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THE FUTURE OF SECURING GLOBAL CITIES

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. INDYK: Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Brookings. I'm Martin Indyk Executive Vice President. I'm delighted to have the opportunity to moderate this first session of a new project that we are launching at Brookings in operations with JP Morgan Chase which we're calling the securing global cities project. I'm very glad to have with us today General Ray Odierno and Michael O'Hanlon who are the co-chairman of this new project that is being organized of the umbrella of our global cities initiative which has been a long standing Brookings initiative run by our metropolitan program. This securing global cities project will be conducted in our 21 century security and intelligence center. Paris, San Bernardino, New York, Boston, Mumbai, Baghdad are cities that dominate the headlines particularly when it comes to the issue of security. And it is cities that have become more and more the drivers of whether it be economic growth for personal security in the 21st century. Indeed we tend here at Brookings to see that the 21st century is cities driven century and that is the logic of the idea behind this securing global cities initiative. Under this arrangement we will develop the first of its kind (inaudible) driven and expert informed manual to help cities think through the key elements of an integrated security strategy to protect their communities and their citizens. It will incorporate experiences and recommendations from experts from around the world for enhancing security in major urban areas. The project will identify the different types of threats posed to global cities as well as the best tools to address them. From reformed and strengthened police forces and justice systems to paramilitary and military institutions and intelligence capabilities. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to introduce you to General Ray Odierno a true American hero through almost 40 years of service in the US Armed Forces closing out that distinguished career as the 38th Chief of Staff of the United States Army. He is currently a senior

advisor to JPMorgan Chase and it's JPMorgan Chase that is providing the support for the Global Cities Initiative of which the Securing Global Cities project is a part. Brookings if you walk in through our doors it was hard to miss it since it's our centennial this year places a high value on its quality of its in depth scientific based research, the independence of that research and the impact that it has particularly in the global cities initiative where we've engaged with cities across the United States and around the world in efforts to help their communities and help their economies grow and provide real jobs for their people. That insistence of quality independence and impact is something that our donors respect and admire and the analysis and recommendations that our scholars make also are respected by them in terms of the independence that we insist upon. So General Odierno, welcome, and it's very good to have you here. Next to General Odierno we have Shivshankar Menon. He is the former national security advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India. He is a Distinguished Fellow both here in the foreign policy program at Brookings and our foreign center Brookings India in New Delhi. Next to him is Vanda Felbab-Brown a Senior Fellow at Brookings who has specialized in counter terrorism and counterinsurgency and has great field experience in understanding how cities cope with these problems. Her most recent book is "Shooting Up: CounterInsurgency and the War on Drugs." Next to her we're very glad to welcome here Ambassador Juan Carlos Pinzon. He is currently Colombia's ambassador to the United States but he previously served for four years as Colombia's Minister of Defense and in that capacity played a critical role in dealing with Colombia's security challenges. Not in just it's cities of course but in the country side in dealing with the (inaudible) and he has been a critical partner to President Santos in the efforts to resolve that conflict successfully through peace agreement. And finally we have Michael O'Hanlon. Mike as I said is co-director of this project with General Odierno. He's also the co-director of the

21st century center on security and intelligence along time Brookings Senior Fellow with a long list of books to his credit, the most recent of which is the fascinating book on the future of land warfare. So thank you all very much for joining us today. I'm going to give the mic to General Odierno to introduce the topic for all of us.

MR. ODIERNO: Well thank you very much Martin. It's great to be here with this distinct group of individuals and I look forward to the discussion. As mentioned as I started to get involved with JP Morgan I became very interested in this global cities initiative that has been established a relationship between Brookings and JP Morgan. And what they were trying to do obviously was equip cities, businessmen, leaders of the cities in order to deal with future issues specifically on how you develop cities economically. And what caught my interest here is in my last five to ten years of experience in serving in the Army and around the world there is a couple of things I've learned and I thought was important to this project as we look at future development. First the one thing that is very clear and everybody in this room understands as I tell you the world is getting smaller every day and it's getting smaller because of how quickly information moves, it's getting smaller because people can interact very quickly and it's changing the dynamics of how we develop as nations, how we develop relationships between nations and how I believe we will develop each other in the future economically, diplomatically and in a security perspective. The second thing is that there is many studies that will tell you that within 20 to 30 years 70 per cent of the population of the world will live in cities. And what that means is you'll have the development of mega cities where you have 10, 20, 30 million people in cities but you also have developing cities of less numbers but are just as important. So I think it's important for us as we think about future development and future relationships that we understand the dynamics of cities and how that's going to change in the next 5, 10, 15, 20 years and how are we

going to react to that? The final point I would make that I think is probably the most important is because of the inner relationship and the movement of information there is now a constant inner relationship between economic, governance and security no matter where you go. Ten years ago or fifteen years ago there were probably more stove pipes when it had to do with security issues, economic development and governance. But as information becomes more viable to all entities they are becoming more and more inter-related every day. So it's important that we understand as we want to develop our cities globally, whether they be US cities or whether they be international cities we understand that in order gain economic development there must be a security piece of that. And one of the things we want to look at is what are the security challenges that we're going to face in the future? What are some of the things we can do to help us deal with those security challenges in the future. And those security challenges can range from terrorism, insurgencies, crime and my favorite is just plain opportunists who try to take advantage or either no governance or lack of governance in order to have personal gain. And so I think a combination of these things are what we're going to have to deal with in the future. And then throw on top of that the developing of new threats such as cyber and other entities like that and the ability to and the more difficult it is to collect intelligence and how do you do that in such a way for us to deal with the many problems that we will face in cities not only here in the United States but around the world. So for me it's a very fascinating topic. And as we want to look at how we develop cities for the future it will be important that security is thought through in equal terms with economic development as well as how they are governed. So I look forward to discussion and thank you very much.

MR. INDYK: Thank you very much Ray. Shivshankar you've of course lived through the time that you were national security advisor. The most extreme terrorist

attack in recent Indian history which was in Mumbai one of your largest and most important cities so can you give us your perspective on the challenge of security when it comes to cities.

MR. MENON: Certainly and I realize I'm here for the wrong reasons because Mumbai is faced complex when assaults by terrorists are now thrice in the last two decades. In fact there were even more lethal attacks before 2008 in 2006 for instance. That I think is one of the major threats that we now face in urban environments across the world because India is not alone in this. Sadly as you mentioned Paris and the list goes on Madrid, it's a very long list. What did we learn from Mumbai, from this experience? It's interesting. Clearly one of them is the risk of cascading failures in a situation where your infrastructure is increasingly integrated in and out of context. The General mentioned this that how dependent we've become and how important it is to have responses which actually keep services and infrastructures growing. But the other take away that we got from Mumbai was that frankly if you think of why the terrorists are doing this, they're doing this to dominant the new cycle of cause. But they also want to provoke a disproportionate response a highly militarized and disproportionate response. That's what gives them their oxygen, that's what empowers them. So don't give it to them. You need therefore a response which is much more sophisticated and goes across the border includes the economy, includes the society and the fundamental problem is how do you build a sense of community in these large mega cities that we're building now that the economy is actually creating where you have newly urbanized conglomerations in India, China and Africa and how do you build a sense of community because that's your only defense. We used to say very proudly in India 10 years ago there are no Indians in Al Qaeda. We can't say it anymore. Today we're proud of the fact that the Indians we know are in IS have actually been brought to our attention by the community

or by their families who don't want to have anything to do with this. That shows a strength of feeling with in the communities but how do you build that sense of community? Without which frankly it's very difficult for the state to actually try and replace that or to perform the functions that communities perform for themselves. Second big learning that we had was the importance of preemption. That you know history is littered with fail safe protective like the unsinkable Titanic the impregnable marginal line, you name it. And especially for this kind of complex urban assault I think the problem is defense is always on the defensive. You're reacting to multiple attacks in a short time frame across and some of it unpredictable. So really preemption is the answer which means you need the intelligence and you have to then start walking this very fine line between peoples freedoms and preemption, it's a hard line. The first law which accepted the idea of preemption in some form in India was after the Mumbai attack. We did a prevention of unlawful activities which permits some amount of preemption with legal supervision. But that's a big issue for a society like ours who wants to stay democratic with peoples freedoms but the intelligence is crucial for that and that's very, very important. So I don't want to go on but it seems to me --

MR. INDYK: So preemption is where you're actually arresting people --

MR. MENON: When you need to get in there before the act actually happens. Now any complex attack actually needs a fair amount of logistics, preparation so you actually have a better chance dealing with this kind of assault then individual attackers who don't give you all the signals that you might get in these cases. The last problem of course in our particular case is that most of these attacks either require support or at least connivance from state entities of various kinds and that's a real problem. So how do you convince states that this is counterproductive that terrorists groups or these kinds of activities are not instruments of state policy and they don't work

that they actually turn back on their supporters and creators. We've done it before as an international community. If you look at chemical weapons which at one time states thought were instruments of state policy but we managed to convince everybody that they aren't anymore except a few outlaws. I think we need to start thinking about how we start doing that change the definitions of what's acceptable internationally. I must say one other thing if you look at the two and half decades when we faced these complex urban assaults, cross border terrorism these are also the two and half decades when the economy had been better than it ever had before. So it's a very strange relationship and I put that down to the fact that we didn't over react, we didn't over militarize our reaction and we chose rather than militarizing the police for instance to create separate forces for particular tasks while leaving normal community policing with the relatively unarmed police. But there's a whole set of issues that follow from this. I'd better stop now.

MR. INDYK: I just wanted to do a quick follow up though on the first point you made about the importance of community. We need to ensure that the community is not divided that a divided community helps those that seek to undermine its security that is a very interesting lesson. We go to the challenge of countering criminal activities. Why don't you give us the sense of what the dimensions of the challenges are there?

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: In that respect the issue of community is a crucial one and it comes in many dimensions. One of the defining characteristics of what's been happening with cities over the past several decades is a great sense of bifurcation. Originally enormous bifurcation between the developed prosperous and relatively secure core and vast slums where government is delivered by non-state actors whether they are slum lords are paramilitary groups or organized crime groups or in some cases insurgencies. There are other divisions other bifurcations occurring that are

posing new challenges. You already highlighted some of them. One is cities versus the rest of the country side and in fact divisions among cities increasingly in many parts of the world we see cities within a country have been in very different dimensions, directions economically, politically and in fact even in the respect of foreign policies although they are not necessarily the capitals. Nigeria policies versus Abuja for example come to mind. So there is another bifurcation taking place so it's the divisions within the city that lack a sense of community within a city division between the city and the rest of the country or even cities relationship to other cities. And then the new dimension with that is refugee flows and migrants that we are seeing who are often mistreated, marginalized, wrongly accused, made scapegoats and deeply unintegrated. So all of these different bifurcations taking place simultaneously sometimes cross cuttings often independent of each other then bring really to the core of the issue of who governs and who governs for whom. And here is where crime comes in. One dimension of crime is of course dealing with ordinary street policing that takes place in a city. Another dimension is organized crime but not new but increasingly prominent and fundamental element is crime as a source of governance. Crime is a source of governance in slums but crime even as a source of governance in known slum areas. This often intersects in complex ways with counter terrorism and that comes back to some of the issues you highlighted. Namely some of the counter terrorism policies even being adopted in the United States go quite fundamentally against basic principles of community policing not the just vulnerabilities that has the repercussions for crime and we were used to deliver street crime in developing relationship with communities might be affected by countries and policies. So key dimensional securing cities will increase to deliver appropriate response to appropriate settings so to focus on what kind of criminality require what kind of responses dealing with street crime can involve very simple but very affective policies such as in

Bogotá and we might here about some of the from you Ambassador or it might develop much more complex policies but the policies specificity then also needs to be integrated to the bulk of security issues that cities will face. And I have not even mentioned other security dimensions such as responses to natural catastrophes responses to earthquake or flooding and also responses of securing infrastructure in delivering basic services which historically have been not delivered to slums or have been outsourced often by states consciously to organized crime groups or slum lords who deliver those services so that the state and those who are taxed, the elites or the middle classes do not have to deliver them. And so one of the exciting things about this new project is to look at the different types of threats and try to pull some of the lessons and practices that can be shared in looking at the complexity of the issues with a great deal of specificity but also with some towards integration.

MR. INDYK: So the heart of what you're saying about this challenge of governance is it's not just about policing but it's about delivering services that you have to do both.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Oh absolutely. Law enforcement is crucial and I have often written about shared economic approaches to dealing with crime but I always emphasize that without good policing the socioeconomic approach will not succeed on their own. So it's really about how (inaudible) is created how a (inaudible) is delivered and is dead or is there a sense of community. So affective strategy really require a bulk of interventions that tried sequencing the key difficulty for many of these policies is that they have to last for years and decades and that means sustainability beyond administration and sustainability of tax payers to deliver those policies and that is a very difficult commodity to come by.

MR. INDYK: Ambassador Pinzon put back your hat on and we're going

to go back in time to when you were defense minister you were also in charge of the police in that capacity. How do you see it from the benefit of those days the experience that you had there in terms of this challenge in security and cities?

MR. PINZON: Well first of all thank you for the invitation. I think that focusing on security about cities is critical. I really comply very much with what General Odierno said on how more and more cities are really the places where people are living more and more and things are happening. So demand for securities coming out of cities more and more so I value very much this idea of focusing your efforts here at Brookings and this talk on those regards. I've been trying to get away from my hat as minister of defense for a while now because it was a very wonderful experience but at the same time it was a long time there so I've been trying to become an ambassador now. But I'll do my best to get the hat, I'll wear it for a while just to remind us how I thought some of the issues I thought were interesting. First just a reminder that Colombia is an interesting case when you discuss about security. Colombia was the most violent country in the world 15 years ago that was the reality of Colombia. We had the worst numbers for homicides, we had the worst numbers for kidnapping and frankly speaking our country was really in a crisis which made us almost a fail state. The story 15 years after is an interesting one. We have the lowest homicide number in four years. In a study of one prestigious university from Mexico that releases every year, just two weeks ago explained that for the first time there are is no Colombian cities in the top 10 of the most violent cities in Latin America. So it proves how much things have moved forward. But at the same time economics are very important because what matters here is how much investing has resulted about this economic growth, creation of jobs and at the end reduction of poverty. In the past decade we have cut poverty in more than half and I think that's a little bit of the whole package which is interesting to look at. I think that I

believe that there are certain features that I believe are important to look at. During my time as minister one of the experiences I'm still trying to understand was transition. We were transitioning from defeating a terrorist organization and organized crime on a big scale going into getting bigger problems like many other countries with organized crime in the cities with gangs and with the problems somehow are the causes for youth to get into violence. I think that perspective gave me some ideas that I think I can share with you today. First we made some decisions on, I'm going to talk about three cases, Cali, Medellin, why these two cases. Remember cartels. The largest cartels in the world used to have that name. Cartel Medellin, Cartel Cali. The most violent cartels anyone can remember. And then a seat in the (inaudible) which is our largest port in the Pacific Coast. Let me talk to you about these three cities. In these three cities we were able to reduce in the past four years almost by half the homicides, the number of people that was basically killed by gangs, by conflict or by any other kind of situation. Interesting to note that the kind of crime that we saw in the cities was not anymore related to the big causes of conflict but was more related to local situations like gangs having control or gangs attracting communities in need, put youth into violence. So we have to take several measures and I finish this for intervention. First we increase policing in a substantial way. Both in Cali and Medellin we increased police in one of the cities by 2000 policeman. In the other city something like 1500 police and in the city of Barranquilla we made even a military police intervention. So increasing that kind of capability was necessary to show presence to provide security and to offer to the citizens the sense of presence that sometimes is necessary to create security. In relation to that I think it was very important in these years that the reform that was made at the end is a justice problem. It's not a security it's not a military problem it is more a combined effort problem so just is critical. So we were able to increase the number of attorneys and actually prosecutors that's the

right word in English, prosecutors by 2000 and that was critical because that allows really to take into the legal process those who are on different crimes. Thirdly we were able to partner from national level with local authorities. Believe me it's mayors who really need this. It's them who you need to work with and at the end they are the ones who lead their communities, have the resources to provide investment or activities like vocation, healthcare or even training for jobs, that was very important. I mentioned the city of Cali and Medellin because there we had wonderful leaders and they were able to work in a way that providing security and taking the police and taking the justice was just a good set of conditions to do something else, I believe that's important. Finally President Santos made a very important decision which was to increase the investment in the location in Colombia and actually we set a goal that is very hard to achieve but is important to have it. We expect that by 2025 Colombia becomes located country in Latin America, very hard to get there but it's important to have the target because it's the best way to offer alternatives to the people to join communities and somehow move resources to that end. Martin I can talk about this for hours because there are many things and details that you'll want to mention but I believe these three features are interesting about these three cities just to comment.

MR. INDYK: Can I just ask you in follow up the dynamic between city and country as you resolve the conflict in the country side with the fact what impact will that have on security in the cities?

MR. PINZON: Well as much as you defeat those (inaudible) and somehow they got into negotiations some of the communities that were typically being recruited by those organizations now they are weaker are staying in cities as gangs or being able to get into different type of criminal organizations. Organized crime is a challenge that Colombia and it is a challenge we will need to confront for a while even

beyond this. So all of this is interconnected.

MR. INDYK: Mike why don't you tell us a little bit about post 9/11 American city responses to the security challenges.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank Martin and I also want to join you in thanking our co panelists. I'm in awe of the talent on this podium today including with my colleagues but certainly General Odierno, Ambassador Menon, Ambassador Pinzon what you've done and what you've taught us already is remarkable. I just want to offer three principles that begin to occur to me in thinking through this question of what we've seen work in the United States and partly informed as well by experiences abroad. But first just one broad motivation to echo General Odierno and Ambassador Menon about the sort of underlying problem we're dealing with and the challenge here and again the General said it very well that we have a world that's increasingly urbanized. We're headed for 10 billion people on this planet by mid-century and the good news is we've never been more prosperous, globalization is working for more people than not, and a lot of living standards are coming up. The bad news is we're living closer and closer together which means we get each other diseases. We are increasingly interconnected by infrastructure that may not always be up to snuff and therefore as Ambassador Menon said we could have cascading problems if one system starts to get in trouble you may have a big population that no longer has water, electricity, sanitation, food and these are dependencies that were essentially creating or magnifying by our growth and by our improving living standards. But to the extent that we live on this sometimes rickety infrastructure we're vulnerable. And so one of the aspects of this project and the broader policy question that interests me is when you marry up that kind of a world with security challenges you can really see some potential for problems you hadn't previously perceived at the same scale so yes I'll talk very briefly about three principles largely from

the United States but let me just offer one scenario or concept that could sort of drive this point home. We're all reading about the Zika virus these days and scared by that. We've watched previous health crisis over the years with various kinds of viruses that came out of chicken stock in East Asia or what have you but of course last year was Ebola. General Odierno was Chief of Staff of the Army when that crisis occurred and helped mobilize the US response. I think overall I was impressed by how the world responded but thank God that happened in a place that was not at war. What if it happens the next time in a place that is a war and what does this mean for the way in which you deal with a health crisis and a security crisis that morph into one and it's an incredibly imposing set of challenges and it's the kind of thing we're going to try to get at in this project. Now to answer your question more specifically and more concretely I just would offer three principals that I think have been important in our response and again most people in this room have thought about this. Some of you I'm sure have been involved in responding to the challenge more directly than I but on principle is that you need resources. There is just no substitute as Ambassador Pinzon was just saying as much of Vanda's work has reaffirmed for having enough people at the local level to provide a presence, to provide intelligence, to provide reassurance and this is not a problem, the problem of urban security is not one that you can skimp on. So I would submit to you adequate resources is essential and the adequate resource problem is largely about human beings. Technology you know robots are not going to go around the streets of New York in 20 years and be able to get the same kind of human intelligence and do the same kind of community policing that police officers are. Automation and computerization and robotics may help but this is fundamentally a demanding problem for human resources and therefore it's expensive and that's just a principle that I would submit has to be kept in mind in general. A second big challenge and we sit it in responding to counter terrorism

concerns here in the United States but I think it's true in many other places as well and Ambassador Pinzon again got at this same kind of challenge for his country is the need to marry up high level national assets and intelligence with essentially what the cop is learning on the beat and on the street. You have to actually be talking real time day to day combining those different levels of information because sometimes a threat will first be discernable from the national intelligence level and sometimes more from the cop on the beat and you've got to have both communities learning from each other and sharing in real time which means that this is not a theoretical point you just write about in a book like a Brookings Scholar Mike this is something that has to happen and work on the ground in a matter of minutes and hours and you need to build relationships and mechanisms that make this happen. I think New York City has been the best at this in the United States. We've seen progress in the Washington, D.C. area we have a ways to go still. Finally and to some extent in this same sort of spirit but making it more about the bureaucratics and the institutional issues here and getting this right, figuring out what mechanisms are going to do the linkages is very difficult and we have struggled. I think we're better now than we used to be but let me at the risk of offending I don't want to offend because I think everyone has made progress in this but early on after 9/11 we had problems with the FBI and joint terrorism or counter terrorism task forces working with local law enforcement and there was not always an ability to decide what information should be shared, highly classified information from the federal level that should be shared at the local. I think sometimes at the local level people knew more than was appreciated at the national level and there was a real difficulty to the point where New York City which probably would have done it anyway and needed to do it anyway but it needed to create its own counter terrorism units. Because they didn't want to rely on the JTTF's and over time this has improved but what it underscores is that you don't just

need a certain number of resources you don't just need the concept of marrying high level intelligence with information on the beat you need people and organizations that have sorted out the rivalries, the personalities, the turf issues of how to do it well and that's going to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. My very last point one thing I've learned from my colleagues in metropolitan studies over the years is how cities in general struggle to unify themselves at the right level of planning because they're usually multi-jurisdictional. In this area of course we have Washington, D.C. and then suburbs around it that are even larger in two different states. We have planning going on at the city, regional, state and national levels and getting all these different entities to work together is hard problem that's going to vary from case to case. So in this project I know General Odierno and I were hoping to actually collect best practices, lay out some general principles but recognize that individual cities are going to have to find out how to apply these general concepts and principles to their own circumstances which will always be different from case to case.

MR. INDYK: Thanks Mike. I'd like to come back to talk about the organizational issues and Ambassador Menon's and General Odierno's experience in terms of the organizational side of it. But first of all I want to focus, General on your own experience leading the counter insurgency campaign in Iraq being responsible for the surge and then commanding your own forces. A lot of that had to do with fighting in cities. Can you tell us some of the lessons you've drawn from those experiences?

MR. ORDIERNO: A couple things is first you have to -- so the west side drew of this limits to military power and so no matter how good you think you are or how much capability you have you can't accomplish everything with military power alone it’s got to be integrated with good governance and it’s got to be integrated with creation of jobs and economic development and if it’s not it’s going to be really difficult. The second

piece is that from a security perspective you have to be among the people, you have to gain trust of the people in order for them to provide them the adequate security that is necessary. They have to see you as someone who is the honest broker out there who will help them resolve their problems. The other thing is the incentives of those who are creating instability and I call it instability because the incentives of how they create instability are different. Some are incentivized by they have a movement which is somewhat of an insurgency some of our incentivized purely by money, others are incentivized purely by power and the ability to control others. So you have to understand what the incentives are and what are they trying to accomplish. The final lesson we learned is that in order to defeat or be successful in this environment you need a network of activity to defeat a network of problems and it gets back to this again I go back to you have to go after the money if there's an insurgency you have to cut off the money of the insurgency. You have to limit their popularity if they are providing jobs or providing money to citizens and you have to provide alternatives to the citizens. So it's this inner workings that I think are so important and all of what I just described probably happens in most major cities in the United States and outside the United States it just happened to be where I was at that was encompassing the whole country. And a lot of it had to do with failed governance to start with. So those are the major lessons that we learned and I think it's important as we look to the future in how we help governance in cities to prevent this from happening. The comment you made about being proactive about getting ahead of it is really important because what happens if you wait too long it's so far out of control it becomes very difficult to bring it back and provide what you need to.

MR. INDYK: Can I just ask you on the kind of bureaucratic organizational side of things the latch up between local forces, intelligent agencies, National Guard Army and so on. Is there a best practice in that regard?

MR. ODIERNO: First there's always a problem because people are concerned about who has overall responsibility, who responds to who so the most important thing is you've got to communicate, you've got to get people in one room, they've got to have an ability to voice their concerns and then you decide and divide up whose responsibilities are what and you understand who overall is responsible. If you're able to do that it can work. It depends on where you are and where you're at how difficult that problem is.

MR. INDYK: Okay do you have comments on either of those issues in terms of --

MR. MENON: Well I think the General is absolutely right. The key is really the governance and is getting ahead of the problem. In both respects in terms of mitigating what might have happened, making sure that infrastructure services are restored as quickly as possible, you can go back to normal lives but also in terms of preventing what's trying to come at you and there I think the hardest part in our experience is really the coordination to get intelligence agencies to talk to each other, to make sure that you exactly what Mike was saying that what the beat policeman knows they quickly and instinctively that that's shared. After Mumbai we set up a whole set of institutions where essentially to share intelligence. But it took them a long time to develop the habit of working. It wasn't as though you could order this and it happened, no. And it took a lot of practice of working on small daily issues to actually build up. Now it's very difficult to do that in the kind of situation that the General faced in Iraq and so on. So you have to do it before, before you actually face the event. If you haven't done it before then it's almost too late.

MR. INDYK: But unless you have the terrorist attack to motivate that kind of corporation it's very hard to get that corporation.

MR. MENON: But I think we've had enough terrorist's attacks quite frankly to incentivize people and I think they know now. That's not a problem. Awareness today across the world where ever you go this is something that really worries people. But are we capable of dealing with this, how do we deal with it. So I think the manual you are producing is really essential, it's very, very useful.

MR. ORDIERNO: If I could jump in this point I skipped it and I'm so happy you brought it up is the importance of infrastructure, I can't overemphasize the importance of infrastructure. The ability to --

MR. INDYK: What do you mean by infrastructure?

MR. ORDIERNO: Basic services. Whether it be delivery of water, delivery of electricity, policing, all of that infrastructure is critical to maintaining security and economic development or creating economic development which increases security. One of the lessons that we learned and again Iraq was a very different place we spent a lot of time on information but where we failed was after we built infrastructure we didn't have a governing body to turn it over to. And so in other words the people that were in Iraq or in Afghanistan weren't ready to accept that infrastructure so they couldn't sustain it over time. So the money we invested ended up not actually feeding the population in such a way the developed a relevance type of infrastructure they could believe in. And so that gets back between to this intersection between governance and infrastructure, governance and security, governance and jobs it's so important.

MR. INDYK: Ambassador Pinzon is there lessons from Colombia's experience in terms of dealing with the organizational challenges?

MR. PINZON: Well first of all I think that generally you mentioned something that you always listen from Generals and I respect that very much. Typically you will think that service men will tell you that the solution for security problem is going

after the bad guys and defeat them and frankly speaking the more sophisticated they get and the more experience they get the advice they will give you is that security requires a two way effort. A set of policies at the same time that happen I a way that really you change environments I think that's really a lesson that we are getting in the case of Colombia. No doubt you need in case you're confronting an insurgence your armed structure you need a major reaction to confront them. Afterwards immediately you need a policing capability that provides some confidence to the people some sense that they are protected. No doubt you need justice in a way that people can solve their problems without confronting each other but no doubt that then you have discuss about the legal economies that typically are funding the different types of violence. Sometimes in the case of Colombia was drug trafficking more recently illegal mining or extortion or any other type of crime. But usually those economies are fed by very young communities without opportunities. And there is where you need to offer people different policies, different set of alternative. I've said it before on location, on job creation or any other kind of alternatives that really gives the loyalty long term. So that's a little bit of the experience. The challenges that now this happens in the cities and there is laws in the cities and there are different kinds of realities that are happening that require us I mentioned before and it's very important engage with locals. I think Michael mentioned something that you got from our experience as well yes on a national level; national institutions or even international organizations you tend to make an intervention to solve all the problems and to bring everything. But one day you will leave. While the population there will stay forever and they require their own governance to insist them to reorganize. There will always be a mayor; there will always be some kind of leader or structure. In the case of Colombia we of course have a constitution; we have our laws that have implications on how our cities are organized. But then you have to prepare

them to lead and really make them not only capable but responsible to take over. In the cases that I mentioned particularly Medellin and Cali frankly speaking those are large cities in Colombia will be large mainly any place in the world but the success that I found in these past three years working with them was that the mayors were really affective leaders. They were leading the security but they were leading the whole set of policies in a way that our support from national government was really connected to what they were needing. So that partnership resulted in affective results.

MR. INDYK: Very interesting. Vanda I welcome your comment on this but you have an expertise in dealing with failed states or failing states that don't have the capacity to respond in a way that everybody has been talking about now. So what do you do in those circumstances?

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Well thank you I was going to add to that and in fact failed cities we've heard several times that we need to get ahead of the curve. The reality is that in major urban areas there are many parts of the city often the largest part in terms of the number of people who live there but also territory that has been left behind decades ago. And so integrated --

MR. INDYK: Left behind by?

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Left behind by the governments by the more privileged members of society that don't have basic services that don't have job creation and that are increasing in size. Most of the migration for the world is not taking place into the well-placed centers of the cities with high sky lines, it’s taking place into slums. So the population of those "failed cities" is really where the bulk of the organization is taking place. Of course all the resource issues are enormous. They often have to deal with basic social contract issues in the country who is willing to tax itself to provide resources for those left behind. Those are major challenges even in the very richest areas Medellin

and Cali are some of the very prosperous areas of Colombia and the resource base available to them is not replicable in other parts of Colombia just as the resource base in Monterey one of the successful are often highlighted as a successful case in Mexico in dealing with violent criminality is not available in other parts of Mexico. Cities don't have money and even when they have money it requires decade's long willingness to increase taxations of the rich and the middle class to provide for the poor and often then the willingness will operate as soon as violent criminality goes down and stops encroaching on the city center. The resource issue is huge and not easily overcome. Local leadership of course varies enormously enough that our explicit or at least (inaudible) contracts between the elite and outsourcing out of rule and governance and services to other state actors. The lag getting ahead in many cases is catching up on decades of malaise that's only being exacerbated is the real issue.

MR. PINZON: I might just bring up something that I think we're missing in the discussion which I believe operational is very relevant is the use of modern technology for surveillance. That's a big difference these days as compared to any other time in security challenges for instance the use of security cameras for instance are very useful not only to provide some kind of security more efficient use of policing resources but at the same time offering good quality information for justice and for investigators. So I think that's another tool we have these days that we use an in affective way with the right set of command and control centers but at the same time connect it with justice suddenly provides effectiveness. I think you might know better than I do about this but London is typically used as a case of study on how you can do well.

MR. INDYK: And cameras of course are specific to cities. No point in having cameras in the countryside.

MR. PINZON: Absolutely.

MR. INDYK: But let's look at this question of surveillance and privacy. How do you find a balance, how does the Indian government find a balance?

MR. MENON: It defines it differently for itself. That's something that society has to choose. The problem is how do you make that choice? How do you make it possible for a society to make that choice and to understand where you're drawing a line? Because when you just say I'm going to connect all the surveillance cameras, traffic whatever throughout the city and make it available to the police that are unobjectionable. How do you then supervise the use of those cameras? How do you prevent other people from tapping into it and using it including the terrorists and the criminals using it? That's something that frankly I think each society has to do for itself. I don't think there is one rule that you can lay down and say here it is. But I wanted to raise a slightly different question. How do you define victory in these things? We're all brought up in military academies wherever that either you fight it like a war. A war is a war is a war you fight the enemy, defeat him or else you're taught the other extreme which is you have to win his mind and his heart and you know which is okay. That's the classical theory that we're all taught but that's not what we're dealing with here. What we're dealing with is mowing the grass and we don't have a solution for these things for these situations that we're facing. You mentioned one reason why because there's this constant stream of migrants coming to the ungoverned parts of these cities and it's a very complex problem. So I think we need to start setting ourselves standards that we can really meet rather than saying we're going to solve this problem if you do the following things and in the next five years you won't have a problem.

MR. INDYK: Define mowing the grass as you understand it?

MR. MENON: Well mowing the grass means we have this problem, the grass will keep growing but you have to keep mowing it whether you like it or not and you

have to learn more and more efficient and painless ways of doing it and the better you get at it, the better.

MR. INDYK: But the challenge of that is the society the people that you're dealing with have to be prepared to accept mowing the grass in other words a level of insecurity.

MR. MENON: But I actually think people are more clever then we are. I think it's the experts that confuse them and tell them that have solutions. But that's a different argument.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: This conversation and the previous one very much gets issue at who has trust and who has authority of the communities and the key problem both in many cities with large slum areas but also in many cities that are facing a new influx of refugees is the large segment of the population do not trust the official state authority. The see police as abusive and often the police are the best criminals on the block. Their security is provided by (inaudible) actors. Often the criminals the organized gangs provide far better human security than the formal police or military forces. So there is this junction between trust and security which is not overcome by technology. The technology provides greater intelligence feed but does not really result the issues of trust and authority. The other issues and that's very much again linked to the trust is then deploying socioeconomic policies whether in the context of counter insurgence or counter terrorism or in the context of highly violent organized crime in combination of law enforcement. The reality is of course whatever design of policing strategies is deployed the likely use for some sort of effect much faster than any socioeconomic approaches. And often forces socioeconomic approaches to work to look at years or decades of sustained resources but as the expectations are much often the policing is not sustained. And crucially the jump from counterinsurgency type policing to anti-crime policing is very

difficult and even cites like Rio de Janeiro that have been experimenting with programs like (inaudible) have not resolved the jump. They come into highly violent areas with military or military police but really struggle to transition to community police and enormously struggle to transition to any sustained legal economic growth creating employment so that (inaudible) is transferred to the state. And in that sense those struggles and difficulties mimic some of the counterinsurgency and counter terrorism issues, some I don't want to overdraw the (inaudible).

MR. PINZON: Well following the two previous comments what is victory that's always a question that never has an easy answer or a fast answer I believe that's important. I think in the case of Colombia we are getting precisely onto a discussion but I would summarize in the following way. We were able to reduce the size of the problem to 30 per cent of what it was 50 years ago. So the size of the crime is 30 per cent of what it was. So reduction of crime, reduction of the criminal capabilities is the signal. But second in the case of (inaudible) was making us to the possibility of getting into a peace agreement using political tools which was unthinkable before. I think that's how you craft this idea. No doubt victory in this kind of counterinsurgency, counter terrorism campaign is not something like the all conventional offer concepts it’s a little bit more mix of security and political discussions which I think is what we are pulling together. On the right of trust which I think Vanda is very keen on that I think it’s absolutely true. You require first of all the credibility of institutions that are in the field to be affective. People need to believe in them, need to trust them and in order to do that unfortunately you have to be very affective at the same time on controlling your own institutions. So while things we have done in the case of Colombia many, many times is getting rid and taking to jail and to justice those members of the service who don't behave. I think that has created a lot of legitimacy in Colombia to a level that the institutions that had the highest regard by

Colombian people on any pole usually are the armed forces or the national police. I think that is very important which implies that you only need to do more. I was just reading the paper yesterday and in the city of Bogotá our capital city we captured 14 members of the police that were related to a micro traffic gang. Good news. While a sad story to know that it happens but its good news to continue to create a trust and go after the corruption and misbehavior. That's necessary and critical.

MR. INDYK: Interesting. So we're going to go to the audience for questions in a minute but I just want to give Mike a chance to come in if you wanted to on this subject.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you I'll be brief. I wanted to pick up on a point about technology because this raises the question that we're all wrestling with in the United States about issues of personal privacy and of course we're also learning more and more about what we didn't know and couldn't have known about the Paris attackers and their ability to use new kinds of apps to have their communications be encrypted and secure. There's been an ongoing debate as well between DOD and the intelligence on the one hand with Silicon Valley and on the other hand over the last couple of years about whether we should be building in back doors to new software we're all familiar with this debate. I think the administration to some extent has conceded that it doesn't really know how to mandate this and even if we did mandate these that would create vulnerabilities in our software. So in a sense we're potentially loosing certain tools that we once had. And because all the threats we're talking about are serious this is especially relevant to terrorist's networks and to cartels and transnational criminal networks more generally where there are a lot of communications within the organization. We're going to have to try to use big date and correlations and tracking different lines of communication if we're not allowed to use small data which means access to the actual

communication itself. So count me as a -- I'm not trying to sound like an Orwellian but I think we have to be a little careful about not being just civil libertarians. We should preserve our civil liberties of course but be aware of the need for intelligence. And one last point that's related although it's not about technology it's about the cop on the beat and it's the whole issue of profiling. And again I don't want to sound politically incorrect and I'm not necessarily in favor of profiling but we have to let police get into the neighborhoods where the crime is the worst and that's where the crime needs to be stopped and that's where the intelligence networks need to be developed. This is not trying to make an apology or create leniency for bad policing we obviously need to be very severe about punishing bad policing and very protective of individual rights but in this year where we've had so many problems with police issues in the United States we have to bear in mind I think that a key principle is going to be we have to keep the police in the neighborhoods where things are the toughest and we can't over compensate for some issues that have been very troubling, where some very bad things happened but go to the point where we don't allow the police to do their job in some of these tougher neighborhoods.

MR. INDYK: Okay let's go to your questions. I would ask you after I call on you please do three things. One wait for the microphone, two identify yourself and three make sure you ask a question.

MR. POLLO: Thank you my name is Alex Pollo from the Atlantic (inaudible). I wanted to ask about a subject that's affecting all of European cities including the one I'm from London which is that you know these cities and this is something that I think the US has had more success at then we're having in Europe but cities thrive on openness, the flow of people into them, migration, the new ideas they bring with them and multiculturism. So how do we encourage this dynamic while

(inaudible) this with reassuring the people that live there and the citizens of these places that migration is not a security risk and the answer is not to shut our borders.

MR. INDYK: Ray do you want to start?

MR. ODIERNO: Well I mean I think, so first I think it's how you integrate them into your society. To me that's probably the most important point here. I think the world that we live in is going to have a huge refugee flow for the next several years as I look around the world. So we all have to face this problem but I think what you can't do is allow them to come into your country and segregate them. Segregate them by where they live, segregate them by what rights they have, segregate them by what jobs they can hold, segregate them about what they can do. I'm not going to go into a lot depth but I tell the story my grandfather came here from Italy and I became the head of the United States Army. There's not too many places in other countries that happens. But because I was given and he was given the freedom and opportunity to do what was necessary and gave me that opportunity. So that's how you solve this problem is you have to allow them to be totally integrated and not segregate them in and so we're all going to have to face this issue and we're facing it in the United States. We have our discussion on immigration, I don't want to get into the politics of immigration but the bottom line is we've got to make sure we give the people the ability to completely integrate and give them the opportunities that everyone else has and then I think it will help us to solve the problems.

MR. INDYK: Essentially we have a situation now where I think the number is like 30 governors don't want refugees to come in, mayors also don't want them in their cities. Do the refugees present a security threat?

MR. ODIERNO: Well it's like everything else I mean I think the large majority of them I guess is we'll have no security threat at all. Is there one or two probably but we have to figure out how to deal with that. And the answer is not saying in

my opinion I don't want to get to political but come into my area.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: I agree very much that the issue of integration is key. Realistically first of all most refugees are victims. Victims under terrible circumstances and not for one minute I think we can and should lose focus on our moral responsibility for the people and the terrible circumstances. It's imperative of us as human beings, it's imperative of our history. If integration fails and integration has been a major challenge in Europe and places like France then communities become easily victims of alienation and victims of criminalities and potential linkages to terrorism. Often it is the second generation that is more susceptible to recruitment then it is the first generation and there are many aspects to policing. The question is to many complexities to give a good answer but let me give you an example of failed integration in the United States which was the rise of large Latino slum areas in places like Los Angeles with criminality there the response of which the United States was to then imprison many of the young men and export them back to their countries such as El Salvador and Honduras. That's creating the moral (inaudible) which in the level of threat they pose to the states resembles insurgency. So US policy is one of failed integration, criminalization and export then of those problems back to home countries without the refugees coming back to the United States. So integration is key, but how one goes about that is difficult. The second generation often is trickier to engage with appropriately develop appropriate policing. But here is what the issue of counter terrorism and the integration of counter terrorism with community policing becomes clear. If counter terrorism becomes about very aggressive phishing and very aggressive sort of the factor entrapment that might be seductive in terms of effectiveness in the short term or preventing or disrupting perhaps immediate terrorists plots but can be very destabilizing and counterproductive in the longer term as the community stops cooperating with the police. So developing local

police forces recruiting among the refugees so they become member of policing and police forces is on the crucial dimensions and being very sensitive to the needs of the community to protect the community from crime as much as to focus on any potential acts of terrorism.

MR. INDYK: Okay the lady in green here.

QUESTIONER: I'm with the US small business administration regional administrator previously a city planner. So for me it's really important for me to look at the generations especially the younger generations because in a lot of these cities you have a lot of people under 25 years old and when we talk about economic development and we're trying to create a platform or businesses can be started I think that there's a lot to do as you develop and as you look at the crime and the infrastructure you really have to look at the data on what is affecting this younger generation. Because you know for example in Mexico 25 per cent of the population is under 25 years old. So there's a lot of that type of data is very important for us to look at as you look at your studies and your conversations.

MR. INDYK: Interesting part. Ray you have to deal with this in Iraq of course.

MR. ODIERNO: Yes. You're exactly right and first you have to understand what are they looking for and you have to understand what do they want and you have to do that analysis. We start with education do they have fair education opportunities and after they've had education opportunities do they have fair job opportunities. But it's not that simple we all know that and so it’s important to understand that because what happens is it’s also about having a sense of people who you can look up to, family or somebody outside of the family that develops the right values and once you start that you will be going down the right path. So we have to do programs that

allow us to do that in my opinion because if they become disenfranchised then it leads to then you just pointed it out you just talked about what happens if we don't take care of this problem. And that's why second generation is they've now lived through and you get to the second generation they turn to violence, they turn to legal activity in order for them to survive and so we have to be very aware of that. In my mind that problem is going to get worse as cities grow and as Vanda stated earlier they're going to go to the slums in the cities and how you deal with these populations is going to define overall security and economic development. I think that's the kind of things we have to make sure we look at as we do this study.

MR. VAN AGTMAEL: Antoine Van Agtmael, Brookings trustee. I wanted to ask both General and Mr. Menon about a particular issue that I think is associated with otherwise critical important policies sharing intelligence and providing basic services as you mentioned. Because the first one opens up the risk of people infiltrating you as opposed to you infiltrating them how do you deal with that in your experience?

And then the second question about basic services and associated with that is the risk and the reality of corruption which has its own corrosive effect. You have both dealt with these issues in practice how do you deal with that?

MR. ODIERNO: I'll talk for the United States specifically here. One of the biggest problems we have is sharing of intelligence and frankly in my opinion our ability to sometimes deny us sharing intelligence really hinders us in developing the appropriate relationships that are necessary to solve many of the problems that we're facing. And so we have to do a better job of resolving because for the most part I believe we can share most of the intelligence that we get. We've got to figure out how we do that and it can be specific to a situation it could be specific to a city it doesn't have to be necessarily national level but it could be very specific to the problem that we're fighting. So I think

that is something we have to get our arms around and do a much job at. We can protect ourselves against infiltration I believe. I think we can figure out ways to do that and frankly most of it will not harm us because of the level of intelligence that we would provide anyhow. Corruption in my mind is so endemic and it's societal. What I've found its part of the normal way of doing business and so it's really hard to break it in a society because their father did it their grandfather did it their great grandfather did it and it's been going on for a very long time and becomes an endemic part of society. So getting them to educate people to understand how devastating this is in terms of resources and in terms of pouring it back into the population is an education process and a real challenge. So I haven't solved the problem I guess I'm agreeing with you that it's a huge problem. We've tried to solve it so many places and we've made some progress but not enough.

MR. MENON: On the sharing of intelligence I entirely agree with you. I speak only for myself in my experience in India. After Mumbai happened we sat with all our friends, the US, the UK everybody else and we put together what we knew before and it turned out that if we had actually had done that exercise properly beforehand we'd of had a much better idea of what to expect. Maybe not 100 per cent but we would have been much better prepared. So we learned from that experience and I think we do better now in terms of what we share internationally among ourselves. It's much harder to do it domestically, to actually to get everybody and the amount the creativity that's shown in not sharing is incredible. But I think experience is the best teacher ultimately when you suffer as a result of not having shared. And today I think we are certainly better off than we ever had been before but it's a constant battle it's something that we just have to do and I don't think there's any one structure, one system. But I can't say it's perfect yet but it's better than it's been before and I think frankly we'd been forced by necessity and

experience into doing better at this. Corruption the problem is that corruption is the real cost of the service. There isn't enough of that service or whatever to go around to meet demand and what corruption does is it charges the extra bit. So in economic terms it's a very hard thing to attack and solve. It's not something we can do just by education or by appealing to peoples' morality, their good nature or even by corrosion. Because ultimately it's the economics of it that's driving it and the only solution to that is to increase supply to the point where you can actually meet demand and that's not something you can do overnight. So for me that's the problem The problem is therefore that's why I said you don't have victory available in sense of eliminate but you can reduce it to manageable proportions, concentrate on places where you don't want corruption. Certainly in intelligence and security these are areas which you have to keep clean and you have to provide the supply which is exactly what he was saying. You need to get the policemen but that's how I look at the problem. I don't think that's a very good answer but at least --

MR. ODIERNO: If I could just add one thing about sharing of intelligence. Really a bigger issue is today we have so much information. It's 10, 20 30 times what it was five or ten years ago. The amount of information that you have and the most difficult part is sorting through the information. For example when we know something already happened and we go back through and find yeah we did have this information but frankly in a lot of cases we didn't know and we didn't get it to the right people and so this idea of big data and how we use big data to solve complex problems and how we get the right information to the right people at the right time is almost as critical as sharing intelligence information. So for me that's becoming a bigger problem for us as we deal with some of these issues.

MR. INDYK: Ambassador, do you want to come in on these questions?

MR. PINZON: Well for us sharing intelligence became one of the sources of success and when people learn about the benefits of sharing somehow they got good incentives but I have to tell that by 2006, 2007 we were not able at that point to even get to one of the high level targets of the (inaudible). Starting then we came one by one and what was the answer at the end we create a system in which we gathered all the intelligences agencies to share what they had to create a community of information and somehow success brought a good incentive to continue to do that. I think that was useful and later on it worked the same way for to detect terrorist's intentions. But the year 2009, 2010 we detected that there were going to be responses from those organizations against cities in certain cases and that system of gathering intelligence and sharing somehow became the way to contain that to happen. I have to confess that that's very difficult to sustain. The incentives for people to be the one who really get success and not sharing that success with anyone else are very high but the risks of not sharing are not at the same time very consequential for state and for cities in this case that we're talking. So it's very important to work into that culture. In my opinion it's not a thing that you can just say you have to because everybody knows you have to sharing. Everybody talks about sharing but how do you do it. Well it requires leadership, it requires culture, and it requires time to really make that happen. I think as of now some says this in Colombia proved that worked but doesn't it mean it will continue forever so we need to keep working to that.

MR. INDYK: I think we have to go to the last question to this gentleman here.

MR. MALFORD: Hi my name is Navita Malford I'm a local teacher here in D.C. in a high poverty school and my question is about drug legalization. When I talk with a lot of my students they come from very poor backgrounds and they face a lot of

drug violence. Some of my students buy drugs, some of my students sell drugs, some of them are not involved in large criminal gangs, some are in MS 13 and then others have families who are in prison. I'm wondering whether managed drug legalization could help cut down on the drug violence in US cities and in Latin America.

MR. INDYK: This is one for Vanda I think.

MS. FELBAB-BROWN: Sure I've spent a lot of time working on drugs and coded at Brookings a project on global drug policy reform. So that's one of the questions we look at. Now I'll preface it by saying US policies that have criminalized low level dealings and particular use have been disastrous. There is overwhelming agreement that they have needed to cut down on use and have compounded a tremendous amount of problems social problems particularly with respect to minorities. So movements toward the criminalization of use certainly not sentencing to prison of people just on the base of drug possession offenses and drug use offenses is indeed the way that we need to go. There is movement in the United States and globally in that direction. Let's not persuaded the legalization per say with result of high criminality issues and issues of gang violence. Indeed there are many economies around the world that are legal but are pervaded by illegality, corruption and violence. For example in places like Indonesia logging is far more violent logging in mining than the illegal drug trade. We need to deploy much better strategies to policing gangs that is an enormous wealth of lessons such as on focus the strategies many pioneered in the United States in places like Boston where a real anti-gang program has been exported around the world with often not equal successes. So definitely the criminalization of use, definitely not sending users into prison thinking much more creatively reducing penalties for whatever dealers, swift, short penalties such as projects that have the greatest effectiveness rates but then focusing on other strategies to dealing with criminal violence and with respect to

young children or young people being recruited into gangs or a whole set of interventions.

MR. INDYK: Unfortunately we are basically out of time but I wanted to give the Ambassador a chance to respond on the question of Colombia's experience with legalization.

MR. PINZON: Well legalization is a world debate and I think one day economies will move on to find solutions for global leaders. But from the perspective we've had to confront of course it will be a lot easier for us to confront the fight on drugs if demand were to reduce. So I really care about thinking about how countries that are consumers can do policies to reduce consumption. Because at the end even if you illegalize or not consumption of drugs usually drives down it's like alcohol. There are things that usually contribute to involvements abounds. So reducing demand is very important. First in our case for that money not to go and fund terrorism, crime and organized crime but second when I think about now cities in the case of Colombia where we have seen some increase on consumption from the youth population I really care about thinking on policies to allow people to do something else like sports culture or something else that puts them out of consumption because consumption anyway deteriorates the environment of security and affects a peaceful environment.

MR. INDYK: Unfortunately we are out of time and I wanted Mike to just give us a close out sentence or two about securing global cities.

MR. O'HANLON: Well I'd just like to thank everyone for coming, everyone here on the panel. I think the other piece of this whole enterprise that comes out to me listening to my colleagues here and especially the three who have done this in the real world for long periods of their time at a leadership role is the importance of leadership. This is a hard thing to put into a bottle or write about in a book and explain how to do it, you just have to have people who are capable and what I've seen I know

there is great leadership capacity across this whole panel but what I've personally had the privilege to watch General Odierno and Ambassador Pinzon do in the real world and practice underscores that to break down these barriers, to make these bureaucracies work you need sometimes the right kind of leadership. And so that's just one more piece of the puzzle, I wish I knew how to quantify it or generate it or produce it but it shouldn't go unsaid in this kind of a discussion.

MR. INDYK: Thank you. I want to thank General Odierno very much for taking a leadership role in this project. To Mr. Menon, Ambassador Pinzon and Vanda I thank you all for contributing to what is a very rich conversation and it think we all have a sense now of the importance of focusing on security in cities and we're grateful to you all for that, thank you all very much.

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