SCALING UP
A FRAMEWORK AND LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS FROM LITERATURE AND PRACTICE

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Authors’ Note:

The authors are indebted to James D. Wolfensohn, Larry Cooley, Homi Kharas, Richard Kohl, Santiago Levy and the entire team at the Wolfensohn Center for Development for their guidance, intellectual input and support. They also thank the participants at a seminar held at Brookings in May 2008 in which they presented an earlier version of this paper. Oksana Pidufala provided invaluable assistance in compiling the companion “Annotated Bibliography on Scaling Up and Development Effectiveness” and in providing general research support for the preparation of this paper. The paper also benefited from case studies undertaken with the Roma Education Fund. A preliminary summary of this paper was published as an IFPRI Focus Note “Scaling up: A Path to Effective Development,” October 2007. Any errors are exclusively those of the authors.

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<tr>
<td>ADEA</td>
<td>Association for the Development of Education in AFRICA</td>
</tr>
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<td>ARDE</td>
<td>Annual Review of Development Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
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<td>CACID</td>
<td>Cellule d’Appui a la Conservation et aux Initiatives de Developpement Durable</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community Driven Development</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Citizen Report Card</td>
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<td>EDUCO</td>
<td>Education with Community Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGVGD</td>
<td>Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>IFPRI</td>
<td>International Food Policy Research Institute</td>
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<td>IIRR</td>
<td>International Institute of Rural Reconstruction</td>
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<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kecamatan Development Program Indonesia</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
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<td>PROGRESA</td>
<td>Progresa-Oportunidades Program Mexico</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>REF</td>
<td>Roma Education Fund</td>
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<td>SERVOL</td>
<td>Service Volunteered for All</td>
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<td>TTFSE</td>
<td>Trade and Transport Facility for Southeast Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nation's Children's Fund</td>
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SCALING UP
A FRAMEWORK AND LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS FROM LITERATURE AND PRACTICE

Arntraud Hartmann
Johannes F. Linn

“Small is beautiful, but big is necessary.”
Motto attributed to BRAC*

“Nearly every problem has been solved by someone, somewhere. The frustration is that we can’t seem to replicate [those solutions] anywhere else.”
Attributed to Bill Clinton†

“We have to discover how we move from our feel-good successes, how to scale up these initiatives to a depth and a breadth where we can really have an impact on poverty, where we can achieve the Millennium Development Goals.”
James D. Wolfensohn‡

ABSTRACT
Scaling up of development interventions is much debated today as a way to improve their impact and effectiveness. Based on a review of scaling up literature and practice, this paper develops a framework for the key dynamics that allow the scaling up process to happen. The authors explore the possible approaches and paths to scaling up, the drivers of expansion and of replication, the space that has to be created for interventions to grow, and the role of evaluation and of careful planning and implementation. They draw a number of lessons for the development analyst and practitioner. More than anything else, scaling up is about political and organizational leadership, about vision, values and mindset, and about incentives and accountability—all oriented to make scaling up a central element of individual, institutional, national and international development efforts. The paper concludes by highlighting some implications for aid and aid donors.
INTRODUCTION

In 2000, the global community set itself the challenge of meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 as a way to combat world poverty and hunger. In 2007, the halfway point, it became clear that many countries will likely not be able to meet the MDGs, or at least will not do so without significantly greater efforts. Confronted with the challenge of meeting the MDGs, the development community has recently begun to focus on the need to scale up development interventions. Most of the debate has been on how to mobilize, deploy and absorb the substantially increased levels of official development assistance that were promised by the wealthy countries at recent G8 summits. A fragmented aid architecture complicates this task; multilateral, bilateral, and private aid entities have multiplied, leading to many more—but smaller—aid projects and programs and increasing transaction costs for recipient countries. Volatility in aid flows further compounds the problem of aid effectiveness (Kharas 2007). In response, some aid donors have started to move from project to program support and in the “Paris Declaration” official donors committed to work together for more efficient and better coordinated aid delivery.

However, the challenge is not just a matter of more, better coordinated and less volatile aid. A key constraint that needs to be overcome is that development interventions—projects, programs, policies—are all too often like small pebbles thrown into a big pond: they are limited in scale, short-lived, and therefore without lasting impact. This may explain why so many studies have found that external aid has had only a weak or no development impact in the aggregate at the global and at the country level, even though many individual interventions have been successful in terms of their project- or program-specific goals. In order to reduce poverty substantially, we have to follow the advice of James Wolfensohn (2005) and discover “how to move from our feel-good successes to large scale, how to scale up these initiatives to a depth and breadth where we can really have an impact on poverty, where we can achieve the Millennium Development Goals.”

In this paper, we take a comprehensive look at what the literature and practice tell us about whether and how to scale up development interventions. Our aim is not to present a theory, nor an operational handbook on “how to scale up.” Our objective is to develop a framework for thinking about scaling up, which helps us better understand the key dynamics that allow scaling up to happen and to draw lessons that may help the analyst and practitioner find a shortcut through the copious debates.

As we delved into the scaling up literature and experience, we realized that while the concept of scaling up may be simple at an intuitive level it is actually quite complex in the conceptual and practical dimensions. Hence, this review had to be structured also in a somewhat complex manner. Figure 1 lays out the sequence of the argument.

We first take a brief look at the debate in scaling up literature. We then turn to the scaling up framework, beginning with a review of definitions and dimensions of scaling up found in the literature. Having cleared this underbrush, we consider an important, but often neglected, question: whether to scale up. If the answer is yes, one next has to consider alternative approaches and paths to scaling up, and the appropriate drivers for scaling up along the paths chosen. One also needs to assure that there is space for the intervention to grow. The framework also includes key implementa-
tion aspects: monitoring and evaluation of the interventions and sound planning and management. The paper closes with a summary of main lessons and a post-script on the implications for aid and aid donors. An Annex summarizes a number of cases of scaling up referred to in the text. The annotated bibliography prepared by Oksana Pidufala (2008) serves as a companion piece and a resource for the entire paper.

Before we proceed, some caveats are in order:

- First, while we review a large number of sources and specific cases, the coverage of the literature and of experience is not exhaustive. However, we did not come across a similarly comprehensive effort to pull together the cumulative evidence. Much of the literature focuses on specific sectors, thematic areas or case studies.4

- Second, while there is a general presumption in the literature that not enough attention has been paid to scaling up development interventions, there actually is very little rigorous evidence on this key point. Much of the literature and evidence covers examples of successful scaling up. Little evidence exists on the lack of or the failure of efforts to scale up.

- Third, there are few thorough, scientifically rigorous impact evaluations of large scale interventions, and none of them that we are aware of permit a rigorous identification of the significance of the multiple factors that determine the success or failure of scaled up programs.5 Accordingly, like all of the literature we reviewed, we had to rely on qualitative judgments both of individual programs and of the overarching lessons of experience.

- Fourth, we found no thorough evaluation of the institutional performance of any individual organization in terms of its focus, ability and performance on scaling up, which we believe is another serious gap in the available analysis.

- Finally, this review does not aim to delve deeply into the issue of aid effectiveness. Instead, we provide an assessment of the experience with development interventions more generally, whether donor supported or not. A brief post-script at the end of the paper draws some preliminary conclusions for aid-financed programs, and their donors, as a way to demonstrate how our scaling up framework can be applied to the issue of aid effectiveness.
Figure 1: Scheme of the paper

- Annotated Bibliography on Scaling Up
- The Scaling Up Debate
- Whether to scale up?
- Definitions, Dimensions
- Approaches and Paths
- Drivers
- Space to Grow
- Monitoring and Evaluation
- Planning and Management
- Lessons
- Postscript: Implications for Aid
- Annex: Case Boxes

Flow of the paper

Elements of the scaling up framework
THE SCALING UP DEBATE

Today’s debate on scaling up can be confusing since it involves three interrelated, but separate issues: (i) the need to increase the level of aid in order to reach the MDGs, i.e., the scaling up of aid flows on the donor side; (ii) macroeconomic and institutional constraints to increased aid flows to poor countries; and (iii) the expansion, replication and transfer of successful development policies, programs or projects in order to reach more beneficiaries—with or without donor assistance. The literature on the first two issues suggests that while more aid resources are clearly needed to achieve the MDGs, increased aid flows might not be absorbed effectively by developing countries due to a lack of institutional capacity. It also points to possible macroeconomic imbalances leading to “Dutch-disease” exchange rate appreciation. We will not pursue these two sets of issues in this paper. Instead, our focus is on (iii): how the impact of successfully applied policies, programs and projects can be increased in order to reach a larger number of beneficiaries.

The debate about scaling up development interventions is not new. During the 1970s, the World Bank, under Robert McNamara’s leadership, focused on addressing development challenges in a comprehensive manner and at a large scale. For example, it identified urbanization as a key global challenge and developed strategies for addressing the urban infrastructure and housing needs, especially of the poor. Replicability, affordability and financial sustainability were key considerations in the World Bank’s efforts to reach the urban poor at scale. (Box 1) During the 1980s, as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly engaged in development activities, scaling up emerged as a challenge for them. NGO interventions were—and are—typically small in scale and often apply new approaches. Therefore the question of how to replicate and scale up successful models gained prominence, especially in connection with participatory and community development projects, often at village level. Indeed, the current interest among philanthropic foundations and NGOs in how to scale up their interventions is an echo of these earlier concerns.

Seminal early analytical work on “going to scale” in development programs was undertaken by D. Korten (1980) and R. Myers (1984). This was followed by important conceptual work by the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, IIRR, (2000), which laid out key principles widely applied in subsequent discussions. Since then, the literature on scaling up has mushroomed. But the discourse remains mostly compartmentalized by focusing on selected sectors. In recent years, particular emphasis has been placed on the analysis of scaling up of health interventions. Parallel work on education is more limited. Hancock (2003) developed a conceptual framework for scaling up rural development operations. Scaling up of poverty programs figures prominently in numerous case-studies and in a recent review R. Desai (2007) analyzed the political economy of scaling up poverty programs. Binswanger and Aiyar (2003 & 2005) laid out a framework for scaling up “community-driven development” (CDD) programs. Cooley and Kohl (2005) developed an important management framework for scaling up pilot projects, which is not limited to any specific sector. Extensive multi-sectoral case-study work was undertaken by the World Bank (2005) under James Wolfensohn’s leadership in preparation of the 2004 Shanghai Conference on scaling up.

Scaling up approaches and processes are also debated in the developed countries. Scaling up and expansion of social programs have been explored particularly in the US, where a multitude of domestic social services
are provided through non-governmental organizations and funded with private support. Many of these programs remain small and scattered and hence have not had a significant impact in addressing overall social problems. Funding and implementing agencies have therefore come under pressure to build replication, expansion and dissemination into their programs and “going-to-scale” has become a major concern for the programming of social services. An important study on replication was published in 1994 under the auspices of various US government agencies (RPS 1994). The issues and recommendations identified in this debate are relevant for the governments, NGOs and donor agencies in developing countries.

Finally, the literature on “diffusion of innovations” is relevant for the scaling up debate since it highlights key attributes that facilitate successful application

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**Box 1. Scaling up urban development projects: the experience of the World Bank in the 1970s**

A review of World Bank project lending for urban development projects prepared for World Development Report 1979 squarely focused on the issue of replicability and scale in reaching the world’s urban poor:

“The replicability of urbanization projects, and thus their ability to reach all or most of the world’s urban poor over time, depends to a large extent on how low standards (and therefore costs) are set and on the extent to which costs are recovered from project beneficiaries. But these are not the only constraints on replicability, as some World Bank projects have shown. One problem relates to the availability of raw land for sites-and-services projects in reasonable proximity to employment opportunities... A somewhat different problem that also involves the issue of land affects the replicability of upgrading projects. As discussed earlier, tenure regularization tends to be easiest where slums are located on public land. Usually these areas are tackled first in upgrading projects. When follow-up projects then turn to squatters on private land, the whole question of tenure regularization becomes more difficult to resolve and will generally involve greater political obstacles, dangers of delays, and budgetary costs than was the case initially.

“Another limitation on the replicability of low-cost housing programs, even where costs are fully recovered in the long term, is the problem of limited availability of capital for such programs in the short term. The government’s overall housing strategy is important in this context. As long as scarce capital is devoted to major high-cost housing programs, the availability of funds for low-cost housing projects is obviously limited, and the pace and scale of replication of such programs are considerably impaired.

“Finally, the ability of housing agencies and of other related governmental units to raise revenues from other sources is a crucial determinant of the replicability of low-cost housing programs... A strengthening of the fiscal base of local governments is of central importance and has been of concern in various World Bank projects (for example in Kenya, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia).”

and expansion of innovative ideas and techniques (Rogers 1983). Dissemination of research, diffusion of agricultural technology, and the scaling up of these innovations through agricultural extension systems mostly follow the path of diffusion of innovations. Elements of the diffusion approach are also applied in some aspects of health interventions. A recent popular best-seller, *The Tipping Point*, looks at examples of how some commercial and educational ideas and practices reach the point beyond which they spread “like wildfire” (Gladwell 2002). While this literature—*The Tipping Point* being a notable exception—mostly focuses on how to ensure that scientific research results are effectively transferred to development policy and practice, rather than on the scaling up of operationally proven interventions, its findings are relevant to an understanding of how to implement effective development programs at scale.

In sum, the scaling up debate goes back at least to the surge in development aid and attention to global poverty in the 1970s, spearheaded by Robert McNamara, and continued in the 1980s with efforts by NGOs and others aiming to achieve a development impact on a larger scale. While it has since broadened to include various dimensions of development interventions beyond the project level and has been linked to the debates on diffusion of innovation, the literature remains primarily focused on the scaling up of individual projects, with a particular focus on public service delivery programs especially in the health sector and for community-driven development (CDD) programs, which typically are community based and involve NGOs. The literature offers less insight on the scaling up of policies, programs and projects outside the health sector and CDD programs, and it rarely discusses scaling up from national to supra-national (regional or global) levels.

In the remainder of this paper we attempt to pull together the many strands of the scaling up literature and practical experience. Our ultimate goal is to draw pragmatic lessons for the debate on development effectiveness, since in our view development effectiveness depends on whether and how successful development interventions are scaled up and sustained.
WHAT IS SCALING UP?

Let us start by addressing the question of what we mean by “scaling up development interventions.” This is of more than passing interest since the literature has adopted many different definitions and has considered multiple dimensions of scaling up.

Our preferred definition is adapted from the one used by the World Bank (2005) in connection with the 2004 Shanghai conference on scaling up. It focuses on quality of impact, or “success,” and scale and sustainability, and makes clear that scaling up is not only about projects, but also programs and policies:

“Scaling up means expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs or projects in different places and over time to reach a greater number of people.”

This contrasts with a widely adopted definition of scaling up proposed by IIRR (2000):

“Scaling up brings more quality benefits to more people over a wider geographical area, more quickly, more equitably, and more lastingly.”

This definition emphasizes equity and speed, in addition to the common features of quality, scale and sustainability. The equity aspect was included by IIRR as it was a particular concern of the NGO community. It is, of course, relevant where interventions are principally designed to reduce inequities and poverty; however, this need not be the case for all development programs and policies. We, therefore, drop the equity aspect as part of the definition. The emphasis on “more quickly” is also misplaced in our view, since in most cases scaling up is a gradual process and often requires years to succeed (see the section on “Sound Planning and Management Processes for Effective Implementation of Scaling Up”). Emphasis on speed may well get in the way of effective scaling up. On the other hand, is it correct that scaling up successful development interventions in a systematic way will ultimately help achieve better development outcome more quickly than the alternative approach—neglecting opportunities for scaling up. Specific definitions for different sectors abound in the literature. For example, the background paper for the World Bank Rural Development Strategy defines scaling up as: “to efficiently increase the socioeconomic impact from a small to a large scale of coverage” (Hancock 2003). A recent publication for the health sector defines scaling up as: “the deliberate efforts to increase the impact of health service innovations successfully tested in pilot or experimental projects as to benefit more people and to foster policy and program development on a lasting basis” (Simmons and Shiffman). Our preferred definition can be adapted as needed for specific sectoral interventions.

But scaling up is not only about quality of impact, scale and sustainability. In practice it involves a multidimensional process of change and adaptation. The literature considers a variety of possible dimensions and applies a multitude of different terms. We prefer to follow Uvin (1995), who identifies four different dimensions of scaling up: (i) quantitative, (ii) functional, (iii) political, and (iv) organizational:

- **Quantitative** scaling up is the geographical spread to more people and communities within the same sector or functional area. It is also referred to as horizontal scaling up or scaling out. It occurs when a program expands its size by replication in different places or by increasing its beneficiary base in a given location.

- **Functional** scaling up is expansion by increasing the scope of activity. For instance, a program ini-
tially specialized in agricultural development may add nutrition, health or literacy activities. The Kudumbashee-Women Empowerment project in Kerala is a case of a functional scaling up. It developed from an initial focus on improving nutrition for women and children into a multisectoral anti-poverty program (see Annex Box A10).

• **Political** scaling up refers to expansion through efforts to influence the political process and work with other stake-holder groups, with state agencies, parliamentarians and political parties, etc. Through political scaling up, individual organizations can achieve greater influence, protect their efforts from countervailing political interests and affect political and institutional change that sustains scaled up interventions. The CACID environmental preservation initiative in Cameroon provides an excellent example for the political scaling up process needed to involve multiple stakeholders in a successful process of scaled up and sustained engagement (see Annex Box A11).

• **Organizational (or institutional)** scaling up means the expansion of the organization implementing the intervention, or the involvement of other existing institutions, or the creation of a new institution. This can involve both horizontal and vertical organizational expansion, the former involving similar institutions while the latter means going up the ladder from community to local to regional to national (and in some cases even supra-national) institutions.

Different dimensions of scaling up are interrelated. Scaling up rarely occurs in one dimension only. As programs scale up quantitatively and functionally, they typically need to scale up politically and organizationally.
WHETHER TO SCALE UP?

Not all development interventions should be or can be scaled up. Taking an analogy from everyday life, a gourmet restaurant usually does not replicate well, fast food restaurants do. Hence, a key question is whether a project, program or policy should be scaled up at all, and if so, for how long. Dams and flood protection works have natural physical or environmental limits. Replication or scaling up beyond the natural limits makes no sense. On the other hand, universal school enrollment in quality primary schools and providing clean water to all are explicit targets under the MDGs and many countries are way below the scale needed to achieve these goals. It is not surprising then that it is in the areas of social policy—education, health, poverty reduction programs, rural and urban community development, etc.—where scaling up has been of particular concern. But in other areas, scaling up also needs to be explored—microfinance schemes, rural and urban infrastructure, irrigation development, environmental protection schemes, disaster preparedness initiatives, etc.

A decision to scale up requires a reflection on the optimal size of programs. Should the program operate on a national, on a provincial or on a local level only? Diseconomies of scale, quality/quantity trade-offs and institutional/organizational constraints, might put limits to the scaling up path. Scaling up, thus, does not necessarily mean national coverage. Considerations about desirable size are particularly important for programs based on participatory processes. As these programs are highly contextual, depending on the trust and processes established in a community, the scope of expansion may be limited. On the other hand, scaling up also may entail going beyond national borders as some projects and programs, to be effective, need to be expanded supra-nationally to a regional or global scale. This is typically the case for regional infrastructure, water, energy and environmental programs, especially for the small countries in Africa, Central America, Central Asia and South-East Europe. An interesting example of successful regional scaling up involves a multi-country trade facilitation program in South-East Europe which was recently implemented with World Bank. Some programs must operate at a global scale (see Annex Box A2). Programs to combat global epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS, or global environmental threats, such as global warming, are prime examples.

Scaled up interventions should not always last indefinitely. Some interventions have a natural limit in time. For example, privatization, as a process, and the institutional infrastructure needed for it, has a limit both in terms of policy—how much to privatize—and in terms of duration: once all requisite firms and assets have been privatized, the privatization process and institutions need to be wound down. Scale limits and sunset provisions are especially important in areas where public action is taken to correct for what are at best seen as temporary private market failures—state banks, state marketing boards, etc.

Scaling up should only take place after the model/pilot conducted on a limited scale has been evaluated, and found to be effective and efficient, and after adapting and, where appropriate, simplifying, the model to focus on those aspects critical to its successful scaling up (Cooley and Kohl 2005). If one scales up programs prematurely, without evidence of their beneficial impact and potential for scaling up, risks failure, disappointment and a waste of resources may result. “Scaling down,” not scaling up, is warranted if models/pilots fail to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency necessary or if interventions have achieved their goals. Abandoning failed programs and shutting down initiatives and institutions that have completed
their mission can be difficult. Admitting failure is hard, particularly for politicians, bureaucrats and donors. But without admitting and understanding failure, there will be no effective learning process for what works or doesn’t work, what can (and should) or cannot (and should not) be scaled up. Moreover, as we will see below, scaling up successful and promising new initiatives requires organizational and fiscal “space.” This may require the termination of existing ineffective initiatives and institutions as more promising initiatives are scaled up.
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES AND ORGANIZATIONAL PATHS TO SCALING UP

Once a decision to scale up has been made, appropriate institutional approaches and organizational paths need to be chosen depending on the development program to be scaled up. Big infrastructure projects have different institutional needs than preventive health programs, fiscal reform programs different ones than projects to improve the education system. The contextual nature of programs varies. While some programs can be designed and implemented primarily through planned, top-down approaches, other programs need to be deeply embedded in local communities and based on the inputs and trust of the people involved. Following the literature, we distinguish among three basic institutional approaches for scaling up development interventions:15 (i) hierarchical; (ii) individualistic; and (iii) relational; and among three organizational paths: (i) expansion; (ii) replication; and (iii) spontaneous diffusion.

Institutional approaches

Hierarchical approaches typically involve top-down, planned programs, often driven by strong central leadership. Hierarchical approaches prevailed in the 1950s through the 1970s when public services typically were to be provided by a centralized bureaucracy supplying a uniform public service. This approach can point to selected successes, such as immunization and literacy campaigns. A recent example of such a hierarchical approach is the case of Progresa-Oportunidades, the highly successful Mexican large-scale antipoverty program, which relies on a centralized, top-down method to deliver conditional cash payments to women in poor households (see Annex Box A6). In contrast, a similar Brazilian program, Bolsa Familia, is organized in a more decentralized manner.16

The individualistic approach looks at society as made up of individuals motivated by self-interest. Effective development is therefore largely the result of individuals’ actions, mediated in a market place for goods, services and ideas. The individualistic approach stresses the need for effective incentives and accountability for individual actors. Perhaps the most provocative proponent of the individualistic approach is William Easterly (2006a, 2006b). He argues against the top-down, large-scale ambitions of what he calls “planners” and advocates that more space be given for individualistic aspirations of what he calls “searchers.” According to Easterly, the role of government and donor organizations should be limited at most to supporting these searchers, so that they—guided by their own vision, knowledge and leadership—can apply their solutions and bring them to scale. Other proponents of a bottom-up approach argue that long preparation and hierarchical planning of large-scale interventions is costly, leads to big mistakes and fails to involve key stakeholders; instead, they advocate a focus on short-term targets and rapid results of small interventions, which can motivate longer-term engagement and scaling up based on the cumulative effect of the individual interventions (Schaffer and Ashkenas 2005).

While correct in arguing for a careful consideration of incentives and accountability and in stressing the risks of over-sized interventions without attention to staging and early impact, the proponents of the individualistic approach do not effectively address the need for collective action when development programs are taken to scale. This often requires a long term perspective, large-scale and centralized organization and some top-down decision making and implementation.17 This is well exemplified by the case of Progresa-Oportunidades, which Easterly cites as a case of “searchers” at work. He is correct in that the
key protagonist of the program, Santiago Levy, was a searcher par excellence in coming up with and promoting the idea of the program for Mexico. But Levy took a long-term view, engaged in a carefully planned process of preparation and deployment, and chose a centralized, top-down method of implementation.28

Relational approaches view societies as a set of networks, social links and informal groupings. They aim to promote the accumulation of social capital through decentralization, participatory methods and empowerment techniques. Relational approaches have gained prominence among development thinkers and practitioners in recent years and have fostered the belief that effective development requires a fundamental shift in perception: project beneficiaries who have traditionally been cast as passive recipients of outside support need to be seen as active participants and their needs and capacities must guide and underpin delivery of social services (Malik 2002). Therefore, community engagement and empowerment, development of community-level capacity and efforts to scale up of successful community programs are now common practice.29 The goal is to move beyond “islands of excellence” and spread the message of participation and empowerment to the greatest possible number of poor people and communities along with better access to quality services.30

However, community based programs face special challenges in scaling up. These programs tend to be highly contextual and are thus difficult to expand and replicate in a new environment (Gillespie 2004, Mansuri and Rao 2004). Maintaining participation by the communities and preserving a lean, committed and accountable management are difficult challenges as one moves from small, single-community initiatives to large-scale programs that try to involve many different communities (Uvin 1996).

In practice, different approaches may be appropriate for different types of development intervention. Pritchett and Woolock (2004) have developed a useful conceptual framework that allows us to assign different approaches to different types of interventions, depending on the degree of transaction intensity, i.e., transaction cost, and on the degree of discretion, i.e., situation-specific information, required to take and implement decisions. Community development programs are typically transaction intensive and require discretionary, i.e., context-specific, information and are therefore generally not suitable for top-down, hierarchical approaches. They best follow relational and participatory approaches. Services which are transaction intensive but not discretionary, i.e., they have high transactions costs, but do not require much context-specific information, can be provided by establishing standardized rules implemented through standard bureaucratic procedures (e.g., micro-finance, school lunch and pension programs). Decisions that are not transaction intensive, but are discretionary, such as macro-economic policies, require well-informed decision makers but do not rely on participatory, bottom up approaches. Hierarchical, top-down approaches can be utilized.31

In practice, moreover, elements of each of the three approaches are best combined for successful scaling up. Individualistic and relational approaches cannot achieve scale and be sustained without some form of institutional support and well-planned processes. Searchers and community activists also have to be—or work with—good planners, if they want to succeed at a meaningful scale. At the same time, the hierarchical approach will have to leave room for individual initiative, innovation and leadership stressed by the individualistic approach as well as for inputs from and accountability to the beneficiaries or the communities served.
Organizational paths

Scaling up can take place through three different organizational paths: expansion, replication, and spontaneous diffusion.32

Expansion involves scaling up a pilot to scale within the organization that developed it, possibly along with organizational reforms, such as decentralization or restructuring. The expansion path has the advantage of allowing for uniformity of approach, but it is generally limited to cases where a hierarchical approach is feasible. In most other situations, organizational inefficiencies that come with increasing size and lack of adaptation to contextual differences will make the expansion model problematic. Also, the organization that invented or tested the pilot may not be interested in or capable of managing the transition to a larger scale (Cooley and Kohl 2005). In those cases, replication will be the better option.

Replication means scaling up by others than the organization that originally developed the initial pilot or model intervention. As Cooley and Kohl (2005) point out, replication can occur between organizations of the same type, e.g., NGO to NGO or government to government, or between organizations of different types, e.g., NGO to government. In the public sector, local and provincial governments can replicate successful initiatives. In the NGO and private sector, a well-known form of replication is the franchise model which involves a central entity, the franchiser, which sets standards that have to be met by the franchisees and which provides technical assistance, marketing, training and other services.33

Under a franchising approach participants and donors can expect certain quality standards to be met in the scaled-up programs while each franchise operator has the leeway to adapt to local conditions and seek community inputs (Binswanger and Aiyer 2003). Franchising has been successfully applied in the commercial sector for a long time, but it is still insufficiently propagated in the non-profit sector. Many actors find the notion of applying already established models as less attractive than creating their own new ones. Moreover, the idea of franchising is often misunderstood as an inflexible hierarchical relationship between the supplier of products and ideas, and the licensee who only sells them (Wachs 2007). This, of course, need not be the case, as many examples presented at the Social Franchise Summit attempted to demonstrate.34 Good examples of franchising models exist for social service projects in developed countries, but they are now more commonly applied in developing countries.35 One example for a franchising approach outside the social service sector is Transparency International (TI), the international anti-corruption NGO (see Annex Box A1). Other examples are the microcredit organizations BRAC and the Grameen Bank, which are replicating in Africa some of their programs first implemented in Bangladesh.36

However, franchising is not always an option. NGO initiatives may have to be mainstreamed in governmental programs in order to be scaled up. One of the big challenges for NGOs is to recognize when this is the case and to manage the hand-over process effectively—of course, it also requires appropriate receptivity and capacity on the government’s side. A Roma scholarship program for secondary education in Southeast Europe is a good example: Originally started in Macedonia by the Open Society Institute, it was replicated in Serbia and more recently adopted by the government of the Serb province, Vojvodina, as a standard government program (see Annex Box A3).
Spontaneous diffusion (also sometimes referred to as “explosion”) involves the spread of good ideas or practices largely of their own accord. It may be so ground-breaking, involving such pioneering technology and meeting such pressing needs, that it proliferates seamlessly from person to person, organization to organization and country to country. In the private sector, diffusion generally happens simply through the forces of competition, where a successful—i.e., profitable—idea, invention or pilot gets imitated by others who see the opportunity also to make a profit. The case of the cell phone and its rapid spread in developing countries by private providers is a notable example. The dramatic change in technology, the associated reduction in unit cost, and a competition-driven, competitive private delivery system largely unfettered by public constraints were the key ingredients. The fact that cellular phone service involves low transaction costs and little discretion in delivery was a key feature.

Where transactions costs are high and/or discretion applies, as is more typically the case with most development interventions, the requisites for spontaneous diffusion are demanding and hence this path is likely to be rare. Diffusion of even the best ideas and practices generally requires that information can be and is readily disseminated, that there is an institutional infrastructure for dissemination and adoption, and that the institutional actors have incentives to propel the new idea or model forward. These ingredients are often missing. The Green Revolution is an example of successful diffusion of innovation but it required functioning extension systems. Without such systems, agricultural innovations are difficult to spread and unlikely to be adopted. With the widespread use of the Internet, access to global best practices in health, agriculture, accounting, food hygiene or other practices is readily available even in remote locations. But even this requires the presence of an organized knowledge collection and diffusion mechanism, such as the Global Gateway for general development knowledge or CGIAR for agricultural research.

In sum, the right path for scaling up—expansion, replication, or spontaneous diffusion—will depend on the nature of the intervention. Expansion will most likely be an appropriate approach where hierarchical interventions are appropriate; while replication, with franchising as a special option, is the most likely path for expansion where non-hierarchical approaches are needed—the more common set of circumstances. Spontaneous diffusion can work for basic ideas and technologies and for information about good practices, but requires an information and knowledge infrastructure that often still is not in place in developing countries.
What moves a development intervention forward on the path from inception or pilot to a larger scale? We can point to five key drivers: (i) ideas; (ii) vision; (iii) leadership; (iv) external factors; and (v) incentives and accountability.

**Ideas**

Any intervention that is eventually to be scaled up starts with an idea, an innovation or a model that contributes to the development process. The idea can be new in an absolute sense or new in the local context where it is being applied. It can also be an old idea whose time has come for implementation as the conditions are ripe to move it forward.

New ideas are often based on or validated by research. The key question then is how research results move from the realm of theory, academia and think tanks to the realm of policy and program application. There is often a great gap between researchers and practitioners and insufficient efforts are made to disseminate, apply and scale up the results of research. For example, Gundel, Hancock and Anderson (2001) conclude from their review of the experience with application and scaling up of research in natural resource management that there is too little effort made to link research results with practical implementation. Similarly, in the nutrition and early child development fields, many practitioners feel that while the problems and solutions are well understood, based on decades of research, there is too little focus on how to implement and scale up interventions. The recent in-depth and independent review of World Bank research by a number of noted development economists is a striking example of how researchers tend to disregard dissemination, application and scaling up of research findings: The review focused entirely on whether the World Bank’s research met rigorous academic standards of quality, while not considering what impact the research had on the Bank’s project and programs nor analyzing what efforts the Bank made to assure effective application in the Bank’s operational work or in development practice more generally. In contrast, the UK aid agency DFID has initiated a process of bringing into practical use the findings of research which it has supported over the years in the natural resource area.

**A vision of scale**

To move from idea to reality and from scientific finding to practical application, a vision for implementing and scaling up the idea, innovation or model is critical. Ideally, such a vision should be developed while the first phase of an intervention, frequently called a pilot, is being put in place. Pilots should be designed in such a way that they could be scaled up, if successful, and so that key factors which will be necessary for a scaling up decision—with what dimensions, with which approach, along which paths, etc.—are already explored during the pilot phase.

Too often such a vision for scaling up is lacking when projects are first designed and put in place. Governments and donors frequently design interventions as one-time events, as expensive “boutique” projects with high unit cost and high management and human skill intensity. They may do well on a limited scale, but often cannot be expanded or replicated to reach a bigger scale. Because not every project or program could or should be scaled up, the question whether scaling up is appropriate should be explicitly factored into the decision on whether and how to implement the pilot intervention in the first place. If program designers believe that their intervention eventually should be taken to a larger scale—and
scaling up will be needed for most interventions to achieve a real development impact—then they need a vision and strategy for how to proceed beyond the first phase or pilot project. A good example for a clear vision about the appropriate scale of intervention is the Progresa-Oportunidades program in Mexico. Although the program started with a pilot phase, it aimed from the beginning to provide conditional cash transfers to all of Mexico’s poor and was designed accordingly.

Leadership
Ideas of what will work and visions of scale are the ideas and visions of people. The presence of a “champion” is generally necessary for scaling up efforts. A champion believes in the potential of an idea, model or intervention, is committed to promote its scaling up, sticks with the agenda and can convince others to follow her or his lead. A common feature of effective champions is that they are persistent, well connected, have coalition-building skills, articulate a clear vision amidst complexity and have credibility that facilitates the mobilization of resources. It is also desirable for them to know how to generate commitment by appealing to social values, to identify the critical challenges in their environments, and to have the relevant technical competence, management skills and capacity to motivate and train others (Simmons and Shiffman 2006). Most successfully scaled up programs have been led by outstanding personalities (see Box 2 for some examples).

Box 2. Examples of champions for scaling up
Well-known champions are Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, and Fazle Hasan Abed, founder of BRAC, who both pioneered microcredit movements and cooperative community efforts in Bangladesh (see Annex Box A8). The vision and persistence of these leaders were unquestionably a key factor behind the success of the microfinance industry in Bangladesh. Their vision was that microcredits could work for the poor and their effective leadership was critical in the early stages and throughout the subsequent process of scaling up. They focused on developing their staff and they assured that decisions were made not at the center but close to the communities and participants. They built in evaluation and monitoring systems which created a learning and scaling up culture in their institutions and allowed continuous improvement, adaptation, expansion as well as replication.

His Highness the Aga Khan has pursued for 50 years the goal of broad-based economic development, specifically through the Aga Khan Development Network, which is “a non-denominational, international development agency established in 1967 by His Highness the Aga Khan. Its mission is to develop and promote creative solutions to problems that impede social development, primarily in Asia and East Africa.” With branches and affiliates in 15 countries, it has consistently supported sustained and scaled up community based development interventions.

Fr. Pantin, the founder of SERVOL, is another such a leader. The Black Power riots, which took place in Trinidad and Tobago in 1970, were interpreted by Fr. Pantin as a “cry for help” from the ghetto (see Annex Box A7).

(continued on next page)
The innovators launching a new or timely idea are often “searchers” along Easterly’s lines (2006). But the innovators who have ideas about what should be done are not necessarily those who take the idea to scale. We, therefore, need to distinguish two sets of individuals, those who innovate or recognize the timeliness of an idea, and those who figure out how an idea, technology or model that works in the small scale can be brought to greater scale.47

Peter Eigen is another outstanding leader. As director of the World Bank regional office in Kenya in the 1980s, he observed the futility of aid if it primarily leads to the enrichments of a few as a result of corruption. Based on the belief that civil society can make a fundamental difference in changing values and policies, he founded Transparency International, an NGO which combats corruption and has gained worldwide attention and authority (see Annex Box A1).

Ernesto Zedillo as President of Mexico and his Deputy Minister of Finance, Santiago Levy, respectively provided political leadership and served as the intellectual and organizational champion for the path-breaking innovative anti-poverty program Progresa-Oportunidades during its critical initial years (see Annex Box A6).


Hence, one of the key characteristics of good leadership involves planning and working effectively toward putting in place a governance structure that can assure an effective process of selecting and handing over responsibility to a capable successor.

**External catalysts**

Natural disasters, civil unrest and economic shocks can be important drivers for change and scaling up. They often provide opportunities as old systems cease to function or as a crisis calls for rapid new solutions. Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades was put in place during the country’s macroeconomic crisis in 1995,
when GDP plummeted by about six percent and new approaches became necessary to help the poor during this crisis (Levy 2007). Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program (see Annex Box A9), which provides funds directly to local institutions with the authority to allocate them according to local preferences, was put in place to substitute for central public service institutions which became defunct as a result of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 (see Annex Box A9). Similarly, El Salvador’s EDUCO program was created out of a crisis situation. During a twelve-year civil war, the country’s education system had collapsed. Parents started to establish their own schools, hired their own teachers and became directly involved in the education of their children. This was the beginning of the large number of schools operated today by Parent Association in El Salvador (see Annex Box A5).

Funding received from external donors and commitments to external partners can also be a factor in driving development interventions to scale. The support of the international donor community for the River Blindness Eradication Program in Africa is one example (see Annex Box A12). Another example is the strong leadership and financial support provided by international donors in combating HIV/AIDS. Perhaps the most striking case of an external impetus has been the accession process of new country members to the European Union. Preparation for accession required a sustained commitment to policy reform. At the same time acceding countries received substantial amounts of funding before and after accession to help upgrade infrastructure and to support the development of their more backward region. A related example involves the criteria laid out by the Council of Europe on the treatment of minorities and institutionalized children which were an important driver for scaling up a small scale project on social services for Roma children in Romania (see Annex Box A3 on Roma School Desegregation program). However, in general, as we will point out in the Postscript detailing the implications for aid and aid donors, donors and external partners have not done enough to stress the importance of scaling up and are not organized effectively to support scaled up development interventions.

Incentives and accountability

A final, and perhaps the most important, set of drivers is a system of incentives and accountability that encourages actors to look toward scaling up as a key criterion defining their success. In commercial activities, incentives are built into the functioning of a market system, since the profit motive and profit metric normally drive entrepreneurs to expand the scale of operations to the optimal extent or provide incentives for replication of successful interventions by competitors to the point where the optimum scale has been reached.48 No similar automatic incentive system exists in the non-commercial world of the public sector and not-for-profit NGOs. Instead, often the incentives are to move from one new idea to the next, from one project to another, from one job to another. In this case, basic values, i.e., the conviction by all actors that scaling up and sustained engagement matter, and bureaucratic incentives and political accountability need to substitute for market forces. Incentives can be monetary or non-monetary, and they can be at the level of the individual or at the level of institutions.

The East Asian economic success story significantly represents the prevalence of a set of values that stressed scaling up. It created an alignment of incentives toward growth for all actors in the private and public sectors, and throughout the economies of the region, regardless of the macroeconomic level—in terms of industrial policy or in terms of the develop-
ment of social programs (Kharas 2007). A similar story can be told for the Progresa-Oportunidades program, where from the beginning success was defined as reaching all poor households in Mexico, where bureaucratic incentives were deliberately structured to reward the achievement of this goal, and where the cash transfers created a strong and sustained grassroots demand for the expansion and maintenance of the program. At the same time, the program was deliberately insulated from the usual political pressures to change ongoing social programs with the arrival of newly elected governments (Levy 2007).

A special tool for giving jurisdictions and their authorities an incentive to scale up successful interventions is the use of inter-jurisdictional competition. As Zinnes (n.d.) points out, setting up competitions or “tournaments” among jurisdictions or organizational entities with comparable functions helps align incentives between the national authorities, or donors, and the implementing agencies as well as their stakeholders. Such competitions are also a tool for scaling up since by definition they encompass change not only in one jurisdiction or for one organization at a time, but they encompass potentially many jurisdictions/organizations and hence achieve change at a scale that can be considerable. Examples for this approach, some more successful than others, abound. One such example is the reform of provincial government policies and practices in Russia which was supported by a program of inter-provincial competition, organized by the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Finance with financial and advisory support of the World Bank.

To achieve effective incentives for scaling up one needs to ensure accountability of those involved in designing and implementing development interventions by including scaling up as a key dimension of performance feedback. This means monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs not only in terms of their impact, but also in terms of whether they are creating the conditions for effective scaling up of successful interventions. Of course, evaluations result in accountability only when they feed back into incentives for the institutions and individuals in charge of the interventions.

Accountability of donors, NGOs and government agencies has traditionally been “upward” toward the political or bureaucratic leadership and “outward” toward donors. But accountability in the development process also needs to be “downward” to the beneficiaries and communities, to partners, to staff and, in the case of government action, toward the tax paying public (Edwards and Hulme 1995). Political accountability at the ballot box in democratic systems is one mechanism to achieve this. Other mechanisms include community feedback mechanisms—surveys, score cards, etc.—(see Box 3 for a particular example; independent benchmarking exercises which give donors and tax payers an objective measure of the performance of governments, NGOs and donor organizations; and internal audit systems of implementing organizations which provide the boards and senior managers with information about the performance of their organizations and staffs. One advantage of community based programs is that transparency and accountability mechanisms can be established at the community level, where the numbers of people covered are manageable and where the project managers know both the problems of the local area as well as each other (Binswanger and Nguyen 2005).

In sum, programs to be scaled up should include the three key determinants for functioning accountability mechanisms: (i) availability and use of information; (ii) mechanisms for monitoring and performance; and (iii) the existence of adequate incentives for compliance.
(De Renzio and Mulley 2006). Of course, all such efforts will bear fruit only if they are focused on scaling up as a key success factor in evaluation and accountability, which too rarely is the case, as we will see in the Postscript, in the case of aid-supported programs.

Box 3. Building accountability toward citizens: The Bangalore Citizen Report Card

The Bangalore Citizen Report Card (CRC) was initiated by the Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore. It aims to evaluate the degree of satisfaction of citizens with regard to public service performance, including water, power, municipal services, transport, housing, telephones, banks and hospitals, the police and ration shops. The PAC conducted three CRCs (1994, 1999, 2003), involving a random sample surveys of households, focus group discussions, visits by investigators to offices of public service agencies and interviews with their staff and management.

An evaluation of the CRC shows that it has been generally positive. Especially after the second CRC, city services improved markedly. Media involvement, especially after the second CRCs, helped to increase public awareness of the quality of services and led citizens to demand better services. CRCs raised the awareness among officials that public service providers need to listen to the views of citizens on the quality of services and that civil society has a legitimate role to play in informing city government. One shortcoming of the CRCs is that they are only available in English. This denied access to its findings by the non-English speaking population.

The evaluation of the Bangalore CRC concluded that there were a number of improvements following the CRCs, particularly the second one. Partly in response to the feedback from the CRCs the state government and public agencies worked actively to improve the quality of city services, the transparency of government agencies, and their responsiveness to citizens’ needs.

The Bangalore CRC has been replicated in other Indian cities, including Ahmedabad, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Mumbai and Pune. Key lessons are that it is critical to involve the media and civil society in dissemination and follow-up of the findings of the report card and the need for repeated use of the instrument to achieve reforms in service provision and a more responsive set of public service agencies.

CREATING SPACE TO GROW

Finding the right approaches, paths and drivers for scaling up is necessary, but not sufficient. Interventions need room to grow, if they are to be scaled up. More often than not this space needs to be created. This may require replacing existing institutions, activities, policies and expenditures which could constrain the scaling up of the new initiative. Creating space for new initiatives to grow can cause resistance and friction that has to be foreseen and managed.

There are seven spaces we consider relevant: (1) fiscal space; (2) political space; (3) policy space (4) organizational/capacity space; (5) cultural space; (6) partnership space; and (7) learning space. Of these, the first four are given more detailed attention here. The remaining three are only treated briefly, even though in specific situations they can well be the critical bottle neck for scaling up.

Fiscal and financial space

Larger programs will require more financial resources to meet capital outlays and increased operating and maintenance expenditures. For programs in the public domain, this means more budgetary resources. Fiscal expenditures implications need to be assessed before scaling up is attempted, including a realistic assessment whether unit costs will increase or drop as programs expand. Also, the potential for cost recovery, affordability and willingness to pay must be explored. If costs are to be covered by taxes, one needs to consider how additional taxes can be raised. Alternatively, expenditures on other programs may have to be cut. Finally, lack of funding for the scaling up process and uncertainty of funding may be as much of a constraint as lack of overall financial resources. Let us look at these issues in turn.

Research on the cost implications of scaling up has been limited and what research has been carried out has been hampered by the scarcity of relevant cost data reported in the public domain. A research review of costs of scaling up health interventions is one of the few exceptions, but it underlined that costs of scaling up are specific to both the type of intervention and its particular setting (Johns and Torres 2005). The review concluded that a representative cost curve for health care cannot be constructed, due to the lack of data and the difficulties to transfer cost estimates across settings. But there is some evidence that unit costs tend to rise when programs are extended from urban into rural areas. For example, health services are less expensive to deliver in urban areas due to higher population densities and hence lower costs per capita (Johns and Torres 2005, Khan et al. 2001). The higher price of transport, supervision and training due to lower population density in rural areas and greater distances traveled and difficult terrain in remote regions explain higher unit costs as services are expanded in these areas. Fiedler (2001) found that the training costs in remote and mountainous districts in Nepal covered between 1996 and 2000 had a higher cost per trainee than districts covered before 1996, and that the average cost of transporting vitamin A capsules to Nepal’s mountainous areas is three times more expensive than for hill districts and five times more than for the lowlands. There is also some evidence that the unit costs of urban services tend to rise as cities get very large, with high land values, cost of living, congestion and pollution, and the need to tap in more distant and costly sources of water and energy.

Economies of scale and hence declining unit costs may be realized by piggybacking on current under-utilized capacity. For example, offering an additional vaccine antigen in an already established immunization program has significantly lower costs than offering the vaccine in a separate program. Edmunds et al. found that for
vaccination programs more intensive utilization of the existing capital stock is the reason for the significantly lower average cost of the add-on program and that unit cost reduction can also be achieved through large scale purchasing of goods program (Edmunds et al. 2000). Of course, this requires that more intensive utilization of service capacity actually occurs. Hence, scaling up efforts are often accompanied by educational outreach or mass media campaigns in order to create demand for services (Levin et al. 2001).

Finally, costs of enlarged programs may be prohibitive or unsustainable because pilot projects rely on expensive technology, inputs, staff, and advisers or on special provisions of public infrastructure which could not be replicated on a larger scale. The Millennium Village Project, supported by the United Nations and Jeffrey Sachs, has been criticized on this score as not replicable and not sustainable.51 “Boutique” interventions with high unit costs that cannot be reduced when scaling up are likely too costly for wider application.

However, no matter whether unit costs are rising or falling with scale, the fundamental question is: Will the budget be able to finance the expenditures—capital and recurrent expenditures—as program scale expands? Two options are available: one is to raise more revenues, either by direct cost recovery from the program or by raising more general taxes. Subsidies for publicly provided services, i.e., all or some costs funded by general revenues rather than direct cost recovery, tend to increase demand for a scaled up service, which may be desirable on grounds of social considerations and facilitates the scaling up process. However, they may also displace privately supplied substitutes, create inefficiency in utilization and result in excessive budget burdens. The shifting debate about school fees is a good example of the kinds of arguments pro and contra subsidies.52 Of course, external donor funds may take the place of nationally generated resources, but the history of donor support is one of limited, fragmented and volatile resources which do often not represent a sound footing for sustained and scaled up engagement.53 If scaling up efforts are supported by donors, one needs to address the question what financial resource will be available once the donors withdraw their support.

Another option is to reduce spending elsewhere in the budget. Since total costs will inevitably increase with scaling up, since full direct cost recovery for publicly supplied services or raising general taxes may not be desirable or possible, and since donor funding cannot be presumed to be sustained at the levels and for the duration required, the question will often be what room can be made in the budget by replacing current programs with the newly expanding initiatives. For example, the conditional cash transfers under the Progresa-Oportunidades program replaced a number of other food subsidies and smaller cash transfers, which needed to be phased out in order to make room for the scaled up PROGRESA program (Levy 2007). This of course will tend to run into political opposition, a topic which we turn to in the next section. But before doing so, it is worth pointing out that private, NGO and foundation-supported initiatives face very similar challenges in creating the financial space needed to sustain a scaled up program. Costs have to be projected and financial resource availability—either from the donors or from the beneficiaries, or from both—has to be assessed, when a program is taken to scale.54

There are two other important funding issues: lack of funding for the scaling up process and volatility of financing.55 New ideas and pilot projects generally have relatively little difficulty finding financial support. The start-up costs tend to limited. Aid donors love to fund promising new ideas. Ministers will push their pet initiatives into the budget. Families, friends or venture capitalists provide start-up finance even in poor countries.
Microcredit initiatives now abound. At the same time, large established programs tend to sustain their funding through the budget process since they have many political supporters. What is missing, both in terms of aid support and in terms of domestic budgets and capital markets, is support for the intermediate stage—for scaling up. More attention therefore needs to be paid to assuring adequate finance for the scaling-up process.

Finally there is uncertainty and volatility of funding. Domestic budget uncertainties in the case of public programs, uncertain support by private financiers for private investments, or volatile foreign aid commitments can and generally are causes of volatility and unpredictability of funding. This can seriously interfere with the scaling up process, and it’s not just that an individual program will suffer: The basic incentive for scaling up will be much diminished, if past efforts have been cut short repeatedly due to fickle funding. Therefore long-term political commitment for domestic budget support, long-term engagement by private funders for NGO programs or for private investments, and steady, predictable support from external aid sources are all critical for successful scaling up of individual programs and for reinforcing the incentive to consider scaling up in the first place.

**Political space**

Fiscal allocations for scaled up programs need the support of the political leadership, of elected parliamentary bodies, where they exist, and of a variety of stakeholders. More generally, scaling up requires finding ways to make political space for the program. In other words, one needs to mobilize support for the program and protect it from vested interests which may perceive it as a threat. Such vested interests include the implementing bureaucracy whose efforts to resist or routinize change can easily smother it (Samoff and Molapi Sebatane 2001).

For community based programs, strong support to local empowerment and to decentralization is vital to scaling up. The political dynamics change as grassroots programs take on momentum and become more visible and potentially threaten the established political interests in a country or region. What might be supported by the establishment as a limited intervention, can easily lose political support when taken to larger dimensions. For example, the Bulgaria Roma desegregation program was well accepted by politicians as long as it operated on limited scaled (see Box A4). But established parties have been reluctant to support the program at a national scale for fear of losing political support in their non-Roma constituencies. The reluctance of the political leadership to endorse the desegregation approach, to allocate some public funding under the national budget and to officially engage education structures in the management process of the program, is posing a serious obstacle to further expansion.

For new health and education initiatives, such as HIV/AIDS, TB and early child development programs, public awareness needs to be created and political constituencies forged, while possible political resistance from established interests or public inertia need to be overcome. For example, when the Russian authorities tried to introduce the internationally recognized DOTS TB treatment program in connection with a World Bank-financed health project in the late 1990s, there was stiff resistance from the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry in Russia, because they saw their traditional treatment approaches and related professional and commercial benefits threatened. Box 4 briefly reviews how political factors play out in some selected areas of scaling up. One of the lessons is that solutions that are “second-best” from a technical perspective may have to be promoted in order to gain political support. Thus, scaling up is not only a technical process, but also a political one.
Antipoverty programs: Creating a constituency for pro-poor programs can be a daunting task. A wide body of evidence suggests that social and political fractionalization in poor communities limits the ability of the poor themselves to engage in collective action. At the same time, the non-poor may have little incentives to support tightly targeted antipoverty programs. Program designers therefore face a dilemma: under ideal circumstances, antipoverty programs would be scaled up without fundamental changes to their (progressive) targeting, but this type of scaling up is often politically infeasible. Since narrowly targeted poverty programs do not benefit the majority of the population, or the “median voter,” politicians who wish to scale up antipoverty programs may not get broad political support. But spreading the benefits more widely will reduce the impact on the poor. Finding the right balance in targeting antipoverty programs therefore involves complex political judgments.

Opinion polls from Latin America, for example, show that those countries where the poor tend to be held partially responsible for their own poverty are less likely to support large antipoverty efforts (Graham 2002). Consequently, many antipoverty programs deliberately target middle income groups by, for example, tying the eligibility for receipt of transfers to formal-sector employment in order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Lindert et al. 2006).

Community development programs: Global experience of scaling up of CDD projects shows that strong political commitment to decentralization and empowerment is essential, and that a local champion often leads the process. Often, however, politicians and bureaucrats oppose, or at least do not support, shifting power to the grassroots. Government actors traditionally think of themselves as uniquely suited to provide “public” services, they don’t believe that local communities can manage money and projects effectively, or they may simply feel threatened in their established positions of influence by local empowerment (Binswanger and Nguyen 2005). If national institutions are considered too weak or insufficiently committed, parallel institutions for program implementation are sometimes established. This practice is generally considered second-best as parallel structures, if successful, tend to further weaken existing public sector capacity. However, some successfully scaled up programs have been built separately from mainstream public service structures. Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program outsourced all technical functions to individual consultants and firms from the private market and not from civil servants. This approach allowed for a quicker scale up than if existing government employees had been redeployed or retrained (Moreno-Dodson 2005).

Microcredit programs: Strong political commitment often is dependent on close social ties between governments and NGOs, which in turn, depend on individuals to make this happen. The success of the Grameen microcredit program is often cited as an example, since key government officials were supportive in facilitating the growth of the microcredit sector, including for the registration of Grameen as a bank and for the decision to grant it far-reaching autonomy (Yunus 1998).
Well-designed and implemented evaluations can help build political support even if political parties and governments change. To assure credibility it is important that the evaluation be carried out by an independent third party and has strong scientific underpinnings (see Section 8). In the case of Progresa-Oportunidades, randomized evaluations were undertaken by IFPRI and the data was made available to many people. This raised the credibility of the program and helped sustain it over successive electoral cycles (see Annex Box A6).

Development practitioners often consider dissemination of information on a good program sufficient, but it is usually not enough. Political outreach, constituency building and proactive advocacy are generally required, including lobbying to influence policy makers, training civil servants, mobilizing the media and networking via professional and political channels. For programs to be expanded and sustained, political support needs to be secured through explicit strategies of advocacy that are built early on into the scaling up process. Advocacy often needs to be built around individual champions, but it should aim to create broad coalitions, as sustainable programs require constituencies that reach beyond individual actors (Kohl 2007). It should focus not only on the key ministers of the day, but should seek to build coalitions of stakeholder support and political commitment that outlast particular ministerial appointments and government administrations. Political parties or factions move in and out of power, but scaling up is a long-term process and the agenda needs to be broadly anchored in the political system. Again, the Progresa-Oportunidades program was exceptional in building explicit mechanisms into the program designed to assure political support beyond individual presidential administrations.

Two important risks need to be managed as one creates the political space for scaling up: One is that the scaling up process may be pursued purely for political reasons. Leaders can gain prominent visibility from scaling up of programs and gain the support from the electorate or political interests which benefit. Thus scaling up processes can be employed to secure political advantages. The experiences in Latin America are replete with examples. In Peru, prior to elections, Fujimori’s government financed the FONCODES public works and antipoverty programs with clear political goals. In Mexico between 1989 and 1994, Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL), a national anti-poverty program, and precursor to PROGRESA, spent 1.2% of GDP annually on transfers mostly for municipalities supportive of the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (Desai 2007). Some electorally-driven transfers may be necessary to secure the public support needed for programs to be scaled up and survive, but where programs are later judged as ineffective, resources and political capital are wasted. Moreover, if programs are seen to be closely linked with the ideology or politics of a particular party or faction, they will tend to be replaced when the opposition comes into power as part of the natural drive of new governments to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. Therefore, the process to be scaled up should be shielded as far as possible from partisan politics. Progresa represents a good case study in how this was done deliberately and effectively.

Another risk in the political process is known as “elite capture.” Community based programs by necessity have to draw on local elites for effective design and implementation. These elites may use their position to over-provide social services to themselves and their families and friends or otherwise channel public money and resources for their own benefit (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). A range of studies has revealed the number of mechanisms local elites can use to divert resources from programs designed to help the poor. But elite capture can also occur with
centrally-run programs. The case of the soup kitchen projects within the Peruvian Food Assistance Program (PRONAA) illustrates what can happen (Mendizabal and Lavado 2005). Although the original soup kitchens were grassroots initiatives, the administrations of Presidents Belaunde and Garcia in the 1980s integrated the various PRONAA programs into the structures of the state. By 1990, all grassroots initiatives had ceased and the soup kitchens were fully state run. Rather than aimed toward food security for the poor, soup kitchens under PRONAA benefited mostly non-poor groups. Moreover, the political apparatus of the Fujimori regime used PRONAA for patronage: Key positions were assigned to political supporters, and through the ruling party’s own local office, authority over individual soup-kitchen associations was passed to party loyalists.

Policy space
Efforts to scale up programs may run into constraints because the policy, regulatory and legal framework is not supportive. Microcredit schemes have often been constrained by financial regulations that have limited expansion of micro-lending institutions ostensibly to safeguard the public interest from imprudent banking practices. The extension of urban services and housing may be limited by underdeveloped legal norms and cadastral systems for ownership of urban land, or by poorly designed policy and legal frameworks of eminent domain (see Box 1). Established health and education policies and norms may limit the introduction of new approaches to treatment and curriculum design. Regulatory interventions, administrative inspections and corrupt practices by government officials frequently prevent the scaling up by private businesses. Therefore, scaling up, to be successful, often needs to be combined with reforms of the policy environment. Of course, policy changes alone will not lead to scaling up of development interventions, if the other necessary conditions for the scaling up of programs are not put in place.

One particular policy dimension relates to the question of whether there is sufficient demand for the services offered by the larger program. Insufficient demand is often an issue for preventive health and family planning services and sometimes for education programs. Low household income, foregone earnings of children in the case of education, lack of information, cultural factors, or earlier experience of poor services provision might inhibit demand for social services. Many agricultural innovations cannot be scaled up because farmers are unable or unwilling to accept the risks of new crop varieties, inputs or technologies. Or, in the case of illicit drug substitution programs, substitute crops cannot compete with higher value drug production. A realistic assessment of demand and of the factors needed to create it is therefore an essential step in scaling up successfully. One way to help create demand is to subsidize the cost of service or to provide cash transfers in connection with people’s use of services—as done, for example in the case of Progresa-Oportunidades—but of course one needs to assess any possible negative efficiency impacts and possible fiscal space constraints before rushing to subsidize a particular program.

It is not only a matter of sufficient demand. Key policy constraints may also relate to the supply of complementary inputs that are needed to permit effective scaling up. A good example, once again, is Progresa-Oportunidades. Cash transfers led to increased demand for health and education services, as more families visited health clinics and more children were sent to school. This required the mobilization of the health and education ministries to ensure additional health and educational service capacity was put in place, so as to avoid drops in service standards for the enlarged beneficiary population.
**Organizational space**

Fiscal, political and policy obstacles are not the only possible constraints to scaling up. Institutions unwilling or lacking the capacity to operate the larger program can be serious obstacles to scaling up. The problem is typically twofold: (i) an unwillingness of organizations to carry through the required change needed to create the capacity for scaling up; and (ii) lack of skills, systems, manpower to manage the increased program.

For forging institutional change for scaling up: As noted by Simmons and Shiffman (2006), there are two different organizational roles involved in scaling up: the role of the “originating” organization that develops and pilots the model, and that of the “adopting” organization which takes the model to scale. Cooley and Kohl (2005) have suggested that it would be helpful to use an intermediary institution between the originating and the adopting organization. This intermediary organization would be a process facilitator focused on the scaling up process.

Adopting organizations can be newly set up specifically for the purpose of scaling up an intervention or they can already exist. Creating new institutions often involves lengthy start-up periods, while using existing organizations to adopt new programs means that they may have to accept significant institutional change to succeed in scaling up. Such changes may be resisted by the managers and staff of the adopting institution if they displace well known old ways of doing business. At the same time, the leaders and staff of the originating institution may resist handing off the program, since they feel they “own” the initiative. Public sector and NGO workers alike, whether teachers, health workers or extension agents, may fear losing their jobs when they hand off a program, or resist new demands on their time and energy when adding a new program. Competing bureaucracies or civil society organizations may act as rivals rather than collaborators, undermining the scaling up process by fragmenting it institutionally, rather than creating synergies through bundling efforts.

There is no clear guidance from the literature on whether to go with new or existing institutions in scaling up. While some authors advocate building on past experience and utilizing existing institutions, others emphasize the need to draw on or create new institutions in the scaling up process, as those involved in the original pilot phase may be unwilling to adjust and carry out required changes. In some cases, existing governmental structures and ministries were bypassed for successful scaling up, as in the case of Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program, which supports community driven public service provision (see Annex Box A9). But more often, setting up separate donor-supported project implementation has harmed the chances of scaling up and sustaining interventions in the longer term, as the World Bank has learned the hard way.

Another institutional challenge arises from the fact that many programs to be scaled up take place in sectors where both the government and NGOs have a potential role to play, especially in health, education, rural infrastructure, poverty alleviation. NGOs often are active in these sectors with small scale interventions, usually with community engagement. As those interventions increase in scale, the public sector typically needs to play a more active role. The shift from small-scale NGO-based interventions to Government-based operations requires a cultural shift that can be difficult. Alternatively, successful co-production between local constituencies and local governments is hard to replicate on a larger scale. Community-based programs rely on the network and trusts established among community members. Government bureaucrats are expected...
to adhere to strict administrative controls and may not understand or have the leeway to replicate the informal means by which communities can hold their leaders accountable. In Binswangers and Ayer’s words (2003): “Until program participants learn to adhere to a common set of values and approaches, scaling up will remain difficult.” Loewenson’s review (2003) of more than 100 cases of attempted state-civil society participation in public health programs found that many of these were typified by an absence of a clear mechanism that would create a systematic and lasting relationship between the civil society organization and the state in support of the implementation of the programs.

But these hurdles can be overcome by creating “win-win” situations, as four examples demonstrate: in the case of the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development Program (IVGDP) in Bangladesh, government agencies successfully cooperated with BRAC, a large NGO. Initially government programs which tried to introduce high yielding varieties for poultry breeding found that effective demand was low, due to severe supply and support bottlenecks. The government then turned to BRAC, which successfully addressed these bottlenecks with its IGVGD program and managed to create demand all over Bangladesh for the new poultry variety (Matin and Rabeva 2004). Another example involves a school desegregation program for Roma children in Bulgaria supported by the Roma Education Fund, a new international NGO (see Annex Box A4). Many Roma children in Bulgaria do not attend general public schools but instead are placed in schools attended by Roma students only. In rural areas, teachers and school administrators saw that the school-age population was declining, schools needed to be closed, and teachers were laid off. This created the conditions for teachers, administrators and many parents to support the integration of Roma children into previously non-Roma schools. A third case of successful collaboration is EDUCO, an educational program in El Salvador which saw an effective integration of community-based and governmentally supported education (see Annex Box A5). Finally, the SERVOL initiative in Trinidad and Tobago involved close cooperation between the NGO which created an innovative program of early child development and the relevant ministry (see Annex Box A7).

As these examples show the key ingredient to institutional success is (i) careful consideration of the options available with a view to determine which option is most suitable for the specific scaling up initiative; (ii) forging incentives for managers and staff in the implementing agencies to buy into the scaling up process; and (iii) assuring effective partnerships between public agencies and NGOs as well as between higher level authorities and local governments and community-level organizations.

Creating the Human Resources for Scaling Up: The lack of adequately trained human resources is often a major constraint to scaling up. Both Ghana and Benin will not achieve several of their health related MDG targets, as out-migration of health professionals limits the expansion and improvement of the system. In Chad, the scaling up of a health services project funded by the European Union under the 7th European Development Fund was constrained by the severe limitations of qualified staff in the health sector. The public training system did not provide the necessary qualification and many of the few qualified staff in the country sought employment abroad due to lack of incentives at home. Those who remained were mostly under-qualified (Sani 2000).

Quality training, coupled with appropriate incentives thus is often an essential component of scaling up. The pilot process is meant to develop an effective and efficient program design, but the efforts are wasted if the lessons learned are not consistently applied.
Training helps to transmit procedural and technical expertise and organizational values to new hires, and helps ensure that these critical, if intangible, assets are not diluted as the organization expands. Existing personnel, meanwhile, need training to support continuing professional development as a growing organization presents them with new challenges. Binswanger and Nguyen (2005) stress the importance of training in the scaling up of community driven development programs and Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) focus on the development of manuals to support the implementation of such programs. The experience of BRAC demonstrates the role of training in successful scaling up: BRAC operates 16 training facilities across Bangladesh. The development of a new BRAC program is always supported by the preparation of relevant training for new and existing personnel ahead of the actual implementation (Ahmed and French 2006).

But it is important to remember that training, while essential under many circumstances for effective scaling up, is generally not sufficient for creating an effective institutional capacity. Some experts have observed that training is often seen as the universal response in the face of capacity shortfalls, forgetting the importance of other factors that are critical to success, in particular the creation of adequate incentives and accountabilities (Kohl 2007).

Other “spaces” for scaling up

After a detailed consideration of what are the most important spaces in which room needs to be created—fiscal, political, policy and organizational—there are three more spaces which can be very important in particular circumstances, but are of less universal importance and can be treated briefly.

Cultural Space: It is important to determine whether the scaled up program will fit culturally. This is particularly important for participatory programs and for programs that deliver culturally sensitive services (education, health, family planning). Programs may have to be adjusted as they are being extended or replicated to accommodate other values or social-interaction patterns, especially in multicultural communities and countries, and especially when successful interventions are transferred to another country or continent. Without cultural acceptability programs will not take hold and be effective in a new environment. Perhaps the best known example is the case of cultural obstacles to girls’ education.

Partnership Space: It is also important to determine whether domestic or external partners will continue or step up to support the program. In most successful scaling up initiatives, partners were a key factor in helping to keep the momentum and focus. Partners can support the drivers and provide financial support in the scaling up process. Successful programs like BRAC and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh have cooperated successfully with partners despite being clearly in the driver’s seat. The long-term partnership of international drug companies, international donors and national health agencies was essential for the success of the River Blindness Eradication Program in Africa (Moreno-Dodson 2005, 148). And even as China picked its own way to scaling up and sustaining its highly successful development programs, it has frequently sought the technical and financial input of outside partners—as in the case of the Loess Plateau Watershed Rehabilitation Project supported by the World Bank (Moreno-Dodson 2005, 152). The effective partnership and cooperation among aid agencies remains a special challenge, even as official agencies have pledged to coordinate their activities under the “Paris Declaration.” One approach to ensure greater incentives and accountability for making partnerships work is to agree on an “accountability compact” among all partners (see Box 5).
Learning Space: Scaling up requires a “learning by doing” culture, one that values adaptation, flexibility, and openness to change (Korten 1990). Scaling up is not a linear process, it extends over many years and travels many uncharted territory. While a solid process needs to be laid out, processes need to be adjusted regularly. Regular monitoring and evaluation and feedback from beneficiaries, communities and field-based staff are important for learning and adjustments to take place.

Training of policy makers, managers and staff and outreach to the public are complementary elements of a learning strategy for scaling up. BRAC and Progresa-Oportunidades effectively used monitoring systems to provide feedback and learning opportunities. China’s ability to learn and adapt in its policy reforms and program implementation has been one of its greatest assets (Moreno-Dodson 2005).

Box 5. Accountability compacts as a means to improve incentives

The Task Force on Capacity for Program Delivery advocates the adoption of Accountability Compacts, where all partners are bound by jointly agreed outcomes and targets. Accountability Compacts help organizations such as the Global Fund and similar multi-stakeholder organization to agree on joint principles, goals, actions and outcomes and establish mutual accountability. They work best, if they evolve over the life-cycle of an initiative rather than being locked in at the outset, as the partners regularly come together to define and adapt as needed the problem and targets, resource requirements, etc. Through this process, Accountability Compacts can and do evolve, enabling the actors to establish a clear but flexible basis for action based on principles of mutual accountability (Zadek 2007). The Task Force further highlights the following four elements for public accountability mechanisms: (i) drive mandatory involvement of intended beneficiaries in the program design process; (ii) use a transparent and clear basis for performance assessment through standards; (iii) involve intended beneficiaries in outcome assessment; and (iv) endorse principles around “publish what you pay.”

THE IMPERATIVES OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION

There is a broad consensus that careful and well-designed monitoring and evaluation is crucial for effective scaling up (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Two types of evaluation are relevant: One is the evaluation of the pilot program which needs to establish whether or not the innovation tested has been successful and what lessons can be learned from it relevant for the subsequent scaling up process. The other is a rigorous monitoring and evaluation of the scaling up process itself.

Effective evaluation of the pilot phase is critically important. Piloted innovations need “a thorough, evidence-based evaluation of the extent and reasons for a model’s success; an assessment of the model’s strengths, weaknesses, and cost-effectiveness; and a comparison with alternative models or mechanisms for achieving the same goals.” Such evaluations should ideally be done by someone who is not only technically qualified, but also independent and arms-length from the implementing organization. Evaluation should be incorporated in the initial design of a pilot project to permit best-practice elements to be included: an implementation of a baseline survey; documentation of the model; building an ongoing process for monitoring and evaluation; and publicizing results (Cooley and Kohl 2005).

While the need for effective project and program evaluation is now widely recognized, if not always acted upon, the process of scaling up is generally under-evaluated. Gaps in evaluation are explained by a number of factors. First, many projects and programs, whether domestically or donor initiated, are undertaken without a clear intention of scaling up. Second, project evaluations generally do not address the question of whether scaling up was attempted and whether the right ingredients were in place for scaling up to succeed. Third, evaluations focus primarily on the accountability for the uses of funds, and hence on what was done, i.e., the inputs and, less frequently, on what was achieved, i.e., outputs and outcomes. They focus least on how the program was implemented, with implications for scaling up (Lele et al. 2007).

An exception to this pattern is the evaluation practice of BRAC and of Bangladesh’s NGOs and the microfinance movement more generally. BRAC’s Research and Evaluation Division has about forty professionals who evaluate BRAC’s programs and provide “quick-turnaround” assessments. It handles both program evaluation and basic research on issues relevant to BRAC’s development goals (Ahmed and French 2006).

Ideally, evaluations should be based on randomized impact studies which compare the outcomes for beneficiaries covered by the programs with comparable population groups not covered. Such impact evaluations need to be planned in advance, to establish a control group and carry out a baseline survey before the intervention has started. Randomized impact evaluations are not suitable for all programs: Policy reform at the national level can generally not be randomly allocated to one part of the country and not the other. Programs that provide social services to individuals or local communities, such as water and sanitation, education and health, are generally amenable to impact evaluations (Duflo 2004). Good impact evaluations can be crucial for the scaling up effort of a program by convincingly demonstrating the impact of a program and hence the case for its expansion and the required resource allocation. The careful impact evaluation of the Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades program, which was an integral part of the program’s design and implementation, was one of the important
reasons why this program could over time be scaled up and nationally replace other, less effective, programs (see Annex Box A6).  

While the importance of evaluation in general is uncontested, some interventions are less suited for evaluation, especially those that are individualistically driven, or those which are subject to competitive pressures—most of these will be in the private sector. Also, randomize impact studies are less likely to be meaningful or practicable, where the specific local conditions matter. Using the terminology of Pritchett and Woolcock presented previously, interventions that are discretionary will not lend them themselves easily to impact evaluation. On the other hand, interventions that are transaction intensive, and hence most likely hierarchical, whether public or private, and nondiscretionary, will lend themselves well for evaluation, and for randomized impact evaluation in particular.
The literature places much emphasis on a sound planning and management process as an essential component for successful scaling up. The most comprehensive analysis of this process has been undertaken by Lawrence Cooley and Richard Kohl (2005). They provide a management framework for practitioners and propose a three-step/ten-task process, which contains many of the key elements—dimensions and paths, drivers, space and evaluation—presented in this paper (see Box 6). A key message of their approach is that successful scaling up begins with good planning, ideally already during the pilot project design and long before implementation of the pilot phase is completed.

Binswanger and Nguyen (2005) lay out a step-by-step process for scaling up community driven development programs which contains many of the same elements as that of Cooley and Kohl, while EXPANDNET/WHO do so for taking health interventions to scale. Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) emphasize the need for good logistical planning and simple, transparent rules that can be replicated easily. They argue that “scaling up requires precise assignment of a long list of functions to specific actors at different levels, and clear instructions on what they should do, how to do it, and what tools to use.” They consider the use of field-tested operational manuals essential. They also emphasize the need for careful logistical planning. Binswanger and Aiyar, as well as Ahmed and French (2006) in their review of BRAC’s experience, emphasize down-to-earth planning and management in addition to evaluation, learning and advocacy. Davies and Iyer (2002) also stress carefully planned scaling up processes for rural water

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**Box 6. Steps in a systematic planning and management process for scaling up**

**Step 1: Preparing the Model, Setting Goals and Planning**
- Task 1: Identifying the Innovation or Model
- Task 2: Assessing Scalability and Filling in Gaps
- Task 3: Setting Goals and Choosing a Method
- Task 4: Creating a Scaling Up Strategy

**Step 2: Legitimization, Advocacy and Mobilizing Resources**
- Task 5: Legitimizing Change
- Task 6: Advocacy for Adoption
- Task 7: Realigning and Mobilizing Resources

**Step 3: Implementing the Model at Scale**
- Task 8: Modifying and Strengthening Organizations
- Task 9: Coordinating Action
- Task 10: Tracking Performance and Maintaining Momentum

supply programs. They emphasize the need for patience and careful design; development of procedures suitable to the specific environment and reflected in user-friendly manuals; the constant adaptation of manuals in the light of new lessons from learning; the need for good systems for sharing and spreading knowledge among different stakeholders.

In this connection many of the same authors also note that scaling up is a long-term process, typically extending over a period of 10 to 15 years. The literature stresses the need for gradual and sustained approaches to scaling up, citing the importance of learning by doing and of having the requisite time to adapt the innovation to local circumstances. Based on an analysis of five separate instances of scaled up pro-poor programs, Gillespie (2004) asserts that scaling up should always start with one province or district to prove that the scaling up can indeed be successful. Gradualism is also strongly emphasized by Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) in their general review on scaling up CDD program and by Davies and Iyer (2002) in the review of scaling up rural water supply programs. Binswanger and Aiyar mention specifically the successful Indo-German Watershed Development project in its scaling up effort built on 25 years of many earlier government/NGO programs. SERVOL, the early child development and adolescent training initiative which spread its activities from Trinidad-Tobago to the entire Caribbean and beyond, is another successful effort which had to be sustained over decades to reach its current scale (see Annex Box A7).

Sufficient time and gradualism are also necessary to allow for the testing, evaluating, adapting and simplifying the innovations. Hancock (2003) in his background paper for the World Bank Rural Development Strategy observes that successful cases “generally started with 10-15 year lead-up times,” during which effective models were adapted to local conditions, procedures were developed, and initial donor support could be gradually replaced by local resources.

The importance of experimentation of innovations at the pilot stage is emphasized for the BRAC program, even though for BRAC only three to four years has been generally the time needed for piloting new initiatives (Ahmed and French 2006). “The piloting process has two main objectives: effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness, the essential purpose of any program, must be the first goal. At a small scale, it is possible to experiment, to take risks, and to make some mistakes, in order to determine which strategies produce the best results. Once effectiveness is achieved, the focus shifts to efficiency, a quality whose importance will become increasingly conspicuous as a program scales up. Unnecessary tasks and program elements should be eliminated, while those necessary to program effectiveness should be standardized and routinized as much as possible in preparation for replication“ (Ahmed and French 2006).

Finally, evaluations suggest that scaling up is more successful if programs are highly focused. For example, scaling up of community driven development poses challenges as one moves up the administrative and political ladders to the national level in confronting political, policy and institutional, fiscal/financial, technical, legal, regulatory and market related issues at higher levels. The larger the number of sectors involved in such grassroots interventions the more complex the problems of scaling up. The simpler the institutional framework and the less complex the relationships between actors, the swifter and more successful the initiative is likely to be (Binswanger and Aiyer 2003). However, this does not always come easy for individuals or institutions who have pioneered new initiatives. The tendency more frequently is to stick with the initial often complex approaches and, if anything, add bells and whistles to perfect the model, even though this may actually get in the way of scaling up.
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE: KEY SUCCESS FACTORS FOR SCALING UP

The real world is highly differentiated and disorderly. Scaling up strategies have to adjust to this differentiation and disorder. Individual strategies must be flexible and tailored to the realities of the setting (Simmons and Shiffman 2006). The practical challenge is to identify a promising innovation or intervention for scaling up; to identify those elements that are context specific and those that are universal; to assure the universal elements are applied, but leaving room for local adaptation; and to evaluate, learn and change the approach as scaling up proceeds.

Fortunately, the literature and experience which we have reviewed in this paper—by focusing on dimensions, approaches and paths, drivers of and space for scaling up—permits us to identify seven common building blocks of success. They are (i) applying leadership, vision and values; (ii) managing political constituencies; (iii) ensuring supportive policies; (iv) developing institutional capacity; (v) creating incentives and accountability; (vi) practicing evaluation, learning and feedback; and (vii) planning for success.

Lesson 1: Scaling up needs leadership, vision and values

More than anything else, scaling up is about political and organizational leadership, vision and values. If leaders don’t drive the process of scaling up with a clear vision, if institutions don’t embody a clear set of values that empower managers and staff to continuously challenge themselves to scale up, and if individuals within institutions are not offered the incentives to push themselves and others to scale up successful interventions, then the current pattern of pervasive “short-termism” and fragmentation of effort will continue to characterize national policies and programs as well as policies and approaches of donors. No scaling up manual, no check list, and no compilation of case studies will make a lasting difference.

We have cited numerous success stories which demonstrate this factor: BRAC and Grameen Bank; Progresa-Oportunidades; Transparency International; the River Blindness Eradication Program; and the Loess Plateau Project in China. Other examples that combine leadership and institutional values for scaled up success are the Aga Khan Development Network led by His Highness the Aga Khan and the Open Society Institute under George Soros’ leadership. One might also include the World Bank under the leadership of Robert McNamara and of James Wolfensohn, who each stressed scaling up and instilled values in the institution that helped staff and managers to look for scaling up opportunities.

A fundamental problem with leadership and values is that they will not last unless carefully nurtured. The values and incentives that move small organizations to grow and expand their operations may quickly turn into bureaucratic rote, when the organization has routinized its operations and then loses its way from the original scaling up path. Or when leaders move on, their legacy and drive may fade. An example is the departure of James Wolfensohn from the World Bank in 2005: his effort to create an environment in which the World Bank systematically pushed for scaling up as an operational modality was quickly abandoned by his successor. Finding ways to perpetuate good leadership and institutional values dedicated to scaling up is one of the main challenges.

Lesson 2: Scaling up needs political constituencies

One key way to ensure that leaders and institutions continue to pay attention to scaling up is to create an...
Lesson 3: Scaling up needs mutually supportive policies, programs and projects

Interventions generally have to be piloted first, before they can be scaled up successfully to reach large numbers of people in many jurisdictions. At the same time, pilot projects that are conceived without the scaling up objective from the outset will ultimately not serve as a good basis for scaling up.

As programs are scaled up, the policy framework—laws, regulations, norms—has to be supportive if the scaling up process is to succeed. At the same time, most policy reforms need to be underpinned by programs and projects that lead to the effective implementation of the policy regime if it is to achieve its intended consequences.

Lesson 4: Scaling up needs institutions willing and able to support change

Scaling up needs organizations with the institutional and human capacity to deliver on the scaling up mandate. There are no blueprints for institutional change that would guide the approach to reform, and different models will work in different contexts. Some lessons, however, are worth remembering.

First, setting up new institutions and bypassing existing institutions should be the exception, rather than the rule. Institutional fragmentation, as we will see in the case of aid donors below, is one of the chief reasons for failure to scale up. Where new or specialized institutions are created, they should be continuously evaluated in their performance relative to appropriate benchmarks, such as the performance of alternative existing institutions, and the option of merging the old and the new and thus reducing fragmentation should always be kept in mind.

Second, however, where franchising or decentralized management of replicated programs—by, for example, local communities, local governments, or NGOs with clearly defined, non-overlapping functional or geographic mandates—are possible, decentralized organizational replication will be preferable to centralized, integrated service delivery by a unitary agency. However, accountability and competition for resources based on performance, as under the method of “interjurisdictional competition” described above, are essential in this case.

Third, organizations that pilot innovations may not be good at scaling up or at running large scale programs. With exceptions, this tends to be true for NGOs. Therefore, a readiness to hand off to institutions that are able to manage the scaling up process...
is key—more often than not these may be governmental agencies and ministries. Of course, there will also be cases where the scaling up and the scaled up interventions could and should be handled by private business. For example, based on smaller scale experiments by the non-for-profit sector, ICICI Bank in India has scaled up microcredit schemes in India on a private sector basis. Another example, representative of good scaling up experience in agricultural and food processing innovation is the case of the International Potato Center’s efforts to take its innovations from the research to the broad application stage by engaging private sector actors throughout the production, processing and distribution chain.

Fourth, training and development of the staff in charge of implementing scaling up initiatives is important, but it is not a panacea. On its own, and without the other key elements of institutional capacity building, as well as leadership, political support, incentives and so forth, training will not have a lasting impact (Kohl 2007).

Lesson 5: Scaling up needs incentives and accountability

Throughout this paper we have encountered incentives as the key ingredient for ensuring leadership, political support and institutional capacity for scaling up. Indeed, without appropriate incentives innovation would be hampered and the process of scaling up would not be driven forward. Accountability in turn is necessary to ensure that incentives are aligned among the individual actors, the goals of the organizations they work for, and the broader goals of society.

Scaling up is a change process, but as we noted earlier changes can easily be stalled by unwilling players. In social service delivery programs, these players are often public bureaucracies when inertia, combined with inadequate skills and human resources, prevent change from happening. Scaling up processes thus need to include incentives for the key actors (Binswanger and Aiyer 2003). These can be positive rewards for achieving scaling up goals or penalties for failing to achieve them. They can be monetary or non-monetary (recognition and status, also promotion or election to office and hence influence). One important tool for creating incentives is to plan for incremental steps with early results, rather than building the perfect program to be rolled out after a long preparation time without intermediate results (Schaffer and Ashkenas 2005).

Accountability in turn is needed to ensure incentives can be linked to shared objectives. Accountability processes are more easily established in small scale interventions where much of the activities are carried out within a community and results are easily seen and monitored. Scaling up of programs generally makes measurement of results and their attribution to individual actors more difficult due to greater complexity of interventions and the greater multiplicity of actors involved. At the same time, effective accountability becomes more important, since scaling up leads to increases of power, which in turn invites the misuse of power.

Accountability is often directed upward toward the organizational and political leadership and to outside donors. Moreover, much of this accountability is focused on assuring effective use of inputs and on financial propriety, much less on assuring actual results and scaling up of successful interventions, whether by governments, NGOs or donors. This means that the interests of the intended communities and beneficiaries are neglected, even as the commitment to local empowerment has increased in recent years among
some governments and most donors. As a result, beneficiaries of development interventions are often least able to provide effective feedback. Their voice is often overpowered by institutional interests during the design and implementation of developmental interventions (Dalberg Global Development Advisors 2006). This is where an effective voice from the bottom up through citizens’ score cards, beneficiary surveys, independent, empowered community organizations and democratic political institutions takes on great importance. Some also advocate the systematic use of “accountability compacts” (see Box 5). In all of this, it is critical that incentives include prominently a reference to scaling up as a key goal and that accountability metrics include explicitly outcome measures that reflect scale as a key results dimension.

Lesson 6: Scaling up needs effective monitoring and evaluation

Incentives and accountability for scaling up in turn require monitoring and evaluation at two levels: first, for the original small-scale or pilot operation and, second, during the scaling up process. The successful scaling up of BRAC’s operations in Bangladesh depended crucially on regular feedback from monitoring and evaluation systems. This allowed the programs to be adjusted as they are expanded in the light of well-understood experience. One of the secrets of Progresa’s success, as we mentioned before, was the existence of credible impact evaluations, undertaken with randomized samples. These evaluations clearly demonstrated the impact of the program and thus played an important role in convincing politicians to expand and maintain the program during successive electoral cycles. But even simple evaluations can play an essential role in providing feedback on whether scaling up is embedded in the institutional and managerial culture and values of an organization, provided that the evaluations actually focus on scaling up as a key dimension of success, which unfortunately is still the exception rather than the rule.

Lesson 7: Scaling up benefits from an orderly and gradual process

The literature on the diffusion of innovations focuses on the spontaneous spread of innovations and observes that some ideas/innovations can spread very quickly, especially when they are market driven (for example, the diffusion of information and communications technology, such as the cell phone). However, social process innovations—which rely on political processes, public sector bureaucracies and often on participatory, bottom-up community engagement—generally do not spread instantaneously or spontaneously. An orderly and gradual process, careful logistical planning, a clear definition of partners’ roles and good communication are important ingredients to scale up development interventions. One of the key lessons learned from the many case studies of successful scaling up, and repeated again and again in the scaling up literature is the need to keep processes simple, goals manageable, and accountabilities clearly identified. Of course, this is easier said than done, not only because most large organizations, whether private or public, tend to follow a bureaucratic tendency to search out more complex solutions than perhaps necessary, but also because the process of scaling up inherently involves many possible dimensions, approaches, paths, drivers and spaces as this paper has documented that need to be considered, planned for, monitored and evaluated, if the process is to be successful. But more than anything else, scaling up is about political and organizational leadership, vision and values. If those are present and geared to drive forward individuals, institutions and bureaucratic and political processes, then scaling up will have a chance to succeed.
**POSTSCRIPT: IMPLICATIONS FOR AID AND AID DONORS**

Donors have a particular role to play in the scaling up process. Especially in many of the poor and aid-dependent countries this process involves a complex relationship between donor and recipient agencies (Van Oudenhoven and Wazir n.d.). This relationship tends to be one-sided, in the sense that recipients depend on the donors and need to follow donors’ preferences. Because of this unequal relationship, donors carry a particular responsibility in the scaling up effort.

External partners and resources often play an important role in the experimentation process, as well as in subsequent scaling up, although some of the more successful programs have been designed and implemented at scale with the government (in the case of Progresa-Oportunidades) or NGO (in the case of BRAC) very much in the driver’s seat. There are in fact plenty of examples of close partnerships between local public agencies or NGOs and external donor partners in successful scaling up experiences. Most of the cases of successful scaling up cited in this paper fall in this category, but others can be cited: the Russia coal sector reform program; multi-decade support for irrigation development in Thailand; regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Great Mekong Sub-region Program and the Central Asia Regional Cooperation Program (see Annex Box A13). In the scaling up of the successful Cambodian Health Equity Fund, the involvement of international financial institutions and UNICEF are considered to be instrumental for the establishment and subsequent scale up of the scheme.

An important platform through which the scaling up agenda could be moved forward is the “Paris Donor Harmonization Agenda.” It was adopted in 2005 and commits the development partners to the following five basic tenets: (i) government ownership of development programs; (ii) alignment of donor processes with government systems; (iii) harmonization among development partners and with government; (iv) managing for results; and (v) mutual accountability of donors and government. This agenda does not specifically refer to scaling up, but if advanced, it should have important impacts on scaling up of programs. Progress has been made in implementing the agenda. Harmonization of programs should help to take successful smaller interventions to bigger scale. Donor alignment, with government systems and government ownership as the eminent principle for interventions, should help to create the policy space, the fiscal/financial and the political space for successful programs to grow. In addition, bilateral and multilateral donors increasingly rely on joint donor financing instruments, such as sector-based lending, basket lending, sector and general budgetary support instruments. These joint instruments require alignment and focus. The scaling up agenda should rely on these dynamics for the creation of “space.” Given the rather recent nature of the Paris Donor Harmonization agenda, a conceptual linkage with the “scaling up” agenda has not, yet, been forged, but presents an opportunity for the future.

Finally, some donor agencies have introduced the idea of “scaling up” into their strategic rhetoric and are attempting to institutionalize scaling up. UNICEF, for example, lists as its first priority for HIV/AIDS education “moving away from small scale pilot projects” and “expanding effective and promising approaches to national scale.” IFAD defines its mission among other aspects by the catalytic role which it hopes to play by supporting innovation and its roll-out. The World Bank under James Wolfensohn promoted the “Comprehensive Development Framework” and its offshoot, the “Poverty Reduction Strategies” (PRSPs), which supported country-owned, compre-
Applying the basic lessons summarized above. This means first and foremost defining a clear vision, applying strong leadership and instilling the institutional values in the aid organization to assure that the scaling up goal is systematically reflected in the institutional mission and practices.

Second, aid agencies need to see the creation of “political space” as an important component of the programs they finance. It is not a byproduct or after-thought, as scaling up can only take place if political support can be secured. Stakeholder analysis, information campaigns, outreach to constituencies and efforts to assist those negatively affected by programs are all elements of a strategy that reflects consideration of the political space in which scaling up needs to take place.

Third, linking support for projects, programs and policies in a seamless web is important—the World Bank has been most advanced in this regard, but other donors could and should do more.

Fourth, helping to build the institutional capacity for scaling up is critical. Special efforts must be made to avoid setting up parallel institutions for aid financed projects, such as the still frequently used “Project Implementation Units.” The now common focus of aid agencies on capacity building is welcome, but it needs to go beyond conventional training, twinning and expert advice, in assuring that local expertise is actually created and sustained, through long-term support for learning by doing, and by stressing reform of institutional incentives and accountabilities to assure there is actually a demand for the capacity to be created at the country level.

Fifth, donors must realign their own institutional incentives and accountabilities to assure that staff and managers, strategies and programs, as well as technical advice and financing are clearly directed to the scaling up objective.
Sixth, donors need to get serious about harmonization of donor administrative and fiduciary requirements. This is an area in which the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was to make progress, but little seems to have been achieved so far. The successful effort by BRAC to get its donors to pool their resources and harmonize their disbursement and reporting requirements is an example of what can be done (see Annex Box A14).

Seventh, donors have to systematically overhaul their evaluation standards and approaches. At the moment, evaluations of the donor agencies only assess project impact and sustainability, but not whether or not they have provided the basis for scaling up and whether successful projects and programs were actually replicated and scaled up (Lele et al. 2007).

Finally, support for a gradual, orderly and coordinated process in which other partners are brought to the table, in which systematic learning can take place, in which simple solutions for scaling up can be identified and applied, and in which sustained financial support is provided should become the norm, rather than the exception.

Donors could take some immediate practical steps to implement these broad priorities:

1. Each organization should implement a “scaling up audit” for itself, perhaps best with some independent outside input. This audit would assess in how far the seven lessons are actually applied by the organization and where changes need to be made in order to induce a more systematic and effective focus on scaling up.93 Project preparation manuals and other operational policies should then be amended to reflect the need for scaling up. Country and sector strategies as well as project documents should be required to address the scaling up dimensions explicitly.

2. The donor agencies’ evaluation units should review their evaluation approaches and manuals and ensure that they adequately address scaling up. The newly established International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3IE) should take up this issue and thus ensure a concerted donor effort.94

3. Evaluations of donor-financed research programs should not only assess the academic quality of the research output, but also its policy and operational relevance, as well as what efforts are being made to disseminate the research effectively for operational application.95

4. Donors individually or as a group should set up “replication funds;” these are financial resources which would be made available, possibly on concessional terms, in the form of matching grants or loans, to provide special incentives for scaling up successful programs. This could be linked with “development market place” initiatives which would reward not only innovative projects, but also the replication of well-evaluated successful projects. Alternatively, they could be allocated through inter-jurisdictional tournaments.96

5. Donors should expand the use of programmatic instruments that allow for going from individual projects to support for broader sector programs; these can be multi-donor sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) to pool donor resources for sectoral programs or single-donor support for multi-jurisdictional initiatives which use a competitive or tournament approach to provide incentives and finance to multiple jurisdiction at the same time.97

6. Stakeholder analysis, political analysis, citizens’ report cards and client surveys should be introduced as routine instruments for country strategies and project appraisal.

7. Donors should create a network of senior donor managers, recipient country representatives and/or technical experts who regularly meet to explore how scaling up initiatives can be supported across donor institutions.

8. Donors should support systematic research on scaling up.
ANNEX: CASE MATERIALS ON EXAMPLES OF SCALED UP PROGRAMS

Throughout the text we have referred to specific examples of successful scaling up. In this annex we take the more important and representative cases and provide more detailed information for the interested reader in the form of Annex Boxes. It is important to note that the brief descriptions cannot do full justice to each case nor do they amount to careful evaluations of the experience. For more detail on the available evidence in each case the reader should consult the sources cited as well as additional materials readily available in most cases. Additional cases can also be found in the many references cited in the text and especially in two valuable publications, one by the World Bank (2005) “Reducing Poverty on a Global Scale,” the other by the Center for Global Development (2004) “Millions Saved: Proven Successes in Global Health.”

Box A1. Transparency International (TI) – an example of scaling up through institutional franchising

Transparency International was founded in 1993 as a worldwide coalition to fight corruption. It is a global network including more than 90 locally established international chapters and chapters-in-formation. The chapters are represented in the governance structure of TI, but operate as independent legal entities. They can only use the name of Transparency International if accredited or pre-accredited by the Accreditation Committee of the Governing Board. The accreditation process is taken very seriously to assure the movement’s integrity, cohesion and reputation and to safeguard the diversity and richness of opinion and actions within the movement. Quality control is exercised through this accreditation process.

Accreditation is undertaken by an Accreditation Committee. It is a multi-staged process, which consists of a preliminary stage, a provisional accreditation and the accreditation. Detailed criteria have been established with which a chapter needs to comply in order to be accredited. In case of non-compliance, TI disaccredits and suspends chapters. Disaccreditation of chapters is not just a formality but actually exercised in TI.

Source: http://www.transparency.org. See National Chapter Accreditation and Individual Member Appointment Policy.

Box A2. Southeast European Trade and Transport Facility – regional scaling up

With the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, a number of new countries emerged in Southeast Europe. They were all small in size and dependent on trade with neighboring countries and the European Union. Many new borders, trade systems and divergent rules threatened trade integration and became a major obstacle for economic growth. Barriers included long waiting times at borders and demands for informal payments at border crossing points posed serious obstacles for trade.

The Southeast European Trade and Transport Facility aimed to lower non-tariff trade costs and control corruption at border crossing points. While conceptually designed as a regional program, TTFSE was integrated continued
Box A2. Southeast European Trade and Transport Facility – regional scaling up (continued)

through eight different country projects, each one strategically focused on the introduction of reforms at selected pilot sites in each of the countries. Common performance indicators provided comparative quantitative information. Progress documented and lessons learned at one site could be used to replicate the approach at other sites. The private sector had strong interest in the project. User perspectives were sought and performance indicators where shared at Steering Committee meetings and the TTFSE Web site.

The project was supported by the World Bank in collaboration with other donors. It helped to reduce waiting time at border crossings, improved dialogues among customs administrations and border control agencies, increased revenue collections, simplified processes and helped to launch a gradual process of change in the culture of customs administrations. The World Bank has been promoting a similar approach in the South Caucasus.


Box A3. Pre-school education for Roma children in Serbia

An estimated 10% of Serbia’s school-aged population is Roma. A large share of the Roma population lives in deep poverty and often in isolated settlements. Most Roma children do not receive even a basic education. Only a third of all Roma children complete the eight-year primary cycle. While about 80-90% of children enroll in first grade, only 50% of students enrolled continue after fourth grade. The low level of education perpetuates the cycle of poverty. Reasons for low school attendance are multiple. Low scholastic success in school, a school environment, which is discriminatory and alien to Roma children, and parental attitudes unsupportive to school attendance are important reasons.

Evaluations have consistently shown that early enrollment of Roma children during pre-school years are the most effective intervention to help Roma children participate successfully in primary school. Throughout the last 10 years, a large number of NGOs helped to support Roma children through pre-school programs, typically provided to Roma children in separate facilities and segregated from other pre-school children. The Roma Education Fund (REF) propagated and supported an integrated model of pre-school enrollment for Roma children, to help assure that Roma children are not taught in separate—and typically lower quality schools—and to help them to become familiar and integrate into the broader Serbian society. A first project was implemented during 2006. It supported a collaboration of preschools, municipalities and the Ministry of Education/National Council of Minorities. Special incentives were provided to schools to accommodate Roma children into pre-schools. NGOs acted as facilitators between schools and Roma communities/parents to help children attend the schools. Municipalities provided resources and actively supported the approach. Concurrently, REF provided policy advice to the Ministry of Education on Roma education issues. In 2007, Serbia made attendance of at least six months of pre-school a requirement for all children prior to being admitted to first grade. The continued
Box A3. Pre-school education for Roma children in Serbia (continued)

policy decision to make pre-school mandatory was an important step forward but, in itself, not sufficient. The REF continues to work toward assuring that pre-school be taught through integrated programs and that Roma children need special support through facilitators familiar with their culture, to make sure that parents support their attendance. The REF continues to provide funding for integrated programs and special support to Roma children through facilitators.

The program is a model where important advances were achieved on the policy level, and activities could be transferred from the NGO level to the public system. However, the path of transferring implementation activities from NGOs to public structures did run into difficulties. The National Council of Minorities, which implemented the first project, did not succeed in the follow-up operation in 2007. Half-hearted support due to various ministerial changes, vested interests and weaknesses in human resources are seen as the most important reasons for this failure. The project concept was subsequently revised and the follow-up operation is presently again implemented by NGOs, in direct cooperation with municipalities. The repeated strong implementing role of NGOs is seen as a transitional solution until consensus for the appropriate public implementation structure can be forged and implementation can again be transferred to the public system.


Box A4. Bulgaria’s Roma School Desegregation Project – building political consensus

The Bulgaria Roma School Desegregation Project is an example how scaling up of a program could be achieved through successful replication in several locations but also how further scaling up critically depends on an accommodating public policy, financial support and active direct engagement of the public sector. It is also an example how successful programs can rather easily scale up to a certain level, but political support for further scaling up is difficult to achieve as it requires commitment from political leaders for systemic changes.

Many Roma children in Bulgaria attend so called “Gypsy schools.” These schools have predominantly, or only, Roma children enrolled, and the learning conditions and quality of education in “Gypsy schools” are considerably poorer than in other schools in Bulgaria. Schools are typically located in Roma settlements and there are formal entry barriers which make it difficult for Roma students to enter schools outside of these neighborhoods. Educational outcomes of Roma children remain significantly below non-Roma students. The segregation of Roma students in the so called “Gypsy schools” is one of the reasons for poor educational performance.

The desegregation program formerly supported by the Open Society Institute (OSI) and now by the Roma Education Fund (REF), help children to attend desegregated schools outside of the Roma settlements, pro-
vide after-school support for children, and include outreach components to support parents in establishing a better relationship with their children’s schools and to increase parental motivation. The program started in 2000 as a small pilot in one town and has since expanded successfully to nine different locations. While replication has been successful and the program operates well in most locations, it still only reaches, at most, 2000 Roma children each year, out of an estimated total Roma school population in Bulgaria of about 100,000. The program is widely viewed as successful and evaluations undertaken point to good scholastic achievements of Roma students supported by this program (Bulgaria Helsinki Committee 2005). Integration of Roma children into general schools has been successful in rural areas, where due to declining student populations, schools have to be closed and teachers are being laid off. The program has been much less successful in urban areas, where there is overcrowding in schools. In rural areas, programs have mostly good collaborations with municipalities. The program is fully implemented by NGOs. Except for very limited funds, sometimes provided by municipalities, the program is fully funded by REF.

Further scaling up of this effective program crucially depends on active engagement of the public education system and public funding. While Bulgaria has made numerous, prominent policy statements on Roma issues as part of the EU integration process, actions to translate these basic policies in practice has mostly been missing. On an informal level, politicians seem to welcome the desegregation project as a path to integrate Roma children in school communities and to address school vacancies. But this informal support has not yet translated into sufficient public policy support. Bulgaria still has not officially adopted desegregation of schools as an education policy and is providing no public funding for the program. This poses serious constraints on further scaling up. Political leaders seem reluctant to take open stances in support of Roma programs, as it might weaken support from their traditional constituencies.

Box A5. El Salvador: Education with the Participation of Communities (EDUCO)

EDUCO is an example of how a small innovation can be scaled up to a national level and have significant impact on national education systems. It is an example of successful collaboration between community based organizations and public sector systems even as the program expanded.

The civil war in El Salvador during the 1980s severely damaged the education system. By the end of the war, one million children were out of school and communication between ministry and schools ceased, supervision collapsed, and many teachers viewed abandoned posts. Communities started to establish own community schools, and recruited and paid their own teachers when they could. Once peace was established, the government seized this model of community schools as a basis of a formal program that would be administratively and financially supported by the government. Because of the turbulences and social tensions resulting from the civil war, the Ministry was prepared to take a low-key role in the management of the initial program while actively supporting the approach.

EDUCO began in 1991 by targeting 78 of the country's poorest municipalities, out of a total of 221 municipalities. By 1993, the program had been expanded in all rural areas. In spite of rapid expansion, education outcomes of the schools were comparable to traditional schools, in spite of being located in the poorest areas of the country. EDUCO schools are operated by Community Education Associations, an elected committee made up primarily of students' parents. This Committee enters into an agreement with the Ministry of Education. The Community Education Association hires, monitors, retains or dismisses teachers. Parents are taught about school management and how to assist their children at home. Parental involvement is considered key and parents frequently visit classrooms.

Once started strictly as a community program with minimal involvement of the Ministry of Education, the collaboration between the Ministry and Community Committees grew closer and more formal as the program was scaled up. EDUCO's administration has become embedded in the Ministry of Education and EDUCO has developed into a schooling model, which had important impacts on the country's traditional systems. The scaling up process benefited from the explicit support, which the model received from the public school administration in the early after war years. As the population met centralized public institutions with deep distrust, the Ministry of Education viewed the parent-organized schools as the only option to reach rural communities. Thus, the Ministry was cautious in placing undue demands and only gradually called for a more formal integration of parent-operated schools into the overall education system.

In 1997, the Mexican Deputy Minister of Finance, and well-known economist, Santiago Levy came up with an innovative program to help poor people help themselves. Called PROGRESA, the program provides cash grants to mothers if they keep their children in school, participate in health education programs, and bring the kids to health clinics for nutrition supplements and regular checkups. In 1998, when the program was initiated, the government realized it could not reach the 50,000 potential beneficiary communities of PROGRESA at once. Instead, Levy started with a pilot program and allocated the scarce funds in a way that the program could be scientifically evaluated. The program randomly selected 253 villages to get the benefits with another 253 villages, not yet getting the benefits, chosen as comparators. Data was collected on all 506 villages before and after the beginning of the program. The Mexican government gave the task of evaluating the program to IFPRI. The findings confirmed that the program worked. Children receiving PROGRESA benefits “had a 23 percent reduction in the incidence of illness, a 1-4 percent increase in height, and an 18 percent reduction in anemia. Adults had 19 percent fewer days lost to illness. [There was]... an average 3.4 percent increase in enrollment for all students in grades 1 through 8; the increase was largest among girls who had completed grade 6, at 14.8 percent.” (Duflo and Kremer, p. 10). The evidence of success based on thorough evaluation helped to create the political support that made a rapid expansion of PROGRESA possible.


SERVOL is an NGO in Trinidad and Tobago that manages education programs in poor neighborhoods. It is an example of an effective private-public partnership in early childhood and adolescent education, where the government gradually assumed increasing funding responsibilities. It is truly a success story, but a success story built over 20 years.

SERVOL runs a national early childhood education program with 160 centers and over 300 teachers for nearly 5,000 children aged two-and-a-half to five years. Teachers are well trained and programs are operated entirely by the community. Each center functions under the direction of a village board, which hires and fires teachers in consultation with SERVOL and meet monthly to consult with parents.

SERVOL was originally set up as a private initiative with private funding, mostly from international public and private sources, including from the Bernard van Leer Foundation, but as it expanded over time it built a strong partnership with the Ministry of Education. Initially (1971-86), the program depended heavily on the financial support of overseas foundations. In 1986, the government asked SERVOL to expand its pre-school program continued
but the Ministry only provided minimal funding. In 1992, SERVOL set up its own endowment to achieve more independence from overseas contributions. In 1996, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Ministry of Planning and Development, and SERVOL signed a grant agreement which effectively doubled salaries and significantly improved the status of teachers and eventually led to the Ministry of Education assuming responsibility for teachers' pay. The Ministry of Education treats SERVOL as the implementing agency for the development and dissemination of early childhood in Trinidad and Tobago. Along with this has come a remarkable shift in policy at the national level. Whereas in the 1970s when the government had not even recognized the importance of early child development, it now places great emphasis on pre-school education, following SERVOL's successful pilot program development and advocacy efforts.

SERVOL has expanded its early childhood and adolescent training programs to most countries in the English-speaking Caribbean as well as to South Africa and Ireland.


Box A8. BRAC’s non-formal primary education program

BRAC began as a small relief operation in Bangladesh in 1972. It is the largest NGO in the world. BRAC experienced staggering growth. In 1980, it employed 471 full-time staff. In 1990, staff had grown to 4,222 people. By 2005, full-time staff numbered more than 37,000. This makes BRAC the second largest employer in Bangladesh after the government. It conducts programs in micro-finance, education, health and social development and serves an estimated 110 million people. Scaling up of BRAC programs rests on seven principles: Listening to the People, Vision, Piloting, Training, Down-to-Earth Management, Evaluation and Adaptation, and Advocacy. The application of these principles can be demonstrated in the scaling up of the Non-formal Primary Education Program. The program started as a small pilot in 1985. Today it covers 31,000 primary and 16,000 pre-primary schools throughout Bangladesh, and it is replicated in many countries.

The program was prompted by requests from village women who were concerned about high drop-out rates among their children. They turned to BRAC for help. For two years, BRAC conducted pilot operations and experimented with materials, teacher selection and training in twenty-two class rooms. Training of teachers was considered essential. Teachers were native to the village in which they worked but were not fully qualified teachers. The program teaches the five-year primary cycle in four years. The majority of the students are girls. Intensive training combined with good teaching materials are considered to be key to the success of the program. Most students continue their education after completion of the program. BRAC maintained excellent relations with the government’s education services. This helped in the transfer of students from the non-formal to the formal education system.
Evaluations were conducted regularly during the scaling up process. Adjustments were made as a result of these evaluations. For example, the program was originally designed as a three-year program based on the assumption that students would only remain at most for three years in a non-formal education program. This assumption turned out to be wrong, and the program was extended to four years.


The project is an example for an exceptionally large and fast scale up. It had explosive growth. It expanded from a small pilot operation in 25 villages to more than 28,000 villages within six years (1997-2003). KPD, together with its urban counterpart, is now the main pillar of the government’s national poverty reduction strategy. Main objectives of the project were to raise incomes in rural areas, build public infrastructure through labour intensive methods and strengthen sub-district institutions.

Its basic architecture is simple: Block grants are given to kecamatan councils to fund development programs. Kecamatan are sub-districts typically composed of 20 to 50 villages. Development programs are prepared through a participatory process which typically lasts between four to six months. Funds range between $60,000 and $110,000 per kecamatan. Each village can submit up to two proposals to the kecamatan council. Villagers must negotiate among themselves which proposals to submit. It is the kecamatan council which agrees which village proposal to accept. The decision of the kecamatan council cannot be overruled through other authorities. Funds are directly released from the provincial branch of the national treasury to a bank account held by the village. Thus, it bypasses provincial and district governments.

This system proved to be a robust way to channel resources to poor villages. Key success factors were the flat hierarchy, the authority delegated to villages and kecamatan council in preparing and selecting projects, and the disbursement of funds directly to the villages. The highly participatory process increased transparency and helped to limit corruption. A special feature of KPD is that it contracted its consultants from the private sector and did not use civil servants. Such services were used extensively for supporting the planning process and in the implementation of programs. The use of private providers helped to scale up KPD more quickly than if government employees had been used, as they would have had to be redeployed and retrained. Given public sector inertia they might have been reluctant to adjust to the changed processes. But the decision to employ only private sector services has been contentious as important public institution building in the public sector did not take place. The scaling up of the kecamatan project thus also points to a potential trade-off between rapid scaling-up and longer-term institution building.

Box A10. Functional scaling up: Kudumbashee-Women Empowerment

Based on a successful pilot program, the government of Kerala scaled up a program of a three-tiered community-based organization of poor women known as community development societies. Women from families identified as poor were organized into neighborhood groups. Each group elected a committee to develop, coordinate, and facilitate community development and action plans. Neighborhood groups were in federated at the ward level, those in turn federated at the municipal level.

“Kudumbashee employs four key strategies to promote community development: convergence of various government programs and resources at the municipal level, participatory antipoverty planning and implementation, formation of thrift and credit societies, and the development and nurture of microenterprises.

“Kumbashree’s scaling up has been more than geographic. From primarily a pilot to improve nutritional status of mothers and children, it evolved into a multisectoral poverty alleviation program, scaling up functionally. And by facilitating empowerment of women’s organizations and concurrently devolving resources and power to localities, the program scaled up politically. Its organizational scaling up includes forming partnerships with diverse institutions including banks, universities, and an increasing number of government departments.”


Box A11. Political scaling up in Cameroon

“The Waza Logone region of Cameroon is home to a 170,000 hectare national park and extensive floodplain biodiversity. It is also a zone of intense fishing and agricultural activities, livestock production, and increasingly tourism. The region was disrupted ecologically, socio-economically, and hydrologically in 1979 by the installation of a hydro-agricultural dam that damaged productive systems and natural habitat in Waza National Park. Through a participatory partnership, the Cellule d’Appui a la Conservation et aux Initiatives de Developpement Durable (CACID) brought together government organizations, traditional and administrative authorities, and the private sector to restore, conserve, and manage the Waza Logone floodplain in a sustainable manner.

“CACID used their Equator Prize 2002 award money to undertake a comprehensive and strategic management planning process. The strategic planning process focused on information and awareness-raising for local elected representatives and local and provincial administrative authorities. It also incorporated an evaluation of current community initiatives and identified pilot communities for future work and assistance. The process involved workshops at the community level and the monitoring and evaluation of the status of planning and awareness among local and regional communities and policy-makers.”

Box A12. River Blindness (Onchocerciasis) – an example of long-term donor support

The successful River Blindness Program in West Africa is an example how long term donor commitment is essential. The program originally started with village level vector control in the 1940s, and expanded to cover river systems in seven countries, before being systematically extended to eleven and then to 30 countries in West, Central, and East Africa. The donor support program started in 1974 with 18 donors.

“Today, 31 years later, fifteen of the original donors are still actively supporting the program. Donor contribution to the initiative increased from $63 million when the program started to $157 million when the disease was defeated in West Africa in 1991. In West Africa, the initiative led to sustained increases in labor productivity, prevented 600,000 cases of river blindness, and made 25 million hectares of land safe for human settlement. After 1991 donor aid declined as the initiative moved to other parts of Africa, where river blindness, though present, is not as critical as it used to be in West Africa. The long-term commitment of donors to this initiative was maintained through openness, regular feedback, and a clear definition of roles and responsibilities.

“Along with long-term donor commitments, the program also benefited from political commitments at the highest level.”


Box A13. Donor support for coal sector reform in Russia

A series of loans by the World Bank implemented over a period of about six years starting in 1996 for the restructuring of the Russia coal sector reflects an effective partnership between the Russian authorities and the World Bank in successfully designing and implementing a program that effectively reformed the entire coal sector in Russia in a carefully sequenced and scaled up process. Virtually the entire coal sector was transparently privatized and downsized in the process by closing unproductive mines. A dysfunctional central ministry was transformed into an effective regulatory body, large coal subsidies were reduced and redirected from subsidizing loss-making publicly run mines to mining communities to mitigate social impacts and maintain social assets during the coal sector restructuring process. The end result was a doubling of the coal sector’s productivity, the fiscal drain of large subsidies was contained, and the social and political tensions that had characterized coal operations in Russia for the previous ten years largely abated. Key ingredients of the successfully scaled up effort include a combination of domestic political and external economic drivers; an effective project team in the World Bank (including Ashraf Ghani, who later became Minister of Finance in Afghanistan’s Transitional Government 2002-2004), which was able to work with a dedicated and effective counterpart team of key Russian reformers; and a carefully designed and implemented program that had a clear vision of the sector-wide scale of change needed and included a well-articulated strategy to engage mining communities, miners’ unions and other important political stake holders.

Box A14. How BRAC worked to achieve unified donor support

“Uncoordinated donor missions and disparate disbursement and reporting arrangements taxed BRAC’s internal capacity and led to its management proposing changes for how its donors ought to operate. In the early 1990s, donors shifted their approach from financing specific BRAC projects to financing BRAC programs. Donors also formed a consortium that pooled funds, negotiated jointly with BRAC and had common reporting requirements. An important part of the consortium funding arrangement and the move toward program funding has been to improve the predictability of resource flows—for instance BRAC secured financing for its Rural Development Program for a five-year period from the donor consortium. Moreover, the establishment of a donor liaison office for BRAC also acts as a buffer between BRAC staff and the various visitors, consultants and evaluators.”


Box A15. Scholarship support for secondary school attendance for minority children in Serbia and Macedonia

The PSI/REF supported scholarship program for secondary education is a model for successful replication from one country to another and for transfer of NGO directed activities to the public sector for implementation and funding.

Only a tiny fraction of Roma children continue their education at the secondary level (estimated at 3-5%) in Southeast European countries. To provide incentives for parents and students to continue with secondary education, OSI/REF launched special scholarship programs for Roma students which want to attend secondary schools. The programs provide living stipends which cover basic expenses. The program was successfully implemented in Macedonia in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education is responsible for implementation and over the years gradually assumed an increasing share of funding. The program has been replicated by the state government in Vojvodina/Serbia in 2007 and has been broadened in scope to cover all minority students. The program is still supported by REF. As of 2009, the program is planned to be fully funded and implemented by the Vojvodina education system.

REFERENCES


Partnerships for Health Reform (PHR), Project Abt Associates, Inc.


ENDNOTES


1. See United Nations (2007) and Easterly (2007). Easterly has criticized the MDGs for a methodology that is badly designed and biased against poor countries.
3. For a summary of the debate on aid effectiveness see Radelet et al. (2005). Results of the World Bank’s Evaluation Department (IEG) point to a disconnect between project outcomes and country outcomes for World Bank projects. Seventy percent of projects evaluated by IEG between 1997 and 2007 had outcomes which were rated as marginal satisfactory or better. In contrast, only 55 percent of country assistance programs evaluated had ratings of marginal satisfactory or better. In one out of every three cases, country programs with less than marginal satisfactory ratings had satisfactory project outcomes ratings. In these cases, the World Bank supported successful projects, which did not translate into successful country programs. World Bank (2006), “Annual Report of Development Effectiveness 2006.” http://web.worldbank.org/website/external/extoed/extoedarde/ext2006annrevdeveff/menuPK:3079280-pagePK:64168427-piPK:64168435-theSitePK:3079226,00.html.
4. The World Bank’s publication on the outcomes of the 2004 Shanghai Conference on Scaling Up and related Global Learning Initiative provides a summary overview of a wide range of case studies, but it does not systematically review the scaling up literature. See Blanca Moreno-Dodson, ed. (2005).
5. Santiago Levy’s book (2007) on the Mexican anti-poverty program Progresa-Oportunidades which was commissioned by the Wolfensohn Center of Development at Brookings and which we cite frequently in this paper is an exception due to its systematic consideration of many of the aspects of scaling up which make up our framework.
6. An additional, fourth aspect to the scaling up debate has been introduced by Picciotto (2005). He calls for a new development paradigm at the global level, a “scaling up” of rich countries’ policies so that they are coherent with the development needs of developing countries.
7. UN Millennium Project (2005).
16. For a recent issues note on education see Horner and Sugai (2006).
20. For diffusion of new agricultural practices, the need for supportive institutions, such as extension systems, and effective engagement of farmers is emphasized. See Wambugu et al.(2001).


23. We are grateful to Homi Kharas to pointing out to us this last consideration.


25. The typology of approaches was inspired by an article of Robert Picciotto (2005).


27. Amartya Sen critiques Easterly’s approach by contesting Easterly’s basic premise that it is enough for searchers to create and respond to demand. He argues that market demand does not function effectively for key services in developing countries with incomes so low that needs cannot be converted into market demand without institutional interventions by the state or other collective forces. Sen (2006).


29. Communities can be either geographical entities (urban neighborhoods, villages, sub-districts) or groups with common interests (water user associations, herders, members of microcredit groups, women associations, etc).


31. Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) argue that services which are not transaction intensive and not discretionary can be administered by simple rules and routine procedures and are typically quite rare. Cell phone service is an example.

32. Some authors distinguish collaboration as an additional method of scaling up, which falls somewhere between the expansion and replication approaches. It runs the gamut from formal partnerships to informal networks. See Cooley and Kohl (2005).

33. Wazir and van Oudenhoven (1998). The franchising of programs, products, names and logos is common practice in the field of social programs in the USA. More than half of the top one hundred charitable non-profits, e.g. American Red Cross, YMCA, and Scouting groups, are franchising organizations. They transfer to franchisees the exclusive right to use their “trademark” or sell certain products, usually in a particular territory, in return for a payment. The franchiser provides assistance and exerts control over certain aspects of the operation. Profits, losses and liabilities are borne locally. Similar practices are now becoming common in other countries as well. See Oster (1992).

34. See Social Franchise Summit under: www.stiftungen.org.

35. A good example is the Multiple Sclerosis Society, established 1953 in London as a non-profit organization. It provides assistance in connection with victims and families of those with multiple sclerosis. The central office supervises 350 branches managed by volunteers. A uniform catalogue of services as well as a constitution which sets rules and practices guides the operations. The Manual “Suggested Good Practices” sets the standards of structure and quality developed in conjunction with the branch offices. See Wachs (2007).


37. Gladwell (2002) explores experiences of spontaneous diffusion (or what he calls “epidemics”) of ideas in the US and concludes that even where the diffusion of ideas appears spontaneous, the key to successful rapid diffusion, and especially to getting beyond what he calls “the tipping point,” is the effective engagement and interaction of three types of people: connectors, mavens and salesmen—i.e., people who connect different groups or strata in society, people who store and propagate...
knowledge and ideas, and people to sell the ideas. Spontaneous or endogenous replication is also presented by van Oudenhoven and Wazir (1998) as a path for program replication for scaling up of services in the US. In this approach demand for the program comes from below, is needs based and is characterized by spontaneous and informal contacts between like-minded individuals. Additionally, the communication flows is not one-way, from the recognized model to recipient, but it is rather a two-way process.

38. IIRR identified the following daunting requirements for spontaneous diffusion, including: (i) whatever is spontaneously spread usually is a response to an identified need; (ii) a person with a vision or unique skills often drives the process; (iii) there are perceived intrinsic benefits in adapting/adopting the technology, process or idea; (iv) the technology/process/idea is simple, cheap, adaptable and can easily be streamlined within existing programs; (v) it is easily transferred through indigenous routes, i.e., the content and manner of transfer are culturally appropriate (linked to the culture/value systems including values about the environment, laws and obligations); (vi) the source of the technology/process being spread is credible. IIRR (2000).


40. See www.cgiar.org.

As Rogers (1995) point out, it matters little whether the idea, practice or object is new or whether it is only perceived to be so. If it is perceived to be new, it is considered an innovation.

41. The Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings has a new research project focusing scaling up early child development interventions because of a lack of adequate attention to this topic.


These statements are based only on the authors’ personal experience with a wide variety of development-related activities and institutions, not on systematic studies or evaluations of institutional performance, which do not appear to exist, as we pointed out in the introduction.


47. Cooley and Kohl (2005) talk about “intermediaries,” which are needed to take pilots to scale.

48. Of course there are lots of reasons why optimal scale may not be reached or exceeded, not least the existence of positive or negative externalities, the absence of competition, or legal, regulatory and fiscal constraints. The main point is that incentives are built into the market system to scale up commercial activities—some might say, even too much so.

49. In the literature the term “fiscal space” is most commonly found in the sense that we use it here. “Political space,” “policy space” and “institutional space” are also used, if less commonly. We have adopted the term here and extended it to other aspects, such as culture, partnership and learning, because it fits well with the idea that the context has to be structured in a way that allows and supports, rather than impedes scaling up.

50. For the costs of urbanization, see Richardson (1987) and Linn (1982).

51. See for example, Rich (2007).

52. See UNESCO (2004).

53. See Kharas (2007). In some instances, fiscal allocations are made in budgets, but the timing of the resource requirements for scaling up programs may not be consistent with donor or budget cycles. In a project on “Decentralized Initial Training” in Chad, supported by the 8th European Development Fund (EDF) and several other donors, the delay of EDF funds to the scaling up intended under the project led to serious delays in the process. See Wyss et al. (2001). Donors also need to be sure that they take account of the total fiscal cost of the programs they support and not only the direct costs of their grants or donations. Geoff Lamb of
the Gates Foundation made this point in conversation with the authors.

54. Many NGOs in Central Europe that were founded and sustained in the initial years after the break-up of the Soviet Empire have run into severe funding difficulties in recent years, as external donors have significantly reduced their financial support on the grounds that the countries have reached an adequate level of development that can sustain itself without outside assistance. (Based on authors’ personal observation.)

55. Homi Kharas suggested consideration of these two issues.

56. See Desai (2007) for a detailed discussion of the political aspects of scaling up of poverty programs.

57. Based on one of the authors’ own engagement in this process.


61. Van Oudenhoven and Wazir (n.d.).

62. The implementation of community-based projects can create an adverse-selection effect whereby those individuals who are more likely to obtain leadership roles are precisely those who are better able to extract rents, who are able to convince donors that their motivations are based on the collective good of their community, or who are better able to create the façade of community participation. In the words of one study, scaled up antipoverty projects without fundamental changes to authority relations within affected communities—often constitute “nothing other than new structures with which elites can seek to establish an instrumentally profitable position within the existing structure of neo-patrimonialism.” See Chabal and Daloz (1999).

63. For example, curricula and standards approved at centralized levels often need to be changed before innovations can be introduced on a broader scale.

64. Capacity is defined as “the ability of a person, community, organization to take control of its own destiny and manage and direct its development process through an iterative process of assessment, analysis, and action,” and includes the quantity and quality of human resources (skills, time, knowledge etc.) and social, organizational, financial, natural, and material resource. It also includes such factors as authority, power, responsibility, incentives, leadership, and systems of problem-solving, decision making, and communication. See Gillespie (2004).


67. Devarajan and Kanbur (2005) argue that NGOs address areas of government failures, where public services cannot be delivered by government.


69. A Google search of the term “Girls Education Cultural Obstacles” yielded 182,000 citations with many country examples from different continents.
70. See for example Mansuri, and Rao (2004).
71. OECD (2007).
74. Impact evaluations typically involve multiple project and non-project sites. As such, they naturally involve a focus on replication of project interventions. However, this may not be sufficient to address key questions about whether or not projects can eventually be scaled up beyond the initial program design if the impact evaluation concludes that the intervention is successful. Such questions as whether the project will work in different cultural and economic contexts, whether the institutions are adequately geared up to support an expanded program implementations, etc. need to be assessed separately from the impact evaluation or explicitly integrated into the evaluation design. Raj Desai at the Wolfensohn Center for Development is currently in the process of implementing an impact evaluation of a new program of the Self Employed Women’s Association, a community self-help organization in India with the goal of addressing both the conventional issues of program effectiveness as well as some of the questions of scalability of the intervention.
75. We are grateful to Homi Kharas for suggesting to us this paragraph.
78. This section draws on Desai (2007).
80. See Anderson (2007).
83. See www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness.
87. “We encourage innovation and test new approaches. We work with governments and other partners to learn from experience, and replicate and scale up successes.” From IFAD, “IFAD’s Strategic Framework 2007-2010: A summary” http://www.ifad.org/ sf/.
89. For an explanation of the concept and applications of the PRSP see the IMF website under http://www.internationalmonetaryfund.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp.
90. Hancock (2003). As noted earlier World Bank staff also prepared a paper for the Development Committee (2007) entitled “Country-Based Scaling up: Assessment of Progress and Agenda for Action,” but this paper deal more with the macroeconomic and country-level management of aid absorption, rather than how to scale up scale up development interventions.

92. See for example, UNDP, *Country Evaluation: Assessment of Development Result: Turkey, New York*, 2004. UNDP noted that in the case of Turkey, UNDP initiated many pilot projects that were never evaluated or followed up on, whether they were successful or not.

93. IFAD very laudably carried out a review of how its support for innovation, one of its strategic institutional goals, was being implemented. The conclusion was that it was not implemented effectively, if at all. Many of the issues addressed were similar to the scaling up issues which we have identified in this paper. IFAD, “Evaluation of IFAD’s capacity as a promoter of replicable innovation,” no date. http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/ek-syst/doc/corporate/innovation.htm.

94. See Center for Global Development Web site regarding 3IE: http://www.cgdev.org/content/opinion/detail/15102/.


96. For a description of the World Bank’s “Development MarketPlace” see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVMARKETPLACE/4416738-1196093766795/21583185/DM.htm For ideas about how to link them to competitive scaling up ideas, one can look to Zinnes, C., op. cit. and his analysis of interjurisdictional competition.

97. For the latter approach, see Zinnes (n.d.).

98. As many of the Roma children do not attend school and many Roma families are refugees from Kosovo, exact numbers are difficult to establish.