THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS:

THE SALAFI TURN TO PARTY POLITICS IN EGYPT

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INTRODUCTION

In Egypt's November 2011–January 2012 balloting, political parties belonging to the ultraconservative Salafi movement captured 25 percent of the vote in the country's first free parliamentary elections in decades. For many observers, the only thing more surprising than the size of the Salafis' victory was the Salafis' decision to establish political parties to contest the elections in the first place. Salafis typically condemn parliaments as usurping God's role as lawmaker and decry party politics as violating the Qur'anic command not to split into factions.[1]

The fact that some Salafis have embraced parliamentary politics in Egypt is neither new nor unprecedented in the region. However, their support for political participation has waxed and waned with their changing perceptions of the fairness of elections and the risks of sitting on the sidelines. In examining these shifting views, one can see that many of Egypt's Salafis, especially in the wake of Hosni Mubarak's fall, have accepted parliamentary party politics for a specific reason: they believe the benefit of shaping the nature and activity of Egypt's new government would outweigh the cost of compromising their principles and leaving the work to their competitors, which include secularists and less conservative Islamists. Similar calculations will likely be made when there are open and fair elections in other Muslim-majority countries that have large Salafi populations with institutional clout they wish to protect. Such political participation has reduced, and may continue to reduce, the appeal of jihadi Salafis and their message of violent government overthrow. In this way, the United States' interests may be best served when the electoral tent is as wide as possible in these countries.

DEFINING SALAFISM

Salafism is not new to Egypt. Some of the first avowedly "Salafi" bookstores and magazines in the Middle East were established in Egypt in the early twentieth century, when the movement began. Indeed, the powerful Egyptian Salafi institution, Ansar al-Sunna, was established in 1926, two years before the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, considered the archetypal Islamist group.[2] (A fraternal order, the Brotherhood is relatively inclusive on questions of law and dogma, so its ranks include Salafis as well as less conservative Islamists.[3])

Salafism is notoriously difficult to define because its practitioners prefer to say what it is not rather than what it is. Broadly speaking, Salafism is the method of modeling one's thought and behavior on Muhammad and the first three generations of Muslims, called the "forefathers" (*salaf*).[4] Consequently, Salafis refuse to exclusively follow the legal rulings of one of the four Sunni schools of law, although they revere the ninth-century founder of the Hanbali school of law, Ahmad bin Hanbal, and adhere to his theological teachings. (Ibn Hanbal opposed rationalist speculation on the nature of God.) Ibn Hanbal's legacy received a strong ideological boost from the Damascene scholar Ibn Taymiyya in the fourteenth century, who skillfully elaborated the school's doctrines and refuted its critics.

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Four hundred years later, in the eighteenth century, Ibn Taymiyya's elaboration of Hanbali theology was operationalized politically by Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab when he excommunicated the tribes in Arabia that refused his religious message. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's political partners, the Saudi family, used the tribes' rejection as justification to conquer the Arabian Peninsula and establish the first Saudi state. Since that time, outsiders have employed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's name to label the current Saudi state's conservative form of Islam as "Wahhabi," though adherents of the religious vision refer to themselves as "monotheists" or, increasingly, "Salafis." Given that there is so much affinity between Salafism and Wahhabism, it is little wonder that the two have become virtually synonymous, particularly since Saudi money and institutions have promoted Salafi scholarship throughout the world.

There was a time in the early twentieth century when Salafism engaged with modernity and sought to Islamicize it in the same way that the Muslim Brotherhood has done. But after World War I, the urgency to do so faded, with the end of European colonialism, the rising cultural confidence of Muslim conservatives fueled by Gulf money, and the success of the conservative Saudi state. All this invigorated the purist genes embedded in Salafism's Hanbali DNA.[5] (Ibn Hanbal and his successors routinely denounced the introduction of "foreign" elements into Islam, such as Greek learning and folk traditions, and drew sharp lines between those who adhered to their creed and those who did not.) Today, Salafis take particular pride in doggedly denouncing any ideology that might be a Western import, though they embrace many Western technological innovations, like the Internet, and organizational advancements, such as universities.

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To Run or Not to Run: Salafis, Party Politics, and Parliamentary Elections

One element of modernity has faced particular criticism from Salafis: parliamentary democracy. Most Salafis either view it as a sham (which is not far from the truth, historically, in the Arab world) or antithetical to Islam because it allows humans to usurp God's role as lawmaker. Yet some revered Salafis like Ahmad Shakir and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani have had a differing opinion, arguing that while it is an evil, it is sometimes a

necessary one if Salafis can elect God-fearing candidates who will prevent a greater harm of a secular state and will push for the establishment of an Islamic one.[6] Shakir and al-Albani each reached their conclusions in the context of relatively free parliamentary contests in 1940s Egypt and 1990s Algeria, respectively.

For many Salafis, therefore, the less of a sham parliamentary democracy is the more necessary it becomes to take part in the electoral process. Thus, when Kuwait held parliamentary elections in the 1980s, some Salafis abandoned their opposition to parliamentary politics in a bid to shape the way in which the state would be governed and offset the influence of the secularists and modernist Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood.[7] At their head was Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, an Egyptian who resettled in Kuwait and established the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society. The society supports the most powerful Salafi political association in Kuwait (political parties are not allowed) and regularly helps elect candidates to office. In several influential books, Abd al-Khaliq has urged his fellow Salafis in Kuwait and across the Muslim world to embrace parliamentary politics as a necessary evil to ensure that they have a voice in government.[8]

The same rationale that has led some Salafis to engage in politics in Kuwait exists in Egypt, but even more so. Whereas Kuwaiti Salafis can only seek control of the legislature and cannot form the executive branch or end Kuwait's monarchy, Egyptian Salafis can compete within all branches of government and be in a position to help write a new constitution. Many Egyptian Salafis could not countenance leaving the task of remaking the state to the secularists or the Muslim Brotherhood.

Even before the Egyptian revolution, though, some prominent Egyptian Salafis had either dabbled in politics or were reconsidering their decision to stay out of parliamentary elections. The popular Salafi Hazim Salah Abu Isma`il successfully ran for parliament in 2005, with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Egyptian government overturned the results of the election (the Egyptian election commission also recently blocked his candidacy for president). In 2010, there were reports that Yasir Burhami, a leader of the powerful Salafi Call Society headquartered in Alexandria, and some of his followers had considered putting forward Salafi candidates for the parliamentary elections of that

year. This was consistent with the position of the Salafi Call just before the revolution, which softened its stance on participating in elections over the last decade after having forbidden it in 1987, on the grounds that parliaments are contrary to Islam.[9]

Still, many in the Salafi Call's leadership were ambivalent or hostile to participating in elections in the years leading up to the revolution. In 2009, one of the Salafi Call's founding members, Muhammad Isma`il al-Muqaddam, voiced the concern of many senior Egyptian Salafi leaders that participating in parliament is harmful because, by its nature, it requires compromising one's beliefs: "Politics is based on interests and does not know principles. It knows the Machiavelli principle: the end justifies the means." Muqaddam argued that having to adjust their values and take part in political horse-trading would damage the Salafis' integrity, which is the source of their power in society. (Non-involvement in politics also had the benefit of earning Salafis the benign neglect of the Mubarak regime.) Muqaddam further argued that parliamentary politics since independence have been a sham. Nevertheless, he refused to condemn Salafis who advocated for participating in parliamentary elections, arguing that they have arrived at a different opinion based on their careful reading of the texts and their consideration of the public good. Muqaddam also envisioned changing his mind if circumstances were to change in Egypt.[10] And change they have.

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In recent years, Salafis in Egypt have shown themselves to be politically savvy. Most Egyptian Salafi leaders refused to call for Mubarak's ouster, either voicing their strong support of him, remaining silent on the issue, or, in the case of the Salafi Call, issuing cautious pronouncements that the popular uprising that began on January 25, 2011 undermined the security of the country.[11] Having benefited from Mubarak's benign neglect, the Salafis had a lot to lose if they turned against him and he managed to remain in power. After the fall of Mubarak, though, many of these same leaders began organizing political parties. At their head was the Salafi Call, which, despite the hesitation of some of its leading lights like Muqaddam, founded the Nur Party. The publicly articulated rationale for doing so was so that secularists would not dominate the political field. The more private but no less urgent rationale was so that their Islamist competitors, the Muslim Brotherhood, would not dictate terms in the post-Mubarak era.[12] The competition between the Brotherhood and the three Salafi political parties—Nur, Asala, and Building and Development—and, specifically, the Brotherhood's attempt to dominate the candidate lists ultimately led to the collapse of an electoral alliance they had formed with each other.[13] The Salafi parties subsequently joined forces in their own "Alliance for Egypt."[14]

The Salafi parties are formidable, drawing their support from charitable institutions with broad geographical reach, popular satellite channels, and deep pockets that are allegedly filled with Gulf petrodollars (estimated by one analyst at $1 billion).[15] One particularly influential source of largesse is the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, the Kuwaiti organization that spurred Kuwait's Salafis to embrace parliamentary politics. The society was the subject of some controversy recently when news reports revealed that it had donated $19 million to Ansar al-Sunna, the Egyptian Salafi institution mentioned above that has strong ties to the Salafi Call.[16] (Critics charged that foreigners were influencing the Egyptian elections.) Abd al-Khaliq, the founder of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, has also claimed to have been instrumental in pushing Salafis in Egypt after the revolution to form political parties.[17] At the very least, he is highly esteemed by many influential Egyptian Salafi clerics, some of whom sit on Ansar al-Sunna's Shura Council. In March 2011, the council endorsed Salafi participation in the country's parliamentary elections, a pivotal moment in mass Salafi politics in Egypt.[18] The Salafi parties won 123 of the 498 seats contested (almost 25 percent), with Nur taking the largest share at 107.

Abd al-Khaliq and the Salafis who agree with him have been criticized by the numerically-superior but politically-quietist Salafis in the region, as well by the small minority of so-called jihadi Salafis—Salafis who believe that violence is the best way to establish an Islamic state. Like their quietest Salafi counterparts, jihadis believe Muslims should not be involved in parliaments and party politics. But this does not mean they all completely reject democracy; many believe in electing rulers and representatives to make sure those rulers implement Islamic law properly.[19] Nevertheless, jihadi-Salafi ideologues have been at pains recently to explain to their followers why Salafis should not get involved in politics when the stakes are so high and the elections are so free, at least in Egypt. Many of the most pointed

questions are posted online by Egyptian jihadi Salafis, who now find their loyalties divided between their no-longer quietist shaykhs and their jihadi shaykhs.[20] To assuage these concerns, jihadi-Salafi scholars like Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti have gone so far as to sanction participation in the Nur Party as long as participation is confined to missionary activities, and does not entail voting or standing for office.[21] (He has even conceded that secularists do not want to create totalitarian governments under the guise of democracy and that true parliamentary governments are better than those that are authoritarian.[22])

The Salafi approval of parliamentary democracy in the wake of the Arab uprisings is not without its own complications when it comes to violence. Abd al-Khaliq's role in the Salafi turn to parliamentary politics in Egypt has been hailed by many (including this author) as a positive step toward discrediting the methods of violent Salafi groups like al-Qa'ida. Yet his Revival of Islamic Heritage Society was designated a terrorist-funding organization in 2008 by the United States for bankrolling al-Qa'ida and other Sunni Islamist terrorist groups.[23] In a similar vein, onetime al-Qa'ida associates now play a prominent role in Libyan politics after Muammar Qadhafi's fall. Furthermore, the Islamic Group, some of whose members in 1981 were responsible for assassinating former President Anwar Sadat and which terrorized Egypt in the 1990s and mercilessly criticized the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for participating in elections that were obviously rigged against them, founded a political party, Building and Development. The party, part of the Salafi Alliance for Egypt, won thirteen seats in the lower house of parliament in the recent elections. Such contradictions will no doubt multiply as the fight against authoritarian Arab governments shifts from the battlefield to the ballot box.

POSITIONS OF SALAFI PARTIES

Complications abound, too, when it comes to Salafis' political positions, which do not necessarily reflect the desires of their supporters or walk in lockstep with one another. Although Nur holds that the "principles of the Islamic Shari'a are the primary source of legislation" (this was the standard formulation in Article 2 of Egypt's constitution under Mubarak) and wants "democracy in the framework of the Islamic Shari'a," many of its positions align with some universal democratic principles:

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separate judicial, executive, and legislative branches; freedom to form political parties and elect rulers and representatives; free speech and association;[24] and economic privatization.[25] As for non-Muslims, Nur says they should be governed by their own religious doctrines and strictures when it comes to "personal status laws" (family matters like marriage and divorce).[26] But perhaps most surprising, in his interview with Al Jazeera, the party's head, Imad Abd al-Ghafur, said that women should not be forced to wear a veil.[27] Abd al-Ghafur has also stated that Copts and women should be allowed to run for any political office, even the presidency, because the Egyptian Constitution treats them as equals of Muslim men.[28]

The smaller Salafi parties—the Asala Party and the Islamic Group's Building and Development Party—make clear in their platforms that they share Nur's desire for a parliamentary system, a separation of powers, free speech, and economic privatization. Like Nur, Asala characterizes Shari'a as the "primary source" for legislation and allows for non-Muslims to be governed by their own personal status laws.[29] But it goes beyond Nur by proclaiming "the right of the people to delimit the laws and principles by which they are governed so long as they do not contradict the Islamic Shari'a."[30] The Building and Development Party goes even further in its platform, accusing the Mubarak regime of having fostered secularism by making Shari'a merely the primary source of law rather than the law itself. It therefore calls on the new parliament to codify the laws of Shari'a so that they can be implemented. The party assures non-Muslims and women that this will not violate their rights but does not offer specifics how those rights will be protected.[31]

On foreign policy issues, all three parties want closer ties with African nations, particularly their neighbors. Nur's platform wants Egypt's overall foreign policy to be peaceful and based on "mutual respect and equal relationships."[32] As for Israel, the Asala Party, the smallest of the three Salafi parties, is the most emphatic in its desire to repeal Egypt's peace treaty with it.[33] (Some Asala's founders were the most active Salafis in the protests against the Mubarak regime[34] and its base is among the most radical.[35]) Conversely, the Nur Party's official spokesman has stated that the party will respect Egypt's treaty with Israel, even though such a stance is likely unpopular with its base.[36] None of the parties'

platforms express overt hostility to the United States but opinions in the parties vary according to who is asked and what issue is at stake. The head of the Nur Party has stated that it would honor Egypt's security agreements with the United States and other countries.[37]

Just as the parties can sometimes be at odds with the politics of their base, they can also be at odds with the religious sensibilities of their members, even the most prominent. For example, the Nur Party's previous spokesman, Yusri Hammad, has said the Copts cannot be given any ministerial position that gives them authority over Muslims, and women can only have portfolios that have to do with other women.[38] Yasir Burhami, one of the Nur Party's founders, wants to see the implementation of criminal punishments mentioned in the Qur'an, such as severing a thief's hand in some instances[39] (though he does not want replicate Saudi Arabia's virtue police).[40] The fact that the Nur Party is willing to ally itself with secular parties over the objections of people like Burhami[41] indicates the party's real intentions are neither uniform nor immune to compromise. In other words, Salafi parliamentarians and party members are engaging in normal politics, competing with one another and with Egypt's other political parties.

CONCLUSION

Pragmatic political maneuverings do not sit well with Salafi quietists, who argue that Salafism's social capital derives from its words and deeds being consistent with its ultraconservative principles.[42] Politics is anathema to jihadi Salafis, who believe "polytheistic" systems of government should be overthrown, not ignored or validated through political participation. But for politically-engaged Salafis in Arab countries like Egypt, where a corrupt government has fallen and the country has not descended into civil war, the jihadi approach is irrelevant and the quietist approach is irresponsible. The hated regime is gone and sitting out elections means leaving the political field to the Salafis' competitors. This calculation may change as circumstances change, which would be unfortunate since Salafis in parliament will help diversify the politics of the movement. Political participation would be a further reminder that one of the world's supposedly most-inflexible religious ideologies is subject to emendation and accommodation when its adherents have an opportunity to govern.

This is not to say that Salafis will become socially liberal; their political power rests on their social conservatism.

This is why the argument by some analysts, like Georgetown University's Jonathan Brown, that Egypt's Salafis will substantially moderate their positions on social issues if elected may not come to fruition.[43] It is true that the main Salafi party, Nur, has adjusted some important aspects of its vision to attract votes, such as forswearing the use of state power to force women to wear headscarves. But if Salafis go too far down this path—a prerequisite for achieving an electoral majority in Egypt—they will alienate their base. The fact that there is already a big tent Islamist party in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, makes it even less likely that they will try. Instead, it is more likely that they will agitate in parliament for curtailing the rights of women, religious minorities, and the irreligious (in all senses of the word). As for national security and economic issues, Egyptian Salafis have not shown themselves to be much different than Egyptian politicians of other stripes, despite their ultraconservative social views. Those views, therefore, should not discourage other countries from finding common cause with Egypt's Salafis in these areas.

Of greatest concern to the United States and other countries targeted by al-Qa'ida is the fact that the political success of Salafis in Egypt has empowered people who share al-Qa'ida's worldview and support its methods of political change. But the flip side to this is that the more Salafis feel that parliamentary politics are an effective way to achieve their goals the less attractive violent alternatives will be. Indeed, groups like al-Qa'ida have counted on U.S. hostility to Islamist groups to bolster their cause. That al-Qa'ida's head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, recently worried aloud that the United States was no longer driven by such fears is a testament to the threat to al-Qa'ida's agenda such a shift in U.S. policy would represent,[44] at least in stable Muslim countries. The United States can diminish the appeal of violence for Salafis in those countries by encouraging their rulers to create more democratic venues of governance and to curtail illicit means of political change.[45] These two objectives—promoting democracy and weakening militant Islamists—are not always easy to reconcile, as witnessed after Hamas's electoral success in 2006. Nevertheless, the pragmatism demonstrated by Egypt's Salafis should help restore balance to the scales of democratic reform and national security in policymakers' minds—scales that fear has tipped toward national security since the late 1970s.

[1.] The verse in the Quran is: "And be ye not as those who separated and disputed after the clear proofs had come unto them. For such there is an awful doom." Quran, 3:105 (Pickthall translation; http://tanzil.net).

[2.] Definitions vary, but scholars typically define the modern political movement "Islamism" by its goal of establishing an Islamic state. For a useful discussion, see Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (London: Routledge, 2007).

[3.] Several years ago, Marc Lynch noted the growing influence of Salafi youth in the Brotherhood. See his "Young Brothers in Cyberspace," *Middle East Report,* Winter 2007, available at <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer245/young-brothers-cyberspace>.

[4.] For an overview of Salafi thought, see Bernard Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," *Global Salafism* (2009): pp. 33–50.

[5.] For a thorough account of Salafism's changing outlook, see Henri Lauzière, "The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the Life and Thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali" (PhD Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2008).

[6.] Ahmad Shakir, *Al-Kitab wa'l-sunna yajib an yakuna masdar al-qawanin fi Misr* (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Salafiyya, 1407 AH / 1986 CE), pp. 40-1; "Ajwibat al-`allama al-Albani `ala as'ilat Jabhat al-Inqadh – al-Jaza'ir," *Majallat al-Asala* 4 (1993): p. 20.

[7.] Nathan Brown suggests that Kuwait's Salafis might be an analogue for politically-engaged Salafis in Egypt. See Nathan Brown, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success," *The Carnegie Papers*, January 2012, p. 17, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/brotherhood_success.pdf>.

[8.] For example, see his *Mashru`iyyat al-dukhul ila al-majalis al-tashri`iyya* (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Imam al-Dhahabi, 1992 or 1993). Abd al-Khaliq and the Revival Society may also have had something to do with the decision of Pakistan's Salafis, the Ahl-e Hadith, to start a political party in the 1980s. See "A Response to the Unjust, Deceptive and Slanderous Allegations Made Against Markazi Jami'at Ahle Hadith UK," Umm-ul-Qura, August 2008,pp. 6-10, available at <http://www.umm-ul-qura.org/info/uploads/userpics/dba/In%20Defence%20of%20MJAH.pdf>.

[9.] Hussam al-Wakil, "Anba' `an khawd al-salafiyin intikhabat majlis al-sha`b ba`d mubadarat 'rafd al-dimuqratiyya,'" *al-Dustur*, February 16, 2010, available at <http://www.dostor.org/politics/alexandria/10/february/15/6578>.

[10.] Muhammad Isma`il al-Muqaddam, "Tariq al-barlaman al-ra'y wa'l-ra'y al-akhir," Transcript of Lecture, n.d., available at <http://audio.islamweb.net/audio/index.php?page=FullContent&audioid=163387>. The transcript of the lecture is not dated but excerpts of it were posted to online Salafi forums in 2009: <http://alsalfy.com/vb/showthread.php?t=812>.

[11.] Qasim Qusayr, "Al-Tayyarat al-salafiyya fi Misr: fawz rasikh…am hala `abira?" *Al-Safir*, December 29, 2011, available at <http://www.assafir.com/WeeklyArticle.aspx?EditionId=2038&WeeklyArticleId=86298&ChannelId=11422>; "Ahmad Zaghlul Shalata yarsud mawaqif wa tahawwulat shuyukh al-salafiyyin athna' wa ba`d al-thawra," ElMogaz.com, January 30, 2012, available at <http://www.elmogaz.com/node/12651>.

[12.] For background on the pre-election competition between the Alexandrian Salafis and the Brotherhood, see Muhammad Sahwan, "Li-madha al-sira` bayn al-Ikhwan wa'l-salafiyyin `ala maqa`id al-barlaman?" *Sada al-Buhayra* November 20, 2011, available at <http://www.sadabh.com/print.aspx?id=2861>. For a fuller explanation of when and why the Brotherhood and Salafi political parties are likely to bump heads, see Nathan Brown, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success."

[13.] Maggie Michael, "Egypt's Radical Salafis Approach Secular Rivals," Associated Press, January 14, 2012.

[14.] Ahmad al-Khatib, et al, "Al-Islamiyyun yatahalafun didd al-Ikhwan," *Al-Masry al-Youm*, November 15, 2011, available at <http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=314050&IssueID=2289>.

[15.] Qasim Qusayr, "Al-Tayyarat al-salafiyya fi misr: fawz rasikh…am hala `abira?"

[16.] Habib Toumi, "Kuwait Denies Funding Egyptian Salafi Group," Gulfnews.com, January 3, 2012, available at <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-denies-funding-egyptian-salafi-group-1.960635>.

[17.] "`Abd al-Rahman `Abd al-Khaliq: Ana dafa`tu salaf Misr li-tashkil al-ahzab," *al-Watan*, January 10, 2012, available at <http://alwatan.kuwait.tt/ArticleDetails.aspx?Id=164541>. An *al-Ahram* article calls Abd al-Khaliq "the spiritual father of the Salafis in Egypt" and notes that a group of the leading Salafis in Egypt met him at the airport upon his return to Egypt following Mubarak's fall after more than thirty years abroad. See "`Ada al-salafi `Abd al-Rahman `Abd al-Khaliq ba`d 33 `aman bil-kharij," *al-Ahram*, January 13, 2012, available at <http://www.ahram.org.eg/Al-Mashhad-Al-Syiassy/News/124678.aspx>.

[18.] Wahid `Abd al-Majid, "Al-Salafiyyun wa'l-siyasa min al-mumana`a ila al-muzahama," *al-Ahram*, March 21, 2011, available at <http://www.ahram.org.eg/Issues-Views/News/68758.aspx>.

[19.] See William McCants, "Al-Qaeda's Challenge," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2011; D. Hazan, "Salafi-Jihadi Cleric Abu Basir al-Tartusi Presents His Position on Democracy: The Principle of the rule of the People is Heresy—But Some Mechanisms of Democracy Can Be Adopted," MEMRI, January 19, 2012, available at <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6007.htm#_ednref6>.

[20.] For example, see Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, "Al-Radd `ala fatwa al-shaykh Muhammad `Abd al-Maqsud bi-khusus al-intikhabat," Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad, August 2, 2011, available at <http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=5018&pageqa=1&i=14>.

[21.] Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, "Ba`d al-shibh fi mas'alat al-musharika fi'l-intikhabat," Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad September 28, 2011, available at <http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=5455&pageqa=1&i=14>.

[22.] Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, "Shibh hawl al-intikhabat fi Tunis," Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad October 9, 2011, available at <http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=5062&pageqa=1&i=14>.

23. "Kuwaiti Charity Designated for Bankrolling al Qaida Network," U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, June 13, 2008, available at <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1023.aspx>. The organization has also been designated a terrorist-supporting entity by the United Nations for the same reason, see <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE07002E.shtml>.

24. "Al-Barnamaj al-siyasi," AlNourParty.org, accessed March 17, 2012, available at <http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_poilitcal>.

25. "Al-Barnamaj al-iqtisadi," AlNourParty.org, accessed March 17, 2012, available at <http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_economic>.

26. "Al-Thaqafa wa'l-huwiyya," AlNourParty.org, accessed March 17, 2012, available at <http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_culture>. This likely only pertains to religious communities recognized by the state. Communities like the Baha'is will probably not be allowed such privileges.

27. Al Jazeera interview with Imad al-Din Abd al-Ghafur, January 4, 2012, available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCINgwpgE44>.

28. "Al-Salafiyyun yada`un al-`amal al-sirri," AlWafd.org, June 12, 2011, available at <http://www.alwafd.org/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1/16-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1%20%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/58493-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%E2%80%AE-%E2%80%AC%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%E2%80%AE-%E2%80%AC>.

29. "Barnamaj Hizb al-Asala," AlAsalah.org, accessed March, 17 2012, pp. 4-5, available at <http://www.alasalah.org/book1/program.html>.

30. Ibid., p. 6.

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32. "Barnamaj al-siyasa al-kharijiyya," AlNourParty.org, accessed March 17, 2012, available at <http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_foreign_policy>.

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