GLOBAL TRENDS AND SECURITY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: DILEMMAS FOR U.S. AND REGIONAL POLICY

CONVENERS:
Stephen R. Grand
Tamara Cofman Wittes

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY:
Thomas Fingar
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The Doha Discussion Papers provide testament to the opportunity for renewed dialogue between the United States and the Muslim world. Written specifically for the U.S.-Islamic World Forum’s three task forces, they have been edited and compiled into separate volumes on Governance, Human Development and Social Change, and Security. The Doha Discussion Papers bring together the major papers and responses that frame each of the task force discussions. They include as well a summary of the off-record discussions at each of the task force sessions held at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum.
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When it comes to relations between the United States and the Muslim-majority countries, too often diatribes and stereotypes substitute for genuine dialogue and mutual understanding. The annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, held in Doha, Qatar, brings together key leaders in the fields of politics, business, media, academia, and civil society from across the Muslim world and the United States for three days of carefully structured discussions. The Forum seeks to get beyond the empty rhetoric and mutual accusations and address the critical issues actually confronting the United States and the Muslim world by providing a unique platform for frank dialogue, learning, and the development of positive partnerships between key leaders and opinion shapers from both sides. It includes plenary sessions, smaller task force discussions focused on key thematic issues like governance, human development, and security, and initiative workshops that bring practitioners from similar fields together to identify concrete actions they might jointly undertake.

The theme of this year’s Forum was “Common Challenges,” as 2009 presents, for both the United States and the Muslim world, an opportunity to work together to address and resolve the major issues of our time. Opened by H.E. Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, deputy prime minister and minister of energy and industry of Qatar, the Forum featured keynote addresses by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Malaysian parliamentarian and opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, and commander of the U.S. Central Command Gen. David Petraeus. Plenary sessions focusing on various aspects of the future of U.S.-Muslim world relations included such luminaries as Aitzaz Ahsan, president of the Pakistani Supreme Court Bar Association; Nashwa al-Ruwaini, CEO of Pyramedia Ltd. and host of “The Million’s Poet”; U.S. congressmen Brian Baird (D, WA-3) and Keith Ellison (DFL, MN-5); Thomas Fingar, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council; Hala Lattouf, minister of social development of Jordan; Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, author of *Descent into Chaos*; David Rubenstein, co-founder of the Carlyle Group; Ismail Serageldin, director of the Library of Alexandria; and Bourhaina Shaban, minister and political and media advisor to the President of Syria.

These Doha Discussion Papers seek to capture the rich discussions that take place between U.S. and Muslim world leaders in the Forum’s task force sessions. Edited and compiled into separate volumes on Governance, Human Development, and Security, the Doha Discussion Papers bring together the major think pieces and responses that were prepared for and framed each of the task force discussions. Included as well is a summary of the off-record discussions that occurred in each of the task force sessions. We hope you will find them as stimulating as the participants in Doha did.
On behalf of the entire Saban Center at Brookings, we would like to express our deep appreciation to HRH Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the Emir of the State of Qatar, for making it possible to convene this assemblage of leaders from across the Muslim world and the United States. We are also appreciative of the support and participation of HE Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar. We would also like to thank HE Mohammed Abdullah Mutib Al-Rumaihi, the Foreign Minister’s Assistant for Follow Up Affairs; Abdulla Rahman Fakhroo, Executive Director of the Permanent Committee for Organizing Conferences; Malik Esufji, Director of Protocol, and the entire Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff for their roles in ensuring the successful planning and operation of the meeting. Finally, we would like to thank Hady Amt, Peter W. Singer and Shibley Telhami for convening the Task Forces, as well as Aysha Chowdhry for her hard work in compiling and editing these volumes.

Sincerely,

Ambassador Martin Indyk
Director
Saban Center at Brookings

Dr. Stephen R. Grand
Fellow and Director
Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World
The world is undergoing rapid change and with it the very nature of international security is evolving. While the United States remains by far the pre-eminent military power on the planet, other dimensions of power (in the sense of the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do) beyond the strictly military have become increasingly important. After a brief unipolar moment for the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the world is looking increasingly multipolar. Economic power is shifting steadily eastward, with China and India experiencing vibrant economic growth and the Gulf States accumulating enormous oil and gas wealth. With globalization, borders have also become more porous and the sovereignty of the state less absolute. What happens in the remote regions of Waziristan, Pakistan, has ripple effects as far as Washington, D.C. Issues that were once primarily domestic matters—issues like governance, public health, demographic change, energy consumption, and natural resource use—now often have far-reaching international security implications.

President Barack Obama came into office promising to improve America's often troubled relations with the Muslim world. Beyond changes in the tone of American foreign policy from that of his predecessor, President Obama has also signaled that he will take new approaches to many of the conflicts roiling the region—conflicts that have often divided the United States and the Muslim world. This includes reducing rapidly the American troop presence in Iraq, renewing America's efforts to finding a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, exploring diplomatic openings with Syria and Iran, and working closely with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

These represent, for the most part, traditional security challenges. Over the horizon, though, lie a host of non-traditional security challenges that are likely to introduce new tensions in America's relationship with the Muslim-majority countries, but also potentially present new opportunities for collaboration and partnership.

This volume examines some of those new, non-traditional security challenges and how they are likely to affect U.S.-Muslim world relations. Since 2004, the U.S.-Islamic World Forum has offered key leaders in the fields of politics, business, media, academia, and civil society from across the Muslim world and the United States the opportunity to come together to discuss critical issues of the day. During the course of the 2009 U.S.-Islamic World Forum, a group of approximately forty leaders from the United States and Muslim-majority countries formed a Security Task Force to conduct two focused, two-hour-long discussions on security. This volume of the Doha Discussion Papers seeks to encapsulate the papers and discussions that comprised the Security Task Force.
likely to affect U.S.-Muslim world relations in the security domain. Discussion centered on how local issues, like domestic governance, and social patterns, like fertility rates, impact global security and therefore invite external scrutiny. Likewise, interpenetration of societies, politics, and economics means that effective policy must also work across borders. Rather than viewing the Muslim world as the “source” of problems, and the West as the “source” of policy interventions, both the United States and Muslim-majority countries must anticipate which hot spots will demand our collective attention and resources in times to come, and must work together to confront shared challenges.

The second session of the Security Task Force focused specifically on Pakistan as a case study of the sort of security challenges these transformations are likely to pose in the future. It was noted that many of the key trends noted in the Global Trends 2025 study—weak governance structures, demographic change, resource scarcity, nuclear proliferation, and ideologically-driven terrorism—are at play today in Pakistan. Aitzaz Ahsan, Barrister-at-Law and a senior advocate at the Supreme Court of Pakistan and Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States, led off a fascinating but sobering discussion of the challenges now confronting Pakistan and the role the United States could play in assisting its new democratic leadership.

This volume contains the final papers prepared by Drs. Fingar and Al Suwaidi. You can find a summary of the Security Task Force discussions that ensued here. As the sessions were off-the-record to encourage as frank and open an exchange as possible, we have omitted any quotations or references to specific individuals.

We offer the materials compiled in this volume for the purpose of sharing the rich discussions begun in Doha with a broader audience and enabling them hopefully to continue.
The United States and the Islamic World in 2025

Thomas Fingar

Thomas Fingar is the Payne Distinguished Lecturer in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar previously served as assistant secretary of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, principal deputy assistant secretary, deputy assistant secretary for analysis, director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and chief of the China Division. Between 1975 and 1986, he held a number of positions at Stanford University including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control. Fingar received a B.A. in government and history from Cornell University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.
INTRODUCTION

The countries and communities comprising the Islamic world will be even more central to American interests and U.S. foreign policy in 2025 than they are today, but their importance will derive less from their shared Islamic character than from the nature and impact of the issues they—and the United States—will confront. As a result, Washington will eschew attempts to formulate an overarching strategy for countries with large Muslim communities in order to increase the efficacy of policies tailored to address specific issues in specific contexts. Most governments will—or should—welcome this approach because it offers unprecedented opportunities for collaboration on issues that directly affect the lives of people in and beyond the Muslim world. Business as usual and one-size-fits-no-one policies cannot solve the difficult and potentially disastrous challenges we will face over the next fifteen years. We must do better than that and I believe that we can.

CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

Although it would be inaccurate and unwise to ignore the scope and severity of differences and disagreements between Americans and the citizens of countries with majority or substantial Muslim populations, it would be a mistake and self-defeating to characterize perceptual and policy differences as an inevitable clash of civilizations. Many extant and emerging problems, some of which will be examined below, cannot be ignored without increasing the likelihood and severity of social dislocation, political instability, government collapse, and regional conflict. All of the challenges identified in the recent National Intelligence Council study entitled Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World will confront leaders in Muslim-majority countries. Individually, these challenges can probably be managed with “normal” coping mechanisms, at least in most countries. But the challenges will not arise one at a time; they will escalate simultaneously and exacerbate one another, making it imperative to address them in a prioritized and coordinated fashion. This will require—and create unprecedented opportunities for—collaboration within the Muslim world and between individual or multiple Islamic countries and their external partners, including the United States. How soon the imperatives and opportunities are recognized, and how creatively and courageously political leaders respond, will determine the success of the effort and the future course of U.S. relations with the Muslim World.

The argument sketched out above suggests that it would be inappropriate and ineffective for the United States to treat the Islamic world as a unitary actor with undifferentiated interests, objectives, or priorities. It also suggests that any attempt to do so would invite policy failure in direct proportion to the extent to which it obscured significant differences in demography, government capacity, and public expectations. As importantly, I think it unlikely that political leaders or ordinary citizens anywhere in the Islamic world would want their own priorities to be subordinated to a homogenized “Islamic agenda.” As a result, U.S. relations with Islamic countries will be multifaceted and highly diverse. Whether these multiple and multifaceted relationships are contentious, cooperative, or effective in addressing the problems ahead will be a function of the wisdom and courage of political leaders on both sides.

To the extent that the foregoing analysis is correct, U.S. relations with the Muslim World in 2025 will be the sum of multiple, independently developed, and only partially integrated attempts to solve single or clustered issues in specific contexts. In other words, approaches and policies will emerge piecemeal and bottom up more often than they will derive from overarching strategic frameworks formulated in Washington or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). With so many variables in play, and lacking a reliable crystal ball, I will
sketch briefly a range of possible variants and what would be required to achieve them. To structure the discussion—and to elicit comment from participants—I will subdivide the Islamic world into five regions: the Maghreb, the Levant, the Gulf, South and Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. I do so because of significant differences with regard to the constellations of issues to be confronted in each of the subgroups, and because the capacity for and likelihood of effective cooperation between Washington and the regional governments to address those challenges differ from region to region.

**Maghreb**

Demography and governance are likely to be the primary drivers in this region, with energy and climate change playing secondary roles. As a group, governments have adequate and improving capabilities to manage challenges and address the demands and expectations of their citizens. But the aspirations and rising expectations of increasingly youthful populations will stress the capacity of governments to provide education, jobs, and other opportunities for young people increasingly plugged into the globalized world. Satisfying expectations at home and managing tensions between youth eager for opportunities in Europe and European nations that at best will be ambivalent about receiving them will tax existing political and economic systems. However, relative success in providing education suitable for the jobs of tomorrow, the large and growing number of ambitious young people willing to work, and the availability of money for investments that would take advantage of the labor pool and proximity to European markets provide cause for optimism. The United States could and probably will support efforts to enhance economic prospects and government capacity, but it is likely to play a less central role than will the European Union and individual European states.

**Levant**

This region arguably has more problems and more relevant players than any other discussed in this paper. The litany is familiar but important: Israel-Palestine, intra-Palestinian divisions, instability and external meddling in Lebanon, Iranian aspirations and actions and countermoves by countries in the region, ambivalence or discomfort regarding the role of the United States, the inability of the United Nations to play a decisive role, etc. To this already daunting list of challenges will be added increased pressures related to demography, competition for water, and impediments to investment and job creation exacerbated by instability and terrorism. The old saw that the United States cannot solve problems in this region but no solutions are possible without United States leadership will remain valid. Although tempting, and probably prudent, to predict that the future will look much like the past, only worse, I am more optimistic than that. The combination of changes within the region, shared concern about Iranian ambitions, and the likelihood of new approaches by the Obama administration may change the calculus of the players and create opportunities for cooperation and reciprocal unilateral moves that, over the period between now and 2025, could change the situation for the better. To the extent that this happens, Muslim perceptions of the United States will become less negative and opportunities for collaboration outside of the Levant will increase.

**The Gulf**

Developments in the Gulf region and relations between the countries in the region and the United States will be shaped by all of the drivers examined in the *Global Trends 2025*, but none will be more important than the success or failure of

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1 These groupings obviously do not include several important Islamic communities, including those in Turkey, Nigeria, and other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They are just as important as those that are included but space limitations made it impossible to examine, even superficially, all components of the large and diverse Islamic world.
efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the geopolitics of energy. These challenges will be discussed at greater length below; here I wish merely to note that how issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions play out, and the pace of—and rationale for—the transition to alternative fuels will profoundly affect the content and character of political, economic, diplomatic, military, and even cultural relationships.

Perhaps more so than is true of any other region of the Muslim world, efforts to address key challenges in the Gulf will affect and be effected by developments and considerations at the global level. For example, possible ways to address Iran’s aspirations and concerns about its nuclear program almost certainly will involve revitalization and reform of international control regimes on a global scale. But, as was pointed out in the Global Trends report, reengineering multilateral institutions at the global level will be extremely difficult. Whether this creates an opportunity for regional or multi-regional arrangements that might eventually be incorporated into a global regime or poses insurmountable chicken and egg-type problems of the “we can’t solve the regional problem without first creating new international institutions, but we can’t create those institutions fast enough to address the regional problem” variety is an open question. As in the case of the Levant, I think there is a better than even chance that the United States will offer new approaches and that some of them will elicit constructive responses from states in and beyond the Gulf region. Whether they are adequate to solve the specific problems at hand may be less important, in the short run, than whether these initiatives and responses create opportunities and the political will to work together.

**South and Central Asia**

The challenges of South and Central Asia will command sustained attention in Washington and restrict the amount of time and effort senior officials can devote to other regions of the Islamic world. Moreover, to a greater extent than is true even in the Levant and the Gulf, the interests and actions of players other than Washington and OIC members will shape and complicate efforts to address critical challenges related to stability and governance, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, energy, the consequences of climate change, and other nettlesome issues. Russia, China, and India have interests and cannot be excluded from efforts to address challenges in the region. Their interests, like those of the United States, transcend the region in ways that could as easily impede as facilitate cooperation to resolve the serious and very dangerous problems in South and Central Asia. For obvious reasons, the United States must attach high priority to this region. But U.S. efforts to play a leading role almost certainly will be viewed through lenses of a latter day “great game” competition for resources, influence, and insurance against unwanted developments. Two examples will serve to illustrate the point.

The first example involves access to oil and gas resources in Central Asia. Instability in Afghanistan prevents construction of a pipeline to Pakistan that could deliver gas to South Asia. Pipelines to Europe must go through either Russia or Iran. Both Russia and Iran want the transit fees from such pipelines and the capacity to control the flow for economic and political reasons. The United States has sought to limit Russia’s control of pipelines from Central Asia, but it has also opposed building pipelines through Iran. Whether, when, and how Central Asian oil and gas reserves are exploited will affect global supply and price, thereby providing an impetus or disincentive to accelerate the search for alternative fuels.

The second example is tension between countries with two of the three largest Islamic populations: Pakistan and India. Terrorist safe havens in Pakistan, especially the region along the Afghan-Pakistan border, have enabled insurgents and terrorists to hone their skills and support the insurgency
in Afghanistan, attacks against Pakistani officials, attacks on Indian targets, and preparations to attack European and American targets. Islamabad’s ability, militarily and politically, to use its military forces to gain control of the areas harboring terrorists is severely limited by tensions and animosity with India. Indian hedging strategies include cultivating influence in Afghanistan that reinforce Pakistan’s perceived needs to hedge by maintaining ties with the Taliban. The witch’s brew of issues is made even more dangerous by nuclear weapons, increasing competition for water, and a proclivity to view all relationships in zero-sum terms.

The net result of these multiple and conflicting interests and the multiplicity of issues involved is that serendipity could have a major impact on the focus and content of policies pursued by regional governments, the United States, and other interested parties. This, in turn, will shape what happens and the character of relations between the United States and specific Islamic communities in the region.

**Southeast Asia**

Relations between the United States and the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, and with Malaysia and the other regional states with sizeable Islamic communities, are likely to be driven primarily by economic issues and shared interest in revitalizing international institutions. *Global Trends 2025* identified Indonesia as one of the rising powers and it seems destined to play an increasingly important role in regional affairs. The United States welcomes this development but both Jakarta and Washington are likely to seek a low-profile relationship to avoid the appearance that Indonesia is acting at the behest of the U.S. In addition to investment and trade, cooperation between the United States and Southeast Asian nations is likely to involve efforts to mitigate the impact of climate change and to forge new regional and international mechanisms to supplement or replace those developed after World War II.

**Relative Impact of Drivers and Trends**

Even though developments and the character of relations between the United States and Muslim communities will be shaped by different sets of issues in each of the regions discussed above, and the relative weights accorded to the drivers will differ from country to country and region to region, it is still useful to make a net assessment of their relative importance. One reason is that events anywhere have the capacity to affect developments everywhere by focusing the attention of decision makers and skewing political debate. For example, if resurgent economies, natural disaster, targeted violence, or politically orchestrated reductions in supply were to produce rapid and substantial increases in the cost of oil and/or gas, politicians in the United States—and elsewhere—would redouble their determination to find and fund alternative fuels. If the price increases resulted from obvious political interference with market forces, ire and animosity would shape the choice of response options and affect perceptions of—and policies toward—the government that limited supply and those that responded in a helpful or unhelpful way.

The illustration above could be played out in many ways with different implications for U.S. relations with the Muslim world, but the point I wish to make here is a rather simple one with potentially grave implications. No matter how the disruption and resultant price increase came about, ensuing calls for alternative fuels almost certainly would be framed in terms of “our need to reduce dependence on Middle East (or “Arab”) oil. Framing the issue in this way might be as unfair as it is inappropriate, given the relatively small percentage of U.S. oil imports from that part of the world, but the political and perceptual implications would be substantial and entail negative consequences for U.S. policy toward the Middle East and the Muslim world more broadly. This would, of course, be a somewhat
“irrational” response but it would have a severe and deleterious impact on U.S. relationships with Islamic communities in each of the five regions discussed above.

The illustrative example above would complicate and aggravate U.S. dealings with the Muslim world, but the geopolitics of energy is already at the top of the list of factors shaping political, economic, and military relations and seems destined to remain so unless displaced by concerns about nuclear proliferation. Under almost any scenario, questions about Iran’s nuclear capabilities—if not its intentions—will be answered long before 2025. How they are answered—and how issues are resolved—will have a profound impact on the Gulf region, the Middle East more broadly, and the future of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

If Iran declares or demonstrates that it has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, it could trigger a race by others in the Muslim world to acquire a similar capability. If Iran is assessed to have a “breakout” capability but has neither declared nor tested a nuclear device, the consequences might be the same. This assessment might be wrong, given the fact that Israel’s suspected but undeclared nuclear capability did not trigger sustained efforts to acquire a similar capability by countries in the Arab core of the Muslim world, but it is widely expected in the United States that an Iranian bomb would evoke a different response. Perhaps this is because Iran is Persian, Shia, and theocratic, and is perceived to aspire to regional dominance.

If Iran does acquire the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, it would be the third country with a large Muslim population to do so—the other two being Pakistan and India. The example of India and Pakistan, and the anticipated response of other Muslim states to an Iranian bomb, suggests that further proliferation within the Muslim world would, at least in the short term, increase the diversion of resources from education, mitigation of climate change effects, job creation, preparation for the post-oil era, and other challenges in order to acquire the capacity to counter the Iranian threat. But that is not the only possibility. One can imagine responses that would entail greater cooperation among Sunni majority nations, new security arrangements with the United States and/or other existing nuclear weapons states, or some type of new regional security arrangement that would include Iran. In any case, proliferation and security-related issues would move to the top of the agenda in many Islamic countries, the United States, and other major powers.

A third trend identified in Global Trends 2025 that will shape relations between the United States and the Islamic world is the declining capability of governments to control developments within and across their borders. Globalization is projected to continue, albeit perhaps more slowly as a result of the current financial and economic crisis. As it does, production chains will become longer and more segmented, wealth will continue to flow from the more developed to less expensive production centers, and people everywhere will know more about what is available to their counterparts elsewhere in their own countries and outside their borders. National identity no longer automatically trumps other identities (e.g., ethnic, tribal, linguistic, class, or religion) and the multiplicity of identities appears likely to grow and to pose more difficult challenges to political systems ill-prepared to deal with them.

Governments in the Muslim world, like their counterparts everywhere, will have to cope with escalating demands from more attentive and better informed publics. The problem will be especially severe in the Muslim world because of demographics; all have youthful and rapidly growing populations with rising expectations and limited tolerance for what they perceive as unresponsive bureaucracies. Competing demands for attention and resources will strain government capabilities, make it harder for officials to devote time and attention to
problems and opportunities in relationships with the United States (and other countries), and more difficult for American officials and private sector actors to engage with their counterparts. If internal stress leads to social instability and a government responds with repressive measures, the impact on relations with the United States will be immediate and overwhelmingly negative.

Terrorism will continue to be a problem in much of the Muslim world, but it is likely to be directed more often at ruling elites and central governments than at external targets. If threats to the United States from terrorists operating from safe havens in Muslim countries or funded by donors in the Muslim world diminish, this issue will recede in importance and, hopefully, will become the subject of even greater cooperation among law enforcement agencies. If Global Trends 2025 projections with respect to terrorism prove wrong, however, and there is another devastating terrorist attack on the United States, its citizens, or its interests that can be proven to have originated in or been abetted by a Muslim country, the likelihood of productive collaboration will decline precipitously and for an extended period. No policymaker wants that to happen.

**Getting Ahead of the Curve**

The first prerequisite for successful intervention to prevent or mitigate undesired developments and to capitalize on opportunities to achieve positive goals is to compare and discuss views on what we think will—and will not—happen. The specific projections in Global Trends 2025 and the predictions outlined above may well be wrong. Indeed, they almost certainly are wrong, at least in part. But they provide a basis for discussion and debate. Even if the projections are badly flawed and events unfold significantly differently than anticipated, the potential implications of inaction are so significant, and the timeframe within which they will occur is so short, that we should begin immediately to clarify points of agreement and the reasons for differences of view. I am not sanguine about the will or ability of political leaders to do the intellectual heavy lifting necessary to come to grips with the issues, but I am encouraged by the approach of the new administration in Washington and the fact that we have come together to define and discuss challenges likely to demand attention in the years ahead.

Although easy to see doom and gloom in much of what is written above, nothing in the scenarios described or implied here should be regarded as inevitable or immutable. The first step in solving a problem is to recognize that it exists; the second is to understand why it exists and what is driving it in a particular direction. Both the Global Trends study and this short paper point to innumerable opportunities for leaders to change and shape the course of events. Whether a projected development ultimately has more positive than negative consequences will be a function of the quality of leadership on all sides and the efficacy of policies pursued individually and, more often, collaboratively. Unfortunately, past practice and recent history provide little cause for optimism that opportunities will be recognized and acted upon.

Misinformation and mistrust are formidable impediments to collaboration in pursuit of common goals. To capitalize on opportunities and avoid the many dangers suggested above will require exceptional leadership—leaders who are brave as well as competent and are able to put long-term interests ahead of short-term political expediency. They, and we who provide analysis and advice, must focus on identifying shared interests, not on ferreting out behaviors and attitudes that make it more difficult to achieve common goals. If we assume the worst, we will accomplish little more than the articulation of self-fulfilling prophecies.

We must begin with dialog, or more specifically, multiple dialogs. These dialogs should focus on
the issues that are most pressing or most important in a particular country or region. It would not be productive to pursue all-inclusive agendas with participants from every country, community, or constituency in the Muslim world. The sub-groups described above are a first-pass attempt to develop manageable agendas and lists of participating countries; the effort clearly needs to be refined.

The proposed dialogs must begin by defining the trends and issues and how they relate to one another. It also should attempt to establish their relative priorities. When these steps have been completed, it would be necessary and appropriate to adjust membership in the group, adding those with a clear stake in the issues and dropping any who lack such a stake. It will be essential to move beyond the recitation of familiar and unhelpful bromides such as “Nothing can be solved until Israel-Palestine issues are solved,” and, even worse, that “resolving Israel-Palestine issues will automatically lead to the resolution of myriad others.”

**Concluding Observations**

*Global Trends 2025* describes an arc of instability stretching from the Maghreb through the Levant, the Gulf, and Central and South Asia that coincides almost exactly with the territory I have discussed as regions in the Muslim world (Southeast Asia is not covered by the arc). The two areas were defined in accordance with different criteria and the study does not assert or imply that its Islamic character explains why it is the least stable region of the globe. The relationship almost certainly is more coincidental than causal, but the fact remains that countries and communities in the Muslim world must deal, simultaneously, with more of the problematic trends and drivers than do the inhabitants of any other region. This poses enormous challenges for governments in the Muslim world. It also poses enormous challenges for the United States (and others). The magnitude and implications of the issues involve compel us to act quickly and collaboratively. I believe that we can and will do so.
Global Transformations and Security Relationships:
Projections and Prospects for U.S.-Muslim Relations

Jamal al Suwaidi

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INTRODUCTION

The publication of Global Trends 2025 by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) in November 2008 raises many interesting issues regarding the relationship between the Western and Muslim worlds. Most significantly, the NIC predicts that the relative power of the U.S. was likely to decline over the next 15 to 20 years as the world became increasingly multipolar in its power configuration. Such an alteration in the balance of power will have profound consequences in a world undergoing rapid technological, economic and demographic change. The Muslim world, which confronts its own particular challenges, will be at the center of the trends that now confront the global community. Thinking about where we might be in 15 to 20 years time provides us with a valuable opportunity to look at how relations between the West, particularly the U.S. and the Muslim world, will develop. This paper will look at three important and interrelated issues: the likely nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the Muslim world in 2025; the trends and transformations that we are likely to see in the coming years in the relations between the U.S. and the Arab world; and the consequences that the changes projected by the NIC will have for policy makers in the Muslim world.

THE U.S. AND THE MUSLIM WORLD IN 2025

Over the next few decades, the relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world will evolve in the context of a wider reconfiguration of international power and influence. As the relative power of the U.S. declines, the capabilities and influence of China and India, and possibly also Russia, will increase. As the distribution of global wealth changes, integrated trade between different countries will encourage stability and development. According to the Global Trends 2025 report, one of the principle consequences of this development will be that alternatives to the Western, liberal, political, and economic models will emerge. Such a development looks increasingly likely as a consequence of the global economic turbulence and the apparent success of the ‘state capitalism’ model exemplified by China. This issue will be particularly important given the debate over the ideology of political Islamism and how it may dominate the Muslim world in the years to come. The main objective of Muslim governments is the defining of a governance model that combines moderate Islamism with effective socio-economic development. The need to address the pressing demands of growing populations needs to be prioritized.

In this context, ideology will frame the debate that will become increasingly intensified between progressive and reactionary forms of Islamism. The NIC also predicts that al-Qaeda’s terrorist franchise will diminish because of the movement’s unpopularity in the Muslim world, due to the fact that Muslims constitute most of its victims. These findings present a notably optimistic assessment given other recent warnings that al-Qaeda remains a major threat.2 The NIC nevertheless stresses that in the long term, al-Qaeda will diminish due to its extremist ideology, unrealistic strategic objectives and lack of mass appeal. Al-Qaeda’s radical and violent approach will further alienate its already dwindling numbers of supporters throughout the Muslim world. The NIC concludes that the Neo-Salafi movement is destined to decline due to the fact that it has no convincing agenda for addressing the problems affecting the Muslim world. However, socio-economic problems in the Muslim world, especially those stemming from demographic imbalances, could give opportunities

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predicts that secularism in the Middle East will decline, a trend that will be especially evident in Turkey. Secularism will increasingly be seen as an alien Western import as Islamist political parties become more prominent. The likely result will be a hybrid of Islamization and economic growth and modernization. The NIC assumes that Turkey will move away from a ‘European destiny’ and project itself more as a Middle Eastern power. Such an outcome would be of profound importance in the context of the Muslim countries’ to find their own distinct societal model.

According to the NIC, Turkey will embody the tendency of a general move away from secularism towards Islamism, combined with a distinct form of nationalism. The country will also have a higher profile in political and economic terms. The assumption of the report is that the pace of Turkey’s present reforms is linked with the prospect of EU membership. If the prospects of accession to the EU fade, then these reforms will be delayed or abandoned. The challenge for Turkish policy makers is to reconcile the demands of their distinct political, economic and cultural challenges. Turkey’s future path will be of great interest to all of the Muslim countries, as it illustrates the problems of synthesizing development models in a very stark way. In many ways, the questioning of Western liberal models in the Muslim world is a natural and beneficial process considering that different global traditions need to somehow reconcile the best aspects of Western modernity with their own distinct cultures.

**TRENDS AND TRANSFORMATIONS**

A number of important trends will become evident in U.S.-Muslim relations over the next few years.

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While the degree of real transformation they produce is a matter for debate, much will depend on the degree of access that countries have to diminishing natural resources. The report predicts that there is likely to be a much greater concentration of energy wealth in individual countries and regions. The depletion of many fields in smaller countries will ensure that energy export-generated wealth will be increasingly concentrated in Russia, the Arab Gulf and several African countries. The challenge that energy producers will face is maximizing the gains made from oil and gas exports for use in much needed infrastructure and human capital projects.

Although the NIC predicts that there will be increased efforts by the U.S. and the wider Western world to reduce dependence on oil and gas, there is nothing to challenge the prediction that the world will remain reliant on these sources of fuel for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the most recent report of the U.S. Department of Energy predicts that the international demand for oil will increase by 50% by 2030. While much of the new demand will come from China and India, it is worth noting that U.S. oil consumption is expected to grow from 20 million to 28 million barrels per day. These projections reinforce the importance of the energy exports of the Arab Gulf. Over the next two decades, the vitality of the world’s economy will be linked to the ability of Gulf energy exporters to sufficiently expand oil production to keep pace with demand. The Gulf retains a relative advantage over oil due to the comparatively low capital investment and production costs needed to expand output to meet the predicted demand.7

Nevertheless, the effective exploitation of these resources will depend on continued security and stability. In recent years the U.S. lost authority in the region as a result of the troubled legacy of the war in Iraq in 2003. The Gulf States have been confronted with the dilemma of maintaining a close working relationship with Washington at the same time the Bush administration was heavily criticized by local populations. There is a danger that a further rapid decline in the U.S. position in the Gulf would create a political and security vacuum in the region. Although al-Qaeda is projected to decline, the ways in which the residual terrorist threat might evolve and mutate is open to question. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons will become an increasingly problematic issue, particularly given the danger that “rogue states” and militant groups might acquire such weapons. Some analysts have warned of the growing Islamist extremist infrastructure designed to promote a political and ideological message rather than a command structure for military attacks. This ‘virtual’ structure would constitute a ‘caliphate-in-progress’ and is likely to enlist alienated Muslim minorities powerfully attracted to the discourse of humiliation and victimization propagated by Osama bin Laden and his associates.8

The opaque and nebulous nature of the potential terrorist threat reinforces the need for effective multilateral efforts to underpin the stability of the Gulf region. What is most urgently needed for the Arab Gulf is a new regional forum of security cooperation that includes Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. An uncertain strategic outlook will complicate the prospects for political and economic development in the Gulf. The two greatest areas of concern are the ongoing civil conflict in parts of Iraq and the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. There are also concerns that political and security rivalries might generate an arms race in the region. The fact is that the GCC states are still primarily reliant on the U.S. as the

main guarantor of security in the Arab Gulf region. The strength of the links are reflected in the granting of U.S. ‘Major Non-NATO ally’ status to Kuwait and Bahrain. This situation reflects the fact that individual GCC states have pursued their own agendas in terms of strategy, defense doctrine and procurement. Despite all of this, relations with the U.S. are likely to remain close due to the converging interests of Washington and the rulers of the GCC states.

The persistence of a mutually beneficial strategic relationship will ensure that the U.S. and Arab Gulf states will remain allies. However, the alliance needs to be developed on the basis of the potential developments foreseen in the Global Trends 2025 report. For instance, developments in the internal situation in Iran could mean that the policy adopted by the U.S. could be very different in a few years. The NIC report is clear that Iran is a nation with immense potential, and the downfall of the clerical regime could usher in a change of profound importance. The emergence of a more open Iran which seeks cooperation rather than confrontation means that the Arab Gulf States will have to consider their powerful neighbor as a partner rather than an antagonist. The result of a ‘regime change’ in Iran, whether accomplished or not by peaceful or violent means, would have a real transformative effect on the Muslim world.

ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES FOR POLICY

Expecting the unexpected should be a governing principle for the Muslim countries in their future relations with the U.S. The danger is that the potential for conflict will become greater by 2025, a reflection of increased competition among the world’s population for declining food, water and energy resources. In a broader context, the EU’s rejection of Turkish membership will be seen by many Muslims of a growing civilisational divide between Islam and the West. The crucial objective will be to prevent such a divide deepening and the challenges for policy makers are immense. Whatever happens to Turkey’s EU application, the imaginary “boundary” between the Western and Muslim worlds will become increasingly blurred. In the case of Europe, Muslims will become increasingly willing to take a stand and express their views on issues relating to the Middle East such as the Israel-Palestine dispute.

What will have a profound impact on relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world in the future are perceptions of the extent of mutual respect. Opinion polls show that many Muslim populations see the Western world as lacking respect for the Muslim world. This opinion is strongly held by the majority of Palestinians (84%) and Egyptians (80%), while the responses from those polled in Turkey (68%), Saudi Arabia (67%) and Iran (62%) are only marginally less. It can be concluded from these results that the perception of disrespect is consistent regardless of the considerable differences in the economic, political and geo-strategic relationships that these countries have with the West. In order to address these kinds of attitudes, policy makers in both the U.S. and the Muslim world must do more to counter misunderstandings and prejudices while also encouraging inter-cultural dialogue through conferences and exchanges.
A damaging result of the Bush administration’s simplistic approach to political reform in the Arab world is that the clear distinctions between moderate Islamist political movements on the one hand and extremist factions on the other has often been overlooked. For our purposes, political movements that can be loosely grouped under the label ‘Islamist’ usually seek to reject the worst excesses of Westernization and promote a political program that reflects the precepts of the Koran and the need to preserve Muslim identity. Although such programs have elements of social authoritarianism, they also usually have a strong theme of social justice and welfare provision that has a powerful appeal to the needy and dispossessed. Only a small minority of Islamist political groupings could be described as ‘fundamentalist’ for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan. Even the supposedly strict Islamist Iranian government has had to reconcile itself to a semi-democracy and modern technological innovations. A good example of a moderate Islamist movement in a functioning democracy is the popular and influential Justice and Development Party in Turkey.14

The development of a successful moderate form of Islamism is critical to the future of the Muslim world.15 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing focus on the notion of legitimacy within the state system. The notion of domestic and international legitimacy is seen to be mutually reinforcing: if a state follows the best possible practice in terms of good governance and human rights, then it also bolsters its international standing. States can consequently claim ‘rightful membership’ in the international community. There of course has to be some allowance for different cultural practices in governance. As international society has become increasingly integrated, the plurality of cultures and their differences has itself been more evident.16 This development is not, however, a recipe for inevitable conflict. The implementation of successful reforms in the countries of the Muslim world will not only ensure domestic stability, but will also gain legitimacy in the context of the overall international system.

Muslim political identity is often shaped more by ethnicity and tribal affiliation rather than religion or nationalism. More importantly, the case of sectarian conflict in Iraq illustrates how in the absence of political plurality and consensus, Islamism is no guarantee against violent civil conflict. There is a need for a political plurality leading to broad power-sharing between regimes, Islamist and non-Islamist groups. In the cases of Turkey and Indonesia, moderate Islamists have taken a legitimate place in a system that has evolved to meet the need of local circumstances. While Turkey and Indonesia are not perfect by any means, they do illustrate the kinds of solutions that might be viable.17 The challenge for policy makers is to find a program of political reform that will reconcile local cultural preferences with universal standards, such as human rights, that shape internationally accepted standards of legitimacy and governance.

Conclusion

The Global Trends 2025 report serves to illustrate the challenges that confront relations between the Western and Muslim worlds. Despite the disparities in interests and perceptions between these two worlds, there is room to move forward on the basis of mutual respect and cooperation. As far as the

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Arab Gulf is concerned, all parties have an interest in ensuring that the region remains a stable and profitable arena for economic integration and global interaction. All of the major powers, including the rising Asian countries as well as the U.S., will retain a basic interest in underpinning the stability and prosperity of the region. Such interest holds out the promise of an effective multilateral system for guaranteeing the security of a region that will be crucial to future global prosperity. The sudden decline in oil prices in late 2008 illustrates the difficulty of planning for the future. While this objective will be underpinned by mutual interest in developing energy resources, the exploitation of oil and gas reserves provides only one dimension of the relationship between the Muslim world and the U.S.

It is hoped that Muslim states can provide models that combine a moderate Islamist political culture combined with modern and effective socio-economic development. The Global Trends 2025 Report rightly contends that overly simplistic views of Islamism overestimate the degree of common intellectual ground shared between moderate and extreme Islamists. This is evident in the fact that there is no sign of any widespread social movement supporting al-Qaeda’s agenda of a unified ummah and a revived Caliphate. What is seen by some Western observers as a battle between moderates and extremists over who best represents the essence of Islam, is in reality a debate over the pressing requirements for better governance, stability and security in the Muslim world. It is to be hoped that the many potentially positive trends identified by the NIC prevail over the desire of extremists to sow discord and instability.
In the first Security Task Force session, participants identified various recent or anticipated global trends and how they are expected to shape the security relationship between the United States and the Muslim World, or what some participants called the “Arab-Asian world.”

The task force highlighted several key trends, including demographic, economic, and institutional ones. Firstly, security is no longer viewed solely through the lens of military might; now, in an age of globalization and instant communication, domestic issues—unemployment, education, food security—have become equally important.

Many participants felt that current global institutions are not meeting contemporary needs, particularly in the economic realm. While wealth is shifting from West to East, there is rising economic inequality and post-WWII institutions are not adequately dealing with current challenges. Additionally, while people around the world strive for the liberal democratic opportunities of equality and rule of law, they oppose the way the West is attempting to spread those values.

Governance and development challenges are key to understanding the U.S. security relationship with the Muslim world. Several participants challenged the conventional wisdom of a binary choice between revolutionary militant extremists and Arab authoritarian police states, and discussed how other options could be created by encouraging moderate Islamists, civil society, and non-state actors to enter into a democratic process.

There are a variety of ways to improve the security relationship between the United States and the Muslim world. They argued that international norms on a wide range of issues that are pressing for both sides, from nuclear non-proliferation to human rights, should be established and adhered to. This includes addressing double standards, such as the U.S.-India nuclear deal and America’s refusal to recognize Hamas. Participants also suggested that the United States in general and the U.S.-Islamic World Forum specifically, should reach out to a broader range of non-state actors, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Women should also be brought into the fold.

With power comes responsibility, and countries that exercise power around the globe must also be held accountable. In places where governments
are not able to provide for their people there are security risks that must be addressed. Participants addressed the question of multiple power centers, debating whether it was more appropriate for America to deal with actual governments or non-state actors that have significant popular support.

**SESSION II**

Pakistan is facing significant challenges today as it confronts many of the global trends discussed in the first session. Seventy percent of the country is below the age of thirty and there is high unemployment. Additionally, Pakistan is isolated from its neighbors, due largely to its alliance with the United States. The situation with India is precarious, and there is a need for more civil society and to educate women. Additionally there is a demographic shift within the army from the northern Punjab to the less educated and often more radicalized south. Finally, the leadership of Pakistan is seen as unwilling or unable to grapple with the problems at hand.

Pakistan's current problems were born out of the country's history. More than half of the country's existence has been under military rule which has prevented the appropriate development of institutions. The military dominates the civilian leadership of Pakistan as well as the country's budget. Furthermore, the United States has historically been allied with the governments of Pakistan rather than with the populace. The core of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is a military one.

However, even the Pakistani military has its limitations and the threats the country is facing have changed. Gone are the days where the major threat was a conventional war with India. Now the army must fight a domestic campaign against terrorists in both FATA and Swat. A successful counterinsurgency campaign, one participant argued, needs the support of the local population.

But there exists a vast disconnect between the Pakistani people and their government. One participant asked how the Pakistani government could bring its people on board with its policy of working with the United States. A paradigm shift may be needed in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship—“Trade is honorable; aid never is,” one participant said. Many felt free trade with Pakistan and opening up of the textile market would go a long way toward this effort.

Lastly, participants discussed the global view of Pakistan. One participant said that, despite repeated warnings, Pakistan will not collapse. To the contrary, it is important that the United States view Pakistan as a place where civil society and women's rights are on the rise. Another participant stressed the importance of seeing Pakistan for what it is—a Muslim, South-Asian country, that is neither Arab nor Middle Eastern.
The Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World is a major research program housed within the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The project conducts high-quality public policy research, and convenes policy makers and opinion leaders on the major issues surrounding the relationship between the United States and the Muslim world. The Project seeks to engage and inform policymakers, practitioners, and the broader public on developments in Muslim countries and communities, and the nature of their relationship with the United States. Together with the affiliated Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, it sponsors a range of events, initiatives, research projects, and publications designed to educate, encourage frank dialogue, and build positive partnerships between the United States and the Muslim world. The Project has several interlocking components:

- The U.S.-Islamic World Forum, which brings together key leaders in the fields of politics, business, media, academia, and civil society from across the Muslim world and the United States, for much needed discussion and dialogue;

- A Visiting Fellows program, for scholars and journalists from the Muslim world to spend time researching and writing at Brookings in order to inform U.S. policy makers on key issues facing Muslim states and communities;

- A series of Brookings Analysis Papers and Monographs that provide needed analysis of the vital issues of joint concern between the United States and the Muslim world;

- An Arts and Culture Initiative, which seeks to develop a better understanding of how arts and cultural leaders and organizations can increase understanding between the United States and the global Muslim community;

- A Science and Technology Initiative, which examines the role cooperative science and technology programs involving the United States and the Muslim world can play in responding to regional development and education needs, as well as fostering positive relations;

- A “Bridging the Divide” Initiative which explores the role of Muslim communities in the West;

- A Brookings Institution Press Book Series, which aims to synthesize the project’s findings for public dissemination.

The underlying goal of the Project is to continue the Brookings Institution’s original mandate to serve as a bridge between scholarship and public policy. It seeks to bring new knowledge to the attention of decision-makers and opinion-leaders, as well as afford scholars, analysts, and the public a better insight into policy issues. The Project is supported through the generosity of a range of sponsors including the Government of the State of Qatar, The Ford Foundation, The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, and the Institute for Social Policy Understanding. Partners include American University, the USC Center for Public Diplomacy, Unity Productions Foundation, Americans for Informed Democracy, America Abroad Media, and The Gallup Organization.
The Saban Center for Middle East Policy was established on May 13, 2002 with an inaugural address by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan. The creation of the Saban Center reflects the Brookings Institution’s commitment to expand dramatically its research and analysis of Middle East policy issues at a time when the region has come to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

The Saban Center provides Washington policymakers with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely research and policy analysis from experienced and knowledgeable scholars who can bring fresh perspectives to bear on the critical problems of the Middle East. The center upholds the Brookings tradition of being open to a broad range of views. The Saban Center’s central objective is to advance understanding of developments in the Middle East through policy-relevant scholarship and debate.

The center’s foundation was made possible by a generous grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of Los Angeles. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, is the Director of the Saban Center. Kenneth M. Pollack is the center’s Director of Research. Joining them is a core group of Middle East experts who conduct original research and develop innovative programs to promote a better understanding of the policy choices facing American decision makers in the Middle East. They include Tamara Cofman Wittes, a specialist on political reform in the Arab world who directs the Project on Middle East Democracy and Development; Bruce Riedel, who served as a senior advisor to three Presidents on the Middle East and South Asia at the National Security Council during a twenty-nine year career in the CIA, a specialist on counterterrorism; Suzanne Maloney, a former senior State Department official who focuses on Iran and economic development; Stephen R. Grand, Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World; Hady Amr, Fellow and Director of the Brookings Doha Center; Shibley Telhami, who holds the Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland; and Daniel L. Byman, a Middle East terrorism expert from Georgetown University. The center is located in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings, led by Brookings Vice President Carlos Pascual.

The Saban Center is undertaking path-breaking research in five areas: the implications of regime change in Iraq, including post-war nation-building and Persian Gulf security; the dynamics of Iranian domestic politics and the threat of nuclear proliferation; mechanisms and requirements for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for the war against terrorism, including the continuing challenge of state sponsorship of terrorism; and political and economic change in the Arab world, and the methods required to promote democratization.