U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

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PARTICIPANTS:

Moderator:

TANVI MADAN
Fellow and Director, The India Project
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

ALYSSA AYRES
Senior Fellow, India, Pakistan, and South Asia
Council on Foreign Relations

STEPHEN P. COHEN
Senior Fellow, India Project
The Brookings Institution

DANIEL MARKEY
Senior Research Professor, International Relations
Academic Director, Global Policy Program
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

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MS. MADAN: Good afternoon I’m Tanvi Madan. I’m the director of the India project here at Brookings and a fellow in the Foreign Policy Program. Thank you for joining us today as we celebrate the work of Brookings senior fellow Steve Cohen and the launch of his latest book the South Asia Papers which is available for sale outside. Steve will be signing books after this event as well. It is also available online and for those who will be watching this on video or listening to the podcast there will also be a South Asia addition that will be coming out later this year.

The book itself is an anthology of Steve’s writings from his five decades long career studying South Asia including his time here at Brookings since 1998. If I started listing all the books that Steve has written let alone his articles and the details of his career in academia and think tank world and in government we’d go through the entire 90 minutes so I will just say that Steve’s impact in the field is truly profound. He is not just shaped and contributed his study of South Asia through scholarship but also through the many scholars across generations and across borders that he has trained, mentored and nurtured along the way along with his wife Bobbie who is here today. There are other members of the Cohen family as well, welcome to all of you. I have benefited personally from Steve’s wisdom and support and knowledge and so particularly delighted and honored to be moderating the session today.

We will be discussing Steve’s book of course as well as his contributions to the field that he really helped create in the U.S. and beyond. We’ll also be talking about continuity and change in South Asia as well as U.S. policy towards the region over the last few decades.

We’ve got a great panel here today to discuss these subjects. Steve himself, we’ve Alyssa Ayres to my right senior fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia of the Council on Foreign Relations. She was project director for this year for sponsored independence task force reports on U.S. India relations which is available online and that was released last year. She also served as deputy assistance secretary of state for South Asia from 2010-2013. To Steve’s left we have Dan Markey who is senior research professor for international relations and academic director of Global Policy of the Global Policy Program down the road at SAIS. He was previously at CFR as well and from 2003 -2007 he said served on the policy planning staff at the State Department. Ed Luce who was supposed to be here unfortunately could not make it. He sends his apologies.
We’ll start this session with some comments and observations form Steve. I would request before we do that if you could please put the ringers on your cell phones on silent. Steve I’ll turn the floor over to you.

MR. COHEN: Tanvi I appreciate this opportunity both to you and to Brookings for enabling me to continue my scholarly activity for a number of years after I left the University of Illinois. The book contains a lot of things to a lot of people including you for making it possible. It has been a great career and it is not over yet. I’ve got one or two books left that I want to write including to a return to something I did in the seventies and that is disaster studies and I’ve got a manuscript and I’d like to publish.

Let me just say a few remarks. This book includes writing that tries to explain the past but also looks ahead to the future. So it is 19 or 20 essays and chapters from about 250 articles and chapters I’ve written over the past 50 years including some of my earliest work. As I looked at that to make a selection I thought in some ways that was the most interesting. The stuff I did when I was a grad student at Wisconsin and elsewhere and in India. Some of it I think holds up as durable but the book has my own comments about what I wrote then both critical and retrospective. Also the book tries to fill in the gaps of what has been written since then on the same subject.

One area I worked on was cast in the Indian Army. There really has been nothing since I wrote that. I was waiting for someone to write a book and Steve Wilkinson of Yale actually wrote a fine book on that subject. I worked with Steve Givens on the British period. So I engaged in time travel. I visited regiments in South India, in the Khyber Pass area and I was visiting these regimental training centers which were built in the 19th century some even earlier. The regimental training center in South India was built in 1850 for British soldiers. When independence came the Brit’s (inaudible) so there’s a form of time travel. But it also looks ahead. I shifted my interests around 1978 especially when Dick Park asked me to write a book about India as an emergent power. That’s shifted me from looking at the internal role of the military to role of the military outside that is a use of force across one’s borders.

Looking at today from a perspective of 53 years and observing changes in politics and society and regional politics I try to imagine the future. Throughout all of this my own angle of vision changed remarkably. So then I went back to India several times. Once I went back as a member of the
Ford Foundation as a guest scholar of Ford in 1993 which was a totally different experience.

So five events shaped my understanding of India. I think these were critical and maybe add a few. First of all, in 1965 I lived for six months with an untouchable member of parliament in the heart of New Delhi. That enabled me to see India from the bottom up literally. He was an MP from a new by district and we would go out touring with him just to see what (inaudible). The Republican Parties manifesto to get Unbedkar in the parliament was typed on my portable typewriter. So it was a remarkable experience to see India from a different perspective then most other American's had seen it. We would hold a dar bar and it was really an interesting perspective.

Secondly in 1971 I taught for one year in Tokyo because I couldn’t get an Indian visa and there’s a chapter in the book that describes my visa problems with the Indian government which are all forgiven by the way. So I was able to view Asia from a different Asian perspective. From an ally central to the United States foreign policy Japan. I spent a lot of time there studying China with Cael University China. I think I subconsciously asked myself the question I’ve heard the other day how do make India the center of the world when no one else believes it to be so. Whenever I told Japanese scholars that I was studying India they’d say why bother you’re crazy. So in a sense I could tell the cultural resistance with the Japanese. There are very strong differences of opinion in Asia about each other. The Indian’s have their own perspectives and sometimes distortions of Japan and China. That’s a separate essay.

In 1977 I went to Pakistan for the first time. I’m proud to say my visa was turned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto so I had to go as a private citizen in 1977. So I went to Pakistan staying in second and third class hotels. Traveling the country without any official intervention. It was at that trip I came to the (inaudible) museum and went back later as his guest. But that taught me that Pakistan was the unendear. It wasn’t like India in many ways but it was similar to India in many other ways. I thought that the perspective on Pakistan I picked up on India was wrong. I’ve always thought there was a lack of Indian expertise on Pakistan. To some extent my own work is helping Indian’s recognize Pakistan.

The same year 1977 my wife and I with our three kids we lived through the Andre Cyclone in 1977 which killed between 10 and 20 thousand people. Doing what most academics do when there is a crisis I wrote a book about it. We toured the area right after the cyclone hit. Looked at the bodies and talked to the politicians. I’d like to republish that book in some way. I think it was probably the
first social political study of a disaster in India of any credibility.

In 1985 and 1987 I served for two years in the U.S. Government in the chair that Dan
eventually held that is the South Asia person for the policy planning staff. So we were high enough to see
the system but not so high that it actually influenced it. So we had information without responsibility. We
dealt with such lowlies and deputies and secretaries but it was a great position and working with Gerald
Schulz in the Reagan administration which I was a Democrat by the way. It was not a pleasant
experience because I saw the damage that had been done to this country by Reagan and other
ideologues. But I saw the system there and there was some relevance for events today. Reagan in his
second term was moderated by his wife and people like Schulz who I greatly admire. In a sense
whenever there was a problem a decision she would have a lot of influence over him and Schulz and
Weinberger and others actually provided substance. I think that is a lesson to be learned in case we
have a who knows who will become president in the next term we’ll see.

So I acquired a different set of metrics and a different way of looking at India and
Pakistan from the perspective of the State Department. I was brought in in fact to help ease the passage
of the second aid package to Pakistan. But as my knowledge about the Pakistan nuclear weapons
program expanded I had a lot of questions and wrote a few memos. At that time when people asked me I
have a little visual aid device. When people come to my office and say Steve what about the Pakistani
nuclear program I’d point to this which in Hindi is teen bonder, three monkeys, see no evil, hear no evil,
speak no evil. I would say that’s the Pakistani nuclear program. Later on in a preface of a book by
Howard Schaffer I was able to explicate that more fully. A Pakistani friend explained to me well we lied
about your presence in Afghanistan which was true and we wanted you to lie about our nuclear weapons
program. So in a sense my relationship with Pakistan I learned then was based on mutual lying to
ourselves and to others which was a good learning experience. That is why the Schaffer book on
Pakistan I think is the best book written about Pakistan.

So let me make four major observations. I think my original interests and my original
research puzzle on South Asia was how does a state contain the army rather than being directed by the
army. How does the state manage the use of force without being managed by those who use and apply
force? I think the answer to that is in the case of Pakistan, Pakistan inherited that part of the raj which we
associate with British militarism and military dominance. I’d say the early part of the raj. India inherited a
different part of the raj a part of the raj which was more liberal and in a sense looked forward to
independence of India. I remember in one of my great experiences with the London Way and a bunch of
former retired Indian Army Generals and Indian officials and mason was a liberal forward looking guy.
India inherited that aspect of the British tradition. Pakistan inherited another aspect of the British tradition.
So I think they inherited different traditions and Pakistan is stuck in this endless loop of military
intervention. Not all the interventions are blameless. When I met Musharraf right after his coup of
throwing out Nawaz I said you know it had to come because Nawaz had run off the rails with acting
unconstitutionally. I hope the General Raheel doesn’t come to the same conclusion. Because as I told
another Pakistan army chief you can’t run the country but you won’t let anybody else run it either and I
think that is Pakistan’s dilemma.

In India the military excluded from power and decision making and efficiency does suffer.
We argue that (inaudible) in control of the military or civilian oppression of the military and Indian defense
policy may suffer from it but it gains enormous amount by being directed by civilians. Pakistan there are
very few civilians who understand military defense issues. I also wrote two articles and they’re both in the
book. One on (inaudible) I think that was my first article and one on Indira Gandhi. In there I explored the
possibility of authoritarianism in India. I think you still see elements of this in Modi but in a sense Modi is
coming to office as Prime Minister and this will be a test of the Indian constitution. I’m pretty sure my own
judgment is that the Indian constitution will be able to contain any authoritarian tendencies that Modi may
have. We will see.

Finally let me say a few remarks about U.S. policy. I think it is as problematic as ever.
I’m now engaged in a little tiny project looking at what American think tanks have said about India for the
past 400 years basically. Then jumping quickly to Catherine Mayo who was sponsored by the British and
went to India and did a study of India. Looking at the American think tank studies including yours Alyssa
most recently there is an interesting transition between them. I remember when I first went to India every
American let me also point out that I tried to avoid the U.S. Embassy as much as I could. I didn’t want to
have any connection with them at all. There was an academic view the the Embassy is bad place for
reasons that are still not clear. Every American going to India was sort of expected to lecture the Indian’s
about birth control and family planning. The next group of American’s came over and lectured the Indian’s about sanitation. Third there was also Kashmir wanted to solve Kashmir. And then another wave of American’s argued with the Indian’s about their ties to the Soviet and finally a wave of Americans went to India and criticized the nuclear program. I saw each wave entering and leaving and the Indian’s greeted us all with respect. A cup of tea and totally ignored what we said.

I remember meeting a senior Indian official and he came to me and said Mr. X came to me and said “didn’t even have time for a cup of tea” and talked to him as if he was reading a list of demands. When I talked to the American official it turns out the American official didn’t have time for a cup of tea and did read a list of demands. So I thought that was complete misunderstanding how the Indian’s react to conversation. The American official should have had a cup of tea, worked in his talking points during the conversation but he didn’t. The meeting was basically useless. Each American who came over didn’t affect the scholars that much but certainly the officials were affected by this. This Indian’s were busy lecturing us about our ills and our problems and I remember the first time I went to India I went (inaudible) and there were two questions I always got in this order. First was why do you discriminate against blacks? What is your race problem in American? Having been involved in the American civil rights movement I fully understood the questions. But I also it turns out that Indian’s after the 1965 law changed how he told me about it when we met in Delhi and the number of Indian’s in America increased and the complaints about American racism went down rapidly.

The other question was always still would be why do you support Pakistan? So the Indian’s would have their own questions and they would lecture us. I think that is one of the pleasures of being in India.

I think there’s a new generation of American scholars combined with a new generation of scholars from other countries including and especially South Asia, really good. They get access to documents that I could never dream of having and they’re writing good history for the most part. So I think the quality of our scholarship in South Asia is much better.

In fact, I hesitated to republish my old stuff because I wasn’t sure how much value there would be in it but I think the stuff on cast and touchability in India was first and really has enduring value.

So I hope that these papers and my other writings will do some good in trying to explain
America to India and Pakistan. Also trying to explain these countries to America and to some extent these countries to each other.

Finally, I just read a fine monograph by Dincha Mystery. And Dincha was right when he observes that India and the U.S. are aligning across a number of issues. So I see the process inching forward during the Modi visit and I described India as an Asian France. I don’t think we need to underestimate or oversell but we must be aware of the many things that could go wrong. I could list these but it would make you unhappy. A lot of things could happen. But another student has noted in an email today that alignment and alliance are not the same. When you’re allied the alliance encourages you to overlook other differences. If you’re aligned that means just paralleled policies in one sector or another.

The reason the council on foreign relations report was you called for a joint venture. So India and the U.S. should get engaged in joint ventures across a number of issues which we’re doing issue by issue. So limited partnership is the right term. I decanted from the report because I had some problems with it. I think U.S. India differences on Pakistan in particular are the real sticking point. Both of us see China as a problem in the future which may not be problems. The Chinese are aware of our anxieties about China. Pakistan is not a problem for the future. We just don’t know what the Pakistani’s are up to. In writing a book on crisis in South Asia it turns out the several of the crises were provoked not by Pakistan but by Indian. I was told this was the last time India could have a war with Pakistan and strip them of their nuclear weapons without going nuclear. I think there is reason to be concerned about India Pakistan relations. That’s why I understand but I disagree with the so called dehypenation. We can’t dehyphenate two countries which are each other’s worst enemies.

So let me conclude there and thank you for coming.

MS. MADAN: Thanks Steve and we’ll come back to the question of hyphenation and dehyphenation and rehyphenation as well as talking about what we might see in the future. Before that Alyssa your comments on the book as well as Steve’s work from your vantage point as both a scholar and former policy maker.

MS. AYRES: So I have a few things to say and they’re grouped in to two parts. The first is a couple of observations on the top chapter of Steve’s book. This book is a great pleasure to read. It is a collection of many of which I had not read earlier so it was nice to be able to have them all in one place.
Some of what Steve also does and I just highly recommend this for everyone including if there are students here are young scholars Steve provides advice. His lessons in life that he’s learned from five decades of working on the region and crossing these sectors between an academic career a think tank and being a government official. I should also note that one of the things. There are a couple of anecdotes in the beginning that really are laugh out loud funny. He told you one of them with his themed (inaudible) but another one involves being in Indian in kind of during the peak anti American phase with Gandhi. He goes to visit some former colleagues some friends who are faculty at JMU and they grab him and pull him in an office and lock the door. They say you don’t understand what it is like now. We can’t even reply to your aerograms. It was another era thankfully one that has past but it does go to show another observation that Steve makes that there is a whole generation of American’s who didn’t have deep research contact or deep scholarly contact with India because of this problem of visa’s being denied and like a whole generation that missed out on gaining that knowledge.

So Steve draws six lessons from his many decades long career and I just want to flag three of them and for the other three you should read the book. The first one of these that I think is relevant and applicable to anyone is make lemonade. You’re going to get setbacks in your career and in your life. Find a way to take that setback and turn it into something useful and valuable. I just think that is really important for everybody to remember for everything. I wanted to make sure to mention that.

The second lesson is the importance of what he calls time spent doing something else, building your intellectual capital. If you’re not working on the book manuscript that you have underway you can write an Op-ed. That’s building your broader, intellectual capital. Spend a couple hours studying a language. Work on another project that is related. I don’t think he means go watch TV for 5 hours but he means doing something related that can help broaden and support your pursuits.

The third thing that I really admired Steve for listing which I also agree and think is critically important is the value of learning a language, something that takes a lot of work and requires upkeep but will create a deeper understanding over the course of a career. That is something Steve thought was so important that he listed as one of his top six lessons.

Let me make a few observations on some of the themes that Steve draws out in a set of these essays. The first that I’d like to note is the importance of India as a global power. This may sound
now today like a common place observation. Well it was not in the seventies. From my own work I had actually tracked down and purchased a copy of that 1978 volume that Steve wrote with Dick Park. This is it an original which I got from some online used book place. But really Steve was saying back in 1978 the emerging importance of India in regional and world politics must be more broadly recognized in the United States and elsewhere. He was signaling something at a time I think U.S. policy makers weren’t prepared to entertain as a prospect. India just didn’t seem like it was going to rise as a great power. It was too much of a leap to be thinking about but Steve actually called that one before anybody else.

The second theme that I’d just like to flag is the great challenges that continue with Pakistan and with U.S. relations with Pakistan. If you look at some of the three different essays that Steve has included in the collection, one from 1986 there is a quote there. Pakistan remains a state on the verge of disorder. I think that probably is as true today as it was in 1986. 2003 the Jihadists threat to Pakistan. Again I think that is probably as true today as it was in 2003. In 2011 Steve wrote about the botched U.S. alliance with Pakistan and what that had meant for the country’s trajectory. I think we’re still trying to sort through those questions even today. So I think that Steve’s observations over time continue to be just as relevant as they were when he wrote them.

In that same vain I would also note that Steve’s work on nuclear proliferation in South Asia, strategic questions in the region. Interestingly not only does he write about this as a subject in his book but he also reflects upon his own involvement in the subject and his own trajectory from being somebody who was interested in strategic studies to becoming somebody who was focused on the military and kind of the sociology of militaries internally and then returning to the strategic questions through the course of events through South Asia and growing nuclear programs there. Again I think these questions remain as relevant now. They’ve morphed the shape of the questions are a little bit different than they were in 1964 and 1967 and 1968 and 1974 but we’re asking some different kinds of questions now about what U.S. policies should be.

Two other things that Steve has mentioned. He spoke about wanting to republish the paper on disasters and I just couldn’t agree more. I think that would be great if you could republish this work. I absolutely agree with you that there should be a much greater emphasis on disaster studies in the U.S. academic and policy community. I actually found that disaster diplomacy was something that
was very, very valuable and helpful. It was something that I worked on in the State Department as we worked with the government of Nepal to try to plan for a likely earthquake because there are some kinds of disasters some countries are known to be vulnerable to. We know Bangladesh is going to have cyclones. We have done a lot of disaster diplomacy helping build cyclone shelters. We can expand our disaster relief, humanitarian assistance cooperation and planning exercises. This is a whole area where there is actually a lot more that we could be doing and it can play an important role in saving lives. So I think this is a critical area.

The last note Steve did highlight the importance of language. When you gave thanks in your acknowledgements for the kind of academic training that you had it is not the kind of academic that political science gives today. What you experienced at the University of Chicago was a kind of peak area of study well roundedness that I don’t people emphasize enough today. I think that that causes people to miss out on a roundedness and an ability to understand and have a flexibility and exposure to different influences. I also think that one of the challenges we face in the United States is not prioritizing the study of South Asia high enough on our list and by that I’m concerned about U.S. students studying abroad, language enrollments the amount of funding that we allocate to foreign language and area studies and our national resource centers. When you look at the data on this I think probably everybody in the room agrees that India and South Asia is an important region in the world we should all place great importance on this. I think we’ll all say yes and well you look at the data and you’ve got almost twice as many American students who go study abroad in Costa Rica then go to India. When you look at the data on language enrollments there are four times as many U.S. students that study Korean then study all of the Indian languages combined. That would be much worse if you were just picking Hindi instead of all the Indian languages combined. When you look at the NRC data India is in the bottom half of the levels of funding. So when we think about what it means to be engaged with and have a better understanding of a complex region that is not it has its own ways of thinking about itself and its own ideas about its direction in the world I definitely think that we as a country are not putting enough attention on the region as we should. I think that Steve’s collections of essays show the kinds of insights that result when you do put that level of attention on the region. Those were my observations and congratulations on this collection which really is a lot of fun to read.
There is one other anecdote in there which I probably won’t tell correctly but he talks about traveling in Pakistan and heading up some place and people started calling him Mr. Steven’s. Somebody asked where is Mr. Cohen and he said oh he couldn’t make it.

MS. MADAN: Mr. Daniel you’ve been a scholar and a policy maker but you’re now in the role that Alyssa is referring to which is an educator as well as a professor of a global policy program. So if you could comment on how you see student’s looking at the region and also your comments on the book as well.

MR. MARKEY: Well thank you. Let me just begin by saying it is an honor to be on the panel. It was a pleasure to read the book. Just to address Tanvi’s point briefly today I announced to my students that we’ll be going to India for our research projects. I haven’t yet heard back what they said to that announcement. I’m hoping it was a rousing course of hurray but I will see personally just how challenging it is to bring graduate students, these are Master students, mid-career students to do work in India in 2016. I am sure it will be easier than some of the challenges Steve faced in his earlier career but I think all is not quite so easy yet. Let me go through some of my thoughts beginning with thoughts about the role that Steve has had in the community and some of these will sound familiar. I will be relatively brief in them but I think it is worth saying.

Steve is a bridge and I mean that in three different ways. He’s a bridge between the United States and the region and you can see this first and foremost by the students that he’s trained many of whom are from the region and have returned the region. Some of whom are practicing here and basically working on these topics and building further bridges between the United States and South Asia. He has been a bridge between policy and the academy and here at Brookings there are a more than a few people like that but by enlarge this is an unusual position to hold in the United States. As time and policy planning and his subsequent dedication to thinking about policy and strategy seriously including some of the work that was not in this book but is done on future scenarios and things like this. These are important and address the needs of the policy community in some interesting ways.

I think partly what has made Steve so valuable to Washington and to the wider policy community in the post 9/11 era when we were lucky enough that he happened to be here. So that’s a credit. Not all academics are interested in that and not all of them are capable of making that leap.
Then he is also a bridge between regional studies and security studies. Alyssa is right his training prepared him to think as a regional scholar to have the language and the history and some familiarity with the culture spending time in the region but he is also unusual in that he took this and turned it to issues in many cases not exclusively issues of security. That too I think is quite unusual and deserves attention.

Now Alyssa had a prop, Steve had a prop I don’t have a prop but I did go back this morning. I keep my emails as many as I can on my hard drive and I went back to the first email that I exchanged with Steve in 2000. I was a graduate student finishing up a dissertation which included a chapter on India’s nuclear program and Steve was kind enough to read it even though he said he was in the midst of releasing one of his many books so he was quite busy at the time. He did read it, he did provide comments and a comment that stuck with me and the reason I wanted to go back to the that first email today and reread it I want to make sure I had it right. One of his comments has nothing to do with the substance of my paper. It had to do with the way that I had characterized a statement by a relatively junior Indian academic. I had characterized it in kind of a sarcastic way. I was actually quoting another American academic who had done the same. Steve said there is no point to this. This young guy is doing good work and it doesn’t do anyone any good to come across with this kind of a scathing, sarcastic comment. For some reason that really stuck with me because so few academics are gracious in that way and who would look out for young scholars and would care to make sure that when you characterize things you go after their ideas. Steve has been fearless about going after ideas. He is critical about many, many things and I’ve been in the room when he has been critical of them and he is not scared to make it clear when he disagrees with you. But he doesn’t bring it to a personal level. That is something that I think we can all learn from.

Second big point. Some points that stood out from reading the book and I’ll focus on two. The first is Steve’s repeated frustration with the U.S. inability to grapple with the challenge of proliferation in a regional way. To think about nuclear proliferation in a broad but focused on South Asia and Asian context. Not to think about it in terms of global or non-proliferation treaty terms. Beyond that to think about it he suggests and I think he is absolutely right. You’ve got to think about it not as a technical issue, not as a legal issue but as a political issue, as a question of broader security and preoccupations of
history, of perceptions within the region. You can’t understand proliferation if you don’t think about these things. Beyond that he adds the need to think about nuclear issues in South Asia including China which I think is only getting more important as time goes on and it is not limited to the nuclear area.

Then he’s open minded enough to play around with some of the concepts about the potentially stabilizing but also potentially destabilizing aspects of nuclear weapons. Introducing nuclear weapons into a region. And to do an analysis of the consequences there. To talk about the basics of threats posed by security, safety, accidents, onward proliferation. All of those are real and yet there is also the potential to be something stabilizing about introduction of nuclear capabilities into South Asia as well. He’s willing to entertain some of these ideas and to play around with them.

Of course the goal on non-proliferation has changed radically over the period of time that his book covers. In the earlier essays it is about making sure that India and Pakistan don’t proliferate or at least don’t weaponized and then later and now it is more a matter of dealing with arsenals that exist and finding ways to make sure that they don’t proliferate more rapidly and in ways that are increasingly destabilizing.

This argument on strategic ends or aspirations of states and the prescription which comes from that which you need to think about altering costs and benefit calculations on the part of the actors themselves. You need to try to get into their heads and figure out what makes them tick and what might make them change is so much smarter in my view as compared to focus on legalistic or technical issues of non-proliferation that makes the work shine.

The second thing that I pulled from the book is an even greater frustration and I think his remarks point this out with U.S. policy with respect to Pakistan. He writes in 2011 Pakistan’s current plight and troubled prospects can only be understood in the context of its having embraced the role of America’s most allied ally. So he puts American and its role with Pakistan at the heart of the matter as well. He sees in this essay that the U.S. alliance with Pakistan actually strengthened the army. At the expense he writes left liberal forces. He makes the point that the United States has to infrequently pressed for democracy, thought seriously about promoting education or development or the civilian side of politics in Pakistan that our focus is to narrowly been on security. Now he also notes the Pakistani paradox is that the army is a barrier to political extremism but it can’t promote modern institutions that
would enable Pakistan to thrive. So the army is at the center both as something that wards off some real threats but also reduces the prospect that you get positive reforms and I think that is exactly right.

Third point and I’ll wrap up on this. My sense on the policy issues today. As we think about where we sit right now in the Obama administration coming to a close we have to imagine that the next White House whatever it is is going to be thinking afresh about South Asia. My sense is that particularly as our efforts in Afghanistan have waned from where they once were many of the issues that Steve runs through in this book some of the longstanding issues that have come up again and again in South Asia we’ll begin to peak back in and really be at the fore of the next administrations thinking. So nuclear non-proliferation, the rise of India, troubled Pakistan and Kashmir. Kashmir as both a cause and symptom of the end of Pakistani troubles. I think he also points to the increasing role as I would see it that China would play into the region.

On Pakistan I think it would not be a surprise that the pendulum is swinging back from a high point Obama administration ambition for Pakistan and now maybe not necessarily to the abandonment of years past but at least to a very narrowed focus, a restricted ambition, less attention, less concern. These even to the things like to education and development and so on these are the kinds of things that Steve has written extensively and critiqued the United States for doing in the past. So one of the questions in my mind is as the U.S. vision on Pakistan narrows as we devote less attention and less resources to Pakistan are we going to commit some of the same probably misguided policies as we have in prior decades. On India with the Modi visit looming it is really encouraging to see how much the relationship has changed compared to the bad old days that he writes about in the book.

But the question for the next administration is how to keep up this positive momentum. What are the lessons from history that will allow us to do this to extend our role with India from narrow points I think of defense cooperation to a broader agenda?

I think I’ll wrap up on Kashmir because very little has been said on this but Steve writes about it in the book extensively. One of things I thought was most interesting is he says time will not heal Kashmir in a 1995 essay. And he suggests that the only thing the United States shouldn’t do is nothing. I have to say for the last two U.S. administrations we have done relatively little on Kashmir. It hasn’t been the centerpiece on our focus there except when it comes to crisis management. So the question there
that I have for the next administration is will it take on a more ambitious approach in Kashmir, will it also see that time does not heal anything. Will it also believe that the only thing we shouldn’t do is nothing? I don’t know but I think these are the kinds of questions people should be considering and Steve’s book is a good way to get them into it so thank you.

MS. MADAN: Thanks Dan. Steve?

MR. COHEN: I wanted to point out because I skipped a page earlier. Dan has raised one of the issues, which is nuclear weapons. There is a long chapter in there it was something I wrote in the eighties or nineties about my views on proliferation. Really it argues that I agree with the comments that there could be one, two or three exceptions to the NPT Israel and even Pakistan so I think we have to see it in regional context. But an earlier essay I wrote which is not in the book but you’re the first to hear this. I wrote a piece in 1964 or 1965 on why India should acquire tactical nuclear weapons. Think about that for a minute. To deal with the Chinese. Because then “the Pakistani’s were not a nuclear threat”. I want to republish it. That showed that my training as a nuclear strategist turned off by Herban Kahn among others and I went to India because it was one place in the world where they were saying sensible things about nuclear weapons.

The other general point I want to make which nobody has touched on here is that I learned this from other Indian British army generals is that the partition of British India destroyed the strategic unity of South Asia. The unity had been created by the moguls and the British simply carried it forward and added muscle to it in the shape of the Indian army which is what my dissertation was about. So Indian power now that’s Indian’s great strategic problem. When Modi comes here his one big strategic problem that is how to get Pakistan off our agenda. But Pakistan is not a trivial state. India had its chance to destroy Pakistan at one time and in a sense they chickened out. After Pakistan went nuclear they couldn’t use force to destroy. I was asked by a senior Indian strategist who shall remain nameless. Steve you take care of the nukes we’ll take care of the Pakistan army. I thought that doesn’t work. In other words, you can’t disarm Pakistan. So Indian power as a whole which is increasing is always going to be Indian power minus Pakistani power. The conclusion I draw is that you can’t produce a strategic hedge in the future at all. It can’t be India it can’t be Pakistan.

MS. MADAN: Steve, Alyssa, Dan and you have talked about a number of themes that
continue to resonate over time, things you’ve looked at before and are still some of the questions and themes we grapple with today. What are the biggest changes you’ve seen in the region?

MR. COHEN: The decline of anti-Americanism. Willing to treat us for what we are or what we’d like to be.

MS. MADAN: In all of South Asia or just India?

MR. COHEN: In India particularly. In Pakistan anti Americanism has grown but for good reason. When you bomb your closest ally regularly with drones you’re not loved in that country. We’ve been bombing Pakistan regularly with drones and Pakistani government will admit in fact that some of those drone attacks were on behalf of Pakistan. So the anti-Americanism in Pakistan is very deep. Simply for the United States as a culture and as a country as an idea is powerful both in India and in Pakistan.

MS. MADAN: Alyssa I’m going to turn to something Steve said about Prime Minister Modi’s visit here and his focus on Pakistan. In the region however Prime Minister Modi has made it a point to note that India’s South Asia policy will not just be Pakistan policy. I want to talk about the other South Asian countries that we rarely talk about but that are getting attention. We talked to some extent and Steve said the region doesn’t get enough attention to some extent and to quite a large extent in India’s case; India and Pakistan are talked about for different reasons of course. But in terms of as somebody who has worked on U.S. policy towards Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, how much attention do these countries get and when we talk about South Asia is how much more attention do we need to pay to these countries?

MS. AYRES: So I think we’ve seen ups and downs with the U.S. policy community in U.S. general attention to the region. With the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan I think you saw in fact there was a period where I’d argue between 2005 and maybe 2011 or so the term South Asia here in Washington had almost in a sense stopped including India. I would go to things and people were talking about South Asia and it was only about Pakistan and Afghanistan. So I think India is now back in that concept of what South Asia means. For the other smaller countries, I think it really depends on what the issue is. I think the level of attention is much lower than it would be for any of these three other countries but certainly in the case of Bangladesh there is a very, very deep economic relationship with the
Bangladeshi garment industry and U.S. retail brands and foot wear and garment apparel manufacturers. So when you had the collapse of Rona plaza in 2013 all of the sudden this was front page news. I would walk into a store and hear people talking about Bangladesh which you almost never hear happening. You don’t hear that as much anymore. Sri Lanka you hear about from time to time ambiently in the policy community there actually was a lot of attention to Sri Lanka particularly with the end of the conflict in 2009 and moving forward from there. The United States sponsored some resolutions in the UN Human Rights Council for example focused on Sri Lanka. So in the policy community a lot of attention I’m not sure a narrower issue like something happening in the Human Rights Council gets broader attention.

Not as much attention to Nepal I’m sorry to say. It is a great country but not as much attention. It is just much smaller. There is a lot of development and humanitarian focus. With the earthquake there was a lot of new coverage but of course not sustained. Now of course Nepal faces the issue of rebuilding and the press has gone away and the assistance hasn’t been delivered out to where it needs to go so that is something we should be focusing on but I think it is off the radar screen. Bhutan and Maldives is pretty much off the radar screen.

MS. MADAN: The Ambassador Rich Verma just made his second visit to Bhutan. I was just at a conference recently where one of the themes that came up and a constant question of can we really talk about South Asia in the (inaudible) sort of way anymore. With India’s act east and look west and with the Pakistan looking to the Middle East but also now with the China Pakistan economic corridor as it becomes a reality and India’s attention to the Indian Ocean region along with other countries as well. Can we really think about a South Asia as we did before? Can it be studied that way? Is the U.S. government structured and I would like all of you to comment because Alyssa I know you and Steve have talked about how the U.S. government is structured to deal with the region? Dan to start with you can we think about this in the same how do we think about the role of China in particular but also the U.S. and Japan in this region?

MR. MARKEY: Sure. I mean the short answer is I think you’re exactly right. The region doesn’t make that much sense, the region of South Asia as an analytical unit. In some ways maybe it never did but it makes less and less sense as you look forward. Principally in my mind because of China less so from some of these other developments. I’ll give you a for instance. There is a fact that
gets tossed around frequently sort of intraregional trade in South Asia is less than in any other region in the world. I've always hated that one because I think about their trade with China which is a next door neighbor which is ruled out by the artificiality of drawing where South Asia is from being an intraregional trade partner. I think how silly is this. So which isn't to deny the obvious historical connections between India and Pakistan and all the rest but to suggest that from an analytical perspective it doesn't make that much sense because it doesn't tell you what is actually happening in terms of connections between these countries and their nearby neighbors. As China becomes more invested in this region and is likely to play a greater role on every front from starting on a commercial level in trade and so on moving into infrastructure development and investment and then beyond that into diplomacy and military and strategic issues. As that happens this will be less the case.

That said on the pure bureaucratic management front you have to draw the line somewhere. You have to have a bureaucracy that has pieces to it and all of those lines wherever you draw them will be problematic. One of the things that I found is if you do not have a South Asia or as it has been a South Central Asia bureau separate from the rest of Asia then you're likely to get trampled on by big issues having to do with China and Japan and East Asia and Northeast Asia. So there can be utility tying it off and having a separate piece. But we all saw many of us watched as the AfPak thing got created. Some of us though including myself thought there might be utility in bringing Afghanistan and Pakistan back together because as is often forgotten they were actually separated before the AfPak think happened and then we all looked in horror as AfPak became a thing that became kind of exclusive from other connections. So anywhere you draw the line you're going to have a problem and you just need to be cognizant about what the likely consequence of that bureaucratic redrawing is going to be.

MS. MADAN: And of course the lines are drawn differently in the different places. Steve you've written about this.

MR. COHEN: Yes I'll make a few points. The original title of this book was going to be Parody of Hindustan and South Asia. Hindustan was the name of the entity that the mogul empire called itself which was a unified South Asia from Calcutta to the Khyber Pass. It was the largest integrated economic zone in the world at the time, astonishing. The British simply took it over and in a sense the British raj was the largest integrated economic unit. That's the fact that South Asia is chopped
up so much is so important. Another historical fact which is often forgotten it was the United States that made Chinese unification possible by defeating Japan. When we defeated Japan in 1945 in 1947 the British partitioned South Asia we enabled the creation of another Asian great power and essentially destroyed South Asia. Those are two things that can’t be changed and we don’t want them to be changed. We don’t want Japan to come back as a major balancer with China. Some do Donald Trump may but I don’t.

MS. MADAN: Alyssa do you have anything on the lines and potentially on the realignment of how the lines are drawn by a new administration?

MS. AYERS: Yes I think that the creation of a separate AfPak entity in the State Department makes it harder to coordinate because parallel structures make it hard to coordinate. If you’ve got a proliferation of more structures, you have more people who are not working on the same thing all the time and it makes it more challenging. I think Dan would have been in the State Department when the Central Asian countries were moved out of the European Bureau so he would remember what that was like. I think the idea of that configuration was to try to make sure that there was more attention to thinking about a broader region of economic and political engagement from all of the countries all the way out to India as a kind of regional, economic vortex. Having the AfPak piece carved out of that makes that harder to do. I certainly I am not saying that we should spend less attention focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan these are issues that require a lot of diplomacy, a lot of multilateral diplomacy. You need to have a lot of people who are doing the foot work on all of this having lots of conversations all the time. But I think it would make more sense to have those countries back in a regional bureau so you have one assistant secretary who is the senior person for the region and it makes communication and coordination at least the lines are a lot clearer.

MS. MADAN: Are the concerns that you see from some in India that this will lead to a rehyphenation of U.S. India relations being seen from the U.S. Pakistan person. You’ve written that you don’t think that’s going to happen.

MS. AYERS: I think that is a complete misinterpretation of what the idea of hyphenation and dehyphenation means. I think Steve started to get at some of these questions in his opening remarks too but dehyphenation was a process of trying to shift the way the United States
formulated its foreign policy from trying to balance every action taken with one country with something similar toward the other. The dehyphenation moment in the Bush administration was to say we have different interests with India then we do with Pakistan and we’re going to pursue those separately. We’re going to look for the best relationships we can have with each country. What Steve is now getting at today is this question of for example with the terrorism issues in Pakistan. It becomes more challenging to try to pursue answers to that, more challenging to try to deepen our strategic relationship with India when there are unresolved sources of terrorism in Pakistan that the country is not doing what it should be doing. It makes it much more difficult as a U.S. policy maker to try to work with both countries on parallel tracks if we are not able to address that specific question.

MS. MADAN: Steve we’ve got a few months left in the Obama administration and potentially a big Modi visit coming up in June but since we’ve just got a few months left what is your assessment of the Obama administration as policy towards South Asia on a region as a whole?

MR. COHEN: I’d give it a B plus. Not really still a professor. Not really a creative but I think they learned something from experience. They’ve managed a Pakistan relationship pretty well even though it was in deep crisis for a while and I think they’ve continued the tie with India. But the overall if I had my druthers I’d put a bronze above the desk of the President and everybody else. We look for the common interest we have with India regarding Pakistan which is to make Pakistan a moderate country. We have that common interest with Pakistani’s also. Maybe not the Pakistan army but with most Pakistani’s. I think we should focus and keep in our minds the shared interests we have with the state in South Asia whether it is India or Pakistan and not whether it conforms to our laws or not because that leads us in different directions. So what’s the most important thing we have in common with India I think the one things is seeing its development in divergence and continuing as a democracy. I think that is a vital of American interest in its own rite. But also the moderation of Pakistan because you can’t just try Pakistan that would be too costly and too dangerous for everybody. Pakistan isn’t an achieving regime change in their own country.

MS. MADAN: Dan you can comment on that but also for the next administration you mentioned at least a couple of questions. But for the next administration coming there will obviously be a lot of attention in the Middle East whether the president likes it or not. But in terms of South Asia
what are some of the key challenges and opportunities that you think a new administration especially in its first couple of years might face?

MR. MARKEY: I’ll try to combine the two. My assessment of the Obama administration one of its core strengths on South Asia is in some ways reflected in the upcoming Modi visit which is in spite of the fact that the world has been enormously challenging and has pulled the United States in a wide number of different directions where clearly this administration would prefer not to be it still has expended time and attention at senior levels on India and not in a moment of crisis or in the service of one particular agenda say the civil nuclear deal as the previous administration had but in a workman like fashion that suggests a desire to maintain that over the long term. Now you can criticize it for not having more breakthroughs or not making more progress but simply given all the other things that are yanking the United States in different directions the fact that so much time and attention on India is worth maybe a higher grade then Steve gives it.

On Pakistan and Afghanistan however it depends how you construct your grading framework. Think back to how the Obama administration came in 2009 the kind of attention, ambition, resources, rhetoric was through the roof. And now Steve I haven’t worked on South Asia as long as you have but it had to be in the most exciting time for U.S. policy on South Asia I would think ever. Because this was out front and center and so if that’s the level of ambition if you’re grading on ambition we seriously undershot the mark. That is not a fair grading but I think it is worth thinking about where that ambition was, where we actually ended up. We’re not in crisis with Pakistan right now but as I noted before the pendulum has swung in a direction where I think the consensus view is narrowing and reducing ambition, narrowing attention, reducing resources. That may be the right way to go but until I would say the challenge for the next administration is tying that approach with the vision of how that isn’t just a way to save money and attention of U.S. top leaders and actually has the potential to get you something better. I don’t see it. So that to me is the challenge. How do you actually construct a vision, a strategy for dealing with Pakistan that has something marginally better or at least can give you some promise of warding off something significantly worse? Narrowing attention in and of itself doesn’t do that. So that’s going to be the challenge as I see it.

MS. MADAN: Steve do you have something else?
MR. COHEN: An interesting question would be how would grade India and Pakistan in terms of their relations with us. I’m not sure but I think the Indian’s would get a good grade.

MS. MADAN: Alyssa any comments on how you would assess the current administration with the caveat that you served in the administration?

MS. AYERS: It is not fair to ask me to grade my own work.

MS. MADAN: I was going to ask you in terms of the incoming administration whichever way that goes. What are the key challenges they’re likely to face?

MS. AYERS: I think we’ve hit on them. In fact, in the sort of perennial big questions that are contained in Steve’s collection of essays I do think as kind of a security question there is this perennial issue of thinking about what the dangers are in nuclear proliferation. That is something that anybody would have to think about. Finding a way as Dan said to keep the momentum going with India. India is growing fast. It is now the fastest growing major economy in the world. It is a very ambitious country. It has its own things it would like to be doing on the world stage. Maintaining that, keeping the defense relationship growing as it has been very important. We touch on a lot of these recommendations in our task force report. So I think you see a lot there that would be similar sets of issues to what anybody would be looking at today. There could be wild card issues. God forbid a terrorist attack that forces people to suddenly have to move into crisis mode. That would be the 2 a.m. call that you worry about getting.

MS. MADAN: We’re going to turn to questions. If you could please keep your questions short. Please go to a mic. Stanley Roth first.

MR. ROTH: A quick comment and then a question. I spent seven years working for the late Congressman Solarz to get legislation creating the South Asia bureau in the eighties. Astonishingly it was argued at the time it was unnecessary. It was linked or swallowed up by the near east bureau and it was argued that a mini regional bureau would only hurt policy not help it. Now it is inconceivable to think of it being the two bureaus together shows how times have changed. My question is for Steve or anyone else who wants to comment about the future of India China relations. I know there are many people in this town not really in the administration I think who think India should be a card against China in the way China was used as a card against the Soviet Union which doesn’t seem real.
But what do you see as both the potential and the limitations on the India China relationship.

SPEAKER: This is Larry from the embassy of Pakistan. Two points. One at the notion that Pakistan is a problem to be solved and when we talk about the opportunities and challenges in India and challenges that come to Pakistan again looking like would that be a good approach to do that? Do you think with what is happening the reality on the ground or interventions or interference in Pakistan by agencies from India as proved by one of the later (inaudible)? So have we gone down again to the three blunders and are we again in the same situation of not seeing what is happening?

SPEAKER: My name is Sunder. I'm a graduate student of government at Georgetown and an intern with the India chair at CSS. I want to thank Brookings for this wonderful panel. There are plenty of things I learned today. My question was I was going to zoom out a bit of the South Asian map and wanted to see that obviously the prime minister makes a number of visits to the U.S. but every time he visits Russia he also lays out a formal diplomatic statement that makes it look that India is equally serious with the Russians. I just wanted to ask does that create and ambivalence when U.S. looks at India and the overall India Pakistan China triangle.

MR. COHEN: I think Stanley the South Asia was bureau necessary desirable but South Asia itself does not carry its own weight. In fact, the Indian in the Pakistan dispute hurts India and Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, it is a state that has been mangled by its own army to some degree. I go back to my interview with Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck last commander of the old Indian army. Auchinleck was almost in tears when he said the partition of the two armies was the greatest tragedy of his professional career. But there were Indian politicians who saw that he had to get the Panjabi Muslims out of India into Pakistan because they would dominate whatever country they were in which turned out to be true. So I think Pakistan has the potential to be a major decent state I compare it with South Korea.

MS. MADAN: Alyssa do you want to respond?

MS. AYERS: Are saying does India’s relationship with Russia create ambivalences in its relationship with the United States? So India has never made any claim that it was seeking an alliance relationship from the United States. If you look at the many strategic partnerships that India has forged over the course of the last 10 years or under it’s with all of the major powers and a number of other powers around the world. So the answer is no that is not a surprise in any way. I think
people are prepared to see India have its eggs in a lot of different baskets and have very strong ties with Japan. Incidentally India had signed a vision statement for a possible strategic partnership with China so I think there is a lot happening for India in the way it crossed its relations with many other questions.

Sir to answer your question I think it would be a wonderful day if there were an opportunity to think about opportunities with Pakistan. I think Pakistan should be thinking about what it could be doing to better its economy and to be delivering training and education and better things for its citizens. The fact that there are challenges there is something that I think speaks directly to the challenges that Pakistani citizens face. I think this is something that Pakistani’s have to answer within themselves.

MS. MADAN: Dan do you want to comment?

MR. MARKEY: Yes just on the future of India China relations I think it is maybe one of the most important questions for the region and then by extension because they are so big for much more than the region. But it is also fascinating because you get these really different impulses voiced by let’s just stick with by Indian’s themselves. On the one hand there is a traditional connection with China having to do with more of a non-aligned movement style developing country, big country not seeing the U.S. leadership in the global system as one that necessarily serves their surfaces particularly well on trade or climate with things like this. There you see that combined with commercial interests and business and investment interests in seeing more Chinese money flowing into India. There you see an overlapping of India China interests. Then very much from a different perspective you hear Indian’s of a more geopolitical variety talking about their concerns about China as a threat and also principally seeing Pakistan as a wing of Chinese power of encircling Chinese approaches that will harm India’s capacity to rise as a power into the future. The subsidiary point on that is India is complaining to the United States that we don’t appreciate what China is doing in Western Asia as threatening to India in the same way that we seem to appreciate what China is doing in East Asia as threatening to our other partners and allies. Really fascinating and different views and that deep uncertainty is the overlay that we have to think about the future of the relationship within.

MS. MADAN: Next question.

MR. HURWITZ: Thank you very much for a great presentation. Ms. Ayers I may have
missed something. My name is Elliot Hurwitz. I'm a former World Bank staff member and a member of the intelligence community and I worked in the State Department from 1982 to 1986 under Secretary Schultz. You talked about nuclear proliferation in South Asia and unless I missed something it hasn't been discussed that much. So could you please explain what you meant by nuclear proliferation in South Asia. We know that Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons but are there other countries you're talking about?

MS. AYERS: I'm talking about Steve's book and the essays in his book.

MR. HURWITZ: Okay I'm sorry. I bought the book but I haven't read it yet.

MS. MADAN: Question over here.

MR. RONSOMY: Hi Dave Ronsomy. Those who can make you believe historical absurdities can make you commit policy atrocities. So when you talk about the hyphenation with India and Pakistan it stems from the understanding that starting from the mogul empire and then the British raj or the kind of best hours of modern day India and Pakistan. The mogul empires stretch from Pakistan to Islam. So going forward how does the opportunities created in the commercial space in India and also the security aspect containing our rising China versus combating radical Islam? So what is the alignment with India and the U.S. in that regard? Thank you.

MS. MADAN: We'll take these two questions over here and then go to the panel.

SPEAKER: Hi I'm Aushe I'm a student of transnational cities and economics. My question is related to Nepal. What do you think about India's conduct in the border blockade that happened recently after the earthquake and in regards to Nepal’s constitution? Mind you that Nepal’s constitution was passed with the large majority in the constitution assembly. Don't you think that the United States embrace of India and India’s foreign policy has rather created problems inside South Asia?

MS. MADAN: The question over there and then we’ll go to the panel.

MR. CONSARO: Hi Jay Consaro with the Hindu American foundation. Having seen the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 can you give some analysis on its birth as a secular nation and then its dissention into what is now a religious extreme hot bed? Also do you feel that the American president now or in the future should apologize for the failure of the U.S. administration in 1971 to prevent the killing
of primarily secular Bengalis and Hindus?

MS. AYERS: The tail end of your question was a view on India’s relations with Nepal over the constitution and the blockade. So I don’t think that the U.S. India embrace causes problems for India Nepal ties. I would separate these two pieces of your question. I think that India has a very firm belief on what it was hoping to achieve in pressing the government of Nepal to revise its constitution to provide greater space for the Medici community and for rites. The government of India says they did not impose a blockade. They say the truck drivers were hesitant to enter the border because of the protests that were going on. I am not able to adjudicate that dispute. I don’t know the answer to that. I’m not privy to any special information. I do agree this was a tragic situation after this earthquake. The assistance has not reached people in high villages where the earthquake epicenter was so there is still all this assistance that hasn’t reached people. There were shortages of fuel and food. I think this was a tragedy. I hope that protests which I gather are taking place again don’t create other problems for supply convoys to cross the border. But I don’t think the United States and its partnership with India necessarily creates problems at all for India’s ties with Nepal.

MS. MADAN: Anything on the current situation in Bangladesh or any comments?

MS. AYERS: No I’ll let Steve take that.

MS. COHEN: I don’t think the U.S. needs to apologize for its past policies even though I strongly disagreed with American policy during the East Pakistan uprising. But I think that has been widely misunderstood and misrepresented by a lot of people. In the case of regional economic cooperation, I think that is an important question. I think American policy should be to offer incentive especially to Pakistan with India that the expansion of Indian economic power throughout the subcontinent would not threaten Pakistan. Pakistan is desperately afraid of Indian economic power. We talked to senior Pakistani generals about this and they say if you give them an inch they’ll take a mile. So in a sense there are ways of providing assurances and guarantees and verification that the Indian’s limit their expansion to those agreements.

MR. MARKEY: I recently wrote on China Pakistan economic corridor. If you’re thinking about opportunities for the United States and Pakistan the question in my mind about the Pakistan China corridor is will it be as transparent and inclusive as the Chinese say and if so will that actually make space
for outside investors including American investors to be involved in useful ways and not just on the commercial side but also U.S. assistance moving forward. That’s an area where there is potential commonality of interest and opportunity but as yet we haven’t seen that it’s a door that we can walk through. I would add that unfortunately right now you live in Washington, you see and hear the mood about Pakistan is a narrowing and a constraining of ambition and a refocusing or military security and intelligence counter terror issues not on an expanding, broadening vision of opportunities.

MS. AYERS: Steve makes the point in his book that one of the problems is that in the United States our Congress never delivered trade privileges to Pakistan to help create an incentive that would really push more on economic growth.

MS. MADAN: We have time for three quick questions.

MR. KANAN: My name is Kanan and I have a question for Mr. Cohen. So you give a B plus grade to the Obama administration. What would be the grade given to the Modi administration given that he came into office without even having a visa privilege to come into this country. Now it has been two years what would be your grade?

DR. CHARLES: This I Dr. Charles and I’m a (inaudible) organizing panel of such distinguished people. As Alyssa mentioned about dehyphenation by Bush administration I think is a very fair analysis. The U.S. has independent relations with India. The U.S. relationship with Pakistan in the same way Pakistan has independent relation with China then Pakistan has with U.S. As Stan mentioned Pakistan is looking towards Middle East I think I would be inclined to differ on this. I believe U.S., India, and even Pakistan all these three countries are looking eastward. As Dan mentioned about the narrowed down relationship India is not a country it is a continent. One fourth of the population lives in that area. Pakistan is a reality. Both have (inaudible) and America will continue to demand engaged in these policies. Steve you have covered for half a century you combed the territory of India. How can they become good neighbors?

SPEAKER: I have a short question. What are the U.S. national interests in each of the constituents of South Asia?

MS. MADAN: Dan we’ll start with you.

MR. MARKEY: Let me talk about the grade for Modi. In my grading system I think if the
student learns something from me and the experience and the paper is reasonably well done gets a B. If I learn from the experience if it has creative it gets and A or A minus. In other words, if there is something new or creative in Modi’s foreign policy and I think he began at a very high level with the invitation to Pakistan particular to attend his inauguration. But then and it wasn’t necessarily his fault sort of degenerated into squabbles. So I give him a B plus verging on an A minus that the semester isn’t over yet and he may do something more impressive. He brilliantly handled his relationship with Obama despite his monogramed suit. He knew how to handle with America and American Congress in a way that no other Indian prime minister has been successful. His supporting staff gets a lot of credits.

MR. COHEN: For both I’d say read my books. I wrote a book on shooting for a century which ended very pessimistically about India Pakistan normalization. But I concluded that it is better that two ships pass in the night then rather two ships collide in the night and sink. So it could be worse in the case of India Pakistan but the book has a lot of suggestions and arguments about what could be done positively.

MR. MARKEY: I hate to say it but due to the constraints of time I would reiterate what Steve said on the U.S. interests in South Asia.

MS. AYERS: We’re here to celebrate Steve’s book and half a century of his scholarships so read the book.

MS. MADAN: You can buy the book outside and Steve will be signing the book. Thank you all for coming. A special thanks to the Cohen’s all of whom who have in different ways contributed to this book being possible and thank you to Steve and the panelists for coming.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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