Foreign Policy
at BROOKINGS

POLICY PAPER
Number 8, October 2008

Democracies: In a League of their Own?

Lessons Learned from the Community of Democracies

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"The new League of Democracies would form the core of an international order of peace based on freedom. It could act where the U.N. fails to act, to relieve human suffering in places like Darfur."

—Senator John McCain[1]

"Well, I like the idea of the league of democracies, and only in part because I and others had proposed it about six years ago. What I like about it, it's got a hidden agenda. It looks as if it's all about listening and joining with allies, all the kind of stuff you'd hear a John Kerry say, except that the idea here, which McCain can't say, but I can, is to essentially kill the U.N."

—Charles Krauthammer on Brit Hume Report[2]

[1] Senator McCain Addresses the Hoover Institution on U.S. Foreign Policy, *State News Service,* May 1, 2007.
[2] FOX Special Report with Brit Hume, *Fox News Network,* March 26, 2008.

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Introduction

The laudable vision of "an international order of peace based on freedom" has become a perennial entry in the sweepstakes of grand ideas and presidential campaigns. In its latest version, proponents argue that democracies, based on their shared values and system of government, are natural allies on a range of international issues from climate change to humanitarian intervention and should form the core of the international system. The idea's reemergence in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign is testament to its endurance as a concept that appeals both to neoconservatives, who believe in using U.S. power to assert our values abroad, and liberal internationalists, who want to anchor the United States in an international system that favors cooperation over unilateral action. Yet despite its superficial appeal to our better angels, even some of its advocates acknowledge that its real purpose is to legitimize the use of U.S. military force and destroy the United Nations. For that and many other reasons, the idea will not fly in the current geopolitical environment and will have to await the day when the world is composed of many more like-minded democracies than currently exist.

I come to this conclusion with some hesitation. After spending over eight years working to shape the Community of Democracies (CD), a more modest version of the League of Democracies Senator McCain is now advocating, I remain convinced of the merits of a multilateral forum for democracies—and those aspiring to join—to support each other in strengthening and consolidating democracy. Such an organization, if fully realized, would provide a powerful platform to strengthen ties among governments that adhere to core universal values of freedom and human rights and can thus speak with some legitimacy on the world stage. At the same time, my experience with the Community of Democracies tells me that if the world's democracies have so much trouble finding common ground in promoting democracy and human rights, then surely there is little hope for a more ambitious agenda of cooperation, particularly on issues that by their nature require the cooperation of non-democracies.

In this paper, I will briefly sketch the different versions of the League of Democracies concept currently in circulation. I will then provide a more detailed account of the functioning of the Community of Democracies since its inception in Warsaw in 2000, with special attention to the question of how to determine who qualifies as a democracy. I will also offer some recommendations for strengthening multilateral approaches to the promotion of democracy and human rights, which should remain a central goal of any new administration in Washington. Throughout the paper, I will also offer some thoughts on what lessons policymakers can learn from the CD experience.

A Community, a Concert and a League of Democracies

The proliferation of names for what sounds like a simple idea is just one indication of the real complexities involved in launching a new global forum whose organizing principle is a government's qualification as a democracy and a shared commitment to collective action. The more ambitious versions of the concept—the Concert of Democracies proposed

by such liberal thinkers as Anne-Marie Slaughter, John Ikenberry, Ivo Daalder and Jim Lindsey,[3] and the League of Democracies backed by neoconservatives like Robert Kagan, Tod Lindberg, and Charles Krauthammer[4]—share in common a deep frustration with the inability of the United Nations, particularly the U.N. Security Council, to take action to address threats to collective security emanating from rogue dictators who antagonize their neighbors and abuse their own people. Remarkably, neither camp appeared to study in much detail the experience of a similar, though more modest initiative—the Community of Democracies, a multilateral forum of over 100 governments launched in 2000 by a Convening Group of seven (and now 17) governments from every region of the world.

The League of Democracies, according to Senator McCain, would link the more than 100 democratic nations around the world in one common organization working together for peace and liberty. In addition to tackling the crisis in Darfur, such an organization of like-minded states would cooperate "to combat HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, confront environmental crises, provide unimpeded market access to those who endorse economic and political freedom, and take other measures unattainable by existing regional or universal-membership systems."[5] It would complement rather than supplant the U.N. "by harnessing the political and moral advantages offered by united democratic action" to bring pressure on Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran.[6] Building on the experience of U.S. leadership of NATO, a President McCain would convene a summit of the world's democracies his first year in office to start the process of creating a League that would "advance our values and defend our shared interests." The idea's proponents, beyond this rough concept, have not spelled out any details of their vision. Notably, the proposal is couched only superficially in the language of democracy and human rights promotion, with security cooperation apparently its main concern.

The Concert of Democracies, proposed among others by a group of foreign policy experts leading the Princeton Project on National Security, shares a similar vision of creating a new institution to strengthen security cooperation among the world's democracies. "This Concert would institutionalize and ratify the 'democratic peace.' If the United Nations cannot be reformed, the Concert would provide an alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective action, including the use of force, by a supermajority vote. Its membership would be selective, but self-selected. Members would have to pledge not to use or plan to use force against one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their

[3] Ikenberry and Slaughter propose a charter for the Concert of Democracies and describe it as "an alternative forum for the approval of the use of force in cases where the use of the veto at the Security Council prevented free nations from keeping faith with the aims of the U.N. Charter." Ikenberry, John and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Final Report of Princeton Project on National Security, *Forging a World Under Liberty and Law*: *U.S. National Security in the 21st Century*, September 2006. Daalder and Lindsay originally proposed their idea in 2004 as "An Alliance of Democracies." Their proposed organization would "unite nations with entrenched democratic traditions." For their plan see Daalder, Ivo H. and James Lindsay, "An Alliance of Democracies," *The Washington Post*, May 23, 2004. Daalder and Lindsay later expanded their idea, calling it "The Concert of Democracies." Their proposed organization would have three major functions: helping democracies confront their mutual security challenges, promoting economic growth and development, and promoting democracy and human rights. See Daalder, Ivo H. and James Lindsay, "Democracies of the World, Unite," *The American Interest*, Vol. II, No. 3, January/February 2007.

[4] Kagan explains that the League of Democracies would give the world's democracies the opportunity "to act in humanitarian crises when the U.N. Security Council cannot reach unanimity." Kagan, Robert, "The Case for a League of Democracies," *Financial Times*, May 14, 2008. Lindberg, an informal advisor to the McCain campaign, argues that "it's time for the United States to join other democracies in adopting a new Treaty of the Democratic Peace." Lindberg, Tod, "The Treaty of Democratic Peace: What the World Needs Now," *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 12 No. 12, February 12, 2007. Lindberg further explains that the League is a major foreign policy idea for Senator McCain and that "if elected it is meant to have an outcome." See: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Event: "Is the League of Democracies a Good Idea?" May, 2008. Krauthammer argues that the best way to kill the U.N. is to "establish a parallel institution of democracies that actually does stuff, that actually acts in the world, and that is not acting either against our interests or doing nothing, as the U.N. almost all the time does." See Special Report with Brit Hume, Fox News Network, March 26, 2008.

[5] John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2007.

[6] Id.

citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept the responsibility to protect."[7] In the view of Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey, a Concert of Democracies would be *effective* because the world's democracies possess the greatest militaries, economies, wealth, innovation and productivity, and *legitimate* because they are governed through "democratically chosen representatives of the people, not the personal whims of autocrats or oligarchs."[8]

More recently, advocates of the Concert of Democracies, in response to a wave of criticism of McCain's embrace of the concept, have sought to draw out some distinctions. In a recent op-ed in the *Financial Times*, Ikenberry and Slaughter imagine a core group of liberal democracies coming to the rescue of a renewed and expanded system of global governance by widening the circle of global decision-making to include such countries as India, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey. Such a multilateral council would "check rash, unilateral U.S. initiatives" like the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Since, in their view, "[d]emocracies understand the need to have effective global institutions that include all important powers," they should be willing to expand the G-8 to a G-16 that would include non-democracies like China and Egypt. Rather than begin a new presidential term by pushing for a Concert of Democracies, the next U.S. president should consult close allies and, in the words of Daalder, build upon the already existing Community of Democracies.

The Community of Democracies (CD) was formed at the height of the democratic wave of the 1990s at the initiative of then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Poland's Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek. A hero of the Polish Solidarity movement, Geremek survived both the Nazi concentration camps and Soviet-inspired military dictatorship. Geremek hailed the Community of Democracies' first Ministerial Meeting in Warsaw in June 2000 as a critical turning point away from the old military Warsaw Pact engineered by the Soviet Union and towards a new era of international cooperation for the expansion of democracy.[9]

The Warsaw Declaration, approved by over 120 countries, is a straightforward statement of shared principles of democratic governance and human rights, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and some emerging universal norms of democracy like civilian control of the military, impartial judiciaries and independent electoral authorities.[10] The Community's mandate is to "cooperate to consolidate and strengthen democratic institutions… support adherence to common democratic values and standards…jointly to cooperate to discourage and resist the threat to democracy posed by the overthrow of constitutionally elected governments…[and] work with relevant institutions and international organizations, civil society and governments to coordinate support for new and emerging democratic societies." Governments in Warsaw also agreed to promote civil society and independent media, people-to-people exchanges, civic education, and minority rights. To advance their collaboration on democracy-related issues, they agreed to form coalitions and caucuses in existing institutions like the United Nations "to support resolutions and other international activities aimed at the promotion of democratic governance."

Thus, the Community of Democracies was born, as a self-selecting global forum of governments on

[7] Ikenberry and Slaughter, Final Report of Princeton Project on National Security, p. 7. http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf
[8] Daalder and Lindsey, "Democracies of the World, Unite," pp. 10-11.
[9] At the conference's opening ceremony, Geremek said, "We were agreed that democracy, civil society, good governance and human rights were matters that should engage the attention of the international community. We consider it both desirable and essential to involve governments in defining and redefining democracy. This denotes, first, the application by governments, civil society and individuals of the standards of democracy... Second, if we believe in the beneficial influence of democracy on human rights, development, and peace, we must actively promote respect for democracy in international relations." Finally, he added, "We should have a vested interest in expansion of democracy as a foundation for sustainable development and peace." Professor Geremek was tragically killed in an automobile accident on July 13, 2008.
[10] "Towards a Community of Democracies: Final Declaration," http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/warsaw_english.pdf

the democratic path committed to common values of liberal democracy and joint action to strengthen democracy wherever its citizens had chosen it. This mandate was both modest and ambitious. It sought to create a majority bloc of countries that agreed that democracy was the preferred form of government but did not intend to impose it on others or unduly antagonize important states like China and Saudi Arabia. It also aimed to build patterns of cooperation that cut across traditional north-south and east-west lines, to give emerging democracies an additional group of like-minded states to align themselves with in global bodies. In this sense, it sought to join a panoply of existing groups and caucuses of like-minded states built, for example, around a common language (la Francophonie), history (the Commonwealth), religion (Organization of Islamic Conference) or region (Africa Group).

At the same time, the CD states agreed to tackle as a common endeavor what traditionally has been a core preserve of sovereignty—the internal democratic politics and practices of states. Various precedents already existed for international intervention in internal political affairs, e.g., the United Nations' authorization of military force to reverse the military coup in Haiti in 1995, the Organization of American States' decision to authorize diplomatic measures in cases such as Peru in 2000, the Organization of African Unity's suspension of Cote d'Ivoire after the coup in December 1999, or the Commonwealth's suspension of Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Pakistan for failing to adhere to its democratic membership criteria. Building on these precedents as a foundation for a new pro-democracy body on the global level, however, was a bold step and one that so far has proved unattainable.

After eight years, four biennial ministerial meetings (Warsaw, Seoul, Santiago and Bamako), and countless meetings of senior and junior level diplomats, the Community of Democracies has little to show for the effort. On the plus column, it has developed its own governance structure, composed of a Convening Group of now 17 states from every region of the world:

Community of Democracies Convening Group			
Americas:	Chile El Salvador Mexico United States	Africa:	Cape Verde Mali Morocco South Africa
Europe:	Czech Republic Italy Portugal Poland Lithuania (as of 2008)	Asia:	India Mongolia The Philippines Republic of Korea

It has created a new, though largely moribund, **Democracy Caucus at the United Nations**, meeting annually at the foreign ministers level on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly in September and collaborating on occasion on democracy and human rights-related resolutions. It has improved its selection process by welcoming advice from an independent body of international experts as to which states meet the CD's official criteria for participation in its biennial meetings. And at its most recent meeting in Mali in November 2007, it decided to establish a Permanent Secretariat hosted by Poland with staff seconded by various Convening Group governments. Since then it has hired an Executive Secretary, Dr. Bronislaw Mistzal, a Polish academic who is trying to stand up a functioning operation in Warsaw (with very few resources from the Convening Group governments).

In terms of activities, largely through the leadership of the United States, India and Australia, the Community of Democracies provided critical early backing for a voluntary U.N. Democracy Fund (UNDEF) to support democracy-building initiatives mainly implemented by civil society groups around the world. Since its establishment in 2005, UNDEF has received donations and pledges totaling over $95 million from a wide range of countries, including India ($20 million), the United States ($25 million), and Japan ($20 million), with smaller donations from countries like Senegal, Slovenia and Peru. Notably, Qatar, the only donor not currently invited to

participate in the CD meetings, has given $10 million to the fund and thereby qualifies to sit on its advisory board.

As a body of diverse democracies with a range of governing systems, the CD offers a rich bank of best practices for those engaged in the never-ending quest to perfect democracy. Under Chile's chairmanship in 2004-05, the CD Convening Group organized two international missions to provide counsel to emerging democratic governments in Timor Leste and Georgia. It also has facilitated greater interregional learning through meetings of democracy promotion experts from regional organizations, with a particular focus recently on cooperation between the OAS and the African Union. Yet this resource for cross-regional learning remains severely under-utilized. Finally, it has improved its receptivity to input from civil society, inviting representatives from an international nongovernmental committee to brief its monthly meetings in Washington and participate actively with senior delegates at the biennial ministerials. Indeed, some would argue that, but for the persistent activism of civil society groups from around the world, the CD would have died on the vine years ago.

On the down side, the Community of Democracies and its leadership have turned down just about every opportunity to speak out against undemocratic maneuvers and outright coups, even when its own members fall off the democratic path. It has failed to exploit the modest leverage it has through its novel invitations process to pressure backsliding states to improve their democracy and human rights performance. It even has trouble reaching consensus praising a state for progress, for example after the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2007 (blocked, *inter alia*, by South Africa).

At its opening meeting in Warsaw, Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi made a videotaped appeal to the assembled ministers pleading for them to "use your democracy to save ours." Since then, its only collective venture into territory involving an authoritarian regime consisted of a Convening Group resolution condemning the Burmese military junta's attack on Suu Kyi in 2005, carefully worded to mimic what the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a club of countries not known for their attention to democracy, had already said. More recently, the Convening Group met to consider what it might say about the crisis in Zimbabwe and the Russia-Georgia conflict but, typically, consensus was blocked by one or two members. Apart from the contributions to UNDEF, its members continue to invest very few resources in building up a structure that could actually do something, like field expert missions to countries of concern, establish a mechanism to monitor threats to democracy, fully staff and fund a robust Permanent Secretariat or even establish a coherent presence on the internet.

Who Qualifies as a Democracy?

One of the most challenging aspects of any endeavor to convene the world's democracies is the what, how and who portion of the program. What specific benchmarks of democratic governance are most salient for selection of the participants? How are decisions to include or exclude certain governments made and by whom? And is the final outcome credible judging as best we can from the state of democracy and human rights in each country? Having been intimately involved in answering these questions as both a policymaker and an external expert, I can say with some authority that the Community of Democracies invitations process, after a rocky start, has made measurable progress in devising good answers to each of them but would not have done so without significant external pressure and support. Yet it still requires further institutionalization and transparency.

In its first Warsaw phase, the United States and Poland, as co-convenors of the process, took the novel approach of starting first with the "what" rather than the "who" question—what principles and values did the body seek to represent and what were its aspirations for collective action? Rather than establishing the usual time-consuming multilateral negotiating process with a hundred or more states, the organizers decided first to reach agreement on a draft declaration of principles among a core circle of representative states; this also helped avoid the lowest common denominator hazard of most multilateral negotiations.

Invitees were then approached with a clear idea of what they were signing up to and the message that this was more than just a photo opportunity.

As for the invitee list itself, the organizers of the Warsaw meeting took a moderately inclusive approach, inviting governments that either met basic norms of democracy and human rights as understood under prevailing international norms, or were deemed to be moving in a positive direction on the path to democracy. The organizers were hoping that, similar to the experience with the Helsinki Declaration process of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, underperforming states, once they endorsed a credible declaration of democratic principles, could be persuaded or embarrassed into improving their respect for international norms that they themselves had endorsed. This was especially pertinent to countries from the Middle East and Asia, which had no regional democracy standards to speak of. Providing domestic and international democracy activists a tool for holding borderline states accountable against an internationally-sanctioned democracy benchmark was seen as an important outcome of the process. It was also conceived as a way to give non-invited states an opportunity to qualify for inclusion once they met the group's standards, as Serbia did after the fall of Milosevic. Not surprisingly, calculations to invite certain countries were influenced by other factors, with intense lobbying among the State Department's regional bureaus for such favored states as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Qatar to be invited. This more liberal approach was quickly criticized for giving pseudo-democracies a status they did not deserve.[11]

To address this and other complaints about the process, the Convening Group agreed after Warsaw to establish official criteria for participation in CD meetings based on the principles endorsed in the Warsaw Declaration.[12] At their core, these principles endorse constitutional democracy with protection for minorities and individual rights. It also created an observer category for those states which do not meet the criteria but are taking concrete steps in a positive direction. Finally, the group agreed to review all states' qualifications every two years in anticipation of biennial ministerial meetings.[13] Together, these were key steps toward making the CD invitations process more dynamic and credible, one in which no state was automatically invited from year to year but had to be reviewed regularly by the Convening Group against the officially endorsed criteria. It allowed new developments like the quality of elections, human rights abuses or military coups to be considered on an ongoing basis.

The core challenge remained how a self-selected group of diplomats should apply the official criteria in specific country situations, many of which were murky at best, without unduly resorting to extraneous factors. The Convening Group, which had proven to be clumsy and non-transparent in its approach, was adamant about keeping control of the invitations process. But at the suggestion of a group of nongovernmental organizations, and with support from the United States and Czech Republic, they agreed to invite an independent advisory group to provide analysis and recommendations regarding which governments to invite to the fourth ministerial meeting in Bamako, Mali in November 2007. The International Advisory Committee for the Community of Democracies Invitations Process, composed of prominent figures from around the world and backed up by a multinational secretariat, undertook an 18-month process designed to zero in on the forty-some states that did

[11] Standards Urged for Community of Democracies, Human Rights Watch Letter to Convening Countries of Community of Democracies. New York, August 9, 2001. See: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/08/09/global994.htm

[12] According to the official guidelines adopted by the Convening Group, invitations to *participate* will be issued to "genuine democracies and those countries undergoing democratic consolidation," in accordance with the criteria. Invitations to *observe* will be issued to countries that fail to meet international standards of democracy and human rights, but are in a transition process and have given concrete steps along the lines of the criteria. Finally, if any state fails to comply, for a reasonable period of time, with one or several of these main requisites, it will *not be invited to participate* in any events of the Community of Democracies, for a limited time and as long as deemed necessary.

[13] http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/CD_participation_criteria.pdf

not clearly qualify.[14] Through an analysis of leading quantitative indices like the World Bank Institute's Governance Indicators, the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, Freedom House's Freedom in the World, and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Committee agreed on a list of countries that clearly qualified or did not qualify. It then turned its attention to the states in the gray zone through in-depth qualitative research and analysis of recent trends in respect for democracy and human rights.

As further detailed in the chart on page 16, the Committee made a set of recommendations that put pressure on the Convening Group to cut back the list of invitees. The final results, however, were mixed. The experts panel, for example, recommended that autocratic states like Russia and Egypt stay home while the governments compromised, inviting them as observers. The Convening Group decided not to invite Thailand, Fiji, Singapore, Qatar, Venezuela, Bangladesh and Tunisia, all of whom had participated in or observed the meeting held in Santiago in 2005 but had since slid backwards in respect for democratic norms. Iraq, which the experts panel argued was not ready for participation, was given full status, as was Afghanistan, clearly a result of U.S. insistence that its two main democracy projects be seen as part of the world's democracy club despite their lack of qualifications. The Convening Group was lenient also with regard to keeping some countries, such as Bahrain, Jordan, Malaysia and Yemen, as participants despite the Committee's documentation of a downward trend in democratic standards and human rights. They also maintained several questionable countries in the observer category (Oman, Burkina Faso and Azerbaijan), despite recommendations by the experts panel to not invite, and moved several countries that the experts panel said were not making sufficient progress (Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, and Uganda) to the observer category for the first time.

Decisions to include or exclude certain countries from a club of democracies are inherently difficult even when the stakes—qualifying in the eyes of the international community as a "democracy" or not—are relatively low compared, for example, to qualifying for membership in NATO or the European Union. Excluded states, along with their friends and neighbors, are certain to object on any number of grounds. Even members of the Convening Group chafed at the process—South Africa actively pushed for including all U.N. member states, even though such an open door process already exists through the U.N.-sponsored International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD).[15]

From a democracy promotion point of view, the invitations process offers a positive tool to foster respect for democratic norms through the attraction of qualifying as a member of good standing in the only global body devoted to democracy. Ideally, the Convening Group would have exploited the known desire by some borderline states, e.g., Russia or Algeria, to get an invitation, by engaging in a dialogue with them about what steps they could take to qualify for inclusion. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, they generally failed to take such an approach, preferring not to confront such states about deficiencies in their democratic practices. Nor is there any sign that the governments are willing to institutionalize a dialogue with observer states or invest the resources necessary to build on the experts' process.

The CD's invitations process would have more leverage with wayward states if it became more transparent

[14] The 13 members of the International Advisory Committee for the Community of Democracies Invitations Process are: Genaro Arriagada (Chile), E. Gyimah Boadi (Ghana), César Gaviria (Colombia), Morton Halperin (United States), Rima Khalaf Hunaidi (Jordan), Asma Jahangir (Pakistan), Josef Janning (Germany), Hong-koo Lee (Republic of Korea), António Mascarenhas Monteiro (Cape Verde), Nadezhda Mihailova (Bulgaria), Mark Palmer (United States), Sonia Picado (Costa Rica), and Ghassan Salamé (Lebanon). Wim Kok (the Netherlands) served as an advisory member; Amb. Martin Palouš (Czech Republic) was an observer. The Secretariat was composed of Freedom House, Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development and the Democracy Coalition Project.

[15] For more information about the ICNRD, see http://www.icnrd.org/. See also the website developed by the Qatari government, current chair of the ICNRD, http://www.icnrd6.com/.

and accountable to the wider international community. The Convening Group, for example, is self-appointed with unlimited terms. It should be elected by the CD's general membership for fixed terms if it is to be taken seriously.[16] Review of countries of concern should take place on an ongoing basis and could be led by the new Permanent Secretariat with support from the experts panel. The aim would be to help states that have not yet qualified graduate toward membership with some support for technical assistance coordinated through the Convening Group.

What does this experience with a criteria-based invitations process tell us about how a League or Concert of Democracies would handle this fundamental question of who to invite? Given that both proposals are oriented toward multilateral cooperation for security purposes rather than democracy promotion, it is hard to imagine that either one would invest the resources necessary to ground an invitations process in respect for democracy and human rights. Rather, one would expect its backers to take a "coalition of the willing" approach: the United States, as the purported godfather of the democracy universe, would anoint which countries to enfold based on their willingness to take collective action against non-democracies or other threats to global peace. This, in my view, runs an intolerable risk of precipitating Cold War II, particularly in light of Russia's newfound assertiveness against its democratic-leaning neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine. Were they to decide otherwise, they would be wise to look hard at the experience of the Community of Democracies and draw from it some lessons regarding three key elements: the importance of criteria grounded in international law and endorsed by a wide circle of states, the need for independent advice, and creation of an ongoing process of engagement that allows new states to be included along the way and non-performing states to be kicked out.

Cooperation among Democracies – A Bridge Too Far?

In studying the prospects of a League or Concert of Democracies, it is important to ask the question: Why has the Community of Democracies failed thus far to get beyond declarations and take concerted action even on modest initiatives to support democratization? I would cite three principal reasons:

1. *U.S. Leadership*. As in so many other cases, the United States' role as midwife to the Community of Democracies has proven to be both a blessing and a curse. It is true that the initiative would never have been launched without bipartisan support from Washington and the leadership of Madeleine Albright and her Policy Planning Director, Morton Halperin. The State Department rallied early endorsements from such diverse countries as Mali, Chile, South Korea and the Czech Republic, whose leaders understood and appreciated the role the international community played in their own transitions to democracy. India's participation in the organizing committee also gave the initiative an important stamp of legitimacy while post-apartheid South Africa, a reluctant and last-minute member of the committee, rounded out an impressively diverse leadership group.

   U.S. leadership of CD in the context of Washington's new post Cold War role of lone superpower, however, prompted real concerns that have only gotten worse since the invasion of Iraq. Interestingly, the most vocal doubters have come from among our closest allies in the European Union (EU), itself a community of democracies. Despite the obvious convergence of goals between the CD and the EU's emerging foreign policy,[17] most European governments

[16] See David Yang's contribution to the debate sparked by Daalder and Lindsey's proposal, "Democracies of the World, Unite: The Debate Continues," *The American Interest*, Spring (March/April) 2007, p. 134.

[17] Chapter 1, Article 10 *A* of the Treaty of Lisbon states: "The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to…consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law…" For more information see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF

either reluctantly participated or outright opposed the initiative, largely out of concern that it represented the start of a U.S. campaign to undermine the U.N., isolate China and/or block the ascension of Europe. France, in particular, thundered against the Warsaw meeting as an arrogant exercise of U.S. "hyperpower" and an imposition of its own model of democracy on the rest of the world. France's then Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, decorously refused to endorse the Warsaw Declaration and lobbied others, including in Francophone Africa, to join him.[18] But it was France, not the U.S., which was isolated in the end as governments, some of them barely pseudo-democracies, jockeyed to be seen in the photo opportunity of a democracy club at its birth.

Since then, the State Department has struggled to maintain the momentum of the Warsaw meeting. After an initial period of "anything but Clinton" resistance within the first term of the Bush 43 presidency, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky took ownership of the initiative and fought for a more operational outcome to the second ministerial meeting, hosted in November 2002 in Seoul by democracy dissident-turned president Kim Dae-jung. While the outcome was disappointing, the Seoul meeting planted the CD flag in the less hospitable region of Asia and ensured that Warsaw was not a one-off event.

As the chairmanship of the Convening Group rotated next to Chile then Mali and now Portugal, U.S. leadership behind the scenes remained a point of contention, a classic case of the old adage—"you can't live with 'em and you can't live without 'em." A good example of this can be seen in the selection of new members to the Convening Group, which continues to meet mainly in Washington. The inclusion of such close U.S. allies as El Salvador, Italy (under Berlusconi), Cape Verde, Mongolia and Morocco (a dubious choice on other grounds) fed perceptions that this was a club hand-picked to do Washington's bidding. Another example was the U.S. insistence that Iraq be invited as a full participant, despite its failure to meet the official criteria for participation.

The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 offered an opportunity for Washington to rally support from this new club of democracies for a concerted rejection of terrorism in all its forms. In fact, meeting for the first time as a Democracy Caucus at the U.N., the group did issue a statement condemning "the unprecedented terrorist attacks" and further adding that the "members of the Community of Democracies' Convening Group believe that continuing the work to strengthen democracy and to promote its core values and principles will help to create a stable international order and a climate of mutual understanding and tolerance that can effectively prevent violence and crimes against humanity."[19] The Iraq debacle, however, specifically the White House's cloaking of the Iraq war as a crusade for democracy in the Middle East, unsheathed its true unilateral instincts and was probably the main culprit for the failure of the CD to get off the ground. In the minds of the CD's skeptics, it converted what began as a mutual support club for countries on the democratic path into a potentially lethal weapon designed to impose democracy at the point of a gun. It punctured a still fragile consensus for a global multilateral forum as an anchor to a new democratic peace approach to international relations. Furthermore, the abuses associated with the U.S. war on terror undermined the argument that democracies were inherently superior to non-democracies when it came to protection of basic human rights.

[18] Perlez, Jane, "100 Voices for Democracy, as France Clears its Throat," *The New York Times,* June 28, 2000.
[19] http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/conveninggroupstateterror.pdf

2. *Intransigence from the "Non-Intervention" Crowd.* Related to the problems associated with U.S. leadership is the opposition coming from certain countries on the Convening Group, mainly India and South Africa and less so from Mexico and the Philippines. The bureaucratic traditionalists managing multilateral diplomacy for New Delhi and Johannesburg have routinely blocked any action by the Convening Group that might set a precedent in which the Community of Democracies speaks up about a country-specific situation. Even in the most straightforward cases, like when a CD member suffers a military coup, as Thailand and Bangladesh did in 2006 and 2007, respectively, the Convening Group has held back from any public declaration (though it did withhold invitations to these two states to its Bamako Ministerial meeting several months later). While internal deliberations of the Convening Group are confidential, sources have confirmed that these states hew the traditional line against so-called interference in internal affairs.

   Some of this resistance to operationalizing the CD stems from an entrenched traditionalist view of foreign policy as practiced by diplomats schooled in the non-interference and non-aligned approach to diplomacy. Their reluctance to join voice with those advocating a more robust and coordinated response to democratic crises is a product of these countries' long battles with colonial and imperial powers from which their ruling parties emerged as the victors. Vocal constituencies in now democratic India and South Africa both within and outside government circles argue against switching sides to join what is perceived as a campaign of "the West" (read Washington) for invading sovereignty in the name of promoting democracy. Instead, they choose to maintain their primary allegiance to other voting blocs like the G-77, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) or the Africa bloc.

In addition to the problem of the legacy of interventionism, there is the larger issue of democratic states simply not placing importance on the promotion of democracy and human rights as an element of their foreign policy. In a survey conducted of forty countries' foreign policies regarding democracy promotion over a ten-year period (1992-2002),[20] the authors identified some positive trends, at least in condemning the most flagrant reversals of democratic transition. On the other hand, they also concluded that key states like Japan, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Mexico showed no inclination toward supporting democratic development outside their borders and had invested little to no resources in training its diplomats on how to address the matter. And in cases where a clear choice was presented between supporting democratic transitions and an authoritarian status quo, most states chose the latter in order to protect other security and economic interests.

One indicator of how these factors influence state behavior can be seen in the voting patterns of member states when voting on human rights resolutions at the United Nations. On both thematic and country specific resolutions, a core group of democratic states from Europe and the Americas, plus Japan, Australia and South Korea, demonstrate some solidarity in supporting resolutions aimed at strengthening the U.N. human rights system or condemning egregious violators.[21] These resolutions often squeak by or fail, however, due to opposition or abstention from such important democracies as South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, Philippines, India and many African democracies, the same group that one would want in any League or Concert scheme. Blocs built around identities other than

[20] Robert G. Herman and Theodore J. Piccone, *Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends, 1992-2002*, (Washington, Democracy Coalition Project, 2002).

[21] Human Rights Council Report Card, 2006-07 (Washington, Democracy Coalition Project, 2007), http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/HRC%20Table%20of%20Indicators%20for%20Year%20One%20-%20Full%20Chart.pdf

democracy, such as the OIC or the Africa bloc, maintain stronger solidarity, particularly in the face of any serious attempt to use the Human Rights Council to scrutinize domestic human rights behavior.

The case of India is particularly noteworthy for the schizophrenic approach it took to the policy choices it faced when Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh decided to join the CD's organizing committee, over the objections of bureaucrats in his ministry. As the world's largest and most diverse democracy, India has much to teach the world about its own democratic practices and should have a strong interest in supporting a measure of democratic stability in its neighborhood. Yet it has largely viewed the CD as an instrument for advancing other priorities and has shown little inclination to assert leadership as shaky democracies next door crumble (Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka). At first its diplomats' principal goal was to fight for the exclusion of its troublesome neighbor Pakistan from the club and otherwise to water down any language that suggested a more active agenda. As New Delhi sought warmer bilateral relations with Washington, mainly to secure a nuclear deal, India became more positively engaged by, for example, making a very large donation to the U.N. Democracy Fund.[22] It even co-funded a joint government-civil society project to construct a handbook for diplomats designed to instruct them on how to handle requests for help from democracy activists.[23] Nonetheless, its diplomats generally obstruct and delay attempts to strengthen the CD, particularly on country-specific situations. At the Bamako meeting, its senior representatives from New Delhi sought to weaken the final statement's language regarding support for independent civil society, despite its earlier endorsement of the text in Washington, creating havoc and dissension. More recently, and coincident with the ascent of McCain's proposal for a League of Democracies, India is quietly pulling back again, as seen from its decision recently to downplay its role in the diplomats democracy handbook.

3. *Fear of a New Cold War and a Weakened U.N.* One of the strongest objections to the Community of Democracies has been the fear that dividing the world between the "good" democracies and the "bad" non-democracies could spark conflict and a strong pushback from powerful authoritarian states like China and Russia. Such a Manichean approach would also interfere with the need for cooperation from non-democracies on a host of important global issues. A related worry, voiced in particular from democratic allies in Europe, is that the CD is really a hidden U.S. attempt to undermine the United Nations or create a rival organization.

   Anticipating Beijing's concerns, the Clinton State Department sought to assure China from the start that the CD was not intended to antagonize or isolate them and that instead it sought to support countries that had chosen the democratic path rather than proselytize to the non-converted. It also agreed that Taiwan would not be invited as a member of the CD on the grounds that participation would be limited to standing members of the United Nations. As a result, China has largely remained quiet about the initiative, although it has subtly campaigned against the CD's efforts to create a Democracy Caucus at the U.N.[24] It also allegedly persuaded Mali to block any Taiwanese citizen from participating in the Bamako ministerial meeting.

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[22] Mohan, Raja C, "Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with Democracy Promotion," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2007, (99-115). See also "U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative Fact Sheet," U.S. Department of State, July 18, 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49722.htm

[23] A Diplomat's Handbook for Democratic Development Support, available at http://www.ccd21.org/pdf/handbook.pdf.pdf

[24] China, along with Egypt, Cuba and Pakistan, has led efforts at the U.N. Committee on NGOs to deny or defer action on the applications of credentials for NGOs that it perceives as too critical of its human rights record or campaigning for greater scrutiny of voting patterns on U.N. human rights resolutions.

Russia, on the other hand, presented its own set of problems as Putin's respect for democracy and human rights continued to falter. After some debate in 2005 as to whether Russia should be downgraded to observer status for the Santiago Ministerial meeting, Russia was included. It behaved badly, however, as it joined Venezuela in various attempts at that meeting to undermine a strong outcome document. In 2007, in the face of strong evidence it no longer met the democracy criteria for invitation to Bamako, the Convening Group quietly agreed to downgrade Russia to the observer category. Meanwhile, Putin and his allies have ramped up the rhetoric against democracy promotion efforts emanating from Washington and Brussels and even launched a "think tank" dedicated to critiquing Western forms of democracy.[25] They are also putting tremendous pressure on domestic and international civil society groups pushing for greater civil and political rights in Russia.[26]

More ominously, Russia's recent military conflict with Georgia has revived a troublesome Cold War mentality of east vs. west with democracy promotion as one of the touchstones of tension. Georgia and Ukraine's bid to join NATO, the world's only military alliance for democracies, along with a series of other humiliations, pushed Russia to the tipping point of a brutal counterstrike against Georgia's clumsy assertion of sovereignty in South Ossetia. Now, the United States and Europe are compelled to join hands to condemn Russia's untoward behavior against a "defenseless democracy," further underscoring the dividing lines between the "good" democracies and the "bad" autocracies. McCain's own position calling for excluding Russia from the G-8, which actually preceded the South Ossetia conflict, coupled with his League of Democracies proposal, certainly will further weaken support for the CD among those countries that do not wish to further antagonize a newly assertive Moscow.

As frustration mounts over the United Nations' seeming inability to play a meaningful role in addressing real and potential conflicts, the calls grow louder to fix the system by going around it. It was precisely that scenario which led many governments to keep the CD, and its U.N. Democracy Caucus, at arms length. To counter this problem, pro-CD supporters emphasized that the goal of the new U.N. Democracy Caucus was to strengthen the U.N. from within, by offering member states a grouping organized around common values, values embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N.'s most important statement of principles. Kofi Annan, speaking at the inaugural meeting as U.N. Secretary General, endorsed the initiative as compatible with U.N. goals: "When the United Nations can truly call itself a community of democracies, the Charter's noble ideals of protecting human rights and promoting 'social progress in larger freedoms' will have been brought much closer."[27]

Under the leadership of Chilean Amb. Heraldo Munoz, the U.N. Democracy Caucus began to find its legs in 2005, quietly organizing regular meetings to share information and coordinate positions on resolutions relating to democracy and human rights, for example. Yet the grouping has never coalesced, in part because of the sheer diversity of its 120-plus membership, and because member states continue to associate themselves first with other types of like-minded states. But even among its natural allies, there was always the concern that the Bush Administration, with the heightened anti-U.N. rhetoric of John Bolton and company, really sought to lay

[25] "New Russian Think Tank to Question West Ways." *Associated Press*; January 28, 2008. Osipovich, Alexandar, "Institute to Delve into U.S. Democracy." *The Moscow Times,* January 14, 2008.
[26] "Defending Civil Society," World Movement for Democracy and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, February 2008. http://www.wmd.org/documents/Defending%20Civil%20Society%20-%20English.pdf
[27] http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/un_secertary_gen_kofi_annan.pdf

the groundwork for an alternative forum. The U.S. decision to vote against the establishment of the U.N. Human Rights Council, joined only by Israel, Palau and the Marshall Islands, and since then to disengage from its activities in Geneva, provide yet further support to the view that Washington's true intentions are to abandon the U.N. in favor of a new architecture in which it is both judge and jury of the actions of others.

Getting Democracy Promotion Right

In light of the experience of the Community of Democracies thus far, what should a McCain or Obama Administration do to address the genuine need for better multilateral cooperation among close democratic allies and smarter democracy and human rights policies? Can it achieve both aims in one grand scheme? Should it downgrade democracy promotion as a goal of foreign policy?

Despite the pounding that democracy promotion has taken at home and abroad as a result of the Bush Administration's policies, democracy and human rights as a key component of U.S. (and EU) foreign policy will not go away. It's in our genes. The core evidence supporting the democratic peace theory still stands. And the alternative to democracy—autocratic or failed states harboring terrorists, generating refugees, fostering massive corruption and using energy as a potential weapon—is certainly worse.

A focus on democracy and human rights is also central to a moral concept of foreign policy, which will continue to drive U.S. politics and policies and, I would argue, the politics and policies of other democracies susceptible to pressure from their citizens. Over time, the moral, citizen-driven aspect of foreign policy will increase as migration, media communications, civic activism and internet penetration expand around the globe. It is in the interest of the U.S. to be on the right side of this trend, in contrast to its utter failure in Pakistan to abandon General Musharraf until the bitter end.

If we want a more legitimate and effective international system that responds to transnational threats in a way that also abides by democracy and human rights norms, then what we need is more and stronger democracies that understand the value of democratic governance for political and economic stability. We need democracies that see their national security interests as best protected by the expansion of democracy next door and around the globe. The focus, therefore, should be on strengthening and expanding the circle of functioning democracies rather than investing in a new scheme before its time. The key question is not if but *how*, in the current global political context, should the U.S. incorporate democracy and human rights promotion in its foreign policy.

As for the League/Concert idea, it is fair to say that it is dead in the water, not least because it would find few supporters among the world's democracies. One could, however, usefully invest time and resources in building up the Community of Democracies as a forum for helping democracies deliver meaningful results for its citizens *and* for advancing democratic solidarity for reform of existing international institutions. A revitalized Community of Democracies, meeting at the heads of state level at its tenth anniversary in 2010, could dedicate itself to three main goals: 1) democratizing the governance structure of international institutions by, for example, sharing power with others, with an explicit preference for democracies that govern with the support of their citizens through free and fair elections; 2) creating real incentives for democratic reform, including economic, development and trade benefits; and 3) investing the financial and human resources needed to create a real Community of Democracies organization with the legitimacy and credibility to get the job done.

The U.S. should not, however, seek to convert the CD into a venue for security cooperation. There are other more appropriate ways of pursuing this goal, namely the U.N. Security Council. If consensus cannot be reached there, then the U.S. can turn to NATO, or help create ad hoc coalitions of close partners in each region who can join us in addressing core threats and deploying peacekeeping troops, as the African Union has slowly begun to do in Sudan or as troops from Latin America countries have done in Haiti.

In order for the U.S. to recover its ability to play a leadership role in resuscitating the CD, we need to get our own democracy promotion house in order. Below I offer seven recommendations for policymakers prepared to continue bipartisan efforts to support democracy and human rights:

1. *De-contaminate the Bush doctrine of regime change* by cleaning up our own human rights record (and our antiquated voting systems), lowering the rhetorical volume and finger-pointing, and explicitly abandoning the regime change approach. We ought to stop picking favorites in foreign elections, be consistent in our support for democratic processes, learn some humility and lead by example. The style of our diplomacy often matters as much as the substance.

   As a corollary to the above, it is time we take an "all-government" approach to democracy and human rights promotion by having the National Security Council establish an interagency process, led by a Senior Director, that coordinates all relevant agencies in a coherent and mainstreamed democracy policy. In order to build credibility abroad, the next president should appoint a high-level expert in U.S. human rights and democracy in the State Department—not as a propagandist extolling the virtues of the U.S. model of democracy but as someone who could deal responsibly with the growing international scrutiny of the U.S. domestic record of respecting international norms.[28] The expert would be responsible for drawing out lessons, pro and con, of the U.S. experience, identifying the most important areas of reform needed to comply with our international human rights obligations, preparing the U.S. submission to the new Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the U.N. Human Rights Council, and overseeing a new chapter on the U.S. in the annual State Department human rights report.

2. *Take a "do no harm" approach* to democracy promotion. Let local activists guide us in how we support their indigenous campaigns for reform. In this regard, consider abandoning the Iran democracy program, which appears to have done more harm than good to the very people we are trying to help. And be prepared to take a long-term view, given the erratic nature of democracy-building, by investing significant resources for many years to come.

3. *Pull back from the rush to elections*. In post-conflict situations, where societies are grappling with an array of complex problems and demands for both peace and justice, we ought to take the time needed to lay the groundwork for free and fair elections. Similarly, when elections go very badly and are contested through legitimate constitutional means, as in the case of Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe, we should hold back from recognizing the victor until matters are settled in accordance with the rule of law or through international mediation. We also should build up international norms of what constitutes free and fair elections accompanied by rules on what to do when they are violated. These principles should include the notion that armed actors shall not participate in elections. This will help foster greater coherence in the international architecture for isolating illegitimate regimes and strengthen the rule of law.

4. *Go multilateral at every opportunity*. The next administration should reinvigorate the Community of Democracies by persuading key allies to join its leadership, investing resources and demonstrating that we do not intend to use it to divide the world between good guys and bad guys. Beyond rescuing the CD, U.S. embassies need to partner with other like-minded embassies on the ground. Our diplomats in New York and Washington, but also Addis Ababa, Brussels, Geneva and Manila, need to work through old and new international mechanisms wherever possible, both with governments and civil society.

28 For a recent example of U.S. government efforts to show a more complex picture of America, see www.america.gov.

Institutionalizing dialogues on democracy and human rights issues with our democratic partners in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America would sensitize us and them toward a common purpose and smarter modalities. Certainly, the next president should continue, with Congress' support, to fund the U.N. Democracy Fund. We ought to re-engage at the Human Rights Council by appointing a senior-level envoy to do the hard work of building coalitions for real reform. At the same time, much more work could be done to strengthen regional organizations as leading actors whenever possible.

5. *Use economic incentives and rewards*. As the EU enlargement example shows, states transitioning to democracy and inclined toward regional and global integration can make major reforms to their democracy and human rights records if the right economic incentives are in place. The Millennium Challenge Account is modeled on a similar award system in which states that perform well at home qualify for major U.S. investments in projects the receiving state determines. While the MCC track record has come under some criticism, it is worth studying whether Washington should try to multilateralize the fund, perhaps through the OECD. In any event, U.S. policy should focus its limited assistance on transitional democracies and help them consolidate through bilateral aid, debt relief, trade preferences, etc.

6. *Ensure democracies deliver* meaningful improvements to people's lives. Polling indicates that people in every region of the world desire the freedoms and rights best guaranteed by a democratic system. Yet they also want tangible improvements in their livelihoods—jobs, schools, water, health care and safety. Our aid and trade programs should prioritize the delivery of concrete benefits, especially in post-conflict transitions to democracy.

7. *Restore human rights to a higher plane.* A standard axiom of democracy promotion is that democracy is the best way to guarantee human rights. Yet the reverse is equally true—you cannot lay the foundations of a democratic state without respect for basic human rights. The next president should lead off any speech on democracy by putting respect for human rights as the first argument. As we have no international treaties on democracy, only high-sounding political declarations, we should ground our case in the core elements of international human rights law. This will have the ancillary benefit of reinforcing U.S. respect for international norms. And we should finally ratify these and other relevant conventions to prove that we are willing to hold ourselves accountable to the universal norms of humankind.

Conclusion

The next president of the United States will face some clear choices when it comes to the question President Woodrow Wilson posed over 80 years ago—how to make the world safe for democracy. He could spend major political capital in a campaign to rally our democratic allies around a common mission of collective action that serves U.S. purposes, as Senator McCain proposes to do. This, the evidence suggests, is likely to fail. Or he could take a more realistic approach by first repairing our badly damaged reputation around the world, particularly in the area of democracy and human rights, and investing in the long-term to help consolidate democracies and democratize their foreign policies. Either way, the experience of the Community of Democracies, with its more limited agenda of fostering collaboration among democracies for the sake of mutual solidarity and support, offers some important lessons for the journey ahead.

RECORD OF PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES MINISTERIALS*

Categories: NI (Not Invited/Do Not Invite); I (Invited/Invite); I* (Invite, deserves close monitoring); O (Observer); P (Participant); NR (No Recommendation); NR* (No Recommendation, deserves close monitoring); D (Withhold invite pending dialogue)

COUNTRY	WARSAW (2000)	SEOUL (2002)	SANTIAGO (2005)	IAC Recommendation BAMAKO[1]	BAMAKO (2007)[2]	COUNTRY
Afghanistan	NI	O	P↑	O	I↑	Afghanistan
Albania	P	P	P	I	I	Albania
Algeria	P	O	O	O	O	Algeria
Andorra	I	P	P	I	I	Andorra
Angola	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Angola
Antigua Barb.	I	P	P	I	I	Antigua Barb.
Argentina	P	P	P	I	I	Argentina
Armenia	P	O	O	O	O	Armenia
Australia	P	P	P	I	I	Australia
Austria	P	P	P	I	I	Austria
Azerbaijan	P	O	O	NI	O↑	Azerbaijan
Bahamas	I	P	P	I	I	Bahamas
Bahrain	NI	P	P	O	I↑	Bahrain
Bangladesh	P	P	P	D	NI↓	Bangladesh
Barbados	I	P	P	I	I	Barbados
Belarus	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Belarus
Belgium	P	P	P	I	I	Belgium
Belize	P	P	P	I	I	Belize
Benin	P	P	P	I	I	Benin
Bhutan	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Bhutan
Bolivia	P	P	P	I*	I	Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzeg.	P	P	P	I	I	Bosnia-Herzeg.
Botswana	P	P	P	I	I	Botswana
Brazil	P	P	P	I	I	Brazil
Brunei	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Brunei
Bulgaria	P	P	P	I	I	Bulgaria
Burkina Faso	P	O	O	NI	O↑	Burkina Faso
Burma	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Burma
Burundi	NI	NI	NI	O	O	Burundi
Cambodia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Cambodia
Cameroon	NI	NI	NI	NI	O↑	Cameroon
Canada	P	P	P	I	I	Canada

Italics: Member of the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies
Light Blue: Invitation issued by Convening Group for level of participation higher than recommended by IAC.
Gray: Invitation issued by Convening Group for level of participation lower than recommended by IAC.

*Chart prepared by The Democracy Coalition Project, www.demcoalition.org

[1] Recommendations made by the independent International Advisory Committee (IAC) for the Community of Democracies Invitations Process, Feb. 2007
[2] Official invitation status for Bamako Ministerial as decided by the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies, August 2007.

COUNTRY	WARSAW (2000)	SEOUL (2002)	SANTIAGO (2005)	IAC Recommendation BAMAKO[1]	BAMAKO (2007)[2]	COUNTRY
Cape Verde	P	P	P	NR	I	Cape Verde
Centr. Afr. Rep.	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Centr. Afr. Rep.
Chad	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Chad
Chile	P	P	P	NR	I	*Chile*
China	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	China
Colombia	P	P	P	I	I	Colombia
Comoros	NI	NI	NI	NR	NI	Comoros
Congo (Brazz.)	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Congo (Brazz.)
Congo, DR	NI	NI	NI	NI	O↑	Congo (Kinsh.)
Costa Rica	P	P	P	I	I	Costa Rica
Côte d'Invoire	NI	O	NI↓	NI	NI	Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia	P	P	P	I	I	Croatia
Cuba	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Cuba
Cyprus	P	P	P	I	I	Cyprus
Czech Rep.	P	P	P	NI	I	*Czech Rep.*
Denmark	P	P	P	I	I	Denmark
Djibouti	NI	NI	O↑	NI	O↑	Djibouti
Dominica	P	P	P	I	I	Cominica
Dominic. Rep.	P	P	P	I	I	Dominic. Rep.
Ecuador	P	P	P	I*	I	Ecuador
Egpt	P	O	O	NI	O↑	Egypt
El Salvador	P	P	P	NR	I	*El Salvador*
Equat Guin.	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Equat. Guin.
Eritrea	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Eritrea
Estonia	P	P	P	I	I	Estonia
Ethiopia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Ethiopia
Fiji	NI	O	P↑	NI	NI	Fiji
Finland	P	P	P	I	I	Finland
France	P	P	P	I	I	France
Gabon	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Gabon
Gambia	NI	NI	O↑	NI	NI	Gambia
Georgia	P	O	P↑	I*	I	Georgia
Germany	P	P	P	I	I	Germany
Ghana	NI	P	P	I	I	Ghana
Greece	P	P	P	I	I	Greece
Greneda	I	P	P	I	I	Grenada
Guatemala	P	P	P	I*	I	Guatemala
Guinea	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Guinea
Guinea-Biss.	NI	NI	NI	NI	O↑	Guinea-Biss.
Guyana	I	P	P	I	I	Guyana
Haiti	P	O	O	O	I	Haiti

Italics: Member of the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies
Light Blue: Invitation issued by Convening Group for level of participation higher than recommended by IAC.
Gray: Invitation issued by Convening Group for level of participation lower than recommended by IAC.

COUNTRY	WARSAW (2000)	SEOUL (2002)	SANTIAGO (2005)	IAC Recommendation BAMAKO[1]	BAMAKO (2007)[2]	COUNTRY
Honduras	P	P	P	I	I	Honduras
Hungary	P	P	P	I	I	Hungary
Iceland	P	P	P	I	I	Iceland
India	P	P	P	NR	I	*India*
Indonesia	P	P	P	I	I	Indonesia
Iran	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Iran
Iraq	NI	NI	O↑	NI	I↑	Iraq
Ireland	P	P	P	I	I	Ireland
Israel	P	P	P	I	I	Israel
Italy	P	P	P	NR	I	*Italy*
Jamaica	I	P	P	I	I	Jamaica
Japan	P	P	P	I	I	Japan
Jordan	P	P	P	O	I↑	Jordan
Kazakhstan	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Kazakhstan
Kenya	P	NI	P↑	O	I↑	Kenya
Kiribati	I	P	P	I	I	Kiribati
Kuwait	P	O	O	O	O	Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan	NI	NI	NI	O	O	Kyrgyzstan
Laos	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	:aps
Latvia	P	P	P	I	I	Latvia
Levanon	I	O	O	I*	I	Lebanon
Lesotho	P	P	P	I	I	Lesotho
Libertia	NI	NI	NI	O	I↑	Liberia
Libya	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Libya
Liechtenstein	P	P	P	I	I	Liechtenstein
Lithuania	P	P	P	I	I	Lithuania
Luxembourg	P	P	P	I	I	Luxembourg
Macedonia	P	P	P	I	I	Macedonia
Madagascar	P	O	P↑	I	I	Madagascar
Malawi	P	P	P	I*	I	Malawi
Malaysia	NI	O	P↑	O	I↑	Malaysia
Maldives	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Maldives
Mali	P	P	P	NR	I	*Mali*
Malta	P	P	P	I	I	Malta
Marshall Isl.	I	P	P	I	I	Marshall Isl.
Mauritania	NI	NI	NI	O	O	Mauritania
Mauritius	P	P	P	I	I	Mauritius
Mexico	P	P	P	NR	I	*Mexico*
Micronesia	I	P	P	I	I	Micronesia
Moldova	P	P	P	I*	I	Moldova
Monaco	P	P	P	I	I	Monaco

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COUNTRY	WARSAW (2000)	SEOUL (2002)	SANTIAGO (2005)	IAC Recommendation BAMAKO[1]	BAMAKO (2007)[2]	COUNTRY
Mongolia	P	P	P	NR	I	*Mongolia*
Montenegro	N/A	N/A	N/A	I*	I	Montenegro
Morocco	P	P	P	NR*	I	*Morocco*
Mozambique	P	P	P	I	I	Mozambique
Namibia	P	P	P	I	I	Namibia
Nauru	I	P	P	I	I	Nauru
Nepal	P	P	NI↓	O	O	Nepal
Netherlands	P	P	P	I	I	Netherlands
New Zealand	P	P	P	I	I	New Zealand
Nicaragua	P	P	P	I	I	Nicaragua
Niger	P	P	P	I	I	Niger
Nigeria	P	P	P	O**	O	Nigeria
North Korea	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	North Korea
Norway	P	P	P	I	I	Norway
Oman	NI	O	O	NI	O↑	Oman
Pakistan	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Pakistan
Palau	I	P	P	I	I	Palau
Panama	P	P	P	I	I	Panama
Papua N.G.	P	P	P	I	I	Papua N.G.
Paraguay	P	P	P	I	I	Paraguay
Peru	P	P	P	I	I	Peru
Philippines	P	P	P	NR*	I	*Philippines*
Poland	P	P	P	NR	I	*Poland*
Portugal	P	P	P	NR	I	*Portugal*
Qatar	P	O	O	NI	NI	Qatar
Romania	P	P	P	I	I	Romania
Russia	P	P	P	NI	O↑	Russia
Ruwanda	NI	NI	NI	NI	O↑	Rwanda
St. Kitts Nev.	I	P	P	I	I	St. Kitts Nev.
Saint Lucia	P	P	P	I	I	Saint Lucia
St. Vincent G.	I	P	P	I	I	St. Vincent G.
Samoa	I	P	P	I	I	Samao
San Marino	I	P	P	I	I	San Marino
Sao Tome Pri.	P	P	P	I	I	Sao Tome Pri.
Saudi Arabia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Saudi Arabia
Senegal	P	P	P	I	I	Senegal
Serbia	NI	P	P	I	I	Serbia
Seychelles	P	P	P	I	I	Seychelles
Sierra Leone	NI	O	O	O	O	Sierra Leone
Singapore	NI	O	O	NI	NI	Singapore
Slovakia	P	P	P	I	I	Slovakia

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COUNTRY	WARSAW (2000)	SEOUL (2002)	SANTIAGO (2005)	IAC Recommendation BAMAKO[1]	BAMAKO (2007)[2]	COUNTRY
Slovenia	P	P	P	I	I	Slovenia
Solomon Isl.	NI	NI	NI	NR	NI	Solomon Isl.
Somalia	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Somalia
South Africa	P	P	P	NR	I	South Africa
South Korea	P	P	P	NR	I	South Korea
Spain	P	P	P	I	I	Spain
Sri Lanka	P	P	P	I*	I	Sri Lanka
Sudan	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Sudan
Suriname	I	P	P	I	I	Suriname
Swaziland	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Swaziland
Sweden	P	P	P	I	I	Sweden
Switzerland	P	P	P	I	I	Switzerland
Syria	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Syria
Tajikistan	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Tajikistan
Tanzania	P	P	P	I	I	Tanzania
Thailand	P	P	P	NI	NI	Thailand
Timor-Leste	N/A	P	P	I	I	Timor-Leste
Togo	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Togo
Tonga	NI	NI	NI	NR	NI	Tonga
Trinidad Tob.	I	P	P	I	I	Trinidad Tob.
Tunisia	P	O	O	NI	NI	Tunisia
Turkey	P	P	P	I	I	Turkey
Turkmenistan	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Turkmenistan
Tuvalu	I	P	P	I	I	TUVALU
Uganda	NI	NI	NI	NI	O↑	Uganda
Ukraine	P	O	P	I	I	Ukraine
United Arab Emirates	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom	P	P	P	I	I	United Kingdom
United States	P	P	P	NR	I	United States
Uruguay	P	P	P	I	I	Uruguay
Uzbekistan	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Uzbekistan
Vanuatu	I	P	P	I	I	Vanuatu
Venezuela	P	P	P	D	NI↓	Venezuela
Vietnam	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Vietnam
Yemen	P	O	O	O	I↑	Yemen
Zambia	NI	NI	P↑	O	I↑	Zambia
Zimbabwe	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI	Zimbabwe

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About the Author

Theodore J. Piccone is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for Foreign Policy at Brookings. Piccone specializes in U.S.-Latin American relations; global democracy and human rights; and multilateral affairs. Piccone serves as an advisor to the Club of Madrid and has served on the National Security Council and at the State Department and the Pentagon.