

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, FOSTERING DEVELOPMENT, AND EXPANDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY

A WORKSHOP REPORT

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by Frederick Barton and Noam Unger



BROOKINGS

CSIS

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Civil-Military Relations, Fostering Development, and
Expanding Civilian Capacity
A Workshop Report¹

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INTRODUCTION

This is a critical moment for the United States' approach to global engagement. Concerns have been rising over an apparent imbalance in American statecraft, principally resulting from too heavy a reliance on the military. As such, the Obama Administration is launching related policy reviews. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly noted "the decisive role" reconstruction, development and conflict prevention play, and he has called for greater resources for civilian agencies. Similarly, upon taking office, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton highlighted development as "an equal partner, along with defense and diplomacy," in advancing US national security. She has also announced aims to reverse the "migration of the authority and the resources to the Defense Department," and committed to bolster USAID with clear authorities and resources. Her new additional deputy at the State Department has been charged with boosting the resourcing and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance.

Within this context, on February 11, 2009, more than 40 policy experts and practitioners convened at Brookings to discuss efforts to build civilian stabilization capacity within the U.S. government's international affairs agencies and broader efforts to reform U.S. foreign assistance. The day-long workshop also sought to explore pathways for rebalancing civilian-military roles and to ensure necessary increases in civilian capacity. This event was hosted by Brookings Global Economy and Development and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project with the generous support of the Connect US Fund. Workshop participants offered a range of expertise in defense, diplomacy, and development, as well as varying perspectives from the executive branch, Capitol Hill, civil society and the research community.

This brief report attempts to capture and distill the themes and insights that emerged over the course of the workshop's exchanges, and it also presents further research questions and future steps as we continue our joint CSIS-Brookings project – *Civil-Military Relations, Fostering Development, and Expanding Civilian Capacity*. The project aims to develop priorities and investigate the connections between various investments to effectively execute programs in the overlapping areas of development, humanitarian aid, stabilization and reconstruction. After

¹ COVER PHOTO CREDIT: Lt.j.g. Albert Gembara, Officer-in-Charge of Maritime Civil Affairs Team 205, speaks with USAID logistics officer Robert Demeranville about coordinated efforts to assist the people of Haiti. PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti (Sept 16, 2008) (U.S. Navy Photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist James G. Pinsky/Released).

further study and outreach, the project will publish a more detailed report with our findings and recommendations in the summer of 2009.

This brief is divided into five sections. Section one captures the thoughts of the participants on why expanding civilian capacity in international development and stabilization is important within the United States' broader foreign policy objectives. Section two details participants' suggestions for how these objectives could be implemented. In particular, expanding the capacity of USAID (or its successor agency) is highlighted as an important first step. Section three identifies some of the potential political and institutional challenges in implementing the necessary reforms. Section four offers some of the participants' solutions in overcoming these challenges. Finally, this brief concludes with a set of questions and issues for further analysis.

A brief chronological summary of the workshop's discussion sessions is **ANNEX 1**. **ANNEX 2** contains the workshop agenda and **ANNEX 3** includes the list of participants.

1. Why Expand Civilian Capacity?

Numerous commissions, task forces and other expert reports over the last several years have identified the critical need for the U.S. to adopt a more strategic approach to overseas engagement in a way that leverages the comparable advantages among America's various civilian and military instruments.² Over recent years, the Department of Defense has emerged as the Government's most prominent international affairs instrument, expanding in recognition of an environment characterized by extreme poverty, weak and failing states, transnational terrorist threats, and international power shifts. The capabilities of civilian agencies have not kept pace with the growth of Defense, which has caused an imbalance in the tools of statecraft and a resultant inability to meet strategic aims. This current imbalance exists despite widespread recognition that stabilization and reconstruction must not only be viewed through the lenses of short-term goals or military operations, but also as a key step in supporting sustainable economic development. At the same time, the civilian-led U.S. foreign assistance system is politically weak, incoherent, fragmented and, as a result, frequently ineffective at delivering aid that supports strategic long-term goals. Although this paper focuses primarily on foreign aid, the need to recalibrate could equally apply to other civilian-led international relations tools, such as the diplomatic service.

² For analyses that cover many of these reports, see Craig Cohen and Noam Unger, [Surveying the Civilian Reform Landscape](#), The Stanley Foundation and the Center for a New American Security, 2008; and [Putting 'Smart Power' to Work](#), by the Center for U.S. Global Engagement.

1.1 Focus on poor and fragile states

Throughout the workshop's discussions on the need for and paths toward greater U.S. civilian capacity, participants would often refer to "these missions," "these environments," or "these contingencies" without much clarity on the boundaries of their categories. The group generally agreed, however, that the focus is U.S. policy and assistance efforts related to poor and fragile states, even if some contributors were primarily commenting on a further subset of war zones and failed states.

Resolving the issue of focus is a critical first step, but what exactly are we trying to build greater capacity to do in those contexts? If the U.S. government must somehow strengthen its civilian capacity in relation to engagement in poor and fragile states, the purpose of that capacity matters. "Development," "counterinsurgency," and "post-conflict stabilization" each presupposes a set of actors, a framework for looking at the problem, and a range of improvements that may be quite different from one another.

The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the understanding that strengthening the economy of states and ensuring social equity are in the short and long term interests of the United States. Stable states pose the United States with far fewer security challenges than their weak and fragile counterparts. Indeed, stable states with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade and represent potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing states pose serious challenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug production, money laundering and people smuggling. In addition, state weakness has frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can destabilize entire regions.

While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near future by the U.S.), participants broadly concurred that the lessons of these challenges are that the United States must improve and expand its stabilization and development capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan and Nigeria, huge countries with strategic importance, make clear that a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely limited. As such, increased emphasis on civilian capacity within the U.S. government and civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States' ability to respond to such crises in the future.

1.2 Strategy

The purpose of greater civilian capacity serves as a call for a strategy. Since one is lacking, it also calls for a process to devise such a strategy. Over the course of the workshop, numerous experts raised the possibility of crafting a National Strategy for Global Development (NSGD).

Most current proponents of a NSGD seek a strategy that employs a broad definition of development as it applies to foreign assistance -- inclusive of humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction and good governance as well as poverty alleviation and economic growth. Within this vision, an NSGD would also address other relevant development policy areas such as trade and migration. The underlying understanding is that efforts in all of these areas shape the long-term progress of developing countries, including the prevention of conflict. The workshop discussions also reminded participants that “development assistance” can be interpreted more narrowly as long term aid programs to various less-developed countries. This definitional problem continues to be important as the government explores the scope of potential new strategies, but the feeling of the organizers is that the complementarities of crisis response and longer term development should be emphasized.

There is a general consensus on the need to strengthen the capacity of the United States government’s civilian international affairs agencies as part of a “smart power” approach to global engagement. Clearly, it is a national security imperative to ensure that the United States government can effectively harmonize stabilization efforts with broader development approaches and institutions. At a strategic level, policymakers must identify steps that can set the nation on a course of greater reliance on, and sufficient investment in, civilian development expertise.

2. How Should Civilian Capacity Be Expanded?

There is broad consensus that the United States’ approach to international development must be reformed and workshop participants agreed that many tasks in stabilization operations should move from Defense’s hands to civilian agencies. Participants repeatedly pointed to two areas in need of critical attention. First, USAID, which has lost much of its capacity over the past few decades, must be strengthened to effectively support development and to play a significant role in the United States’ approach to weak and failing states. Second, the United States must consider its allies and international organizations in a calculus of dividing labor and coordinating on the basis of common interests.

2.1 USAID

Regardless of questions over what greater civilian capacity is specifically meant to do, a prominent theme was the importance of strengthening USAID (or its successor agency) . Given the general acknowledgment that much stronger capacity is required to effectively assist poor and fragile states, a spotlight on USAID makes sense. While the workshop’s framing questions were not aimed at a dialogue on organizational structure, the discussion mined that territory, as well, with several participants noting their preference for a re-empowered, reformed and

renamed agency responsible for development and reconstruction.³ Multiple participants suggested that USAID should be turned into a cabinet-level agency. Interestingly, none advocated for USAID to be merged into the State Department. The needed capacity at USAID, as described by the group, ranged from resources through to responsibilities and authorities.

The issue of resources entails budgets and personnel. Stronger budgets on the civilian side can lead to an expansion of needed assistance programs and greater policy control if civilian agencies feel less pressure to turn to DOD for program allocations. To bolster the 150 account requires willingness on the part of the Executive branch to ask for a serious increase and willingness on the part of Congress to appropriate it. This is difficult enough in times of economic prosperity – not to mention the current economic crisis – given the variance in political benefits between investing in the military and investing in our foreign affairs agencies (commonly viewed as a politically-stacked trade-off). Additionally, for such an increase in the 150 account to translate into greater budgets for development programs requires an additional step. On the topic of personnel, multiple participants raised the serious erosion of direct-hire staff at USAID over time, as well as the importance of building up the right kind of human capital with the recruitment and continued training of crisis and development professionals skilled in key technical and managerial areas.

In connection with points made about bolstering USAID, the discussion also focused on some of the more operational aspects of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). These contributions to the dialogue amounted to general recognition that there may indeed be some responsibilities currently associated with S/CRS that would ideally reside in a strengthened agency responsible for development and reconstruction activities.

2.2 Leveraging international actors

Although a consensus has emerged that both the executive and legislative branches should get their own houses in order to make civilian engagements overseas more effective, the U.S. government and public should not assume that the United States must do everything. Other actors such as the UN and the World Bank are capable of driving the international development agenda, especially if the U.S. is constructively engaged. Other governments are working to improve fragile states. The number of international organizations and nongovernmental actors active in the field of development and reconstruction greatly overshadows the number of U.S. government personnel and resources devoted to the same field. The United States would not only be wise to leverage these international and nongovernment resources, but it would be short-sighted to invest in grand plans to strengthen its own capacity without also considering capacities

³ The group discussed the idea of a United States Agency for Development and Reconstruction as put forward in Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., [*Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*](#).

existent beyond the U.S. government that also may address common problems. Similarly, the U.S. government must consider how its own capacities mesh with those of other partners operating in the same space.

3. What are the Challenges to Expanding Civilian Capacity?

The participants identified two main sets of challenges to expanding civilian capacity. The first is a potential lack of political support for such a move from the public, Congress and even from within the Administration. The second set stems from cultural and structural challenges, many within Congress, which may resist such a radical break from past practice.

3.1 The challenge of political support

The necessary level of political will to raise the profile and increase civilian capacity for development (understood broadly) can be quite high depending on the depth of the reforms chosen. The current economic crisis is a dominant factor in determining this appetite. Although Barack Obama made campaign pledges to double foreign assistance, strengthen conflict prevention and response capacity, and lead reforms to elevate and consolidate U.S. efforts toward global development, his administration might not be able to deliver as a result of the shifting priorities of the last six months. Workshop participants noted that many of Obama's foreign policy promises from the campaign carry large 2010 budget price tags, and that the Obama administration is already devoting large amounts of political capital and budget to domestic economic recovery measures.

Congress is equally consumed and was described by one participant as "sclerotic and risk averse." As noted earlier, members see greater political benefit from investing in the military than investing in our foreign affairs agencies and as long as they believe the Defense Department has significant capacity to execute stability operations, it will be difficult to persuasively argue for the expansion of civilian capacity. Also, despite an uptick in hearings and legislation related to global development, post-conflict stabilization and civilian international affairs capacity, it continues to be a challenge to attract sustained Congressional engagement on these issues. Congressman Howard Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has publicly committed to a rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, but there is skepticism on the Hill about his prospects for success and concerns that even a successful push in the House could be stymied in the Senate. Individual members of Congress may be persuaded to see development in a new strategic framework, but this strategic approach will still have to compete with those members' personal, constituent and party priorities, along with the demands of the election cycle. Additionally, early signals from the Obama administration indicate that it does not have the legislative reform of foreign assistance on its agenda.

The need to make a better argument about the value of crisis response and development to the American public was a central point of Secretary Clinton's visit to USAID on her second day in office.

3.2 Structural and cultural hurdles

Structural and cultural barriers also persist at the presidential, agency, and congressional levels. Without direction from the highest levels of government and across the Executive-Congressional divide, an integrated and disciplined U.S. approach to development and reconstruction will continue to be elusive.

Perceptions of executive branch agencies, and real weaknesses of those agencies, continue to be a barrier to integrating an effective approach to development. Although DoD under the leadership of Robert Gates is generally viewed to have the right rhetoric on reconstruction and stabilization, disagreements remain as to its motives and record on civilian capacity. While some participants view DoD as a reluctant contributor to the development field, and many appreciate its "can-do" attitude, others see DoD as willfully expanding beyond proper limits. Operational weaknesses, a disinclination to plan, bureaucratic dysfunction, and a passive-aggressive culture are widely held criticisms of the State Department. Negative views of USAID are common and that agency seems to often view itself negatively, as well. There are also real questions about USAID's ability to manage substantially increased funds if they were to materialize. One participant pointed out that all three seem to operate within their own Myers-Briggs personality profiles and are not likely to break out of these anti-synergistic behavior patterns without significant leadership commitment.

On Capitol Hill, Congress has its own structural and cultural barriers that affect the ability of the U.S. Government to build greater civilian capacity and to rebalance roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis the military. To be sure, partisanship serves as one key hurdle in Congress, but there are others. The "silos of excellence" and cultural differences, for example, that are apparent across civil-military lines in U.S. national security and foreign affairs agencies are also reflected in the different Congressional committees responsible for oversight and appropriations of the armed services and foreign affairs. As a whole, Congress is slow to learn, and progress in understanding and tackling our weakened capacity to assist poor and fragile states is interrupted frequently by the election cycle. Congress also requires partnership from the executive branch that it has not received, such as a clear strategy (matched by budget requests) on how the U.S. – across its various instruments of influence – should be engaging in developing and fragile states. On rebalancing military and civilian levels of funding, Congress has a deep institutional resistance to the transfer of money between agencies because it is careful to avoid funds lacking proper accountability. On the other hand, Congress is hesitant to fund efforts unless they believe such efforts are effective. When dealing with chronically under-resourced agencies, this presents a "catch-22." Yet another structural barrier in Congress is the absence of authorization bills for

foreign assistance. Authorization bills that have been introduced in the last two decades have hit obstacles in the effort to obtain floor time. This reflects a lack of understanding on the part of the full body of the stakes involved for the U.S. national interest, including our security.

4. Were there any Suggestions?

The participants made many useful suggestions for overcoming some of these challenges, namely on increasing political support and marshalling Congress. Some of these have already been attempted with varying degrees of success.

4.1 Political support

Political support is crucial to any reform of this size and duration. As such, the participants made three recommendations for increasing political support.

First, in order to expand its capacity, USAID must marshal congressional support. Here lays a challenge. On the one hand, USAID must convince Congress that it is worthy of a larger budget by becoming more efficient and effective. However, it will be a serious challenge for USAID to retrain staff, restructure its organization and increase its impact “on the ground” without more flexible mechanisms and funds.⁴ To overcome this problem, there must be a closer and more cooperative relationship between USAID and Congress. USAID must engage Congress and convince key members that its efficiency and effectiveness will increase with greater responsibility. One possible means for achieving this is through a collaborative process that charts a strategic direction and provides regular reviews. This measure could dramatically improve discipline within USAID and foster a big-picture focus.

Second, the case will have to be made to the American public for why expanding civilian-capacity in crisis response and development is important to the national interest. Few tax-payers like to see their dollars headed overseas without understandable results- something that practitioners have not done well over the years. If results can be strengthened, without making a fetish of their development,⁵ then a public education campaign is possible to overcome popular resistance. As the Defense budget demonstrates, the American people and their political

⁴ Indeed, it was suggested that for complex stabilization contingencies alone USAID would need to be expanded to 5,000 active and 10,000 reserve personnel, at a cost of \$2 billion annually See Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Cronin, National Defense University

⁵ Regarding measures of progress and indicators, there has been a history of tortured development within USAID and elsewhere. Attempts to find fresher approaches can be found in Barton’s Aspen paper, http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/barton_mop_august2008.pdf

representatives are fully prepared to support measures seen as important to national security when professionally pursued.

Third, as the enormity of tomorrow's challenges are clearly articulated (from mega state collapse to climate change), there is the natural expectation among the public and Congress that alliances and cooperation with partner countries, intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations and non-government organizations are necessary.⁶ A likely result is the need for an expanded civilian-capacity.

4.2 Structural and cultural change

The participants emphasized that any expansion of civilian capacity to conduct international development programs will require significant Congressional support. To gain this support several proposals were suggested.

First, the civilian agencies must present a more coherent argument to the Congress – of current activities and future plans. Rather than featuring all of its initiatives as worthy of Congressional support (or accommodating a history of hundreds of earmarks), the Administration must sharpen its narrative and focus its efforts on the issues and places which matter most to America's future. Civilian capacity to deliver on this promise will be essential.

Second, Congressional advocates and supporters for increased civilian capacity and foreign assistance should be identified and mobilized. If political will exists to increase civilian capacity, floor time will exist for authorization bills.

Finally, the Administration should prepare a credible budget that includes budget crosscuts and displays priorities and tradeoffs among the 'three Ds.' The dramatic expansion in spending during the Bush II Presidency provides a higher starting point.

5. Future Directions and Questions

The workshop discussion covered many of the critical issues of our joint CSIS-Brookings research project and it also highlighted key areas for further investigation. What follows are sets of research questions prompted by the workshop that will help us to delve deeper into the issues raised and explore other equally important topics that were not as deeply explored:

⁶ See CSIS' Commission on Smart Power ([link](#)) and its Dialogue with America ([link](#))

Planning for the Future:

- What will be the United States' dominant foreign policy aims in the coming two decades? What is the critical role for the U.S. and what are we ready to contribute right now? Are we world leaders in this area? What will be the role of civilian development and stabilization capacities in achieving these aims?
 - To what extent are Iraq and Afghanistan outliers or representative engagements?
- To what extent should the gaps between strategy and capabilities be filled by a permanent capacity vs. a "surge" capability?

Organizational Roles and Responsibilities:

- Which civilian agencies are best suited to take on which aspects of the necessary tasks and added capacity? What would the relationship be between a fundamentally strengthened operational development and reconstruction agency and the State Department, DOD, Congress, and other stakeholders inside and outside of government? What is needed to make such an agency a co-equal among larger parts of the USG?
 - As civilian capacity stands up, presumably military "gap-filling" authorities and responsibilities recede but what might this look like in practice?
- How should the Government evaluate the trade-offs between building its own civilian capacity and relying on contributions from international actors geared toward similar goals? What could be the role of alliances and partnerships already in existence, such as NATO, other regional groups, and the UN?⁷

Other Practical Considerations:

- What are the tactical pathways to building up more optimal civilian led efforts and over what timeframe might we anticipate such change given major factors such as the global economic downturn and ongoing U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan?
 - How (and with whom) would critical alliances be forged with Congress?
 - How much would reforming present capabilities and filling the gaps in civilian capacity cost? Where and in what form would this money and political capital arise?
- By what process should the administration define and communicate its priorities in order to best guide detailed plans for capacity building?

⁷ Former Ambassador Dane Smith's upcoming book makes a substantial contribution to addressing these questions. See, Dane F. Smith, *U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American Peace-Building Operations*, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2009). Two chapters on the State Department and USAID will be excerpted in monographs in April by CSIS.

Alongside the planned analysis of existing capacity, future needs, and tactical hurdles associated with fostering and expanding development and stabilization capacity, these questions for further study will shape future research.

Thanks to all who participated in this workshop.

ANNEX 1: BRIEF SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP DISCUSSION SESSIONS⁸

Session 1: Nesting Stabilization and Reconstruction within Development

The first part of the workshop was framed as a discussion on how best to improve the U.S. government's civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability within the broader context of strengthening development and humanitarian assistance efforts. This thread of the dialogue was important because, despite emerging bipartisan agreement on the need to modernize civilian tools of U.S. global engagement, and the critical need to elevate development and overhaul our entire foreign assistance system, too many national security and foreign policy professionals still approach the notion of civilian capacity strengthening with a focus only on filling the stabilization gap. Ensuring connectivity between stabilization and development requires a fresh look at recent attempts to improve policy coordination, interagency planning, and operational capabilities.

As speakers selected to spur discussion, a panel of participants brought different perspectives to bear on the topic. Those remarks and the ensuing dialogue covered issues ranging from big-picture goals and priorities to institutional relationships involving the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The discussion repeatedly turned to the question of which problems we are trying to solve with forward-looking capacity strengthening efforts and how seeking to address different deficiencies (eg. development, counter-insurgency, stabilization) leads to a different lens on capacity building. Similarly, context matters. For example, several participant comments highlighted the importance of knowing whether the U.S. government should specifically focus its efforts on building civilian capacity to effectively assist with the reconstruction and development of a conflict-torn country in which our own military is heavily and kinetically engaged (ie. Iraq or Afghanistan) or whether it should instead focus on strengthening capabilities across a broader array of developing country challenges – inclusive of stabilization and reconstruction settings but not exclusively oriented to them. The latter perspective connected with yet another thread of the discussion that centered on the need for an overarching strategy that could serve to better align resources and planning for U.S. efforts to assist poor and fragile countries.

Session 2: Getting Real on Civilian Military Rebalance

The discussion continued into the second session in which participants were encouraged to focus not just on the various ways in which civilian capacity must be built, but on the relationship between such efforts and the roles and activities of the Department of Defense. A key framing consideration was how policymakers can move beyond exhortations on the need to reduce the

⁸ The workshop agenda is located in Annex 2 and the list of participants is located in Annex 3 of this report.

nation's reliance on military forces for many more appropriately civilian tasks to an in-depth examination of the actual challenges of investing in a more optimal civilian-led approach. Despite strong recognition by the military and its congressional advocates that stability operations, economic recovery and development are best conducted by civilian agencies, anemic efforts to build civilian capacity to date have driven the military to continue to expand its capabilities, authorities and resources to carry out such missions. Congress and the Executive branch must confront the implications of making significant needed investments in civilian capabilities and authorities while simultaneously ensuring near-term military capacity to mitigate the operational risks associated with current civilian capability gaps.

As with the first session, this phase of the roundtable was launched with remarks from a distinguished set of panelists. The discussion focused increasingly on post-conflict stabilization and often touched on the need to effectively plan, manage, and execute a limited number of human capital intensive contingency operations. The topic of human resources led into issues of training and circled back to questions about investing in standing capacity as opposed to surge capacity. Another key element of this discussion centered on how to organize the government in terms of policy setting, program oversight, and program implementation to achieve coherence and effectiveness. As the dialogue continued, it also incorporated participants' perspectives on the value and control characteristics of specific DOD funding authorities (Section 1206, Section 1207, and the Commanders' Emergency Response Program).

Session 3: Pathways for Change

The workshop wrapped up with a session to explore the politics and processes associated with various ideas raised in earlier discussion. Many of the workshop participants have significant experience in congressional authorizations and appropriations or executive branch mechanisms to shape and implement policy. Again, several of these participants ably guided the roundtable discussion with panel remarks. The conversation that followed underscored the critical roles various committees in Congress must play, the uphill challenges to securing bicameral Congressional attention and action, and the rapid onset of budget decisions that figure centrally in shaping any efforts to strengthen civilian capacity in the areas of development and stabilization. The group also explored the specific conundrum of responsibly requesting and allocating budgets across what is widely understood as an imbalanced system: ideally if an administration stands by its budget request, then retroactive transfers from DOD to the State Department and USAID should not be necessary, yet it is clear to all parties involved that it continues to be politically easier for DOD to get money.

ANNEX 2: WORKSHOP AGENDA



Civil-Military Relations, Fostering Development, and Expanding Civilian Capacity

The Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC
February 11, 2009

8:30 – 9:00 am

Continental Breakfast

9:00 – 10:45 am

Session 1

Welcome - Lael Brainard, Vice President and Director, Brookings Global Economy and Development

Nesting Stabilization and Reconstruction within Development

How best can the nation improve civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability within the broader context of strengthened development and humanitarian assistance efforts? Despite emerging bipartisan agreement on the need to modernize civilian tools of U.S. global engagement, and the critical need to overhaul our foreign assistance system and elevate development, too many national security and foreign policy professionals still approach the notion of civilian capacity strengthening with a focus only on filling the stabilization gap. Ensuring connectivity between stabilization and development requires a fresh look at recent attempts to improve policy coordination, interagency planning, and operational capabilities.

Discussion Chair

Noam Unger, Brookings Institution

Speakers

Gordon Adams, American University

Laura Hall, U.S. Department of State

Paul O'Brien, Oxfam America

Mark Schneider, International Crisis Group

10:45 – 11:00 am

Break

11:00 – 12:30 pm

Session 2

Getting Real on Civilian-Military Rebalance

How can policymakers move beyond exhortations on the need to reduce the nation's reliance on military forces for many civilian stabilization and reconstruction tasks to an in-depth examination of the practical and political challenges of investing in a more optimal civilian-led approach? Despite strong recognition by the military and its congressional advocates that stability operations, economic recovery and development are best conducted by civilian agencies, anemic efforts to build civilian capacity to date have driven the military to continue to expand its capabilities, authorities and resources to carry out such missions. Congress and the Executive branch must confront the implications of making significant needed investments in civilian capabilities and authorities while simultaneously ensuring near-term military capacity to mitigate the operational risks associated with current civilian capability gaps.

Discussion Chair

Rick Barton, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Speakers

Hans Binnendijk, National Defense University

Amb. Jim Dobbins, RAND Corporation

Michael Phelan, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

12:30 – 1:00 pm

Lunch

1:00 – 2:30 pm

Session 3

Pathways for Change

What legislative vehicles, reorganization plans, or policy reviews are viable mechanisms for pursuing desired changes? What Members, committees and Executive branch agents are best positioned to advocate on behalf of needed civilian capacity changes?

Discussion Chair

Beth Titter, The Glover Park Group

Speakers

Larry Nowels, Independent Consultant

Mike Casey, House Armed Services Committee

Anne Richard, International Rescue Committee

ANNEX 3: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS



Civil-Military Relations, Fostering Development, and Expanding Civilian Capacity

*The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
February 11, 2009*

PARTICIPANTS

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Professor, U.S. Foreign Policy
American University

Tom Baltazar

Director, Office of Military Affairs (OMA)
USAID

Rick Barton

Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project
and Senior Adviser, International Security
Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Holly Benner

Assistant Director, Managing Global Insecurity
Brookings Institution

Hans Binnendijk

Vice President for Research and Theodore
Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy
National Defense University

Reuben Brigety

Director, Sustainable Security Program
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Christopher Broughton

Director, Stability Operations
National Security Council

Melissa Brown

Senior Policy Advisor for Democracy &
Governance
USAID

Mike Casey

Professional Staff Member
House Armed Services Committee

Paul Clayman

Senior Vice President
APCO Worldwide

Craig Cohen

Vice President for Research and Programs
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Beth Ellen Cole

Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict
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United States Institute of Peace

Janine Davidson

Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Brookings Institution

Amb. Jim Dobbins

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Courtenay Dunn

Fellow
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State
and Foreign Operations

Steven Feldstein

Professional Staff Member
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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Tammy Schultz

Marine Corps War College

Nina Serafino

Specialist in International Security Affairs
Congressional Research Service

Daniel Silverberg

Professional Staff Member
House Foreign Affairs Committee

Beth Tritter

Vice President, Government Relations
The Glover Park Group

Noam Unger

Fellow and Policy Director, Foreign Assistance
Reform Project
Brookings Institution

Sam Worthington

President and CEO
InterAction