



The Emerging Architecture for Security and
Cooperation in Northeast Asia

By James E. Goodby

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Summary

The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program could rank in importance with the creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe if two things happen: North Korea makes a strategic decision to terminate its nuclear weapons program and destroy any nuclear weapons in its possession; and all the governments involved opt for transformational agreements, as opposed to preserving the status quo in Northeast Asia. Three interrelated elements bear on bringing peace to divided Korea: an agreement to end the armistice agreement, a larger cluster of agreements that create conditions for enduring peace in Korea, and a regional framework that provides a mechanism for resolving conflicts and promoting peace in a region where divided Korea is not the only bitter residue of the past. Thus, the future security architecture of Northeast Asia will have at its core the Korean Peninsula legally at peace after six decades, that peace supported by a set of cooperative understandings mainly between South and North Korea comprising a "peace regime," all embedded in a multilateral mechanism for promoting peace and security in Northeast Asia.

A mechanism for peace and security could evolve from the Six-Party Talks, through the meeting of foreign ministers envisaged in the Feb. 13, 2007 statement. Their agenda would include political and security issues, economic and scientific issues, and human dimension issues. Establishing multilateral ministerial meetings to focus on a broad range of issues, including the human dimension, could enhance progress in these areas and the prospect for long-term stability on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in Northeast Asia. The agenda for institutionalized foreign ministers meetings would have its counterpart in a charter for a mechanism for peace and security in Northeast Asia. That charter could include agreements not to use or threaten force in the mutual relations of its members; to enhance transparency in military affairs; to cooperate in developing the energy and transportation infrastructure in Northeast Asia; to work for the improvement of human welfare everywhere; to develop cultural and historical awareness; to encourage the freer movement of people, information, and ideas across borders; and to promote adherence to international human rights standards. Critical to the success of the mechanism for peace and security would be provisions in the mandate for follow-up.

The outlook for the Peninsula is far from bleak. The Bush administration seems to be assigning a high priority to resolving many of the tough issues related to Korea and Northeast Asia before leaving office. North and South Koreans are continuing to work harmoniously together. China, Japan, and Russia all have reasons – not necessarily the same – for wanting progress. But top-level leadership in all countries will be required if 2008 is to see significant progress toward a new system for peace and security in Northeast Asia.

The Emerging Architecture for Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia

by James E. Goodby

The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program have been transformed into the world's most important negotiation on regional security architecture since the end of the Cold War. Potentially, it could rank in importance with the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and the creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Whether that actually happens will depend on two things: (1) whether the government of North Korea makes a strategic decision to terminate its nuclear weapons program and destroy all nuclear weapons in its possession; and (2) whether the governments involved opt for *transformational* agreements, as opposed to preserving the status quo in Northeast Asia. If the first condition is met the prospects for realizing the second condition would be improved.

The Basic Structure. Aside from progress in normalizing bilateral relationships, three inter-related elements bear on bringing peace to divided Korea:

- an agreement to end the armistice agreement;
- a larger cluster of agreements that create conditions for enduring peace in Korea;
- a regional framework that provides a mechanism for resolving conflicts and promoting peace in a region where divided Korea is not the only bitter residue of the past.

Thus, the future security architecture of Northeast Asia will have at its core the Korean Peninsula legally at peace after six decades, that peace supported by a set of cooperative understandings mainly between South and North Korea comprising a "peace regime," all embedded in a multilateral mechanism for promoting peace and security in Northeast Asia. The six-party agreement of Feb. 13, 2007 (Appendix A) mandated talks on other issues, for example, on normalizing U.S.-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations. These are outside the scope of this paper, but clearly, progress in these areas will be an essential part of progress toward peace and security in Northeast Asia.

In fact, there are so many moving parts in this negotiation that it is easy to lose sight of the importance of connecting all the various elements in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. The vision of a regional security structure helps to achieve coherence by demonstrating that initial implementing measures are part of a larger picture. The goal should be to build a "security community," defined as a group of nations for whom armed conflict is not considered a means of resolving differences. But to get there, small steps across a broad front will be necessary. Those should include measures that improve security in the classic military sense. Those should be followed by measures of a more transnational, global character as the region coalesces into a more cooperative system of states.

Replacing the Armistice Agreement. Efforts to strengthen peace and security and to improve the human condition in Northeast Asia must take into account the fact that the Korean

War was never legally ended. The war began in June 1950 when North Korean military forces drove deep into South Korea, at one point occupying most of the country. Two opposing generals signed an armistice agreement in July 1953. One was an American, Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command; the other co-signer was a North Korean, Gen. Nam Il, who signed for both the North Korean People's Army and for the Chinese People's Volunteers. The South Korean government declined to sign the armistice. Ever since, diplomats have argued about who the parties to a successor arrangement should be and how to finally end a war that began nearly six decades ago.

The legal issue actually is a relatively small part of the puzzle. The bigger issues are political. The absence of a final settlement of the Korean War means that the war, technically, lingers on and, as a practical matter, that situation has continued to create tensions. The armistice signed in 1953 brought an end to the shooting but left a genuine peace to the wisdom of succeeding generations, who have not been equal to the task. This situation is not just another remnant of untidiness left over from past wars: it is directly relevant to the North Korean nuclear threat. Experience suggests that while negotiations focusing narrowly on nuclear weapons programs may yield transitory success, the agreements are not sustainable over the long run, and that a broader context will be necessary to buttress them. That broader context will have to include, earlier rather than later, a formal agreement to declare that the war is at an end, to disestablish the armistice arrangements, and in some cases, to replace those with new arrangements.

Ending the armistice system cannot be accomplished by a simple statement saying it is all over. To terminate the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, some kind of legal action or agreement accepted by the parties to the agreement is required. That action need not include the United Nations, in whose name Gen. Harrison signed the agreement. But it certainly would have to include the United States, which has been among the three chief implementers of the Armistice Agreement, along with North and South Korea.

Should China also be a participant in ending the armistice arrangements? There may be aspects that directly affect China and China should be involved as a guaranteeing power. Other countries may have to be consulted about certain specialized questions. But in the major issues that affect relations between North and South Korea, the two parts of the divided Korean nation will have to be the primary negotiators, with the United States heavily engaged as the principal external actor in military terms.

Replacing the current machinery of the 1953 Armistice Agreement that ended the shooting in the Korean War could be done through a legal document along the lines of the treaty that surrendered quadripartite rights in Berlin and Germany as a whole in 1990. If in the form of a treaty, it would probably be called the Treaty on the Final Settlement of the Korean War, but other forms of agreement are possible. It would be signed by those nations still technically at war, i.e., North and South Korea, with the United States adhering to those articles relating specifically to ending the state of war.

Its principal elements might include the following:

- The state of war is terminated;
- Armistice arrangements are terminated;
- The border in effect established in 1953 (the Military Demarcation Line) is affirmed and the Northern Limit Line becomes the maritime boundary;
- The manufacture, possession, stationing, and control over weapons of mass destruction is renounced;
- The right to adhere to alliances is affirmed and the stationing of allied forces, if requested by one of the parties, is accepted;
- The threat or use of force is rejected;
- The goal of reunification is affirmed.

A variety of measures related to political and military relations between North and South Korea, for example the status of the Demilitarized Zone, also might be included. A North-South Korean agreement similar to the U.S.-Soviet agreement of 1989 on “Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities” would be a suitable method of regulating military activities near the border. Other nations also could subscribe to it. A separate agreement related to military matters also might have to be negotiated that in some manner would include North and South Korea and the United States. For example, liaison offices might be established to replace the channels of communication set up by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Armistice maintenance arrangements should be replaced by other methods.

All this might be endorsed by a United Nations Security Council resolution, recognizing the UN’s role in the Korean War, and the importance of having all permanent members of the Security Council support the settlement.

The foreign ministers of the six parties that are negotiating to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula – China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and North and South Korea – may meet at some point in 2008. If progress has been achieved by then in disabling North Korea’s nuclear facilities and in producing an accurate accounting for all of North Korea’s nuclear programs, the ministers should call for an end to the Korean War. They could issue a declaration that stated that their common objective was to see a formal end to the Korean War, with the modalities to be worked out among those nations most directly concerned. They could express the hope that this could be achieved in 2008, the 55th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement.

Peace Regime. The idea of a “peace regime” was formally placed on the negotiating table in the Six-Party Talks. China, Russia, Japan, the United States, and North and South Korea agreed on Feb. 13, 2007 that “the directly related parties” would negotiate such a regime “at an appropriate separate forum.” The idea, of course, under different names, pre-dates that agreement by several years.

What is meant by that notion? It implies that a true peace (or a stable peace) requires more than a legal document that ends a state of war. Peace is still conditional while distrust and mutual antagonism lingers on. Conceptually a peace regime includes an array of North-South understandings, some of which may involve other nations, designed to foster habits of

cooperation. North and South Korea negotiated quite a good facsimile of a peace regime in 1991-92. It was called the “Basic Agreement” (Appendix B) and it included most of the measures that a peace regime might be expected to contain – military cooperation; freer movement of people, information, and ideas; and economic cooperation. Its major defect was that it had no external guarantors and it was hostage to good North-South relations. Soon after the Basic Agreement went into effect, the first North Korean nuclear weapons crisis erupted and the agreement became a dead letter.

The Basic Agreement needs to be revived and supported in various ways by other nations in the Six-Party Talks. The ways may, and probably should, differ in each case. In addition to understandings relating to normal military operations, which could be included in an agreement that supersedes the Armistice Agreement, North Korean and South Korean force levels and dispositions may be regulated in some way. Agreements on these subjects between South Korea and the United States may be necessary as a result.

More specific agreements on military security between North and South Korea should be included in an updated Basic Agreement than were included in the original. Some ideas advanced by South Korean officials during the time when the Basic Agreement was being negotiated are still relevant:

- Withdrawal of forward-deployed offensive arms and troops to rear areas;
- Reductions of heavy equipment;
- On-site monitoring to guarantee the implementation of the agreements, and the establishment and operation of joint verification teams.

The Basic Agreement also contained several provisions regarding the freer movement of people across borders and greater access to information beyond that provided by governments. True security, in the long run, will be based on “normalization” in those respects, not just on correct diplomatic relations. In fact, similar provisions should be included in the charter of a multilateral mechanism for security and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

A Regional Mechanism for Peace and Security. If it is to be sustainable, the building of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula must be supported by the international system, especially China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The fundamental purpose of creating new multilateral arrangements in Northeast Asia is to enhance and, in some ways, to improve upon the means presently available to:

- promote the peaceful resolution of disputes;
- resolve misunderstandings and prevent miscalculations;
- encourage transparency in the mutual relations of the member states;
- enhance regional economic cooperation within the larger framework of the global economy;
- raise the living standards of all the people living in the area to the levels of the most advanced nations;

- promote the free movement of people, information, and ideas among their nations;
- foster an improved mutual understanding of each other's histories and cultures.

No issue is more timely or more consequential for the long-term peace and security of the world than the creation of a new framework to promote regional stability in Northeast Asia. Presently, the likelihood of war in the region is very low but peace is still conditional. Cold War structures live on in the form of the U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan security treaties, and these still serve important security needs. They are insufficient to meet all of today's challenges. Both liberal and conservative administrations in South Korea have pushed the idea of a multilateral framework to enhance peace and security in Northeast Asia, seeing it as a way of forestalling a repeat of the tragedies that have afflicted the nation in centuries past when Korea became the victim of its powerful neighbors. The dream has remained beyond their grasp.

A multilateral organization is not a panacea: many sensitive issues will continue to be handled through other channels. But a multilateral organization could be a much needed agent for change. Over time it could encourage a different pattern of relationships to evolve. The present pattern is clearly not sufficient to lead the nations of the region to a stable peace. Northeast Asia, in fact, is one of the few regions of the world where there is no multilateral organization dedicated to enhancing security and cooperation. The absence of a mechanism that makes cooperation a habit among nations is also one of the reasons why Northeast Asia remains infected by the poisonous legacies of the Cold War, and even of World War II.

A mechanism for peace and security could evolve from the Six-Party Talks. The meeting of foreign ministers envisaged in the Feb. 13, 2007 statement could become the first of institutionalized periodic meetings. Their agenda would include political and security issues, economic and scientific issues, and human dimension issues – respect for human rights, family reunification, freedom of information, and increased contact between people. Establishing multilateral ministerial meetings to focus on a broad range of issues, including the human dimension, could enhance progress in these areas and also the prospect for long-term stability on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in Northeast Asia.

A Mandate. But what would an agreed mandate for a permanent peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia look like? The experience of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) offers some insights. One of them is that a comprehensive agenda provides a context within which disparate problems can be solved, partly because it encourages trade-offs among diverging national interests. The predecessor of the OSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a mechanism created in 1975 in Helsinki by 35 European and North American nations. These nations agreed on very little but each of them saw advantages for themselves in a comprehensive charter called the Helsinki Final Act. The charter included security, economics, and the human dimension, inclusive of human rights, and it launched the process that helped to end the Cold War in Europe.

The CSCE/OSCE obviously is not a blueprint for other regions to copy. But it should be noted that it was:

- an agreement successfully concluded despite very different motivations and interests among the major negotiating partners;
- a politically binding accord, not in treaty form, which nevertheless exercised a significant influence in Euroatlantic affairs for three decades;
- a process that required no permanent organizational support from 1975 to 1990;
- an accountability covenant that covered most of the activities in which governments engage but also upheld the rights of citizens of those governments;
- a multidimensional security arrangement relating to military confidence-building and economics, as well as the human dimension.

The agenda for institutionalized foreign ministers meetings, mentioned above, would have its counterpart in a charter for a mechanism for peace and security in Northeast Asia. That charter could include agreements not to use or threaten force in the mutual relations of its members; to enhance transparency in military affairs; to cooperate in developing the energy and transportation infrastructure in Northeast Asia; to work for the improvement of human welfare everywhere; to develop cultural and historical awareness; to encourage the freer movement of people, information, and ideas across borders; and to promote adherence to international human rights standards.

Operationalizing the Concept. In parallel with progress in other actions called for in the six-party statement of Feb. 13, 2007, a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism could be established during 2008 by a decision of a ministerial meeting. In addition to setting forth principles which will define the broad framework for cooperation in Northeast Asia, the mandate could include specific implementing steps by which progress in implementation can be measured. To illustrate this concept, from the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe the following human dimension principle could be adopted: “The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”

Examples of specific implementing steps could be drawn from the Final Act or, preferably, adapted from the South-North Korea Basic Agreement of 1992. The following illustrates this:

“The participating States shall implement freedom of travel and contact between their States and peoples; they shall permit free correspondence and meetings and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives, promote their voluntary reunion and take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues; they shall promote cooperation in journalism and the media as well as in literature and the arts.”

Similar sets of principles and implementing steps would be taken in the security and economic areas. For example, a principle that requires States to refrain from the use or threat of force in their mutual relations would be accompanied by a series of military confidence and security-building measures. A principle advocating trade and commerce among the participating States could be accompanied by specific steps in the area of energy and transport.

Critical to the success of the mechanism for peace and security would be provisions in the mandate for follow-up. The Final Act included such a provision that encouraged bilateral meetings and multilateral meetings of experts. It required meetings among representatives of participating States at the level of representatives appointed by Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Periodic Review Meetings of this type are an essential component of a mechanism for peace and security.

Such Review Meetings, which should be held annually, also should be the means through which specific steps of cooperation would steadily be enlarged.

Military Confidence-building Measures. Among the security provisions should be a range of military confidence building measures such as those negotiated in the CSCE framework:

- Information on organization, manpower, and weapons/equipment, including plans for deployments of weapons/equipment;
- Information on defense planning, including defense policy and doctrine and force plans;
- Consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities and hazardous incidents;
- Voluntary hosting of military visits;
- Military-to-military contacts;
- Joint military exercises and training to work on tasks of mutual interest;
- Prior notification and observation of certain military activities, including an annual calendar of such activities;
- Constraints on size and frequency of exercises and prohibition of any large unannounced exercises;
- Inspections and evaluations;
- Communications network;
- Annual implementation assessment meeting.

Final Reflections. Northeast Asia in the 21st century may not have much to learn from the experiences of other times and other places. History and geography and culture create unique circumstances within which nations develop and act. But so long as nation-states are the basic building blocks of the international system the behavior of these units within that system is not likely to be radically dissimilar.

History suggests that autonomous behavior by powerful nations – behavior that ignores the interests of others – sooner or later leads to disaster. The corollary of this lesson is that some mechanism has to be found, be it implicit or explicit, to allow for policy accommodation and for self-imposed restraint within a system of nations. To fail to do so is to make a collision almost inevitable. This is a time for inclusiveness and engagement, rather than exclusiveness and detachment, if the nations are to gain some control over a rapidly changing system.

Can such ambitious undertakings as those described in this paper succeed? It is too early to say, but first signs are promising. The disablement of the North Korean nuclear program is

under way in a verified and internationally recognized manner and if this process is continued, including full disclosure of nuclear programs and dismantlement of nuclear facilities, it may be possible to proceed toward improvements in U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations and to discussions of how to end the armistice system. The question of assembling the components of a peace regime benefits from prior work on the 1991-1992 North-South Basic Agreement: a template already exists. Discussions of a multilateral mechanism for peace and security in Northeast Asia are underway in a working group established in the Six-Party Talks.

The Bush administration seems to be assigning a high priority to resolving many of the tough issues related to Korea and Northeast Asia before leaving office. North and South Koreans are continuing to work harmoniously together. China, Japan, and Russia all have reasons – not necessarily the same – for wanting progress. So the outlook is far from bleak. But top-level leadership in all countries will be required if 2008 is to see truly significant progress toward a new system for peace and security in Northeast Asia.

About the Author

James E. Goodby joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1952 and after service in the U.S. Air Force in 1952-53, joined the staff of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. His work there focused on the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the beginning of negotiations on a treaty to ban all testing of nuclear weapons. Rejoining the U.S. State Department in 1960, he became Officer-in-Charge of Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations. In that post, he contributed to the successful conclusion of the limited test ban treaty, in effect since 1963. After service in the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff and at the headquarters of the European Community and NATO, both in Brussels, he became Vice Chair of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). He then became head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe where military confidence building measures were successfully negotiated between NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the neutral and non-aligned nations of Europe. In the early 1990s, Goodby served as Chief U.S. negotiator for cooperative threat reduction (the Nunn-Lugar program). Some 30 agreements were negotiated by his delegation with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to accelerate the implementation of the START treaty and to improve controls over first materials. Later, he headed a delegation which sought to secure U.S.-Russian agreements dismantling of nuclear warheads. When not engaged in public service, Ambassador Goodby has been a writer and teacher, at Carnegie Mellon, Georgetown, Syracuse, and Stanford Universities. His last book was published in 2006: *At the Borderline of Armageddon – How American Presidents Managed the Atomic Bomb*.

APPENDIX A

Joint Statement from the Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks Feb. 13, 2007

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for action".

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.

3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the

Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase - which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

APPENDIX B

AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION, AND EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

Effective February 19, 1992

South and North Korea,

In keeping with the longing of the entire Korean race for the peaceful unification of our divided fatherland;

Reaffirming the three basic principles of unification set forth in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972;

Determined to end the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation;

Also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, and to ensure the lessening of tension and the establishment of peace;

Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to promote interests and prosperity common to the Korean people;

Recognizing that their relationship, not being a relationship as between states, is a special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification;

Pledging themselves to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification;

Hereby agreed as follows;

CHAPTER 1

SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION

Article 1

South and North Korea shall recognize and respect the system of each other.

Article 2

South and North Korea shall not interfere in the internal affairs of each other.

Article 3

South and North Korea shall not slander or defame each other.

Article 4

South and North Korea shall refrain from any acts of sabotage or insurrection against each other.

Article 5

South and North Korea shall together endeavour to transform the present state of armistice into a firm state of peace between the two sides and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement until such a state of peace is realized.

Article 6

South and North Korea shall cease to compete with or confront each other, and instead shall cooperate and endeavour to promote the racial dignity and interests of Korea in the international arena.

Article 7

South and North Korea shall establish and operate a South-North Liaison Office at Panmunjom within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement to ensure close liaison and consultations between the two sides.

Article 8

South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Political Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to consider concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the agreement on South-North reconciliation.

CHAPTER 2

AGREEMENT OF NONAGGRESSION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

Article 9

South and North Korea shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.

Article 10

South and North Korea shall resolve peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation, any differences of views and disputes arising between them.

Article 11

The South-North demarcation line and the areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.

Article 12

In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression, the South and the North shall establish a South-North Joint Military Commission within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss problems and carry out steps to build up military confidence and realize arms reduction, in particular, the mutual notification and control of large-scale movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased

reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.

Article 13

South and North Korea shall install and operate a telephone line between the military authorities of each side to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed clashes.

Article 14

South and North Korea shall establish a South-North Military Sub-Committee within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and to remove the state of military confrontation.

CHAPTER 3

EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

Article 15

In order to promote the integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the South and the North shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as intra-Korean commerce and joint ventures.

Article 16

South and North Korea shall carry out exchanges and promote cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, the environment, journalism and media including newspapers, radio, television broadcasts, and other publications.

Article 17

South and North Korea shall implement freedom of intra-Korean travel and contact among the members of the Korean people.

Article 18

South and North Korea shall permit free correspondence, movement between the two sides, meetings, and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives, promote their voluntary reunion, and take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.

Article 19

South and North Korea shall reconnect the railway and the previously severed roads, and shall open sea and air routes.

Article 20

South and North Korea shall establish and link facilities for exchanges by post and telecommunications, and shall guarantee the confidentiality of intra-Korean mail and telecommunications.

Article 21

South and North Korea shall cooperate in the international arena in the economic, cultural and other fields, and shall advance abroad together.

Article 22

In order to implement the agreement on exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural, and other fields, South and North Korea shall establish joint commissions for each sector, including a Joint South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within three months of the entry into force of this Agreement.

Article 23

A Sub-committee on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Negotiations within one month of the entry into force of this Agreement, to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on South-North exchanges and cooperation.

CHAPTER 4

AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 24

This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 25

This Agreement shall enter into force from the date the South and the North exchange the appropriate instruments following the completion of the respective procedures necessary for its implementation.

Signed on December 13, 1991

Chung Won-shik
Chief Delegate of the South delegation to
the South-North High-Level Negotiations

Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea

Yon Hyong-muk
Head of the North delegation to the South-
North High-Level Negotiations

Premier of the Administration Council of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea