

BROOKINGS

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# NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013

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
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# Lecture Outline

- How further nuclear arms reductions and arms control can enhance US security
- Arms control opportunities
- Arms control challenges

# Reduced Enough Already?



# New START Treaty

- Each side limited to no more than
  - 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles
  - 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers
  - 1550 deployed strategic warheads
  - Limits to be implemented by 2018
- US-Russian strategic balance stable and numbers declining ... need to do more?

**WHY PURSUE FURTHER  
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL?**

# Reduce Strategic Threat to US

- Under New START, Russia can still have ~2000 deployed strategic warheads
- Most 7-55 times the power of “Little Boy” and “Fat Man”



# Limit Nonstrategic (Tactical) Weapons



- Not constrained by any treaty
  - Concern to US allies
- Russian numerical advantage
- Strategic vs non-strategic

# Transparency

- Data exchange and updates
- Notifications
- On-site inspections
- Result: US knows more about Russian strategic forces





# Data Exchanges and Updates

## New START Numbers, Sept 2012

<u>New START Limit</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>Russia</u>
Deployed SDVs (700)	806	491
Deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers (800)	1034	884
Deployed warheads (1550)	1722	1499

Source: U.S. Department of State

# Potential US Cost Savings

- Robust strategic triad
- Need to recapitalize
  - Ballistic missile submarines
  - Heavy bombers
  - ICBMs
- Budget demands



# Non-Proliferation Goals

- US nuclear reductions bolster diplomacy to block nuclear proliferation
  - US, Russia have to act
- Won't solve North Korea or Iran
- Strengthens position to mobilize pressure against states seeking nuclear weapons

# A Word on Deterrence

- Nuclear deterrence during the Cold War
- At several points, world was lucky
  - Cuban missile crisis
  - Test errors
  - US-Norwegian sounding rocket



# Towards Lower Numbers ... and Zero?

- President Obama's Prague speech
  - Reduce role and number
  - Zero attractive to US?
- But many challenges to resolve before could even get close to zero
- Still, properly designed reductions can enhance US security

**NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL  
OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013**

# US, Russian Nuclear Warhead Levels

	<u>US</u>	<u>Russia</u>
Deployed strategic warheads *	~1950	~2430
Nonstrategic warheads	~500	~2000
Non-deployed (reserve) strategic warheads	~2500	?
<b>Retired warheads</b>	~ <u>3000</u>	~ <u>5000</u>
Total warheads	~8000	~10,000


\* Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number  
Numbers drawn from Kristensen/Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012” and “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

# New US-Russia Negotiation

- Limit each side to no more than 2000-2500 *total* nuclear warheads
  - Sublimit of 1000 deployed strategic warheads
  - Limit of 500 deployed missiles, bombers
- Overall warhead limit forces trade
- Result = ~50% reduction
  - US still could maintain robust triad



# Notional Reduction to 2000 Total



# Missile Defense in Europe



- “European Phased Adaptive Approach”
  - (1) SM-3 IA, sea-based
  - (2) SM-3 IB, Romania
  - (3) SM-3 IIA, Poland
  - (4) SM-3 IIB
- Endorsed by NATO

# NATO, Russia and MD

- Russian concern about EPAA
  - Offense-defense relationship
- NATO seeks cooperative missile defense
  - But Russians want “legal” guarantee
- Cooperative missile defense system
  - Political commitment
  - Jointly manned centers
  - Transparency


# CTBT Ratification

- Testing moratorium
- Senate did not approve CTBT in 1999
- What has changed since then?
  - Stockpile stewardship program
  - Improved monitoring system
- CTBT locks in US advantage
  - Spur ratification by others

# Multilateralizing Process

- Lay groundwork to broaden process
  - UNSC P5 discussions

## Third Country Nuclear Forces



# CHALLENGES TO ARMS CONTROL

# Russian Position

- No enthusiasm for new negotiations now
  - Nuclear weapons = key to superpower status
  - Link to issues such as missile defense and conventional forces
- Waiting to see who will be US president
- US strategic advantages may give Russians motive for further reductions

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# Allies and Assurance

- ~200 US nuclear bombs believed deployed in Europe
- Russians will insist weapons be based on national territory
  - Acceptable in right circumstances?



Source: “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012”

# Verification

- Monitoring warheads in storage
  - New ground for both sides
- Lower monitoring confidence



# Senate Republicans


- Skeptical about nuclear arms control
  - New START ratification proved more difficult than expected
- Seek commitment to US strategic force modernization
- Treaty or unilateral steps?

# Prospects

- President Obama has indicated desire to negotiate further nuclear cuts
- Governor Romney skeptical of arms control
  - But tight defense budget, NATO considerations could affect his view
- Possible incentives for Moscow to negotiate
- Have opportunity in 2013 – will we use it?

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A B R O O K I N G S F O C U S B O O K



# THE OPPORTUNITY

NEXT STEPS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS

**STEVEN PIFER** and  
**MICHAEL E. O'HANLON**