DOES FAIRNESS MATTER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?

Hakan Altinay
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DOES FAIRNESS MATTER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?

Hakan Altinay

INTRODUCTION

W orldwide, there has been a recent increase in expressions of cynicism. We are reminded that all power is hard power, and that being loved or respected is no substitute for being feared. The great power game of nations always continues, we are forewarned, even when a higher goal or rhetoric is evoked. Superpowers are selfish, arbitrary, and dangerous nations, and they should not be embarrassed to be so and not feel constrained by international legitimacy and laws.1 We are cautioned against assuming that the rise of the world’s emerging powers is doing anything to the status of the United States as the sole superpower. Naturally, it would be a folly to think that global public opinion is, in effect, a “second superpower,” or is even a crucial factor. Such concerns are akin to the Lilliputians binding an unsuspecting Gulliver. Anyone harboring naïve views needs to be told that good intentions are, at best, a distraction and a nuisance and, at worst, a recipe for disaster, given their imprudence. Cynics prefer to be unconcerned about the achievements of transnational normative actions, such as abolishing the slave trade or establishing the International Criminal Court.2

The advocates of these views would readily conclude that fairness does not matter in managing our global challenges—only power does. And these cynical views are not advanced only in the hard center of the international system. In a fascinating twist, many on the various peripheries of the international system also agree with this depiction. They argue that might makes right, and this absolves those without formidable power of any responsibility for solving global problems or even articulating their potential contributions if something other than the law of the jungle were to prevail. Thus, the hubris of the powerful triggers irresponsibility among the not so powerful, which in turn is used by the cynics to argue the need for unadulterated power, given the rampant irresponsibility in the world at large.

This working paper, however, is based on a hypothesis that the cynics may be wrong. Its central conjecture is that fairness in global governance does matter today and will matter more in the future. Long-term projections are notoriously and predictably difficult. The forecast that the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the Next 11 group of emerging nations will overtake the Group of 7 may not materialize for a very long time. Yet it is evident that power disparities
are less severe today and are likely to be even less so in the near future. At the same time, the current level of global interdependence and the very nature of the imminent global problems we face have clear repercussions for the minimum constellation of alliances that is necessary to overcome these problems. Climate change is the most obvious case in point; unless all the major players and their citizens willingly and proactively cooperate, it is unlikely that human civilization as we know it will survive. It is clear that Commodore Matthew Perry’s body language will not secure the proactive and willing cooperation of citizens around the world. Hubris and cynicism will also not embolden those who witness emergent threats and plots, as diverse as those by Osama bin Laden and Abdul Qadeer Khan, to speak out. And, thus, both notions and perceptions of fairness will be central to developing the master narrative about our epic interdependence and our responsibilities toward each other. Without a sense of fairness that appeals to many and a corresponding framework of global civics, we cannot navigate the treacherous waters of global interdependence.\(^3\)

Without a sense of fairness that appeals to many and a corresponding framework of global civics, we cannot navigate the treacherous waters of global interdependence.

The world’s architecture of power is not the only vector that is becoming more democratic. Through the rapid proliferation of transborder broadcasting, we have become increasingly aware of each other’s grief and bliss. We are not yet a global village, but we are significantly more aware of each other’s predicaments than we were a decade or a century ago, and as a result, public opinion has come to matter, even in the previously mandarin realm of foreign policy. Yet, it also so happens that public opinion around the world is more multilateralist than are the views of policymakers. For instance, a recent survey by the organization World Public Opinion showed that when given the option between “Our nation should consistently follow international law; it is wrong to violate international law, just as it is wrong to violate laws within a country” and “If our government thinks it is not in our nation’s interest, it should not feel obliged to abide by international laws,” 57 percent of the people in 24 countries chose compliance with international law and 35 percent chose national opting out.\(^4\) Countries that are often assumed to be unilateralist, such as China, India and the United States, were in line with the global trend. A total of 74 percent in China, 49 percent in India and 69 percent in the United States favored compliance with international laws, with 18 percent, 42 percent and 29 percent, respectively, wanting national opt-outs.

The same survey also showed how people systematically underestimate to what a large extent their own multilateralist preferences are shared by their compatriots and feel solitary in their support for international law. A total of 48 percent said that they personally were more supportive of consistently abiding by international law than the average citizen was; 28 percent said they were less supportive. This optical illusion can possibly be explained by the hegemonic discourse of the cynics, and may in itself present an opportunity for enhanced multilateralism. It is not difficult to observe the disdain that cynical policymakers have for popular preferences in favor of international norms, in the complaint that “Americans do not want their power raw; it has to be sautéed in the best of causes.”\(^5\) A similar survey has shown that 55 percent of the people in 24 countries wanted their governments to be more ready to act cooperatively to achieve mutual gain, as opposed to the 39 percent
who felt that their governments tend to be too willing to compromise and are often taken advantage of.\textsuperscript{6}

This working paper is not a blanket indictment of cynicism. Idealists have been called cynics who have not yet been mugged by reality, and there is a significant degree of truth in this assertion. Yet one can also argue that cynics are moderate idealists who yearn to be rescued from their excessive pessimism. The task of balancing the feasible and the ideal has never been easy, and it has certainly defied timeless prescriptive formulas. The conjecture of the contributors to this paper is simply that fairness matters more than cynics would have us believe, and it will matter more in the future as power disparities further decrease and larger alliances that are more based on society become necessary.

One also needs to be attentive to naked and narrow self-interest being presented in a normative framework. The fact that actors in the international arena have to increasingly resort to the normative language is an encouraging development and allows us to compare and contrast competing claims for doing the right thing.

This paper includes essays by authors analyzing the situations in 12 countries: Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, South Africa and Spain. Each analyst was asked to answer whether the policy elites and public opinion in their country view the international order as essentially predatory (sometimes referred to as Hobbesian) or essentially fair and rule-based (sometimes referred to as Kantian). Each analyst was also asked to describe which events were central in informing these assessments and address whether the policy elites and public opinion in their countries would be more supportive of enhanced national contributions to overcoming global problems if they were convinced that a fairer international order was possible. The first edition of this working paper was published in April 2010 and was shared widely with colleagues around the world. We are grateful for their feedback.\textsuperscript{7} This edition is the second and final one. Even in the second and final edition, our contention is not that we have conclusively answered these cardinal questions but that our questions and working conclusions have gotten better along the way.

There are both convergences and divergences among the 12 analyses. We see that countries that have benefited in the past from international solidarity and normative action, such as South Africa and Spain—considered here, respectively, by Siphamandla Zondi and Jordi Vaquer—have then become responsible international actors and proactively contribute to better management of our global problems. We also see that there are cases of profound disappointment with the current international system, as in Egypt and Russia, which in turn leads to withholding cooperation. Rakesh Batabyal, in examining the situation in India, depicts how the ethos of decolonization has shaped his nation’s proclivities on the world stage. Krzysztof Bobinski explains how the imperative to consolidate independence and sovereignty has acted as the overarching motive in the case of Poland. The difference between the trajectories of Solidarity generation in Poland and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa poses an interesting puzzle. In the essay on Indonesia, Hadi Soesastro and Evan Laksmana remind us of the centrality of national politics as the link between national public opinion and global problems. We are told that global norm entrepreneurship is viewed as a soft power tactic to advance national interests in Brazil and Indonesia. In considering the situation in Japan, Motofumi Asai focuses on the centrality of political culture. With respect to Italy,
Ettore Greco and Nathalie Tocci convincingly argue that concerns about the nation’s relative decline in prominence in the international system need not be an obstacle to being a good global citizen. In Carlos Portales’s account of Chile, we see how a small country can view the viability and vibrancy of international norms and institutions as indispensable for its own welfare, as well as the courageous steps that they are ready to take in defense of these international dynamics.

Most of the analysts agree that public opinion in their countries is more multilateralist than the opinions of the policy elites are. They also concur that perceptions of a fairer international order would boost the appetite for national contributions to global problems. Daniel Fung’s depiction of China and Fyodor Lukyanov’s account of Russia are the two notable exceptions. Lukyanov points to the dramatic disappointment of the Russian public with Gorbachev’s normative policies; our Russian friends seem to have concluded that magnanimity does not bear results. Fung argues that Chinese public opinion is markedly more nationalistic than the opinions of the nation’s elites are and that China is a risk-averse member of the international community, more interested in stability and order than in adventurous redesigns. Both with difficult cases, like Russia and China, and with the rest, the art of aspirational aggregation seems critical. Will we be able to acknowledge with genuine sincerity the legitimate disappointments of many with the international system and yet still harness their readiness to take a realistic leap of faith for a better world where they share in the responsibility? This remains a key question for our time.

In his thoughtful Afterword to this volume, Brian Urquhart observes that global fairness and civility are vast and, simultaneously, glorious objectives. While they may never be altogether realized, they are an indispensable guide to decent behavior. Urquhart notes that because a universal tradition of fairness and public spirit will not be created quickly or easily, the foundation from which it can grow needs to be established as soon as possible. It is difficult to disagree with him.
The many possibilities that studies of identity can generate to explain countries or cultures and their behavior in the international arena are one of the great things about the recent comeback of subjectivity in the social sciences. In fact, there is no doubt that what we do and create says a lot about what we are and how we think about the world where we live, and vice versa. Thinking about how we see the other and the unknown gives us an effective window into ourselves.

Thus, I argue here that Brazilians’ ideas about the world were traditionally informed by their country’s historical economic development model, followed between 1930 and 1989, which was based on a nationalist ideology and a political consensus about national objectives. In 1989, however, this framework underwent significant changes with the turn toward internationalism and the end of the Cold War, and the country’s stance toward the world at large moved from relative isolation to compulsory participation.

The result of this historical path is the combination of a nationalist perspective on the world with a vision of the international arena as a fearful one, where the country should fight for its interests while seeking to be part of the everyday building of the international system. This mixture has produced a notion that blends the perception of an unfair international environment, constructed on unequal terms, with the Brazilian myth of working hard and being victorious against harsh realities.

In this sense, fighting for a fairer international politics is not only in the country’s national interest, as a middle-range power, but is also a way to create a fairer international environment, where middle-range (and smaller) powers can be heard. Within this framework, Brazil expects to receive the support of weaker nations, assuming that it represents them against the rigidities of the international order. Since 1989, arguing for international justice has become a way of realizing Brazilian national aspirations for greatness.

Given all this, I will argue here that Brazilian policy elites and public opinion, in general, view the international order as “essentially predatory.” The culture of nationalism generated in the process of economic development during the 20th century plays a key role in this assessment. Memories of the support of the United States to the establishment of the military regime in 1964 and the IMF’s failed interventions in the Brazilian economy in the 1980s further consolidate the same assessment. Given this background, the policy elites and public opinion would be more supportive of enhanced national contributions to overcoming global problems only after a radical transformation and democratization of the international order. Hence, fairness does matter here as a way to avoid the emergence of a resentful power within the system.

The Brazilian industrialization process started in the 1930s and was based on the need to break the chain that connected the country to the world as an agricultural exporter. It represented an ideological rupture with the liberal arguments for free trade and productivity, along with an embracing of the interventionist idea of a very strong state running the country’s whole industrialization process. From a nationalist perspective, the economic process put in place could also break Brazil’s dependence on foreign production.
and would position it side by side with the industrialized nations and the great powers.

In combination, Brazil’s economic development model and nationalist ideology led to some very peculiar foreign policy positions. For instance, until 1989, Brazil was not part of the most important international initiatives concerning trade, nuclear proliferation and intellectual property. The country praised “independence” in relation to the United States during the Cold War, and it fiercely competed against Argentina for regional hegemony.

This historical path led to the 1980s debt crisis, a huge inflationary process, one of the world’s worst income concentrations and a terrible neglect of public services in social areas such as education, healthcare, public security and access to justice. But it also enabled Brazil to eventually become one of the 10 strongest economies on the globe. In addition, it consolidated the idea that the international arena should be a place for the country to act in a limited fashion, or not to establish any commitments that could negatively influence its economic development plan and the process of strengthening its relative position. Joining a nuclear initiative—for example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—was perceived more as a limitation on progress than a peacemaking policy.

The Brazilian political, social and economic crises of the 1980s and the global changes during the last quarter of the 20th century—the fluctuation of the dollar, the rise in international interest rates, oil shocks, economic globalization and the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the old Eastern European regimes—contributed to noteworthy ideological changes in Brazil. The year 1989 turned out to be a very special one. While communism was crumbling behind the Iron Curtain and social catastrophe was knocking on Brazilians’ doors, the country was also experiencing its first democratic presidential elections since the military coup in 1964. Twenty-two candidates were running for president at that very moment, and the elections took place in November (the first round) and December (the second round) 1989. Unsurprisingly, the presidential campaign generated a political debate of gigantic proportions. The whole situation and history of the country were questioned. This was the Brazilians’ “revolution”—their yellow-and-green revolution.

After 1989, Brazil radically changed its international profile—and in my view, together with the democratization process, this is the seed for the country’s widely praised current situation. Brazil slowly committed itself to the international initiatives for free trade, nuclear nonproliferation, the environment and intellectual property, even though sometimes in a limited or critical way. It opened itself to international finance and radically diminished the state’s direct role in its domestic economy. A huge privatization process generated multinational corporate stars such as Embraer, the aeronautics exporter, and the giant of the mineral sector Vale do Rio Doce (now called simply Vale).

Among all these changes, one of the main notions that this “revolution” has put in place has been “international participation.” Brazil could no longer be excluded from the political debate concerning international initiatives, just as it could no longer be excluded from the globalization process. On the contrary, the country should participate in as many forums as possible, defending its interests and exceptionalist behavior. At this very moment, Brazil’s nationalist tradition and desire to participate have created a mixture of a realist fight for selfish interests and a need to have more of a voice in the system. This behavior has been deeply linked to the discourse in defense of democratizing the decision-making process at the in-
ternational level, and the strategy adopted, aimed at fulfilling Brazil’s self-interest as a middle-power country, has also served as a mechanism to gain foreign support from the numerous nations in similar positions and those with even more-limited capabilities.

Brazil’s role in the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round negotiations exemplifies this point. As a leader of the developing world, Brazil represents its own interests by calling for the wider liberalization of international agricultural markets and an end to subsidies. At the same time, Brazil advocates for a fairer trade system, in which less-developed countries could also profit from international commerce.

Brazil’s plea for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council follows the same logic, as do the country’s positions concerning global environmental rules and intellectual property—for example, in the breaking of patents on HIV medicines. All these moves tie Brazilian interests with the intention to fracture what is seen as an elitist framework of international politics and economics. Hence, wealthy and powerful nations must make material and political sacrifices for the world to become fairer and more equal.

Even Brazil’s controversial defense of Iran’s nuclear program fits this model because, for Brazilian decision makers, the issue is perceived as an intervention of the great powers in a middle-power national project. The same logic also applies to the Brazilian foreign aid to poor countries, which has been growing fast in the last few years. For a country where more than half of the population does not count on proper sewage collection and disposal, the magnitude of the Brazilian foreign aid could be explained both by nationalist terms—a way to strengthen Brazil’s relative position by building a consensus among middle and small powers—and, at the same time, as a move to contribute to a fairer international order, which is very attractive to Brazil and many other countries.

Hence, Brazil’s historical path led the country to a perception of the international environment as an unfair arena where a nation should work hard and struggle for its interests and survival, and this same struggle is perceived by Brazilians as a way to build a fairer and better world. Curiously, this representation fits very well with the characters in the most famous contemporary Brazilian movies—Central do Brasil and Cidade de Deus.

Arguing for international justice has become a way of realizing Brazilian national aspirations for greatness.

In addition to the nationalist ideology constructed during the Brazilian economic development path, some historical facts also contribute to the country’s perception of the international order as “essentially predatory.” The support by the United States of the military regime established in Brazil in 1964—which endured almost 20 years—and also Washington’s behavior concerning the other military regimes in South America during the Cold War created a strong sense of anti-Americanism and a perception that the great powers do not really care about values such as human rights or democracy, but only about their interests. At the same time, the failed interventions of the IMF concerning the debt and the inflationary crisis in Brazil during the 1980s created a strong prejudice against international financial institutions. The idea that the IMF was enforcing a harsh economic situation for the people in the name of international creditors became embedded in the Brazilian memory. It is not a coincidence that the Brazilian government paid all its debts to the IMF as soon as
it could and used this as political capital with the Brazilian voters.

In this context, the only way that Brazilian decision makers and political elites could really favor more cooperative behavior for the country in the international realm would be if there were to be a radical transformation of the international institutional framework so that the global political environment could be perceived as more democratic. And this would surely need to be shared by a public opinion used to seeing the world as a very unfair place, where the rich and great powers are always trying to get ahead at the expense of the weaker peoples. The materialization of this idea would include, for example, reforming the UN Security Council, new efforts by the United States and European nations concerning the developmental agenda of the Doha Round, new postures within the environmental debate that take into account the situations of late developers and, unlikely and radically, global nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, in my view, this is the only way to secure important Brazilian cooperation in addressing global issues.
CHILE

Carlos Portales
Director, American University

There has been a profound transformation in Chile, from a “predatory” view of the international system in the 19th century toward an increasingly rule-based approach in the 20th century, with a significant emphasis on participation in multilateral affairs after 1990. The rule-based approach is not necessarily founded in a view of the international system as a fair one, but more in the imperative for small states like Chile to have a predictable system. It is a cautious view, which we could label “Kantian by necessity.” This conclusion derives more from an historical analysis of Chilean foreign policy and views of the elites than from public opinion studies, which are only contemporary. But recent polls confirm support from the public at large to this approach.

From the period of independence, beginning in 1810, to the end of the War of the Pacific in 1883, a predatory approach to international relations prevailed. This early organized country went twice to war with its neighbors Peru and Bolivia, in 1831 and 1879, respectively, but also went to war in support of Peru against Spain in 1866. Meanwhile, a border dispute with Argentina was prevented from escalating to war at the end of the 19th century through the adjudication of a third party, the British Crown. Chile has never again used force against an external enemy.

During the 20th century, respect for international law became the “leitmotif” of Chilean foreign policy. The idea of the international law of the Americas, based on a respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, was promoted by Chilean jurists. Inter-American conventions on asylum were agreed to, strengthening humanitarian law in the region. In 1955, Chile promoted the creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights within the Organization of the American States (OAS). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Chile promoted Latin American regional integration, particularly the Andean Pact. Thus, respect for international law became a shared principle of the Chilean elites. The value of cooperation and the strengthening of a rule-based international system were perceived as coherent by public opinion in a progressively more democratic country, and they guided Chilean foreign policy. As a result, the country gained a respected position in the international system.

Extensive human rights violations by the military dictatorship from 1973 to 1990 led to action by regional and global human rights organizations, and internationally, the military government had to be on the defensive during this period. Although some elements of a predatory view reappeared in the difficult management of bilateral relations with bordering countries, pragmatism prevailed.

An important element of foreign influence over the Chilean political process was President Nixon’s policy of U.S. intervention, first to prevent the accession of the government and then against President Allende from 1970 to 1973. The elite was divided; supporters of the Allende government strongly criticized the intervention, while followers of the military junta underplayed the American role. More important in the long run was the new human rights policy—started by the U.S. Congress as a result of the investigation of the U.S. role in Chile—and the United States’ active support in the mid-1980s for the peaceful transition to democracy in Chile. Thus, the new government after the transition, a coalition (Concertacion) of political parties that had both supported and opposed Allende in the 1970s, would have cooperative relations with...
Washington. However, a public opinion study done in 2008 showed that 56 percent of Chileans were distrustful of the United States, while only 35 percent had confidence in it.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War coincided with the democratic transition in Chile. The first goal of the foreign policy of the new democratic government was reintegration into the international system, developing an active role in the subregional, regional and even global multilateral affairs. The promotion of international rule-making was actively pursued, which was indispensable to guaranteeing national interests in a global world. Public opinion backed this view. In 2008, 80 percent supported active participation in world affairs, while only 13 percent preferred to remain in the margins.8

To have an international system supportive of the national interest requires participation. The Rio Group started in the 1980s as an active political grouping under the principle of democracy. Chile not only joined the group but played an active leadership role by hosting the summits of 1993 and 2003. In the same vein, Chile was very active in the establishment of the Ibero-American Summit in 1991 and hosted the summits of 1996 and 2007. The importance of Latin America in Chilean foreign policy was an opinion widely shared by the public; in 2008, 45 percent of Chileans saw Chile seeking leadership in the region, 44 percent supported active participation but without leadership and only 7 percent showed a preference for being apart from regional processes.

At the inter-American level, Chile has promoted the solidarity of democracies since the early 1990s. The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System was approved in the General Assembly of the OAS held in Santiago in 1991 and Resolution 1080 on representative democracy established a mechanism to address any occurrences giving rise to the sudden and irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government. Following this idea, Chile has been one of the strongest advocates of the Inter-American Democratic Charter approved on September 11, 2001.

During the 2000s, Chile has been an active promoter at the global level of the Community of Democracies (CoD), hosting its third ministerial conference in 2005. The Santiago Commitment stressed the importance of cooperation for democratic progress. Accordingly, Chile promoted a fund for democracy in the U.N. Chile is also a founding member of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), a Stockholm-based international organization to promote democracy.

Reversing the earlier military government policies, human rights has been a central concern since the 1990s. Instead of a defensive international posture, Chile assumed a cooperative approach, and it has participated in rule-making through the contributions of prestigious Chilean experts in the U.N. and OAS human rights organizations. Chile became a full part of the most important human rights treaties, but divergence with part of the elite reappeared when General Pinochet was detained in London in 1998. The ratification of the Treaty of Rome, done only in 2009 after a protracted legislative process, marked a renewed consensus among the elites.

Chile also played a role in the U.N. bodies. The most notorious decision was not to support a U.N. Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq in 2003 because then-President Lagos decided
that there was still space for U.N. diplomatic action before using military means. But when the Security Council passed a resolution on Haiti in 2004, Chile immediately joined the multinational force to avoid a civil war in Haiti and then joined the peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). For the first time, massive Chilean military participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations became part of Chilean foreign policy.

The goal of reinsertion into the international system led the country to join the nuclear nonproliferation zone in Latin America, renegotiate the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994 and sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, reversing a 30-year policy. Furthermore, Chile has increasingly played an active role in the promotion and application of confidence-building measures and transparency in the region. The role of the international system in strengthening security has also been fully recognized by Chile.

Domestic strategies have led to economic and social transformations, which in turn are leading Chile to seek out cooperative international arrangements. The opening of the economy to world markets—started under military rule—was complemented by the democratic regime with a policy of social equity, giving strength to a model that needed legitimacy at home and internationally. In 2008, 77 percent of the population viewed the impact of economic globalization as positive for the country.

International trade rule-making has been an integral part of Chilean foreign policy. There is agreement among the elites on universal rule-making and constant support for GATT and WTO negotiations, where mechanisms for dispute settlement and antidumping measures have been strongly advocated. Chile focused significant resources on attaining free trade agreements (FTAs). Today, Chile has trade agreements with 57 countries, which comprise over 90 percent of the country’s foreign trade. Chile has given particular importance to including mechanism of dispute settlement in the FTAs, thus stressing the value of a rule-based system. In 2008, public opinion recognized FTAs as the most outstanding achievement of Chilean foreign policy in the last 10 years (46 percent), well above Chilean aid to and cooperation with third countries (13 percent) and the Chilean image as a regional model (11 percent).

Chilean foreign policy should follow a Kantian objective: Building a rule-based system for small nations to fully participate in the global world.

Chile was a dynamic supporter of the U.N. Millennium Summit in 2000, which established the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); it was one of the leading negotiating nations in the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterey, Mexico, in 2002; and it joined Brazil and France in establishing innovative forms of cooperation for development, like UNITAID. In Monterey in 2002, then-President Lagos strongly advocated reforming the rules of the international financial system to improve international financial governance, well before the international economic crisis of 2008. During the last few years, former President Bachelet led the implementation of the health components of MDGs 4 and 5 to reduce infant and maternal mortality. Chile has also become interested in climate change, trying to help bridge opposing positions in global negotiations. Former President Lagos has been a special representative of the U.N. Secretary General for such purposes.

Meanwhile, a certain amount of caution comes with a balanced view of a world with cooperative and
predatory elements. In 2009, 58 percent of Chileans sustained that “our nation should consistently follow international laws. It is wrong to violate international laws, just as it is to violate laws within a country”; this is above the 57 percent average among 24 countries surveyed on the same questions. However, 27 percent affirmed that “if our government thinks it is not in our nation’s interest, it should not feel obliged to abide by international laws,” which is below the 35 percent average.9

Chilean public opinion in 2009 favored international cooperation. When questioned in general on whether the government should be more ready to act cooperatively when it negotiates with other countries, 60 percent of Chileans supported the proposition; this is above the 55 percent average among the 24 countries surveyed. However, 26 percent of Chileans answered that the government tends to be too willing to compromise, which is below the 39 percent average among the countries studied.10

Revisiting the initial question, we can conclude that fairness does matter for Chilean elites and public opinion, and therefore, Chilean foreign policy should follow a Kantian objective: building a rule-based system as a needed framework for small nations to fully participate in the global world.

Policy elites and public opinion would be more supportive of enhanced national contributions to overcoming global problems if they perceive results. Evaluation of the participation in MINUSTAH was positive, as it has allowed the maintenance of peace and stability in Haiti. Training for further peacekeeping operations has become an important concern for Chile’s armed forces. FTAs have also been highly valued by elites and public opinion, and global trade rules would be positively estimated. Although the national contribution to global problems could be enhanced, it will need a process of deliberation among the elite and the general public, which should take into account the costs and benefits for a small country.
The question of whether China's foreign policy is infused with a Hobbesian or a Kantian vision is an important one that embraces a philosophical paradox. This arises from the fact that the respective political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant do not differ as fundamentally as they might first appear to do.

Hobbes is often regarded as a premodern cynic who presented to posterity in the *Leviathan* a bleak vision of human nature left to its own devices leading to a state of war, where every state is pitted one against the other and people struggle to survive in a jungle where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” Kant, conversely, is portrayed more sympathetically as a “modern” German Enlightenment philosopher who, on the eve of the Napoleonic convulsion that engulfed Europe in the late 18th century, advocated in his last major treatise *Perpetual Peace* (published in 1795) that human salvation lies in establishing a federation of free states that subscribe to an international covenant forbidding war.

Received wisdom can often be an oversimplification, if not a fallacy, of which the above dichotomy is an example. Far from believing in war, Hobbes sought order so as to check humanity’s self-interested desire for power. He perceived the solution to be the establishment of a civil society presided over by a sovereign who would impose such order but advocated that this sovereign be voluntarily chosen by the majority. To understand Hobbes, one must remember that he lived at a time of wrenching political upheaval when his sovereign, Charles I of England, was executed. Kant lived in the shadow cast by the French Revolution and yearned for peace conferred by an international covenant forbidding war.

In reality, neither thinker was all that different from the other, at least in the realm of political philosophy. Both Hobbes and Kant wrote under the shadow of their respective reigns of terror. Both were suspicious of democracy and argued that order should be imposed vertically from above by a sovereign and subscribed to by people of the state of their own free will, conceding power to that sovereign.

In reality, therefore, China’s vision of the ideal international order is neither strictly Hobbesian nor strictly Kantian, given that no sovereign state today, let alone China, would argue in favor of a world government run by a universal sovereign. Indeed, China, long the rhetorician castigating the U.S. for its real or perceived hegemonic tendencies, is the last state wishing to see world government led by, say, the unipolar superpower the United States, which China knows it has little or no chance of realistically surpassing in the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, China is not even interested in playing deputy sheriff to the United States, this position having been vacant and begging since Australia gave it up shortly after John Howard’s electoral defeat in December 2007 and because the European Union does not have the capacity, inclination, interest or taste to assume it.

In truth, the specter of China bestriding the globe as an insatiable colossus—gobbling up natural resources in Africa and companies in the United States and Europe; hoarding rare earths within its own borders; building missiles to shoot down satellites, stealth submarines to challenge the U.S. 7th Fleet and an
aircraft carrier or two to augment its budding blue-water navy; and nurturing a secret army of hackers to wage a cyberwar against the United States—reminds one of nothing so much as a fairy tale or moral fable. No doubt the West, in particular the United States, which has the greatest reserves of power for renewal and reinvention seen in modern history, will bestir itself from slumber and reach for yet greater heights, in much the same way as the specter of Sputnik spurred the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations to put the first man on the moon, and the angst generated by Ezra Vogel's 1980s thesis of "Japan as Number One"—with the Japanese keiretsu buying such treasures of Americana as Columbia Studios and Rockefeller Center—spurred the United States to launch the dot-com revolution in the 1990s.

China’s vision for the future is far more prosaic. As every Chinese leader for the past 30 years, from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, has emphasized, China needs to focus above all else on domestic economic modernization and on maintaining its momentum to attain real annual growth of close to double digits, so that it can continue lifting a fifth of humanity out of abject poverty to a state of modest, lower-middle-class prosperity (currently hovering around $3,200 in terms of per capita gross domestic product). And for this to happen, China needs a stable international environment, so that oil keeps flowing to East Asia through the twin Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as a world economy that recovers at least to the extent of maintaining the rude health of China’s export markets and its appetite for Chinese-made consumer products. In pursuing this course, China freely acknowledges and will continue to acknowledge the status of the United States as the world’s sole superpower for at least the next generation, because China will certainly not be ready to take over anytime sooner—if at all. And if that superpower wishes to play international global police officer, China would be reasonably tolerant, subject only to the NIMBY (not in my own backyard) principle that applies as much to international as to domestic politics. In other words, so long as no invisible tripwires are crossed, such as the 7th Fleet patrolling the Taiwan Strait or U.S. spy ships sucking up electronic signals within spitting distance of China’s submarine base in Hainan, China will at least turn a blind eye, if not be openly supportive.

All the actions that China has taken over the last decade underscore this fundamental perception of its needs. Its entry into the World Trade Organization in 1999 and its support for other multilateral institutions—in particular, the United Nations and the entire Bretton Woods architecture, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—constitute eloquent testimony to this old-fashioned vision. Indeed, China is so “retro” in its outlook that it even went out of its way to host the Summer Olympic Games in 2008, an event regarded as so irrelevant by the jaded developed world that the irony was not lost on China in 2000 when Beijing, in its second bid, finally succeeded in securing the Olympics for 2008 and held a massive public celebration on the streets of the capital, while its erstwhile rival Osaka held a public demonstration celebrating its failure to secure the Olympics!

Are there any differences between China’s policy elites and Chinese public opinion on the nation’s foreign policy or approach to foreign relations, and if so, what are they? Even the most cursory surf through the hyperactive Chinese blogosphere reveals that the nation’s public opinion is anything but homoge-
neous. By definition, therefore, the view of Chinese public opinion is different from that favoring consensus-based policies embraced by China’s policy elites, which are developed through a laborious process of consultation and consensus-building strikingly different from the vociferous partisan debates in the West enacted dramatically on the public stage known as the marketplace of ideas and covered assiduously by the media. At the risk of making a gross generalization, however, it is tolerably clear that Chinese public opinion on issues of foreign policy can be more stridently nationalistic and iconoclastic than the position adopted by the nation’s policy elites, who tend to support a much more traditional, conventional and multilateral framework.

On questions of territorial integrity, cross-Straits relations, Taiwanese unification, Tibet and Xinjiang, the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese public are at least as trenchantly nationalistic as the position of the policy elites. On Sino-Japanese relations, however, the nation’s public opinion is unquestionably more strident and anti-Japanese than is the position adopted by the policy elites. On China-U.S. relations, the country as a whole, as well as individual Chinese citizens, remain endlessly fascinated by the U.S.—and this long-standing, starstruck infatuation remains unabated for the present generation of Chinese youth, who have been seduced by the freedom, openness, optimism and dynamism of the American socio-economic system to the extent that the U.S. remains far and away the destination of choice for both higher education and migration.

However, on broad questions of Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis America, Chinese public opinion is not noticeably less nationalistic or hostile toward the U.S. than are the policy elites. On the contrary, China’s rapidly increasing national pride in its achievements since 1979, not just economically but also socially, politically and militarily, has led to the situation of Chinese citizens not wishing to be bullied or cowed by the United States in matters of foreign policy or military confrontation. Only in the areas of public and corporate governance, the rule of law, property rights and human rights, including the right to freedom of information and free expression—all more important as issues of domestic rather than foreign policy—is Chinese public opinion noticeably more liberal than that of the policy elites. Indeed, in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress scheduled for October 2010, triggering the Fifth Generation’s succession to the helm, with Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai’s jockeying for inclusion on the Politburo Standing Committee alongside the anointed ones (current Vice President Xi Jinping and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang), no one in this current collective leadership of nine would risk appearing craven in foreign policy, more particularly vis-à-vis the United States.

The billion dollar question, which is more difficult to answer, is still whether Chinese public opinion or that of the policy elites would more readily support an increase in national spending to build a fairer international order—at least, one that is fairer to China from its perspective. Although Chinese public opinion would certainly welcome the nation attaining a higher and more favorable international profile, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that public opinion would necessarily support greater overseas spending just for the sake of building a fairer international public profile.

On the contrary, given that China’s economy is, like that of the U.S., predominantly continental, and China is, even more than the U.S., a universe unto itself, and given also that China exists at a much lower stage of development, a broad swathe of Chinese public opin-
ion would likely prefer to see such expenditures take place domestically. The adage that “charity begins at home” could well become a Chinese domestic political slogan in the first half of this century.

As for China’s policy elites, however, there is little question that they would be prepared to countenance a higher and more favorable profile for the country on the international stage and to see it at least partially spend its way to achieve that goal. Witness China’s policy in Africa and the spreading of largesse in such forgotten corners of the world as Moldova, not known for being endowed with a cornucopia of natural resources.

Given the turmoil and tragedies experienced by China during its recent history—and more particularly since its dramatic relative decline, from contributing close to 30 percent of the world’s gross domestic product in 1820 to only 4 percent in 1900—the country has only just begun its long and painful climb back to normality after its turn-of-the-20th-century humiliation by the great powers, its occupation by Japan and its self-inflicted disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The goal of China’s trajectory is, of course, to regain its legitimate position as a regional leader in Asia, which it has held for 18 of the past 20 centuries. It is little wonder that China yearns for a bit of peace and stability, both domestic and international, so it can pick up and glue together the shards of its old civilization, like a broken Ming vase, and hopefully regain at least a semblance of its previous glory. China subscribes to the old-fashioned notion of a classical Westphalian architecture of nation-states suspended, in Metternich’s delightful expression, in “a chandelier balance.” Little wonder that China regards Metternich’s most famous modern pupil, Henry Kissinger, as an “old friend.”
Most Egyptian citizens and policymakers view international institutions with great skepticism—fueled by the widely held belief that the Western powers, specifically the United States, manipulate international bodies to maintain power over the political and economic landscape of the developing countries. Specifically, most Egyptians see the international legal system as a by-product of World War II, and they feel that this 60-year-old arrangement does not represent today’s geostrategic reality.

The Egyptian perception of the United Nations is ambivalent at best. There is popular support for the U.N. to assume a more active role in Egyptian domestic affairs. Yet conversely, the U.N. cannot escape its image as a U.S. proxy, and dissatisfaction over the body’s handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has further damaged its credibility. A poll conducted among Egyptians by the World Public Opinion Program of the University of Maryland on December 2, 2008, demonstrates this ambivalence. When asked whether they believed the U.N. to be under U.S. control, 68 percent of those asked responded yes. However, because political freedom in Egypt has often been promised but is long overdue, 63 percent of those responding still would like U.N. observers to monitor elections in Egypt.

There are three major contributing factors to Egypt’s divided opinions about international law: what I call the Israeli Exception, the Iraq invasion and Farouk Hosni losing the race for the UNESCO directorship. It is useful to briefly examine each.

The Israeli Exception

The establishment of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli conflicts have shaped the Egyptian view of international law for the worse. Disgruntled Egyptians have arrived at a conclusion that I call the “Israeli Exception”: Under the auspices of international law, Israel is allowed to redraw its borders at will, and at the expense of its Arab neighbors. Dozens of U.N. Security Council resolutions designed to deter such Israeli expansions have been vetoed by the United States. Moreover, no steps have been taken through international law to prevent Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons, while every step imaginable is being taken to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal. Egyptians, who have not forgotten recent regional history, believe that the international system observes a double standard for Israel vis-à-vis the other states of the Middle East.

Even when international nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, issue reports condemning Israeli aggression against Palestinians, they have little effect on the international community. So far, international bodies have done little to prevent Israel from constructing a wall through the West Bank, dividing thousands of Palestinians from their families and their livelihoods. Many Egyptians would take international bodies more seriously if they were able to deter Israel on such issues.

After Israel’s latest “hot” conflict in Gaza ended in early 2009, the United Nations established a fact-finding mission to investigate whether human rights abuses had occurred or international law had been transgressed by either side. The resulting document, the Goldstone Report, elicited hope in Egypt that Israel might be forced to change its ways. This hope grew to an expectation after the U.N.’s Human Rights Council
fully endorsed the Goldstone Report. However, despite the report’s accusations of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity, Israel faced no major repercussions from the Gaza War. In Arab minds, this confirmed the Israeli Exception.

Even if U.N. resolutions were followed, there is a lingering fear in Egypt that allowing the U.N. a greater role (either domestically or in the Arab-Israeli peace process) would amount to yielding authority to the U.S. When President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in the summer of 2009 that Israeli settlements on the occupied West Bank are illegal and should be stopped immediately, the Israeli government simply chose to ignore them. This kind of empty rhetoric only furthers the impression, held by 60 percent of Egyptians according to the World Public Opinion Program, that the U.S. has no intention of helping to create a Palestinian state. When it comes to Israel, it is nearly impossible for an Egyptian leader to be diplomatic and maintain any credibility with the domestic population.

The Iraq Invasion

Egypt, one of America’s strongest regional allies in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, was dismayed by George W. Bush’s “unilateral diplomacy” leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. Like many citizens in the Middle East and throughout the world, Egyptians saw the American invasion of Iraq as proof of international law’s inability to counter the will of a superpower. It appeared, as it has for much of history, that great powers will do as they please.

When Bush’s claim of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction failed to materialize, his justification for the conflict quickly shifted to democratic reform. Most Egyptians cynically rejected this new explanation, and they continued to believe that America’s interest in Iraq centered on gaining access to its oil. What Egyptians perceive as the illegitimate war in Iraq continues to jeopardize the ability of the nation’s citizens to trust a system of international law.

Farouk Hosni Loses the Race for the UNESCO Directorship

Egypt exploded in collective outrage when its cultural minister, Farouk Hosni, lost the race to become UNESCO Director General in September 2009. Egyptians had hoped that the election of Hosni as UNESCO’s first Arab-born head would advance the visibility and authority of Arabs in the international arena. When the U.N. elected a Bulgarian diplomat, Irina Bokova, over Hosni, the Egyptian press cited the event as evidence of a cultural war between the Arab world and the West.

In 2008, while serving as Egypt’s minister of culture, Hosni pledged to burn any Israeli book he found in an Egyptian library. This statement, an attempt to bolster domestic support for his programs, returned to haunt him during his UNESCO campaign. He was met with accusations of anti-Semitism, and he faced strong opposition from the U.S. and Europe. Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, declared that appointing Hosni would shame the global community.

After Hosni’s defeat, the Egyptian press condemned the Israeli-Western alliance and framed the allegations of anti-Semitism as a pragmatic tool to marginalize Arabs. No one was willing to remember notable Egyptians who held prominent international positions, such as Boutros Boutros Ghali as the Secretary General of the U.N. and Mohamed El Baradai as the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(IAEA). Few were willing to admit that Hosni had made a political gamble and lost; his “book-burning” comment had played well at home but played poorly in an international setting. Rather, the day after the election, Al Masry Al Youm, a leading Egyptian newspaper, proclaimed, “A clash of civilization determines the UNESCO fight,” adding that “America, Europe and Jewish lobby brought down Farouk Hosni after honorable competition by the Egyptian delegation.”

This line of reasoning was largely accepted by citizens and policymakers alike. The failed election, and its exaggerated retelling in the press, went largely unnoticed in the American and European news media but reinforced the Egyptian view of the U.N. as being anti-Arab. After returning to Cairo, Hosni gave his own version of events: “The U.S. ambassador to UNESCO acted very strongly, and did everything possible to prevent me from winning.” Regrettably, this is still what most Egyptians will continue to believe.

In the End . . .

Despite its disagreements with the United Nations, Egypt continues to contribute to U.N.-led peacekeeping efforts in Darfur and the Balkans, and 57 percent of Egyptians believe their country should play a greater role in U.N. operations. Realistically, given that it is a developing country, Egypt’s ability to transform international bodies is limited. Still, Egypt has a large presence in Africa and in the Islamic world, and if the U.N. made an effort to appear more sympathetic to Arab concerns, Egypt would be more likely to participate in U.N. programs. For instance, Egypt could take a leading role in combating East African piracy or the water shortage crisis and in coordinating humanitarian work in Afghanistan, Darfur and Yemen.

Egypt’s stance on Israel and its perception of international law are inescapably threaded together. The more frustrated Egypt becomes with Israeli policy, the more unjust international law appears to Egyptians, and the less warmth Egypt receives in international settings. Conversely, if these strands could be delicately untangled, a breakthrough in the Israel-Palestine crisis could restore a tremendous amount of Egypt’s faith in international law. But such a breakthrough will not be likely unless Egypt makes a commitment to the Israel-Palestine peace process.
India

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The driving force of Indian polity and its normative horizon are premised on the ideas of equality, justice, secularism and democracy. The experience of fighting a national freedom movement against colonial rule and the deepening and expansion of democracy in post-Independence India have meant that these four ideas have become part of the larger public consciousness. The leaders who molded public consciousness starting in the early 19th century were open to the world and articulated their support for democracy, equality and world peace. The interplay of these ideals within India as well as outside the national boundaries has provided a very dynamic template both for the leaders who guide policy and for public opinion, which expresses and also molds this worldview among the leaders. The world is not seen as inhabited by predatory or exploitative states, but instead, there has developed a philosophical horizon in which the expansion of peace, prosperity and democracy is seen as desirable and possible. The shared universal horizon of public opinion and the political leaders is, in many senses, a Kantian one. Both agree that there should be a peaceful world order based on a normative structure constituted of equal nations and rule-based organizations.

India’s colonial experience and strong opposition to a hierarchical social order have made both its leaders and the public sensitive to the issue of equality. Discrimination on the basis of race, religion or nationality has been strongly resented ever since Independence.11 Thus, Indian leaders had wide support from the people when they decided to raise the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa, and in fact, they did not agree to have even diplomatic relations with that nation until it ended its policy of apartheid. And this desire for a democratic world order has also been in tune with the expansion of democracy inside India. In this sense, the Indian contribution to world events will continue to deepen and expand in the future as this internal expansion of democracy continues.

Since the early decades of the 20th century, India’s leaders have held a very strong belief about the efficacy and significance of international organizations for establishing democratic norms for global governance and leading the way toward world peace. This in turn has led India to play an active role in world forums. For instance, it was this belief that led Jawaharlal Nehru to approach the United Nations when Kashmir was invaded, an act for which he is still criticized by a large section of public opinion because the issue became enmeshed with the anti-India position of the erstwhile colonial power, Britain. Consequently, public opinion of many shades became suspicious of the commitment expressed by many developed countries to equality and impartiality while they played their part in the institutions of global governance. To their credit, however, Nehru and his successors did not allow this pervasive suspicion to dictate India’s foreign policy. Instead, engagement with states, institutions and polities through dialogue and negotiation, and not distrust, remains the defining feature of Indian foreign policy—and therefore, with the evolution of the nation’s economy and polity to a more mature shape, India will achieve, all indicators suggest, even more global engagement.

The U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003 seems to be a watershed for the way India’s leaders and public opinion have tried to relate to each other in a rapidly changing world. The government’s readiness to send troops for
peacekeeping in Iraq was met with strong rejection by public opinion. Notwithstanding complete disapproval of Saddam Hussein's undemocratic regime by all sections of popular opinion, they were not convinced by the justification for the attack given by the U.S. government. This came in sharp contrast to the support for the government's decision in 1983 to airdrop humanitarian aid for the Sri Lankan Tamils in Jaffna, where they were trapped by their own army. Likewise, public opinion was not averse to sending military aid at the request of the president of the Maldives, M. A. Gayoom, when mercenaries tried to attack that nation's capital. In pursuance of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, in 1987 India also sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to help demilitarize the Sri Lankan separatist movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). There was opposition from different quarters, but the leadership decided to call off the operation only when public opinion at home had turned almost hostile against the continuation of the operation after news began pouring in about the killing of IPKF troops by the LTTE. In a different situation, today, a large number of Indian personnel are engaged in Afghanistan in peacekeeping and humanitarian work. They are also being regularly targeted and killed by different terrorist groups. However, in India there has been no public opposition to this intervention. It appears, therefore, that neither the country's leaders nor public opinion are prisoners of a principle of no intervention. What would define the public response, one would presume from experience, is how people see the intentions behind such interventions. And here a sense of equality and the sharing of the global responsibility for peace will definitely be the two constants.

Indications of altered self-awareness could also be seen in India's nuclear behavior. India was one of the original members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the nation's leaders have from the beginning been committed to world disarmament. There has also been strong popular support for it. However, Chinese aggression in 1962 and wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 increasingly led public opinion on this issue to politically range from the extreme right to the centrist and socialist, demanding efforts to arm India with nuclear weapons. While negotiating under this pressure, the nation's leaders did not give up their advocacy and work for global disarmament. This has quite often been ridiculed as moralistic rhetoric and a hypocritical stance. India's leaders, however, did not give up this commitment, and in the 1980s, when talk of the U.S. Star Wars defense strategy and the Russian reaction to it dominated the strategic sphere, then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi initiated the Six-Nation Declaration for Disarmament.

The shared horizon of public opinion and political leaders is a Kantian one where expansion of peace, prosperity and democracy is desirable and possible.

Following this same trajectory, India's leaders have left their traditional position and, in fact, have voted against Iran's effort to construct nuclear weapons on two recent occasions—February 4, 2006, and November 28, 2009. This was a very big political risk because it gave leverage to the forces busy consolidating popular opinion around the theme that India is part of the U.S.-Israel-India axis. And this also has serious ramifications for Indian polity and society because it could become the locus for a communal, fundamentalist mobilization against the secular Indian state. The anti-Americanism of such a mobilization would also be a foregone conclusion. It was in this atmosphere that India's leaders went ahead and entered into a nuclear deal with the United States. Public opin-
tion seemed to have gone against the government on this. However, the government won a majority in the ensuing general elections to the House of the People, the Lok Sabha, indicating that public opinion, though divided, can be supportive of the government if it perceives, as in this case, that such moves go in the direction of making India a responsible global power of equal status. This also can explain why public opinion will not support any move by the nation’s leaders to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is viewed as unequal and discriminatory. On the other hand, achievement of a more equal international order will strengthen the voices for disarmament within India, as the desire for disarmament among the people is genuine and deep and necessarily clashes with nationalistic feelings.

India’s leaders and public opinion therefore appear to have reached a new stage; there are expectations from the former that the nation should become a leading voice on human rights, environment, trade and globalization issues. However, on terrain where the rules are still unequal, India’s leaders seem to be saddled with two simultaneous responsibilities: the expectation of sharing more global responsibilities, and doing this while struggling to establish the principle of equality. Public opinion, too, seems divided broadly along these two different trajectories. Though a vocal majority would like India to be a major actor in world affairs, a silent but ever-watchful minority will not allow the country to withdraw from the fight for equality for both itself and other poor and developing countries.

This dilemma was most visible at the Copenhagen meeting on climate change in December 2009, where India’s leaders, notwithstanding popular objections back home, announced that their nation would make voluntary cuts in greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate the effects of global warming. However, the news of the unequal and nontransparent move to get the heads of state present in Copenhagen to assent to a resolution angered both the nation’s leaders and public opinion of almost all shades.

One can argue, therefore, that the constitution of a new world order based on the shared universal values of peace and prosperity will need to emphasize the context of equality. Thus, international institutions need to follow Kantian democratic principles of governance, interpreted through norms and rules, to enlist increasing commitment to their goals. Otherwise, we will lose the support of the public opinion, which is the real guarantor against attempts by those with predatory sensibilities.
Indonesia seems to be making a comeback in world politics lately—from its regional leadership in Southeast Asia to its global role in the U.N. Security Council and the Group of 20, all suggesting that the nation is on its way to "creating a better world" in conjunction with its long-held doctrine of pursuing an "independent and active" foreign policy. Scholars argue that such a growing role hinges on Indonesia's status as the world's third-largest democracy, with the world's largest Moslem population. In a sense, these unique qualities, especially when seen from the perspective of the country's highly strategic location, do give the nation a significant regional and global presence. But to say that Indonesia has the capacity to play a global role and that it is willing to do so are two different things.

Why is Indonesia trying to take on the mantle of global prominence? Is it simply because of normative ideals—a belief that the world is generally benign and that therefore Indonesia's ideals and values could help make it a better place? Or is it because the world is simply seen as a hostile place and that therefore Indonesia must take a proactive role in shaping international events?

Indonesia's worldview is perhaps best described by the constant feature of an "independent and active" foreign policy, which came out of the country's struggle for independence from the Dutch during the throes of the Cold War. This policy, first promulgated by then-Vice President Muhammad Hatta, essentially outlined the need for Indonesia to have an independent policy in charting its own course—based on its own national interests and free from the dictates of others—as well as being active in shaping, not just sitting idly by, the global arena.

This policy further carries a mixture of ideal or normative goals, such as anticolonialism and independence, and a strong sense of pragmatism. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, though under different guises, this paradox of wrapping realpolitik-style pragmatism with a strong brand of idealism (such as the "Non-Aligned Movement") has continued to underline the worldview of Indonesia's foreign policy elites. Specifically, the world is seen to be an unfair arena of competition among states that has often provided both opportunities and threats to Indonesia—and, thus, the country needs to be not only independent but to also actively seek to shape international events.

However, given Indonesia's continued domestic problems, and its lack of military and economic power, such views can only be implemented using the nation's "moral force," as Hatta put it—or what the world now sees as the country's "soft power," including its democratic credentials. Put differently, though Indonesia sees the world as a hostile environment, it still seeks to engage in international affairs through normative instruments rather than power politics per se.

Today, however, for Indonesia to translate this view into concrete policies is more complicated and challenging than one might expect. For one thing, it seems that there is ultimately no wholehearted consensus on the basic foundations of foreign policy among the country's policymakers, including what constitutes its "national interests," or from where the threats to
those interests might come. Any appearances of unity in foreign policy have often reflected only a temporary alignment of the elites’ domestic political interests.

Since the advent of democracy in 1998, the making of foreign policy has become further complicated as new actors have emerged, especially in the National Parliament. In fact, constitutional amendments have empowered the Parliament to endorse or reject presidential nominees for ambassadorial posts, start a legal inquiry into the president’s foreign policy and block or pass any international agreements that the government has signed. The problem here is that legislators have occasionally framed foreign policy issues as part of a “neonationalist” agenda. Many legislators in charge of foreign affairs have also often lacked the necessary expertise and experience.

Arguably, therefore, despite the relatively constant interplay of pragmatism and idealism in Indonesia’s worldview, domestic political calculations still take precedence over international interests. Consequently, the specific pronouncements of Indonesia’s foreign policy—whether it becomes a global player pushing normative ideals (for example, the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s) or an inward-looking power trying to restore domestic stability (for example, during the first two decades of Suharto’s New Order)—depend largely on how its policymakers align domestic and international interests, with the former being most important.

**World Peace: How Indonesia Chips In**

Indonesia’s first moment of global prominence was perhaps the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Leaders attended by developing countries, which then led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Though taking place under the shadow of what President Sukarno described as a struggle between the Old Established Forces versus the New Emerging Forces, this initiative came on the heels of the domestic battle between the Indonesian military and the National Communist Party (known as the PKI).

Another crucial mark was the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which President Suharto took the lead in creating in 1967. He also ensured that the organization would help defuse various regional conflicts under the rationale of ensuring regional stability, while Indonesia focused on internal consolidation and economic recovery. Only after the dust settled did he begin to bid for global leadership—leading to Jakarta’s chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1992.

Following Indonesia’s recovery from the 1998 democratic transition, it again tried to reassert its regional leadership upon assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003, especially through its proposal to create a regional security community. This proposal, totaling more than 70 specific ideas when it was first announced, actually calls for the promotion of democracy and human rights, for a commitment to free and regular elections and for the building of open, tolerant societies.

Additionally, Indonesia also continued its international peacekeeping operations under U.N. auspices by participating in Lebanon’s peacekeeping forces. In fact, as a regular contributor since 1957, Indonesia by 2009 had sent 65 different contingents on U.N. peacekeeping missions.

**The Yudhoyono Paradox and Foreign Policy**

Interestingly, however, on the global stage, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has recently taken a rather moderate stance. Many feel that he is not mak-
ing use of Indonesia’s favorable position, especially as a member of the Group of 20. Such moderation, he has argued, is appropriate mainly because other countries were already voicing more progressive or radical views, and therefore, Indonesia is wise to simply act as a bridge between the developed and developing countries. This position was stated again in Copenhagen in December 2009.

Such a stance cannot be entirely explained without referring to Yudhoyono’s domestic weakness in recent years. Despite the fact that he was directly elected twice—for the first time in Indonesian history—and with a large parliamentary coalition, he still remains subject to the “Yudhoyono Paradox”: feeling insecure despite being at the apex of power.14

Additionally, public opinion begins to feature prominently in Yudhoyono’s image-conscious administration. This does not mean that the president is more amenable to public opinion, per se, but rather that he would prefer policy options based on how much they could elevate his favorability ratings.

Indonesian public opinion is volatile, and this can partly be explained by the overall low education level of many Indonesians and is partly due to the minimal overseas travel, travel being a privilege of the few. In fact, when asked in 2005, only 1 percent of the public said that they had traveled overseas in the previous five years.15 Given these hurdles, therefore, the nation’s political elites, including the members of the president’s administration, often use the pursuit of foreign policy goals or achievements for domestic political purposes—an established tradition in Indonesian politics since the 1950s. As such, the main concern is not how much the public can be persuaded that there is a hostile or benevolent world order that could allow Indonesia to take a more active role in global initiatives but how receptive and stable domestic politics are and how well the president can align competing domestic interests and public opinion with foreign policy goals.

**Conclusion**

For all Indonesia’s potential as an emerging world power, its entanglement of domestic and global politics in its foreign policy remains. Consequently, any foreign policy goals and initiatives will often depend on how the nation’s policymakers, especially the president, can engage public opinion and cajole domestic forces in its favor. Thus, the key question here is not so much whether Indonesia’s global profile will continue to rise—or in what portfolio—but whether or not President Yudhoyono can overcome his “inferiority syndrome” and rally the domestic support needed for his foreign policy goals. Perhaps Tip O’Neill’s old saying that “all politics is local” remains the logic underlying Indonesia’s quest for a better world after all.
ITALY

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Do Italians believe that the international order is essentially predatory or fair and rule-based? This fundamental question can be unpacked by answering three further questions. First, do Italy’s policies suggest an underlying Hobbesian or Kantian worldview? Second, to what kind of world order would Italians aspire and be ready to contribute? Third, if there is a gap between the answers to these first two questions, why does it exist and how can it be bridged?

Italy remains solidly anchored in the European and transatlantic structures of cooperation. No political party or movement with a significant following challenges Italy’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Both Italy’s decision makers and public opinion also attach great importance to the country’s role within international organizations, notably the United Nations. For example, in the last 15 years, Italy has been one of the major contributors to U.N.-mandated peacekeeping missions. However, particularly under the center-right governments led by Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s foreign policy has been characterized by an increasingly assertive defense of “national interests” and vocal complaints about the constraints posed by international cooperation. A vivid example is the anti-EU rhetoric of the Northern League, a populist party, which is a minor but influential partner in Berlusconi’s governing coalition. Further examples include the reluctance of the center-right government to accept EU commitments on immigration and climate change.

Berlusconi himself has made no mystery of his unease with the EU’s rules and obligations, which he views as excessively rigid and bureaucratic. He has preferred pursuing international relations by cultivating personal ties with leaders ranging from George W. Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Muammar Ghaddafi and Vladimir Putin, even when his acquiescence to them has risked tarnishing Italy’s international image. As this attitude takes root, Italy may find itself entrapped in a Hobbesian vicious circle: the more it acts as an international and European outlier, the more other countries seek to marginalize it; and the more Italy is marginalized, the more ammunition is given to those seeking to rid the country of its international and European obligations, which they see as hampering its pursuit of its national interest.

Does this frame of mind coincide with the way the public views the world and Italy’s role in it? The answer is an unambiguous no. A cursory glance at the results of opinion polls, such as the World Values Survey and Transatlantic Trends, suggests that Italians are characterized by anything but cynicism. Italians feel strongly about a wide variety of global problems—such as poverty, climate change and conflict—and they manifest a clear willingness to help in solving them through multilateral rules and action.

When it comes to development, not only do 80 percent of Italians consider the fight against poverty the most serious global problem but a majority would be willing to pay higher taxes to increase Italy’s development aid. This stands in contrast to the nation’s dwindling contributions to development aid, which have sunk to shamefully low levels compared with those of other Western countries. Turning to climate change, Italians are deeply concerned about the problem (86 percent), calling for action at individual (40 percent), state (60 percent) and international (77 percent) levels and accepting to do what it takes, even if this means doing more than other countries (87 percent). As for questions of war and peace, Italians manifest a
strong belief in soft power as a recipe for dealing with global conflicts, with 81 percent of respondents considering economic instruments to be more effective than military ones, while decisively shunning the claim that war may be necessary to achieve justice (80 percent). More generally, Italians remain committed to multilateral rules and institutions, with approximately 70 percent of the public expressing confidence in the EU and 60 percent in the U.N.

So what explains the disconnect between popular attitudes and the emerging tendencies in foreign policy conduct? The main reality underpinning Italy’s retrenchment, nationalism and flamboyant unilateralism is a deep sense of unease with a changing world that is viewed as hindering the country’s ambition to act as a midsize power with a prominent regional and international role. Italy’s many structural weaknesses, which have worsened during the last two decades, make its foreign policy challenges all the more daunting. They include an economy that for many years has recorded the lowest growth rate in Europe (even before the 2008–2009 global financial crisis), worrying demographic dynamics and a volatile political system that has been unable to rejuvenate itself.

Three examples highlight this growing sense of unease. The first is Italy’s unsuccessful attempts to revive the moribund Group of 8 (G-8), of which it has been a member since the mid-1970s. Italy’s futile resistance to transfer global governance responsibilities from the G-8 to the Group of 20 (G-20) during its G-8 presidency highlighted its difficulty in adjusting to major international developments. The rise of the G-20 has been a source of embarrassment for Italy. During the final press conference of the G-8 summit in July 2009, Prime Minister Berlusconi expressed deep reservations about the G-20, which he described as too large to be effective, just two months before the Pittsburgh summit sanctioned the G-20’s primacy in global economic governance. What haunts Italian elites is the specter of their nation’s continuous loss of relative weight on the international scene. Hence, the shift from the “exclusive” G-8 club to the broader G-20 is perceived as resulting in a loss of prestige for Italy and a downgrading of its global status.

The second example is Italy’s exclusion from key EU decision-making structures. Italy has always struggled to be accepted as an equal partner in the restricted structures within the European Union, composed of the biggest member states—France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Yet in recent years, it has been almost regularly excluded from them. Most vividly, the emergence of the “EU-3” (made up of these three biggest member states) as the lead group in European foreign policy has been perceived as a blow to Italy’s ambitions. This is partly attributable to Berlusconi’s erratic attention to, and limited interest in, the EU and the fact that he is seen as a controversial figure in many European capitals. However, these problematic aspects of his foreign policy have only exacerbated the much more structural problems undermining Italy’s international role.

A cursory glance at the results of opinion polls suggests that Italians are anything but cynical.

The third, more generally applicable, example of this growing sense of unease is Italy’s perplexed and perplexing reaction to the emergence of a multipolar world—particularly to the rise of powers such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Whereas concern about multipolarism and its consequences is no higher in Italy than it is elsewhere, the nation has often stuck its head in the sand. It risks succumbing to
the temptation to embark on shortsighted policies to defend the status quo and its immediate national interests rather than devising new strategies for adapting to a changing world.

Given the glaring gap between Italy's aspirations and conduct in practice, what can be done to reassert the nation's role as a value-driven world citizen? First, following from the discussion above, Italy would need to engage in a painful adjustment process to preserve its international role and consequently contribute to fulfilling the values advocated by its citizens. This vital link between domestic reforms and international projection is rarely acknowledged in the country's foreign policy debate. Second, Italy should accept the need to change the rules of the game and contribute to the ongoing international efforts to do so. The nation is well-versed in playing such a role, as evidenced by its diplomacy within the U.N. to promote a reform model aimed at preventing the consolidation of a new, rigid international hierarchy. Third, Italy's political elites must take heed from the public and refocus their energies on the EU. The precondition for an effective Italian contribution to the world is a strong, more coherent European Union. Only if the EU succeeds in becoming one of the pillars of the new international system can Italy hope to avoid being marginalized and avert the risk of a Hobbesian retrenchment. The Lisbon Treaty opens the possibility for the EU to play such a role, but its ability to seize this opportunity is not a foregone conclusion. Italy's challenge will be to reacquire its traditional role at the heart of Europe, pushing for a rapid implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and thereafter participating in shaping EU solutions to global challenges. Only by regaining its central place within the EU can Italy reverse its current trend toward irrelevance, which is widening the gap between its international conduct and its people's Kantian aspirations.

If these reforms were to be carried out and Italy could fulfill its potential in the international and European realms, a virtuous circle would be created, whereby the Italian belief in and willingness to contribute to a fair international order would most likely increase. In other words, much of the cynicism that characterizes the Italian political debate today is strictly correlated with the country's perceived weakness on the international stage. This said, Italy's enhanced international ability to exert its power is unlikely to be sufficient to fundamentally alter the public's perception of the current international order. Italians are aware of their country's limited capabilities, as a midsize power, to bring about a just international order. Only if the interactions among the major powers—such as the U.S., China, India and the EU—were to point in a more value-based direction would Italians be persuaded that a just international order is possible and imminent and then be willing to concomitantly increase their own contribution to such a new global situation.
In Japan, as in other nations, cynicism about the international order, outside the hard core of those involved in working with this order, originates in the still-dominant view that this order can only be maintained by the rule of power—power politics—not the rule of law, as far as international affairs are concerned. This view is also based on the assumption that people are resigned to the fact that the international system is fundamentally and unchangeably so anarchic that no human efforts could transform it.

Revisiting the history of humankind, however, we can easily trace the growing recognition of the notion of human dignity as the essential universal value. As a result of World War II, basic human rights and democracy have become the minimum norms for any state seeking to claim legitimacy as a responsible member of the society of nations—standards that were unimaginable as recently as before the war. Why, then, can we not transform the perceived anarchic and power-dominant international system into one that is friendly to, if not based on, the rule of law and the universal value of human dignity? The day has come in this 21st century when idealistic realism needs to take the place of power-driven realism as the guiding principle for international relations. In this essay, I use the term “idealistic realism” in the sense that we must realistically recognize that the fundamentally anarchic nature of the international system comprising nation-states will last indefinitely into the future but that this system is destined to be transformed into a society where human dignity and the rule of law increasingly prevail, replacing power politics, as has been the case for individual states.

Recognizing that the course of human history and the international order is positive and progressive, therefore, we may be freed from cynicism and regard investments to maintain international peace and order based on human dignity and the rule of law as necessary and constructive, not just an opportunity cost.

Japan’s Peace Constitution is an early materialization of such idealistic realism in human history. The provision of its Article 9 is as follows: “(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Furthermore, the preamble to the Peace Constitution states the national resolution “that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government” and the nation’s determination “to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” It also states that “[w]e desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” Article 97 also makes it clear that the Peace Constitution is in line with the history of the gradual universalization of the notion of human dignity, when it states that “[t]he fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future
generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.” As such, the Constitution has gained the support of the majority of the Japanese people and has formed the main pillar of informed public opinion throughout Japan’s postwar political history.

The dominant intellectual current of Japan’s policy elites, however, has been heavily imbued with power-political thinking throughout Japanese history, since the nation’s opening to the world in 1868. The U.S. policies, which gave birth to the Peace Constitution, were quickly abandoned in favor of fortifying the country as an outpost of anticommunism and rehabilitating the prewar policy elites, who now avowed their commitment to the anticommunist, pro-Americanism policy without having sincerely repented of their criminal past. One important politico-military result was the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as a price of Japan’s recovery of independence in 1952, in contravention to the pacifist spirit and provisions of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. During the post-war period, successive conservative governments have accommodated escalating U.S. military demands by repeatedly reinterpreting the meanings of Article 9’s words and phrases, thus hollowing out the very pacifist spirit of the article.

The international system is destined to be transformed into a society where human dignity and the rule of law increasingly prevail.

Maruyama Masao, an outstanding political thinker and scholar on the history of Japan’s political thought, once characterized the concept of Japanese “reality” as having three strong political biases: It is submissive to, rather than challenging, the given; it is one-dimensional and, therefore, ossified rather than multifaceted and flexible; and it is subservient to the strong and coercive against the weak. In sum, resignation imbued with cynicism to power politics has thus been a part of the national character. The introduction of pacifism and individualistic democracy onto Japan’s political soil by the Peace Constitution led, for the first time in its history, to the emergence of civil public opinion. Now, however, after more than 60 years’ experience with constitutional democracy, Japanese public opinion has still not yet established itself as an independent political force against the power-oriented, conservative political establishment. With this historical background in mind, I would argue that Japan’s conservative policy elites stubbornly believe that the international order is unchangeably predatory, whereas its public opinion is still in a state of flux between Hobbesian and Kantian views.

Japan’s conservative political elites have consistently maintained that its Peace Constitution is a foreign document that must be revised so that Japan can become a “normal,” rearmed country and thus adapt itself to the power-driven international system, and they have also maintained that the Constitution’s “excessive” human rights guarantees must be restricted in favor of what they call the “national interest.” The fundamental contradiction between the Constitution, which is based on Kantian idealistic realism, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which is driven by considerations of Hobbesian power-politics, should be settled in favor of the latter. Japanese public opinion, conversely, has been divided between believers in the Kantian international order and those of Hobbesian convictions. Incidentally, the Democratic Party, the governing party since the fall of 2009, includes a mixture of policy elites who share the conservative Hobbesian roots of the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party and grassroots members who, by and large, mirror mixed public opinion.
According to Japanese political elites' Hobbesian view, the U.S.-Japan military alliance should be a precondition and central pillar, not a policy option, for maintaining not only Japan's security but also the international order in general. The provision of military bases for free U.S. use is regarded as a necessary opportunity cost. However, Japanese public opinion of a Kantian persuasion looks at the bilateral military alliance and U.S. bases differently. The root causes of international disorder should be addressed not militarily but by nonmilitary means. Especially, according to such public opinion, since the end of the Cold War, the alliance and U.S. bases have become not only a net liability for Japan as it seeks to pursue its Constitution-based Kantian diplomacy but also a serious destabilizing factor for the international order.

The Cold War mentality and Hobbesian worldview of Japanese policy elites is specifically manifest in their belief in and reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence for the country’s security against what they term “nuclear threats” from China and North Korea. Antinuclear sentiment is very strong, however, among many Japanese people, based on the national experiences of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and the Happy Dragon incident, in which a Japanese fishing boat was exposed to heavy radiation caused by a U.S. hydrogen bomb experiment in the Pacific Ocean. The policy elites could have hardly ignored such strong national antinuclear feelings when, in the late 1960s, they promised a national policy of the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles: not possessing, not producing and not allowing the entry of nuclear weapons onto Japan's territory. To bridge the gap between reliance on U.S.-extended nuclear deterrence and this avowed policy of not allowing the entry of nuclear weapons, secret agreements were reached between the U.S. government and Japan's policy elites. Incidentally, the public exposure of the existence of such secret agreements in 2009 inflamed public opinion, forcing the new Democratic Party government to launch a full investigation.

Such global issues as climate change, poverty and hunger have a common thread: They threaten human dignity, the essential universal value. A Hobbesian, power-driven worldview is fundamentally indifferent to and even hostile to this value. Market capitalism, by the way, should be understood as an economic expression of Hobbesian philosophy. Since the 1980s, Japan’s policy elites have pushed, together with their U.S.-led Western peers, such politico-economic policies, which have aggravated the effects of climate change and jeopardized living standards. Without external interference, these negative consequences will continue unchecked, accompanied by increasing international disorder.

Japanese informed public opinion has increasingly reflected alarm about this deterioration of the Earth’s environment and worldwide living standards, along with encouraging signs of a desire to look to international cooperation to stop this decline. The guiding principle for public opinion has been the preamble of the Peace Constitution. A hopeful sign for public opinion is the push, for the first time in Japan's history, for the nation's traditionally power-driven policy elites to seriously address global environmental and humanitarian issues. The latest example is Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s widely reported political commitment regarding climate change.

For Japanese political elites of a Hobbesian inclination, including the leaders of the ruling Democratic Party, the question of whether the international order should be fair is fundamentally irrelevant. Bluntly put, whatever the United States claims is white is white to them, and whatever the United States claims is
black is black to them. They are ready to pay the opportunity costs of maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Japan bilateral military alliance, but they will act on global and humanitarian issues only under strong external pressures to which the United States, the very patron and guide of Japan’s political elites, cannot help but succumb.

Japan’s informed public opinion stresses the nation’s nonmilitary roles in overcoming global problems, guided by its Peace Constitution, which identify its peace and prosperity with those of international society. The day will hopefully come when people who hold such opinions become a political majority and fundamentally transform Japan’s political thinking and behavior, departing once and for all from a cynical resignation to the Japanese style of “reality.”
Poland, like other countries that emerged 20 years ago from the Soviet bloc, is special. For half a century or more, these countries were all subjected to a political, economic and intellectual regime that sought to subordinate them to the global interests of an outside power, the Soviet Union.

However, Poland is particularly distinctive in that much of Polish society was subjected to a near-death experience under the Nazis during World War II. The Nazis not only embarked on an unthinkable genocide of murdering the entire population of Polish Jews but left no doubt that a similar fate awaited the country’s elites.

To make things worse, Poland’s wartime experience came only 20 years after regaining its independence and followed a century or so of partition between more-powerful neighbors. It was then that the state disappeared from the map of Europe, which left successive generations of Poles with a choice between acceptance and national struggle in various forms as the only issue in public debate.

No wonder then that once independence was regained in 1989, one of the key issues for Poles was security, and they looked to membership in successful western European organizations, such as NATO and the European Union, as a means of securing their new-found freedom.

This meant adapting national priorities to the demands of the members of these two organizations and mimicking and not challenging their attitudes on the Kantian or Hobbesian scale in order to get recognition as a member of the club. This left little room for any debate about what a newly refounded Poland should stand for: either a recognition of the power relationships in a dangerous and predatory world or for an international role in a virtuous struggle for a harmonious world.

One choice was made early on. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, a cantankerous international lawyer and the first post-1989 foreign minister, insisted that Poland sign friendship treaties with all of its neighbors. This was a Kantian act of faith in the rule of law by a largely defenseless Polish Republic as it emerged from the Soviet bloc. But it was not as foregone a choice as it now seems. For one thing, Poland exchanged three pre-1989 neighbors—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic—for six after 1989—Russia in Kaliningrad, Lithuania, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. There were also historic issues with almost each of these countries, which could have flared up into some form of border or ethnic conflict. There was the bad blood between Poles and Ukrainians engendered by wartime massacres and reprisals. The Lithuanians were concerned that Poland would seek to dominate them and seek amends for the loss of Vilnius. No less were the Poles worried that Germany would make demands for the loss of its eastern territories as part of the Soviet-sponsored postwar settlement.

A combination of Skubiszewski’s single-mindedness, an internationalist approach to newly independent neighboring states by Solidarity elites and an insistence by Poland’s Western mentors that conflict would bar its entry into NATO and the EU averted the kind of conflagration in Poland that engulfed the Balkans a few years later. But this was not to say that Poland had embraced the rule of international law as its sole way...
The young fail to see the logic of Poland being helped when many abroad are so much more in need.

The choice of the United States as the hoped-for ultimate guarantor of national security meant that breaches of international law, such as NATO’s failure to secure a U.N. resolution for its attack against Serbian leader Milan Slobodovic over Kosovo, were accepted. Poland also followed the U.S. into Iraq under the assumption that a part in the fight for Baghdad would be reciprocated by the U.S. if the security of Białystok in eastern Poland was ever to come under threat in the future. The Polish government was also complicit in the illegal incarceration and interrogation of U.S. prisoners on Polish soil. Thus, Hobbes won out over Kant, but not exclusively. The latter could be invoked as and when expedient in circumstances deciding which worldview was to be promoted at any given moment.

None of these choices was ever put to the test of public opinion, and these questions never became election issues. Where Polish lives were at stake, as in Iraq and in Afghanistan, public opinion polls showed significant opposition to participation in these wars. But opposition to these wars never forced government decisions. Rather, the government was guided by the strategic choices made by the U.S.

Polish public opinion has shown and continues to show little interest in foreign policy issues. This has left a great deal of space for elites to shape policy. But they failed to use this space to develop new strategies, such as a consistent foreign relations doctrine, based on the experience of the Solidarity elites who came to power after 1989. The Solidarity opposition to Soviet communism had been a nonviolent movement. It had placed its faith in negotiation rather than confrontation to achieve its aims. It invoked human rights ideals as a source of legitimacy in its struggle. It was a perfect recipe for a movement unable and unwilling to turn to armed struggle to achieve its ends. It relied entirely on the ability to cry foul and appeal to public opinion at home and abroad for fairness if thwarted. But memory of this political practice was not enough to underpin a foreign policy once independence had been achieved.

Instead, membership in NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004 tied Poland firmly to the coattails of more-powerful Western partners. Over time, however, the country has become more self-confident, as the country’s size and historical tradition seem to predestine it to play a role in the region. This has centered on challenging Russian influence in Eastern Europe by promoting democracy and the independence of former Soviet states, such as the Ukraine, and the fight for Poland’s national interests inside the European Union.

This is and looks set to be the legacy of the Solidarity generation, which is still in charge in Poland. It came of age amidst the student protests of 1968 and cut its political teeth on the dissident movement of the 1970s. It graduated through the clandestine activism of the Solidarity movement in the next decade and came to power after 1989. Cold War divisions and at-
titudes, the Soviet threat, the promise of Reagan's anticommunism and a feeling of abandonment by the West were all watchwords for a generation, which still holds sway but whose days are now numbered.

This legacy is still strong, however. It assumes that security can only be assured through alliances with strong partners ready to use armed force should the need arise. And the only candidate for the time being is the U.S. It is felt that the rule of international law underpinning a fair world order is no substitute for hard power given Poland’s experience. Only if attitudes among major Western players were to change would Poland’s present elites then begin a reassessment. But Poland would make no move on its own to ensure security by playing a greater national role in building a fairer international order.

Nevertheless, a change in attitudes may well come from a younger generation born after 1989 and now coming of age. Also, a 40-year-old in 2010 may have been born and gone to school under the old regime but has spent his or her entire adult years living under democratic conditions. The change as these new generations take over could be all the more dramatic, as Poland has currently reached a number of calendar milestones that potentially question the attitudes and behavior patterns of past generations stretching back at least a couple of centuries, if not more. Poland has now been truly independent for longer than at any time since 1795, the date of the last partition. Poland’s system of parliamentary democracy under universal suffrage has now lasted longer than ever. In a unique development in Polish history, economic growth is bolstered by external aid in the form of EU regional funds. Poland is more secure than ever before, despite the fears enumerated above. This means that many young people are more self-confident about the outside world. Free to travel, they are much less focused on the problems of the region, feel more comfortable with their neighbors and are more interested in the world at large. They are also much more ready to see their country as a member of a bloc of richer nations with an obligation to help the less fortunate abroad. The older generation sees itself as a victim of history and deserving of help from abroad. The young fail to see the logic of Poland being helped when many abroad are so much more in need.

Would this be enough to see a Kantian comeback in attitudes to foreign policy in coming years? Membership in the European Union is forcing Poland to address foreign aid questions, and the foreign aid budget is slowly increasing. World issues, such as the fight to reverse climate change or disarmament, are forcing the developed world, including Poland, to recognize the arguments of those countries that see themselves as treated unfairly. Hobbesian force is no longer enough to bring countries to the negotiating table and force recalcitrants to bend to the will of the developed world. As the economic and political centers of power shift to the East, Western countries, including Poland, will have to deploy the force of reason rather than reasons of force if climate change or disarmament issues are to be addressed effectively on a world scale. Poland’s present ruling generation lacks the imagination to see the implications of the changes in the post-Cold War world. Poland’s new, more self-confident generations who are now coming onto the political scene may well rise to that challenge.
RUSSIA

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Russia has had a unique experience. Over the last 25 years, it has traveled a long way from almost absolute foreign policy idealism manifested by Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new political thinking” in the late 1980s to extremely mercantilist approaches and total disbelief in ideals, which characterized the end of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. This amplitude is easier to understand when one takes into account the scale of turbulence Russia went through during those years.

Over the past 25 years, Russia has experienced a series of disappointments. Inside the country, all possible types of social organization have been discredited: socialism, democratic liberalism and authoritarian progressivism. While in other countries public opinion is more inclined to multilateral approaches than the elites are, this does not seem to be the case in Russia. The people and the rulers are products of the same period of socioeconomic disasters and conceptual turmoil, and total disillusionment marks the whole society, making them both equally wary of multilateral approaches. In fact, public opinion sometimes demonstrates an even more conservative and inward-looking stance than the authorities do, rejecting, for example, Russian participation in international peacekeeping efforts or relief operations as not serving Russia’s national interest.

The world still underestimates the magnitude of the shock to Russian society and its political class caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union. The collapse had several dimensions: (a) the status dimension—the collapse of a power that had for several centuries provided structure to a vast Eurasian space; (b) the mental dimension—Russia lost not only its “colonies” but also territories that it viewed as its natural parts, including Kiev, the cradle of Russian statehood and the place where the nation was baptized; 25 million Russians became foreigners overnight, without making a move; (d) and finally, the socioeconomic dimension—the habitual way of life collapsed for 150 million people, and the majority of the population lost more than it gained as a result.

This emotional complex has determined Russian politics for the last 20 years. But there is one main point in the context of our subject: The aforementioned changes resulted from the idealistic attempt by the last general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, to rebuild the country and the world on the principles of a new, fair world order. One can argue that the gloomy fate of the Soviet Union was predetermined by decades of its previous history. However, the public consciousness sees a direct link between total national disruption and Gorbachev’s desire to walk away from a predatory system.

At first, this attempt received strong support from society, which passionately longed for change. The fantastic popularity of the early Gorbachev, who gave people a ray of hope amidst the cynicism and degradation of the late Soviet era, eventually turned into its opposite. In Russia, Mikhail Gorbachev is considered either a traitor who “sold” the Soviet might to the West for personal popularity and economic handouts or a naive idealist who was simply deceived by hard-boiled realists, such as George H.W. Bush and Margaret Thatcher. As a result, it is widely believed that his policies benefited only the West, while Russia lost everything.
By the mid-1940s, the Soviet Union, which once upon a time started as a communist utopia keen to transform the whole world according to revolutionary guidelines, turned into a classical continental empire obsessed with expansion and security buffer zones. The general spirit of European politics of the 1930s and 1940s contributed a lot to this change. Territorial gains in Eastern and Central Europe were seen as legitimate in the eyes of both the rulers and the majority of people because of the unprecedented human price paid by the Soviet population in World War II—where up to 30 million of Soviets were killed—and the division of Europe was accepted by all members of the anti-Hitler coalition in Yalta, Potsdam and, finally, in Helsinki.

By deciding not to fight for the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Mikhail Gorbachev discarded the whole approach based on the legitimacy of war deeply rooted not only in the Soviet but also in the European political mentality. Gorbachev was the last Wilsonian of the 20th century. Like Woodrow Wilson during World War I, he believed not in deals based on a balance of powers but in “new thinking” in the name of global harmony, built on the primacy of “universal human values.” Gorbachev wanted to turn the end of the Cold War—a unique confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that did not evolve into a head-on clash—into a “joint venture” between the two superpowers. It turned out, however, that Gorbachev had no superpower behind him. Consequently, no one wanted to discuss principles of the world order with a weaker partner. He was simply to accept what more powerful actors decided to do.

However, the triumph in the Cold War played a malicious joke on the victors. The liberal values of democracy and human rights and confidence in the rightness of the victorious social and political order were coupled with an unprecedented military might to which there was no counterweight. The era of the declared “end of history” brought not “eternal peace” but three wars initiated by NATO or its individual members. The famous maxim that democracies do not fight each other has not been disproved yet, but it is a fact that democracies now simply fight much and long; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have already surpassed World War II in duration.

In peacetime, at the end of the 20th century, the air force of the alliance of democratic countries bombed the capital of a European state. The overwhelming majority of Russians and a large part of the non-Western world did not, and still do not, believe that the war against Yugoslavia in 1999 was launched in the name of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. It should be noted that the background that led Western powers to war against Yugoslavia, namely, bloodshed in Bosnia through terrible acts of genocide, was largely overlooked by the Russian population as it played out at the time when Russia was fully bogged down in internal turbulence, including an episode of civil war in October 1993. Also, Russia during the 1990s looked at all developments through the prism of its own weakness. Increasing disappointment in the results of the anticommunist revolution and defensive suspiciousness of any military actions undertaken by a superior military force against a much weaker entity were seen as a display of a highly predatory approach hypocritically masked under humanitarian slogans.

But even if we were to assume that NATO’s motives were sincere, the consequences of the war were symbolic. First, the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo and then the recognition of its independence ran counter to international law and were driven essentially by political calculations. This recognition opened a new
chapter in the history of the redrawing of European borders. But whereas in Kosovo’s case the motives can be at least debated, the actions of the George W. Bush administration in Iraq finally erased the boundary between the pursuit of U.S. geopolitical and geoeconomic interests and the advocacy of certain political ideas and values. In other words, democracy and regime change became an instrument of the great-power strategy, which seriously discredited any ideological slogans in the eyes of the rest of the world, above all Russia.

Public consciousness sees a direct link between total national disruption and Gorbachev’s desire to walk away from a predatory system.

The system of multilateral institutions, which formally has not changed since the second half of the 20th century, obviously does not correspond to the new reality and is degrading on its own. In any case, it serves less and less as a guide to action for leading players who are working out rules of their own that are beneficial above all to themselves—rules of force adopted by the U.S. or legal and economic ones adopted by the European Union. Such rules are inevitably void of universal legitimacy, so they can only be imposed on other participants in international relations.

Rehabilitation after the collapse of 1991 has been the main mission of Russian politics over the last 20 years. During those years, Russia was first a status quo power, which tried to preserve the remnants of geopolitical assets remaining from the Soviet Union, and then a revisionist power, which lost faith in the possibility of achieving anything by playing according to rules. Its mercantilism and belief only in force peaked in the mid-2000s and was largely a reaction to the erosion of international institutions and the triumph of coercive approaches in U.S. politics. Now, both Russia and the U.S. are entering a new stage, namely, awareness of their limited power—at the global level for the United States and at the regional level for Russia. Having achieved de facto the recognition of its own exclusive interests in the post-Soviet space, Moscow has faced a shortage of political, economic, military and intellectual resources required for implementing its goals. The need to interact with its competitors causes Moscow to harmonize the rules of conduct with them. However, these rules do not seem to be based on values; rather, they are based on a sober understanding of one’s own interests.

In an era of an increasingly interconnected economy and an increasingly fragmented system of political relations, order is very difficult or even impossible to establish in the 21st century. A huge superiority in military strength, political influence or economic capabilities does not help solve problems. Perhaps order, if it ever returns, will come from the bottom upwards—that is, from regional centers of influence to the system of relations between them—rather than from the top downwards—from universal institutions or from one dominant power. From this point of view, Russia will be able to contribute to the establishment of order only if it becomes a real regional center/pole.

After 20 years of political pitfalls and bumps, Russia seems inclined to accept a more rule-based system. Most likely because Russia exhausted the potential of compensatory growth after the collapse of the Soviet Union and looks at the future with uncertainty, Russia is now starting to realize that it does not have many chances to find itself among the strongest powers in the decades to come. Those who are aware of their weaknesses are used to being more interested in a rule-based system. The key notion, however, is how
those rules will be defined and who will do the defining. Western civilization used to determine rules during the centuries it was the dominating world power. Now the situation is changing in terms of the international distribution of economic, demographic and likely even technological forces. The Russian dilemma is simple and very complicated at the same time. It is too big and powerful to accept rules imposed by anybody else but too weak to determine rules on its own. Most likely, Russia sooner or later will need to join one of the emerging leaders of world constellation, but Russia will try to postpone the final choice as long as possible, which also means it will hesitate to endorse any system of rules.
SOUTH AFRICA

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South Africa’s attitude toward international relations, and therefore its foreign policy, exhibits a profound belief that the international order can be reformed to create a better world. Since 1910, when the Union of South Africa was declared, there has been much evidence of South Africans’ strong trust in the international system as an antidote to misrule, both domestically and internationally—particularly in that South Africa’s policy elites have seen the international order as being capable of progressive reform. The consistent faith in the positive role of the international order is an artifact of the coexistence of neoliberal and neorealist doctrines of international relations among political elites in South Africa. Yet still, there are divergent views within the mainstream about what the country’s worldview should be and what national interests should inform this.

The Eclectic Perspective of the International Order

This coexistence in South Africa of faith in the international system and commitment to the creation of a new world order is heavily influenced by the eclectic ideology of the nation’s current governing party, the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC is the oldest liberation movement in Africa, born out of the African elites’ quest for a progressive platform to express their yearning for a policy space and for modernizing South Africa. From the outset, the ANC’s leadership—made up of African elites educated in Christian missions, mainly teachers, pastors and lawyers—linked their struggle to the evolving cosmopolitan values of equality and freedom. And when national efforts failed, they took their appeals to key international actors, like the United Kingdom and the League of Nations. In fact, the ANC’s leaders attempted to propose a global human rights charter in the early 1920s, one that would link national unity and international solidarity.

Of course, given the ANC’s situation now as the governing party, and earlier as a deeply entrenched mass-opposition movement under apartheid, it has evolved over the decades from an African liberal nationalist platform to a more militant and radical organization, especially after its marriage with the South African Communist Party in the 1940s. This has given the ANC a pluralist political philosophy, combining conservative and liberal doctrines. Yet its leaning toward progressive liberalism has remained intact.

The ANC took the lead in the struggle against apartheid on the international stage in 1961, at the same time it launched the armed and underground strands of the struggle. This reflected continuity with the internationalist tradition of the ANC, which was founded on strong faith in the utility of the international order. There was unanimity among the forces fighting apartheid that the time was ripe to mobilize the international community and institutions of global governance to isolate and put pressure on the apartheid government to agree to negotiations with the freedom fighters. They did not see the international order as a state of anarchy, as did the realists; nor did they see it as essentially fair, as from a Kantian perspective. Instead, they saw it as capable of protecting the vulnerable and weak, while evolving into a more democratic and just order. Today, the international order is seen as a bastion against misrule and abuse by the powerful against those possessing limited or no power at the nation-state level.
This eclectic ideological position on the international order informs the ANC’s long-standing commitment to a new world order, where this means reforms of the power structures that underpin the current institutions of global governance. This has always been seen by the majority as an extension of the national and continental quest for freedom and newness, typified by the motto “A better South Africa, better Africa and better world.” The neorealist idea of reform coexists with the liberal faith in international institutions as well as cosmopolitan values and norms. A radical quest for the democratization of the international system to reflect post-World War II realities was marked by increased membership from the global South. The policy elites were also committed to bridge-building between the North and South through consensus and cooperation.

This view of the international order as credible but in need of further reform pervades general public opinion in South Africa. If election results and opinion polls conducted over the past decade are anything to go by, the majority of South Africans subscribe to a mixture of ideological perspectives on all matters of public policy, including international relations. This is underpinned by a profound belief in the evolution of an ideal global order, with tectonic changes that coincided with decolonization in the 1960s and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. While the view that global reform is necessary is widespread within the ANC, there is no definite consensus on how radical such changes should be; some favor gradual reform, while others espouse radical change.

Three Cases That Inform the South African View

Three cases epitomize this eclectic view of the international order in South Africa. The first is the role of the international community in the struggle against apartheid. Both the policy elites and sections of the public constantly recall how the internationalization of the struggle led to a gradual shift in the power of forces within South Africa in favor of prodemocracy movements led by the ANC. This moment in South African history is told as a narrative about the victory of multilateral cooperation, nonstate solidarity and public diplomacy over the connivance of some within the apartheid state. The disinvestment by major multinational companies and the freezing of diplomatic ties with South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s are seen as evidence that the international community espouses and promotes cosmopolitan values of human rights, democracy, equality and good governance.

The second case is the spread of democracy in Africa, which has been used by South African policy elites to frame the international order as an effective instrument for the creation of a more democratic and egalitarian world. The international order was seen to be gradually transforming during the 21st century, and the new South Africa and Africa are simply epitomes of this evolution of a new world. Policy practitioners and decision makers see progress, even if piecemeal, toward a new world order. This has inspired the idea of an African Renaissance, which has been reconceptualized to mean both the resurgence of self-confidence and self-reliance, on the one hand, and the political stabilization and democratization that prepare Africa to participate fruitfully in what is envisaged as a democratic world system, on the other.

Finally, the third case is the growing power and influence of emerging democracies like India, Brazil and South Africa, among other large emerging nations, which has newly inspired the South African political elites’ faith in the international system and optimism about its transformation. They recognize that the rise
of what are commonly called the “emerging powers” is an artifact in part of the elasticity of the international system that allowed it to cope with both unipolarism and multipolarism in the 1990s. These new significant actors in the international system are able to establish issue-based alliances in multilateral forums to counterbalance the power of the few globally dominant states. The belief is that this asymmetric power imbalance will provide a stimulus for the incremental reform of global institutions with respect to economic and political power.

**South Africa: A Norm Entrepreneur?**

The dismantling of South Africa’s nuclear arsenal on the eve of democracy, which was driven more by the white government’s unwillingness to handover a nuclear state to the ANC than by a strategic calculus on the part of the black-led government after 1994, projected the nation as an exemplary actor in the growing pursuit of a nuclear-free world. This gave the country moral authority to position itself as a bridge builder between various power blocs during the negotiations that led to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to intervene in tensions between the contentious nuclear states India and Pakistan in the mid-1990s. South Africa used the force of its example and the iconography of the reconciling Nelson Mandela to position itself as a major actor in nuclear questions, a tradition it sought to continue during its bid for the position of Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2009.

South Africa’s extensive involvement in peacemaking diplomacy in various parts of the world has been informed by a moral duty to replicate its “miracle” of democratic transition in other parts of Africa. For this reason, whether in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire or Northern Ireland, the country has pushed for a formula for conflict resolution that replicates its successful transition from apartheid. In doing this, it has sought to spread democratization, peace and stability in the belief that these are necessary preconditions for development. The country’s enthusiastic push for the reengineering of the United Nations’ human rights architecture, leading to the Human Rights Council, was designed to project the country as a champion of human rights at a time when the “war on terror” had relegated issues of values to a lower priority, as matters of security and interest became prominent.

**Conclusion**

The challenge for South Africa is that crude power politics and tension in the international system are more prevalent than is generally assumed. This situation, then, is bound to push the country into one or the other camp in the global power struggles, which will weaken its capacity to act as a global norm entrepreneur, bridge builder and an agent of stabilization. Another challenge is the growing domestic pressure for the government to project the country’s national interests more sharply in international affairs. This suggests that public attitudes toward international relations are changing toward guarded optimism, if not downright pessimism, which may gradually transform South Africa into a state with a realistic perspective on its conduct of international relations.

However, in the end, it is likely that a number of factors will reenergize South Africa’s search for a reformed global governance system—including incremental successes in multilateral negotiations on climate change and multilateral trade, a continuing focus on a global development agenda epitomized by the Millennium Development Goals, the growing importance of the Group of 20 and the increasing global efficacy of the emerging powers. A new international order holds out
the promise of beneficial partnerships and political clout for Africa, and South Africa's ability to defend and advance Africa's collective interests means that the continent will thrust upon South Africa, in the absence of a fitting alternative, the responsibility to lead its engagement with the world for some time to come. That is, if South Africa's membership in structures like the G-20 does not transform it into just another status quo regional power.
I
n late 1985, weeks before Spain became a member of the European Communities, a major Spanish television show popularized a sentence that caught the spirit of the moment: “Finally, we are Europeans!” At last, the country could turn the page from the international isolation it had endured since 1945 under the dictator Francisco Franco, when it had been excluded from the United Nations and the emerging Western European order. But now, after the tyrant’s death, Spaniards embraced the post-1945 international system with the enthusiasm of new converts. And since then, Spanish public opinion has by and large remained essentially pacifist and positive toward a rule-based idea of international relations.

Spanish public opinion on international issues can be monitored through two main national sources: the poll of the public Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) and the poll of the Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano, which is commissioned by an independent think tank that focuses on international relations. However, the opinions of the elites are not systematically surveyed in any comparable manner. Spain is also included in several international surveys, which makes possible some interesting comparisons. These international surveys that regularly include Spain among the countries they study include the European Commission’s Eurobarometer, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, and Transatlantic Trends. Additionally, both the CIS and the Real Instituto Elcano have included in their own survey questions that can be compared with those of other international surveys, such as Latinobarómetro. As a result, there is a wealth of materials for comparison between public opinion in Spain and in other countries, particularly European ones. This aggregated picture shows that, within the general trends in European public opinion on international affairs, Spanish public opinion has kept some characteristics of its own.

By and large, Spaniards declare themselves more in favor of international law and multilateral solutions, against hegemony (in particular, American hegemony) and for a stronger European role than most Western European societies. Spaniards’ enthusiasm for multilateral solutions, however, stops at the military option; they stand out as being considerably less inclined to using military force in almost all cases (66 percent of respondents vs. 42 percent in Western Europe and 10 percent in the U.S.), whether or not Spain is involved. In the wake of the administration of George W. Bush, when the exceptional anti-Americanism prevailing in Spain was first matched by the deterioration of the U.S. image elsewhere in Europe and then reversed after the election of Barack Obama, Spaniards have been closer to the Western European average in support and/or sympathy for the U.S. In this new context, it becomes clear that Spain’s opposition to unilateral action and preference for solutions more in line with international norms and under the leadership of international institutions was not a simple product of anti-American feelings. In fact, the source of these positions runs deeper, as a part of a general understanding of how the international system should work that is prevalent in Spain. We could explain this pacifist and normative view of international relations as related to three major processes that have affected Spain’s international standing: isolation, integration and politicization.

The exclusion by the winners of World War II reduced Spain to a peripheral position and deprived it from participating not just in the design of the new interna-
tional system but also in almost every major international event for four decades. Resolution 39(I) of the U.N. General Assembly (December 12, 1946), barring Spanish entry into the United Nations, sealed the isolation of Spain, which would only be fully overcome 40 years later. The will to break this marginalization and to participate in the new international order became a crucial part of any program for democratization. As a result, adherence to international law, participation in international institutions and the contribution to the solution of global issues seems, to many Spaniards, a natural consequence of their nation’s new democratic character. Spain’s late reintegration into the international order spared its citizens the disappointment with international mechanisms that had eroded other countries’ confidence in them during those three decades. Whereas situations where international law and institutions were powerless to avoid large-scale violence and even genocide, such as Cambodia or Rwanda, remain relatively obscure to even the most internationally oriented sections of the public, other situations where U.N. resolutions are at stake, in particular in Western Sahara and Palestine, remain central in Spain’s foreign policy debates. This might explain why Spaniards often have a traditional and relatively static view of international law and why concepts such as the responsibility to protect have been questioned unless they are applied with the full backing of U.N. mechanisms. The latest example of this attitude can be found in Spain’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s declared independence, on the grounds that it breaks international law.

A second event that explains Spanish attitudes constitutes, in a way, the total reversal of the effects of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 39(I): Spain’s accession to the European Communities in 1986, the most symbolic moment in a series of accessions— to the Council of Europe in 1977, to NATO in 1982 and to the Western European Union in 1989. The Euro-enthusiasm of Spanish civil society, which has eroded but still remains stronger than the Western European average, also extends to the vision of a world that should become a sort of wider version of European integration as experienced by Spain’s public opinion: norm-based, driven by economic and not military means and highly beneficial, in particular to those most in need, but also devoid of major controversy on the overall objectives and paid for, by and large, by others. In fact, even the last point has become less controversial since the one paying is the public budget, and Spanish society has kept a constant pressure on its governments, which has translated into considerable growth in development aid. This kind of solidarity, however, does not apply when jobs and personal (and corporate) income, rather than aid from the state budget, are at stake—as reflected by the government’s largely unchallenged positions on agricultural subsidies and international fisheries. Spain’s integration into Western institutions was seen in the first years of democracy by parts of the country’s political left wing as contradictory to its more universalist positions—some even advocated integration into the Non-Aligned Movement—however, since a referendum in 1986 confirmed Spain’s NATO membership, its full participation in Western institutions and commitment to a law-based international order have by and large been understood as two sides of the same coin.

The broad consensus on the benefits of belonging to the European family and on the global objectives of Spanish foreign policy was broken in the foreign policy cycle that followed the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks in the U.S. The Spanish government, led at that time by José María Aznar, decided to realign itself more closely with the American position, to the point of the country’s becoming one of the most ardent supporters of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, this support contradicted two primary international instincts of Spanish public opinion—pacifism and the nation’s attachment to the United Nations and international law—and was pursued in the face of opposition from a staggering 92 percent of polled citizens. The subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which left 200 dead and hundreds more injured, were thought to be related to Spain’s position on the war in Iraq by 64 percent of its citizens. The mismanagement of the aftermath of these attacks is widely seen as the main factor for the later victory of the Socialist opposition. And once they had entered office, the Socialists reversed Aznar’s foreign policy course and began to strongly emphasize international law, starting with a speedy withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. In the aftermath of its overcoming isolationism and embracing the Western model of integration into the world, Spain has arguably entered a phase where competing understandings of how international relations work (a more Hobbesian view embraced by Aznar’s Popular Party vs. a Kantian one defended by the Socialists under Rodríguez Zapatero) are behind several fundamental disagreements in international issues. This politicization of Spain’s foreign policy can be interpreted as a normalization after the years of consensus on its aspirations to regain its place among Western nations.

Given these realities, then, could Spanish public opinion be persuaded to increase the national contribution to organizations and initiatives seeking to solve global problems? Spanish citizens have so far supported international military involvement, the acceptance of global commitments (which have not always been respected, as shown by Spain’s paltry performance in meeting its Kyoto Protocol targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions) and an increase in development aid. This would not necessarily automatically translate into a readiness to make further, more substantial contributions. An explicit link to international norms and to the United Nations and other global institutions and agreements would almost certainly be required. A significant European dimension would in all likelihood help. But even then, the support of public opinion could not be taken for granted in cases of offensive military operations, or global contributions that have negative effects on jobs and other economic interests within Spain.
DOES FAIRNESS MATTER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?

AFTERWORD

Brian Urquhart

Advocates of global fairness, or more formally, of global civics, face a less-than-encouraging picture in 2010. In many countries, let alone the world at large, there is a querulous and ungenerous political and social mood, while international relations, freed from the monstrous hazards of the Cold War, are for the most part anxious, cool, quarrelsome and uncertain. Within the United Nations, the world’s most universal forum, there is little evidence of the enthusiastic solidarity or forward-looking leadership that is needed to resolve threatening global problems successfully, let alone to seek fundamental changes in human attitudes or behavior. While the international humanitarian response to disasters is relatively strong and the realization of human rights has many active supporters all over the world, the vital concept of fellowship of the human race is honored more in rhetoric than in practice.

Nonetheless, since World War II, much progress has been made toward a more equitable and just world. The Human Rights conventions, decolonization, international law, care for the environment, concern with large-scale poverty, the spread of democracy, international peacekeeping and the proliferation of international nongovernmental organizations in every walk of life would have been inconceivable 70 years ago. Such achievements are indispensable to fairness and the civic conscience, both nationally and internationally; but until the actual inhabitants of the planet develop a stronger feeling of mutual responsibility and mutual pride, and communicate such feelings to their rulers, the necessary popular pressure to move us into a new era of global civics will be lacking.

It is not surprising that the contributors to this volume tend to be more concerned with governmental policy than with popular opinion or influence. The quest for fairness needs tangible goals in order to succeed. Solidarity and cooperation can sometimes be mobilized to face common dangers or threats, provided that those threats are perceived in time, but they tend to evaporate quickly when the danger is past. A universal tradition of fairness and public spirit—a glorious objective—will not be created quickly or easily. This is why the foundation from which it can grow needs to be established as soon as possible.

What are the elements of such a tradition? Motofumi Asai suggests what I believe to be the essential starting point in any advocacy of global civics and fairness, the “recognition of the notion of human dignity as the essential universal value.” That is one of the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but in the storm and stress of both public and private affairs in the last 60 years, it has very often been forgotten. The universal recognition of human dignity is, of course, actively denied by any form of bigotry and by ethnic or religious fanaticism. It is often the first casualty of violence or war. Until the recognition of the notion of human dignity becomes universal rather than a distant aspiration, progress in establishing universal respect for human rights will remain partially unfulfilled, and the growth of a universal tradition of fairness will be stunted.

Anyone who has worked for many years in an admittedly flawed international system becomes accustomed to being called deluded, naive or unrealistic. In the end, however, it is possible to look back on a surprising degree of progress that was difficult to discern at the time, sometimes toward objectives that were previously thought to be hopelessly unattainable. Fairness and civility are vast objectives even for a sin-
gle state, but if we pride ourselves on having achieved globalization and a revolution in human communication, why should fairness and civility not also be global objectives? Such vast objectives may never be altogether realized. They stand as a guide to behavior, a great work in continual progress in which leaders, teachers, NGOs, the media, artists and intellectuals can play their part. Human nature can develop and change, and not always in the wrong direction.

In his introductory essay, Hakan Altinay asks, “Will we be able to acknowledge with genuine sincerity the legitimate disappointments of many with the international systems and yet still harness their readiness to take a realistic leap of faith for a better world where they share in the responsibility?” I would answer that unless and until the peoples of the world, whom the U.N. Charter names in its opening words, associate themselves actively with the higher aspirations of the international system, the best hopes of our human civilization will remain, to some extent, unfulfilled.
ENDNOTES


2. For examples of dismissive treatment of transnational movements, see Walter Russell Mead, “The Death of Global Warming,” and Walter Russell Mead, “Blowing Hot and Cold,” both available in American Interest Online. Incidentally, not everyone is as dismissive as Mead. The National Intelligence Council has a scenario where nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increase in number and strength due to the capacity of individuals and groups to affiliate with each other using the Internet, and member states of the United Nations feel compelled to allocate 20 seats at the UN General Assembly to NGOs with the same voting rights as nation-states; see National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 91.


7. We are especially grateful to Jens Bartelson, Rhoda Howard-Hassman, Chaldeans Mensah, Nedim Nomer, Peter Vale and Roman Lopez Villicano.

8. “Chile, las Américas y el Mundo” Opinión pública y política exterior 2008. Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Study supported by the Chilean Agency for International Cooperation through the Chile-Mexico Joint Fund of Cooperation.


12. In 2009, countries like Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt and Turkey abstained from voting, and Cuba, Venezuela and Malaysia opposed the resolution.


