




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Unfinished Business

U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century

By Michael O'Hanlon



**Center for a
New American
Security**

Cover Image

USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) arrives at Naval Forces Marianas Support Activity, Guam, for a scheduled port visit. Kitty Hawk was on deployment in the Western Pacific Ocean participating in exercises with other U.S. forces and various partners throughout Asia and Australia.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist Seaman Stephen Rowe.

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
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About the Author


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Map No. 4170 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS October 2006
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

*Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

**Appears without prejudice to the question of sovereignty.





"A successful outcome for the Global Posture Review... will depend on the next U.S. administration refining numerous rough edges of the current plan — and redefining the broader national security policy context in which any base realignment will inevitably be viewed."

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The next American president will inherit an overseas military base realignment process begun in the first term of the George W. Bush administration. This realignment, guided by an effort known as the Global Posture Review (GPR), was perhaps former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's chief intellectual and policy accomplishment during his six-year tenure at the Pentagon. Unlike his likely warfighting legacy, particularly in regard to Iraq, the GPR is on generally sound conceptual foundations. But a successful outcome for the Global Posture Review, roughly halfway implemented as of mid-2008, will depend on the next U.S. administration refining numerous rough edges of the current plan — and redefining the broader national security policy context in which any base realignment will inevitably be viewed.

In the end, about 70,000 American military personnel will be relocated as a result of the GPR, not counting those directly affected by the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. While this realignment is not comparable in magnitude to what happened after World War II, or even after the Cold War, it is nonetheless a major milestone in American strategic policy. To date, the U.S. armed forces are about halfway through reductions and other changes in their European ground force capabilities. They are well underway with plans to reduce and relocate the American military presence in Korea. Changes in Japan are coming slowly, but that is probably acceptable given that the U.S.-Japan alliance is in generally good shape. New capabilities are being deployed on Guam and in Africa, building on ideas first formulated in the Clinton administration that the Bush administration has further developed, often with considerable creativity and energy.

The GPR's objectives are to enhance American military capability and flexibility for the so-called long war on terror, to deal with major shifts in the global alignment of power in Asia, to keep traditional partnerships strong while building up new partnerships with countries of Eastern Europe and Africa and parts of Central Asia, and to improve the quality of life for American military personnel.

But even if the GPR seeks the right goals and is undergirded by sensible overall logic, the time is right for a review of the review. There are several significant problems in its design and execution, due in part to Rumsfeld's domination of the process, particularly in the early stages—despite the fact that an effort such as the GPR should be thoroughly interagency in character, State Department officials and American allies were not adequately consulted. That leaves much to do for a new administration in improving a conceptually sound, but also rather troubled, process of global posture realignment.

South Korea is where Rumsfeld's domination of the GPR process caused the most harm, on top of the often acrimonious relationship between Washington and Seoul throughout most of this decade. In Europe, plans to move forces to Romania and Bulgaria on a rotating basis could add unwisely to the deployment burdens of an already overstretched Army and Marine Corps if implemented prematurely; such changes should therefore not take full effect until the combined burden of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions has lessened. Planned cutbacks in Germany would go too far given America's need to keep improving interoperability with its major allies. There is no reason to have large and heavy American ground forces in Germany, but the case for keeping at least a single heavy brigade is strong. Thankfully, the Bush administration's newfound willingness to increase the size of the active Army makes it more likely that planned further U.S. troop cuts will be scaled back, largely because it will be difficult to find adequate numbers of places to station them in the United States for the foreseeable future. And while the creation of Africa Command (AFRICOM) has given appropriate new emphasis to the role of Africa in American strategic policy, the fact that AFRICOM is now based in Europe underscores the degree of the United States' implementation problems—in no small part because it is now associated with an administration seen by many other countries as unilateralist and too militaristic.

Other issues have carried on past Rumsfeld's tenure and will endure for the next administration to handle. The GPR does not pay enough heed to some concrete military matters, such as enduring vulnerabilities of American forces on Guam, where a major (and generally well conceived) buildup of U.S. forces is underway. On the vexing matter of the longer-term future of U.S. military bases in Iraq, the GPR is silent.

Perhaps most important is a broader tension, if not contradiction, in the philosophy undergirding the Rumsfeld-led review. On the one hand, the review's architects talk of optimizing a global base network for a protracted war against terrorists prosecuted on many fronts and requiring therefore cooperation with a substantial number of partner states. On the other, the review is largely designed to reduce America's overseas footprint, particularly in Germany and Korea, and to avoid construction of large bases in other places even when the need for certain new capabilities is apparent. Most new facilities, as in Romania, Bulgaria, and much of Africa, are to be flexible, and quite possibly temporary. U.S. forces are to remain most numerous in countries with a strong and long tradition of allowing relatively unencumbered American use of those forces, such as Britain and Japan. The American presence in Iraq provides an exception to this trend—but it is important to recall that much of the motivation for the GPR arose in the period of 2002 through 2004 when Iraq was not expected to be a long-term military commitment for the United States.

The possible contradiction in this philosophy arises from the fact that, as Iraq has taught us, effective partnership in the war on terror requires commitment to the long-term security of allies. Maximizing America's own flexibility, while desirable in many ways, must not go so far as to reduce U.S. willingness to stand by its friends and help them stabilize and protect their countries for the long haul.

The good news is that a new U.S. administration can rectify this potential problem largely by moving away from much of the rhetoric and style of the Bush administration, and by ensuring that it works to undergird the security capabilities of allies needing the help through a variety of tools. But this situation requires attention. For all the talk of how the GPR is to strengthen America's

overseas capabilities and improve its responsiveness in various ways, the reality that many around the world see is a trend to reduce U.S. commitments abroad out of a desire to preserve American flexibility—and to ensure that the United States not get bogged down excessively in the internal or even the regional problems of allies. This perception may have had some real validity to it during the Rumsfeld era. It will not be generally well-founded in the era ahead. Most American strategists and leaders remain committed to a traditional form of internationalism and engagement, including strong support for allies and other important partners.

The next administration will have to take pains to reestablish the right perception about American intentions, and American dependability, in places where the perception may have been somewhat compromised of late. Thankfully, the underlying ideas associated with many of the planned changes are reasonable enough that a new administration should have a good chance of successfully addressing all these issues and successfully completing an overhaul of U.S. global posture.



"The GPR... further codifies the U.S. intention to retain a network of major overseas bases and working military to military relationships with other countries on all continents except Antarctica. What would be highly unusual for most countries has become matter of fact for the United States."

I. THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW IN CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

The Rumsfeld era at the Department of Defense will undoubtedly be most remembered for the Iraq war, and beyond that, for the U.S. response to 9/11 including the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is only natural that a Secretary of Defense find his place in history first and foremost for the wars fought on his watch. But another central element of Rumsfeld's legacy is the way in which he reshaped America's global military base network.

This reshaping has happened through a process that began shortly after 9/11 and that continues today. The process was formally codified as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, though for brevity it will be referred to here as the Global Posture Review or GPR. A vocal advocate of military transformation, Rumsfeld probably did more to reshape the U.S. armed forces through the GPR than through his changes to policies on weapons modernization, force structure, military personnel, or any other major aspect of defense policy. It is no mean feat to change global basing arrangements; as Kent Calder has argued, once established, they tend to display considerable inertia and prove difficult to modify.¹

The GPR encompasses everything from the creation of new bases in Central Asia and Eastern Europe to the downsizing of the U.S. military presence in Germany to a reduction and realignment of the American presence in South Korea and Okinawa, Japan. These changes are designed to improve U.S. and allied options for handling new developments—such as the ongoing struggle against extremism and terrorism, the rise of China—and enduring problems such as the North Korean and Iranian regimes. Of course, there have also been enormous changes in the Persian Gulf, the largest related to ongoing

operations in Iraq, and the elimination of American combat forces from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. (Deployment patterns of naval vessels have also changed a good deal, but the base infrastructure supporting them has changed less in recent years.)

According to the plan, about 70,000 U.S. military personnel would return to the United States over a ten-year implementation period—just under 30 percent of the 250,000 the United States deployed abroad prior to 9/11 (though less than 20 percent of the total deployed when the review was announced in 2004 with the Iraq and Afghanistan operations fully underway).² The total number of American military sites abroad would decline from 850 to 550 over that same ten-year period of drawdown (not counting sites in Iraq or Afghanistan).³ That 35 percent cut in numbers of facilities will translate into a reduction of somewhat more than 20 percent of the total value of the assets used by U.S. forces abroad, which topped \$100 billion earlier this decade.⁴

Despite its significance, the GPR is hardly radical or unprecedented in scope. Less than 20 years ago, in the aftermath of the Cold War, much larger changes occurred in America's European base network. The Vietnam and Korean wars had themselves produced much larger overall shifts in forces in previous decades. The British departure from the broader Middle East region in the 1960s and early 1970s, together with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had led to momentous shifts in the American role in that region before as well. And of course, all these changes pale in comparison with what happened in the 1940s and early 1950s, when America fully became a global power, then tried to come home after World War II, and then realized it could not do so as the Cold War began.

Ongoing changes are nonetheless worthy of close examination. The following pages provide essential context for the GPR and how it compares with previous major changes in America's global military capabilities. The report then summarizes and assesses the plan in more detail on a region by region and country by country basis. It goes on to suggest improvements to the policy for the remaining months of the Bush administration and for the next American president.

The GPR will be first and foremost Donald Rumsfeld's legacy, but Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, his successor, and other actors in the government—not to mention American allies—will have a critical hand in shaping numerous decisions that are still to be made. Given the stakes involved, not just for America's military forces but for U.S. foreign policy and alliance security more generally, this is as it should be.

BROADER CONTEXT

In the decade prior to September 11, 2001, the United States had about a quarter million troops abroad, mostly within the jurisdictions of European Command, Pacific Command, and Central Command. More than 100,000 troops were in Europe. Most of these were in Germany (71,000 troops total, more than 55,000 of them Army soldiers); another 12,000 were in Italy, 11,000 in the United Kingdom, and smaller numbers elsewhere. Nearly 100,000 American military personnel were in East Asia, divided up between Japan, South Korea, and the waters of the western Pacific. About 25,000 were ashore and afloat in the Persian Gulf in the Central Command theater; smaller numbers were found in Latin America and Africa. (As the numbers have begun to shrink somewhat in Europe and Asia in recent years, those deployed to the Central

Command region have of course grown enormously. As of early 2008, the United States had some 25,000 troops in or near Afghanistan and another 220,000 in and around Iraq.)

In September 2004, the Pentagon released a 17-page document entitled “Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture,” which summarizes the GPR's aims and main elements. Designed to flesh out some of the logic behind policy proposals unveiled by President Bush in a speech the previous month, and to explain changes in America's global military network already well underway by that point, it provided broad themes as well as some region-by-region detail.

Consistent with the Rumsfeld tendency never to think small, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith wrote in the document's foreword that “the changes stemming from the review will result in the most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas since our current posture was cemented at the end of World War II and the Korean War.” Casting the review in broader perspective, Feith continued:

Since the United States became a global power at the turn of the 20th century, it has changed its forward posture as strategic circumstances have evolved: from bases for administering new overseas territories, to post-World War II occupation duties, and then to a Cold War containment posture. Today, fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is again time to change our posture to fit the strategic realities of our era: an uncertain strategic environment dominated by the nexus of terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁵

Of the 70,000 troops slated to come home, about 15,000 were initially in Asia,⁶ and reductions there are occurring largely through consolidation of

redundant headquarters in Korea and Japan and a reduction of Army combat capability in Korea from two brigades to one (in fact, the latter change has already occurred). In Europe, while some streamlining is occurring in Air Force and Navy assets, most changes are in the Army: the total numbers of soldiers will decline from 62,000 to 28,000 if original 2004 plans hold.⁷ There are also a number of places where American capabilities and even troop totals are being augmented. These include parts of Japan, Guam, Romania, Bulgaria, and Central Asia. The GPR also builds on less trumpeted but still important strengthening of the American posture in the 1990s in places such as the smaller Persian Gulf nations and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The GPR was in effect the second major review of overseas basing since the Cold War ended. As such it further codifies the U.S. intention to retain a network of major overseas bases and working military to military relationships with other countries on all continents except Antarctica. What would be highly unusual for most countries has become matter of fact for the United States.

Because of America's unique position, the GPR's changes are among the most important issues discussed by diplomats, security specialists, and even regular citizens in countries such as South Korea, Japan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Major powers such as China and Russia are highly cognizant of every detail of America's basing decisions, worrying about the degree to which Washington and allied capitals may be designing new structures with an eye on them. Crucial Islamic countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan are focused on America's every move as well. Moreover, the GPR was done with a broader approach than most previous base realignments, governed as they often were by the simple need to downsize after war or "upsize" for possible war

against a specific foe such as the Soviet Union. This latest review was guided by an effort to prepare for various possible scenarios—"planning for uncertainty" as the Rumsfeld Pentagon liked to say. It was nearly as notable for its decisions to increase certain forces and capabilities overseas as its decisions to cut others back.

Current Distribution of U.S. Forces

Today, the United States has at least some military forces in about 150 countries around the world.⁸ But it has more than 1,000 armed personnel in about a dozen countries. They feature first and foremost Germany, Japan, and Korea, as well as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Of these, Germany, Japan, and Kuwait are principally hubs or staging grounds for maintaining presence and conducting operations throughout a key region and beyond. Capabilities in Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan by contrast are devoted almost exclusively to possible or ongoing operations in those respective countries. Critical countries in the American base network abroad also include Italy and Britain, and (in somewhat smaller troop numbers) Djibouti, Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt, as well as the British territory of Diego Garcia; all of these have broad regional purposes. The fact that this list of key foreign partners is short makes the entire U.S. overseas base network easier to understand. But it also underscores how critically dependent the United States remains on a few key players.

New Terms of Reference

The GPR set out three new definitions of military facilities. To be sure, these were new terms for old concepts, but they nonetheless helped clarify exactly what the Bush administration envisioned, and gave it terminology to apply to specific sites when seeking to describe them.

"Main Operating Bases" were defined as having permanently stationed U.S. combat forces, well-developed base infrastructures including for

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family support, and robust security protection. Examples were identified as Ramstein Air Base in Germany, Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, and Camp Humphreys in South Korea.

“Forward Operating Sites” are maintained normally by only a modest U.S. support presence; they are places to which American forces can deploy for shorter periods for purposes such as bilateral and regional training purposes. Examples of these are the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras.

Finally, “Cooperative Security Locations” have little or even no permanent U.S. presence, relying on contractors or host-nation support for

maintenance and routine operations. They are designed largely for contingency access, as in a place such as Dakar, Senegal.⁹

It is worth noting that none of these types of facilities are needed for the small-scale training and operational partnerships emphasized by the Bush administration as part of its way of fighting the long-term war against extremism. Such activities do not generally require or benefit from highly visible sites where Americans are based.¹⁰ Generally, trainers are better off operating out of embassies, or private locations, or even indigenous bases operated by indigenous forces—not out of declared, distinctive American facilities. There can be exceptions to this generalization, of course, in places where there is a great deal of U.S.-led training, for example, or in places where the host nation truly wants a visible U.S. presence.¹¹ But for the most part, such activities do not have great bearing on America’s global base network.

Overseas Basing in the Broader Context of Global Military Capabilities

This study focuses on U.S. military bases abroad, the most concrete manifestations of the GPR. But throughout this study, and whenever considering the subject, it is important to recall that America’s global military posture is more than the sum of its overseas bases. As Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Work point out, it is in fact a combination of those bases (and the political and legal arrangements that govern their use) with forward-deployed forces, pre-stationed military equipment, global strike forces including those located in the United States, and worldwide logistics capabilities capable of transporting and sustaining deployed forces abroad. It is interconnected by a global reconnaissance and communications system including assets situated in space.¹²

Tradeoffs are always possible across different elements of the global military posture. For example, cutbacks in bases could be countered by increases in strategic transportation capabilities, long-range strike assets, and/or naval power. But many types of combat capabilities, such as short-range tactical air operations, do require bases close to potential combat zones (unless exorbitant sums are to be spent on inefficient alternatives such as dozens of aircraft carriers). Moreover, maintaining deterrence on the one hand, and fostering strong interoperable capabilities with allies on the other, are far easier to accomplish with forward presence. For these and other reasons, for the most part this study assumes that a strong overseas base network is highly desirable, the real question being how to best structure it rather than how to supplant it with other elements of national military power.

It is worth dwelling on this last point for a moment. Alone among the world's major powers, the United States today has a substantial overseas military presence, with enough capability in numerous strategically important parts of the world to make a difference in normal day-to-day regional balances of power. This is obviously true at present in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is more generally the case even in peacetime. Not only does the United States have a great deal of fire-power stationed abroad, it has the infrastructure, the working relationships, and the transportation and logistics assets needed to reinforce its capacities quickly as needed in crises. This has been continuously true since World War II—so long that we now take it for granted. But stationing hundreds of thousands of troops abroad is not an automatic or inherent characteristic of major powers, especially in the modern post-imperial era. Apart from the United States, no other major power has more than 20,000 to 30,000 forces abroad (with Britain and France leading the way

after the United States). Substantial powers such as Russia, China, and India deploy forces totaling only in the thousands normally, as do several countries that participate frequently in peace-keeping missions.

Long-Range Strike

Long-range strike forces are most usefully defined as capabilities that can effectively fight from American bases, without having to first establish foreign beachheads. By that definition, long-range strike forces are primarily air and naval assets, though some special forces may fit the definition as well. Accordingly, chief long-range strike assets feature the Air Force's about 180 bombers (65 B-1, 20 B-2, and 94 B-52). These, as well as transport planes, tactical aircraft, and support aircraft for purposes such as intelligence, make use of roughly 60 KC-10 tankers as well as nearly 200 KC-135 tanker aircraft, plus more than 300 additional KC-135s in the Air Reserves and Air National Guard. (These tankers, combined with America's dispersed base network, allow tactical combat aircraft to be deployed quickly assuming bases can be found for them in the region of operation. The United States Air Force has 1,700 such combat aircraft in its active-duty inventory alone, so depending on base access, this can be quite a potent capability as the planes can deploy within days if they have somewhere to operate once reaching their destination.)

Long-range strike forces also include the country's 12 aircraft carrier battle groups, each fielding about 55 combat aircraft and 75 planes in all. All but one of the carriers are based in the continental United States, with the other in Japan. Typically two to three are deployed in overseas theaters at a time. Each is protected and aided by numerous surface escort ships.

The Navy's 58 attack submarines represent another notable prompt power projection

capability; half a dozen or more are typically deployed in overseas waters.¹³ As one indication of naval capacity abroad, on September 30, 2007 the Navy had about 1,500 personnel on ships deployed in the European theater, about 12,000 in the East Asia and Pacific region, and about 7,000 elsewhere—primarily in the greater Middle East.¹⁴

Prepositioning

Prepositioned supplies include huge ships stocked with weaponry and ammunition as well as ground-based facilities storing weaponry and supplies. Among other things, the United States tries to keep the capacity to quickly fill out up to eight ground combat brigades with equipment stored overseas and ideally kept in good working order at all times. However, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have complicated the effort to keep such equipment stocks complete.

Strategic Lift

Another key aspect of global posture is strategic lift, including ships and airplanes. Since early in the Cold War, and particularly since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States has placed a high premium on such mobility—and nothing about the end of the Cold War has changed that emphasis. Among its other capabilities, the United States has about three dozen amphibious ships capable of carrying more than two brigades of Marines and their equipment, roughly 360 large airplanes for carrying troops and equipment and another 200 quickly available via the civil reserve air fleet program, each typically able to carry 50 to 100 tons of cargo per flight, and about 20 large “roll-on roll-off” ships each capable of carrying 15,000 to 20,000 tons of equipment (equipment and initial supplies for a heavy division weigh about 100,000 tons). Altogether, these assets create a theoretical capacity for a sustained average movement of about 30,000 tons of military equipment per day.¹⁵

However, bottlenecks often develop at ports and airfields, particularly abroad. In fact, it is generally difficult to deploy much more than 1,000 tons in a day to the typical major airfield and difficult to exceed 10,000 tons per day at even a large port.¹⁶ That means the United States usually needs a few weeks to deploy a division-sized force and a few months to deploy a large force to most parts of the world.¹⁷

Financial Costs

What are the financial implications of overseas bases? The budgetary costs of the GPR, including construction costs for new or expanding bases (and shutdown and cleanup costs for older ones) are estimated to range from \$9 billion to \$12 billion for initial investment according to DoD.¹⁸ However, the Congressionally-mandated Overseas Basing Commission offered an estimate of \$20 billion in its 2005 report.¹⁹

These are real sums of money. But the budgetary importance of overseas basing decisions is often less than many assume. For one thing, the costs of moving people around are modest—typically in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year for forces numbering in the tens of thousands range, for example.²⁰ The costs to DoD of maintaining schools overseas for military dependents are nontrivial, of course, but again, the annual expenses for tens of thousands of military families abroad total in the hundreds of millions of dollars—not the many billions. And foreign bases in the right place can save substantial sums of money. For example, being able to base U.S. tactical airpower at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, Japan arguably saves the United States several billion dollars a year, since the alternative to Kadena might well be a larger Navy aircraft carrier fleet expanded by three or four carrier battle groups.²¹

There is an important caveat in regard to finances, however. There are always real one-time costs associated with building new bases and relocating forces that if incurred quickly can make for big yearly price tags. Moving 7,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam is expected to cost several billion dollars. And with the post-Cold War defense downsizing process complete, as well as most surplus bases now identified and closed, there will not be enough facilities at which to relocate Army soldiers returning from Germany and Korea in short order. This is especially true in light of the ongoing increase in the size of the active Army, announced after the GPR was complete (with an overall increase of roughly 65,000 soldiers now expected within several years). As discussed subsequently, therefore, it would not be at all surprising if plans for reductions in U.S. troops in Europe were slowed or even modified in the coming years. Indeed, to some extent this is already happening.

CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE GPR

The September 2004 GPR Report to Congress states the GPR's goals as "...to assure allies, dissuade potential challengers, deter our enemies, and defeat aggression if necessary." These echo the core national security objectives of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.²² (The 2004 goals do not repeat the preemption language of the 2002 National Security Strategy, though they are consistent with other goals and principles of that controversial document.²³) Indeed, they echo much of the underlying bipartisan philosophy behind U.S. foreign policy throughout the last several decades.

The broader rationale for the GPR was to afford more flexibility in American basing for a new strategic era, and to create new capabilities as well. As the 2002 National Security Strategy put it, "To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces."²⁴

In terms of specific threats and opportunities, the GPR focused in the first instance largely on the global war on terror. But its catalysts, and its objectives, run deeper. Specifically, it was also motivated by shifting power balances among major states, most notably the rise of China. It is not clear to what extent the Pentagon views China's rise as a general matter of likely hegemonic competition among great powers with broad ramifications, and to what extent it is the specific unsettled issue of Taiwan that most concerns it. Regardless, the motivation for changes in Japan, Guam, and even Korea is largely to hedge against the possibility of future difficulty with the PRC.

Another more down-to-Earth, yet clearly important, purpose of the base realignment was to improve the quality of life for U.S. military personnel and their families. While a number of overseas deployments have historically been reasonably comfortable for American forces—allowing military personnel to bring their families to locations that were appealing places to live, such as Germany—the disruption of moving abroad was not always welcome. For example, it could be hard on families with working spouses, who could not always find work quickly, particularly in a foreign land. Indeed, further refinements of the GPR could usefully attempt to loosen this constraint by seeking to gain legal permission for spouses to work abroad. Often that permission is not available at present, under existing alliance arrangements.

The GPR report focuses on three overall types of threats: “the nexus among terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; ungoverned states and under-governed areas within states, which can serve as both a breeding ground and a sanctuary for terrorists and other transnational threats; and potential adversaries’ adoption of asymmetric approaches—including irregular warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and advanced, disruptive, technological challenges—designed to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.”²⁵ Its logic is reinforced in the subsequent 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which lays out several relevant DoD goals, including “having the authorities and resources to build partnership capacity, achieve unity of effort, and adopt indirect approaches to act with and through others to defeat common enemies,” “shifting from responsive actions toward early, preventive measures and increasing the speed of action to stop problems from becoming conflicts or crises,” and

“increasing the freedom of action of the United States and its allies and partners in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century.”²⁶

The criteria summarized above are generally reasonable. As such it makes sense to evaluate the GPR largely against the standards the Bush administration set out for itself in refashioning the country’s base network abroad. To summarize, and to add one or two more practical matters, these criteria are:

- general relevance to the war on terror in operational terms
- relevance to handling other looming threats, in operational terms and deterrence terms (including the need to avoid vulnerability to attack)
- flexibility offered for handling various possible scenarios, since the locations and the character of future threats cannot always be predicted
- utility in shoring up key alliances and strengthening the alliances through combined military training and exercises, while minimizing the political, economic, and social burdens placed on allies in the process. Alliances are important not only for dealing with existing or foreseeable threats but also unpredicted ones, for enhancing the perceived legitimacy of U.S. military actions, and for enhancing military burdensharing to deal with threats
- financial implications for the United States
- quality of life considerations for American personnel

The following sections summarize changes and provide an assessment for four key regions: Europe, the Asia-Pacific, Middle East/Persian Gulf/Central Asia, and Africa. The only significant American troop numbers in Latin America are in Cuba (about 1,000 uniformed personnel at Guantanamo), Honduras (about 400 troops), and Colombia (about 125 troops). There are other countries, too, where the United States has even smaller numbers of forces, such as trainers for military cooperation programs, not to mention military liaisons and Marine guards in many embassies.



II. REGIONAL OVERVIEW

EUROPE

As of mid-2007 the United States had some 85,000 uniformed personnel assigned to bases in Europe (though about 19,000 of the total were deployed to the Central Command theater at that time, leaving some 66,000 actually in Europe). That was down from 120,000 in mid-2001 (with the largest reductions to date having been in Germany as well as the Balkans). Almost 50,000 of the total today are Army soldiers, 6,000 Navy sailors, just under 1,000 Marines, and just over 30,000 airmen and airwomen.²⁷ In its 2004 report to Congress on the GPR, the Pentagon described its goals for future presence in Europe as follows: “The United States will continue to work together with our NATO allies to face common global challenges. The transformation of our military presence in Europe will facilitate the development of capabilities among our NATO allies and partners to address such challenges.”²⁸ Force levels are planned to drop to about 65,000 total American troops in Europe, though that is subject to change.

Details on Presence and Basing

The United States Air Force has a large presence in Europe, with nearly 40,000 total American personnel employed including civilians. It operates seven main bases in Europe plus 70 smaller locations. The main operating bases are the Royal Air Force Lakenheath and Mildenhall Air Bases in England; Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases in Germany, Aviano Air Base in Italy, Lajes Air Field in the Azores, and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The network is commanded from Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

The GPR will reduce total numbers of airmen and airwomen in Europe by 3,000 to 4,000.²⁹ Incirlik in south central Turkey, after having hosted U.S. combat aircraft and more than 3,000 Americans for years during Operation Northern

Watch, has been downsized to a total of some 1,600 Americans that primarily support logistics and resupply flights. It is still a busy base given the amount of U.S. traffic going eastward from Europe, but operates on a substantially smaller scale than before.³⁰ In Germany, Ramstein Air Base is also a logistics hub, with an airlift wing as its core permanent unit.³¹ Spangdahlem Air Base by contrast hosts F-16 and A-10 combat aircraft.³² In Italy, Aviano Air Base hosts several dozen F-16 combat aircraft, and was critical in the air war against Serbia in 1999.³³ Assuming allies permit, these airfields can be used for other types of planes, including aircraft of particular importance during crises or conflicts in Europe and neighboring regions, and for purposed such as intelligence, communications, and electronic warfare assets.

Lajes Field in the Azores Islands of Portugal does not have a large number of stationed aircraft on its premises (similar in this regard to Incirlik) but it is an important transit hub for many military aircraft crossing the Atlantic.³⁴ Finally, in the United Kingdom, Lakenheath is home to F-15 combat aircraft and Mildenhall to refueling aircraft.³⁵ Several hundred tactical nuclear weapons are still believed to be in Europe as well, distributed across bases in the U.K., the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.³⁶

U.S. naval facilities in Europe are even simpler to understand. They are found primarily in Spain and Italy (though there are smaller capabilities in Germany, largely to help with port operations for loading and unloading forces, as well as Greece and Iceland). In Spain, the key facility is U.S. Naval Station Rota, on the Atlantic Ocean side of the Straits of Gibraltar. It is a support base for resupply, repair, and related activities for the Sixth Fleet. The Sixth Fleet headquarters is in Naples,

Italy and another support base is found on the Italian island of Sicily (the La Maddalena base on Sardinia is expected to close as soon as 2008).³⁷ Souda Bay in Greece is a similar type of logistics hub.³⁸ The net effect of the changes to these facilities was to reduce naval personnel in Europe from more than 12,000 in 2004 to 6,000 today.

The U.S. Army presence in Europe involves dozens of bases, many of which are being downsized or closed. The drawdown in Europe is about halfway complete. The number of soldiers was about 70,000 early this decade; it is down to about 47,000 now, and reportedly headed to 28,000 under current plans. After a lull, the drawdown process may again accelerate late 2008, though the future of the planned process is in some flux, as of this writing. Major construction projects and other preparations are now fully underway at stateside bases like Fort Riley, Kansas and Fort Bliss, Texas in preparation for these changes.³⁹

Under the GPR, the 173rd Airborne Brigade of nearly 3,000 soldiers that parachuted into Iraq in 2003⁴⁰ will fully consolidate in Vicenza, Italy by 2011.⁴¹ Modest numbers of forces, numbering in the hundreds, are based in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom to support the NATO command and to provide logistical and rear-area support for combat units in Germany.⁴²


The Army is planning to deploy about a brigade's worth of troops to Eastern Europe at any given time, spread between Romania and Bulgaria on temporary deployments. A total of seven bases in these two countries, all relatively near the Black Sea, would be available for such purposes under the framework of 10-year agreements signed in 2005 with Romania and 2006 with Bulgaria. Smaller Army deployments began in 2007 (indeed, several U.S. Air Force combat aircraft deployed temporarily to Romania in 2006).⁴³

In Germany, most capabilities are in 16 main bases, with a typical strength of several thousand soldiers apiece.⁴⁴ The German facilities are primarily in the southern half of the country, since that was where the United States had principal responsibility during the days when NATO maintained a strong forward defense along the intra-German border. The facilities include such storied places as the Hohenfels Training Area, Heidelberg Army headquarters, and the Ansbach, Bamberg, Baumholder, Darmstadt, Giessen, Grafenwoehr, Hessen, Kaiserslautern, Mannheim, Schweinfurt, Stuttgart, and Wiesbaden posts.

The changes in Germany are now about half complete. One brigade from the First Infantry Division returned to the United States in 2006 and its flag is now flown at Fort Riley, Kansas. A brigade from the First Armored Division, as well as the Third Corps Support Command, are doing so in 2007, though headquarters for the 1st Armored Division is likely to remain in Germany until at least 2010. Eventually, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) is also expected to dissolve as an organization, with the 7th Army providing theater-level organizational leadership for the Army instead.

Whether the Army downsizing plans will continue on the planned trajectory remains to be seen. In fact, former Supreme Allied Commander and European Command Combatant Commander General James Jones, as well as the current holder of these positions, General Bantz Craddock, are on record expressing reservations about continuing the drawdown. Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Peter Pace acknowledged in the summer of 2007 that existing plans may be reconsidered.⁴⁵

Beyond troops and their barracks, combat equipment, training ranges, and other such facilities, numerous other capabilities are associated with



Map No. 3976 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS August 2004 Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

the U.S. military presence in Europe. Ammunition stockpiles, for example, are huge, though they are being reduced substantially at present. During the Cold War the U.S. Army had more than 300,000 tons of ammunition in Europe, at 100 different locations; in late 2006 the total was down to 40,000 tons.⁴⁶

In future years, a missile defense capability may well be built in Central Europe, with radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland.⁴⁷ This issue remains very controversial, given Russia's objections and the fact that the American proposal was worked out principally with the Czechs and Poles bilaterally rather than

through NATO. The future of the deployment hinges on numerous matters now, including the need for formal approval by the basing countries, as well as a decision by President Bush's successor about whether and when to aim for a completed system.

Assessment

The changes in Europe are generally sound, though they are also for the most part less than pressing. Because the quality of life is good for U.S. forces in Europe, the benefits of keeping more personnel on American soil are marginal. Operational flexibility of forces based in Germany versus, say, Texas is comparable on logistical as well as political grounds for missions in the greater Middle East or Africa (though not for East Asia; most stateside forces are better positioned for rapid deployment to that region). Training is better in the United States, with its larger spaces and fewer constraints on live-fire exercises, but there are some benefits to having at least a modest number of American forces able to train with those of allies, even if such combined training exercises are not frequent. Financial implications for the United States will be modest, as most costs are similar whether units are based in Europe or the United States, and host nation support covers some of the added costs of being stationed abroad. And alliance relationships have not been seriously strained by the American presence of late; in fact, there may be more worries in Europe about a hasty American departure than about hosting too many U.S. personnel.

The main issues to contemplate with regard to Europe are twofold. First, is the United States cutting Army forces too much? Alliance exercises could be compromised, and development of

U.S. Troops Based in Asia and Europe, 2001 vs. 2012

	2001*	2012**
East Asia/Pacific		
Japan	40,500	35,000
Korea	37,100	25,000
Guam	3,300	10,000
Other	1,100	1,200
Afloat	12,800	13,000
TOTAL	94,800	84,200
Europe		
Germany	71,300	35,000
Italy	11,700	9,500
United Kingdom	11,300	10,000
Romania/Bulgaria	30	3,500
Turkey	2,000	1,600
Spain	2,000	1,200
Former Yugoslavia	9,800	1,000
Other	4,500	3,600
Afloat	4,700	2,500
TOTAL	117,330	67,900

*As of June 30, 2001

**Projected

NOTE: The 3,500 troops dedicated to Romania and Bulgaria in the 2012 column will be pulled from forces based in Germany and Italy and serve in rotating 6-month deployments. All figures rounded to the nearest 100.

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Defense Military Personnel Statistics website (<http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm>).

joint doctrine weakened, if insufficient numbers of American forces are based in Germany in the future. In addition to plans to keep a Stryker brigade there, an additional heavy brigade or possibly even two should probably stay as well. Second, the plan to rotate forces into Romania and Bulgaria would add one more burden to an Army badly overstretched already, and should proceed very slowly until force levels are reduced significantly in the Central Command theater.

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The United States had about 73,000 uniformed personnel stationed in Asia in mid-2007 (only about 3,000 of whom were reportedly in or near Iraq or Afghanistan, though some others may have returned stateside to backfill deploying forces). This was down from a total of almost 95,000 in mid-2001, with reductions in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) the most important change to date.⁴⁸ This is the region where American forces are the most evenly balanced by service relative to other places with a large U.S. overseas presence—that 73,000 figure includes about 21,000 soldiers, 15,000 sailors, 16,000 Marines, and 22,000 Air Force personnel.⁴⁹ The GPR in this region is being driven by the goal of “increasing our ability to project military forces rapidly and at long ranges, both to the region and within it...strengthen our posture to conduct operations in the Global War on Terrorism... [and] to reduce the number of U.S. military forces in host nations where those forces abut large, urban populations.”⁵⁰ Future changes in numbers may actually be quite modest; in fact, they could even increase slightly when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down. More interesting than shifts in numbers, therefore, are shifts in capabilities and in the details of where forces are based within the region.

Details on Presence and Basing

In the Asia-Pacific theater, the dominant locations of American forces are Japan and South Korea. Each has a formal U.S. military headquarters. The Pentagon’s regional posture also includes important access to sites or collaborative training in Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and elsewhere.⁵¹

Although Japan and Korea are overwhelmingly the centerpieces of the American presence in Asia, the U.S. capabilities and missions performed

out of the two countries differ greatly from one another. Despite their proximity, the fact that the American presence in each country has been around a comparable length of time, the fact that each country hosts a wide mix of American capabilities from several services, and the comparable size of the overall U.S. presence in each place, U.S. Forces/Korea is focused virtually exclusively on the defense of the Republic of Korea. U.S. Forces/Japan is by contrast a regional and global hub.

In Japan, the main headquarters is at Yokota Air Base, just northwest of Tokyo. Key Air Force bases are located in the north of the main island of Honshu (Misawa Air Base) as well as Yokota near Tokyo (home to the so-called Fifth Air Force) and Kadena Air Base on the island of Okinawa. The U.S. combat aircraft in Japan include the most modern variants of the nation's F-15 and F-16 fighters.⁵² The Army, headquartered at Camp Zama in the Tokyo area, has a modest presence in troop terms but is developing a headquarters for the region in Japan to which the 1st Corps will relocate from Fort Lewis in Washington State. The Navy stations an aircraft carrier and air wing in the general vicinity of Tokyo, with ships at Yokosuka Naval Base and aircraft at Naval Air Facility Atsugi. That carrier is the only U.S. Navy aircraft carrier homeported abroad (soon the aging conventional Kitty Hawk carrier will be replaced by a nuclear-fueled version). And the Marine Corps stations more than 15,000 Marines on Okinawa, with key facilities including Camp Courtney, Camp Schwab, Camp Foster, Camp Butler, the Northern Training Area, and the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The Marine Corps also stations aircraft at Iwakuni on the main island of Honshu.⁵³

Major changes are planned for the Japan-based Marines. They feature moving about half—including the headquarters of the Third

Marine Expeditionary Force, commonly called III MEF—to Guam and relocating the Futenma Marine Corps airfield to a different and less populated part of Okinawa. However, various political constraints in Okinawa have prevented movement of Futenma for a decade.⁵⁴ The Guam relocation plan is itself in its very fledging stages, and is not due to be completed until 2014.⁵⁵

At Yokota Air Base, the United States and Japan have agreed to a flexible-use policy which will enhance Japan's ability to use the airspace for civilian aircraft. Yokota will also become the home to a bilateral air and missile defense center.⁵⁶

U.S. capabilities in Korea are focused primarily on the Air Force and Army, organized respectively into what the United States for largely historical reasons calls the 7th Air Force and 8th Army. The former has two main combat bases, Osan Air Base (only 50 miles from the DMZ, and home to the 51st Fighter Wing) and Kunsan Air Base (further south on Korea's west coast, and home to the 8th Fighter Wing). Kunsan features primarily F-16 Block 40 configuration aircraft.⁵⁷ Osan has both F-16 and A-10 aircraft. Together these Air Force bases host about 10,000 U.S. uniformed personnel.⁵⁸

The other 15,000 or so American troops in Korea are mostly Army, centered on the 2nd Infantry Division (which despite its name is actually fairly heavy in terms of vehicles and armament). Other key units include the 19th Sustainment Command and Logistic Support Element Far East, both of which would help with the flow of hundreds of thousands of additional U.S. troops to the peninsula in an all-out war, as well as Special Operations Forces and the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, which fields Patriot missile defense systems among other capabilities. Historically the 2nd Infantry Division was located



Map No. 3974 Rev. 14 UNITED NATIONS June 2007 Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

north of Seoul and the Han River, near the DMZ. But with the strengthening of ROK forces over the years, these U.S. capabilities have been downsized and scheduled for relocation south of Seoul. Similarly, the U.S. military headquarters in Seoul will relocate with them, freeing up a large swath of prime real estate in the center of one of Asia's busiest cities for reversion to the ROK.⁵⁹

The downsizing and restructuring of U.S. forces in South Korea are well underway. Some 8,000 uniformed personnel left in 2004 and 2005; by 2007, the total American presence was down to 28,000, with an expectation of further reductions to a grand total of 25,000 in the course of 2008. Headquarters and other force elements at Yongsan are relocating to Camp Humphreys, some 40 miles southwest of Seoul at Pyongtaek. The United States closed 37 installations by March 2008, with a total size of over 17,200 acres (out of some 60,000 under U.S. control), and returned 35 of those to ROK jurisdiction (concerns over environmental cleanup and other matters have slowed the formal transfer of responsibility in some cases). In all, 59 facilities will be closed, constituting two-thirds of the total U.S. acreage before the new plan was devised.⁶⁰

By 2012, another change will occur in the alliance as well—the dissolution of the combined command system, by which an American general commanded overall allied forces, but with Korean and American officers interspersed in a common command structure (with many Koreans superior to Americans and vice versa). Thereafter, Korean forces will operate under direct Korean control, and American (as well as U.N.) forces will operate independently—though in what is described as a supporting capacity—under separate American command.⁶¹

Beyond Japan and Korea, American capabilities in Alaska and Hawaii occupy a hybrid status of sorts—constituting American forces on U.S. territory that are also to some degree forward deployed. That is also true for the growing presence on Guam, which is soon to feature three attack submarines, up to 48 fighter aircraft, up to 10 Global Hawk spy planes, special forces, tanker aircraft, Navy vessels known as Littoral Combat Ships, and those 8,000 Marines from Okinawa.⁶² Many of these aircraft may have hardened shelters built for them, and over time hardened runways are a possibility too, depending on how the theater evolves. It also has the capacity for massive reinforcement; up to 170 B-52 bombers at a time operated there during the Vietnam War.⁶³

The United States also has bases or facilities with significant if secondary importance in several other places. They include Thailand, where about 100 uniformed Americans (mostly ground forces) are located; Singapore, where some 125 Americans are stationed, largely Navy personnel and civilians to facilitate use of ports in Singapore for ship repair and logistical support for U.S. Navy forces throughout the Southeast Asia region; and Australia, where only around 100 Americans are normally based but where larger numbers often deploy for exercises. In addition, limited numbers of American troops have been active in recent years in the Philippines to train that country's forces in their fight against a local secessionist/terrorist group.⁶⁴

Assessment

By most major military criteria, the Global Posture Review's plans for the Asia Pacific are sound. But there are several major challenges, mostly concerning Korea. The streamlining of U.S. forces there will free up more American capacity to deploy globally while maintaining a viable deterrent against the DPRK, a good quality of life for

American troops, and a bearable burden for the host nation. However, the GPR does not operate in a diplomatic vacuum, and alliance politics have been handled less than ideally, with many Koreans failing to see the strategic and military logic in these redeployments. Preemption doctrine and disputes over how to address the North Korean nuclear crisis conjured up polar-opposite worries in many Korean minds that the American realignment plan was a precursor to either a U.S. attack on the North or an American withdrawal from the peninsula. One of the consequences has been the plan to eliminate the U.S.-ROK combined forces command in the coming years—a shaky idea on military grounds, given the importance of having simple, clear command structures for efficient military operations and for robust deterrence. Given the tight confines of the potential Korean battlespace, the fast pace of modern war, and the long ranges of modern weaponry, close allied coordination is crucial. This decision to de-unify commands weakens the likelihood of such coordination. Combined U.S.-ROK forces would always have operated under the overall strategic control of both American and Korean presidents in the past, reducing the importance of having an American general in overall military command. However, Korean nationalism and the poor state of the alliance in recent years have contributed to a decision to disband the combined command. Good planning can mitigate the problems associated with this change in command structure, but that does not change the fact that on balance it has little to be said for it on military grounds.

In addition, Washington's request to Seoul for "strategic flexibility" in the use of its bases on Korea further strained the alliance. Seoul should have been willing to allow the United States more flexibility for the possible use of American forces based in Korea in the hypothetical defense of

Japan. But Washington should have been careful to emphasize that Seoul would always have a say in any use of U.S. forces operating from Korean soil—especially important given the ROK's need to preserve a good relationship with China and avoid unnecessary tension over hypothetical military scenarios, particularly those involving either Taiwan or disputed maritime resources. Ironically, despite a good plan for changing basing on the peninsula, the last several years have witnessed net harm to the U.S.-ROK alliance.

In Japan and Guam, linked together by the plan to relocate about half the Okinawa-stationed American Marines to Guam in the coming half dozen years, the general philosophy of maintaining or increasing most types of military capacity is sound. Having forces in these two places meet the criteria of preparing for the war on terror and hedging against the rise of China, given the propitious location of Japan and Guam. (Guam is also fairly well positioned for supporting possible scenarios in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.) The future plans for Japan and Guam preserve operational flexibility given Japan's past willingness to allow American forces operating from its bases considerable latitude. They provide for a good quality of life for American troops and, given the generosity of Japan's host nation support, good financial arrangements for the United States. These fundamental characteristics of Guam and Japan will hold up irrespective of exactly how many Marines move from Okinawa to Guam—a planned movement that is up in the air at present due primarily to Japanese domestic politics.

An additional concern that should not be forgotten, however, is the military defensibility of some American bases. Aboveground fuel farms on Guam and little-protected major airfields on Okinawa are among the military vulnerabilities that merit careful scrutiny.

MIDDLE EAST, PERSIAN GULF, AND CENTRAL ASIA

The broader Middle East region has naturally seen the most change since 2001, and will see the most in the future as the Iraq and Afghanistan operations evolve or end. But the American presence in this general theater goes well beyond current combat operations. There are currently about 5,500 American uniformed personnel in quasi-permanent positions in the broader region, beyond those focused on the two wars, and their importance is even greater than their numbers. About 3,000 are land-based and 2,500 are typically deployed on ships in the region's waters. In fact, in most countries in the region, the goal is to minimize the size of the U.S. presence to the extent possible while maximizing capability. As the administration explained in its 2004 review, "we seek to maintain a presence—thereby assuring our allies and partners—without the kind of heavy footprint that abrades on regional sensitivities."⁶⁵

All that said, there is no getting away from Iraq and Afghanistan. There are more than 200,000 American personnel focused on the Iraq mission today (inside that country and around it), as well as 25,000 in and around Afghanistan,⁶⁶ compared to 25,000 American troops in the entire region in mid-2001.⁶⁷

Details on Presence and Basing

At present, U.S. military capabilities in the broader Middle East are found overwhelmingly in Iraq. That presence is subject to rapid change in one sense, but it also now involves large bases with durable structures. There are about a dozen very large bases, and a total of at least 45 major bases, according to an early 2007 counting by *Stars and Stripes* newspaper. Including forward operating bases and various combat outposts, the number of installations is well over 100. The larger bases

include Camp Victory at the Baghdad Airport, where main U.S. military headquarters as well as two American divisions are located (as of 2007), Camp Anaconda/Balad Air Base north of Baghdad (home to the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, the only Air Force wing in Iraq), and Camp Speicher near Tikrit.⁶⁸


Kuwait hosts the second largest U.S. capability in the region. The size of this deployment is not commonly appreciated, but at present it numbers well over 20,000 troops providing rear-area support to those in Iraq. Roughly 16 bases are currently used to support this presence.⁶⁹

Former Central Command Combatant Commander Admiral William Fallon also emphasized the roles of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Pakistan—all designated as "major non-NATO allies" by Washington. All have installations of significance to America's strategic purposes and activities in the region. Bahrain is notable for providing a home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, with more than 1,000 American sailors located there. Qatar is a major logistical hub where several hundred Americans are stationed, as well as the regional headquarters for Central Command—the main headquarters for which are in Tampa, Florida—and hosts the main U.S. regional airbase, Al Udeid. Some 400 U.S. personnel are in Egypt, mostly airmen and airwomen. About 1,000 U.S. personnel are also found on Diego Garcia, a British-owned territory in the Indian Ocean, a major logistical hub.

Normally the Army has two brigades worth of pre-stationed or pre-positioned combat equipment in Kuwait as well. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have largely made use of this, as well as two brigade sets typically on ships, one at Guam, the other at Diego Garcia. Of the Army's normal allotment of five prepositioned brigade sets of equipment, only the set in South Korea is roughly

complete at present.⁷⁰ (In terms of other prepositioning, the Marine Corps has a policy of keeping a brigade's worth of prepositioned equipment afloat at Diego Garcia, a second in the Mediterranean, and a third at Guam. The Air Force keeps ammunition ready to move quickly on ships at Diego Garcia; the Army also keeps support equipment quickly deployable on Guam.⁷¹)

In Afghanistan, the United States and several NATO allies have considerable use of facilities such as Bagram Airbase and Kandahar Airfield, as well as a dozen or so other airfields and bases. Until 2005, the Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan was used for logistical support for the Afghanistan mission; the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan continues to be employed for that



Based on United Nations Map N Rev. 3, August 2004

purpose. Notably, in 2005 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declined to speculate on whether the United States would want long-term basing arrangements in Afghanistan.⁷²

In the broader Middle East region, the United States also stations or deploys very modest numbers of forces in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for training and in Oman and the United Arab Emirates for various purposes.

Assessment

Obviously any assessment of American presence in the broader Middle East revolves around one's views on the future of combat operations there. That is not the main subject of this paper, but a few words on Iraq are unavoidable. Some have advocated that Washington renounce any aspiration of having permanent bases in Iraq in the future. A new American administration should certainly renounce the idea of permanent bases, if the Iraqi government so requests. Otherwise, it might try to keep long-term options open—but state that for the foreseeable future it will not consider the idea of establishing long-term or “permanent” bases, given the sensitivity of the topic as well as the current need to focus on more pressing security issues in conjunction with the government of Iraq. This would seem the most prudent approach for the coming years.

On other matters, the general American philosophy of working quietly with security partners, building up key infrastructure to allow rapid reinforcement if need be, establishing strong headquarters and command centers, keeping a constant naval presence in the Gulf, and otherwise minimizing the land footprint (except of course in Iraq and Kuwait) is sound policy.

AFRICA

The United States has about 3,800 uniformed personnel in sub-Saharan Africa, split among the four services,⁷³ up substantially from the 300 there in mid-2001.⁷⁴ There are also several hundred American troops in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia who are generally listed under the broader Middle East in Pentagon accounting. Future developments will be guided by the following philosophy, according to the Global Posture Review: “Our aim in Africa and the Western Hemisphere is to facilitate practical security cooperation activities and improved access, without creation of new bases or permanent military presence.”⁷⁵

Details of Presence and Basing

There were 13 cooperative security locations in Africa under EUCOM jurisdiction prior to the creation of AFRICOM. With that command's creation, the cooperative security locations switch to its jurisdiction—though the fact that AFRICOM is based in Europe, with uncertain political status and acceptability in much of Africa itself, provides more questions than answers about the future of U.S. capabilities on that continent.⁷⁶

Egypt, a major non-NATO ally, is a key partner of the United States in Africa—but in fact it is within Central Command's area of responsibility, not Africa Command's. It allows invaluable air and naval transit for U.S. forces through the Suez Canal. It is also home to the biennial BRIGHT STAR multinational training event for CENTCOM. Some 250 U.S. personnel are in Egypt, mostly Army soldiers.



Map No. 4045 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS January 2004 Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

Also key in the war on terror is a combined joint task force operating out of Djibouti for the Horn of Africa. Almost 2,100 U.S. troops are stationed there, apportioned roughly equally among the military services.⁷⁷ But again, Djibouti is within the Central Command area of responsibility.

Apart from the forces in Egypt and Djibouti, there are no large numbers of American forces in Africa. That may change soon with the creation of AFRICOM, but as noted, the future of that command and the associated American military presence on the African continent is hard to predict. In any case, large deployments are not expected.

Assessment

The United States needs to walk a fine line in Africa between having a meaningful military role, on the one hand, and minimizing its footprint on the other. Africa's problems are not primarily ones that the U.S. armed forces have been able, or willing, to address directly.

Moreover, Africa's security challenges and circumstances are a bit different from those of most other places. It has little history and probably little current risk of interstate war. It has limited interstate ground transport infrastructure, and only minimal American preparations have been made for using what infrastructure does exist, ground, sea, or air. Yet it has prevalent and serious civil conflicts. As such, it is important to place any enhanced military effort within a careful strategic context. Large U.S. forces based in Africa do not make much sense, even if they were requested in the future by host nations. Given that America's presence in Africa will instead emphasize cooperative security locations and training relationships,

the question of political relationships with host nations is even more crucial than in most cases. The creation of AFRICOM, while potentially a good idea, must therefore be handled with greater care and a better explanation of its broader purpose than has been heard to date.

In addition, creative approaches to using a limited American military presence effectively must be considered. For example, unlike in Iraq, where there has been some backlash against the use of private military contractors, the American military in Africa may need to make greater efforts to work with contractors—not only in training indigenous forces, which is happening already, but for purposes such as maintaining and operating airfield infrastructure in certain places. If not contractors, then some other flexible means of providing logistics capabilities efficiently may need to be considered for more effective crisis response.



"As for quality of life matters, the key imperative is to avoid adding to the current deployment burden of the Army and Marine Corps."

III. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BOTTOM-LINE ASSESSMENT

The Global Posture Review, if properly implemented by the next U.S. president, should wind up an important and positive contribution of the Bush administration and its successor for advancing American national security. But this outcome cannot be achieved by putting the policy on autopilot. For all the good thinking in the GPR, it remains very much a work in progress, and further refinements are needed. They should proceed from an assessment and understanding of how the GPR matches up with the six criteria introduced earlier to guide its conception and execution.

General Relevance to the War on Terror

For a Pentagon review conducted in the years just after 9/11, relevance to the war against extremism, or war on terror as it was once known, is clearly an important criterion. That said, most counter-terrorism involves cooperation at the levels of intelligence, special forces, and small-scale military operations rather than major U.S. military deployments. Bases are still important—for providing regional staging areas from which the smaller operations can be developed, for making it clear to friend and foe that the United States is intent on being an important player in a given region, and as with Iraq and Afghanistan for conducting large-scale operations in occasional cases. To help with the first two functions, what counts most is maintaining a diversity of bases among various regional countries (most importantly, but not exclusively, in the Central Command theater), rather than optimizing their size or exact location or efficiency for large-scale operations. To first order, then, the GPR is not critically important in this regard, as a variety of bases already exist.

But the GPR and basing changes associated with it have still positively contributed, at least in a modest way, to capacity for the long-term struggle against extremism. Further development of additional U.S. basing options, as in Djibouti, in recent years has strengthened a trend underway for the last quarter century and as such has been useful. Bases have been lost, in Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia most notably, but the addition of access in Kyrgyzstan and the retention of access (albeit a restricted type) in Turkey has maintained a viable network overall. Facilities have been retained in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Diego Garcia, Egypt, and of course Iraq.

As for Iraq, even for a study not focused on that dynamic and important problem, it is important to underscore one point—it would not be prudent to start thinking about any long-term American military bases in Iraq at present. This is at best a very premature idea to consider. If it is ever seriously contemplated, the idea should originate from a future Iraqi government, not from Washington (and not even from the current Iraqi government, due to stay in office through 2009, and seen as very close to the United States). Only in this way could an eventual, possible U.S. military presence in Iraq have any legitimacy in the broader Middle East.

Relevance to Other Threats

In regard to possible threats beyond extremism in the Islamic world, the GPR is most striking for its downsizing in Europe and its modifications in East Asia, and to a lesser extent its new directions in Africa.

On each of these matters, the GPR's core logic is sound, though on each matter and in each region further refinements of the current plans are needed. Regarding Europe, the recognition that our NATO allies are no longer at significant direct risk is correct, notwithstanding worsening

diplomatic tensions of late with Russia. But the planned downsizing of U.S. heavy forces in Germany, if actually carried out, goes too far—not because it leaves Germany in direct peril, but because it forgoes the opportunity for adequate intra-NATO training in what remains America’s most important overseas alliance. At least some U.S. heavy forces should remain permanently stationed in Europe; one brigade or at most two would suffice for this purpose.

On East Asia, there is to be no major buildup of aggregate American capacity under the GPR. But that is just as well, since a major buildup (motivated by concerns about a rising China) would be out of synch with the sensibilities of the region and potentially provocative to Beijing as well. What the United States is doing is more nuanced and as such more effective. Removing a combat brigade from Korea has freed up capacity for Iraq and Afghanistan without appreciably weakening U.S.-ROK deterrent capabilities. Placing a regional Army headquarters in Japan consolidates such capabilities in that country for several American military services. Moving half the Okinawa-based Marines to Guam reduces political strains on the U.S.-Japan alliance without weakening response capacity for any key scenario. Building up Guam more generally as a regional combat base and global staging facility is also based on sound logic. In fact, current plans might even be extended, with consideration of homeporting an aircraft carrier battle group there as well as more attack submarines. In addition to these further augmentations, Guam’s key facilities should be physically hardened; too many American military assets there now are more vulnerable to missile attack and even special forces sabotage than they need be.

Regarding Africa and AFRICOM, the United States has been right to want to pay the continent more attention, but also right to realize a

bit belatedly that placing too visible of a new emphasis on its military instruments of national security policy could be counterproductive. As such the United States has wound up with the unusual arrangement of a new command focused on Africa being located in Germany. But as an interim measure, this approach is preferable to imposing American military capabilities on a continent where there remain acute sensitivities to overt western military presence.

Inherent Flexibility

Going beyond the specific threats identified above, to what extent does the GPR create more inherent flexibility and adaptability for the United States for a range of future military needs?

China and countries facing violent Salafist extremism already include or border many of the world’s key strategic areas. But there could be other concerns as well. With Pakistan’s future stability uncertain, Indonesia still facing major challenges, South Asian power balances shifting, Russia’s willingness to be a cooperative international partner somewhat unclear, and Africa as well as Latin America remaining lands of growing opportunities but huge challenges, it is possible to imagine many scenarios.

Against such hypotheticals, the GPR does fairly well. AFRICOM has already been discussed. The GPR did not do much in regard to Latin America, and some might say it missed an opportunity—but trying to do too much in a region where the United States can still arouse suspicions with any suggestion of overly muscular behavior would be imprudent. Russia’s difficult behavior of late is worrisome, but it would make very little sense to plan for possible war against such a nuclear-armed power in the heart of Eurasia in any event. America has many better, safer, options with which to come to the aid of allies

that may someday feel menaced by Russia, mostly in the economic realm, and many more realistic military problems to prepare against, rather than dwelling on the unlikelyhood of a resurgent, revanchist Russia.

The GPR makes a mistake, however, in provoking a needless faceoff with Russia over the future of possible missile defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland. These capabilities are not inherently bad ideas. But they are not needed now. In addition, the way in which they have been proposed and pursued has also been too bilateral, failing to benefit from the legitimacy and support that a NATO-led decision could provide.

Finally, the GPR makes good use—as had previous initiatives by the Clinton administration and its predecessors—of Diego Garcia and Guam. These maritime locations, well positioned along the world's major waterways and near numerous strategic locations, should be profitably employed. The main caveat is their military vulnerability, as noted earlier, and here the GPR needs corrective work. But in terms of preparing for uncertainty, these are key assets and the GPR rightly emphasized their importance and sought new ways to benefit from them.

Financial and Quality of Life Considerations

These pragmatic matters concerning American taxpayers' pocketbooks and American troops' quality of life can be grouped together. To a first order approximation, foreign military bases are not particularly expensive, but nor do they save the United States money. As such, money matters are most important when considering how fast to make changes. Rapid changes require lots of new facilities to be built (or old ones upgraded). So it could be a mistake to move 7,000 Marines to currently unimproved sites on Guam, unless the Japanese pay for much of the move (thankfully it

is likely that Japan will be generous). And it would be a mistake, compounding the argument made above, to dramatically downsize in Europe if there are no waiting bases on which to relocate troops in the United States. Some amount of building is acceptable, of course, but with the recent decision to increase the size of the Army (and Marine Corps), giving up a large fraction of Army facilities in Europe in order to have to build new ones for some 100,000 soldiers in the United States is imprudent on economic grounds alone. Thankfully the military seems to be realizing as much.

As for quality of life matters, the key imperative is to avoid adding to the current deployment burden of the Army and Marine Corps. As such, the GPR would err if it added U.S. forces to Romania and Bulgaria too quickly right now. Fortunately it is likely that these new deployments will be undertaken gradually. And in further good news, tours in Korea may be accompanied by family much more in coming years, a sound decision given the improved security environment there.⁷⁸

THE ROAD FROM HERE

The Global Posture Review is on balance good policy. The drawdown and consolidation in Europe do not deliver huge dividends, but they do deliver modest and useful ones. They help consolidate the U.S. Army in particular at a smaller number of bases which should over time improve the quality of life for soldiers and their families. New capabilities in Romania and Bulgaria keep the alliance vibrant and forward-looking. Leaving aside the major exceptions of Iraq and Afghanistan, additional capabilities in the broader Mideast/Central Asia region are being developed gradually and moderately, in keeping with the fact that most U.S. partners in those regions do not share America's interests and/or values to quite the degree traditional allies in Europe and East Asia do.

Streamlining U.S. forces in Korea and moving those that remain southward is consistent with realities on the peninsula—a continually improving ROK military, as well as dense population concentrations in and around Seoul (as well as the need for more American forces elsewhere in the world). Reduction of the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa should alleviate a political problem for Tokyo; beefing up military capabilities on Guam, by contrast, takes advantage of good opportunities and convenient geography, and helps hedge against the possibility of future rivalry with China—all while positioning assets reasonably well for possible scenarios in Southeast Asia, South Asia, or the Persian Gulf. Other changes concerning consolidations of military commands around the world should help with military efficiency. Plans for a new Africa Command correctly reflect America's growing interests on that continent, and will have military as well as political benefits.

Many of these arguments in support of the GPR are practical, and in some cases even slightly mundane. For Secretary Rumsfeld, the main architect of the strategy, such a characterization might be seen as damning with faint praise as he and his staff poured huge effort into the base review, and he saw it as central to his efforts to transform the U.S. military.

There is, however, no need for a global posture review to accomplish historic or lofty goals to be a worthy accomplishment. Military networks are, to be sure, about establishing in very visible and material ways a country's national security priorities and demonstrating them to the world. In this sense, changing them can be used to broadcast major messages to friends, foes, and neutrals alike. However, they are also about making military operations efficient, making alliances work smoothly—which often means making them work well quietly and out of the public eye, at least in operational terms—and ensuring a reasonable quality of life for the men and women of the armed forces in the process. By these less grandiose standards, the GPR generally does rather well.

The GPR was also probably more sophisticated than the average major base review of recent decades. It was driven less by an obvious need to downsize after war and more by a mix of considerations including planning for a range of possible scenarios in a number of places. “Planning for uncertainty” characterized the GPR more than the post-Vietnam drawdown from Asia, or the initial post-Cold War defense retrenchment of the early 1990s, or the 1995 Nye report's emphasis on maintaining a minimum number of forces in Asia.

In fact, if there is a danger in the GPR, it is that in efforts to implement its broad concepts in the real world, the Pentagon may be tempted to

achieve too much, too grandly—and without sufficient attention to practical details. Indeed, to some extent these problems have been witnessed already, and they could get worse.

One risk is that enthusiastic proponents of defense transformation will focus future base realignments too much on preparing for hegemonic war, most likely against China. Doing so can make such preparations self-fulfilling prophecies, or weaken America's standing with partner nations abroad. To be sure, it makes sense to prepare for multiple contingencies and multiple future worlds. But an overriding American military strategy for restructuring the base network that placed one priority so high as to neglect others would be a mistake. This has not yet been a glaring problem in the current round of restructuring, at least not in technical or concrete terms. But there do exist voices pushing hard for a single organizing principle for future decision making and it is important that they be checked by alternative, broader perspectives. Moreover, Rumsfeld's Pentagon in the Bush administration was a time when America was seen by many as unilateralist, hegemonic, and focused excessively on whatever U.S. national security priorities were at the time without keeping in mind the views and interests of certain allies like Korea and Germany.

These cautionary notes about some aspects of the GPR, combined with kudos about its generally sound logic, lead to several suggestions about how policymakers might modify or adapt the strategy to improve its strengths and mitigate its few but still important current failings in the years ahead.

Korea

U.S. basing in Korea was the most mishandled major issue of the Global Posture Review. With the exception of a tragedy causing the deaths of two Korean schoolgirls struck by an American

armored vehicle early this decade, most problems were caused by poor alliance management in Washington and Seoul. For example, leaks from the Pentagon and from the Korean government presaged announcement of U.S. troop reductions for years. That gave the impression that basing decisions critical to the alliance's future were being made without sufficient, broad-based, proper consultation across the Pacific (or even across the various parts of the American government). That many of these coincided with the announcement of the preemption doctrine and inclusion of North Korea in the Bush administration's axis of evil made many Koreans worry that America's movement southward and partially off the peninsula was a harbinger of a possible unilateral strike against the DPRK (that is, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea).

“U.S. basing in Korea was the most mishandled major issue of the Global Posture Review.”

Washington's request from Seoul for “strategic flexibility” in how it might use its forces based on the peninsula for regional contingencies made Koreans worry that the United States might drag it into a war against China that the ROK did not want. Yet Koreans may have objected too much to the possible use of American forces on the peninsula to help defend Japan from hypothetical threats (even if they had some reason to be wary about granting blanket access to American forces in advance for contingencies concerning Taiwan or disputed maritime resources). The warm

feelings between President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi were in stark contrast to the strained relations between President Bush and South Korean Presidents Roh and Kim, making Koreans worry that the resulting reductions in American forces on the peninsula reflected a second-tier status of the U.S.-ROK alliance by comparison to the U.S.-Japan partnership. Ironically, a U.S. base restructuring process that should have been appreciated by Koreans for returning valuable land around Seoul back to their control instead elicited paranoia and mistrust among the two allies.

The United States should have pursued a more pragmatic management of the alliance that avoided unnecessary hypothetical debates about future foes, remembered that presidencies in democracies come and go, and built on the strengths of the U.S.-ROK partnership. Most of all, a process that emphasized consultation, transparency, and mutual emphasis of their continued commitment to each other's security would have been more successful. Under such an approach, the GPR might have strengthened rather than weakened the alliance.⁷⁹

The danger that the U.S.-ROK alliance could continue to suffer in the future is not hypothetical. Anti-Americanism has grown in Korea and generational change has weakened many previously strong bonds. In the United States, the desire of some to focus on future strategic competition against China, and a view that American and Korean strategic cultures may be quite different, could increase.⁸⁰ To be sure, hedging against China's rise makes military sense for the United States. That means hardening and better defending facilities on Guam, Hawaii, and elsewhere. It may also mean broadening the Pacific base network to places such as Tinian (near Guam) and Micronesia and the Marshall Islands,

as well as places such as Johnston, Midway, Wake, and the Kwajalein Islands—and even planning for the possible use of coral airfields or mobile offshore bases someday. But it is one thing to think creatively about new military options based on a threat that may develop; it is something else to assume the threat will arise, or to assume that regional allies will see its potential the same way as does the United States.⁸¹

The U.S.-ROK alliance was underrated and underdeveloped by the Bush administration, on balance. This was a mistake. Is it really so obvious that Japan, with its pacifist constitution and history of spending only 1 percent of its GDP on defense, will be a more solid American ally than South Korea, with its much greater defense spending burden relative to the size of the economy, as well as a history of fighting together with America not only on the peninsula but in Vietnam? Perhaps Japan's inherent antipathy towards China is greater than Korea's, making it easier for Washington to find a common potential threat with Tokyo than with Seoul. But is this really such a good thing, and does it truly reflect an inherently stronger bond between the United States and Japan than the United States and the ROK? In fact, both alliances are important, both have their relative strengths, and either one could be somewhat stronger or weaker at a given moment in history. It behooves Washington to try to remain on good terms with both, rather than to choose unnecessarily among them now. This is again a situation where the GPR cannot be divorced from overall alliance diplomacy and broader American national security policy.

Hedging against China remains appropriate for the United States. But the U.S.-ROK alliance can and should be used to try to shape the broader regional environment in positive ways—and to weave the PRC more closely into regional security

structures in the process, if possible. Areas in which the United States, the Republic of Korea, China, and other regional states can cooperate, beyond the matter of deterring North Korea and preparing for possible conflict scenarios against it, include preparing for how to handle internal collapse of the DPRK cooperatively, preventing regional terrorism, preventing regional piracy, and improving global peace operations. The counterterrorism cooperation probably cannot easily include China, at least not at the military level (though it could include China in exchanging ideas about homeland security). But prevention of piracy can be done multilaterally (as can maritime search and rescue missions). A restructured U.S. base network on the peninsula might seek to make room in a Korean port for visits from not only American but other countries' naval vessels. Expanded capacity for global peace operations might benefit from the use of facilities devoted in part to regional, multilateral training, akin to what is happening in Romania and Bulgaria. But the new plan for USFK does not seem to have any such component to it. A future modified version should correct this situation.⁸²

Then there is the matter of the combined U.S.-ROK command, now due to be effectively disbanded by 2012, with Korean forces being under direct Korean command thereafter and American forces operating in a separate, albeit coordinated, chain of command. This is a regrettable development, militarily complicating coordination in any future scenario, and potentially giving the appearance of a weakened alliance to the outside world. Steps are needed to limit the harm, even if the decision is unlikely to be undone—some steps have reportedly already been taken but regrettably not discussed publicly, whereas the disbanding of the combined command structure has been widely discussed. Perhaps the allies can work out a scenario-

“The benefits of homeporting more attack submarines on Guam would be twofold: one, ensuring faster response during a crisis, and two, making the submarine fleet more efficient.”

dependent system under the presumption that American headquarters would likely have the lead role in major combat operations, at least initially, and Korean headquarters the lead in a stabilization mission within North Korea. In any event, they will need plans and mechanisms for ensuring smooth cooperation in the opening hours of any future war—not only to fight, but to preserve the military deterrence that has thankfully made any such war so unlikely.

The Navy, Guam, and Other Opportunities

The Navy's ongoing moves toward greater dispersal of assets abroad are smart policy and should continue. It is also wise to have made its overseas ship deployments more flexible, with ship journeys more a function of global opportunities as well as crises, and less strictly tied to the dictates of a calendar. Most notable to date, in addition to the new and more flexible fleet response program for maintaining forward naval deployments, is the introduction of attack submarines to basing on Guam.⁸³ But the Navy can go well beyond the idea of stationing three submarines there; in fact there is room to add at least eight more, according to the Congressional Budget

Office, and there are huge efficiencies to be gained by doing so. The average number of mission days for a submarine stationed so near the Western Pacific theater might be about 100 a year, roughly three times what a submarine stationed in the continental United States can muster.

The benefits of homeporting more attack submarines on Guam would be twofold: one, ensuring faster response during a crisis, and two, making the submarine fleet more efficient. This latter fact might allow cost savings through a downsizing of the attack submarine force. To give a specific example, adding six more submarines to Guam would allow a reduction of 10 to 12 attack submarines in the force structure and save an annual average of roughly \$1 billion without a reduction in mission effectiveness.⁸⁴ Perhaps better yet, the force structure could be reduced somewhat, but less than indicated above, yielding some budgetary savings as well as some net increase in overall military capability.

Forward homeporting need not be limited to the attack submarine fleet. Even with the Navy's fleet response program, homeporting a second carrier closer to a key theater of operations makes good sense. The idea of moving a carrier from California to either Hawaii or Guam merits serious attention.⁸⁵ By previous patterns of carrier deployments, homeports in California necessitated travels of some two weeks to East Asia and three or more weeks to the Persian Gulf.⁸⁶ Homeporting in Hawaii or Guam can shave 5 to 10 days off that time, each way.

A carrier based further west in the Pacific may prove somewhat more vulnerable tactically than one based back home—good reason not to extend this idea to several carriers. But on the other side of things, stationing multiple carriers in a single port *anywhere* creates the possibility

of a single point of failure or vulnerability. So taking an aircraft carrier out of a port like San Diego where several are normally present, and instead stationing it in Hawaii or Guam where we presently have none, makes sense from a force protection standpoint as well. Although it seems unlikely to be possible given political constraints in Japan, there is even an argument for homeporting a second carrier there, whether in Yokosuka or somewhere else.⁸⁷

Europe

The downsizing of U.S. forces in Europe in general, and of Army forces in Germany in particular, is sensible even if the benefits are not dramatic. The modest benefits in quality of life, logistical convenience for deployment, and cost savings to the government are enough to warrant some downsizing.

That said, current plans go too far, for two main reasons. First is the matter of operational tempo. Some of the changes proposed for the U.S. Army could worsen an overdeployment problem that is presently posing the greatest challenge to the all-volunteer force in its thirty-five year history. Given the ongoing strains of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, it simply does not make sense to take large numbers of Army soldiers out of bases in Germany, where they can be accompanied by their families, and deploy soldiers on unescorted tours to eastern Europe. At least as of fairly recently, Pentagon plans appeared to envision stationing a brigade of forces at a time in Romania and/or Bulgaria starting in 2008; this seems an overly rushed schedule. Whether more soldiers are kept in Germany or stationed in the United States, they should not be deployed to eastern Europe in large numbers while the Iraq and Afghanistan wars continue to take soldiers away from their home bases and families so much already.

Bringing home all four heavy brigades from Germany may be too much for another reason as well: it would reduce the opportunities for joint training and exercises with European heavy forces. This concern has been expressed by retired General Montgomery Meigs, former head of U.S. Army forces in Europe.⁸⁸ Leaving at least one existing heavy brigade in Europe, as well as the 173rd airborne brigade, while introducing a Stryker brigade too, may make for a better mix and a more adequate overall set of capabilities.⁸⁹ At a minimum, this possibility should be examined. In fact, it is possible that such rethinking is occurring within the Bush administration, in part for the reasons noted earlier and in part because the recent decision to increase the size of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps by nearly 100,000 troops puts a premium on finding appropriate housing and training facilities. As such, there is a stronger case for holding onto what already exists.⁹⁰ If true, this is good news. While Germany itself is hardly at risk from a threat that would require tank-heavy units to counter, NATO remains America's paramount institution for responding militarily to threats around the world—and Germany remains the main place where American Army units train with their NATO counterparts, even if such combined training occurs less frequently than might be ideal. Depriving European Command of all traditional armored and mechanized infantry units would risk weakening broader alliance preparations for heavy combat, be it in the Persian Gulf or East Asia or elsewhere.⁹¹

New Partners and New Locations

The Global Posture Review has also missed opportunities to date to foster international cooperation in military operations where foreign partners can make a substantial contribution. This oversight is hardly surprising for a Bush administration frequently accused of being unilateralist in its security policies. In fairness, however, the

administration has looked for opportunities to develop new relationships or expand existing ones with countries such as Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Bulgaria, other former Soviet bloc states, and the Philippines. With Romania, Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent the Philippines, it has also tried to help certain allies improve their own military capacities as part of its global basing concepts. Moreover, President Bush's global peace operations initiative has built on the Clinton administration's similar efforts and expanded American training and equipping of several African states' armed forces.

“...the soft power dimensions of American foreign policy must improve to create the perception and reality of a more balanced approach.”

But more can and should be done. A case in point is with U.S. special forces. They have been focused almost exclusively on Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years. This has precluded their broader use throughout much of the world, where they are important for training host country militaries, carrying out joint operations with friends and allies, and occasionally conducting unilateral missions against terrorists or other such foes. Some of the shortfall can be addressed by greater use of conventional units to conduct training of indigenous forces abroad. But conventional units are overstretched these days as well, and they are

generally more limited in their ability to train other nations' forces across a wide spectrum of operations. Private contractors can be useful in such training, but they require some level of uniformed military oversight in most cases, and they do not always command quite the respect of the American military uniform in host nation eyes either. Similar considerations may apply to what most major American allies can do in working with indigenous forces in the broader Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.

A partial solution could involve Africa Command. One or more training facilities should be considered, perhaps under African Union auspices, that could host forces from several countries at once. The United States might team with certain other major powers and allies in helping create such facilities. To improve interoperability with American forces, and each other, African militaries would be well served by such facilities that brought numbers of units from different places together all at once. In addition, they would constitute important symbolic and rhetorical confirmation of America's commitment to the continent. Based on the estimated need of missions or potential missions from Darfur to Congo to Somalia and elsewhere, the African continent could usefully expand its peace operations capacity by as much as 50,000 or more troops, above and beyond the 10,000 to 20,000 that have been helped to date by American training and equipping programs.⁹²

But America's military role in Africa is not just a matter of increasing capacity, however appropriate that may be. It also requires attention to projecting the right image to the continent, and ensuring that the U.S. role there is not overmilitarized. As noted above, this concern has emerged in the context of Africa Command, which is beginning its existence in the very non-African country of Germany.

African friends have been reluctant to go along with the political and strategic baggage of hosting the Command on their soil. This is understandable, and for many of them, the strategically correct decision.⁹³

If this situation is to change, the soft power dimensions of American foreign policy must improve to create the perception and reality of a more balanced approach. Increases in foreign assistance certainly have a role. Another worthy idea, advanced by Ambassador Robert Oakley and Michael Casey, is to take steps to make clear that an American ambassador in a given country is the senior U.S. official there and that he or she is in charge of all U.S. assets, including military ones, in the country in question. That may require allowing the ambassador, working with interagency country teams, to have more say over U.S. resource allocation within a given country. Also, he or she should always be apprised of the presence and the activities of American military personnel in his country of responsibility, and should generally share that information with the host nation.⁹⁴

Shoring Up Relations with Key Allies and Partners

Although the GPR is generally on sound conceptual footing, the Pentagon-led diplomacy accompanying the GPR has not always been so wise. As noted, Africa has been a case in which slightly increasing the American military role without creation of a large footprint is the right answer, though even those modest steps will only be well received if accompanied by sound diplomacy and further augmentation of American "soft power" on the continent. That means taking our collective time in any move to place a military headquarters for AFRICOM on the continent; it also means giving serious attention to increased foreign assistance, and more favorable terms of

trade, for African nations before expanding any American military role much further.

In Korea, what should have been widely appreciated steps—reducing the size of the American military footprint, while moving remaining forces and headquarters southward and largely out of the Seoul area—seemed to exacerbate tensions in the alliance rather than ease them. The Bush-Roh dynamic was not altogether positive, to put it mildly, and that was a large part of the problem, as was Secretary Rumsfeld’s approach to dealing with the ROK (leaking plans for deep troop cuts to the press before they had been explained or even formally agreed to, among other things). The fundamentals of the GPR are sufficiently sound, however, that better alliance diplomacy in the future should be able to make the new basing decisions a net positive for the alliance. But time will tell, and this will likely only result if the alliance can address broader challenges starting with the North Korean nuclear challenge in a collegial and cooperative spirit.

In Europe, as well as the Middle East, alliances have fared reasonably well—that is, once one factors out the strains from the Iraq war. Along the Persian Gulf, in Central Europe, and in most other parts of these regions, the GPR maintains a level of presence that America’s security partners seem generally willing to accept.

In certain previous periods, the United States downplayed its changes or underscored the limitations of how far they would go, as when promising to keep about 100,000 troops in Asia during the drawdown of the 1990s. In the case of the current GPR, however, the Pentagon has chosen to dramatize changes even in specific situations when they may not in fact be revolutionary.⁹⁵

This raises an important point: arguably, if the GPR was as sweeping in scope as Secretary Rumsfeld and his team claimed, it should not have been so dominated by the Pentagon for so long, even if coordination did improve later in the process. Decisions on basing only make sense within a given context of U.S. national security policy; locations of U.S. forces must serve the country’s broader interests. Had the changes amounted to radical shifts in security policy, carrying them out from the Pentagon would have been problematic. In fact, the places where shifts have been greatest—most notably in South Korea—have been the places where letting DoD take the lead had the greatest consequences. The Pentagon attempted to make some amends for the lack of consultation later in the process, but it was still too little too late, and policymakers will have to continue to work to repair this situation.⁹⁶ As such, the review is weakest on alliance management. That is a significant matter, not a derivative or secondary one; the strength of alliances undergirds basing relationships and requires constant attention not only from security officials but from diplomats and other officials throughout the government. No basing review should ever be divorced from alliance politics or viewed in strictly technical military terms.

CONCLUSION

As the GPR is refined in the years ahead, three principles should guide officials in the Bush administration and its successors. First, make basing decisions within the context of sound diplomacy and attentive alliance management. That means, among other things, that unnecessary spats with allies should be avoided; it also means that even relatively modest-scale decisions should benefit from early consultation with the Department of State and with foreign governments.

Second, the United States should avoid the temptation to claim clairvoyance about the future strategic environment. Among other things, that means not thinking of China primarily as *either* friend or foe, partner or rival.

And finally, the United States should strive for flexibility and dispersal of assets where possible, even at the risk of some inefficiency and redundancy, if doing so gives it more options in the future.

With these guiding principles in mind, the GPR can indeed wind up a proud accomplishment of the Bush administration and its successor. But several substantial changes in policy, and in American alliance diplomacy, will be needed in a new administration if such an important outcome is to be achieved.

A P P E N D I X A

PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN U.S. MILITARY BASING SINCE 1945

The troop redeployments associated with the GPR are significant, to be sure. But it is worth noting that, in historical terms, they are not unprecedented and hardly huge. They are much smaller even in aggregate than what would result, for example, if the Iraq war ended and most U.S. forces there came home. They are clearly far smaller than the reductions that followed the Vietnam War and the Korean War (to say nothing of World War II, the drawdown from which was literally dozens of times larger in magnitude). Even by the standards of peacetime realignments, the movement of 70,000 troops is only one-quarter that which followed the end of the Cold War, when 60 percent of American military installations worldwide were closed or turned back to host governments. Most of those reductions occurred by scaling back the U.S. presence in Europe generally and Germany specifically, though the United States also ended its presence in the Philippines and Panama during that time period.⁹⁷

The largest changes in overseas American military basing in history occurred during World War II and its aftermath. Millions of forces were first stationed abroad, especially in Europe, late in the war and then brought home (along with the 1.6 million who participated in occupation of Germany at peak U.S. strength, and the 350,000 American GIs in Japan).⁹⁸ Strategies of containment then led to creation of numerous alliances in the ensuing years—NATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, pacts with Japan and Korea and Taiwan—many of these involving the permanent stationing of U.S. forces abroad (or at least the frequent deployment of naval capabilities).⁹⁹ The United States then sent hundreds of thousands

more troops at a time to fight in Korea, and put another half million into the Vietnam theater in the 1960s and early 1970s.

After Vietnam, while a general military retrenchment occurred in Southeast Asia, numbers of U.S. forces remained fairly robust in Europe and Northeast Asia. Their main purpose was to contain Soviet expansionism through the capacity for direct response (conventional or nuclear) to potential aggression in the countries where they were based. But they also provided intelligence capabilities, as well as power projection staging facilities for operations beyond the immediate sites of the basing.¹⁰⁰ Of course, there was change in these deployments even as the fundamentals remained steady. The number of U.S. troops in Korea was reduced by over a third, from more than 60,000 to just under 40,000 during the 1970s. In fact President Carter gave serious and public consideration to ending the U.S. presence on the peninsula altogether.¹⁰¹ By this point in the Cold War, the United States had kept more than 300,000 servicemembers in Europe and some 150,000 in the Asia-Pacific region for two decades, making these two deployments the pillars of its overall global posture—as they have remained to date, even at significantly smaller scales.

To be sure, there have been important changes in these capabilities, not only in the nature of the military technology deployed but also the undergirding alliance relationships. For example, Japan has over the years agreed to a larger role in supporting American forces operating from its territory, in considering combined-force operations in the broader area around Japan, and in making a greater range of its military and non-military facilities potentially available to the American military in times of crisis or war.¹⁰² But the broad contours of the U.S. presence

have been more notable for what has remained steady than for what has changed over a period of several decades.

In the greater Middle East region, a key trend throughout the early post-World War II decades was the reduction in British military influence and presence. After the war, Britain gave up its trusteeship of Palestine. Meanwhile the United States solidified its military position in the region in part, counterintuitively, by transferring ownership of the Dhahran airbase in Saudi Arabia back to Riyadh while extending its access to the facility.¹⁰³ Over time the British presence in the region continued to decline, a key date being the decision to withdraw from the Suez Canal in 1967, followed by the arrival of Bahrain as a sovereign, independent state in 1971 (at which point the United States took over many British military facilities).¹⁰⁴ These developments effectively shifted responsibility to the United States and its Navy, as the combination of the Cold War, entrenched Arab-Israeli conflict, and growing global dependence on Persian Gulf oil raised the strategic and economic stakes in that part of the world. Military bases were still too few and far between for the presence to include much land-based power.

But by the late 1970s, after the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the geopolitical picture evolved further. The United States then sought basing arrangements in a number of Persian Gulf states, most notably at that time Saudi Arabia, which it developed throughout the 1980s—culminating in a strong capability to respond to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.¹⁰⁵ The arrangements were provisional and discreet until Desert Storm, often involving measures such as improvements to Saudi air bases and overstocking the Saudi military with spare parts and munitions.¹⁰⁶ Over the next decade, after Operation Desert Storm, the United States

continued logistical and no-fly-zone operations out of Saudi Arabia and Turkey while also diversifying its base network in the region to include countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait and Qatar and the UAE and Oman. It also pre-stocked many more supplies, including heavy ground-combat equipment and precision-strike weaponry for aircraft, in some of these smaller Gulf countries as well as aboard ships at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.¹⁰⁷

American overseas forces have been designed to deter and, if necessary, to fight major battles. Having forces abroad also provides the United States with multiple options for using military power for limited political purposes, to send messages or reaffirm resolve. In their seminal study, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan counted 215 incidents in which the United States used force in some way, without actually initiating hostilities, between 1946 and 1975. The preponderance of these used naval forces and/or ground-based forces already located in the region of interest. To be sure, for the important crises in particular, force could have been deployed to the region in question even if it not immediately available. However, the ready proximity of American forces often allowed messages to be sent promptly, and without undue effort—allowing Washington to show resolve but do so in a relatively matter-of-fact manner, displaying firmness without belligerence or excessive provocation.¹⁰⁸

While the U.S. global military presence has been extensive for years, conjuring up hegemonic images in the minds of many, an often overlooked point is that the United States has tended to quickly relinquish bases when asked to do so. It has also usually abstained from certain types of military operations when they have been prohibited by the host nation. There have been exceptions. Bases on Okinawa were

used to bomb Vietnam when the United States controlled the entire island prior to reversion in 1972, for example, and Guantanamo Bay has been retained as an American base throughout the Castro period.

But when asked to leave, the United States does so. U.S. forces departed promptly from much of Africa during the post-colonial transition period of the 1950s through 1970s (including for example in Morocco in the late 1950s and Libya in 1970), from Central America during the late-Cold War period of revolution, from Spain in 1988 when Madrid refused to renew the lease for Torrejon Air Base (not to mention from France in the 1960s), from the Philippines in 1992, from Panama by 1999 when control of the Canal was relinquished, and from Saudi Arabia and Turkey after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.¹⁰⁹ It also scaled back capabilities in Central Asia, first established after 9/11 for the purposes of waging war in Afghanistan, after internal political repression in Uzbekistan led the United States and that country to end their partnership.¹¹⁰

In addition the United States has generally respected the requests of its allies not to use their bases for specific purposes. The United States was denied use of bases in Britain for U-2 flights over the Soviet Union in 1956.¹¹¹ It resupplied Israel in 1973 without access to most bases in Europe; it bombed Libya in 1986 using aircraft from Britain that had to fly around continental Europe when France, Spain, and Germany denied overflight rights; it frequently accepted Saudi restrictions on bombing operations throughout the period of no-fly-zone operations over Iraq; and after planning to send the 4th Infantry Division into Iraq from the north, it changed plans when the Turkish parliament objected. There have been exceptions, as when the United States sent cruise missiles through Pakistani airspace to attack al

Qaeda attacks in Afghanistan in 1998.¹¹² But in the preponderance of cases, the United States respected its allies' wishes. This was hardly proof of American generosity; after all, the United States would gain little if it ignored the sovereign requests of its allies during key crises, and would risk being asked to leave many other places as well (if not being physically forced out). Nonetheless, it does mark a break with many of the hegemonic tendencies of prior great powers.¹¹³



APPENDIX B

Department of Defense **ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309A)** **JUNE 30, 2007**

Regional Area/Country	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
United States and Territories					
Continental United States (CONUS)	876,378	395,083	119,583	103,318	258,394
Alaska	19,957	11,496	46	26	8,389
Hawaii	35,874	19,330	5,737	5,724	5,083
American Samoa	1	0	0	1	0
Guam	2,828	43	1,074	5	1,706
Puerto Rico	144	55	36	27	26
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	0	0	0	0	0
U.S. Virgin Islands	4	1	0	2	1
Wake Island	5	0	0	0	5
Transients	52,924	10,100	11,032	26,619	5,173
Afloat	94,512	0	94,512	0	0
Total - United States and Territories	1,082,627	436,108	232,020	135,722	278,777
Europe					
Albania	9	1	1	6	1
Austria	22	5	0	14	3
Belgium	1,367	765	92	29	481
Bosnia and Herzegovina	207	175	15	7	10
Bulgaria	16	4	1	8	3
Croatia	3	3	0	0	0
Cyprus	22	3	0	11	8
Czech Republic	10	3	0	5	2
Denmark	19	2	5	6	6
Estonia	9	1	1	7	0
Finland	18	2	2	11	3
France	69	17	11	23	18
Germany	58,894	43,247	297	283	15,067
Gibraltar	2	0	2	0	0
Greece	354	9	288	11	46
Greenland	138	0	0	0	138
Hungary	19	6	0	7	6
Iceland	25	0	25	0	0
Ireland	7	2	0	5	0
Italy	10,216	3,241	2,659	55	4,261
Latvia	7	0	0	7	0

Regional Area/Country	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Europe (continued)					
Lithuania	9	1	2	6	0
Luxembourg	8	0	0	8	0
Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav	27	3	0	16	8
Malta	9	1	2	6	0
Netherlands	562	273	23	14	252
Norway	80	23	7	12	38
Poland	29	10	1	12	6
Portugal	865	27	29	9	800
Romania	22	4	1	12	5
Serbia (includes Kosovo)	1,395	1,350	0	4	41
Slovakia	11	0	0	8	3
Slovenia	8	0	0	6	2
Spain	1,308	102	740	154	312
Sweden	13	1	1	6	5
Switzerland	19	1	1	13	4
Turkey	1,668	68	9	18	1,573
United Kingdom	10,152	371	475	75	9231
Afloat	1,565	0	1,565	0	0
Total - Europe	89,183	49,721	6,255	874	32,333
Former Soviet Union					
Armenia	7	1	0	6	0
Azerbaijan	7	1	0	6	0
Belarus	2	2	0	0	0
Georgia	13	6	0	7	0
Kazakhstan	11	4	0	6	1
Kyrgyzstan	14	0	0	14	0
Moldova	1	1	0	0	0
Russia	76	14	3	50	9
Tajikistan	2	2	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	4	0	0	4	0
Ukraine	10	6	1	0	3
Uzbekistan	8	1	0	7	0
Total - Former Soviet Union	155	38	4	100	13

Regional Area/Country	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
East Asia and Pacific					
Australia	711	21	26	603	61
Burma	9	3	0	6	0
Cambodia	10	3	0	7	0
China	63	10	7	34	12
Indonesia (Includes Timor)	30	11	2	13	4
Japan	33,068	2,417	3,716	13,771	13,164
Korea, Republic of	27,114	18,366	244	135	8,369
Laos	4	2	0	0	2
Malaysia	15	3	3	6	3
Marshall Islands	20	20	0	0	0
Mongolia	5	3	0	2	0
New Zealand	5	2	2	0	1
Philippines	111	13	5	86	7
Singapore	116	8	80	12	16
Thailand	114	39	7	39	29
Vietnam	13	4	0	8	1
Afloat	12,391	0	10,769	1,622	0
Total - East Asia and Pacific	73,799	20,925	14,861	16,344	21,669
North Africa, Near East, and South Asia					
Afghanistan (See Deployment Detail Below)	0	0	0	0	0
Algeria	10	1	0	7	2
Bahrain	1,389	29	1,187	148	25
Bangladesh	8	2	0	6	0
Diego Garcia	240	0	203	0	37
Egypt	288	225	4	20	39
India	26	7	6	8	5
Iraq (See Deployment Detail Below)	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	50	8	4	27	11
Jordan	28	10	0	8	10
Kuwait (See Deployment Detail Below)	0	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	3	3	0	0	0
Morocco	13	2	3	5	3
Nepal	10	4	0	6	0
Oman	37	3	0	10	24
Pakistan	43	4	2	25	12
Qatar	512	188	4	122	198
Saudi Arabia	274	153	23	30	68
Sri Lanka	10	2	0	8	0
Syria	8	3	0	5	0
Tunisia	15	4	3	7	1

Regional Area/Country	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
North Africa, Near East, and South Asia (continued)					
United Arab Emirates	87	3	7	19	58
Yemen	12	5	0	7	0
Afloat	362	0	362	0	0
Total - North Africa, Near East, and South Asia	3,425	656	1,808	468	493
Sub-Saharan Africa					
Angola	6	0	0	6	0
Botswana	10	4	0	6	0
Burundi	6	0	0	6	0
Cameroon	8	2	0	5	1
Chad	11	4	0	7	0
Congo (Kinshasa)	10	2	0	8	0
Cote D'Ivoire	17	3	0	14	0
Djibouti	2,038	560	765	373	340
Eritrea	2	2	0	0	0
Ethiopia	10	2	0	8	0
Gabon	1	1	0	0	0
Ghana	15	4	1	10	0
Guinea	9	2	1	6	0
Kenya	31	12	4	10	5
Liberia	14	3	0	10	1
Madagascar	3	0	3	0	0
Mali	8	2	0	6	0
Mauritania	5	0	0	5	0
Mozambique	6	0	0	6	0
Niger	7	1	0	6	0
Nigeria	23	3	0	16	4
Rwanda	6	0	0	6	0
Senegal	11	2	1	8	0
Sierra Leone	1	0	0	1	0
Somalia	27	0	27	0	0
South Africa	33	5	0	24	4
St. Helena (Includes Ascension Island)	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan	2	1	0	0	1
Tanzania, United Republic of	11	2	1	8	0
Togo	7	0	0	7	0
Uganda	11	2	0	9	0
Zambia	8	1	0	7	0
Zimbabwe	10	3	0	7	0
Total - Sub-Saharan Africa	2,367	623	803	585	356

Regional Area/Country	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Western Hemisphere					
Antigua	2	0	0	0	2
Argentina	29	4	3	8	14
Bahamas, The	35	0	29	6	0
Barbados	6	0	0	6	0
Belize	2	1	1	0	0
Bermuda	4	0	4	0	0
Bolivia	17	7	1	6	3
Brazil	41	9	4	22	6
Canada	143	8	40	9	86
Chile	38	7	5	15	11
Colombia	124	72	3	42	7
Costa Rica	8	1	0	7	0
Cuba (Guantanamo)	903	311	456	136	0
Dominican Republic	12	2	0	8	2
Ecuador	41	14	2	6	19
El Salvador	21	7	1	13	0
Guatemala	13	7	0	5	1
Guyana	2	2	0	0	0
Haiti	12	5	0	7	0
Honduras	412	194	2	8	208
Jamaica	12	2	3	7	0
Mexico	36	7	2	22	5
Nicaragua	16	7	0	9	0
Panama	19	7	2	9	1
Paraguay	10	4	0	5	1
Peru	48	15	14	15	4
Suriname	1	1	0	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	6	0	0	6	0
Uruguay	14	4	2	7	1
Venezuela	17	3	1	7	6
Afloat	14	0	14	0	0
Total - Western Hemisphere	2,058	701	589	391	377

Regional Area/Country	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Undistributed					
Ashore	112,324	1,252	77,437	27,057	6,578
Afloat	6,967	0	6,967	0	0
Total - Undistributed	119,291	1,252	84,404	27,057	6,578
Total - Foreign Countries	290,278	73,916	108,724	45,819	61,819
Ashore	268,979	73,916	89,047	44,197	61,819
Afloat	21,299	0	19,677	1,622	0
NATO Countries*	85,645	48,164	4,661	721	32,099
Forward Deployment Pacific Theater	76,967	20,987	16,149	16,402	23,429
Total - Worldwide	1,372,905	510,024	340,744	181,541	340,596
Ashore	1,257,094	510,024	226,555	179,919	340,596
Afloat	115,811	0	114,189	1,622	0

DEPLOYMENTS (not complete — rounded strengths)

Regional Area/Country	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Active Component portion of strength included in above)					
Total (in around Iraq as of June 30, 2007) Includes Deployed Reserve/National Guard	202,100	125,300	28,000	26,700	22,100
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Active Component portion of strength included in above)					
Total (in/around Afghanistan as of June 30, 2007) Includes Deployed Reserve/National Guard	24,800	19,100	600	300	4,800
* Deployed From Locations for OIF/OEF (other than U.S.) (Active Component portion of strength included in country)					
Germany	8,900	7,500	0	0	1,400
Italy	2,300	1,900	100	0	300
Japan	2,380	180	300	900	1,000
Korea	200	200	0	0	0
United Kingdom	900	0	0	0	900

Source: Department of Defense, "Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country," June 30, 2007, <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0706.pdf>.

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- ¹⁹ Cornella, Less, Taylor, Curtis, Martin, and Thomson, *Overseas Basing Commission*, p. v.
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