CONTENTS

Forewor Fareed 2		ix
Preface	to the Classic Edition	xii
Abbrevi	ations	XX
Introduc	ction	1
PART ON Decision	IE s: Getting into Vietnam	
ONE	Patterns, Dilemmas, and Explanations Patterns Dilemmas A Range of Explanations Stereotypes Fail Summary: Three Propositions	9
TW0	Recurrent Patterns and Dilemmas from Roosevelt to Eisenhower "Hot Potato" Briefings The "Asian Berlin" The Roosevelt Administration The Truman Administration The Eisenhower Administration	26
THREE	Picking up the Torch: The Kennedy Administration Fastening the Commitment: 1961 Buildup and Breakdown Taking the Reins: 1963	66
FOUR	Intervention in Force: The Johnson Administration, I Preparing for Pressure: 1964 Crossing the Rubicon: Early 1965 Setting the Pattern of Perseverance: Late 1965	89

vi | CONTENTS

FIVE	Coming Home to Roost: The Johnson Administration, II On the Tiger's Back: 1966–67 Debate, Diplomacy, and Disillusionment Off the Tiger's Back: The Reckoning of 1968	130
PART TV Goals: Th	VO ne Imperative Not to Lose	
SIX	National Security Goals and Stakes The Cautious Route to Commitment Exploring the Security Issue The Domino Theory	163
SEVEN	Domestic Political Stakes The Two Phases of American Policy on Vietnam Practical Political Considerations	182
EIGHT	The Bureaucracy and the Inner Circle Career Services and U.S. Stakes in Vietnam Pressure from the Top and from the Bottom Concluding Observations about the Imperative not to Lose	207
PART TH Means: 1	IREE The Minimum Necessary and the Maximum Feasible	
NINE	Constraints Four Strategies for Winning The Fate of the "Winning" Strategies Building and Breaching "Firebreaks"	229
TEN	Pressures and the President Pressures to Do Both More and Less Presidential Responses Presidential Management of the Political System How the System Helped the President Strategy and Politics: The Presidents' Dilemmas	252
PART FO Percepti	UR ons: Realism, Hope, and Compromise	
ELEVEN	Optimism, Pessimism, and Credibility Contradictions and Hedging The Roots of Internal Estimates The Cycle of Highs and Lows Estimates and Escalation	279

CONTENTS | vii

TWELVE	The Strategy of Perseverance The Stalemated War Elements of the Strategy	302
PART FIVE Conclusion	S	
THIRTEEN	The Lessons of Vietnam Nixon's and Ford's Policies How the System Worked Two Schools of Thought on the Lessons of Vietnam Recommendations	325
Documentary Appendix		349
Bibliographical Note		355
Notes		357
Index		399
Table and F	igures	
TABLE 1.	Proportion of the Public Favoring Various U.S. Vietnam Policies, 1966, 1967	146
FIGURE 1.	Trends in Support for the War in Vietnam, 1965–71	145
FIGURE 2.	Trends in Support for the War in Vietnam, by Partisanship, 1965–71	147