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INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ: THE PROCESS OF WORKING TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS

OCCASIONAL PAPER

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Foreword

I am delighted to introduce this study on *Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Process of Working Toward Durable Solutions.* The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement has had a long-standing concern with both Iraqi displacement and with developing a global framework for understanding 'when displacement ends.' By late 2008 improving security conditions in Iraq raised the possibility that many, perhaps most, of Iraq's 2+ million IDPs would soon be able to return to their communities. The prospects of large-scale return of both the IDPs and refugees living in neighboring countries were heralded as signs of political progress. And yet our experience with many other situations of internal displacement suggested that the process of IDP return is rarely easy. In 2006, the Project, in collaboration with Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration, published *A Framework for Durable Solutions: When Displacement Ends.* This framework was developed at the request of the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator who was seeking guidance on how to understand the process by and conditions under which displacement is brought to an end. The framework has been useful in other contexts and is presently being revised on the basis of field experiences in other countries.

When Jamille Bigio and Jen Scott at the Harvard Kennedy School expressed a willingness to work with us on the issue of Iraqi displacement, it was thus natural to suggest to them that they apply the *Framework* we had developed and evaluate its utility in understanding IDP return in present-day Iraq. This initiative was undertaken as a Policy Analysis Exercise that was part of their graduate program at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. As such, it was presented to Dr. Meghan O'Sullivan, Faculty Advisor at the Harvard Kennedy School and to Dr. Monica Toft, Seminar Leader at the Harvard Kennedy School. From our side, we hoped that their work would be useful in today's policy debate on return of Iraqi IDPs, but also that it would contribute to the inter-UN agency process currently underway to revise the *Framework* for application in many different situations.

In fact, the study that they produced surpassed our expectations. The methodology they used to carry out the research is a useful model that could be used in other situations. Their study offers concrete indicators and suggestions for those planning to assist in the return of Iraqi IDPs. This report has also been shared with the working group of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee that is presently revising the *Framework for Durable Solutions* and thus will feed into a process for developing useful tools at the global level. I was also particularly pleased with the collaborative process which developed between the Project on the one hand and with Jamille Bigio and Jen Scott on the other. We consulted frequently with each other, we changed course several times, and we challenged each other on both substance and methodology. But this exercise was not only a good model of academic collaboration, it resulted in a study which contributes to policies seeking to end displacement for millions of people forced to flee their communities by forces beyond their control.

Elizabeth Ferris
Senior Fellow and Co-Director
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement

Acknowledgements

List of Acronyms

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation in Development
AMS	Association of Muslim Scholars
COSIT	Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
GoI	Government of Iraq
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IAU	Information Analysis Unit
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IKN	Iraq Knowledge Network
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IQD	Iraqi Dinar
ISCI	Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
KAR	Kurdish Autonomous Region
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MNF-I	Multinational Forces in Iraq
MoDM	Ministry of Displacement and Migration
PDS	Public Distribution System
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
UIA	United Iraqi Alliance
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID/OFDA	United States Agency for International Development/Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

Context for Research: In total, according to government figures, close to 2.6 million people are internally displaced in Iraq, of an overall population of 28 million.[1] In addition there are approximately two million Iraqi refugees who have fled to neighboring countries, mainly Jordan and Syria, since 2003.

With increased levels of security in Iraq in 2008-9, displaced persons have begun to make decisions about their future: whether to return to their place of origin, locally integrate or resettle in a third location. While the number of displaced Iraqis making settlement decisions remains low, it is expected to increase if current trends in security improvements continue. The time is therefore ripe to assess how the Government of Iraq (GoI), with the support of international and national actors, can advance the process of achieving durable solutions to displacement.

The IASC Framework for Durable Solutions: The Framework was conceived as an analytical response to humanitarian situations characterized by mass uprooting of citizens: the question of when internally displaced persons (IDPs) are no longer considered vulnerable due to their displacement. This question impacts choices on targeting assistance and advocacy, and planning interventions that will most effectively bring about durable solutions.

The Framework aims to answer this question from a rights-based perspective. It enumerates 14 criteria that should be satisfied in order to ensure that the rights of IDPs are upheld in facilitating durable solutions. The goal of providing assistance to IDPs, according to the Framework, is to enable IDPs to attain parity with the non-IDP population, both in terms of rights and socio-economic conditions. As such, they no longer experience vulnerabilities related to their displacement. Furthermore, the Framework proposes the ideal processes through which this goal is achieved by IDPs.

Research Questions: The Framework analysis focused on the following research questions:
- ➢ As an analytical tool, how can the Framework be applied in a country specific context?
- ➢ How does applying the Framework to the Iraqi context help to identify priorities in the process of advancing durable solutions to displacement?

The research aimed to identify which Framework criteria are most relevant to the Iraqi context – thus the areas in which Iraqi IDPs are vulnerable due to their displacement. Relevance is defined twofold; first as those factors that IDPs cite as being the most significant barriers in their ability to make and enact a voluntary settlement decision. Second, it is defined as those factors for which available data indicates that IDPs experience vulnerabilities linked to their displacement.

Key Findings: In applying the Framework to the Iraqi context by using available data, the following criteria emerged as most relevant in terms of the priority concerns of IDPs that impede achievement of durable solutions:
- ➢ **Harassment**, as it relates to a sense of security

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[1] (IOM Iraq, 2008)

> ➢ **Protection**, as it relates to rule of law and access to police and courts
> ➢ **Property**, as it relates to the ability of IDPs to reclaim assets and access shelter
> ➢ **Standard of living**, as it relates to the ability of IDPs to access public services, assistance and employment opportunities.

Secondary to these four priority concerns, analysis of Iraq data suggests that IDP-specific vulnerabilities also exist across a broader range of Framework criteria. For example, within the 'standard of living' criterion, comparison between IDPs and non-IDPs indicates that displacement status is not necessarily correlated with greater vulnerability. Assessment is necessary to identify the most vulnerable within both IDP and non-IDP cohorts and target assistance on a needs basis to prevent tensions arising in the host community. Data suggest that shelter and education are areas where IDPs experience particular difficulties linked to their displacement status. Data also suggests gaps in regards to political participation, access to property, documentation, lack of coercion, and the role of government.

Recommendations: In order to address the findings identified in this report, below are highlighted some key recommendations for involved actors:
> ➢ **GoI**: Establish and publicize a streamlined property restitution mechanism; tailor national poverty reduction strategy to address IDP vulnerabilities; prioritize training and integration of the Iraqi Security Force (ISF); strengthen the judicial system.
> ➢ **International and national actors**: Monitor the settlement decisions of IDPs; build capacity of GoI to deliver services; support development of an active civil society; provide community assistance to increase community absorptive capacity.
> ➢ **Donors**: Maintain commitment to continue funding through the transition to longer term development planning; maintain commitment to support efforts focused on resolving displacement through durable solutions.

Conclusion: Further to the gaps identified above, the analysis suggests that a purely relative perspective does not capture the fact that there may be both a low level of vulnerability amongst certain sections of the IDP population, and a high level of vulnerability amongst certain sections of the non-IDP population. Therefore while IDP status can and should be taken as an indication of vulnerability, the process of advancing durable solutions requires a community-based approach to target assistance in a way that best supports reconciliation. This approach requires rigorous analysis of the status of both IDPs and non-IDPs in terms of each of the Framework criteria, using reliable and robust data. The methodology developed through this research proposes metrics for each criterion, thus making them measurable.

Section II. Introduction

The Policy Problem and Overview of the Framework for Durable Solutions

The Need for the Framework for Durable Solutions

The Framework for Durable Solutions was developed as an analytical response to an enduring public policy problem in humanitarian situations characterized by mass uprooting of citizens: the question of when displacement ends. In contrast to refugees, whose status is legally determined by their movement across a national border, internally displaced persons (IDPs) do not have a clear legal status related to their displacement. While refugees cease to be refugees on choosing to return home or upon being granted citizenship in their host country or on application of the cessation status as provided in the 1951 Convention, no such clear delineation exists for IDPs. Although IDPs retain their legal rights as citizens of their home country, in practice their ability to access these rights is typically difficult. In response to this challenge, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were issued by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs. Based on existing international humanitarian law and human rights instruments, the principles provide a standard for governments and international actors in providing assistance and protection to IDPs.

There are estimated to be approximately 26 million conflict induced IDPs globally today; the total number of IDPs becomes higher still when those uprooted by natural disasters and climate change are included.[2] They are among the most vulnerable groups in their country. They often lack a community of residence and access to essential services, and face discrimination related to their displaced status. While national authorities are charged with protecting and assisting them, often it is actions by national governments that have caused their displacement in the first place. As national and international actors provide targeted assistance to IDPs, the ultimate goal is ensuring a durable solution for their situation. Therefore determining what constitutes a durable solution is critical for policy and program planning.

Without agreed upon criteria on when displacement ends, approaches have varied depending on the judgment of and criteria applied by national and international actors. These conclusions can have serious ramifications for IDPs. It can mean that services are terminated prematurely, or, in protracted situations, it can mean that the extended status as IDP undermines this population's ability to integrate into society. Observing these situations in different countries has prompted an appreciation for a "coherent response" to the question of when displacement ends.[3]

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[2] (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2007)
[3] (Brookings Institution University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement and the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, 2007)

Objectives of the Framework

The Framework is intended to assist national and international actors in developing policies and programs that promote solutions to internal displacement. The Framework aims to provide general guidance to help these actors more effectively assess what needs to be done in order to advance the process of reaching durable solutions, linking the decision to terminate assistance targeted to IDPs with the confirmation that IDPs have reached a standard of protection and assistance that is on par with the rest of the population.

Rather than enumerating a checklist of criteria that have to be satisfied before an 'endpoint' of displacement is declared and assistance can therefore be terminated, the Framework instead aims to outline the conditions and processes that help facilitate movement towards durable solutions. It conceives of displacement not as a status but as an indication of vulnerability; therefore durable solutions are not an end to displacement, but rather a process of addressing this vulnerability.

The Framework provides guidance on the responsibilities of national and international actors for creating and supporting the conditions that are identified as necessary for durable solutions to displacement, ranging from new to protracted situations. Target audiences include: 1) governments as they devise national legislation, policies, and programs; 2) international actors that provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; and 3) "civil society organizations that monitor the extent to which governments fulfill their responsibility to find durable solutions for IDPs and as a basis for their own work promoting the creation of conditions enabling these solutions."[4]

Process of Developing the Framework

At the request of Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs, Walter Kälin, a detailed and lengthy investigation of when displacement ends was carried out by the Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement and the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. Erin Mooney and Susan Martin spearheaded a series of broad-based consultations with governments, donors, international agencies, NGOs, civil society, and IDP organizations. The team incorporated the perspectives of a wide variety of actors as they explored the issue through three lenses. The first was a normative lens, applying the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. The second was a refugee lens, exploring displacement in terms of lessons learned in the refugee experience. The third lens was a series of case studies of different types and phases of internal displacement.

Through this exploration they also applied three possible approaches to the question: "a) cause-based (whether the cause that compelled flight had changed); b) needs-focused (whether IDPs still had needs emanating from their displacement); and c) solutions-based (whether the displaced had returned, integrated locally, or settled in another part of the country)."[5] A blend of

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[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.

needs-focused and solutions-based approaches was found most effective, and utilized in developing the Framework.

In 2007, these consultations culminated in the development of the Framework for Durable Solutions, which found that the ending of displacement is a gradual process over the course of which the specialized needs of IDPs diminish rather than end at a defined moment. The Framework addresses problems that IDPs may face in a variety of situations, and proposes solutions that are consistent with their human rights. The Framework was endorsed by the IASC, the main coordination body for UN and non-UN humanitarian actors, with the recommendation that it be incorporated into humanitarian operations.

Framework Criteria

The Framework considers solutions as durable only if they provide a long-term mechanism to redress the problems associated with displacement and ensure that the formerly displaced enjoy the same legal and human rights afforded to their fellow citizens. In its mix of needs-focused and solution-based approaches, the Framework organizes the criteria in two categories – process and condition.[6] Processes are criteria that should be put in place by the government to advance durable solutions. Conditions are criteria attained by the individual IDP, which alleviate vulnerabilities associated with displacement.

The following are the process criteria through which a durable solution can be found:
- IDPs are able to make an informed decision as to whether to return, remain where they are, or settle elsewhere in the country
- IDPs, including disadvantaged groups, participate fully in the planning and management of return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country
- To the extent possible, arrangements have been made for IDP representatives to visit and assess conditions for return or settlement elsewhere
- No coercion – including physical force, harassment, intimidation, denial of basic services, or closure of IDP camps or facilities without acceptable alternative – has been used to induce or to prevent return, local integration or settlement elsewhere
- National authorities, where appropriate with the support of the international community, have taken appropriate measures to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, to enable IDPs to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country and to facilitate the (re)integration of returned or resettled IDPs
- National authorities grant and facilitate safe, unimpeded and timely access of humanitarian organizations and other relevant actors to assist IDPs to return, locally integrate or settle elsewhere in the country

The following are the condition criteria that mark a durable solution:
- Formerly displaced persons do not suffer attacks, harassment, intimidation, persecution or any other form of punitive action upon return to their home communities or settlement in other locations

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[6] Ibid.

- Formerly displaced persons are not subject to discrimination for reasons related to their displacement
- Formerly displaced persons have full and non-discriminatory access to national and sub-national protection mechanisms, including police and courts
- Formerly displaced persons have access to personal documentation, which typically is needed to access public services, to vote and for administrative purposes
- Formerly displaced persons have access to mechanisms for property restitution or compensation regardless of whether they return or settle in the area where they found refuge or a new location
- Formerly displaced persons enjoy without discrimination an adequate standard of living, including shelter, health care, food, water and other means of survival
- Formerly displaced persons have been able to reunite with family members if they choose to do so
- Formerly displaced persons are able to exercise the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs

The Framework proposes that to achieve a durable solution, each of these criteria must be fulfilled.

Research Questions on the Framework's Application in the Iraqi Context

Given the recent development of the Framework and its dissemination to field agencies and governments, little analysis has yet been conducted on its applicability to decision makers on the ground. This research paper will address key questions that review the relevance and comprehensiveness of the Framework as it applies to the current state of, and future prospects for, Iraq's displaced population.

Our two key research questions are:
- As an analytical tool, how can the Framework be applied in a country specific context?
- How does applying the Framework to the Iraqi context help to identify priorities in the process of advancing durable solutions to displacement?

Concluding recommendations for this project developed for the Brookings Institution will thus be aimed at helping the range of actors responding to Iraq's IDPs identify and develop the tools and capabilities that will assist them in effectively promoting durable solutions for Iraq's IDPs. These actors include the GoI's mandated Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) and the international community, such as the UN, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and civil society organizations that monitor the response. As the Framework is currently under review, this analysis is also expected to aid in the process of revising the Framework.

Research Methodology

Literature review

Relevant literature was reviewed to understand the practitioner and academic perspectives that informed development of the Framework. Up-to-date reports, papers and articles from scholars,

media and organizations active in the field (particularly IOM and UNHCR) were drawn upon to present the background to displacement in Iraq. Details of national policies were obtained from GoI sources.

Interview sample

Key informant interviews served three key functions. First, to fill information gaps identified in comparing the situation of IDPs to that of the general Iraqi population for each Framework criteria. Second, the interviews were used to triangulate secondary data where this was available, and inform analysis of data. Third, the interviews served to provide nuance and a greater understanding of the dynamic context in Iraq, thus informing the framing of research findings.

Interviews were conducted with a range of (mainly) international actors engaged in Iraqi displacement issues. The selection of this interview cohort was partly an issue of access, as security restrictions severely constrained opportunities for research within Iraq. International actors were also chosen for reasons related to the Framework development and questions around its intended purpose. The Framework was endorsed by the UN's IASC with the suggestion that it be applied as an operational tool. If such a tool were to be utilized in this way, one main audience would be UN and non-UN humanitarian actors working at a policy - rather than community - level.

Travel to Amman was possible, and provided access to actors based in Jordan who are operational in Iraq, and who were able to offer nuance and context to the analysis. Interviews were conducted with the main international players engaged in supporting the implementation of assistance/capacity building and in engaging in the policy process: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); IOM; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); United States Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID OFDA), the US State Department. Perspectives were also gained from the US military regarding its role in capacity building/assistance and security.

Important on-the-ground perspectives were gained from representatives of Agency for Technical Cooperation in Development (ACTED), Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and INTERSOS, three international NGOs that implement assistance projects at community level within different Iraqi governorates. Interviews were also conducted with other researchers, both within Iraq (the inter-agency Information Analysis Unit or IAU) and with regional specialists based in the US to gain an understanding of the broader context of policy debates around Iraqi displacement. Finally, talking with a small sample of Iraqis resident in Amman and the US offered a qualitative insight into perceptions and concerns of the displaced population.

Secondary Data

In three case study governorates (Baghdad, Basra and Ninewa), secondary data were used to assess the situation of Iraqi IDPs as compared to the local population in the place of displacement for each of the Framework criteria. This comparison therefore supports analysis of IDP vulnerabilities in the context of a decision to integrate in the local community. A valuable extension of the existing methodology would be applying it to the option of return or settlement

in a third location. To assess IDPs' vulnerabilities with regards to the option of returning, one would compare the situation of IDPs to that of the population in their place of origin. For the option of settling in a third location, one would compare the situation of IDPs to that of the population in the area the IDPs wish to settle.

The Framework does not currently contain in-built metrics for assessment of its criteria, and thus proposing these was a step taken in this research. For many of the criteria, data on the metric that would have been most appropriate were not available. In some cases, it was possible to identify proxies; however in other cases there were distinct gaps. To fill these gaps required relying on anecdotal evidence and insights shared in interviews.

Where possible, secondary data provided the principal input to Framework criteria metrics (for a description of the methodology used by each data source see Appendix A). The source used for data on the general population was the World Food Program's (WFP) Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM). This source employs a robust methodology, providing data by household and at the district level. Data for the IDP population were primarily sourced from IOM and UNHCR. IOM's methodology includes a large sample size, but represents groups rather than individual or household data, and is collected at governorate rather than district level. UNHCR surveys are based on a much smaller sample size and their data are also collected for stakeholder groups of three persons: an IDP, an authority/official figure and a community leader.

Given the different methodologies used to collect the IOM/UNHCR and VAM datasets, the comparison between data in this research is not ideal, comprehensive or conclusive. Rather it serves to give an indication of where further research may be fruitful to feed into evidence-based policy for durable solutions. Furthermore, the research demonstrates that with more suitable data, the method of comparing IDP and non-IDP metrics is a valid and potentially useful application of the Framework. At time of writing, more data were becoming available in terms of both VAM and the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), an IAU survey. Although the timeframe meant that it was not possible to include these datasets in this research, these could enable more rigorous employment of the methodology developed here.

Overview of Displacement in Iraq

Displacement Trends in Iraq

Displacement in Iraq has a long and complex history, which has mirrored the turbulent political developments in the country since the mid twentieth century. These have resulted in both refugee movements, when Iraqis have sought refuge by crossing international borders, and internal displacement, when populations have been driven from their own homes and forced to relocate within Iraq. This distinction underlines the legal difference in status between refugees and IDPs and prompts the research questions of this paper, focused solely on IDPs. However, given that the problems experienced by recently returned refugees are likely to parallel those of IDPs, the Framework can also provide insight into policy planning around refugee returns. Early reports indicate that many returning refugees are unable to either reach or reintegrate in their home communities, hence effectively becoming IDPs on arrival in Iraq.

Saddam Hussein's regime used forced displacement of populations in support of larger political objectives. The campaigns of "Arabization" and "Anfal" contributed to the internal displacement of over one million people by 2003. Between 2003 and 2005, military operations resulted in additional displacement; approximately 200,000 people were displaced in this period. With the sectarian violence prompted by the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra Al-Askari Mosque, an additional 1.6 million people were internally displaced in 2006 and 2007. Displacement rates significantly dropped in 2008 and 2009. Thus, according to government figures, approximately 2.6 million people are internally displaced in Iraq, of an overall population of 28 million.[7] In addition there are approximately two million Iraqi refugees who have fled to neighboring countries, mainly Jordan and Syria, since 2003.

The experience of Iraq's IDPs differs due to a variety of factors, including timing, geographic location, and reason for displacement. For example, according to 2008 figures, Baghdad has more than 560,000 IDPs; 40 percent of this population reports having fled due to forced eviction and direct threats, while 10-17 percent fled due to generalized violence and fear. There is also a high level of displacement from Baghdad to other governorates; post-2006 IDPs are primarily from Baghdad and Diyala (a bordering governorate).[8]

Sectarian violence has played a key part in motivating displacement, which has become both an objective and a strategy in the conflict.[9] Sunni and Shi'a leaders both employ historical narratives to justify the violence. Sunnis, favored under Saddam, cite oppression by the Shi'a majority since 2003; Shi'ites blame a continuation of Saddam-era politics of ethnic cleansing, especially around Baghdad.[10] The bombing of the Samarra Al-Askari Mosque in February 2006 proved to be a critical turning point, leading to a steep rise in sectarian attacks, abductions and killings. The main groups perceived to be the perpetrators of the violence share a common agenda of consolidating sectarian territory and political power: Al Qaeda in Iraq and related Sunni extremist groups, and the Shi'a Mahdi Militia. The main sectarian political parties in Iraq were perceived to have benefited from this violence: the Office of Muqtada al-Sadr and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) on the Shi'a side, and the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and the Islamic Party on the Sunni side. Often, the displaced become targets for patronage by one of these groups, and thus become embroiled in the conflict in exchange for provision of food and shelter.[11] Sectarian violence after the Samarra mosque attack underpins the significant differences that exist between the pre- and post-2006 IDP movements. One such difference is displacement location: the majority of pre-2006 IDPs were displaced in the three northern Governorates (53 percent) and in the south (33 percent). Post-2006 IDPs are primarily from Baghdad and Diyala, and 58 percent were displaced in the six central Governorates, 27 percent in the south, and 15 percent in the north.[12]

As a result of both improved security in Iraq and deteriorating conditions in displacement, return movements have begun slowly; however returns have been mostly to those areas under control of

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[7] (IOM Iraq, 2008c)
[8] (Iraq IDP Working Group, 2008a)
[9] (Ferris, 2008)
[10] (Tanner, 2006)
[11] Ibid.
[12] (Iraq IDP Working Group, 2008a)

members of the same sect. Few families returned to areas controlled by another sect, and few members of minority groups have returned. A 'returnee', as defined by IOM and MoDM, is someone who has returned to their original home or neighborhood. If they cannot settle in their original home or neighborhood, they are considered as secondarily displaced. Even after displaced populations have returned, they may still have urgent humanitarian priorities, including food, fuel, and non-food items.[13]

It is difficult to have a comprehensive picture of the current state of the displaced population, although the IDP Working Group, constituted by UNHCR, IOM, and other UN Agencies and NGOs, gathers surveillance data to complement information provided by MoDM, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), ICRC and NGOs.[14]

The priority needs for IDPs differ by governorate, and include: more resources (such as shelter, legal access, healthcare and education); access to the Public Distribution System (PDS) during displacement; increased security and the creation of employment opportunities for IDPs.[15]

With such a large displaced population, it is critical to determine how vulnerabilities linked to displacement will be addressed in Iraq. The Framework for Durable Solutions for Displacement provides a methodology to determine this question.

GoI's Displacement Policies

The GoI's policies toward displacement have primarily been defined over the last year, a reflection of the relatively recent formation of MoDM under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In July 2008, the MoDM approved the National Policy on Displacement, the goal of which is to "find durable solutions and to set an effective, realistic and comprehensive framework to respond to the needs of the displaced persons regardless of whether their displacement is characterized as protracted or recent."[16] IDP rights in Iraq, as outlined in the National Policy, are consistent with those highlighted in the Framework as well as with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The policy outlines the basic needs of IDPs and returnees in terms of food, shelter, potable water, sanitation, health care and education, based on the international "Sphere" standards that emphasize the need to meet the basic needs of life according to the minimum level of assistance that the government or civil society actors can offer to Iraqis who are displaced inside or outside Iraq.

Planned next steps towards implementing the policy include developing concrete strategies at the national and governorate level, and a coordination structure among all state institutions to facilitate response.[17] The policy specifies the key actors and priorities for each sector, in terms of both institutional linkages and budgeting required.

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[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] (Iraq IDP Working Group, 2008b)
[16] (Iraq Ministry of Displacement and Migration, 2008)
[17] (Iraq IDP Working Group, 2008b)

Given the role of the governorate level in implementing the National Policy, the degree of authority the governorate level has in relation to the central level – as defined by the Provincial Powers Law – will have ramifications on how the government responds to displacement, and on how international agencies and bilateral donors divide their focus between national level ministries and the governorate level counterparts. The question of authority should be better clarified as the Provincial Powers Law enters into force with the swearing in of the provincial officials elected in January 2009. Currently, governorates have varying degrees of authority, and it is unclear how this balance will shift and what its implications will be on the implementation of national policies, including that on displacement.

Additional governmental decisions made over the last year impact Iraq's displaced population. Some decisions expand services available to IDPs. The Prime Minister's Office issued Order 101 in September 2008, establishing Return Centers to manage the return of IDPs and refugees. Two centers are operational in Baghdad. As part of this order, all squatters in Baghdad were given one month to vacate illegal residences, as this was preventing IDPs from reclaiming their property. The accompanying Council of Ministers Decree 262 provided for a six-month 300,000 Iraqi Dinar (IQD) per month rental stipend to be issued to all IDP families evicted by Order 101. However by December 2008, evictions were occurring but rental stipends were not disbursed. Lack of a clear assistance plan for evicted families carries the risk of deepening their vulnerability, and increasing the possibility of further displacement.[18,19]

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[18] (IOM Iraq, 2008a)
[19] (Iraq IDP Working Group, 2008b)

Section III. Application of the Framework to Displacement in Iraq

The previous section identified trends in displacement and the GoI policies that outline its required actions. Within this context, this section discusses the application of the Framework to displacement in Iraq, according to the methodology described above.

IDPs in Three Case Study Governorates

This research applied the proposed methodology to three case study governorates: Baghdad, Ninewa, and Basra. These were selected to loosely represent the northern, central, and southern regions of the country while demonstrating the variability between governorates.

The three governorates contain the country's three largest cities. Baghdad is the capital of both the country and the governorate that bears its name, and is the largest city in Iraq. It is culturally diverse, with populations of many ethnicities and religions, including Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrian Christians, and Sunni and Shi'a Muslims who lived together in mixed neighborhoods. Basra's capital is the country's second largest city, and serves as the southern region's socio-economic and administrative center. Basra shares borders with Iran and Kuwait, and contains the country's only port. Ninewa's capital (Mosul) is the third largest city in the country, and contains a diverse

population, including Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Assyrians, Turkmens and Armenians.[20]

Baghdad has the highest rate of displacement of any governorate. Sixty-five percent of Iraqi IDPs originate from Baghdad, many of whom (83 percent) are displaced to different areas of the city. The governorate has become segregated as people flee mixed communities, with Shiites gathering in the eastern area of Baghdad, and Sunnis in the west. People have also been displaced to Baghdad from almost every governorate, though primarily from Diyala.[21] Thus, critical to resolving displacement in Iraq is the resolution of displacement in Baghdad.

Ninewa received a large number of IDPs both pre- and post-February 2006. After the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, Ninewa received a wave of people connected with the government who were based in Baghdad and the south. After the Samarra bombing in 2006, many people fled to Ninewa in response to sectarian violence; while some were displaced within Ninewa as they fled from disputed areas between the KRG and the GoI (part of the Ninewa governorate is disputed). Fifty percent of IDPs in Ninewa are from Baghdad, 40 percent from within the governorate, and 6 percent from Basra.[22]

Reasons for Displacement

Almost all IDPs in Basra are Shi'a Arab; the majority come from Baghdad (52 percent), and other central governorates (including 25 percent from Salah al-Din, 8 percent from Anbar, and 6 percent from Diyala).[23]

The reasons why IDPs left their governorates of origin differ by and within governorate. For those displaced in Basra, one of the leading reasons was direct threat of life; for those in Ninewa leading reasons were fear and generalized violence, while for those in Baghdad being forced from property and armed conflict were leading reasons.[24]

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[20] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

Intentions

Surveys have indicated that Iraqi IDPs' intended settlement decisions vary significantly by governorate. In Baghdad, the majority of IDPs were displaced from elsewhere within the governorate, and the majority (80 percent) intends to return to their place of origin. The figure is reversed in Basra – most IDPs are from Baghdad and other central governorates, and 84 percent intend to locally integrate in their current location. In Ninewa, IDPs are both from outside and within the governorate, and the settlement intentions vary: 60 percent intend to return to their place of origin, 32 percent plan to resettle in a third location, and 7 percent intend to locally integrate in their current location.[25]

Each of the intended decisions presents different barriers to durable solutions, which must be addressed by actors assisting in the settlement process in order to ensure that all settlement decisions are dignified, voluntary, and sustainable. This emphasizes that analysis and assistance must be targeted to governorate and district levels.

IDPs and the Durable Solutions Criteria

Process Criteria for Durable Solutions

P1. Informed Decisions: IDPs are able to make an informed decision as to whether to return, remain where they are, or settle elsewhere in the country

The ability to make informed choices is necessary for IDPs to make a voluntary decision between local integration, settlement in a third location or return. Assessment of this criterion requires identifying which factors influence IDPs' settlement decisions, and whether they are able to access accurate information on the factors that are most important to them. IDPs cite a range of factors as influencing their settlement decision; these vary between and within governorates. In general (and not listed in priority order), these include: perceptions of security, perceptions of rule of law, access to essential services, access to employment opportunities and access to property.[26] These correspond to initial surveys of IDP returnees, which indicate that the most cited reasons for return are: improvement of security situation (93 percent); came to check properties (36 percent); and access to land to cultivate (32 percent). Also cited but less frequently were: access to assistance (25 percent); difficult economic conditions in displacement (21 percent); access to free housing/water (16 percent); and receive government incentives (13

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[25] Ibid.
[26] (IOM Iraq, 2008b; UNHCR Iraq, 2008)

percent).[27] If these are the factors determining IDP settlement decisions, actors should ensure that IDPs have access to information relating to these factors.

While security has improved since 2007 as measured by numbers of security incidents, returns have not yet increased proportionally. This could suggest that 1) security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for returns, and/or 2) community perceptions of security are more holistic and contextual than captured solely by number of security incidents in a specific area. It should also be noted that while security has improved relative to the baseline of 2006, Iraq still has one of the highest civilian casualty rates in the world. An average of 13 Iraqi civilians were killed per day in 2008.[28]

IDPs obtain information from different sources. Tribal and familial networks are very strong in Iraq, and provide a trusted channel for accessing information about security, sectarian tensions and conditions for returnees. However, not all information is available through these channels, and IDP surveys indicate that important gaps exist in access to information. For property, data indicates that a proportion of IDPs – varying by governorate - lack information on the status of the property they left behind. This is of concern if property is one of the factors informing the settlement decision of these IDPs.

P2. Participation: IDPs, including disadvantaged groups, participate fully in the planning and management of return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country.

Participation in settlement decisions happens at three levels: within a receiving community, within a group of IDP families, and within the family unit itself. In Iraq, the process of IDPs making settlement decisions is still in an early phase and happening on an ad-hoc rather than organized basis. For example, the majority of IDP returns are happening family by family, with few mass movements. This holds for refugees as well. Should a policy of mass returns be implemented, this criterion will become more relevant in terms of participation of the receiving community and groups of IDP families. Currently, it is participation of the host – rather than receiving – community – that is most relevant in the context of planning assistance in those communities where IDPs are present. Many NGOs and agencies are approaching participation through working with both IDPs and the communities that host them. Providing holistic community assistance on the basis of needs and vulnerability aims to increase community absorptive capacity and abate tension between IDPs and non-IDPs.

In terms of the settlement decisions that are being made, while these occur on a family-by-family basis, participation is evaluated in terms of whose perspectives are included in the process. Given Iraq's social norms, settlement decisions are typically made by the head of household, which raises question of the voluntariness of the decision for women (in cases of male headed households) and children.[29] In a society of familial networks, the 'family unit' may include the extended family, in which case some heads of households will have more say than others. These traditions are further supported by thirty years of authoritarian governance. Working towards promoting participatory norms as part of strengthening democratic institutions in Iraq is an

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[27] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)
[28] (OCHA Iraq, 2009)
[29] (Martin, 2004)

important long-term goal. However while not all family members may be involved in IDP settlement decisions, all are impacted and therefore assistance must be targeted accordingly.

> **P3. Go-and-see visits:** To the extent possible, arrangements have been made for IDP representatives to visit and assess conditions for return or settlement elsewhere.

Similar to the above criteria, IDPs in general arrange a go-and-see visit themselves, where the security environment allows free and safe movement, with limited support from the authorities. As the process is not organized (either by the government or an NGO/agency), the general population in the community where IDPs are considering settlement have no formal mechanism to participate in IDP visits. This may shift as authorities become more engaged in arranging go-and-see visits.

Different access barriers exist for female-headed and male-headed households given security conditions and societal norms. It is significant who conducts the go-and-see visit, as this impacts the questions that are asked and how the situation is perceived. Together, these influence the family's final settlement decision, thus emphasizing the importance of including women in go-and-see visits.

> **P4. Lack of Coercion:** No coercion – including physical force, harassment, intimidation, denial of basic services, or closure of IDP camps or facilities without acceptable alternative – has been used to induce or to prevent return, local integration or settlement elsewhere.

According to the Framework, potential coercive factors include: intimidation/lack of safety, restriction of movement, or eviction without acceptable alternatives. In addition, unbalanced incentives that push IDPs towards a specific settlement decision can also be viewed as coercion.

At the level of the general population and disaggregated by religion/ethnicity, data on perceptions of the security situation indicate that Kurds feel safest (96 percent report feeling safe in their neighborhood), followed by Shiites (91 percent), and Sunnis who hold the most negative perceptions of their safety in their area (67 percent). Freedom of movement (the ability to go where you wish safely) was ranked as good by 65 percent of Sunnis, 76 percent of Kurds, and 81 percent of Shiites.[30]

The majority of IDPs and returnees throughout the country experienced restrictions of movement. Factors cited for this were checkpoints (56 percent), broken or flooded roads (49 percent), curfews (28 percent), fences and barriers (27 percent) as well as the need to obtain permission for movements (20 percent).[31] The majority of IDPs in Baghdad, Ninewa, and Basra report feeling targeted based on their belonging to a certain religion or sect.[32] However, at a national level, confidence that Iraqi forces are capable of taking up security varies by sect, from 75 percent among Shiites to 45 percent among Kurds and 38 percent among Sunnis.[33]

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[30] (ABC, BBC, NHK, 2009)
[31] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)
[32] (IOM Iraq, 2008a)
[33] (ABC, BBC, NHK, 2009)

Looking to another coercive factor, evictions take place for two primary reasons - lack of payment or government order. IDPs' lack of ability to pay rent reflects different vulnerabilities related to their displacement status, including unemployment and discrimination. These evictions further increase their vulnerabilities, as do evictions that occur under government orders. The government has at times pledged provisions for alternative shelter. For example, IDP families evicted by Prime Minister Order 101 should be provided with a rental stipend for six months, according to the accompanying Council of Ministers Order 262. However, implementation remains a challenge, as when evictions occurred through PM Order 101 in December 2008 but rental stipends were not distributed. There remain a high number of eviction orders not accompanied by assistance for the evicted IDPs. This raises concern that some of the government's policies are increasing the vulnerability of those evicted IDPs rather than contributing to durable solutions for their displacement.[34] This may have influenced the decision in January 2009 to put on hold PM Order 440, which ordered the eviction of illegal squatters from public property was placed on hold.

Finally, the government's entitlement system for IDPs described under 'role of government' may influence settlement decisions. The stipend for registered IDPs may delay families from returning until they have received their complete 6-month payment. Similarly, families may choose to return in order to access the stipend available to registered returnees; this was a reason cited by 13 percent[35] of returnees as motivating their settlement decision. The extent to which government entitlements influence decisions will vary with the economic vulnerability of IDP families, as the poorest families are most likely to be influenced.

> P5. Role of Government: National authorities, where appropriate with the support of the international community, have taken appropriate measures to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, to enable IDPs to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country and to facilitate the (re)integration of returned or resettled IDPs.

The capacity of the government to carry out its role effectively evolves over time; in order to be trusted it must demonstrate that it is trustworthy by upholding the rule of law and meeting the population's needs in a transparent way. At the level of the general population and disaggregated by religion/ethnicity, more than half of all surveyed rate their local government positively, ranging from 51 percent among Sunnis to 63 percent among Shiites and 66 percent among Kurds.[36] Although this statistic is not specific to IDPs, it implies that local governments are broadly perceived to be making efforts to meet the needs of their community.

In terms of government benefits for IDPs, registered IDP families are entitled to a stipend of 1 million IQD ($800) over a 6-month period. Approximately 150,000 families received this stipend between 2007-8. The entitlement for IDP returnees is the same; around 14,000 families received the stipend between 2007-8. The process of providing IDP benefits is beset by delays and bureaucratic obstacles. The first payments were only disbursed in September 2007, and some IDPs may prefer to forego their entitlements due to the difficulties involved. Others may not be

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[34] (IOM Iraq, 2008a)
[35] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)
[36] (ABC, BBC, NHK, 2009)

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aware of their entitlements. The continued provision of such entitlements is dependent on Iraq's financial situation.

Civil society can serve an important oversight function in support of an effective government. Thus support for capacity building should also be directed to civil society, to ensure that it can fulfill its role in relation to the government.

The National Policy for Displacement, which was approved in July 2008, outlines the rights of IDPs and the responsibilities of the GoI.[37] The adoption and implementation process of the National Policy has been delayed by a lack of capacity (MoDM was established in 2003, but is not yet officially mandated under Iraqi law; its operation is hampered by a lack of resources and qualified personnel). A priority gap is the lack of a coordinated inter-ministerial strategy for responding to priority needs and other factors that contribute towards durable solutions.

More broadly, the GoI is facing budgeting difficulties due to declining oil prices and the accompanying fall in revenue. When combined with demonstrated challenges in executing its budgets, this presents financial constraints for longer-term investments in social and capital projects.[38] This trend highlights the importance of capacity support to diversify GoI's revenue streams and improve its budget execution within line ministries at the central and local levels.

As the Provincial Powers Law is implemented, governorates should have greater authority and responsibility in responding to IDP needs. This may result in disparities between the experiences of IDPs with their local governments, as a reflection of varying capacity and political will in governorates.

> P6: Assistance. National authorities grant and facilitate safe, unimpeded and timely access of humanitarian organizations and other relevant actors to assist IDPs to return, locally integrate or settle elsewhere in the country.

There is a range of local and international actors providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs, and the GoI actively encourages this. Given the security situation and humanitarian organizations' varying security policies, a significant proportion of assistance is administered by local staff employed both by local and international agencies. To date, IDP communities report receiving assistance from: NGOs (63 percent); charities/religious organizations (37 percent); the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (35 percent); UN (28 percent); local resident community (14 percent); tribal leaders (10 percent); ISF (7 percent); and local leaders (6 percent).[39] Religious charities play a larger role in assisting Baghdad's IDPs relative to those in Ninewa and Basra. MoDM provides significant assistance to IDPs in Ninewa in particular, whereas humanitarian organizations account for under a quarter of aid provided in each governorate.[40]

Actors provide varying degrees of assistance by governorate. In Ninewa, three quarters of IDPs report receiving assistance as compared to Baghdad and Basra, where around half of IDPs

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[37] (MoDM, 2008)
[38] (Robertson & Glantz, 2009)
[39] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)
[40] (IOM Iraq, 2008)

receive assistance.[41] However it is unclear what percentage of those who did not receive assistance, do require it.

Key to this criterion is establishing means of distinguishing vulnerable groups among the IDP and host communities. Many organizations pursue a policy of providing assistance to vulnerable groups both within the IDP and host/receiving community. This fulfills their mandates while increasing the prospects for reconciliation by alleviating competition over scarce resources between IDPs and the rest of the local population. A few IDP groups (5 percent) reported that overburdened services, rising prices, and unemployment in the area led to tensions.[42] The poorer the receiving community is, the greater the assistance that is necessary in order to increase its absorptive capacity.

Condition Criteria for Durable Solutions

C.1 Harassment. Formerly displaced persons do not suffer attacks, harassment, intimidation, persecution or any other form of punitive action upon return to their home communities or settlement in other locations.

IDP perceptions of their freedom to live where they wish - free from attacks, intimidation or any other form of punitive action - varies by governorate. At the general population level, this perception varies by religious/ethnic group. In 2009, 43 percent of Iraqis feel free to live where they want without persecution – 31 percent of Sunnis, 44 percent of Shiites, and 66 percent of Kurds.[43]

C2. Discrimination. Formerly displaced persons are not subject to discrimination for reasons related to their displacement.

Relations between IDPs and host communities vary according to time of displacement (pre- or post-2006) and the social and economic stability of the host community. Community-IDP relations were not problematic in the majority of families surveyed (77 percent). Where tensions were reported, these were due to a combination of factors: overburdened services (cited by 63 percent), rising prices (cited by 46 percent), problems related to housing or land (cited by 45 percent), the behavior of the IDP or returnee group (cited by 45 percent), and high unemployment (cited by 36 percent).[44] IDPs may be blamed for housing shortages and job scarcity, and in some areas their involvement in militia activity may fuel resentment. In Baghdad, those displaced post-2006 were mostly accommodated in areas of the same sect or with family, which decreased tension, although illegal squatting has given rise to another source of tension with long time residents of the city.[45]

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[41] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[42] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)
[43] (ABC, BBC, NHK, 2009)
[44] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)
[45] (IOM Iraq, 2008)

Formerly displaced persons have full and non-discriminatory access to national and sub-national protection mechanisms, including police and courts.

A sense of security is linked to levels of violence and of crime, as well as police presence. Security has improved significantly since 2006, though it continues to vary by neighborhood, governorate and in particular by religious/ethnic group. A majority of Shiites and Kurds feel protected in their neighborhood (88 and 89 percent respectively), compared to 59 percent of Sunnis.[46] This comparison could indicate perceived or real biases in the Iraqi police, who are charged with protection responsibilities, or alternatively different levels of violence between and within ethnic neighborhoods.

The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and ISF work closely with MoDM and local councils to protect returnee locations.[47] As outlined in the Planning Variables section below, security remains an unknown as MNF-I prepares to withdraw and ISF assumes greater responsibility. Communities can also become engaged in responsibility for maintaining security; for example hiring community members to provide protection can often be a less costly and more legitimate mechanism when it is implemented without sectarian bias.

C4. Documentation. Formerly displaced persons have access to personal documentation, which typically is needed to access public services, to vote and for administrative purposes.

In Iraq, five key documents are necessary to access public services: PDS identification cards, and certificates of nationality, birth, marriage, and death. These are interlinked, as birth certificates are necessary for nationality certificates, which are necessary for PDS cards. PDS cards, in turn, are required for voter registration. Access to marriage and death certificates is necessary for widows to access their legal rights, including to property and inheritance.

Across the country, some 88 percent of IDPs and returnee families reported lacking documentation; most commonly PDS ration cards (64 percent), national ID cards (60 percent), birth certificates (58 percent), and marriage certificates (46 percent).[48] Breaking the data down by governorate, over 95 percent in Baghdad, Ninewa and Basra have national certificates, although the figure is lower for birth certificates, ranging from 28 percent in Basra to 77 percent in Ninewa.[49] In particular, PDS identification cards remain an issue for some who face delays in transferring them and thus are unable to access their rations or to vote. For example in Baghdad, 17 percent of IDPs who do not have access to PDS report this as the cause.[50]

Registering as IDPs is required in many governorates, and thus the consequence of non-registration is the exclusion from government assistance. About 60 percent of IDPs and returnees stated that they resided in governorates where registration was required; around 78 percent of

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[46] (ABC, BBC, NHK, 2009)

[47] (IOM Iraq, 2008)

[48] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)

[49] (IOM Iraq, 2008)

[50] Ibid.

those required to register had done so.[51] However as of 2009, the MoDM has closed registration for new IDPs, citing improvement of the situation and the decline in new displacement.

> C5. Property. Formerly displaced persons have access to mechanisms for property restitution or compensation regardless of whether they return or settle in the area where they found refuge or a new location.

Property is a significant concern for IDPs, especially in the context of widespread property damage and destruction. Many records have been lost; some people have sold or swapped houses and others claim to own houses but are unable to prove it. In Baghdad, Ninewa and Basra, the majority of property left behind was houses (83.6, 64.9 and 92.2 percent respectively). Sixty-five percent of IDPs in Baghdad could not access property left behind for reasons including that it was occupied, controlled, or claimed by private citizens (59 percent) or destroyed (32 percent).[52] Of IDPs in Basra, almost half of those who left property behind did not know its status; this figure was 61.5 percent for Ninewa and 7.6 percent for Baghdad.[53] These statistics are alarming as they reveal a major barrier to informed decision-making.

Property is one of the most pressing challenges for the GoI to address, not only in the short term but also in the medium to long term if durable solutions are to be achieved. Mechanisms are necessary to both respond to compensation claims and to track the flow of property as it relates to the pace of returns. For example, examining the housing market (including prices and the rate of sale) following a wave of returns to an area can indicate whether IDPs are returning to their property to refurbish and then sell it, or whether they are returning to reintegrate. Either action can contribute to rebuilding society, but the options differ in terms of how they contribute to durable solutions.

Issues of property are one of the primary concerns of returnee centers, which the GoI has begun to establish, beginning with two in Baghdad. Five main institutions sit in each center: MoDM; Baghdad Operations Command; Baghdad Governorate representatives; Reconciliation Committee; and Department of Real Estate Registration (Ministry of Justice). In managing returns, each has some responsibility linked to property restitution. Furthermore, to facilitate property reclamation the government has issued orders to evict squatters from privately and publicly owned land (PM orders 101 and 440; see above under the 'Lack of coercion' criterion).

Property restitution is a difficult process that requires a clear mechanism for adjudicating claims. Thus far, the GoI has referred claimants to the courts; however there is a danger of clogging the judicial system as the number of returns increases.[54,55] This suggests the need for an administrative process, which can be guided by legal precedence and by conducting a

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[51] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)

[52] (IOM Iraq, 2008)

[53] Ibid.

[54] For pre-2003 cases, the property claims system has presented significant delays – of the approximately 135,000 claims filed, around 37,000 have been decided, a fraction of which have received compensation (van der Auweraert, 2007).

[55] (van der Auweraert, 2007)

stakeholder analysis to ascertain the winners and losers associated with implementing any proposed policy mechanism.

> C6. Standard of living. Formerly displaced persons enjoy without discrimination an adequate standard of living, including shelter, health care, food, water and other means of survival.

A national level comparison between IDPs and non-IDPs indicates that across indicators of well-being, IDPs are equal or in some cases marginally better off than non-IDPs. For all Iraq, food insecurity is not correlated with displacement status. IDPs are also slightly better off than non-IDPs in terms of wealth, expenditure and total income.[56]

However within the IDP population, clear vulnerabilities exist. Priority needs of IDPs in Baghdad and Basra are access to work (cited by 78 and 97 percent of IDPs, respectively) and shelter (cited by 86 and 99 percent of IDPs, respectively), followed by food (cited by 80 and 67 percent of IDPs, respectively). In Ninewa, access to work and legal help were the most cited needs (by 89 and 88 percent of IDPs respectively), followed by shelter (cited by 60 percent of IDPs).[57]

Shelter: In all three case study governorates, cases of owner occupied homes are lower for IDPs than for the local population, resulting in many more IDPs renting homes. In Baghdad, 18 percent of the general population rents compared to 73 percent of IDPs. In Basra, these figures are 10 percent and 61 percent; in Ninewa, they are 12 and 78 percent. Furthermore, many IDPs live with relatives or host families: in Baghdad, 12.5 percent, in Basra, 21.3 percent, in Ninewa, 14.7 percent. This trend is not observed among the general population in these governorates.[58,59]

One risk in cases of rental is that the family becomes very vulnerable to fluctuations in their income, with non-payment of rents leading to eviction. Given the housing shortage in Iraq, landlords have limited incentive to tolerate non-payment when new tenants can easily be found. A small minority of IDPs assessed in Baghdad, Ninewa and Basra continue to live in substandard housing, including mud homes, caravans, and illegal squatter settlements. Many in these squatter dwellings face threats of evictions without alternative shelter options.[60]

Food: Given overall high market prices, there is a reliance on PDS to meet basic nutrition needs amongst the Iraqi population. In Basra, 2 percent of households have borderline food consumption[61] while 67 percent of IDPs cite food as a priority need. This is linked to the fact that 60 percent of Basra's IDPs do not access PDS at all. In Baghdad, 3 percent of households have borderline food consumption while 80 percent of IDPs cite food as a priority need. In Ninewa, 28 percent have borderline or poor food consumption while 30 percent of IDPs cite food as a priority need.[62] This suggests that in two of the three case study governorates, food vulnerability

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[56] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[57] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[58] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[59] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[60] Ibid.
[61] Within WFP VAM methodology, households are classified within three consumption groups (acceptable, borderline, poor) according to the diversity of the diet and food consumption frequency.
[62] (WFP VAM, 2008)

is much higher for IDPs than for the local population. The fact that aggregate national level data on food consumption indicates slightly better trends for IDPs than non-IDPs emphasizes the importance of targeting assistance by governorate, or better still by district.[63]

In response to this gap, IDPs in Baghdad, Ninewa and Basra receive food assistance from other sources including humanitarian (10, 34.8 and 18 percent respectively); religious charities (25, 30 and 16 percent respectively) and regional/national authorities (9, 16 and 2.5 percent respectively).[64]

Access to Work: Unemployment across the three governorates is high, both for the general and IDP populations. For IDPs in Baghdad, 60 percent of families reported that no family member was working, compared to a governorate wide unemployment rate of 14.5 percent. In Ninewa, the corresponding figures were 80 percent amongst IDPs and 20 percent governorate wide; in Basra, 85 percent versus 18 percent.[65,66] Although these metrics are not directly comparable, they do signal that IDPs face a significant barrier to meeting their basic needs, in the form of unemployment, and that this may be associated with their displacement. In addition, it is important to note that there is some variation in estimated rates of unemployment; for example the figures quoted above appear conservative in comparison to the Brookings' Iraq index, which puts the overall unemployment rate at 25-40 percent.[67]

Education: Over the three case study governorates, IDP families are less likely to send all of their children to school than families in the local population. IDP families also cite different reasons for non-attendance – primarily lack of money – as opposed to non-attending students in the local population, whose biggest concern is security.

In Baghdad, 62 percent of IDP families sent most or all of their boys to school, while 47 percent sent most or all of their girls to school.[68] For the local population, 92 percent of children 6-14 years of age attend school.[69] In Basra, 50 percent of IDP families sent most or all of their boys to school, while 44 percent sent most or all of their girls to school.[70] For the local population, 93 percent of children 6-14 years of age attend school.[71] In Ninewa, 89 percent of IDP families sent most or all of their boys to school, while 81 percent sent most or all of their girls to school.[72] For the local population, 90 percent of children 6-14 years of age attend school.[73]

For both IDPs and the local population, barriers to school attendance range by governorate and by sex, and include security, lack of money, need to work, distance, cultural/religious constraints, language problems, and a lack of documents. The biggest barrier to attendance for

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[63] Ibid.
[64] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[65] Ibid.
[66] (World Bank/COSIT & KRSO, 2007)
[67] (Brookings Institution, 2009)
[68] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[69] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[70] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[71] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[72] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[73] (WFP VAM, 2008)

IDP children in Baghdad (both boys and girls) was lack of money (cited by 88 and 91 percent respectively). For the local population, it was security (cited by 27.5 percent of students who dropped out of school). For IDPs in Basra, for boys it was work, and for girls it was lack of money (78 percent for each). Female IDPs also cited lack of documentation as a barrier to school (3 percent), which was not cited in either Ninewa or Baghdad. For the local population in Basra, security and lack of money were the main barriers (cited by 26 and 25 of percent of students who dropped out of school, respectively). For IDP families in Ninewa, language problems were the main barrier for both boys and girls (45.8 and 31.7 percent respectively). In Ninewa, like in Basra, security and lack of money were the main barriers for the local population (cited by 26 and 25 percent of students who dropped out of school, respectively).[74,75]

Given that the potential barriers to accessing education as well as quality range by governorate, the status of an area's education system may be a factor that influences IDPs' settlement decisions. For example, families may select to settle in a locale with the most functioning education system. This might be an especially relevant consideration for women as primary caretakers with responsibility for supervising their children's education.

Health: Over 90 percent of IDPs in Baghdad, Basra, and Ninewa have access to health care services. Reasons for lack of access include financial constraints, distance, and lack of availability.[76] This is similar to the access level for the general population; however concerns regarding quality of care and security provisions at hospitals have been important in motivating decisions to leave the country, as reported anecdotally in conversations with Iraqi refugees.

Water/sanitation: Across the three case study governorates, IDP access to water is on par with that of the local population. In Baghdad and Basra, around 90 percent of both the general and IDP populations have regular access to potable water, mainly through municipal sources. However the majority of Basra's IDPs report that water quality is low (salty or brackish). Access is lower, but still similar between IDPs and the general population in Ninewa (66 percent and 71 percent respectively).[77,78] This could be linked to reported disrepair of the water network; maintenance work is underway to improve access.

In the three case study governorates, both IDPs and the general population have access to toilet facilities.[79] Select neighborhoods such as Istiqial district in Baghdad and Al-Sa'as district in Mosul, are not connected to the sewage network.[80] At a national level, 8 percent of IDPs and returnees share a toilet with more than 20 people.[81]

Electricity: Electrical infrastructure is a gap across the country. 60 percent of Baghdad's population has access to electricity, with power cuts over one week totaling less than 15 hours. Nearly 60 percent of IDPs in Baghdad access electricity for four or more hours a day while 40

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[74] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[75] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[76] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[77] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[78] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[79] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[80] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[81] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)

percent have access for one to three hours a day. In Basra, IDP access to electricity is lower than that of the general population. Nearly 30 percent of IDPs have no access to electricity while nearly 100 percent of Basra's local population has access to electricity with power cuts totaling less than 10 hours in one week. In Ninewa, access is lower for both IDPs and the local population.[82,83]

C7. Family Reunification. Formerly displaced persons have been able to reunite with family members if they choose to do so.

In Iraqi society, the strength of familial networks has minimized the extent to which family reunification presents a problem for IDPs. For a minority of IDPs, some family members remain unaccounted for or are living elsewhere. For example, some IDP families may be separated for reasons related to their displacement/lack of integration, such as when the male head of household stays to watch property/work while the rest of the family goes to live with relatives elsewhere. However for the vast majority, efforts in this area are not a priority, possibly because families have been displaced as family units.

C8. Political participation. Formerly displaced persons are able to exercise the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs.

While figures are not yet disaggregated by governorate, at the national level less than three percent of the IDP population participated in the January 2009 provincial elections.[84] Barriers to participation are likely to include difficulties in registering due to lack of PDS cards or problems in transferring these, as mentioned above. Furthermore, IDPs are currently only able to vote in their areas of origin; for those who are not planning to return, the fact that their vote is tied to their place of origin may be a disincentive to engage in the political process.

Based on the above analysis of the Framework and the planning variables presented in the following section, the most relevant criteria in the Iraqi context are identified in Section V: Findings.

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[82] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[83] (IOM Iraq, 2008)
[84] (Boonstra, 2009)

Section IV. Key Planning Variables in the Iraqi Context

The above discussion highlights priorities that exist now for actors engaging with IDPs in Iraq. These actors must plan their engagement around potential opportunities and constraints in the Iraqi context. Below is a list of key variables that may impact the experience of IDPs and their prospects for durable solutions. The discussion highlights how these variables may unfold, in order to provide guidance for planning and programming that is appropriate and adaptive to the Iraqi context.

Domestic politics

<u>Movement towards issue-based politics.</u> During the Saddam era (16 July 1979 – 9 April 2003), severe and violent repression of Shi'a and Kurdish political movements deepened sectarian divisions. Post-Saddam, the failure of the Iraqi state and the coalition to provide security has created space for extremist groups to emerge. These groups, including Al Qaeda and sectarian militias, have caused a rise in sectarian violence that has increased segregation of neighborhoods/provinces, and have stymied Iraq's political process.

In 2005, nearly 4 out of 5 voters approved the Iraqi Constitution—but the 22 percent who said "No" in the referendum were almost exclusively from the Sunni minority, motivated by the fear of constitutional provisions for federalism giving way to independent Shi'a and Kurdish states with control of oil resources.[85] Since then, Sunni participation in the political process has grown. For example during the January 2009 elections in Al-Anbar province, once the stronghold of Al Qaeda Iraq, the turnout increased from 2 percent to 40 percent.[86] Some analysts suggest that this increase in political participation was prompted by improvements in security and a decline in voter intimidation, as well as a growing realization of the failure of violence to achieve political ends. Resurgent Arab nationalism as well as increasing popular frustration with sectarian politics in Iraq has helped to bring Sunni and Shi'a parties closer together in terms of platform.[87]

In the January 2009 provincial elections, multiple political parties within different sectarian groups ran on varying platforms. The United Iraqi Alliance's once two most powerful parties, Da'wa and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) did not run as a block. Da'wa joined the non-sectarian State of Law coalition, campaigning on a platform of national unity and rule of law. The success of the State of Law coalition in these 2009 provincial elections, particularly in the south, contrasts markedly with the poor electoral performance of the ISCI and other religious parties. The failure of many former Shi'a coalition parties to gain a majority of votes in their current configuration raises the question of what new coalitions will emerge in the next national election: will there be a greater trend towards secularism and cross party alliances, or a reversion to sectarianism? With the former comes greater likelihood of peace and stability and with the latter the prospect of escalating violence.

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[85] (Fang, 2005)
[86] (Indian Express, 2009)
[87] (Serwin & Al-Rahim, 2007)

Absorption of predominantly Sunni groups into the political process. The transformation of Sunni insurgents into the Sons of Iraq/Awakening Councils, US funded militias, helped to significantly reduce levels of violence in the Sunni heartland by taking a stand against Al Qaeda. Currently across Iraq, around 20 percent of the Sons of Iraq are being offered employment in the security forces; the remaining 80 percent have been promised civilian positions. Such employment is an attempt to address the economic concerns of these groups, although it is not clear if these positions alone will lead to long-term integration and cooperation with the GoI. A standoff in March 2009 between the ISF and the Sons of Iraq signals potential barriers to this integration process.[88] Without political representation, the Sons of Iraq may seek to establish their authority outside of – or in opposition to – the state. Absorbing these Sunni militias into the political process creates greater incentives for peace.

Potential implications for IDPs in Iraq

If there is greater stability and secularism in politics, Iraq's political parties may be incentivized to compete with each other in promising greater public services. This in turn enhances political will to fulfill the necessary conditions to end displacement in Iraq. However translation of this will into successful implementation is dependent on the ability of GoI to galvanize successful resources and to implement decisions.

If the civilian government remains weak, there is an opportunity for greater political authority of the military, which will have both positive and negative consequences for IDPs. Greater public order under a more authoritarian government may lead to greater stability in security, but will make it difficult for IDPs, and for Iraqis generally, to participate in decision-making over their future.

If the civilian government pursues a sectarian agenda, a reversion to identity politics may hamper service delivery for non-Shi'a IDPs and reduce the role of government in meeting their needs. Marginalization may lead to unrest in Sunni areas, which would be further exacerbated by a failure to incorporate the Sons of Iraq/Awakening Councils in the federal political process.

Decentralization

Decentralization implementation. The Iraq Provincial Powers Law, passed in March 2008, established what the local hierarchy looks like, including the role of governors, provincial councils and other sub-groups, and paved the way for greater decentralization. Although the new councils were seated in March 2009, it remains to be seen if the Provincial Powers Law will be implemented. If it is, provinces will have greater authority and funding to carry out new responsibilities. This is likely to result in even more variation in the governorates' response to IDPs.

A separate but related issue is the potential for federation among provinces in Iraq. As the provinces gain more autonomy, they can under the constitution form regional entities. In turn, these regional entities can claim additional powers and would most likely have a religious/ethnic

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[88] (Katulls, 2009)

identity (with the Shiites in the south, Sunnis in the center, and Kurds in the north).[89] At present, such efforts have lost momentum following the failure of the Basra separatist movement and the poor electoral success of parties advocating for an independent 'Shi'astan' in the January 2009 elections.

Disputed Territories. Debate between the central government and the KRG is most intense over the question of who will govern Kirkuk province and the border area of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Kirkuk sits on about 13 percent of Iraq's oil reserves and was a prime target of Saddam's Arabization policy, which led to the mass expulsion of Kurds in the 1970s. The province is therefore seen by the Kurds as a symbol of the oppression they suffered under Saddam, and a focus of their efforts to redress the demographic balance in favor of Kurds. On the other hand, many Arabs see the KRG claim for Kirkuk as related to KRG's goal of achieving a fiscally viable independent state.

The September 2008 provincial elections law sought to establish a resolution process by stipulating that a committee of seven Council of Representatives legislators – two Kurds, two Arabs, two Turkmen, and one Christian – will work with a range of advisors (including the UN) to develop a consensus mechanism for sharing Kirkuk's governance.[90] The Committee is due to draft its recommendations into a Kirkuk election law to go before the Iraqi Parliament. The acceptance or rejection of these recommendations by the central government and the KRG will be a major factor in the stability – or instability – not only of the north of Iraq, but the entire country.

Potential implications for IDPs in Iraq

If there is local devolution of powers with a strong central government, much of the responsibility and authority for meeting IDP needs will be transferred to provincial governments. Bringing governance closer to the local level may help to increase transparency and accountability, allowing IDPs greater access to decision-making and information within the province where they are resident. However provincial governments are likely to vary in terms of their quality and ability to deliver services to IDPs. Information coordination between regions may be a problem, which will create barriers to IDPs who wish to visit potential relocation sites, obtain requisite documentation, or claim property compensation.

If a strong central government emerges, there is potential for clearer lines of responsibility between line ministries for IDP service provision. Although regional disparities will still exist, a central coordination mechanism for services such as property restitution could significantly aid IDPs who wish to relocate across provincial borders.

If there is a breakdown of central government and de facto reversion to three sectarian power blocs, this will seriously hinder/delay the establishment of any formal IDP assistance mechanisms such as property restitution, documentation and informed participation in decision-making. Sectarian regional power blocs will most likely not encourage citizen participation, contributing to low transparency in decision-making. IDPs will probably fare reasonably well if

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[89] (PBS, 2008)
[90] (Ali & Knights, 2009)

they are displaced within a region controlled by their own sect. Conversely those living under the authority of a different sect will probably suffer discrimination and lack assistance and most likely seek to leave the area in favor of communities of their same religion/ethnicity.

Resources

In order to maintain a functional state and meet the needs of its citizens, the GoI's priority concern is to maintain the nation's oil revenues while at the same time diversifying income streams that will enable it to reduce dependence on oil. Given that the development of alternative sectors such as agriculture and industry will take years to achieve, Iraq's short to medium term budget is dependent on the domestic production level of oil and its price on international markets. The plummeting price of oil over the last six months has created significant pressure on the GoI to cut its budget for 2009, and raised difficult questions about how daily operating expenses will be covered in the next three years. Currently, the GoI has a cushion of $35 billion in the US Federal Reserve. In 2009, $20 billion of this will be drawn down to pay for the 2009 budget, although this funding was intended for reconstruction projects. Many capital projects, crucial for improving the provision of public services, have been put on hold, with operating expenses accounting for four-fifths of this year's budget. Concerns remain regarding the capacity of the GoI to execute its budget.[91]

The fiscal viability of the central government is influenced by its authority over distribution of revenues. As discussed under decentralization, the formation of regional entities will have implications for agreement on the control and allocation of oil resources. The stalemate on this decision prevents ratification of the National Oil Law. In a situation of declining security, the risk of oil infrastructure falling under militia control increases, as occurred post-2003. This would have devastating consequences for Iraq's ongoing attempts to increase production through licensing oil and gas projects to international oil companies under technical service contracts.[92]

Potential implications for IDPs in Iraq

If oil prices are high and the government's ability to disburse funds is increased, greater oil revenues will contribute towards a greater capacity for government to meet the needs of its population (including IDPs) under both federal and provincial systems. A stronger central government is better able to ensure IDP protection and enforce rule of law. However greater resources do not necessarily equate with greater transparency, and thus citizen participation may still be low, especially given the variability in the quality of governance between the provinces.

If oil prices fall, the central government's ability to support IDP needs and the needs of the general population will also decrease. Overall vulnerability will increase, leading to greater dependence on the international community for assistance with social and development programs. This dependence may continue in the long term if the government does not succeed in diversifying its economy. With a stagnating economy and greater poverty in Iraq, the possibility of escalating instability becomes more likely.

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[91] (Robertson & Glanz, 2009)
[92] (Daily Star, 2009)

Security

Security in Iraq has improved dramatically in the past year and a half, following several years of heavy bloodshed that brought the country to the brink of all-out civil war. Security is currently maintained by a combination of ISF (including the military and civilian law enforcement) and MNF-I. According to the US-Iraqi bilateral security agreement signed in November 2008, the ISF will assume full responsibility for providing security for the Iraqi people by the end of 2011. Post U.S. withdrawal, the efficacy of the ISF in maintaining stability will depend not only on its technical capabilities but also on its prevention of sectarian divisions emerging among its ranks. With volatile domestic politics, ongoing Al Qaeda activity and the continued possibility of escalating Iranian influence, security forces in Iraq face substantial and unpredictable challenges.

The U.S. has around 144,000 troops in Iraq, which, under the security agreement, will be completely withdrawn by the end of 2011. According to President Obama's plan, the combat mission will end by August 31 2010, at which point all but 35 – 50,000 troops will leave Iraq. These troops will remain until the end of 2011 to train Iraqi security personnel (so long as they remain non-sectarian), as well as to protect U.S. diplomats and conduct counterterrorism missions.[93]

Potential implications for IDPs in Iraq

If the ISF are able to maintain a secure environment, this will increase the safety of the general population (including IDPs). Increased security will also enable an increase in assistance, and the opening up of greater relocation options for IDPs. However if sectarian bias is evident in the police force, this may create difficulties for IDPs to report grievances such as harassment or discrimination for fear of retaliation. Since it is the responsibility of the ISF to physically evict people, perceptions of sectarian bias in ISF actions could increase tensions.

If the ISF are not able to maintain a secure environment, this will trigger insecurity as violence breaks out among regions and limits access for humanitarian actors. In an extreme scenario, assistance is likely to be severely limited, and provided mainly by military personnel. A new wave of displacement is likely to be triggered while the capacity and will of the government to respond decreases, as quelling violence will become the first priority. Under such conditions, all long-term mechanisms for IDP reintegration/ relocation will be unlikely to function.

Regional and international players

Although domestic politics will largely determine the course of greater stability or greater fragmentation that Iraq takes in the next few years, regional power players – in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran - will also exert influence. Turkey's staunch opposition to an independent Kurdistan on its border will shape the development of relations between the central government in Baghdad and the KRG, as will its support for Iraqi Turkmen standing against the move to incorporate Kirkuk within the KRG. In a larger regional context, the ongoing competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for power and influence in the Middle East may lead to greater interference in Iraq, to the detriment of security.

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[93] (Obama, 2009)

While the drawdown of U.S. troops will signify that Iraq's future is its own responsibility, President Obama has indicated that the U.S. will play a role in helping Iraq build global trade and commerce relationships to strengthen its economy. The Iraq Study Group also included in its recommendations that the U.S. play a greater role in brokering consensus between regional power players vis a vis the need for supporting stability in Iraq.[94] President Obama expressed his intention to engage with all Middle East actors, including Iran and Syria, towards realizing sustainable peace in Iraq. However, to the extent that the U.S. is seen as an ally in Saudi Arabian efforts to limit Iranian influence in Iraq, any success in this area will depend on forging an understanding between Tehran and Washington that sufficiently incentivizes Iran to avoid interference in Iraq.

Potential implications for IDPs in Iraq

The influence of regional and international players will shape IDP experiences and potential for durable solutions by influencing each of the other the other variables listed above. For example in terms of security and decentralization: if Iranian influence increases in the southern areas of Iraq where the population has become increasingly Shi'a, conditions for those of a different religious/ethnic group in the south are likely to become more difficult. Politically, greater alliance with Iran is likely to result in growing political support for 'Shi'astan' and a push for regional autonomy from the central government. Iraqis who oppose this may suffer violence and intimidation, while greater unrest may cause others to flee, causing a new wave of displacement.

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[94] (Baker et al, 2006)

Section V. Findings on Research Questions

The above discussion of the durable solutions criteria, as applied to the situation for Iraqi IDPs, combined with the review of the planning variables, informs analysis of the following research questions.

- ➢ As an analytical tool, how can the Framework be applied in a country specific context?
- ➢ How does applying the Framework to the Iraqi context help to identify priorities in the process of advancing durable solutions to displacement?

The goal of these research questions is primarily to identify which criteria outlined in the Framework are most relevant in the Iraqi context. Secondarily, it is to provide reflections on applying the Framework to the country context in order to help inform its further development as a tool to guide policy and programming at the country level.

In terms of relevance, this is defined twofold; first as those criteria that IDPs cite as being the most significant barriers in their ability to make and enact a voluntary settlement decision. Second, it is defined as those criteria for which available data indicate that IDPs experience vulnerabilities linked to their displacement status. This research suggests the following findings based on analysis of each criterion.

Barriers to settlement decisions

Less than 10 percent of IDPs have returned to their communities so far. Of surveyed returnees, the majority cited improved security and access to property/land as the key factors motivating their decision (93 percent and 68 percent respectively). Additional reasons for return are related to factors that contribute to improvements in standard of living, as represented by access to assistance, difficult economic conditions in displacement, and access to government incentives (these factors combined were cited by 83 percent of surveyed IDP returnees).[95] This indicates that people may choose to return if they have assurances of safety, access to their assets, as well as to means of improving their standard of living. In surveys, the majority of IDPs identify feeling targeted on grounds of their sect/religion.[96] This suggests that their sense of security is tied to fear of harassment by state or non-state actors.

These factors are not exhaustive, as additional issues not included on returnee surveys may influence IDP settlement decisions. Anecdotal evidence from field staff in Iraq suggests that access to employment and rule of law also drive IDPs' settlement decisions. Access to employment is linked to improved standard of living, while rule of law is tied to improved sense of security by preventing impunity around violence and crime.

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[95] (UNHCR Iraq, 2008)
[96] (IOM Iraq, 2008)

Data are lacking on the motivations of those IDPs who indicate their preference to locally integrate in their current location or resettle in a third location. Anecdotal evidence from field staff in Iraq suggests that similar factors drive these settlement decisions.

Given that the relevance of the Framework criteria are in part defined by which factors drive settlement decisions, the following criteria are most relevant in Iraq:

For security: Formerly displaced persons do not suffer attacks, harassment, intimidation, persecution or any other form of punitive action upon return to their home communities or settlement in other locations

For rule of law: Formerly displaced persons have full and non-discriminatory access to national and sub-national protection mechanisms, including police and courts

For property: Formerly displaced persons have access to mechanisms for property restitution or compensation regardless of whether they return or settle in the area where they found refuge or a new location

For standard of living: Formerly displaced persons enjoy without discrimination an adequate standard of living, including shelter, health care, food, water and other means of survival

Vulnerabilities linked to displacement

Framework criteria are also deemed relevant in a country context if they identify ways in which IDPs experience unique vulnerabilities linked to their displacement status. Analysis of these vulnerabilities should focus on their underlying cause, linking these to the criteria outlined in the Framework. Secondary to the priority criteria identified above, analysis of Iraq data indicates that there are also other gaps within a range of criteria.

Within the **'informed decision'** criterion, IDP surveys indicate that important gaps exist in access to information. For example, a proportion of IDPs – varying by governorate - lack information on the status of the property they left behind. Such gaps are especially of concern for property and any other factor that IDPs cite as key to informing their settlement decision.

For the **'lack of coercion'** criterion, one concern is that while evictions are necessary to facilitate IDP and refugee returns, they risk causing secondary displacement. Furthermore, they contribute to increasing vulnerability amongst a cohort of IDPs who are already among the most vulnerable – especially when compensatory stipends are not distributed.

The **'role of government'** criterion will be significantly impacted by how the budget shortfall for 2009 (linked with a drop in world oil price) affects social programs for displaced people, as well as the capacity and resources for MoDM. For example, due to overall cuts in the Iraqi budget, MoDM reduced its budget for IDP housing projects from 40 million IQD (US$43.2 million) to 8 million IQD (US$6.85 million).[97] MoDM is a small ministry intended to coordinate rather than implement; it is not yet officially recognized under Iraqi law, and its position within

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[97] (OCHA Iraq, 2009)

government remains in flux. Budget cuts further limit its ability to effectively coordinate with line ministries and deliver assistance.

Within the **'documentation'** criterion, access to public services, including PDS, are denied to IDPs who do not have the necessary documentation. Barriers to obtaining this documentation include inability to access place of origin due to security concerns and bureaucratic obstacles in navigating the official system to reissue missing documents or transfer the PDS card.

Within the **'standard of living'** criterion, comparison between IDPs and non-IDPs indicates that displacement status is not necessarily correlated with vulnerability. Assessment is necessary to identify the most vulnerable within both IDP and non-IDP cohorts. Data suggest that shelter and education are areas where IDPs experience particular difficulties linked to their displacement.

For the **'political participation'** criterion, IDPs without the necessary documentation and who are unable to travel to their governorate of origin cannot vote. This risks marginalizing IDP concerns and impacting the degree to which they feel they belong to their place of origin. Serious attention is required to identify and address these barriers to ensure that IDPs are able to participate in public affairs, especially in the run-up to the next national election.

Recommendations for Actors

GoI

Property/Lack of Coercion
Property is one of the most pressing challenges for the GoI to address, not only in the short term but also in the medium to long term if durable solutions are to be achieved. There is considerable debate about the most effective way to address property issues.[98,99,100] The GoI is in the process of setting up mechanisms to respond to compensation claims, through establishing the returnee centers currently operating in Baghdad. However the process both needs to be strengthened and streamlined, and more broadly publicized so that IDP and non-IDP populations are aware of – and respect – this as a necessary part of re-integration. More returnee centers are required both in Baghdad and in other governorates as returns increase. Orders 101 and 440 must be implemented with care and sufficient support must be extended to those who are evicted so as not to increase vulnerability.

Standard of Living
GoI should prioritize a poverty reduction strategy within a broader development agenda; this will address socio-economic disparities shared by IDP and non-IDP populations. For both cohorts, unemployment has risen considerably due to the conflict. This has occurred within the context of a system in which the public sector was a large employer, and government revenues were based on oil alone. Ideally, the GoI would support job creation and economic diversification through private sector development. However to attract banking and foreign investment first requires that Iraq ensures rule of law, security and provision of infrastructure such as electricity. Education

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[98] (van der Auweraert, 2007)
[99] (Williams, 2008)
[100] (USIP, 2008)

and vocational training programs are necessary, but should be based on a careful analysis of the country's prospects for macro-economic growth and identification of sectors in which employment is most likely to be sustainable.

Provision of public services, such as electricity, is a priority area for the GoI, both for the general and IDP populations. Attention should be paid to when and how services are restored, given that this process can create tension between communities who gain access at different times.

Documentation/Political participation
As stipulated in the National Policy on Displacement, the GoI should prioritize simplifying the process of transferring PDS cards and issuing other key documentation in order to ensure that IDPs can access the same services and rights as the host and receiving communities – including the ability to register to vote. Working towards promoting participatory norms as part of strengthening democratic institutions in Iraq is an important long-term goal. To further encourage political participation, the GoI should assess what IDPs perceive as the barriers associated with participating in public affairs and work to lower these.

Role of Government
In order for MoDM to operate more effectively, its mandate must be clarified and legally approved. Although there has been progress made, significant capacity and resource constraints still exist and these should be addressed. For example in terms of policy and planning, the existing National Policy on Displacement is comprehensive, but contains no prioritization and as yet has not been implemented. MoDM should work with line ministries to translate the policy into coordinated strategies that will meet the most pressing needs of the displaced. In terms of resources, MoDM and the GoI more broadly must improve budget execution to demonstrate the ability to utilize existing funds if more donors are to be attracted.

The capacity of the government to carry out its role effectively evolves over time; in order to be trusted it must demonstrate that it is trustworthy by upholding the rule of law and meeting the population's needs in a timely and transparent way. To this end, it is important to simplify return and reintegration procedures to decrease delays caused by excessive bureaucracy, as well as to monitor the settlement process.

Informed decisions
The GoI, with support from local and international actors, can add value by providing a unified message on technical information regarding IDP benefits associated with each settlement option (for example stipends, land allocation, and assistance in regaining property). In order ensure that IDPs are able to make a voluntary settlement decision, planning and information provision should be based on regularly updated intentions surveys. These will indicate IDP preferences for return, local integration and resettlement, as well as the factors motivating these decisions. Official policy may be weighted towards one settlement option, but in order for the decision making to be voluntary, information should be available on all three settlement options.

Security/Rule of Law
A key priority is to strengthen the judicial system. In IDP settlement decisions, perceptions of security are as significant as the number of security incidents themselves. Through the Iraqi

police force and courts system, the GoI must make a high profile attempt to arrest and prosecute criminals who are perceived to operate with impunity. To extend and maintain security, the GoI should continue to prioritize the training and integration of the ISF.

International and National Actors

Informed decisions
International and national actors should support the GoI in identifying what information IDPs require through involvement in intentions surveys, and in providing a unified message on technical information regarding IDP benefits associated with each settlement option (for example stipends, land allocation, and assistance in regaining property).

Standard of Living
As international and national actors provide community level assistance (to IDP and non-IDP populations), they should continue to do so on a needs basis and according to vulnerability. This will increase community absorptive capacity and abate tension between IDPs and non-IDPs. From a 'Do No Harm' lens, such an approach is also necessary in integration and reconciliation efforts.[101]

Role of Government
Wherever possible, international actors should provide technical guidance and funding to assist the GoI in fulfilling its responsibilities. Priority should be placed on those recommendations listed above, and on supporting the development of a monitoring mechanism to track IDP settlement solutions.

An important role for national actors lies in the development of an active civil society, which can serve an important oversight function in support of an effective government and can help to ensure development interventions are sustainable. Thus support for capacity building should be directed to civil society – including in management and planning – to ensure that it can fulfill its role in relation to the government.

For donors, there is a need to broaden the pool of funding and recognize that Iraq will continue to need support as it transitions to longer term development planning. Implicit in this is a need to maintain the commitment to supporting efforts focused on resolving displacement through durable solutions in line with human rights standards.

Reflections on Applying the Framework

As prefaced in the introductory discussion, displacement is not a legal status, but rather a descriptive term, often indicating vulnerability. This is borne out in the experience of applying the Framework to Iraq. An IDP does not stop being an IDP from one day to the next, as a refugee can; resolving displacement is not a legal question but a process of addressing vulnerabilities and restoring human rights. The criteria listed in the Framework are not intended to prescribe a uniform response, nor do all criteria have to be addressed at once. Rather the sequence in which

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[101] (Anderson, 1999)

the criteria are addressed - and which criteria are prioritized - will vary according to country context.

The Framework approaches displacement through a human rights lens, and many of the criteria it enumerates capture rights that IDPs may be denied due to the experience of displacement. However the Framework is based on an assumption that IDPs enjoy the freedom to make a voluntary settlement decision. In the Iraqi context, this assumption is hard to justify for several reasons. First, there is a political bias in favor of returns and a reversal of the sectarian segregation of neighborhoods that has occurred primarily since 2006. Second, incentives can be used coercively to influence settlement decisions through a combination of push and pull factors; the poorest segment of the IDP population is most vulnerable to this. Third, in Iraq's recent history there has not been the political norm of participation or the culture of individual rights that may influence the ability of IDPs to make and enact a voluntary settlement decision.

From the human rights perspective of the Framework, a government cannot seek to coerce IDP settlement decisions. Support must be given to IDPs to enact their choice, regardless of whether they want to return, locally integrate or resettle. Thus a second and related assumption of the Framework is that a government will prioritize the human rights of IDPs above political imperatives.

The Framework places responsibility for meeting IDP needs first and foremost on the national government. The dual approach in the criteria of both processes and conditions demonstrates that the government must establish processes in order to reach conditions. When and where the government lacks the capacity to do so, it may request local actors or the international community to provide capacity building and resources to meet the gaps.

The question of when local and international actors should stop providing assistance to IDPs is primarily an operational question. Using the above logic, one indication is when the government has reached sufficient capacity to continue the process on its own. Issues of vulnerability can be outstanding for years; however the international community's role may evolve over this period, for example, from direct provision of assistance to providing donor support to the government and civil society.

Finally, the Framework prompts identification of vulnerabilities that are associated with displacement status. In applying the Framework, this question is addressed through comparison between the status of IDPs and the status of the general population. As mentioned above, in some areas - such as shelter for example - IDPs experience an overall higher level of vulnerability than the non-IDP population. Yet a purely relative perspective does not capture the fact that there may also be a high level of vulnerability amongst certain sections of the non-IDP population. This suggests that actors should implement a 'build back better' approach in utilizing the opportunity of reconstruction to improve the standard of living for the community as a whole. In other areas, vulnerability is similar and high for both the IDP and non-IDP population. In these cases, the problem calls for a broader developmental approach while at the same time supporting the right of IDPs to durable solutions to their displacement. Whether IDPs are more, less or similarly vulnerable compared to the non-IDP population, a holistic community approach is necessary to achieve durable solutions.

Section VI. Conclusion

The Framework can serve as a country-level tool to guide policy and planning towards advancing durable solutions for displacement. To most effectively apply it, rigorous data are necessary for the population as a whole. In order to apply the Framework as proposed in this research, detailed survey data based on a consistent methodology are required for both IDPs and non-IDPs on a range of socio-economic and human rights indicators. In addition, survey data (preferably at the individual level) are necessary on IDP intentions and the factors driving their settlement decisions. Where data are not available, proxy metrics or anecdotal evidence may be used to evaluate criteria, but resulting findings would be less conclusive. To supplement the metrics proposed in this research, tailored interviews and focus groups with IDPs and the local populations in their chosen settlement location would enhance insight on the range of vulnerabilities associated with displacement in the country context.

Application of the Framework to the Iraqi context demonstrates that it can be a particularly useful tool in settings where there is a high vulnerability among the overall population (as is the case in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime). Given the scale of reconstruction work that will be required to facilitate Iraq's transition to stable long-term development, prioritization is necessary. In terms of assistance to IDPs, this research identified that the most pressing areas of concern for GoI and its partners include:

- ➢ **Harassment,** as it relates to a sense of security
- ➢ **Protection**, as it relates to rule of law and access to police and courts
- ➢ **Property**, as it relates to the ability of IDPs to reclaim assets and access shelter
- ➢ **Standard of living**, as it relates to the ability of IDPs to access public services, assistance and employment opportunities.

While recognizing that displacement is often an indication of vulnerability, this paper demonstrates that application of the Framework using the methodology developed here allows identification of areas where certain sections of the IDP population are especially vulnerable because of their displacement; areas where IDPs are not vulnerable; and areas where IDP needs are on par with the general population and thus not linked to their displacement. This nuance is necessary to ensure that available funding is targeted to assist the most vulnerable segments of the population within a community-based approach that will most productively enable redevelopment.

Interviews

UN Agencies
Daniel Endres   UNHCR Iraq Representative (Baghdad)
Annalaura Maria Sacco   UNHCR Iraq Protection Officer (Amman)
Andrew Harper   UNHCR Head Iraq Support Unit (Geneva)
Arafat Jamal   UNHCR Jordan Representative (Amman)
Peter Jansen   UNHCR Jordan Senior Durable Solutions Officer (Amman)
Livia Styp-Rekowska   IOM Iraq IDP Emergency Operations Officer (Amman)
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Clare Dalton   ICRC Iraq Delegation Counselor (Amman)
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Appendix A. Data Source Methodologies

Methodologies for the two principal data sources used (IOM Governorate profiles and WFP VAM) are provided below.

WFP VAM sampling procedures: "The WFP VAM survey covered all 115 districts in Iraq. A classic cluster sampling approach was adopted with districts used as primary clusters. The cluster design factorial was set at 115x15x15 (115 districts with 15 clusters and 15 households within each cluster) to yield 225 households in each district and 25,875 households across all 18 governorates in Iraq. Fieldwork started for all districts on 11 November 2007 and ended on 6 December 2007. The data were collected by 166 teams made up of members from each governorate. Each team had one employee from COSIT or KRSO as well as a paramedic or doctor from NRI, Ministry of Health. The fieldwork was overseen by supervisors from each of the governorates as well as by monitors from COSIT and KRSO. Data verification took place in two stages, first by a local auditor and then by the local supervisors. Once the field work ended, the data was captured into electronic media. Final statistical analysis was conducted by a team from COSIT, KRSO and WFP."[102]

IOM methodology: "IOM's assessments focus primarily on post-2006 IDPs. In Baghdad Governorate, post-2006 IDPs number 90,731 families (an estimated 550,099 individuals based on an average family size of 6). IOM's assessments in Baghdad cover 60,724 families displaced post-2006 (an estimated 364,344 individuals".[103] "In Ninewa Governorate, post-2006 IDPs number 19,100 families (an estimated 106,623 individuals). IOM's assessments in Ninewa cover 12,546 families displaced post-2006 (an estimated 75,276 individuals)".[104] "In Basra Governorate, post-2006 IDPs number 5,989 families (an estimated 35,509 individuals). IOM's assessments in Basra cover 5,092 families displaced post-2006 (an estimated 30,552 individuals)".[105]

"Monitors located in each governorate use IDP Rapid Assessment Questionnaires that address a number of issues and needs, including food, health care, water and sanitation, documentation, property, and the IDPs' future intentions. Monitors visit the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, IDP tribal and community leaders, local non-governmental organizations, local government bodies, and individual IDP families to gather information and complete the questionnaires. As the information is gathered, it is entered into a database for analysis (updating the database occurs bi-weekly). Using the information from the database as a basis, IOM obtains additional information or clarifies questions by contacting other NGOs, IOM staff in the field, the implementing partners, etc. This additional information provides a more in-depth look at the

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[102] (WFP VAM, 2008)
[103] (IOM Iraq, 2008a)
[104] (IOM Iraq, 2008b)
[105] (IOM Iraq, 2008c)

situation   and   issues   surrounding   displacement   in   each   governorate."[106]

Appendix B. Mapping Iraqi Data to the Framework Criteria

Status of Process Criteria for Durable Solutions[107]

P1	**Informed decisions:** IDPs are able to make an informed decision as to whether to return, remain where they are, or settle elsewhere in the country	
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Percentage of IDPs who know that it is their right to choose where they settle - Percentage of IDPs who have sufficient information to decide between their available options - Percentage of IDPs who have registered for assistance with the government	
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDPs who have decided where to settle - Percentage of IDPs who have registered for assistance with the government	
	Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	**Status of Baghdad's General Population**
	Of assessed IDPs in Baghdad, a range of settlement options are reported. 80.3 percent reported planning to return to their place of origin; 10 percent to resettle in a third location; and five percent to locally integrate in the current location.	(N/A but relates to how informed general population is of their rights as citizens and their entitlements from the government)
	Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
	Of assessed IDPs in Ninewa, 59.8 percent reported planning to return to their place of origin; 34 percent to resettle in a third location; and 6 percent to locally integrate in the current location.	
	Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
	Of assessed IDPs in Basra, 85.2 percent reported planning to locally integrate in the current location; 9.1 percent to resettle in a	

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[107] The source of all IDP data is IOM Iraq; other data is cited accordingly.

	third location; and 5.7 percent return to their place of origin.	

	Participation: IDPs, including disadvantaged groups, participate fully in the planning and management of return, local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country	
P2		

	Proposed Framework Metrics:
	- (In circumstances of mass return) Percentage of IDPs (disaggregated by sex and age) who report that the movement decision represents their preferences

	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
	- Qualitative (involvement of IDPs in community planning for their needs in the location they decide to settle)

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	**Status of Baghdad's General Population**
For qualitative analysis please see Section III above.	For qualitative analysis please see Section III above.
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**

	Go-and-See Visits: To the extent possible, arrangements have been made for IDP representatives to visit and assess conditions for return or settlement elsewhere	
P3		

	Proposed Framework Metrics:
	- Percentage of IDPs who report that they or their representative have access to visit potential settlement sites before making their decision

	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
	- Qualitative (ability of IDPs to visit potential settlement sites before making their decision)

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	**Status of Baghdad's General Population**

For qualitative analysis please see Section III above.	For qualitative analysis please see Section III above.
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**

P4	**Lack of coercion:** No coercion – including physical force, harassment, intimidation, denial of basic services, or closure of IDP camps or facilities without acceptable alternative – has been used to induce or to prevent return, local integration or settlement elsewhere

Proposed Framework Metrics:
- Percentage of IDPs who report facing a threat of eviction or pressure to leave

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of IDPs who face(d) a threat of eviction or pressure to leave
- Percentage of IDPs who report restrictions on freedom of movement

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	**Status of Baghdad's General Population**
IDPs reported fleeing their place of origin due to: forced displacement from property (48.7 percent); direct threats to life (39.6 percent); armed conflict (37.6 percent); and generalized violence (30.1 percent). The vast majority of IDPs (94.4 percent) reported feeling targeted for belonging to a certain religion or sect.	**Baghdad:** 1 percent decrease in monthly security incidents from December 2008 to January 2009 (from 214 to 212 incidents per month) (UNAMI, 2009).
Prime Minister Order 101, issued in August 2008, gave all squatters in Baghdad one month to vacate any illegal residence. Accompanying PM Order 101 was the Council of Ministers Order 262, which provided 300,000 IQD per month for six months as a rental stipend to IDP families evicted by PM Order 101. By December 2008, evictions were occurring through this order but rental stipends were not distributed.	

In late 2008, ISF bulldozed a small part of Al Batool Complex of Baghdad's Khademiya district when 659 IDP families, who had received an eviction notice, refused to leave. The reason they cited was a lack of reasonable alternative shelter options.	
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
IDPs reported fleeing their place of origin due to: generalized violence (79.6 percent); left out of fear (65.5 percent); direct threats to life (42.8 percent); and less than 5 percent due to armed conflict. A large majority (85.7 percent) reported feeling targeted for: belonging to a certain religion or sect.	**Ninewa:** 8 percent decrease in monthly security incidents from December 2008 to January 2009 (from 221 to 205 incidents per month) (UNAMI, 2009).
Only 2.4 percent of those assessed reported being subjected to eviction pressure from militants, relatives, authorities and other sources.	
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
IDPs reported fleeing their place of origin due to: direct threats to life (95.7 percent); out of fear (4.9 percent); forced from their property (2.0 percent); and less than one percent due to generalized violence and armed conflict. Nearly all (98.4 percent) reported feeling targeted for belonging to a certain religion or sect.	**Basra:** 18 percent increase in monthly security incidents from December 2008 to January 2009 (from 17 to 20 incidents per month) (UNAMI, 2009).
A few evictions and threats of evictions have been reported in Basra. In Abu Al Khaseeb District, a group of IDPs were evicted from government property. In Duor Al Nafut and Al Huseyn neighborhoods, some IDPs have been threatened with eviction due to their inability to pay rent.	

P5	**Role of Government:** National authorities, where appropriate with the support of the international community, have taken appropriate measures to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, to enable IDPs to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country and to facilitate the (re)integration of returned or resettled IDPs
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Percentage of IDPs who report that they are confident the government is acting in their interest - Percentage of IDPs who feel the government plays a key role in their reintegration
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Qualitative

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	
For qualitative analysis please see Section III above.	
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	
Status of Basra's IDP Population	

P6	**Assistance:** National authorities grant and facilitate safe, unimpeded and timely access of humanitarian organizations and other relevant actors to assist IDPs to return, locally integrate or settle elsewhere in the country
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Proportion of humanitarian organizations who report safe, unimpeded, and timely access to IDP communities - Percentage of IDPs who report receiving any humanitarian assistance - Percentage of IDPs who report that (identified key humanitarian actors) have provided assistance to their community - Percentage of IDPs who report that (listed types of humanitarian assistance) are available in the community
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDPs who report receiving any humanitarian assistance - Percentage of IDPs who report that the following actors have provided assistance to their community (relatives; host community; religious group; NGO or UN Agency; MoDM; Iraqi Red Crescent; Other Iraqi Government body) - Percentage of IDPs who report that (health; food; non-food items; sanitation) are available in the community

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
50.4 percent of IDPs assessed in Baghdad reporting receiving humanitarian assistance since their displacement (though it is unclear what percentage of those who did not receive it do require it). Sources included the following: relatives (36.2 percent), religious groups (28.9 percent), humanitarian organization (17.2 percent), host community (16.0 percent), Iraqi Red Crescent (10.9 percent), MoDM (7.3 percent), and other Iraqi government bodies (1.8 percent). 47 percent of aid received is for food, 41 percent for non-food, and eight percent for health.	
When asked from whom they receive food aid, Baghdadis cite religious authorities (25.3 percent), humanitarian organizations (10 percent), national authorities (8.9 percent) and regional authorities (2.7 percent). 60.3 percent do not receive assistance (though it is unclear what percentage of these require it); and 11.5 percent receive assistance from other institutions.	
To IDP families who returned to Al Salam sub-district, Baghdad's city council provided each with seven million Iraqi dinar (US$5,948) in compensation. They remain in need of basic household items and food.	
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	Status of Ninewa's General Population
75 percent of IDPs in Ninewa reported receiving humanitarian assistance since their displacement. Sources included the following: host community (29.5 percent); MoDM (43.2 percent); Iraqi Red Crescent (31.6 percent); Religious groups (29.8 percent); relatives (26.6 percent); and humanitarian agencies (18.5 percent). 67.8 percent of aid received is for food, 60.2 percent for non-food, and 8.5 percent for health.	

Status of Basra's IDP Population	Status of Basra's General Population
54.6 percent of IDPs assessed in Basra reporting receiving humanitarian assistance since their displacement (though it is unclear what percentage of those who did not receive it do require it). Sources included the following: Iraqi Red Crescent (33.9 percent), relatives (22.5 percent), MoDM (22.1 percent), host community (13.5 percent), religious groups (12.0 percent), and humanitarian organization (7.2 percent). 50.3 percent of aid received is for food, 41.5 percent for non-food, and eight percent for other.	

Status of Condition Criteria for Durable Solutions in the Selected Governorates

C1	**Harassment:** Formerly displaced persons do not suffer attacks, harassment, intimidation, persecution or any other form of punitive action upon return to their home communities or settlement in other locations
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Percentage of IDPs who report feeling targeted - Percentage of IDPs who are the victim of attacks or punitive actions - Absolute number of attacks or punitive actions reported by IDPs
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDP family units reporting a death or serious injury of a member since their displacement - Total number of security incidents reported - Anecdotal accounts of violence against returnees
	Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	
	Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	
	Status of Basra's IDP Population	

C2	**Discrimination:** Formerly displaced persons are not subject to discrimination for reasons related to their displacement	
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Percentage of IDPs who report feeling discriminated against for reasons related to their displacement	
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDPs who felt well-received by the host community	
	Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	**Status of Baghdad's General Population**
	In Baghdad, relations between IDPs and host communities differed by wave of displacement. IDPs displaced since February 2006 fled to areas with friends and family of the same sect, and were fairly well received. IDPs displaced in 2003 were often not accepted by the host community. There were cultural clashes as most were from rural areas, and frustration by host communities at IDPs illegally squatting in public buildings in poorer areas.	
	Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
	In areas of Ninewa where IDPs are concentrated in large numbers, they are perceived as the cause of increased rental and local market costs. Some IDPs are involved in the militia activity that continues to render the governorate unstable in some areas, causing more resentment. Despite this, there is generally strong support and assistance provided by the host community to local IDPs. They are generally well accepted in schools and universities as well.	
	Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
	Relations between IDPs and the host community in Basra can be tense. IDPs are also sometimes publicly blamed for such issues as the scarcity of employment or the rising rental costs.	

C3	**Protection:** Formerly displaced persons have full and non-discriminatory access to national and sub-national protection mechanisms, including police and courts	
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Percentage of IDPs who report that they have accessed protection mechanisms, including police and courts - Percentage of IDPs who report feeling safe in their current location	
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDPs who report feeling safe in their current location	
	Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	
	Security has improved significantly since 2006, though it continues to vary by neighborhood in Baghdad, and many checkpoints restrict movement. MNF-I and ISF work closely with MoDM and local councils to protect returnee locations.	
	Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	
	Security in Ninewa worsened during the second half of the year, visible through an increase in kidnappings, assassinations, militia attacks, and generalized violence. Ethnic tensions fuelled these problems and culminated in the killing of tens of Christians in Mosul, which lead to displacement of almost 2000 Christian families to surrounding areas. Although some of these Christians have returned and violence has calmed, many are still too fearful to return, and security remains extremely tense and volatile, particularly in Mosul city.	
	Status of Basra's IDP Population	
	Following a 2008 military operation led by Prime Minister Al-Maliki to remove terrorist elements from Basra, the security situation in the governorate has improved. The security presence remains high, and there are frequent checkpoints. There continues	

to be sporadic reports of violence, including kidnappings and mortar attacks.	

C4	**Documentation:** Formerly displaced persons have access to personal documentation, which typically is needed to access public services, to vote and for administrative purposes

Proposed Framework Metrics:
- Percentage of IDPs who report having documentation necessary for access to public services

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of IDPs who report having documentation necessary for access to public services

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	
IDPs assessed in Baghdad report carrying multiple forms of documentation. The majority carries national certificates (99.6 percent), ID cards (83.0 percent), and birth certificates (65.7 percent). Some also carry marriage documents (41.6 percent), death certificates (22.5 percent), and passports (9.5 percent) (IOM Iraq, 2008a). In order to register in Baghdad, IDP families present documents that prove their place of origin and place of displacement to the local city council. Their registration is then approved by the sector municipal council and the MoDM branch in either Karkh or Rusafa.	
17.3 percent of assessed Baghdadi IDPs who do not have access to Iraq's Public Distribution System attribute it to a delay in transferring their PDS registration to their new location.	
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	
IDPs assessed in Ninewa report carrying multiple forms of documentation. The majority carries national certificates (96 percent), ID cards (98.4 percent), and marriage documents (92.7 percent). Some also carry birth certificates (76.9 percent), death certificates (32.8 percent), and passports (9.6 percent). Only 6.3	

percent of assessed IDPs who do not have access to Iraq's Public Distribution System attribute it to a delay in transferring their PDS registration to their new location	
Status of Basra's IDP Population	
IDPs in Basra report carrying multiple forms of documentation. The majority carries national certificates (98.7 percent), ID cards (97.8 percent), and marriage documents (82.2 percent). Some also carry birth certificates (28.6 percent) and death certificates (11.9 percent). In order to register in Baghdad, IDP families present their PDS ration card, ID card, and proof of residency for their location of displacement.	

C5	**Property:** Formerly displaced persons have access to mechanisms for property restitution or compensation regardless of whether they return or settle in the area where they found refuge or a new location	

	Proposed Framework Metrics:
	  - Percentage of IDPs who report being able to access their property
	  - Percentage of IDPs who report receiving compensation for their property
	  - Percentage of IDPs with access to functioning mechanisms that handle property claims	

	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDPs who report being able to access their property	
	Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	**Status of Baghdad's General Population**
	IDPs assessed in Baghdad reported leaving a variety of property behind, including houses (83.6 percent), apartments (6.7 percent), agricultural land (5.1 percent), and small businesses (2.1 percent). Of those who left property behind, 22.7 percent could access it. 59.4 percent reported that private citizens controlled their property, 32.4 percent reported it destroyed, and 7.6 percent did not know its status.	76 percent of Baghdad's population reported owning their houses, followed by 18 percent who rent and 5 percent who live in public accommodation (WFP VAM, 2008).

Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	Status of Ninewa's General Population
IDPs reported leaving a variety of property behind, including houses (64.9 percent), shops/small businesses (6.1 percent), apartment or room (11.9 percent). Of those who left property behind, 12.9 percent could access it. 4.6 percent reported that private citizens controlled it, 3.7 percent reported it destroyed, and 61.5 percent did not know its status.	86 percent of Ninewa's population reported owning their houses, followed by 12 percent who rent and 3 percent who live in public accommodation (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
IDPs assessed in Basra reported leaving a variety of property behind, including houses (92.2 percent), apartments (3.1 percent), small businesses (2.2 percent), and agricultural land (1.3 percent). Of those who left property behind, 47.3 percent did not know its status. 23.5 percent reported that private citizens controlled their property, 15.2 percent reported it destroyed, and 13.2 percent could access their property.	84 percent of Basra's population reported owning their houses, followed by 10 percent who rent and 6 percent who live in public accommodation (WFP VAM, 2008).

C6	**Standard of Living:** Formerly displaced persons enjoy without discrimination an adequate standard of living, including shelter, health care, food, water and other means of survival
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Percentage of IDPs versus non-IDPs who report being able to access priority needs for an adequate standard of living
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDPs versus non-IDPs who report being able to access priority needs for an adequate standard of living (water, food, health, sanitation, hygiene, shelter, education, access to work, legal help)
	Status of Baghdad's IDP Population
	For IDPs assessed in Baghdad, priority needs include shelter (cited by 86 percent of the population), food (80 percent), and access to work (78 percent).

Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	
Priority needs include access to work (89 percent); legal help (88 percent); and shelter (60 percent).	
Status of Basra's IDP Population	
Priority needs for Basra's IDPs include shelter (99 percent), access to work (97 percent), and food (67 percent).	

FOOD

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of IDPs with access to PDS food rations
- Percentage of IDPs who receive food assistance from other sources

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
IDPs in Baghdad have varying access to PDS. Some have successfully transferred their PDS identification cards, such as in the Al Yousifiya sub-district, but rations when delivered lack items. Some choose not to transfer their PDS cards for fear of eviction, such as IDPs in the Mariam al-Adhra' complex, and make do with what they can buy at market price. Those who cannot afford market prices, such as many IDPs in the Al Ma'amil area of Rusafa district, suffer from malnutrition.	96 percent of Baghdad's households have acceptable food consumption, followed by 3 percent with borderline consumption and 0.6 percent with poor consumption. These figures vary between districts – 6-7 percent of households in Al Sader, Al Madaane, and Rusafa have borderline consumption (WFP VAM, 2008).
Forty percent of Baghdad's IDPs receive food assistance from other sources, including: humanitarian organizations (10 percent); religious charities (25.3 percent); and national authorities (8.9 percent).	
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
IDPs in Alkosh village, Talkeef district, Ninewa, are currently unsupported by PDS rations, carrying their own personal items such as clothes, money and valuables with them. They are reliant upon the support of their families and the local churches for food	71 percent of Ninewa's households have acceptable food consumption, followed by 18 percent with borderline consumption and 10 percent with poor consumption. These figures vary between districts, from 94 percent

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and non-food items.	acceptable in Mosul to 39 percent poor in Al Baache (WFP VAM, 2008).
Seventy percent of Ninewa's IDPs receive food assistance from other sources, including: humanitarian organizations (34.8 percent); religious charities (30.3 percent); and regional and national authorities (6 and 10.5 percent, respectively).	

Status of Basra's IDP Population	Status of Basra's General Population
IDPs in Basra report delays in transferring their PDS cards (53 percent), and, due to transportation costs, limited access to their original governorates. 60.6 percent of IDP families do not access PDS at all, 33.4 percent access it always, and 6.1 percent are only sometimes able to access it. Those without access to PDS are especially impacted by the high market prices on such food items as fresh produce.	98 percent of Basra's households have acceptable food consumption, followed by 2 percent with borderline consumption and 0 percent with poor consumption. All districts have high acceptable rates and no one with poor consumption rates (WFP VAM, 2008).
Fifty percent of Basra's IDPs receive food assistance from other sources, including: humanitarian organizations (18.6 percent); religious charities (16.0 percent); and regional and national authorities (1.4 and 1.1 percent, respectively).	

WATER/SANITATION

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
   - Percentage of IDPs with regular access to water
   - Percentage of IDPs with access to toilets

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
88 percent of Baghdad's IDP population has regular access to water, the majority through municipal sources (underground pipes). A small percentage access water through open/broken pipes or tanking/trucks, and even fewer through public wells or rivers, such as IDPs in Al Yousifiya sub-district in Baghdad. Sewage is also lacking in some districts, such as in part of Istiqlal district, while in	89 percent of Baghdad's population has continuous availability of drinking water, 96 percent of whom access it through the general network. This ranges by district – in Mahmoudia and Al Madaane, 27 and 35 percent of households respectively have continuous access to water. Across Baghdad, 99.8 percent of households report toilets

others, the sewage network is damaged and mixes with the water network.	as their sanitation type (0.2 percent reported holes) (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
66 percent of IDPs in Ninewa report access to water, the majority of these (92 percent) access from general network. 51.5 percent access water from water tanks/trucks; 11.4 percent from wells. A small percentage access water through open pipes and rivers, lakes or streams. 98 percent of IDPs have access to sanitation facilities.	71 percent of Ninewa's households have continuous availability of drinking water, 96 percent of whom access it through the general network. These range by district, from Al Baache where 27 percent of households have continuous access to water (none by general network) to Tilkeaf where 100 percent of households have continuous access to water (all by general network). 95 percent of households report toilets as their sanitation type (3 percent reported holes and 1 percent reported none) (WFP VAM, 2008).
Water networks across Ninewa are in disrepair. The networks in neighborhoods such as Al-Sa'as and Hay Al-Khazraj in Mosul district have been damaged by heavy military vehicles operating in urban areas. Neither neighborhood has a sewage system in place, and families are disposing of sewage in holes dug nearby their households, posing an immediate contamination risk.	
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
Nearly all (97.3 percent) of Basra's IDPs access municipal water (underground pipes), however many report that the quality is low (salty or brackish). 10 percent depend on water trucks, 3.9 percent on rivers and streams, and 1.7 percent on broken pipes. Water from rivers and broken pipes is at risk of contamination, and has caused health complications. 96 percent of IDPs have access to toilets.	97.6 percent of Basra's population has continuous availability of drinking water (the district with the lowest access is Shat Al Arab with 87 percent). 99.7 percent of households report toilets as their sanitation type (0.3 percent reported holes) (WFP VAM, 2008).
SHELTER	

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of IDPs with access to shelter

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
The majority of IDPs (72.8 percent) live in rented housing; while 12.5 percent live with relatives or host families. In the Karkh district's Beer Alewi complex, 206 IDP families live in mud homes with no protection from the elements. IDP families in Khademiya district's Al Imam al-Hassan complex live in caravans previously used by the Iraqi army before 2003. Since it is government land, they have been threatened with eviction. IDP families returning to Baghdad's Al Salam sub district found their houses destroyed by militias. Those who returned to intact homes have supported other families as possible.	76 percent of Baghdad's population reported owning their houses, followed by 18 percent who rent and 5 percent who live in public accommodation (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
The majority of IDPs (78.2 percent) live in rented housing; however, rising rental prices are leading to increased evictions. Much of the rest of the population live with relatives or host families (14.7 percent).	86 percent of Ninewa's population reported owning their houses, followed by 12 percent who rent and 3 percent who live in public accommodation (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
IDPs live in the following conditions: rented housing (61.2 percent); with relatives or host family (21.3 percent); or in public building (13.5 percent – much higher than the national average of four percent).	84 percent of Basra's population reported owning their houses, followed by 10 percent who rent and 6 percent who live in public accommodation (WFP VAM, 2008).
FUEL AND ELECTRICITY	

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of IDPs with access (can afford) to fuel
- Percentage of IDPs with access to electricity

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
58.3 percent of Baghdad's assessed IDP population has access to electricity for four or more hours a day. 40.7 percent has access for 1-3 hours, and 0.9 percent has no access. In some areas, IDPs	60 percent of Baghdad's population has access to electricity, with less than 15 hours cut in the last week. 40 percent had more than 16 hours cut in the last week, and

access electricity illegally by attaching cables to the network, which is dangerous and increases tension with local authorities. In Baghdad, the majority (86.7 percent) of the assessed IDP population has access to some type of fuel.	0.2 percent has no access (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
Maintenance to electrical infrastructure in Mosul district, reduced the access that most families have to electricity to about 4-6 hours a day. 51.8 percent report having access to electricity for this time period, while 41.8 percent had 1-3 hours access and 4.9 percent no electricity at all. Families were forced to compensate with private generators in the meantime. 75.2 percent reported having no access to fuel.	63 percent of Ninewa's population has access to electricity, with less than 15 hours cut in the last week. 34 percent had more than 16 hours cut in the last week, and 2 percent has no access. This varies by district, with the least access in Al Baache and Sinchar (99 and 92 percent respectively with more than 16 hours cut in the last week) (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
69.7 percent of Baghdad's assessed IDP population has access to electricity for 1-3 hours a day. 28.4 percent has no access, and only 0.1 percent has access for more than four hours a day. Authorities are strict on illegal electrical wiring. In terms of fuel, the majority (91.3 percent) has access to some type of fuel.	99.5 percent of Basra's population has access to electricity, with less than 10 hours cut in the last week. This varies little by district; Al Qurna has the least access with 77 percent of households experiencing less than 6 hours cut in a week, and 22 percent 6-10 hours cut in a week (WFP VAM, 2008).

HEALTH

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
  - Percentage of IDPs with access to health care services in the area

Status of Iraq's General Population
Shi'a: perception of availability of medical care in the neighborhood is: 6 percent very good; 25 percent quite good; 38 percent quite bad; and 31 percent very bad. **Sunni** perception of availability of medical care in their neighborhood is: 4 percent very good; 18 percent quite good; 37 percent quite bad; and 40 percent very bad. **Kurd** perception of availability of medical care in their neighborhood is: 27 percent very good; 41 percent quite good; 25 percent quite bad; and 6 percent very bad. (UNDP ABC Polls 2008).

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
93 percent of assessed IDPs have access to health care services. Reasons for lack of access include that it is not available (4.5 percent) and financial constraints (1.0 percent). 82.8 percent were visited by a health worker in the past 30 days, and 91 percent have participated in a vaccination campaign.	Number of primary healthcare clinics: 154 (WHO MOH Monthly reports 2006) Under five mortality rate: 35/1000 live births (UNICEF MICS 2006)
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
93 percent of assessed IDPs have access to healthcare services. Reasons for lack of access include that it is too distant to access (3.4 percent); that it is not available (2.3 percent); and financial constraints (1.2 percent). 60 percent said they could not access the medicines they need and 50.3 percent have not participated in a vaccination campaign. 47 percent report being visited by a health worker in the past 30 days.	Number of primary healthcare clinics: 132 (WHO MOH Monthly reports 2006) Under five mortality rate: 43/1000 live births (UNICEF MICS 2006)
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
90 percent of assessed IDPs have access to health care services. Reasons for lack of access include that it is financial constraints (6.6 percent) and too distant (4.0 percent). 57.5 percent were visited by a health worker in the past 30 days, and 60.3 percent have participated in a vaccination campaign.	Number of primary healthcare clinics: 84 (WHO MOH Monthly reports 2006) Under five mortality rate: 34/1000 live births (UNICEF MICS 2006)

EDUCATION

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of school age IDP boys in the group/family who attend school
- Percentage of school age IDP girls in the group/family attend school

Status of Iraq's General Population

Net primary school attendance rate: rural (77.7 percent); urban (91.1 percent). By gender, rural females (68.4 percent); rural males (86.7 percent); urban males (93.8 percent); urban females (81.9 percent) (UNICEF MICS 2006).

For all Iraq, of children 6-14 years of age who attend school (92 percent), 2 percent did not attend school regularly for a variety

of reasons, including security (23 percent), illness (17 percent), distance to school (8 percent), and lack of funds to afford the costs (7 percent). 8 percent of students dropped out of school for reasons ranging from lack of funds to afford the costs (22 percent) to security (16 percent) (WFP VAM, 2008).

For all Iraq, there is a 17.6 percent illiteracy rate for household members over 10 years of age. Disaggregated by gender, the illiteracy rate is 10.7 percent for males and 24.5 for females. (WFP VAM, 2008).

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
For both IDP boys and girls who did not attend school in Baghdad, a lack of money was the primary reason (88.3 and 91.3 percent). Distance was also a barrier (for 2.2 percent of boys and 1.8 percent of girls), as well as a lack of documents (0.4 percent of boys and 0.1 percent of girls). Work prevented 5.8 percent of boys from attending school, many of who are orphaned or belong to female-headed households.	In Baghdad, of children 6-14 years of age who attend school (92 percent), 4 percent did not attend school regularly for a variety of reasons, including security (39 percent) and unpaid household or farm work (12 percent). 5.4 percent of students dropped out of school for reasons ranging from security (27.5 percent) to distance (9.3 percent) and lack of money (8.2 percent) (WFP VAM, 2008). 9.6 percent illiteracy rate for household members over 10 years of age. Disaggregated by gender, the illiteracy rate is 5.7 percent for males and 13.7 for females. (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	Status of Ninewa's General Population
Reasons reported for boy and girl children of IDP families not attending school in Ninewa include language problems (45.8 and 31.7 percent); cultural/religious constraints (22.4 and 2.2 percent); work (12.5 and 18.4 percent) and lack of money (7.5 and 31.6 percent).	In Ninewa, of children 6-14 years of age who attend school (close to 90 percent), 1 percent did not attend school regularly for a variety of reasons – the most cited is other (60 percent), distance is cited by 4 percent and security by 1 percent. Of those who have dropped out (7 percent) – security and lack of money are the most cited reasons (26 and 25 percent respectively) (WFP VAM, 2008).

Status of Basra's IDP Population	Status of Basra's General Population
	21 percent illiteracy rate for household members over 10 years of age. Disaggregated by gender, the illiteracy rate is 12 percent for males and 30 for females (WFP VAM, 2008).
For 32.7% of IDP families, all boys attended school, while all girls attended school for 25.7% of families. For IDP boys in Basra, work was the primary reason for not attending school (78 percent), followed by lack of money (14.6 percent). For IDP girls, lack of money was the primary reason (78.5 percent), followed by distance/lack of transport (5.2 percent), and lack of documents (2.9 percent).	In Basra, of children 6-14 years of age who attend school (93 percent), 0.3 percent did not attend school regularly for a variety of reasons – the most cited is security (58 percent). 7.3 percent of students dropped out of school for reasons ranging from security (26.3 percent) to lack of money (25.4 percent) and unpaid or farm work (8.8 percent) (WFP VAM, 2008). 14.5 percent illiteracy rate for household members over 10 years of age. Disaggregated by gender, the illiteracy rate is 10.8 percent for males and 18.5 for females (WFP VAM, 2008).

EMPLOYMENT

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of IDP groups/families who have at least one member who has a job that brings income currently

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
Of assessed IDPs in Baghdad, 60.1 percent of families reported that no family member was working. This is especially a challenge for female-headed households, who have trouble finding income sources and 'are more likely to be poor, to live in unhealthy or unsafe conditions, and to have insufficient food to eat.	Unemployment rate of 14.5 percent and under-employment rate of 27.3 percent (UNDP and COSIT/World Bank, 2008). Reasons for unemployment include: illness/aging (58 percent) and no chance of work (22 percent). At a governorate level, security was cited as a reason for 6 percent of unemployment, but for 17 percent in the Rusafa district (WFP VAM, 2008).

Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	Status of Ninewa's General Population
Of assessed IDPs in Ninewa, 81.8 percent report that none of the family members have a job. Arab and Turkmen IDPs report particular difficulty in finding work. In the Mosul district, access for IDP women in this area is improving, as some earn an income by baking bread in their homes to sell to local workers.	Unemployment rate of 20.9 percent and under-employment rate of 35.7 percent (UNDP and COSIT/World Bank 2008). Reasons for unemployment include: illness/aging (46 percent) and no chance of work (40 percent at the governorate level, ranging from 24 percent in Al Qurna district to 65 percent in Al Fawo district) (WFP VAM, 2008).
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**
86.4 percent of families reported that no family member was working. Some IDPs are able to find non-skilled jobs in oil and local agricultural cultivation. Those dependent on agriculture are impacted by the lack of access to water – which when available is highly salty.	Unemployment rate of 18.8 percent and under-employment rate of 21.5 percent (UNDP and COSIT/World Bank, 2008). Reasons for unemployment include: illness/aging (42 percent), no chance of work (32 percent), and didn't find a suitable job (16 percent) (WFP VAM, 2008).

C7	**Family Reunification:** Formerly displaced persons have been able to reunite with family members if they choose to do so

Proposed Framework Metrics:
- Percentage of IDPs who report being able to reunite with family members
- Percentage of IDP families that are separated for reasons related to their displacement/lack of reintegration
- Percentage of IDPs who report that they have family members still unaccounted for

Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data:
- Percentage of IDPs who report that they have family members still unaccounted for

Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	Status of Baghdad's General Population
Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**

C8	**Political Participation:** Formerly displaced persons are able to exercise the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs	
	Proposed Framework Metrics: - Percentage of IDPs who are registered to vote in local/national elections - Percentage of IDPs who voted in local/national elections - Percentage of IDPs who report being able to join associations and groups, and participate in community affairs	
	Metrics Linked to Available Iraq Data: - Percentage of IDPs registered to vote in local and national elections - Percentage of IDPs who voted in local/national elections	
	Status of Baghdad's IDP Population	**Status of Baghdad's General Population**
	At that national level, less than 3 percent of the displaced population participated in the provincial elections in February 2009 (Boonstra, 2009).	
	Status of Ninewa's IDP Population	**Status of Ninewa's General Population**
	Status of Basra's IDP Population	**Status of Basra's General Population**