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INDIA AT THE GLOBAL HIGH TABLE

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. COHEN: Good afternoon. My name is Steve Cohen. I'm a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program, and I'm affiliated with the India Project at Brookings, also there's an India Project in New Delhi. Today we are here for the launch of another book on India, but one that is exceptional, and remarkable in many ways.

Ambassador Schaffer, Howard and Teresita Schaffer have written a book which is an analogue to the superb book that they wrote on Pakistan, “How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States,” they’ve also written other books, both together and separately. I'll say some comments about that later.

India has been emerging and rising for decades, at least since the 1970s, and I think a study of those reports over the years that examine India said that it's about rise. And the book, the question that Schaffer has raised is, now that it is risen, and it's at the high table, what's it going to do and how will it do it? And I think those are critically-important questions.

Some would argue that perhaps it's not worth it, that India doesn’t want to be at the high table, and if I could just quote Groucho Marks and say, "I wouldn’t want to join the club that would have me as its member." But India does want at the high table, whatever euphemism that is, and I think we can interrogate the Schaffers on what they mean by high table. And their bios are in the handout, we also have discussions, both Ashley Tellis and -- to discuss the book -- discuss it also.

Let me begin by asking the Schaffers to briefly articulate the outlines of the book, the arguments and so forth, then we'll go directly to questions and comments.

MR. SCHAFFER: Thank you very much, Steve. Well as Stephen said, this is second book that we co-drafted. The first, which I hope many of you have read, dealt with the way Pakistan conducts its foreign relations. Especially the way it's negotiated over the years, with the United States. We found that Islamabad's approach often included efforts to involve this country in a guilt trip.

Washington, Islamabad would allege, had let Pakistan down, and failed to be a loyal ally despite all that Pakistan had done for the United States. Pakistanis were often convinced that America needed Pakistan more than Pakistan needed America. By the time we completed the book the rollercoaster-like US-Pakistan relationship had gone through three marriages, and two divorces as some

picturesquely put it.

When we set out on that earlier enterprise, some of our friends warned us that it could lead to a third divorce, overall. That we'd end up throwing in inkpots at one another, or whatever coauthors toss in this computerized age. To our pleasure we found the experience both pleasant and stimulating, and unthreatening to our marital ties. Indeed, it whetted our appetite to try our hand at another in-depth South Asian study, this one on Indian foreign policy and diplomacy.

We are delighted that you are with us today, as we launch “India at the Global High Table,” and we are grateful for all the support we've received from Brookings and so many of you as we wrote it. “India at the Global High Table” is a much more complex, and I would say, more ambitious book than our Pakistan endeavor. The story we spell out in it, has three parts. We survey the enduring themes that have characterized independent India's foreign policy from the Nehruvian years, to those of Narendra Modi.

Against this background we consider India's vision of its global role, or more correctly the competing visions Indians have had about that role. And we carefully examine India's negotiating style, the way its diplomats handle key issues, like those involved in the complex negotiations with the United States leading to the 2008 nuclear deal, as well as their dealings on such matters as security and commercial relations. Our examination draws heavily on the U.S.-India experience but it also involves India's multilateral negotiations, a very important aspect of Indian diplomacy, and its negotiations with its subcontinent of neighbors and China.

Let me start with what we have highlighted as the three main themes of India's foreign policy, its quest for regional primacy, and the security of its borders. It's insistence or nonalignment, or as this has been more often termed in the Post Cold War world, Strategic Autonomy. And especially after 1990, its growing use of its expanding economy, as a source of power on the international stage, ultimately, as the springboard for India's ascent to the global high table.

We look carefully at the way these themes have evolved, and illustrate them in a two-chapter snapshot of Indian foreign policy. The first covering the period from independence to the 1990s, the second, examining the dramatic changes at the end of the Cold War, and India's almost simultaneous decision to open its economy brought about.

Off periods were times of considerable flux, despite the retention of familiar shibboleths, old definitions were often redefined. Nonalignment, often much derided in the United States and elsewhere in the west, is an example, despite initial misgivings, Prime Minister Nehru acceded to demands from other third world country leaders, that the concept become institutionalized as a nonaligned movement.

In Indira Ghandi's day, India played a leading role in reinventing the NAM by making it a key player in efforts to bring about a more equitable economic balance between the north and the south. Though she resisted Fidel Castro's call for the NAM to recognize what he argued was its natural partnership with a Communist Bloc. Both Nehru and his daughter were prepared to jettison non-alignment when India's security needs seem to call for this; Nehru at the time of 1962 border war with China, Indira on the eve of a Bangladesh war in 1971.

Nowadays, nonalignment is largely viewed by Indians, except some old-timers who nostalgically persist in regarding foreign policy through a Cold War lens, as more or less, synonymous with strategic autonomy. We also thought it important to examine the structure of Indian foreign policymaking, especially the roles of the highly competent but undersized Ministry of External Affairs, and the powerful staff of the prime minister's office, led by the national security advisor.

We've looked more briefly at the Ministry of Defense where major decisions were made, not by the uniformed military brass, but by civilian Indian Administrative Service, officials whose background in such matters is often very limited. We looked, too, at the foreign policymaking role of parliament, so different from the U.S. Congress, and of the Indian states, especially those with ethnic connections with neighboring countries.

Finally, I should mention that we included a section on the growing role of Indian think tanks in the formation of foreign policy. Many of their brighter lights, retired officials, such as the late Kay Subramanian, and the late P.R. Chari, have been well known and much respected by many in this audience.

We come next to the vision of India's global role which animates its policy. There is wide consensus in India about the fundamentals. Who stand out? First, that India is unique, the exemplar of a great civilization, not bound by accepting what "everybody does". Second, that India must, above all,

preserve its strategic autonomy, it keeps its distance from all encompassing international associations and especially from "alliances" and India is famously a sovereignty hawk.

Beyond this starting point there are different points of view. We have distinguished among three major schools of thought. The first is the nonalignment firsters, whose view of India's role in the world was most powerfully shaped by Nehru's original concept of nonalignment. They regard India's power as driven by the force of ideas, and of seizing the moral high ground.

Then there are the broad power realists, who stress India's relations with the world's major powers. See India as well on its way to joining that select club, regard the Indian economy as an essential source of power, and take a more utilitarian view of foreign policy.

Finally, the hard power hawks, these tend to venerate India's historical arch realists, especially Kautilya, the 4th Century BC, Indian Machiavelli, for them military force is the primary currency of power. One can find elements of all three in India's foreign policy, but during the Post Cold War period the policy has been closest to the broad power realist model.

Prime Minister Modi comes out of the hard power hawk tradition, but has clearly grafted a strong emphasis on the economy onto the hawk's playbook. This is a backdrop for discussing India's negotiating style. And for that, I'll turn the table over to Tezi.

MS. SCHAFFER: Thank you. And let me reiterate Howard's thanks to all of you for being here. A lot of you have been friends and colleagues for many years, not to speak of the people on this platform. I believe I first met, Walter Anderson when we were both riding a bus between the State Department and the Universal North Building where I had my first apartment in Washington. So this goes back a long way.

About half of the book deals with India's negotiating style, which we have chosen to examine topic by topic and by forum. Some of our findings will be familiar to anyone who has dealt with U.S.-India official relations, the skill and sometimes stubbornness of India's negotiators for example. Other things may be more of a surprise, or maybe as they were for us, things we recognized but had never thought about before.

To whet your appetite, we've picked out a few examples that we think illustrate how India's vision of its global role has colored its negotiating approach. Let's start with India's uniqueness

and with defense trade. When the U.S. sets up a defense sales relationship with anybody, part of the package includes three, so-called, fundamental agreements, one of them embodies the U.S. legal requirement to keep track of the way U.S.-supplied equipment is being used, but the others establish procedures for things like mutual logistical support between the U.S. and friendly militaries.

This is a unique feature of the U.S. system, the exceptionalism that Howie talked about actually cuts both ways, and that's one of the complicating factors in U.S.-India relations. But in most cases, signing these agreements is regarded by both the U.S. and whoever the other party is, as a bureaucratic housekeeping matter. But all three, to India, look intrusive and seem to threaten its strategic autonomy.

The book describes how Hillary Clinton wrestled with this, and wrestled specifically with what the U.S. refers to as India's monitoring, and I'm sure you can all recognize how the term would make any self-respecting Indian official squirm. But I'm going to take a more recent example. Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, was in India earlier this month, as he was leaving it was announced that he and his Indian counterpart had agreed in principle, on a long, postponed logistic support understanding, this understanding, they didn't actually sign it, they just agreed on what it was going to look like, when there was an "it" to sign, and it's not actually clear that there was going to be a document to sign, I think that remains to be worked out.

But it was a classic work around; a new name, a more modest sound in procedural understanding involving case-by-case permission, and a lot of time and heartburn. India will have its own custom-designed agreement but it won't do what "everybody does."

My second example has to do with economic negotiations. Now the minute you are negotiating on economic issues, you are dealing with domestic problems which makes them more complicated, both for India and for other countries, and in this case my example is the United States. But the most difficult India-U.S. negotiations are multilateral, and hence they rely critically on building coalitions.

This is not an altogether comfortable exercise for Indian officials schooled in strategic autonomy, but it's one that Indians have learned how to do, and do somewhat differently in each forum. India's long-running effort to avoid expanding the World Trade Organization's reach into new areas, has

also, however, involved important solo performances and a willingness to just say, no. One example, the Trade Minister in the Congress Government that was in power at the time, used high profile brinksmanship in 2013 to reach agreement on a package deal involving trade facilitation measures, what that means is procedures that make the customs process not too burdensome, and similar -- essentially bureaucratic things.

And on limits sought -- the U.S. was sought on agricultural stockpiles that India wanted freedom to hold, essentially as needed. The Modi Government came in, and that agreement was reached in December, the Modi Government came in, in May, and within a few weeks had blocked that agreement, complaining that not enough progress had been on its agricultural concerns. This sent shock waves around Washington, and I think there were reciprocal shock waves in Delhi, that Washington actually cared so much.

Modi's trade agreements had blocked the agreement, but this time India had virtually no support. Everybody else was worn by the previous Donny Brook. India, however, carried on and it was willing to take a stand which at least, one author that we looked at, and wrote a fascinating book on the Mahabharat as a kind of model for India's negotiating style. I would suggest a little bit of salt in reading it, but it's a fascinating story.

India was willing to take a stand reminiscent of some the heroic figures of its ancient literature in order to clear to both its trading partners in the voting -- the voters at home, that India was willing to go to the MAT, having gone to the MAT it didn't actually get much change in the agreements that it had blocked, but it certainly made a statement with impact.

Third example, Howie mentioned as the first light motif of Indian foreign policy, the pursuit of regional primacy, add to this an acute of consciousness of relative power, and you come to the heart of what is similar and different about India's negotiations with its neighbors. With Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, India has played hardball, not always but it's been an important tool.

In 1989, for example, to prevent Nepal from getting too close to China, India maintained a 10-month blockade of that small land-locked country. The Nepalese believed that India reenacted this unpleasant episode last winter. India has a different explanation, but there were a fair number of close observers in India who would have disagreed with the Nepalese analysis.

The hardball game, however, was not available when dealing with China. There, India faced a different problem. Not just the fact that China was also a giant, but its giant status was not nearly as obvious in the early years as it has subsequently become. But for years, India had great difficulty dealing with one of the signature Chinese negotiating techniques, keeping silent on contentious issues, only engaging on an issue when it was good and ready.

In those days, and I'm talking about the period up to 1962, Nehru ran foreign policy personally, and he counted on his eloquence to persuade China. He suspected that Mao's silence was an attempt to control problems -- conceal problems and control timing, but he really couldn't find a good way to counter it.

The China-India War that took place a couple of years after one set of world talks has broken down, came as a devastating defeat for India and for Nehru personally. Eventually the China-India border negotiations resumed and became, I would say, a more mutually hard-nosed enterprise. But it took some getting used to.

Let me close with the mother of all negotiations between India and the United States, the U.S.-India Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation. And here, I owe a great deal to Ashley Tellis, but also too, some of the counterpart negotiators in Delhi. It was an extraordinary exercise because usually when you ask people from different countries about a negotiation, there are multiple episodes where they sound like they were on different planets, and only one episode in these negotiations got that kind of treatment.

This was not one negotiation, but a whole series, from the agreement in principle that George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed in 2005, to the statement the following year, on which facilities would be covered, a unilateral Indian statement that also had to be worked out in advance with the United States.

Through the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement, the so-called 123 Agreement agreed on in 2007, did set the terms for U.S.-India cooperation, but nearly brought down the Indian Government and scuttled the accord. To the Safeguards Agreement negotiated between India and IAEA, again, with the U.S. in the background, to the climactic finish, the nuclear Suppliers Group's Agreement in 2008 to grant a waiver for civilian nuclear trade with India, described by one of the U.S. participants as the most brutal

exercise in multilateral diplomacy he had ever seen.

In this last case, only the U.S. was formerly a party to the negotiations, but India's diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, was a critical part of the process. To get the full flavor of this negotiation and many others, you'll have to read the book. But we have two big takeaways from our research. First, never forget the importance India attaches to being handled as a unique representative of a great civilization.

Many of India's tactical preferences derive from this key feature. A case in point, India's dislike for a request when it isn't assured of a yes; and second, as we saw in the nuclear negotiations, a really strategic push from the top of both governments, can overcome both classes in negotiating style, and disconnects between the two systems that would normally be show-stoppers.

In a changing world, one has to ask whether India's negotiating practices, even those that have around since independence, or longer, will change. We believe that the answer to this question will reflect two important trends. First, India's economy; will it make another big bed on globalization as it did 25 years ago. And second, the relationships among the world's larger powers especially the United States and China, and their ties with India.

India is both drawn to and somewhat comfortable with the U.S. standing as the world's single-most powerful country. Its response is driven but also inhibited by India's continuing devotion to strategic autonomy and to avoiding difficult choices. For those who say that Indians and Americans are fated to grate on each other, and to suffer clashes of basic interest, I think the experience we've described, shows that a more promising future is possible, not guaranteed, but possible. To get there, both sides will need to understand how the other sees them, and sees the negotiating process, and we hope this book will help them do so. Thank you.

MR. COHEN: Thank you, Tezi. Let me apologize to Walter K. Anderson for displacing your name Walter, and also for not noting that Ambassadors Schaffer, plural, in addition to the distinguished experience as ambassadors in South Asia, serves sequentially as deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, now they were the leading policymakers for South Asia for a long stretch of time. Was that eight years total?

MS. SCHAFFER: I'll have to add it up. It was something like that.

MR. COHEN: Yes. At least two terms, maybe, and maybe more than that.

MS. SCHAFFER: Seven or eight.

MR. COHEN: Seven or eight, yeah, so it was -- So, the book reflects this incredible experience as participants in the process, and also academic attachments as we look back on what happened and what may happen in the future. So let's turn to Aslhey Tellis, with additional comments.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Thank you, Steve. Let me start by congratulating Howie and Tezi for really, a remarkable book. I knew the book was in the making when I first talked to Tezi many, many months, probably a few years ago, and I thought the book was going to be about India's negotiating practices. It certainly is that, but the discussion about negotiating practices is embedded in a really rich tapestry, which sort of goes way beyond the issues of negotiating practices itself.

And the book is actually the better for it, because you don't see the issues of negotiating practice as somehow detached from India's inheritance, which is extremely important to keep in mind, and the psychology of India's negotiators, India's policies as they have evolved over time, and the practice of Indian diplomacy as its being manifested in all those episodes. So, this is an extremely rich book, and I want to re-echo what Steve just said.

It really gains, not just simply from interrogating a huge literature, and there is a huge literature that both of them have read, as you can discern from the foot notes which run into many score pages at the end of the book. But the book is filled with a great deal of nuance, and a lot of telling detail, which comes essentially from being involved in the business of dealing with India. So, in that sense this is not just simply an academic book, which could have been written in a library, but is really a product of, you know, an intimate engagement with the country over many years and decades.

And I promise you that reading it will be an education for anyone including those of us who are sort of deeply and intimately involved in India. The multifaceted character of the book also makes it difficult to comment, because you can comment at it from literally, you know, a multitude of angles. And as I was thinking through what I was going to say this afternoon, I was struggling to figure out what might be a good way to summarize what I thought the key themes.

And I think the best way to approach to the book is to sort of compare India to previous great powers. And the point I want to make, which I think sort of captures the three derivative reflections

that I'm going to offer, is that a very funny thing has happened on the way to great power steps. If you look at the modernizing European states, as they became great powers in the modern period, what you see is a dramatic transformation in state capacity, coupled concurrently with a remarkable improvement in societal resources.

And so states become powerful just as their societies are also concurrently getting rich. And so becoming a great power had a particular kind of complexion, it was a really comprehensive effort that transformed both state and society simultaneously. The funny thing that has happened with great powers in recent years, is that states are growing in capacity microscopically, but on the edifice of still very substantial societal weaknesses, and that has a very important set of consequences for the new great powers, and I would both China and India in this category, even though China is obviously many orders of magnitude more capable and more impressive in terms of power accumulation than India is.

But this broad proposition leads me to make three points. Each of these points riffing off from themes in the Schaffers' book. The first point I want to make is that it's so clear from reading the description in the book that India has really a defensive position list in the international system, and very conscious of the fact that it's operating in a world that is being made by others.

That leads to the points both Tezi and Howie had reminded us of, which is an obsession with protecting sovereignty, a very, very concerted effort to protect independence of action, and of course a determination to preserving this local primacy within South Asia itself. These are fundamentally shaped in many ways by the recognition that India lives in a world, where it has to sort of defend its interests, because those interests will not be defended for it.

And each of these three elements, the obsession of sovereignty, the independence of action, and the desire to protect local primacy, actually poses, you know, important challenges to the United States as the United States seeks to develop a new relationship with India.

For example, in principle, the U.S. is as determined to protect its sovereignty as India is, but in practice the fact that the U.S. is a global power with global interests, often ends up putting it in a position where it has to intrude on the sovereignty of others. For a country like India, which is often at the receiving end of international politics, the protection of sovereignty becomes so important because no matter how strong the relationship with the United States is, India cannot concede the principle, but

stronger countries have a right to intervene, or a bridge to the sovereignty of others.

The same is true for independence of action; you cannot find a country that is as determined to protect its independence of action as the United States. But, again, because of the intersections between American global interests and Indian regional interests, the desire to protect the independence of action can sometimes lead to consequences that both sides neither intend nor desire.

And last, of course the question of protecting India's local primacy. In theory the U.S. is willing to recognize India as the local primate in the South Asian region, but if that principle is taken to its extreme, which means the United States having to defer to India on the important bilateral relationships that the U.S. shares with many South Asians partners, obviously that proposition is going to create tensions in the U.S.-India relationship. You see this most clearly in the case of Pakistan and in historic times with respect to both Nepal and Sri Lanka as well.

So, there is a good-news and there is a bad-news story here when one thinks about India's way in defensive positions. The good news is that as the United States and India evolve in their bilateral relationship, their interests converge more and more, and that makes the potential for tension between the two, it moderates the potential for tension between the two countries. But the bad news is, because we come from different planets, the importance of negotiating our differences, becomes critical.

The automaticity of outcomes in the bilateral relationship between India and the United States simply cannot be assumed, it has to be negotiated, and that means an enormous amount of effort has to be put into getting the right outcomes as opposed to simply presuming that they will arise. There is a second broad point that comes out of the sort of governing principle of India being a new style of (inaudible), and it's something that both Tezi and Howie flagged.

India is an unyielding negotiator, because it feels the impeditive, to protect its interest through sheer dint of effort. Unlike great powers in the past, like the United States, India does not have the resources to assure itself, that the outcomes that it prefers will inevitably ensure simply as a result of having superior capabilities.

So, because India lacks the superior capabilities, it has to work to achieving outcomes in negotiations, often the powers that have superior capabilities is relative to itself. And so it should not be surprising at one level, though if you are at the receiving end of the negotiation, it's not always an exciting

prospect, but India is very conscious of its material weaknesses and that sensitizes it enormously to the imperatives of avoiding losses.

In fact, sometimes the importance of avoiding losses is so engrained in the negotiating posture that Indians sometimes are willing to lose out on opportunities for greater gains, if they were willing to be more flexible in their negotiating positions, and if you see, for example, India's negotiations in the WTO at Doha, it's a clear example that the desire to protect against losses, prevented India from actually making modest compromises, which might have had actually greater than proportionate benefits for India itself.

And so the rarity of risk taking becomes a consequence of the structural sort of impediments that India faces. The other point, which I think comes out so clearly in Howie and Tezi's book, which is worth reminding ourselves of, is something that they mentioned in the last few minutes, and that is this desire for India specific agreements. It's obviously linked in many ways to India's uniqueness and India's perception of its own uniqueness as a civilization.

But I would flag two other elements, the pressures of domestic politics, that Indian politicians the gamut that they have to run -- the gauntlet that they have to run, and the pressures of democratic politics as India moves out to develop new relations with countries like the United States, close relationships that it has not enjoyed before, the importance of defending the legitimacy of those relations becomes extremely critical.

And therefore India cannot be seen as somehow joining the gang of 80 or 90 other countries that United States may have similar relations with. So the need to show, in domestic politics, that these arrangements or these agreements are exclusive, or preferentially beneficial to India, becomes a very important part of the driving elements that shape that -- shape those India's specific calculations.

I would also make one other point with respect to India's bargaining strategies. The Indians drive hard bargains. It's always fun to negotiate with them because you know you are always going to be kept on your toes. But with only exception that I can remember, once the agreements are reached, India's compliance with those agreements is generally very high. The Indians are very, very careful about upholding both the letter and the spirit of the agreement. And unlike some other counties that we negotiate with, the fears that we have to worry about, about non-compliance, actually matter less

in the case of India compared to others.

Leads me to the last thought which the book raises, which is India is now at the high table in many ways, but what kind of a power will India be as it goes forward? That, I think is still an open question, and one can think of sort two polarities. India can, over time, become like just another Western power, a power maximizing state that seeks to transform its environment, really sort of leave its imprints on the environment in which it is located.

Somehow reading Tezi and Howie's book, I do not get the impression of India as a relentless power maximize, at least outside of South Asia. Inside South Asia of course, it's natural that Germany gives it much more flexibility, and a greater to sort of shape the choices made by its small neighbors. But outside South Asia I see India still being very in the struggle to adjust and shape its environment. And so I think India is, of course, in that evolutionary phase, where it is coming to terms with its own growth and capacity.

And over the period of time it could be much more forthright, and much more willful in how it exercises its power. But for the foreseeable future, much of what is in Tezi's book leaves me with the impression that India is still going to be a relatively conservative power on the international stage. In terms of the classical distinctions in international relations theory, it will persist as a leading power, one that will make an impact in shaping its environment, rather than as a true, great power, which is a state that actually determines the environment in ways that both itself and others.

So, once again, let me just end by commending the book for your reading. And if you are a long-time student of India, there is much that you will learn from it, as I did in reading it. Thank you very much.

MR. COHEN: Thank you. Before I ask Walter to offer a few remarks and have the Schaffers respond. I must ask Ashley, what's the exception to the India -- the good behavior in agreements?

MR. TELLIS: I think the one that comes closest to my mind was the use of fuel from the city's reactor for the '74 test.

MR. COHEN: Walter, do you want to --

MR. ANDERSON: Yes. Thank you. And Tezi had mentioned that we first met 46 years

ago, on a bus, and I've been friends with them ever since, and I've learned a great deal from them. And I've read some of their books in the making, and pleased to do so. I've actually assigned their book to one of my classes next year at SAIS so I can guarantee about 15 t 20 copies will be sold. I hope that's encouragement elsewhere for those of you who teach, that if you have anything to do with South Asia, you take a look at their book.

I think the very special feature of this book that you don't see elsewhere, is it fills the gap of analysis, in Indian's foreign policy and specifically reporting of India's approach to multilateral and bilateral negotiations. And hopefully, it will encourage other people to write in these areas. Now, admittedly the Schaffers are uniquely qualified to do so. Both of them have spent most of their career either in South Asia, or on South Asia, and my many years to the State Department, South Asia to a certain extent, met the Schaffers, one or the other, to whom I often went for advice or help.

The book as they say, at the beginning, is a labor of love, and it certainly is, and that's reflected in the meticulous detail, that one finds in a book that is for the complexity of the book, remarkably easy to read. Well written and interesting.

Now, on the substance of the book, there are a few things I want to say. The Schaffers address the question of whether India is sufficiently daring to assume a leadership role in a changing world. In short, can India get past transactional relations with individual countries and pursue a strategic vision at the global high table? Now, as I read the book, and I think Ashley is reading it the same way, judging from his remarks, I think the answer is maybe; not necessarily, it depends how things go.

They list four drivers in foreign policy, exceptionalism, supremacy in South Asia, nonalignment and a desire for economic power. I would agree with them that the most difficult on the issue of leadership is likely to be nonalignment. And unless India seriously engages in a review of this driver of its foreign policy, it's likely to end up with transactional relations with each of the powers at the expense of a larger, global vision.

But there is a fifth drive, and Ashley related to that fifth driver near the end of his comments, that is an equally daunting challenge to India's quest for leadership, and that is domestic politics. And I use that term in the broad sense of decision-making at home. A new approach on foreign policy will almost certainly meet resistance, because it impacts on many interests in a traditional way of

doing business.

Manoj Joshi, I read the article, you may have read his article too on the Aston Carter visit, in which he says, India is giving up its independence of judgment to the U.S. That reflects a deeply-held view among Indians who comment on foreign policy. Mobilizing support for change it requires in my view, a large measure of political stability at home. And whether this is possible s you look out into the future, is not at all certain, given the fragmented nature of Indian politics, and the weakness of the ruling BJP in many parts of the country.

While the BJP has the majority today in India's Lower House of Parliament, the return of coalition politics at the next parliamentary election in 2019, is a real possibility, and the imperative of coalition politics may mean that foreign policy decisions will be driven by the parochial interests of regional, political parties, as several important relations with India have demonstrated in the past, namely with Bangladesh, but there are others as well.

Still another element of domestic political process is the ability to sustain the desired high-level of growth that the Schaffers mentioned and others do too, is it's essential for India to be a great power, and normally governments of India have said 7 to 8 percent plus, is necessary. However, that goal faces the political reality of a county that is still largely poor, and a country historically committed to political equity.

And so far the Modi Government has been hesitant to take the often painful adjustments necessary for long-term and rapid economic growth. The last two budgets reflect this caution. The unmet needs of India's core and huge infrastructure needs also mean that the guns and broader debate, is likely to be a resolve in the favor of butter, in the Indian context.

A related point is whether the Indian political class is prepared to accept the important role of private investment at home, and in mobilizing outside support for investment in India. That investment by private enterprise, both Indian and foreign, is a strategic shift in the way Prime Minister Modi embarks on his major Make In India campaign, with the focus on defense manufacturing, much of it by private enterprise.

Already much of the Indian political class as mention of the note, Joshi indicates, has charged him with filling out to the U.S. and abandoning India's commitment to strategic autonomy. Yet,

India faces several major challenges that require leadership on its part. One is the rise in China, that is both much richer and militarily stronger and with an interest in deepening relations with its South Asian neighbors and around the Indian Ocean. Another is the terrorist threat from the northwest of the subcontinent, a third is greater integration in the world economy, and fourth is looming environmental disasters in South Asia and elsewhere.

So, what will it take to move India into a leadership position? And I refer -- I'm going to make a few quotations from a speech that Indian foreign affairs secretary, S. Jaishankar, gave at the April 6, 2016, inauguration of the Indian Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he addressed this role, and you, I'm sure were there when he gave the talk. It's a fascinating talk; if you haven't seen it I strongly encourage you to read it.

He starts the talk with a categorical statement that, and I quote here, "The quest towards becoming a leading power rests first and foremost on our success in expanding the economy," a point the Schaffers also make. He goes on to say that making India a world leader will be a priority goal for Indian diplomats, and perhaps with an eye on his own bureaucracy assets, and I quote, "This task calls for a change in attitude and skills of diplomats, which I can affirm," he says, "is already underway." I'm sorry I missed the facial expression on that, but I'm sure it was intent that he made that --

MR. COHEN: And talked about (crosstalk) --

MR. ANDERSON: -- and it's also, well -- He then says that India's immediate goal is of course being linked more closely to South Asia, but he goes on to say, and I quote, "An aspiring, leading power, at a minimum, needs to expand its global footprint far beyond the region." And he specially mentions the U.S., Russia, EU, Japan and China.

He then goes onto say, and I quote, "An important characteristic of a power that seeks to go beyond a limited agenda, is interest in global issues; in short, moving beyond mere transactional relations;" Jaishankar can raise these questions, because Prime Minister Modi is willing to think differently about India and how the world interacts with it. The real question, however, is how deep and sustainable are Modi's views, and will he sustain the attacks by liberals on the left who put ideology above self interests, and the nativists right that has little appreciation for the larger world, and easily influenced by xenophobia.

I strongly agree with the Schaffers' closing argument, the very end of the book, the very last paragraph, as does Jaishankar, by the way, "If India is to assume the role of a leader in international affairs, its policies must become more deeply interdependent with those of other countries. The hard part is getting there."

MR. COHEN: Would you like to comment? Discuss the questions?

MS. SCHAFFER: I would like to hear from the people who have been sitting patiently, but let me just make two comments in response to what we've just heard. Ashley said that with one exception, and he mentioned the nuclear fuel issue, India fulfills the agreements that it reached. I would say that there is another example, although it's really an example of the complexity of a system where the federal government can decide some things, state government can decide some things, and when you have a mismatch between the two, anything can happen, and that is the electric power plant at Dabhol, which was an Enron brainchild and which, I mean, the international role in which it eventually collapsed, and there's a -- there are any number of case studies on this coming out of business schools, and in legal journals, and so on, we've done a very selective look at that, but I think there's enough in the book to back up the point that I just made.

The second point, Walter argued that in order to mobilize support for real changes in Indian foreign policy, you need to have political stability, and the coalition government implied, can't do it. I don't altogether agree, because I think the post-Cold War changes in Indian foreign policy were for the most part, taken by and sustained by coalition governments, but that gets into the difference between a stable coalition and an unstable coalition, and the Indians have plenty of experience with both.

MR. COHEN: Before we turn to the audience for some comments and questions, let me (inaudible) so since we are reminiscing. I first met Ambassador Howard Schaffer in 1965, when he was in the Indian Embassy, and Howie was the first American diplomat I ever met, and it was quite a lesson.

MR. SCHAFFER: It was a very interesting experience. We found ourselves together at the annual meeting of the Indian National Congress which took place in a small town, in West Bengal. The main subject of that discussion, I think it was in '64, was, should India go nuclear, build a nuclear bomb, following Chinese explosions? Who do you suppose was the leading voice speaking out against such a proposal? I think it was Krishna Manna.

MR. COHEN: What? (Laughter) Let me make a few comments of my own, probably building on what Ashley said. I've always regarded India a revolutionary country, in that they are attempting at the same time, to transform the relationship between the center and the states, which is where all of the coalitions come from, in attempting to make a new foreign policy, casting aside the British model, create a new nonaligned foreign policy to being adopted, but also attempting to overturn the caste system.

And there have been recent events which have brought that to publicity recently, and the caste system is alive and strong in India, and furthermore, attempting to revolutionize India's class system that's what economic growth is about. And finally all of this requires an economic revolution, which is the source in the overall, I would regard as revolutionary stand, I made that argument in my own book, "India Emerging Power." So, it's a revolutionary state and conducting these revolutions under condition of democratic governance was just an amazing fact, and I think that itself commands our attention if not (inaudible), and our respect at the same time.

So let me -- I think we can now turn to the audience. Many people out here know the Schaffers well, you know for question and comments. And David (inaudible); David?

SPEAKER: Thanks. And I apologize, I've not read the book so I can't comment on that, but on the discussion and on the issue of India at the High Table, I'm not at all an India expert, I spent most of my career on China. But to the countries that I think can legitimately be said to be at the high table, have additional characteristics beyond military power, economic power, and civilization, old or new that deserves respect, and that's an ideology, that's a motivating, attractive principle to others, at least they think it's attractive.

China has what people call the Beijing Consensus, a very different view of the economic social and political order that are offered countries, as the Chinese today say is the better model, than the individual oriented U.S. approach, are there more social approach of Western Europe. Am I missing something here, does India have an ideology that can be attractive to others? Because as what you've laid out basically seems negative, nonaligned autonomy; things that are not an ideology, but actually -- but a position.

So, perhaps among, that in order to be really at the high table, you need an ideology that

is attractive to others, to offer a vision for their future, and perhaps I'm wrong, but I'd love to hear your comments.

MS. SCHAFFER: I'm not sure I agree with your premise, that you need an ideology that will attract others in order to be at the high table. And Steve started out by wondering what that meant, the high table. An Indian friend of mine said that what wanted to be a member of the board of the world, and I think that's basically what we had in mind.

SPEAKER: Another way of looking at it is that Indians prefer a multipolar world; they would see themselves as one of the polars.

MS. SCHAFFER: But the ideological attraction is more important if you expect to have sort of an automatic group of countries that will follow in your wake, and that certainly has been important for the United States. Europe, I think you'd have to make a rather more complicated argument. Japan, no, at least not now; World War II, yes, certainly. China, yes.

So, there's a mixed result. If you wanted to look at the way Indians look at the world, and at their own society, and find elements of an ideology, there were certainly pieces of it that you could find, and if you go back to the earlier years, there's a lot of idealism there. Nehru's dream of a resurgent Asia with India and China leading the way, got blasted to bits in 1962, but there are elements of it that still pop up from time to time. But it's hard to fit India into that mold, basically.

MR. SCHAFFER: Can I add something? I think there are two possible answers to that, as you compare India with China. It has always struck me that, you know, if you have an ideology in the sense you were referring t Chinese ideology, the democratic process in India It's the kind of ideology -- it's looking at the world on how India should function. Where that came into debate, was in 1975 state of emergency in India, which in effect dumped democracy for a while.

There was a very adverse reaction to that activity, and I don't think anyone today in India could propose, seriously, moving away from the democratic model in the country. The other aspect has to do with the civilizational aspect. There's a strong sense in India that they are a unique and distinct civilization. The group I look at most closely, the Hindu Nationalists, have a very strong sense of what it is to be Hindi, but others do as well.

Read Nehru's "Discovery of India," where he then discovers this great civilization out

there, and what it offers in bringing us all together.

MS. SCHAFFER: A few pages worth of cliff notes in the first chapter.

SPEAKER: Yes.

MR. SCHAFFER: I think another point is that over the years, whichever government has been in Delhi, India has not tried to export democracy. You don't get anything like American's effort, the effort of American political parties to set up offices to promote democracy and democratic practices. If a country wants India's help, say, in organizing the minutia of an election India will provide that.

But the idea of India holding forth as a beacon of democracy, and calling on other countries to follow suit, you don't, you have never seen that.

MR. ANDERSON: There's no Indian equivalent of the Confucian Institutes around the world to advocate a certain ideology.

MR. COHEN: Yes, sir?

SPEAKER: I, as an Indian, I would like to say the organizing principle, the idea called India is unity in diversity. I think part of the approaches India has taken in the world, remove towards that, and I think my interest is, what India is today is what America is becoming. This idea in diversity, if it can work in an impoverished country like India, there is hope for the world.

MS. SCHAFFER: That is what I will call a beer and pizza question, one that one can discuss much better with beer and pizza and tea and samosas, and preferably late at night.

MR. COHEN: This gentleman right here.

MR. HURWITZ: Thank you very much for a great presentation. I also worked in the Universal North Building, as one of the panelists did. I'm Elliot Hurwitz a Former State Department Official, under Secretary Wiles, and Secretary Shultz in the 1980s. And I believe Mr. Schaffer made the comment that Modi is a hawk, and I would like to ask the question, who is the adversary if he is a hawk?

MS. SCHAFFER: First of all, you can be a hawk based on the concept of adversaries, secondly, I think that Pakistan is certainly an adversary although most Indians strategic analysts nowadays would argue that China is India's most important strategic challenge, and that Pakistan is not in that same league.

You can argue that for some persons, the purpose is China is the adversary, but China is

simultaneously a country with which India has very important economic relations. And Modi is, you know, if the concept of sovereignty hawk has any meaning, he is one of them.

MR. COHEN: I would argue a PS unless Ashley wants to comment on that. Do you?

MR. TELLIS: No.

MR. COHEN: That adversaries are a product of the nation state, you define yourself by who you are not and who opposes you, and in a sense, if you look around the world, everybody says that they live in a dangerous neighborhood, including all their neighbors. So, in other words, the world is defined by a sense of fear and danger, everywhere, where there's Asia -- Latin America -- the Middle East. So I don't think the question is terribly relevant, who India defines as a -- they will find an enemy source, Indira Ghandi defined the Americans as an enemy; the U.S., China, Pakistan access, so that's a question for which there are many answers. (Inaudible)?

SPEAKER: Thank you and congratulations on the book. My question is about India's policy toward the neighborhood. Tezi, you mentioned how India has played hardball, and Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and Ashley, you mentioned how India is not a power maximizer outside South Asia with Smaller South Asia being the exception. I am wondering, as India continues its ascent to the global high table, will we see a lessening of this tendency in the neighborhood? Or is this just simply unrelated as a dimension? Is this just a timeless aspect of Indian foreign policy?

MR. SCHAFFER: I'm encouraged to believe that India has now set off on a good-neighbor policy, which has very interesting, and I think, new aspect. And that is in the past, India has preferred because it's by far the most powerful country in South Asia to negotiate with the smaller countries on a one-on-one basis, it can be very tough, it has been very tough with such negotiations.

It's now changed its tune, at least with regard to Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and the record with Nepal is ambiguous, the record with Pakistan is bad. But the idea now is that India is prepared to enter into multilateral negotiations, at least to begin with on economic issues. And this I know has been welcomed by these smaller countries, which feel that they'll be in a better bargaining decision.

MR. TELLIS: Can I take a crack at that? I think there are several dimensions to the question. It's very clear that there is a huge gap in material capabilities between India and its neighbors. What has always been lacking from an Indian perspective, is consent to Indian premise, and so it's almost

grumption in some sense. You are powerful, but it's not enough to be powerful, you need acknowledgement of your power, and so that's one important element.

The second element has to do with the very strong Indian conviction, that all of South Asia has a sort of unity, however defined, and that the processes of politics over centuries have fragmented that unity. And so there is a struggle to reunify the South Asian space. The question is, what means you use to do it. If the means are classical international relations politics, you are never going to get that unity, because it's going to be competition, contestation, resistance.

And so the opportunity that India now has is to see whether it can recast that unity on the basis of economics. Whether economic integration helps unify the subcontinent, and take the edge off some of the political rivalries, that would naturally occur if India sought consent purely in political terms.

MR. COHEN: Yes? One right here. Could you state your name, please?

SPEAKER: Yes. I'm Lauren Hull, formerly with State Department, my question is about India potentially, joining APEC, and with an eye on TPP. Asia Society recently put out a report, the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. was speaking glowingly about their interest in that, looking at some of the ideas that you've mentioned. How do you place that?

MS. SCHAFFER: Actually, I just got back about 10 days ago from 10 days in India during much of which time, I was talking about that very issue, not making speeches about, but listening. I think you've got two conflicting tendencies here, on the one hand there is a strain of thought in India that joining, preferably in a prominent position, various international clubs is a good thing for India. And of course prime among those is the U.N. Security Council with a permanent seat.

On the other hand, there is another school of thought that says you don't want to -- that when you join clubs of this sort in a prominent position, you wind up having to say stuff that's guaranteed to irritate somebody you don't want to irritate. And I remember vividly the then Indian ambassador who was sitting in the audience when a former Indian ambassador opined that the Security Council really wasn't a particular big deal for India. And she stood up and said, it's extremely important, and I thought, boy, we've got them both in the room.

APEC isn't quite in that league, India's interest in APEC stems from, first of all, its greater interest in East Asia which has been a factor since the mid-1980s; secondly, it's more successful

economy which has led, among other things, to its negotiating a free trade area with ASEAN. U.S. trade officials sneer at the free trade area because its coverage isn't nearly as wide as a comparable U.S. agreement, but for India this was a big deal.

The U.S. has been, I would say, cool to Chile on the prospect of India joining APEC, until President Obama and Prime Minister Modi discussed it, at which point President Obama said that we welcome India's interest in joining APEC. And I would describe that as a lawyerized statement. In other words, look for fine print all over the place. But largely at U.S. instigation, APEC instituted a moratorium on new members, so India has been in very classic fashion, reluctant to ask again, until it was sure the answer was going to be yes.

It the wake of the Obama statement, and with India's economic performance still pretty strong, the issue of APEC has come up again, but what we found, and we in this case was a group put together by the U.S.-India Business Council, was that -- first of all, the Indian Government and the Indian political system are extremely skittish about any further trade opening at the present time. And this is, in part, at least driven by the Small Trader Constituency that's always been a very important part of Modi's base, and that there was at least one group that saw APEC as the camel's nose under the tent.

APEC doesn't have any binding agreements, so that it shouldn't be threatening, but there are those in the Indian Government that thinks that would make it a great way to start, and there are others that would make it a dangerous way to start because you couldn't stop. And it was pretty apparent, as we went around and talk to people both inside and outside of the government, that this tug of war had not been resolved.

I wouldn't be surprised to see the move on that sometime soon, and there's a growing consciousness in India, that if the TPP, if the Trade Trans-Pacific Partnership goes through, India will supper most undesirable competition in its export markets. And again, you've got two kinds of answers, one -- on the one hand, or a lot of observers were saying the Vietnamese are going to eat our lunch, and others were saying, well, we'll figure out a way. This is what I referred to as India's preference for avoiding difficult choices, but sometimes avoiding a choice is a choice. So, this is a rather long answer to a nice, clear question, but I hope it helps you.

MR. COHEN: Yes, the gentleman from the center. Could you state your name, please?

SPEAKER: Yes. My name is O'Neal Sigdel, I have a PhD from the University of Vienna, Austria, in political science. I come from Nepal. I'm a resident of this beautiful town of Washington, D.C. My question is addressed to Madam Schaffer. It probably would be relevant to Sir Ashley as well, but the questions are many, but because of the time constraint I just have one question. It is about the U.S. policy, especially in terms of the relationship between India and the small -- they are not really small, but compared to India, small neighbors.

Is it true that there was a claim, if you remember, at the time of the aid of the Maoist insurgents in Nepal, when everybody went against King Gyanendra Shah, there was a talk in town that the United States outsourced its Nepal policy to India. So, as a Nepali citizen and a student of political science, what should I expect in the days ahead, where the United States sees, and the reason itself, especially in terms of the relationship between India and its small neighbors, especially in the changing context, right.

Even India has always claimed -- street claiming its hegemony, or the local primacy, it's certainly changing. In fact we would call it losing the ground there, there are a lot of recent evidence, what's going on in Maldives, the relationship between India and in Maldives, what recently happened in Nepal, it was the third time that India imposed -- but they say it's not declared a blockade, but third economic and trade blockades, and in fact it sort of back-lashed, because for the first time in the history of Nepal, now we have a trade agreement with China, the second country after India. So, Madam Schaffer, thank you.

MS. SCHAFFER: I can certainly understand your anxiety about the fallout from problems between India and Nepal. This has always been a difficult area. India has, as I said, played hardball. The United States has, certainly, in the past 25 years, come to consult more closely with India about policies in the South Asian Region. That, frankly, is something that Nepal and everybody else ought to welcome, because if you have miscommunications and miscues between the United States and India, it's likely to end badly for everyone.

If your expectation is that U.S. sympathy for a tough spot that Nepal might find it in, it's going to result in either military intervention or some kind of a magic wand, I think you will be disappointed. The U.S. does not outsource its policy to India, but it treads carefully when it's working in

the periphery of a friendly country, with whom we have overlapping but not identical interests. And I think it's likely to stay complicated.

MR. TELLIS: I would just make one point. When you think about issues like this, there are not purely interstate issues. I mean, in the most recent problem between India and Nepal, what was implicated was an internal disagreement between -- within the Nepalese society, and India's interest in creating a certain outcome there, so you've got to take into account the fact that there are internal dissentions in each of these states, which then bleed into the interstate relationship.

The point that Tezi made, I think is the one that you have to always keep in mind. The U.S. is always going to ask itself, what its interest, and what its stakes are in any of these countries, and if those stakes, important though they may be, do not warrant overriding the relationship that it has with the very powerful neighbor like India. The U.S. is simply going to be much more deferential to Indian interest, in a situation like this.

Now this varies from country-to-country, circumstance-to-circumstance but, you know, you don't want to take the logic of sovereign equality too seriously when you are dealing with countries of such asymmetrical size, and when the interests are so different.

MR. COHEN: Yes. This gentleman over here?

MR. RAMASWAMY: Hi. Dave Ramaswamy. A couple of comments and a question. The name for India and Ancient China was Tianzhu, which is the pillar of heaven, and the Chinese Diplomat Hu Shih made a statement that India dominated China for 20 centuries without sending a single soldier across the border. Angus Maddison, the economist, historian, has shown that India was the world's biggest economy for 1,600 of the last 2,000 years. And also India is the only country with an ocean named after it, because historically there was Apax Indica, ranging from East Africa to modern-day Bali.

So, knowing these facts, you know, of course Prime Minister Nehru gave up the seat under Security Council which is offered to India or to China. And since then India has almost been in the South Asian high chair. So, going forward, how can the U.S. work together with India for forced projection and maintaining security in the Indian Ocean Rim states, and ultimately bringing India to a G3 kind of scenario, along with China and itself? Thank you.

MS. SCHAFFER: I'm going to focus on the last part of your question because the 2000-year historical perspective I think would require a lot of tea and samosas, or beer and pizza. I think that David Sedney will bear me out, that if the United States raised with its -- the U.S. Defense officials raised with their Indian counterparts, how can we do forced projection together? You would get a lot Indian officials, running, screaming in the other direction.

I don't think that is on the U.S.-India agenda at the moment. What we seem to be working on, and bear in mind that I've been out of government for almost 20 years now, is a very different kind of strategic conversation. It took a while before the strategic dialogue between the United States and India, reached the point where it even deserve that name, where countries were talking about what their broader strategic goals were. I think we have reached that point.

Our defense trade has also come to include some fairly important items, as I indicated, Ashton Carter looks like he's finally going to get one of the agreements that normally accompany that, but that is for all kinds reasons, difficult for the Indians to fit into their system, and to the way they look at the world in their strategic autonomy.

From the perspective of what you are asking about, though, the most interesting development is the Indian Ocean Naval Summit which was begun with Indian leadership a few years back, which, initially was limited to countries that border on the Indian Ocean, and that would include those that border on the Arabian Sea, so that Arabians, collectively, have a body of water named after them, even if isn't called an ocean.

And I believe the U.S. is now an observer in this. What exactly his role is, is a little bit unclear to me, but it certainly includes bringing people into the conversation about security in that region. Some years back, the U.S. Navy issued a policy statement, the burden of which was, we are still a two-ocean Navy, but now the ocean is in question, or a pacific and Indian. So that the whole question of Indian Ocean Security has become a more consequential one for U.S. strategist.

I think you'll see a movement closer together, we also have at the diplomatic level, a very serious dialogue between India and the United States, and this the State Department and the Ministry of External Affairs of -- I'm using a side of, Howie and I went and called on the Indian Joint Secretary of East Asia a couple of years back, to interview him for the book, and as we sat talking we happened to notice

on an end table in his office, a baseball bat.

This is a pretty unusual prop in the Ministry of External Affairs, so when we came to a break in the conversation -- he's a very bright guy, Gautam Bambawale, he's now ambassador in Pakistan -- high commissioner in Pakistan. We said, “where did the baseball bat come from?” “Oh!” He said, “the first time we met with our American counterparts, Kurt Campbell came equipped” -- that the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, came equipped with a cricket bat and a baseball bat, and the Indian team signed the cricket bat, which he kept in his office, “and I kept the baseball bat with the American signatures.”

A nice, slightly hokey theatrical touch, but it did capture the spirit of things. That is what helps you to get to first base which you can only do in baseball and not in cricket, in terms of developing a broader strategic conversation. At this point we are long way from thinking about joint force projection; the closest we've come to it is joint disaster relief work, which actually was a light bulb moment, for the Indians who participated in it.

And as far as G3 is concerned, I think it helped both the American and the Indian participants in the room, having a sudden need to go someplace else if that subject came up.

COHEN: So let me, as the historian, let me comment on -- and obviously, you are versed in history (inaudible) to say a few words. There were three events that took place, 1945 two, and 1947 one; 1945 responses, so David said in his comments. The United States defeated Japan's -- China's only real enemy, which was Japan. Well like them or not, that’s a major problem, they’ve remained a non-power ever since; an economic superpower but not a military power.

In 1945 also, we dropped an atomic bomb on Japan that which contributed to the end of the war, which then transformed relations between any states ahead. India, Pakistan, China, the U.S., all have nuclear weapons, any rational calculation leads you to conclude very quickly that a major war between any of these states can't happen, even President Reagan said that, cannot happen should not happen.

So think that the balance of power game that’s played, use of military power really was stuck -- catching up to reality, especially in Asia. And especially the Indians, who wants to be great nuclear power, but I don’t really want to be a great nuclear power, for them it's a first super (inaudible)

among others, it was a symbolic act, not a military act.

So I think you have to rethink your Kautilya and your rule of power, and become a great state. The relevant model may be Europe which is a civilian superpower, it has no serious military power, but it has great economic power and a cultural power which spreads around the world. Let me leave that comment (inaudible) -- Yes, sir, over there, yes; the gentleman over here.

MR. TILLMAN: Greg Tillman, Arms Control Association. This may be an elaboration for the last remarks made, but I'm wondering if the panelists could comment on what really drivers Indian nuclear weapons policy. Is it perceived as a ticket to the global high table? Or is a specific response to nuclear threats perceived from China, for example.

MS. SCHAFFER: Ashley, I think you are the one up here who is best qualified to answer that.

MR. TELLIS: Nothing I say, Greg, will some as a surprise to you. I think it has two, rather three elements I guess. One is, as long as there is natural connection between great power status and the nuclear weaponry, the elements of prestige will always sort of be there on the background. But I think that two other issues which are more active in terms of (inaudible), first is Pakistan, and very consciously in the Indian mind, a reality of Chinese nuclear systems to (inaudible) the rise Pakistan as a nuclear power because of China. And all the implications that had more Indian threat perception vis-à-vis China.

The second is the desire to maintain some kind of a minimal deterrent against the Chinese because of the areas, sort of dimensions of competition. So, there is clearly a security dimension in addition to the status dimension. The good news I think in all of this, India does not see having a large arsenal as being the necessary predicate for being at the global high table. And so you can imagine, an Indian nuclear program that I still relatively small and relatively limited, and satisfying both its security and its status needs; with the economic issues really determining, whether it finally persists at the high table or not.

MR. COHEN: We just have a few minutes more, so let's take -- let's try and group questions. This gentleman here and the gentleman there.

SPEAKER: Hi, there. I just picked a copy of your book, and I scrolled to the back of the

index and to see if there was anything an Afghanistan, so I'm looking for it to read that. So, my question regarding Afghanistan kind of goes back to what Mr. Tellis said. You've see Afghanistan -- India become a little more involved in the, with state-building efforts in Afghanistan, especially with them building their parliament. Is that a sign that India is coming out of its conservative streak of playing a huge role in world affairs?

And secondly a lot of scholars have written that India-U.S. relations can be summed up in this statement that, it's a mix of ideals and interest. And some even go far as to say that they'll never be allies. What are your thoughts on that statement? Thank you.

MR. SCHAFFER: Addressing your first question, it seems to me that India is not trying to expand its role in Afghanistan. India's position continues to be that will provide as much support as it can for the reconstruction of Afghanistan for the economy of Afghanistan, for social work, but it does not wish to get involved in any significant political way in Afghanistan. It has been prepared to train some troops, some Afghan troops for service in the war in Afghanistan, but I don't think -- I think it recognizes the dangers for India becoming further involved, and questions, how successful any political role would be for India.

MR. COHEN: I think that just about does it for time. Let me add a -- let me pick up an answer I gave which was incomplete. I said there three historical dates that were important, '45 because Japan was destroyed, and so what happened to China, nuclear weapons used. The third event was 1947, when the British left South Asian, partitioning a major power that had been created by the Mughals and then -- not by the Hindus but by the Mughals, well, this (inaudible) to the Raj.

And that created two rival states, India and Pakistan, and now Pakistan has nuclear weapons. So I think the region's dilemma -- is that there are two countries which aspire, not to greatness, one to greatness and the other to balancing, India and Pakistan. And my own view is that as long as -- this could go on indefinitely, and that's one of the -- that's several, that's one of India's chronic problems, how to deal with Pakistan.

Let me thank the authors, the commentators, the audience for a splendid session. (Applause) I hope you will read the book carefully; it's really worth careful study. Thank you.

MS. SCHAFFER: They do have copies for sale out there, and anyone who wishes us to

write something in them, there will be an opportunity for that.

MR. COHEN: Good.

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