

Do New Democracies Support Democracy?

THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSION

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The world's six most influential rising democracies—Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey—are at various stages of democratic consolidation. Freedom House ranks them all as Free in terms of political rights and civil liberties except for Turkey (which is at the top of the Partly Free category), and all six have enjoyed remarkable economic growth and improved standards of living in recent years. Yet when it comes to supporting democracy and human rights outside their borders, they have differed quite a bit from one another, with behavior ranging from sympathetic support to borderline hostility.

One revealing indicator of their stance toward international action to support democracy and universal human rights can be found in the votes that they have cast on relevant issues in international organizations. United Nations voting data compiled since 2004 by the Democracy Coalition Project, as well as a review of each country's behavior at the UN Security Council and on the international stage reveal positions ranging from pragmatism to fairly strict allegiance to traditional principles of state sovereignty and noninterventionism. This essay presents a comparative examination of the voting patterns of these six countries in three key UN bodies—the Human Rights Council, the General Assembly, and the Security Council. The UN voting records of these countries must be understood within a larger context, however, and so we begin with brief accounts of the overall place of democracy and human rights trends in their foreign policies over the past decade.

Brazil. Formerly a country with a relatively quiet, inward-looking, and defensive foreign policy, Brazil has evolved into a more assertive

regional—and increasingly global—player, a transformation that has coincided with the huge political and economic strides that the country has made in recent years. Brazilian diplomats often credit the country's democratic consolidation and economic progress for its growing credibility and influence on the world stage.¹ When it comes to wielding that influence in support of democracy in other countries, however, Brazil has been ambivalent and often unpredictable. If supporting democracy or human rights will help it to further its own goals of consolidating regional leadership, protecting business interests, or winning a seat on the UN Security Council, Brazil generally favors multilateral strategies geared toward pro-reform outcomes. But in the recent cases of Cuba, Iran, Venezuela, and most recently Syria, Brazil has taken a more ideological or “soft-balancing” approach, siding against the United States and Europe by avoiding criticism of human-rights abuses and ducking behind the defense of noninterventionism favored by diplomats in the foreign ministry.

India. The world's most populous democracy was a founding member and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. Its foreign policy is deeply rooted in the twin principles of anti-imperialism and noninterventionism. Yet as India has grown into a global economic power, its identity as a secular, pluralist, and democratically governed state has begun to influence its behavior in multilateral organizations. Thus, on the global stage, India has become increasingly vocal in favor of democracy, which it believes can be a strong foundation for international peace and cooperation. At the same time, the South Asian powerhouse maintains that democracy must not be imposed on other countries; rather, nondemocratic countries should seek out the assistance of India and other democracies if they themselves wish to make the transition to free societies. It will take some time for the traditionally noninterventionist diplomats in charge of multilateral affairs to implement the increasingly clear prodemocracy sentiments coming from the top political leadership in New Delhi.

Indonesia. Indonesia's remarkable transformation from an authoritarian system to an open, pluralist democracy—the third largest in the world—has been accompanied by a significant reorientation of its foreign policy. In the past, Indonesia rejected international norms of democracy and human rights, claiming that they were incompatible with “Asian values.” Now the country strongly endorses the principles and values of democracy in its foreign-policy rhetoric, though it continues to oppose most human-rights initiatives at the UN. This transformation, accompanied by consistently high levels of economic growth, a growing middle class, booming foreign direct investment, and (for the most part) internal and external peace, is precisely its greatest asset when it comes to projecting its interests and values in Asia. Although Indonesia has—in word, if not in deed—pushed for democracy in the region, its advocacy thus far has

had little impact. Today, the majority of ASEAN members are nondemocratic, and there is no meaningful regional mechanism to support democratic change. Nonetheless, Indonesia can claim credit for advocating the establishment of an ASEAN human-rights mechanism, albeit a weak one, and for bringing its foreign-policy rhetoric—though not its UN votes—more in line with its domestic credentials.

South Africa. Although South Africa's record of democracy and human-rights promotion is in some ways laudable, it is perhaps the most disappointing case among the six. The country's remarkably peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy under the inspiring leadership of Nelson Mandela raised high expectations that South Africa would become a strong ally of peaceful democratic movements in Africa and elsewhere. Yet when faced with tough choices, South Africa's four post-apartheid presidents have generally aligned themselves with nationalist or pan-African movements, either acting in "South-South solidarity" or choosing neutrality vis-à-vis autocratic regimes. Faced with deep-rooted economic and social challenges at home, South Africa tends to prioritize foreign relations that help it to achieve such domestic priorities as rural development, job creation, and crime prevention.

South Korea. After emerging from three decades of military rule in the early 1990s, the newly democratic Republic of Korea quickly became a reliable supporter of multilateral efforts to promote democracy and human rights. Its generally strong voting record on these issues at the UN during the past two decades, particularly under President Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003), is no doubt influenced by its security alliance with the United States. South Korea's record of democracy support has been somewhat constrained, however, by its attempts at rapprochement with North Korea and by its heavy dependence on oil-exporting states such as Iran. An active participant in the Community of Democracies since the organization's founding in 2000, Seoul hosted the group's second ministerial meeting in 2002. As there is no East Asian regional body with a democracy agenda, South Korea has instead relied on ad hoc initiatives to offer cautious support for democratic transitions abroad.

Turkey. A candidate for European Union membership, Turkey stands apart from the other countries considered here. As part of the EU accession process, Turkey has been a recipient rather than a provider of democracy assistance. The goal of EU accession has undoubtedly helped to bring Turkey's own democratic standards and practices more in line with liberal international norms, although it still has progress to make. Nonetheless, its improvements in human rights and democratic practices thus far are a testament to the positive role that EU enlargement has played in expanding the circle of democratic, rights-respecting states throughout wider Europe. Because Turkey has fairly successfully managed its own transition from a military-dominated state with weak

checks and balances to a thriving, competitive, multiparty, and multiethnic society in which Muslim democrats now win elections, it has great potential as a defender of democracy and human rights abroad. It deserves some credit, for example, for its willingness to stand up for democracy and human-rights activists in the context of the “Arab Spring” despite complicated geopolitical interests.


Voting Behavior at the UN Human Rights Council

How should the international community monitor and critique the human-rights performance of specific countries? This question was at the heart of the contentious debate that led to the replacement of the Geneva-based UN Commission on Human Rights with the new Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2006. Not surprisingly, during the course of this debate those states that prize the principle of nonintervention argued for minimal, if any, country-level scrutiny. South Africa, India, and Indonesia joined their counterparts in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the African Group in favor of this position.² Other states—mainly from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), but also from Asia (including South Korea), Eastern Europe, and Latin America (including Brazil)—favored retaining the Commission’s power to deal with country situations through critical resolutions, special sessions, and the dispatch of independent rapporteurs and fact-finding missions.

In the end, UN member states reached a compromise: Country-level scrutiny by the new Council would continue through the traditional means of resolutions and rapporteurs, including the expanded use of special sessions to deal with urgent situations, while a new Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process would take the less threatening approach of a “cooperative dialogue” on the human-rights situation in each UN member state. Although some countries still object in principle to any measures criticizing another member state, in practice the Council has adopted this dual approach.

Whether a member state votes at the HRC in favor of country scrutiny or nonintervention is an important indicator of how “human-rights friendly” its foreign policy is. In order to observe a five-year pattern, I have used a data set that includes the last year of the former Commission (2005) along with the first four years of the HRC (June 2006 to June 2010). Most of the votes and official statements chosen for analysis were those that entailed taking a clear position for or against greater international scrutiny of countries with some of the most pressing human-rights situations, such as Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. The other votes included in the data set help to illustrate whether a state supports or opposes normative standards on freedom of expres-

**FIGURE 1—UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
VOTING SCORES (CUMULATIVE), 2005–2010**



Note: A vote for the preferred position is assigned a score of 2; an abstention or absence is assigned a score of 1; and a vote in opposition to the preferred position is assigned a score of 0.

sion and the death penalty, and whether or not it supports strengthening such mechanisms as independent experts (otherwise known as “Special Procedures”).³ (Because Turkey has yet to sit on the HRC, it is not included in this analysis.)

Figure 1 above compares states’ voting records at the HRC to a “top-score” benchmark, which represents the stances that would have the effect of expanding international scrutiny of domestic human-rights practices, strengthening UN human-rights mechanisms, and interpreting international standards more broadly. A vote in favor of such positions received two points; an abstention or absence, one point; and a vote against such positions, zero points. Of the five countries, South Korea came closest to reaching the top score, followed by Brazil, India, South Africa, and Indonesia in that order.

South Korea consistently voted in favor of resolutions criticizing regimes such as those in Belarus, Cuba, and Sudan, as well as resolutions that created or extended mandates to monitor abuses. Yet Seoul often took noncommittal positions, abstaining on resolutions to discontinue confidential consideration of human-rights violations in Iran and Uzbekistan in 2006 and 2007 (these were close votes) and abstaining on a condemnatory resolution on North Korea in 2005. South Korea also abstained from voting on the final resolution of the special session on Sri Lanka in 2009 that upheld the principle of noninterference despite damning reports of that regime’s abuses in its fight against the Tamil separatists; it avoided taking a stand on freedom of expression (2008–2009); and it either abstained on or opposed resolutions that created special sessions and fact-finding missions looking into Israeli human-rights violations in Gaza and the 2010 Turkish-flotilla incident. Although South Korea’s overall voting pattern clearly favored interna-

tional action on human rights, its support for this posture wavered in certain situations.

Brazil's voting pattern closely resembles that of South Korea, but with far more abstentions on country-specific situations, including those in Belarus, Burma, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iran, North Korea, and Uzbekistan. Like South Korea, Brazil avoided taking a position on whether to hold a special session on Sri Lanka, but unlike South Korea, Brazil voted in favor of a damaging resolution that defended the principle of noninterference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. On freedom of expression, Brazil abstained twice from voting on the OIC's successful efforts to condemn "defamation of religion," a concept that threatens international standards of free expression. Moreover, Brazil remained silent when the rapporteur on freedom of expression came under attack by various states (mainly from the African and Asian groups), although it opposed an effort to weaken the rapporteur's mandate in 2008–2009. On the other hand, Brazil voted for closer scrutiny of Israel (three times), North Korea (three times), and Sudan (twice); supported resolutions to insert independent voices in the UPR process; and led the successful effort to convene a special session on the right to food, one of former president Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva's (2003–10) signature initiatives. With its uneven record, Brazil has proven itself to be an unreliable fence-sitter, frequently failing to support country-specific scrutiny.

India, Indonesia, and South Africa generally followed the same line when it came to debates and votes in Geneva. All three tended to vote against or abstain on country-specific scrutiny in whatever form, except when the subject was Israel's actions in Palestine. Indonesia, despite the impressive progress of its own democracy, cast the least human rights-friendly votes of the five countries considered here. It consistently opposed the principle of country-level scrutiny as well as specific missions or special sessions, even in such compelling cases as those of North Korea and Sudan. India usually abstained on votes related to freedom of expression and defamation of religion, and it backed Sri Lanka in debates on the latter's human-rights record. South Africa fell somewhere in between India and Indonesia, occasionally supporting a special session (on Darfur, for example, but not on Burma, the DRC, or Sri Lanka), but otherwise consistently opposing country scrutiny and supporting the OIC position on limiting freedom of expression. These three countries undoubtedly fall into the noninterventionist camp, despite their rhetorical support for democracy and human rights both domestically and internationally.

Advocates of human rights won some important gains during the sixteenth session of the Human Rights Council, held in March 2011—most notably, the creation of a special rapporteur on Iran, which was approved by a vote of 22 to 7, with 14 abstentions. In a departure from its behavior


on previous country-specific votes, Brazil voted in favor of the mandate, fulfilling newly elected President Dilma Rousseff's campaign promise to switch sides on the issue.⁴ Likewise, South Korea, which had usually abstained from voting on Iran-specific resolutions, also supported the creation of the special rapporteur. In another interesting development during the sixteenth session, 84 countries—both members and nonmembers of the Council—collectively sponsored a statement calling for an end to violence and other human-rights violations against people based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. Brazil and South Africa endorsed the statement, while the four other emerging democracies were noticeably silent. At the seventeenth session in June 2011, South Africa and Brazil followed up on the LGBT statement by sponsoring a successful resolution on human-rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. This was a particularly positive sign for South Africa as the move required it to distance itself from its African counterparts: Only one other state from the continent supported the resolution, while nine opposed the vote and two abstained.

Votes in the General Assembly

Diplomats claim that member states show greater flexibility in taking positions on human-rights matters at the UN General Assembly in New York than at the HRC “fishbowl” in Geneva, where voting tends to be dominated by blocs. Yet data gleaned from select General Assembly votes of the six emerging democracies between 2005 and 2010 do not bear out this observation, as Figure 2 below illustrates. It shows that South Korea and Turkey more often than not voted in favor of positions supporting human rights, Brazil remained a fence-sitter, and India, Indonesia, and South Africa lagged far behind, although some recent signs suggest that India and South Africa may be taking more supportive positions.

South Korea consistently voted in favor of country-specific resolutions criticizing human-rights violations in such countries as Belarus, Burma, and Turkmenistan, but also abstained frequently—even on important votes regarding the human-rights crises in Iran and North Korea. It is worth noting that South Korea is Iran's fourth-largest export market, and the two countries' still-expanding bilateral trade relationship reached nearly US\$10 billion in 2008.⁵ Still, South Korea has never directly opposed a pro-human-rights position at the General Assembly, earning it the best score among the six. Turkey was close behind, frequently voting in favor of country-level human-rights scrutiny in cases ranging from North Korea to Uzbekistan (but always absenting itself from the hall when it came time to vote on Iran's human-rights record). Turkey twice voted with its OIC colleagues in favor of defamation-of-religion resolutions that risked weakening

**FIGURE 2—UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
VOTING SCORES (CUMULATIVE), 2005–2010**



Note: A vote for the preferred position is assigned a score of 2; an abstention or absence is assigned a score of 1; and a vote in opposition to the preferred position is assigned a score of 0.

guarantees of free expression, and separately abstained on language that would have incorporated references to violence based on “sexual orientation.”

Brazil more often than not abstained on country-specific resolutions—consistently in the cases of Iran and Belarus, and seesawing from a positive to neutral position and back again regarding Burma and North Korea. Like South Korea, however, Brazil never came out directly against the country resolutions included in this survey. Although it avoided taking a position on some sensitive issues, such as the defamiation of religion and the principle of country-level scrutiny, it voted in favor of a moratorium on the death penalty and language referencing violence based on sexual orientation. Brazil’s careful avoidance of offending certain states may well be related to its campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

The noninterventionist group of India, Indonesia, and South Africa were close together in voting against or abstaining on critical country-specific scrutiny even in the most dire situations, including those of Burma, Belarus, and Iran. Most recently, however, each has made some small steps toward greater support for democracy and human rights. For example, after voting consistently against resolutions critical of Tehran’s human-rights record, India abstained in 2010, while Indonesia, the most consistent noninterventionist voter in the bunch, moved from a negative to a neutral position on North Korea that year. Meanwhile, South Africa twice voted in favor of resolutions on Burma (2009 and 2010) and moved from earlier negative votes to abstentions on resolutions on Belarus in 2007 and Iran in 2009 and 2010. On other issues, the pattern is more varied. Indonesia and South Africa consistently voted

in favor of the defamation-of-religion resolution, while India abstained. Meanwhile, India and Indonesia regularly voted against a moratorium on the death penalty, whereas South Africa voted in favor of the moratorium.

The Security Council

Only four of these six rising democracies have served on the Security Council during the period under review (2005–2010): Brazil in 2005 and again in 2010, Indonesia in 2007 and 2008, South Africa in 2007 and 2008, and Turkey in 2009 and 2010. A careful look at their votes reveals some interesting patterns of their respective views about how the UN's highest body should address threats to international peace and security. Votes on Burma, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe were particularly illustrative of some enduring fault lines in multilateral debates over human rights and democracy.

Most Security Council resolutions, including those that incorporate language pertaining to democracy, human-rights abuses, and political reconciliation, are adopted by consensus. Of the 301 resolutions passed between 2005 and 2010, 39 contained operative language on such issues, including country-specific texts on Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. When these matters came to a vote in the Security Council, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey all went along with the consensus position, except in the cases of Burma, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe.

In 2007, the Security Council took up an unprecedented resolution sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom that would have called for Burma's military government to cease attacks against civilians in ethnic-minority regions, to unconditionally release Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and to begin a substantive political dialogue that would lead to a genuine democratic transition. Although the vote was 9 in favor, 3 against, and 3 abstentions, the measure failed because China and Russia, which are among the five permanent members possessing veto power on the Security Council, voted against it. South Africa joined China and Russia in voting against the resolution, while Indonesia abstained.

South African ambassador Dumisani Kumalo explained that his country's vote was based upon three factors: He claimed, first, that the resolution would compromise the "good offices" of the UN Secretary General in dealing with such sensitive matters; second, that the issue properly should be addressed by the Human Rights Council; and third, that it was inappropriate to consider it in the context of Chapter VII of the UN Charter because even Burma's neighbors did not consider the country a threat to international peace and security. As regards the first point, the Secretary General's representative to Burma, Ibrahim Gam-

bari, had in fact specifically requested the Security Council's support for his mission. Furthermore, both South Africa and Indonesia failed to endorse a special HRC session on Burma the following year, raising obvious questions about the sincerity of their professed concern for the ongoing human-rights crisis in the country and for the HRC's role in addressing such situations.⁷ Indonesia echoed some of South Africa's views, asserting, for example, that the HRC was the more appropriate venue for addressing the problem of Burma. At the same time, however, Indonesia issued a strong statement acknowledging that the situation in Burma "was no longer just a bilateral or regional issue, but an international one . . . Burma must respond to the imperative of restoring peace and democracy and respect for human rights."⁸

The 2007 resolution on Lebanon, adopted by a vote of 10 in favor, 0 against, and 5 abstentions, authorized the formation of an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. The resolution came in response to

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO UN FUNDS ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

While the funds involved are small, a review of the financial contributions of the rising democracies to two important UN bodies, the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), provides another interesting indicator of the degree of their support for human rights and democracy abroad. UNDEF, which provides grants to civil society groups around the world that are working to strengthen democracy, was created in 2005, and India was among its founding members. Today India is UNDEF's second largest donor, contributing a total of US\$25 million between 2005 and 2011. Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, by contrast, have never contributed funds to UNDEF. South Korea donated \$1 million in 2006 but has not made a contribution since. Turkey has donated a modest \$125,000 since the Fund's inception in 2005.

India, South Korea, and Turkey are also the most active donors to the OHCHR, committing funds each year from 2005 to 2010. India has contributed \$50,000 annually, while both South Korea and Turkey significantly increased their contributions in 2007—South Korea upped its donation from \$100,000 to \$300,000, and Turkey increased its commitment from \$70,000 to over \$100,000. South Africa had been a reliable donor until 2010, when it gave nothing. Brazil and Indonesia have contributed sporadically. In 2010, after not contributing for several years, Brazil gave \$1 million. Indonesia, after a three-year hiatus, has contributed a modest \$20,000 each year since 2008.⁶

a request from Lebanon's Prime Minister Fouad Siniora for a binding Security Council decision, after months of efforts to broker a national Lebanese resolution of the matter had been unsuccessful. The United States framed the measure as a vote against impunity for political murders. Indonesia and South Africa, along with China, Russia, and Qatar, abstained. The ambassadors of South Africa and Indonesia claimed that the resolution bypassed national constitutional procedures and therefore constituted an inappropriate intervention in domestic affairs. They also expressed concern that the tribunal would not advance peace and reconciliation in the country. In the words of Indonesian ambassador Hasan Kleib, "seeking justice should neither create new problems nor exacerbate the already intricate situation in Lebanon." For its part, South Africa again objected to what it viewed as the inappropriate use of Chapter VII as a tool to impose a tribunal on Lebanon, and claimed that such an action risked politicizing international law.⁹

In 2008, Indonesia and South Africa had another opportunity to support international action against authoritarian abuses, and again they disappointed. Zimbabwe's presidential election that summer—proclaimed neither free nor fair nor credible by observer missions from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Pan-African Parliament, and the African Union—were marred by widespread violence committed by supporters of President Robert Mugabe, by the use of food aid as a political weapon, and by the displacement of thousands of vulnerable people who had to flee to neighboring countries. A group of twelve countries, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, sponsored a resolution deeming the situation in Zimbabwe a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII. Had it passed, the resolution would have called on the government of Zimbabwe to cease attacks against opposition supporters, imposed an arms embargo as well as financial and visa sanctions on Mugabe and other government officials, and demanded a substantive and inclusive political dialogue reflecting the will of the Zimbabwean people.

Citing a recent decision by the African Union Summit asking states to refrain from any actions that could worsen the climate for dialogue between Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, South Africa joined China, Russia, Libya, and Vietnam in voting against the measure. Key players in the region wanted to give South African president Thabo Mbeki more time to try to broker an agreement, and according to Ambassador Kumalo, South Africa "was obliged to follow the decision of those regional bodies."¹⁰ Indonesia, meanwhile, made a strong statement deplored the violence and acknowledging that the people of Zimbabwe deserved international support. Yet in the end, Indonesia deferred to the African Union and SADC's preference for dialogue. Fearing that sanctions might jeopardize ongoing mediation efforts, Indonesia chose to abstain.

These positions on Burma, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe reflect the tra-

ditionally strong attachment of developing countries to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign nations, genuine worries about creating conditions that would allow for greater Western in-

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tervention under UN auspices, and the desire to allow national and regional bodies to devise solutions to national and regional problems. Moreover, they demonstrate just how difficult it is for the international community to uphold the view that efforts to support democracy and protect human rights are crucial to international peace and security, and are therefore legitimate objectives for action by the Security Council.

The remarkably swift international response to the violence in Libya in early 2011, however, suggests that the principle of responsibility to protect, endorsed by heads of state at the 2005 World Summit, has real meaning. Security Council members, including Brazil, India, and South Africa, unanimously endorsed Resolution 1970, which deplored “gross and systematic” human-rights violations in Libya, referred perpetrators to the International Criminal Court, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, suspended the country from the Human Rights Council, and provided humanitarian assistance for civilians.¹¹ The subsequent Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya, however, was not endorsed unanimously: Brazil and India joined Russia, China, and Germany in abstaining.

Brazil’s Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti condemned the violence in Libya but stated that her country was unconvinced that the use of force would stop the bloodshed. Potentially, she warned, it might even do “more harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed to protecting.” Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri of India expressed similar concerns and urged the Security Council instead to consider political efforts at conflict resolution. South Africa, on the other hand, voted in favor of the resolution and endorsed its full implementation.¹² Subsequently, however, South Africa objected loudly to the NATO airstrikes and dispatched its current president, Jacob Zuma, as a mediator to seek a peaceful resolution to the dispute.

India, Brazil, and South Africa (known collectively as IBSA) continue to be critical of NATO’s expansion of the UN Security Council mandate to include removal of Muammar Qadhafi from power. As evidence of the continued controversy over how to implement the evolving responsibility-to-protect norm, the three countries successfully joined forces to block a UN Security Council resolution condemning the vio-

lence in Syria, forcing a weaker presidential statement instead, and dispatched a team of diplomats to Damascus to pursue direct dialogue. This latest case is a telling reminder of these states' pursuit of an independent profile in foreign affairs that prioritizes dialogue and mediation over more muscular steps such as sanctions and military action.

As their UN voting records show, the emerging democratic powers of Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey are inconsistent advocates for democracy and human rights on the international stage, though recent trends are favorable. These countries, just like developed democracies, prioritize other interests—whether security-related, economic, or ideological—over support for democracy and human rights. One important difference, however, is that the advanced democracies consider democracy and human rights as key contributors to political stability, international peace, economic growth, and sustainable development. The emerging democracies share these goals but undervalue the instrumental role democratic governance and human rights can play in reaching them. In addition, these countries lack strong national voices—parliamentarians, intellectuals, civil society, businesspeople, and the media—demanding that their governments' foreign policies reflect their societies' democratic values.

This is gradually beginning to change, however, as domestic advocacy groups are building international networks and learning how to pressure their governments to alter their behavior at the international level. Social media and the 24-hour news cycle are also contributing factors. As democracy deepens in these countries, and as regional and international organizations grow in importance, we are likely to see more public debate on these issues and, ultimately, greater country-level scrutiny and intervention in support of universal norms of human rights and democracy.

NOTES

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1. See *Brazilian Foreign Policy: Present and Future*, Washington, D.C., 2010, available at www.ftc.org.br/Brazilian_Foreign_Policy.pdf.

2. During procedural debates about the Council in 2006, India, Indonesia, and South Africa joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and African bloc in opposing key mechanisms for country-specific scrutiny. In debates creating the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), these governments argued for a state-led process and urged against a prominent role for independent experts and civil society. They also joined the OIC and Africa Group in opposing the principle of country-specific mandates, arguing that the UPR process was sufficient. These efforts failed. For more information, see the Democracy Coalition Project's "Human Rights Council Report Card, 2006–2007," available at www.demcoalition.org/pdf/HRC%20Indicators%20Analysis%20Doc%20Final.pdf.

3. Votes analyzed for this study range from resolutions that extend the mandates of UN independent investigators to resolutions that condemn egregious violations or uphold human-rights norms. For a full list of the specific votes included in the survey, please see www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/PicconeSupplemental-22-4.pdf. For more detailed information on the study, see www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/06_human_rights_piccone.aspx.

4. Lally Weymouth, "An Interview with Dilma Rousseff, President-elect," 3 December 2010, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120303241.html.

5. U.S. Department of State, Background Note on Iran, 17 February 2011, available at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm; Choe Sang-Hun, "South Korea Aims Sanctions at Iran," *New York Times*, 8 September 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/world/asia/09korea.html.

6. For more information on UNDEF funding, see www.un.org/democracyfund/Donors/donors_index.html. For information on OHCHR funding, see the 2009 OHCHR Annual Report, Part V, Funding and Donor Profiles, 188–219, available at www.ohchr.org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/Publications.aspx; funding information for 2010 is available at www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/OurDonors.aspx.

7. They did, however, endorse the consensus resolution that resulted from the special session on Burma.

8. UN Department of Public Information, SC/8939, 12 January 2007, available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8939.doc.htm.

9. UN Department of Public Information, SC/9029, 30 May 2007, available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9029.doc.htm.

10. UN Department of Public Information, SC/9396, 11 July 2008, available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9396.doc.htm.

11. UN Department of Public Information, SC/10187/Rev.1**, 26 February 2011, available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.htm.

12. UN Department of Public Information, SC/10200, 17 March 2011, available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.