THE ISLAMIST RESPONSE TO REPRESSION: ARE MAINSTREAM ISLAMIST GROUPS RADICALIZING?

Shadi Hamid, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

INTRODUCTION

Today, some of the Middle East's most prominent Islamist groups are in a state of crisis, racked by internal divisions and struggling to respond to regime repression.[1] With key U.S. allies in the region placing increasingly crippling limits on political opposition, mainstream Islamist groups—including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan's Islamic Action Front (IAF)—are reassessing their strategy of privileging electoral and parliamentary politics.

Despite embracing key democratic precepts, modernizing their election platforms, and reaching out to Western audiences, Islamist groups have found themselves victims of electoral manipulation, mounting legal restrictions, and mass arrest. With mainstream Islamists effectively being punished for their moderation, analysts have warned of impending Islamist radicalization.

This policy briefing analyzes how nonviolent Islamist groups in the Arab world are responding to a new, sometimes unprecedented, set of challenges. How have these emerging concerns affected their strategy and tactics? And, as mainstream Islamists are boxed in by government restrictions, will other more radical groups try to fill the vacuum? The course that political Islam takes in the coming years will have far-reaching implications for U.S. policy and regional security, yet it remains unclear whether the Obama administration is willing, or able, to influence events as they unfold.

The briefing focuses on the critical cases of Egypt and Jordan, among America's closest Arab allies

as well as two of the world's largest recipients of U.S. aid. With much-anticipated elections in both countries scheduled for 2010 and 2011, the Obama administration as well as the U.S. Congress have the opportunity to weigh in and address the question of Islamist participation, something they have so far avoided doing. Doing nothing has consequences, as evidenced by Jordanian Islamists' announcement in early August that they would boycott the November parliamentary polls due to the likelihood of fraud. The briefing concludes with several practicable steps the United States should take, including:

- *Publicly affirm the right of all opposition actors, including Islamists, to participate in upcoming elections*. The Obama administration should begin by clarifying U.S. policy toward political Islam by clearly affirming the right of all nonviolent political groups to participate in the electoral process. This should be coupled by a consistent American policy of opposing not just the arrests of secular activists but Islamist ones as well. By treating both groups equally, the United States can counter the (largely accurate) claim that its support for Arab democrats is selective. In Jordan, the United States should pressure the government to immediately reach out to opposition groups and issue guarantees regarding the conduct of the November elections.

- *Empower U.S. embassies to begin substantive engagement with Islamist groups*. The Obama administration has

A Project of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution
PO Box 22694, Doha, State of Qatar | T. +974 422 7800 | F. +974 422 7801
dohacenter@brookings.edu | www.brookings.edu/dohacenter

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emphasized its belief in engaging a diverse range of actors. Yet it has failed to reach out to many of the largest, most influential groups in the region. As Islamist groups work to reassess their strategy and resolve internal divisions, American officials need to be aware of how such developments might affect broader regional interests. At a later stage, open channels of dialogue may allow the United States some influence over strategies Islamists adopt, particularly regarding participation in elections.

This briefing also considers the strategic priorities of Arab governments, which, understandably, fear losing power during a difficult time of regional change. However, the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes would be well served to allow—and even encourage—Islamist participation in the upcoming elections. Doing so would enhance their domestic and international legitimacy and would be unlikely to threaten their domination of the political arena. That said, political openings are invariably risky; small openings can start small and become larger. This is where the interests of Western governments and mainstream Islamist groups, on one hand, and Arab authoritarian regimes, on the other, are likely to diverge.

ISLAMIST PRIORITIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM

In 2004-5, during the height of the so-called "Arab spring," there was a sense among Islamist groups that the key to their future – and that of their countries – was the electoral process. After spending the 1980s and 1990s building grassroots support, assembling cross-ideological coalitions, and oiling their electoral operations, Islamists across the region appeared poised to make significant political gains. For the most part, they did. Islamists' electoral strength—along with their reorientation away from the application of Islamic law (*tatbiq al-sharia*) toward an aggressive reform program—presented a serious threat to embattled Arab regimes. Islamist groups were increasingly using the electoral process, and parliament in particular, to erode the government's grip on public life.

While this briefing focuses on Islamists in Egypt and Jordan, much of the following analysis is applicable to like-minded groups, such as the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the Islah Party in Yemen, and the Movement of Society for Peace in Algeria. Most Islamist groups in the region are branches or descendants of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OF EGYPT

The Muslim Brotherhood's 2004 "reform initiative" stands as a landmark in the organization's political evolution, representing an effort to elevate the cause of democracy and bring other political forces around a shared vision for change. The Brotherhood, for example, states its commitment to a "republican, constitutional, democratic system of government within a framework of Islamic principles," a formulation it had not used before.[2] The initiative outlines 18 reform planks anchored around a set of largely liberal ideas, including the "full recognition that the people are the source of authority," "freedom of personal belief," and the unrestricted right to form political parties.[3]

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For the first time, the group publicly declares its preference for a parliamentary rather than presidential system, stating its "belief that the appropriate system for running the country is the parliamentary system, in which the party that receives the most votes—in free and fair elections—is the one responsible for forming a government."[4] Moreover, the head of state is to play a primarily ceremonial role, "making [the President] a symbol for all Egyptians by ensuring he does not preside over any political party and that he be completely removed from any executive responsibility for governing."[5]

Meanwhile, the Brotherhood was benefitting from the Bush administration's pressure on the Mubarak regime. The confluence of internal and external pressure pushed the Egyptian government to allow greater space for the opposition in advance of the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections. Shortly after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a powerful call for democracy in a June 2005 speech in Cairo, the Brotherhood won 88 seats in parliament, more than five times its previous total.

JORDAN'S ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT

After having boycotted the 1997 elections, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Jordanian Brotherhood, returned to parliament in 2003, winning a plurality of the vote and 16 seats.

In the party's 2003 electoral program and, later, its 2005 "reform initiative," democratization rose to the top on the agenda. In the former, the introduction, subtitled, "Why We Participate in Parliamentary Elections," states that the IAF "considers its presence in parliament as one of the political means to the realization of the sentiment 'Islam is the solution,' and a means of building the nation's strength."[6] Clarifying what it means by the longtime Islamist slogan, the party pledges to "facilitate a climate that helps realize the objectives of the people in [the areas of] freedom, *shura* (consultation), and democracy, and protecting the rights of the people on the basis that they are the source of authority."[7]

The 2005 reform program represents the most far-reaching and comprehensive expression of the Islamic movement's newfound focus on democratic reform. "This initiative," the IAF explains, "is based on the principle of alternation of executive power and [the people's] partnership in the decision-making process," which it later declares a "fixed principle" of political life.[8] In addition to rotation of power, governments must be formed on the basis of the programs of particular parliamentary blocs. Parliament, in turn, should decide whether or not to grant confidence to the government, based on its public program.[9] In addition, the IAF advocates that the Senate, the appointed upper house of parliament, either be abolished or elected by popular vote "as is done in most democratic systems."[10]

THE TURN TO REPRESSION AND THE ISLAMIST RESPONSE

Islamists were demonstrating their comfort not only with the language of democracy but with its substance, challenging centralization of authority and the longstanding institutional dominance of the executive branch. Not surprisingly, a more determined critique of the status quo invited a more determined government

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response. With the Bush administration's waning interest in reform, particularly after Hamas's 2006 victory in the Palestinian elections, Arab governments moved decisively to limit Islamist gains. Facing mounting repression and legal restrictions, Islamist groups have struggled to come up with a coherent response.

Within Jordan's Islamic movement, the utility of continued participation has sparked considerable disagreement over whether to confront the government or continue along a path of caution and deference. The relationship between Islamists and the regime deteriorated in the summer of 2006 when the government moved against the Islamic Center Society (ICS), the Jordanian Brotherhood's charity arm, dissolving its board and appointing a new one in its place. For some, the last straw was the August 2007 municipal election, with its widespread allegations of government interference and voter fraud.

A contentious debate ensued over whether to boycott the national elections, scheduled to take place three months later. Against the objections of a number of prominent leaders, the IAF's executive bureau, in which so-called "doves" enjoyed a slight majority, reached an understanding with Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit, opting to contest a reduced number of seats and avoid running explicitly pro-Hamas and anti-government candidates (in return, presumably, for guarantees the elections would be reasonably fair).[11] One senior IAF official put it this way: "I don't deny there was coordination between some members of the opposition and the government. This is something natural in the interest of the country and I support this kind of coordination because the government is a critical part of the nation. We're all in the same boat."[12]

The "hawks," led by IAF Secretary-General Zaki Bani Irsheid, the party's top official, opposed participation in the elections. But more than this, they opposed the candidate list, biased as it was toward figures friendly to the regime. The IAF's internal turmoil hit a peak when Irsheid caused a public stir by refusing to show up at a press conference announcing the party's candidates. To a large extent, Irsheid and his allies were vindicated by the results: less than 10 out of 110 seats went to the opposition, with the IAF winning only 6, its lowest ever total.

The political shock of first believing, then being betrayed by, the government reverberated within the Brotherhood and IAF. The doves—those whom the West might consider "moderates"—lost credibility in the eyes of the rank-and-file, who increasingly began to ask a simple question of their leaders: what is the point of electoral participation when this is what we get in return? In the crisis of confidence that followed, the Muslim Brotherhood dissolved its shura council and called for early internal elections. In a closely fought contest, Hammam Said, a fiery pro-Hamas conservative, won the position of Overseer-General (*muraqib al-'am*) by one vote.[13] It seemed that the hawks were ascendant.

In 2010, a similar "shift" occurred within the Egyptian Brotherhood, leading observers to raise, once again, the specter of Islamist radicalization. As in Jordan, the event in question was internal elections – Islamist groups, unlike others, hold them regularly – during a moment of crisis. Since 2006, the Mubarak regime had gradually escalated its campaign against the Brotherhood,

arresting thousands of its members and pushing through 34 constitutional amendments, which Amnesty International called the "greatest erosion of human rights in 26 years."[14] For instance, amended Article 5 stated that "no political activity shall be exercised or political parties shall be established on the basis of religion," effectively banning any Islamist activity.

The increased regime repression provoked internal disagreements within the Brotherhood over how best to respond. The organization's "traditionalists" (*taqlidiyun*) favored downplaying electoral competition and focusing more on religious education (*dawa*), constituent service, and tending to the group's massive membership rolls. With an overwhelming majority in the shura council, they elected as general guide Mohamed Badie, once a close associate of Sayyid Qutb and alleged hardliner, defeating the more "reformist" Mohamed Habib.

Elections do indeed have consequences but perhaps less than we might think. The newly elected Badie quickly moved to reassure skeptics, reaffirming the Brotherhood's commitment to democracy, pluralism, and minority and women's rights.[15] More recently, it has aggressively pursued alliances with liberal opposition groups, including the National Association for Change, led by Nobel Prize winner Mohamed El Baradei. That said, it is likely that Badie and the current leadership will, at some point, turn inward but this has little to do with ideology and much more to do with the group's tenuous position and the regime's efforts to silence it. The Brotherhood, perhaps today more than ever, is a prisoner not of its leaders but of its circumstances. As journalist and former Brotherhood member Abdel Monem Mahmoud points out, "[the Brotherhood] won't leave the political arena, but the question is who will allow it to participate?"[16] Even Esam al-Erian, perhaps the organization's most prominent reformist and key architect of its electoral strategy, acknowledged the likelihood that the group's parliamentary presence would be effectively erased: "If things continue as they are… the Brotherhood won't have any seats at all."[17]

Internal shifts within Islamist organizations are important, obviously, to Islamists, but less so for observers. In the end, Islamist groups and parties tend, by Middle East standards, to be particularly well-institutionalized, with complex, layered decision-making processes and multiple veto points. Leaders like Hammam Said and Mohamed Badie, despite claiming the top positions in their organizations, are limited in what they can push, since the bodies of which they are a part operate under strict majority vote. As Abdel Majid Thneibat, former head of the Jordanian Brotherhood, explained: "There are a set of given political principles [that the organization operates by] which no leader is able to change."[18] As such, it should not be surprising that the election of apparently "radical" leaders does not appear to lead to significant radicalization.

ISLAMIST EXCEPTIONALISM

To understand why Islamists may be turning inward, it is more useful to consider their strategic constraints as Islamists, rather than the relative weight of

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"conservatives" versus "reformists." Western observers tend to treat the Brotherhood and like-minded groups as political parties. The goal of virtually all mass-based parties is to win elections, with elections as either an end or means to implementing preferred policies. Political parties are ultimately concerned with governing. Islamist parties, however, are rather different. The popular image, portraying Islamists as obsessed with seizing the levers of power, belies their marked ambivalence and, sometimes, aversion to electoral power.

Islamist groups and parties in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and elsewhere have rarely intended to win elections outright but, rather, to win enough seats to pressure, and exact concessions from, the government. Accordingly, they do not run full (or even half) slates in parliamentary elections. The Egyptian Brotherhood has never run more than 160 candidates out of a possible 444. In the most recent Jordanian elections, the IAF ran only 22 candidates out of 110, adopting an odd campaign motto for a political party—"*musharika wa laisa mughaliba*"—which almost literally means "participating but not seeking a majority." IAF leaders readily admit that the reason they contested such a small number of seats was to avoid offending the regime and to demonstrate that the party had no interest in escalating tensions.[19]

There is a long history of Islamist parties purposely choosing not to contest "protected" seats, working with authorities to defeat other opposition candidates,[20] and otherwise coordinating with regimes. On the eve of the 1993 elections in Jordan, for instance, IAF leaders, in last-minute negotiations with regime representatives (which ultimately failed), agreed to "accept" only 12 parliamentary seats in exchange for the regime's withdrawal of new electoral legislation.[21] This deference, and discomfort with the notion of governing, has been a major point of contention within the IAF and other groups in the region. In Jordan, a number of prominent Islamist figures, including Abdul Rahim al-Akour and Bassam al-Emoush, have resigned from the IAF to accept offers to join the government

It is worth keeping in mind that Islamist parties do not necessarily need to rule in order to fulfill their original objective – the Islamization of society. Because Islamists have an integrated view of culture, religion, politics, and economics, they are more willing to act politically with a mind to non-political considerations. Most mainstream Islamist parties in the Arab world are political wings of religious social movements or at least remain tied to them through informal links and overlapping memberships. For example, the Islamic Action Front is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood while Morocco's Justice and Development Party (PJD) remains closely linked to the Movement for Unity and Reform. Such parties may not be able to use a strictly electoral calculus when adopting public positions or fielding candidates for elections. They may need to take into account the interests of the "parent movement," which tend to be less focused on short-term political gains. Moreover, challenging the regime electorally is likely to invite further repression, which can undermine the operation of Islamists' core activities in the social and educational spheres.

This captures a key point which is often overlooked—Islamist groups are almost inevitably torn by competing, and sometimes contradictory, objectives. To choose

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politics over education and social service provision is a choice that Islamists cannot afford to make. Accordingly, such choices are postponed indefinitely, with Islamist groups ending up in a state of semi-paralysis, cautious and risk-averse, both unable and unwilling to commit themselves fully to the political struggle against authoritarian regimes.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR ARAB GOVERNMENTS

Many Arab regimes have come to the conclusion that the repression of Islamist groups is an effective strategy, largely because it is. The political exclusion of Islamists appears to have "tamed" them, pushing them away from electoral contestation toward less threatening social activities. The more Islamist groups make clear that they cannot afford the costs of repression, the more regimes choose to repress them.

Additionally, Arab governments have come to see repression as an effective tool with which to encourage internal divisions within Islamist movements, particularly between those who advocate a confrontational stance—through street protest, for example—and those who see it as their responsibility to protect members of the group from mass imprisonment.

In some important respects, the objectives of United States are, perhaps counterintuitively, more aligned with mainstream Islamists than pro-American Arab regimes. After all, U.S. policymakers share with Islamist leaders a stated interest in gradual institutional and constitutional reform and a rhetorical commitment to democratization.

Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes are not oriented around long-term concerns because, as they see it, their immediate existence is continuously under threat. Thus, survival—and neutralizing any perceived threats to survival—is the overarching imperative, to the exclusion of other interests.[22] In such a context, the dogged marginalization of nonviolent opposition, particularly Islamists, is an understandable strategic choice for regimes, if also a shortsighted one. If Egyptian and Jordanian authorities permitted greater Islamist participation, it would not threaten their ultimate hold on power. Islamists are not yet ready for executive power and are perfectly content to accept a "threshold" of parliamentary seats.

An inclusionary strategy –- and increased Islamist representation in parliament –- would yield a number of benefits, including greater international legitimacy, something that the Egyptian regime, in particular, is sorely in need of. It would also enhance the legitimacy of authoritarian governments in the eyes of disillusioned citizens. The expectations gap is, in some sense, worse in Jordan, which had enjoyed a reputation of positive movement on political reform, particularly after landmark elections in 1989, in which Islamists won 34 of 80 seats. However, the monarchy soon re-asserted its grip in the mid-1990s, marking the start of long authoritarian retrenchment that continues until today.[23]

Considering the constrained role of parliament, Islamist parties, even in the event that they gained sizable parliamentary minorities, would be unable to enact

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major legislation that countered the priorities of ruling elites. Yet, Arab regimes, in their paranoia and aversion to risk—and encouraged by Western governments that appear firmly behind them—are proceeding down a dangerous path of not only ignoring, but actively blocking, the desires and demands of their citizens.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Islamist leaders often speak of an "American veto." The veto is used by the United States and other Western powers to block Islamists from gaining power, even if they win at the ballot box. The two examples usually raised are Algeria in 1991, when the Western-backed military annulled parliamentary elections after the Islamic Salvation Front dominated the first round, and, more recently, Hamas's 2006 election victory. Esam al-Erian explains it this way: "Even if you come to power through democratic means, you're facing an international community that doesn't accept Islamist representation. This is a problem. I think this will continue to present an obstacle for us until there is a real acknowledgement of this situation."[24]

Democratic transitions require major political forces to fully commit to challenging the regime's hold on power, something which Islamist actors appear unwilling to do out of fear of an Algerian scenario; they feel the international community would oppose their coming to power even if, and after, they defeated ruling parties in free elections. In a sense, Islamists perceive themselves as fighting two fronts simultaneously – the regime as well as the regime's international backers – making it that much more difficult for them to envision alternation of power as a real possibility.

The international component is critical. Pro-democracy movements are usually willing to withstand a degree of regime violence because this elicits international attention and, often, outrage. According to one study by Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, international condemnation of regime repression is positively correlated with the success of nonviolent action.[25] Yet, in the case of the Middle East, there have not been any instances of anti-Islamist repression that have drawn significant international outrage.[26]

In short, even if American policymakers believe their ability to influence Islamist behavior is limited, Islamists themselves happen to think otherwise. Commenting on the Bush administration's pro-democracy efforts, leading Muslim Brotherhood member Abdel Monem Abul Futouh said, "Everyone knows it…we benefited, everyone benefited, and the Egyptian people benefited."[27] This presents a clear, if tenuous, opening for the United States to act. To be sure, the U.S. government should not be seen as favoring one group over another. However, it should also be aware that if mainstream Islamists abandon the political arena, it may leave a dangerous vacuum, one likely to be filled not by liberals but by Salafi groups that are considerably more conservative and less amenable to compromise. This is what occurred in the 2008 Kuwaiti elections, when Salafis overtook the Islamic Constitutional Movement, the political arm of Kuwait's Muslim Brotherhood, as the largest bloc in parliament. Khalil al-Anani notes that, after winning 17 of 50 seats, the

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Salafis' first demand "was to apply sharia through a committee to monitor 'unethical behaviors'…[and] creating a moral police similar to the one in Saudi Arabia."[28]

With both Egypt and Jordan holding much-anticipated elections in 2010 and 2011, the United States must develop clear policies that advance its interests and ideals. As a longtime financial sponsor of the Mubarak regime and the Hashemite monarchy, the United States enjoys a significant degree of leverage. As an initial step, President Obama should publicly affirm the right of all nonviolent political actors –- including Islamist parties –- to freely participate in elections. This should be coupled with a consistent American policy of opposing not just the arrests of secular activists, but Islamist ones as well. More generally, the United States along with European allies should exert direct pressure on the Egyptian and Jordanian governments, in both private and public, to take practical steps to open up political space for opposition groups. This is particularly important in Jordan where the IAF in early August announced a boycott of the November elections but said it would reconsider its position if the government provided guarantees.

At the same time it presses for more political freedoms, the United States can begin improving its institutional knowledge of Islamist political participation, a requisite to effective action. One way, obviously, to learn more about Islamists is to talk to them.[29] Along these lines, the U.S. State Department should give clear guidance to embassies, empowering them to begin substantive engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, particularly in the context of the upcoming elections. To be sure, the United States already talks to Islamist members of parliament but only in their capacity as elected officials (and not as representatives of the Brotherhood or IAF). In any case, these are ad-hoc meetings lacking a substantive agenda.[30]

Washington must move toward a more robust engagement, consisting of regular meetings with the actual leaders of the groups in question that focus on key areas of mutual interest, including protecting the rights of opposition actors and pushing for competitive elections.[31] Such moves are likely to draw domestic opposition in the United States as well as disapproval in the Arab world (primarily from governments and secular elites). The case, then, should be made clearly: the withdrawal of mainstream Islamists from the political arena is not in American strategic interests. Elections without significant Islamist participation will be—and will be seen as—less legitimate and will provide an opening to Salafi groups to fill the power vacuum. Due to their reluctance to formally enter the political process, regimes have seen Salafis as less of a threat despite their relative conservatism and uncompromising interpretation of Islamic law. As a result, Arab regimes have increasingly allowed Salafis greater space to operate. While it may be in their interest to do so, it is likely not in America's.

There may be cause for optimism. The Obama administration, despite its de-prioritization of democracy promotion, has shown more interest in engaging Islamists than did its predecessor. For instance, it put pressure on the Egyptian government to allow Brotherhood members to attend the 2009 Cairo speech and, more recently, established an interagency working group on political Islam. A more substantive engagement with groups like the Brotherhood may be on the

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table.

These very tentative openings aside, there remains—with Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict taking priority— a strong sense in Washington that this is not the time to push on either Islamist engagement or democratic reform. The growing anticipation around the 2010 and 2011 elections in Egypt and Jordan belie that claim. How the United States approaches these contests will be a critical marker for the evolving relationship between the Obama administration and the Middle East, testing America's ability to encourage elections that, while far from free and fair, are at least open and competitive. The degree of openness will go a long way in shaping the course mainstream Islamists choose to take— either pushing them away from electoral politics, or pushing them back in.

[1] "Islamists" is defined here as those who believe that Islam and Islamic law should play a prominent role in public life and organize politically around that belief. This policy brief focuses on *mainstream* Islamists, i.e., mass membership nonviolent groups that enjoy widespread popular support and participate in existing electoral and political structures. In most Arab countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, and Bahrain, mainstream Islamist organizations are easily the largest opposition groups in parliament.

[2] *Mubadira al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin houl Mabadi al-Islah fi Misr* [The Initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding Principles of Reform in Egypt], March 2004. All translations of Arabic sources are the author's unless otherwise noted.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] *Na'am wa ila al-abad al-Islam huwa al-hal: Al-Barnamaj al-Intakhabi li-Murashi Hizb al-Jabha al-'Amal al-Islami*, 2003-2007 [Yes and Forever, Islam is the Solution: The Electoral Program of the Islamic Action Front Candidates], October 2003, p. 5.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 24.

[9] Ibid., p. 28.

[10] *Rou'iya al-Haraka al-Islamiya li al-Islah fi al-Urdun* [Perspective of the Islamic Movement toward Reform in Jordan], the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood, 2005, p. 27.

[11] This issue is contested by IAF leaders and has been a source of great controversy within the organization. Some whom I spoke to vigorously denied the existence of any "deal" between the government and the IAF. However, there is ample evidence to suggest that there was at least an understanding, although it is unclear how explicit it was or to what extent it was the initiative of individual leaders acting without official authorization from the party. However, several senior IAF leaders and former members confirmed the existence of such an "understanding," while others suggested there was some degree of "coordination."

[12] Author's interview with IAF senior official, May 19, 2008.

[13] The General Guide, or *murshid al-'am* is the top leadership position in the Egyptian Brotherhood. In the Jordanian Brotherhood, the equivalent position is called "Overseer-General," or *muraqib al-'am.*

[14] "Egypt: Proposed Constitutional Amendments Greatest Erosion of Human Rights in 26 Years," Amnesty International, Press Release, March 18, 2007, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE12/008/2007>.

[15] See Badie's acceptance speech, Gregg Carlstrom, "Translation: Mohamed Badie's Acceptance Speech," January 16, 2010, available at <http://www.themajlis.org/2010/01/16/translation-muhammad-badies-acceptance-speech>; and transcript of Badie's post-election interview with Al Jazeera, available at <http://ana-ikhwan.blogspot.com/2010/01/blog-post_22.html>.

[16] Author's interview with Abdel Monem Mahmoud, January 17, 2010.

[17] Author's interview with Esam al-Erian, July 16, 2008.

[18] Author's interview with Abdul Majid Thneibat, August 27, 2008.

[19] Author's interview with Tayseer Fityani, May 19, 2008; Interview with Ruheil al-Gharaibeh, June 8, 2008; Interview with Mohammad Bzour, May 15, 2008; Interview with Abdul Latif Arabiyat, June 11, 2008. Gharaibeh, Bzour, Fityani, and Arabiyat are senior IAF officials.

[20] Author's interview with former Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Ziad Abu Ghanimeh, May 28, 2005.

[21] Author's interview with former Prime Minister Mudar Badran, Amman, February 23, 2005. Badran, former head of general intelligence and a close associate of King Hussein, was prime minister during the Brotherhood's participation in the cabinet in 1991. In 1993, he was chief of the royal court.

[22] For more on regime survival strategies, see Steven Heydemann, "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World," Analysis Paper no. 13, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, October 2007.

[23] In late 2009, King Abdullah dissolved parliament, postponed new elections, and began ruling by decree.

[24] Author's interview with Esam al-Erian, July 16, 2008.

[25] Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security,* Summer 2008.

[26] See Shadi Hamid, "Islamists and Nonviolent Action," *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave, December 2009).

[27] Author's interview of Abdel Monem Abul Futouh, August 4, 2006.

[28] See Khalil al-Anani, "The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists," Working Paper no. 4, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, p. 6.

[29] Staff members of a number of individual House and Senate Offices have, in unofficial capacities, held meetings with leading Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Action Front members in both Washington, DC and Cairo.

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[30] Author's interview with U.S. embassy official in Cairo, May 3, 2010.

[31] For more on what "substantive engagement" might look like, see Shadi Hamid and Amanda Kadlec, "Strategies for Engaging Political Islam," Project on Middle East Democracy, January 2010, available at <http://pomed.org/strategies-for-engaging-political-islam/>

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