies, to ensure that efforts to address short-term demands do not overshadow the pursuit of important long-term interests. A strategic planning process that engages all the tools of national power, including public diplomacy and strategic communication, would be a positive step forward.

“America’s diplomats are also struggling to break free from the bureaucratic practices that keep them inside U.S. embassy buildings and that emphasize the processing of information over the personal, active, direct engagement that wins friends and supporters for America.”

—CSIS, *The Embassy of the Future*, 2007

RESOURCES

Public diplomacy is vital to achieving American national security and foreign policy interests. Re-

sources, though limited, should reflect that priority. That is not happening. To give just one benchmark for comparison, the British Council—the independent arm of the British government tasked with education and cultural relations—has a budget that is roughly double the State Department’s Educational and Cultural Affairs bureau. Within our own country, there are currently more musicians in military bands than diplomats.¹⁸ Though comparisons of this variety are imperfect, they are illustrative. The importance of public diplomacy is not reflected in the resources devoted to it. A reallocation is in order.


A shortage of resources should not be used as an excuse. Indeed, many valuable reforms could occur with little or no new resources. However, to achieve substantial impact, more funds are a necessary foundation for better public diplomacy.

“Our leader in the war of ideas has no troops.”

—Defense Department official,
personal communication with the author, 2008

- The Congress should substantially increase the State Department’s budget for public diplomacy. One component of these funds should support a 100% increase in foreign service officers over the next ten years, as recommended by the Secretary of State’s Advisory Commission on Transformational Diplomacy. A significant proportion of these officers should be focused on public diplomacy.
- The Congress should ensure funding for dedicated Deputy Assistant Secretaries in each regional bureau, staff in regional hub offices, an enhanced staff for the Global Strategic Engagement Center, and senior advisers in the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs front office to help manage the expanded role of the Under Secretary effectively.

¹⁸ Nicholas Kristof, “Make Diplomacy Not War,” *New York Times* (August 9, 2008).



Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget

- The State Department should have funds to commission independent polls, research, and analyses that support its public diplomacy work. The Defense Department has vastly more resources devoted to these purposes.
- Resources, and the strategies and tactics they support, should be more consistent in order to

achieve results. Large budgetary fluctuations have characterized U.S. public diplomacy for the last fifty years or more. These fluctuations limit the impact of public diplomacy.

UNDERSTANDING


To engage the world effectively, we must understand it. We need to understand foreign cultures and societies, how people communicate, which leaders they trust, how they prioritize competing values, where they get their information, and why. With an intelligence budget in the tens of billions of dollars, we could be expected to know this. We do not, at least not sufficiently.

- Our government needs to spend more time, energy, and resources on listening. We should listen more and more publicly. Letting others know that we care what they think is a sign of respect and would alone lay the groundwork for better relations.

“All too often, programming has seemed to reflect a ballistic concept of communication—a one-way shooting of a message at a target. Today, however, Americans understand that they have much to learn as well as to teach and that cooperative leadership requires good listening as well as persuasive talking.”

—Stanton Commission, *International Information, Education and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future*, 1975

2007 U.S. Defense and Public Diplomacy Budgets (in billions of dollars)



Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget; U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges," April 2007.

- This understanding needs to inform both policies and projects, especially in public diplomacy. We cannot remind ourselves enough that others do not see the world as we see it and may interpret our statements or actions in ways we never intended.
- Information, especially unclassified or open source intelligence, is too compartmentalized and does not always reach the public diplomacy professionals who need it. Better sharing of relevant information with employees who work in public diplomacy and strategic communication, and rewards for those employees who share information widely and effectively, would extract more value from existing intelligence expenditures.
- Within government, there is poor information about what other departments or agencies are doing. This will always be a problem in large organizations but our government could improve. The lack of knowledge leads to duplication, insufficient learning from experience, insufficient impact, and the waste of taxpayer dollars.
- American citizens, as well as our government, need to understand the world better. This is a mission that extends far beyond public diplomacy, but it affects our ability to engage effectively with the world, whether in government, business, or the non-profit sector. Education, formal and informal, and especially language instruction needs more attention. Americans also need an understanding of what their government is doing internationally and why it is important. In addition to better domestic outreach, the Congress should revise the Smith-Mundt Act (the

United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, Public Law 402) which makes it difficult for citizens to see how their tax dollars are spent. The law, interpreted as an early Cold War effort to restrict propaganda from blowing back into American media, has become an anachronism in the age of the Internet.

METHODS

To conduct public diplomacy well, America should have a range of instruments at its disposal and understand how best to use them to reach different audiences, in different places, for different purposes, at different times. As noted earlier in this study, the world is changing in ways that require new approaches, greater speed and flexibility, engagement of new technologies, the savvy use of networks, more collaboration, and a tone that resonates with the audiences we are trying to reach.

There are many instruments of public diplomacy, which should not be confused with public diplomacy's objectives. All too frequently, conversations about public diplomacy devolve into a discussion of means not ends, focused on educational exchanges or broadcasting, cultural diplomacy or science diplomacy, one-way pronouncements or dialogues, messaging or various other methods of strategic communication (the process of selecting, framing, and sharing information and images to create a favorable climate in which to advance government objectives—though the term is often used interchangeably with public diplomacy). Each one of these instruments, and many others, has a place in a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy. Every one of them will be appropriate in some places and not others, at some times and not others, and with some audiences but not others. We need the ability to weigh our options and select the right tool for the job at hand.

A few points, drawn from extensive interviews and research, are worth keeping in mind.

- The best public diplomacy is tailored to the task and in line with an overall strategy. In many cases, this will entail two-way dialogue. But a powerful presidential speech, a one-way message, in front of a grand backdrop should not be underestimated.
- The best, most creative initiatives may undercut their own effectiveness if they are not sustained. By raising expectations, they may ultimately harm more than help.
- Public diplomacy will be most effective if it recognizes that audiences are not monolithic. Though our government agencies and military commands are often organized according to world regions, we must remind ourselves often that those regions contain populations marked by vast differences. American interests are well served by understanding these differences and adjusting our communications accordingly.
- Listening, done publicly and genuinely, is itself an act of public diplomacy.
- Branding, especially efforts to make clear that foreign assistance such as food and humanitarian assistance are funded by the American people, has an appropriate place in our strategy. In these circumstances, the U.S. government needs clear guidance for when and how contractors (who increasingly implement American foreign assistance programs overseas) publicize that the American taxpayer is supporting their work. These guidelines exist in some parts of the U.S. government, e.g. USAID, but are less clear in other agencies. Government-wide consideration of this issue would be valuable. But we need to understand when such efforts are effective and when they undercut the goals of assistance programs by appearing arrogant or self-serving. We need to understand when letting others take credit best serves American interests.

- Private companies invest tremendous resources in evaluating their products *before* they are public. This is not always practical in government, which must respond quickly to world events. When it is, agencies should have the resources to do this. Even seasoned officers should not assume they know how their efforts will be received. The Defense Department, which does have resources for testing, reports occasional surprise at how others react to its products and has revised its method in response. The State Department has had few resources to test new initiatives and, as a result, has neither expertise in nor a culture of testing. Evaluation of programs after the fact is also essential to future success, but there is little money budgeted for this purpose. Program managers should be given funds for evaluation and be held accountable for using them wisely.
- Educational and professional exchanges are among the most effective methods we have to engage foreign publics. These programs, as well as specialized scholarships to advance military, public health, economic, and development goals, deserve larger budgets.
- Our government, including the Congress, needs to have a serious discussion about the proper role and scope of covert information operations. Public diplomacy professionals often pretend the intelligence community does not exist, for fear of tainting their work. But it does exist—and covert action has a proper, if limited, role in promoting American interests outside of war zones. Ignoring the role of covert actions damages the mission not only by failing to engage useful tools but—as significantly—creating space for unwise uses of covert activities. In an age where we must assume that anything can become public, unwise covert acts, even small ones, can undermine larger overt efforts and the overall strategy.
- America's broadcasting strategy and organization needs a serious review and rethinking to adapt to the age we live in. The Broadcasting Board of Governors is a confusing jumble of broadcasting agencies that are currently disengaged from the broader U.S. public diplomacy strategy. A newly released BBG strategic plan for 2008-2013 calls for closer collaboration with U.S. public diplomacy but that effort has not yet begun and would represent a break from past principles. While the various BBG services have introduced laudable new initiatives such as websites and call-in shows to facilitate dialogue as well as one-way messages, its methods are nonetheless in need of review. This review should include an analysis of U.S. government outreach to foreign media outlets in information-saturated markets as well as a review of media outlets funded by the American taxpayer.
- Partnership should be a core organizational principle. Government agencies increasingly will need to cooperate with organizations in the public, private, and non-profit sector both in the United State and overseas.
- Government agencies should develop clear rules and processes to engage partners. These should be efficient and streamlined. Some suggest doing away with certain rules that restrict fundraising, impede the formation of advisory groups, and prevent work with organizations where there are real or perceived conflicts of interest. This should be done only with great caution. Despite good intentions, there is the potential for abuse. Efficiency is an important goal of government, but fairness and accountability are also important values.
- Government agencies also must develop a culture of partnership and overcome suspicion of the private sector. This will come

with experience, but it will also entail training. Government employees need to know how to work effectively with private sector organizations and what those organizations hope to get out of partnerships.

- Agencies must understand that partnership entails more than finding a company to write a check. This scenario is not only rare, it also reflects poor understanding of all the private sector has to offer.

SECURITY

Security should not trump engagement. The United States should strike the proper balance between security and openness, recognizing that less of the latter does not necessarily increase the former. Openness *enhances* American security in many ways—by increasing U.S. economic power, prosperity, and influence; bringing skills and talent to our country; and building networks of people who understand and perhaps support our values and interests—even as it poses risks. As a nation, we have not yet found the right balance, at our borders, in our visa and immigration policies, and at our embassies overseas. Our government should

- reaffirm support from the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Homeland Security for a new philosophy towards border controls and visas, which emphasizes the need to be open and welcoming
- treat visitors and visa applicants with respect, dignity, and a welcoming attitude, even as we maintain or strengthen security procedures. This will require high level guidance, training for border and customs officials, incentives that reward civility, and streamlined and effective procedures
- reiterate globally that America welcomes students, tourists, business people, researchers, and other well-intentioned visitors

- visibly signal this commitment with higher caps on temporary and permanent employment-based visa categories (H-1B visas and green cards).

“Since the 9/11 attacks, America has struggled to make our borders—both physical and virtual—more secure while maintaining the freedom and openness for which our country is celebrated. It is no indictment of the effort or thoughtfulness of government employees to suggest that we can and must do better.”

—Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Board, *Preserving our Welcome to the World in an Age of Terrorism*, 2008

IMPACT

Public diplomacy must show results. Not all of these results will be quantifiable or observable in the short term, but all public diplomacy initiatives must be developed with impact in mind.

- To maximize impact, programs should either reach mass publics or target opinion leaders for a specific purpose.
- Programs must be evaluated diligently. To do this, employees must be allowed to fail and discouraged from reporting that every project is a brilliant success. Uninterrupted perfection is not a realistic or useful standard and employees should not be held to it.
- The U.S. government should invest in the development of better tools to evaluate the success and impact of public diplomacy programs. Such evaluation is extremely difficult, especially if one wishes to measure long-term rather than short-term impact and changes in behavior as well as attitudes. However, such tools do exist in the private sector and could be adapted for public diplomacy purposes.

Conclusion

America faces a rapidly evolving world, characterized by new centers of power, new ways of communicating, new opportunities, and new perils. Achieving national interests in this environment will require legitimacy and public support, domestically and around the world. Our country is well endowed to rise to this challenge. However, we will continue to need new thinking, new capacities, and new approaches that recognize the complex global environment we face now and the evolving threats we must brave in the future.

This report presents a means to accomplish this end, based on extensive analysis and consultations with individuals in U.S. government agencies and hundreds of private citizens. It recommends a nimble new organization to support our government's efforts and engage companies, universities, and non-governmental organizations in that endeavor. It also calls for a comprehensive approach to strengthen U.S. government capabilities in public diplomacy and strategic communication, bolstered by a clear strategy, new resources, stronger inter-agency coordination, the more welcoming treatment of visitors, and new methods.

Public diplomacy is an important part of America's endeavor to engage the support of foreign publics in pursuit of common interests and values. But, of course, it is not the only—or even the most important—means of shaping our global future. To confront current and future challenges and lay the groundwork for policy success, America needs and will always need

- a foreign policy in line with our highest ideals

- a domestic policy that invests in Americans and their collective future
- a comprehensive, forward-looking, and hard-headed strategy for how to engage and communicate with the world
- strong but adaptable institutions, staffed by professionals who collectively possess the foreign language abilities, deep knowledge of foreign cultures, and wide range of skills necessary to conduct public diplomacy
- foreign policies that promote American interests, based on careful evaluation of the full costs and benefits, including the support or opposition of foreign stakeholders
- a comprehensive understanding of the global environment, including the beliefs and values of foreign societies
- effective, creative, and evolving means to convey and build support for specific policies
- a carefully maintained balance between responding quickly to new opportunities and challenges, without overreacting and neglecting regions that fall out of the headlines
- the ability to project a nuanced and complex vision of America, our ideals, institutions, and society, in order to challenge simplistic assumptions that obstruct understanding
- deep networks of personal relationships between Americans and foreign counterparts

- growing support for universal values such as liberty, equality, justice, and tolerance
- an international environment of understanding, respect, and trust in which the pursuit of common interests is more feasible.

Though America has not yet achieved this vision, it is realistic and attainable. A re-energized na-

tional effort at public diplomacy—one that draws fully on the energy and talents of the American people, supports likeminded champions around the world, and is grounded in a stronger government-wide strategy—will help America to achieve this vision. Our nation, and also the world, will be safer, more prosperous, and more honorable for it.

Contributors and Supporters

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Bruce Sherman
Broadcasting Board of Governors

Daniel Silverberg
House Committee on Foreign
Affairs

Nicole Silverman
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Stan Silverman
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Peter Singer
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Thomas Skipper
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Linda Sloan
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Pamela Smith
Former U.S. Ambassador to
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Crocker Snow
Tufts University

Jay Snyder
U.S. Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy

Dahlia Sokolov
Committee on Science
U.S. House of Representatives

Richard Solomon
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Joel Spangenberg
U.S. Senate,
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Alisa Stack-O'Connor
U.S. Department of Defense

Damon Stevens
National Counterterrorism Center

Michael Stopford
The Coca-Cola Company

Jennifer Strauss
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John Sullivan
Center for International Private
Enterprise

Yael Swerdlow

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Jim Thompson
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Jonathan Tourtellot
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Advancement of Science

Darius Udrys

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The Levin Institute

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Defense Science Board

Andrew Walworth
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Cynthia Warshaw
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Jeff Weintraub
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Gretchen Welch
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Christian Whiton
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Frank Wolf
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James Wolfensohn
Wolfensohn and Company

Michele Wymer
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State and Foreign Operations,
Committee on Appropriations

Meg Young
USC Center for Public Diplomacy

Nancy Yuan
Asia Foundation

Matthew Zweig
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives

Summary of Proposals

Recent legislation and numerous reports have recommended the creation of new organizations to support U.S. public diplomacy objectives. The chart below summarizes these recommendations.

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL¹⁹
The Smith-Thornberry amendment to this Bill recommends a <u>Center for Strategic Communication</u> . This non-profit organization will be responsible for providing independent assessment and strategic guidance on strategic communication and public diplomacy to the government.
OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS BILL²⁰
This bill recommends a public-private organization that will serve as a knowledge bank and a program integration and coordination hub. It will improve interagency coordination, and draw upon private sector knowledge and expertise to inform program strategies, improve program results, and utilize resources in smarter, more innovative, and more effective ways.
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 2008²¹
This task force recommends a <u>Center for Global Engagement</u> . This independent organization would attract civil society expertise. It would be a hub for innovation and ideas, a repository of expertise, a means to institutionalize continuity and long-term memory, and a focus for experimentation and project development. It would be a non-profit, non-partisan, and tax-exempt 501(c)(3). Its board of directors would provide direction for programs and projects. Activities would be widely varied, including: research and analysis, cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, and creation and dissemination of products and programs.
SECURE BORDERS AND OPEN DOORS ADVISORY COMMITTEE²²
A <u>Corporation for Public Diplomacy</u> is recommended. As a quasi-governmental organization, it would engage all sectors of American society in improving world opinion of the U.S. It would take a long-term approach and would be insulated from partisan politics. Most public diplomacy programs would be removed from the State Department and housed in this new organization, which would have the responsibility of creating, conducting, and evaluating public diplomacy.

¹⁹ U.S. Congress, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008).

²⁰ U.S. Congress, *Omnibus Appropriations Bill FY 2008*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007).

²¹ *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008). This recommendation was also included in earlier Defense Science Board reports.

²² *Report of the Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Committee: Preserving our Welcome to the World in an Age of Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of State, 2008).

MERIDIAN INTERNATIONAL CENTER & CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY²³

The proposed independent 501(c)(3) organization, named the Foundation for International Understanding, would work to improve international understanding by supporting the U.S. government's public diplomacy. It would conduct grant-making, polling and analysis of foreign public opinion, and use "new media" to support private advocates with common goals. It would convene practitioners, leverage resources, promote innovation, and use new technologies to improve exchange programs and connections with program alumni.

BUSINESS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION²⁴

The recommended Corporation for Public Diplomacy will be an independent and nonpartisan organization. The governing board will include representatives of political parties, the business community, media, and the nonprofit sector. Like a business, the CEO and management team will be held accountable for achieving goals. These goals will be established with a set of metrics that measure the improvement of America's reputation and image in the world.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES SMART POWER COMMISSION²⁵

A New Institution for International Knowledge and Communication is recommended by CSIS. This semi-independent non-profit organization will tap into public and non-profit sector expertise. It will receive federal appropriations and report to the Secretary of State. An independent board will provide a "heat shield" from current political pressures. It will fill gaps in four main operational areas: improved understanding, dialogue of ideas, advice to public officials, and shaping foreign attitudes about the United States to fit with reality.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CULTURAL DIPLOMACY²⁶

The suggested organization, a Cultural Diplomacy Clearinghouse, will support efforts to bring the best artists, writers, and other cultural figures to foreign audiences. It will develop public-private partnerships and raise funds. As an independent clearinghouse, in the manner of the British Council, this organization will have separate housing from the embassies so cultural events can attract wider audiences.

HERITAGE FOUNDATION²⁷

The Smith-Mundt Act restricts the State Department from disseminating information about foreign public opinion to other agencies. Meanwhile, the BBG, DoD and CIA all engage commercial polling firms. To avoid waste and disseminate information, the recommended independent agency, an Independent Public Opinion Research Center, will collect information. It will not disseminate products or services publicly.

²³ *Foundation for International Understanding*, (Washington, DC: Meridian International Center and Center for the Presidency, 2008).

²⁴ *America's Role in the World: A Business Perspective on Public Diplomacy*. (New York: Business for Diplomatic Action, 2007).

²⁵ Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, eds, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007).

²⁶ *2005 Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2005).

²⁷ Patrick Cronin, Helle C. Dale, Stephen Johnson, "Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, Coordination, and Strategy," *The Heritage Foundation*, Backgrounder #1875 (2005), <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/bg1875.cfm>>.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNCIL²⁸

The recommended government agency—U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy and Foundation for the Future—will coordinate all public diplomacy efforts. The Foundation for the Future will create a permanent trust fund to support international exchanges, and will be managed by a nonpartisan board of directors. The Agency director will hold the rank of deputy secretary and report to the Deputy Secretary of State. It will include education and cultural affairs, information programs, all public diplomacy aspects of regional and functional bureaus, the office of research, and aspects of the public affairs bureau of the State Department.

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 2004²⁹

A recommended Center for Strategic Communication would be an independent nonpartisan 501(c) (3), that takes direction from the NSC Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and members of the Strategic Communication Committee. The center would be governed by a board of directors and would: provide information and analysis to civilian and military decision-makers; develop plans, products and programs for U.S. strategic communication; support government strategic communications through non-governmental initiatives; and support cross-cultural exchanges.

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION³⁰

A Corporation for Public Diplomacy is recommended by Brookings fellow Hady Amr. This non-profit independent organization will bridge the gap between public and private sectors. It will facilitate private donations for public diplomacy. It will be nimble, and will be a credible messenger that engages in dialogue and does not shy away from issues of political sensitivity. It will cooperate with, and be on the same page as, government public diplomacy efforts.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY³¹

A recommended independent organization, the Center for Public Diplomacy would support non-governmental programs that communicate messages compatible with American interests and ideals. It would promote projects that facilitate dialogue and cooperation between Americans and foreigners. Modeled on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the organization would allow government, foundations, corporations, and individuals to contribute to specific programs and provide general support. Grants for private and non-profit activities would encourage use of advanced media and information technology.

ADVISORY GROUP ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD³²

This group recommends a Corporation for Public Diplomacy. This independent organization will make grants to individual producers and independent, indigenous media channels to create and disseminate high quality programming in the Arab and Muslim world. It will develop programming in partnership with private firms, nonprofit institutions, and government agencies in the U.S. and abroad, and distribute that programming through existing channels.

²⁸ *A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy*, (Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2005).

²⁹ *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004).

³⁰ Hady Amr, *The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004).

³¹ Phyllis D'Hoop, ed, *An Initiative: Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Initiatives*, (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2003).

³² Edward Djerejian, ed, *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World*, (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2003).

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2003³³

An Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute is recommended. This independent organization will coordinate with and supplement the State Department's National Foreign Affairs Training Center. It will offer training and services in public opinion research, cultural and attitudinal analysis, segmentation, database management, strategic formulation, political campaign management, marketing and branding, technology and tactics, communications and organizational planning, program evaluations, and conduct studies on media trends. Also recommended is a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps. Modeled on the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Corps will augment domestic and overseas operations by developing action plans, providing training, and engaging the private sector.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2002³⁴

Modeled on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the recommended Corporation for Public Diplomacy will be a tax-exempt 501(c)3 able to receive private grants. The organization will be led by a bipartisan board of directors and will be Congressionally funded. The activities of the organization will include: cultivating public-private messengers in order to build bridges and improve cross-cultural relations, supporting independent indigenous new media channels, and creating joint think tanks with foreign countries.

³³ Peter G. Peterson, ed, *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003).

³⁴ Peter G. Peterson, ed, *Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).

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