

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FRANCE AND EUROPE AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS

Washington, D.C.

Monday, November 23, 2015

PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction and Moderator:

JEREMY SHAPIRO
Fellow, Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution

Panelists:

JOSEPH BAHOUT
Visiting Scholar, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

LAURE MANDEVILLE
U.S. Bureau Chief
Le Figaro

KEMAL KIRIŞCI
TÜSİAD Senior Fellow
Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

PHILIPPE LE CORRE
Visiting Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SHAPIRO: Hi. My name is Jeremy Shapiro. I'm a Fellow here at the Center on the United States and Europe. And I'd like to welcome you to Brookings, and thank you for coming to this event. We are going to be talking about France and Europe after the terrorist attacks.

I think I probably don't need to tell anybody in this town, when there is a terrorist outrage like this, the reaction is often fast, it is often furious and it is rarely well-considered. And at times we have come to regret that, but I think that we understand that the politics of the moment, that the body politic demands a response to outrages like this. And so a response it will have.

I think what we'd like to do here, because we don't have to be elected to any office, is to think about how that response can be certainly consistent with the public desires but also as smart and as considered as we can make it. And I think that we have an excellent opportunity to have that somewhat calmer conversation here today, because we have a really excellent panel, and excellent group of people to discuss it.

We are going to try to do it from a few different angles. The first speaker will be Philippe Le Corre, who is my colleague here at the Center on the United States and Europe, and a Visiting Fellow from France. He is going to discuss the French reaction to the attacks.

The second speaker on my left; will be Joseph Bahout, who is next door at an institution we don't like to talk about but it's called Carnegie. And he's going to talk about the links between French policy and the Middle East.

The third speaker will be Laure Mandeville, who is the Figaro Correspondent in Washington, and she is going to talk about the President Hollande's visits, this week to Washington and Moscow, and how that relates to the French reaction to the attacks.

And finally, on my far left, will be my colleague, Kemal Kirişci, who is our Senior Fellow for Turkey, and he's going to talk about the effects of the French reaction, and the attacks on the broader European migration and refugee debate. So, with that, let's get started, and we'll start with you, Philippe.

MR. LE CORRE: Thanks, Jeremy. Perhaps just to give you a quick summary of what happened, I mean, you've all been following the news, but, as you know, France has been hurt at its

heart by terrorists for the second time in a year. This time it wasn't cartoonists from the satirical magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*, it wasn't even a Jewish supermarket, but it was, you know, a pull from pretty much every level of the society, music lovers, soccer fans, and young professionals having dinner.

So that, perhaps, explains some of the reaction that we -- that Jeremy was describing. In a nutshell, on the night of November 13, several attacks took place around Paris, at the Stade de France, in several streets of Paris, and at the Bataclan Theatre where 89 people were killed. So, altogether, 130 people were killed and almost 400 wounded. So that makes it the worst terrorist attack in France since World War II, and the bloodiest in Europe since Madrid in 2004.

The French society is in a state of shock, of course, and I guess not just the French society, but I think the main reason is perhaps because these attacks have been random. As *The Economist* a couple of days ago wrote, it could have been any city, it could have been you. And in fact it's not just France; it's also Brussels, which has been pretty much a ghost city for the past three days.

It has been Beirut, it has been Ankara, it has been Sharma el-Sheikh, where the Russian civilian plane was shot down. And it has been even Bamako in Mali, where of course it's a different organization, it's not ISIS as we know, but that gives a sort of feeling of a sort of wave of terrorism that the world community has to deal with.

So, I'm going to ask three questions to get the conversation started. The first question, and perhaps the most difficult to answer, and a lot of my friends have been asking, why France has been target and, you know, why not other countries? Well first, other countries have been targeted later or before, but at this level of sort of joint common attack, perhaps, this is, kind of, unprecedented. Well, I mean France, as you know, is one of the best places of Western Free Society, it's a country that has a lot of Muslims, 5 million in France, which has led to a number of issues of integration.

It's the question of the deal, of the (inaudible) of the deal, and of course, *Charlie Hebdo*, and generally the fact the French society is not well integrated and that has led to, perhaps, some people joining the Jihadist Movement. And thirdly, perhaps the fact that France has the world's fifth largest defense budget, and has been using it against the Islamic States, and some groups that are related to the Islamic States, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in the Middle East.

Was the response adequate? Well, as you know, President Hollande declared a state of emergency, and asked Congress to extend it for three months, which is very unusual, which of course gives special powers to the police, and that should, of course, not go on forever, but that's, you know, an immediate response, which has been supported by French political parties, all of them, that's the local response. And also the arrest and killing of some of the terrorists involved. Not all of them, I must say.

And the second response has been to send the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to the East Mediterranean Sea, and to strike Syria quite heavily. The last response and perhaps the most important, and that's also the next step, is the diplomatic response this week really with meeting Prime Minister Cameron today; a visit to Washington tomorrow, a meeting with Chancellor Merkel on Wednesday, and a visit to Moscow on Thursday.

So I would say these meetings are critical, because they are bringing help defining a strategy, and I have to say, the end of that process will be Monday, when about 100 world leaders will gather in Paris for the COP 21 Climate Conference. Now these meetings have nothing to do with terrorism, but this will be a way to -- also to attract attention, in addition to a number of measures such as France invoking the mutual defense clause, and the U.N. unanimously voting a resolution authorizing action against the Islamic State.

My worries, first Schengen, and I think Kemal will probably talk about that. What will happen to our borders, and as you know, France has decided to enhance civilians on these borders, but that's not going to go on forever as well. European Cooperation in security, I mean, the fact that, you know, the French President is meeting his counterparts of the U.K. and Germany are important gestures, increasing the defense budgets of these nations are also important, but that's not necessarily the case for Germany.

And, you know, Europe is in deep trouble, not just because of these terrorist attacks, but also the refugee crisis, and I think France has to show a certain leadership, and that's what President Hollande who was, as you remember, not seen as a very internationally-minded President, but who has sort of become a sort of a -- not just a war leader, but a warmonger, and that's a little bit unexpected, perhaps, but I think he has used sort of adequate response so far. Not what we need as a strategy; and I

think the strategy has to go for international cooperation at all levels as described.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay, first to response, and then a strategy. Sounds like a plan.

Joseph, so France needs to take a leadership position, how do people in the Middle East feel about that?

MR. BAHOUT: Thank you very much, Jeremy, for having given the occasion to cross the demarcation line between our two institutions. It's the first time I'm officially at Brookings, I'm very happy about that.

MR. SHAPIRO: You have a 90-minute visa.

MR. BAHOUT: In fact, I will immediately re-bounce and prolong probably what Philippe just said about, what's the strategy, and what to do in the Middle East? Before that, maybe if you would about the Arab-Muslim component of France in what happened, a few words; just to, also, probably diffuse some clichés about that. First of all, there's a debate in France now which is becoming a little bit silly about some thinkers and pundits saying, this is, after all, a legitimate answer of ISIS to France's anti-Muslim policies, et cetera.

Just a reminder to square these issues factually off, France's involvement actively in the ante-ISIS campaign has really started or upgraded on September 27 with the strikes over Raqqa. I'm not sure operationally that a terrorist attack like the one that happened, doesn't need much more time than that to be prepared, so I think it was probably brewed and thought of, prior to that. The second argument to that, and Philippe alluded to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, they happened before France really got into the F-Strike operation in Syria, or in Iraq.

So, I think that this is something that we have also to keep in mind. ISIS does not really need a pretext like that, or an excuse to hit, it could hit tomorrow in the U.S., it could hit in Sweden, it could hit somewhere else. So, I think that this is something we have to keep in mind. The second important, I think, element is what distinguishes ISIS as an Arab/Muslim phenomenon, and a European phenomenon growingly.

You know that seven -- probably seven of the attackers, all of them, maybe to the exception of one who is still enquired in fact, are Europeans, they are Belgians and French, born in France, born in Belgium, probably by nationals, however they are Europeans. So it's not a question of

foreign cohorts from somewhere in the Levant crossing the Mediterranean and coming to hit the Western world, it is inside us that it is happening, and this tells us, I think, something very important for the future, and for our strategy.

On that level, and the third important remark on that point, is that if you look at the statement that ISIS has published after the Paris attack, it's very important to notice the wording. The statement uses the term ASWA, which is the Durazia, the strike. And the Islamic philosophy, let's say, of war, or theory of war, if ASWA is something that is applied in the Islamic cosmology against Islam, it's something which is part of the Ummah.

Meaning that ISIS considers now that Europe, and maybe tomorrow the United States due to the presence of a large number of Muslims there, as part of the Muslim nation. So it's not a hit against a remote enemy, however, it is a kind of attempt to retake a territory that is considered by ISIS as its own.

So, this is -- I think these are some points I wanted just to remind you, because I think they will weigh on the debate. Now, what will France do, and what we can expect, what can we expect out of that, and after that? First of all, of course, and you have seen it, France will enhance, upgrade, increase its strikes over Raqqa, and it has been done, probably against Mosul, and today I think for the first time since a long period, French aircrafts have taken off from the Charles de Gaulle this morning to hit Iraq.

Of course France will take a much more active part in the airstrike campaign against ISIS, maybe at one point in special ops on the ground, if, and this is probably an output of the meeting between Hollande and Obama tomorrow, if they agree on that, to accompany the American -- This is a departure of former French reluctance to do that, yes, but it is not a crucial, let's say, change, because France was in Tuzat, and this will explain what I will say in a second.

The second important, I think, dynamic which is now at play in France, and this is also something I would like you to really have in mind, to understand what's happening what's happening in France internally. Yes, there is a very strong, and probably this tendency is called to increase. There is a very strong pressure that is going to be exerted on the French leadership on François Hollande

personally, politically, to change his course over Syria.

The pressure will come, and it has already come before the Paris attack, from more or less vast arrays of the political class, the right, and even inside the socialist party, from the Intel and military community. What are we doing with these ambiguous forces in Syria, let us talk to Assad, let us talk to Putin, let us talk to the Iranians, and it is already coming, very strongly from large parts of the Catholic Club which is very strong in France, i.e. under the label of protecting minorities, let us partner with Assad in order to stop the rise of extremism.

Will that lead to a change? According to my analysis, it is a bit farfetched to believe so. First of all because this is a very huge political loss for François Hollande, it means that all what he has been saying for the four past years is wrong, and usually politicians don't like to admit that. Second, I think, and this is also my personal opinion, I think that the analysis so far in the (inaudible) on Syria and Iraq is not completely wrong.

What Hollande is saying, I mean the software of the French diplomacy on Syria and Iraq is to say, yes, ISIS is a monster, but ISIS is a monster that grew for a reason, and this reason has to do with the rotting situation in Syria and also in Iraq. So, unless we tackle this issue, we will not be able to tackle the ISIS issue.

This leads me to my last point. I think that in this diplomatic tool that Philippe described, this is exactly what François Hollande will probably be saying to his interlocutors. I think that this morning and tomorrow the message, to the U.K. and to the U.S., to our partners, allies and friends, is we have to exchange more, we have to have better intelligence cooperation, this is something operational. However, politically, and I think this will be said to Obama tomorrow, we also have to focus much more on Syria.

This American approach to ISIS that consists -- that's differentiating a little bit between Iraq and Syria, having a strong strategy against ISIS in Iraq, and an elusive strategy over Syria, probably has to change. This is what, probably, Hollande will say. So, let us do together things on Syria, and we have the program to do it, it's the Vienna Communiqué, the Geneva Communiqué, et cetera. So this will be the message to our Western -- to the French Western partners.

With Russia, and I think this is probably the most important part of Hollande's tour, it's

Thursday in Russia, the message will be more difficult to convey. It will consist to say, okay, you are fighting ISIS since the 1st of September, so far we all know that your strikes have very little to do with ISIS. You have hit 85 percent of non-ISIS targets, so if you really want us to build this large coalition that you want us to build, let us focus on ISIS, and not on other things also. Let us focus on ISIS and let us call our mutual bluffs, in a way, and see who is really working against ISIS.

And also the second point, which will be much more difficult, is to focus on the political component, by saying, we all know that tackling ISIS, staining ISIS, vanquishing ISIS, eliminating ISIS, will never work if we still put aside the question of, let's say, the rebuilding of a political Syria, and that has to do with the question of the regime and Assad. And by the way, and this is what Hollande will probably add, two weeks ago in Vienna, we agreed that this has to be done. On that I am a bit pessimistic for a reason.

This morning Vladimir Putin was in Tehran, and he saw Rouhani, and the statement was issued, which is a very strong (inaudible) insisting, let's say, or insistence on the fact that the Assad question is something that is not to be discussed, that is none of the business of the foreign powers, that Syrians have to do with that, and that the West, and this was very worrying for me, coming from Russia and Iran together, and that the West is hypocritical, kind of alluding that the West has created ISIS.

I don't know if you can partner in the battle against ISIS if one of your partners is still believing that you are at the ISIS of creating the enemy you are fighting. So these are the things that I think will weigh on the climate of Thursday's François Hollande tour. Of course if I have to answer Jeremy's question about, what do people in the Middle East expect, and how do they see that? I think that this analysis is across the board, from Turkey, and probably we'll say much more, but in the Gulf and other places, this is exactly the way things are seen.

Things are seen as the following, you cannot build a proper ground force in order to take on ISIS, moreover that, I mean, especially that you Westerners don't want to put boots on the ground, which is I think, a very wise and clever decision. So if you don't want to do it, and probably it's the best thing not to do, you have to rely on the people from the ground, from the place. Kurds, Arabs, tribes, et cetera, and to do that, you cannot do it, you cannot embattle and mobilize these people if you don't

address the political question, which is the question of the change in Syria at some point.

And it is in the Vienna Communiqué, we have the platform for that, let us all together put a roadmap and a calendar for that. So, to close, I would say that the pressure to change over -- the pressure over François Hollande to change course, and to probably abandon, let's say, the discourse that is so far existing that ISIS and Assad are two sides of the same coin, that we have to battle them together, will remain probably in the deep, let's say, software of French diplomacy.

However, what will change is for a period, probably different priorities, you will probably focus much more, at least militarily, on ISIS, and the question of the regime and the political solution, will probably be put on a longer, let's say, time span, and here the process of Vienna will be probably much more instrumental on that level. So I don't think we have to expect a change of strategy, but we can expect a change in tone, in tempo and in focus, at least, in the short term. Thank you, Jeremy

MR. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Joseph. Laure, is that how you see the President's visits to Washington and Moscow, are you seeing -- well, why don't we go to Kemal, and I'll see if I can get your microphone fixed. Kemal, why don't you discuss the refugees?

MR. KIRIŞCI: If that was a technical conspiracy there --

MS. MANDEVILLE: Ah, it seems to work, actually.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yes, go ahead, please.

MS. MANDEVILLE: Sorry. I'm taking the word back. So, yes, tomorrow we have the meeting between -- we have a lot of questions and very few answers about what is going to happen. Because we have a President coming, François Hollande, who is telling us that this is a game changer, that these brutal attacks on our nation, are changing the geopolitical game. Okay, Joseph says that, in fact, it's not going to change the game. There is still this question, and I think when President Obama meets François Hollande he is going to wait for Hollande to tell him what he wants to do.

What strikes me is that the -- in a way, the contrast in the situation between these two men, these two men actually were very much on the same line for quite a while, I mean, they were indeed absolutely in line concerning the Syria policy, actually the French was more, you know, in 2013 when Obama decided not to do anything after Russia and Assad crossed the famous red line on chemical

weapons, the French wanted to go for, a much more muscular approach, but more or less after that, the same line was in France -- in Paris and in Washington, it was neither Bashar nor Islamic State, what we call in France, the neither-neither strategy.

Today, I mean, in my own paper, there was an article by the person who is charge of the President, and she was saying that there is some kind of, approaching a diplomatic with close, close member of the Administer of the Élysée, that there is some kind of marginalization of Fabius who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs in favor of a new approach. Fabius being actually the quintessence, the symbol of this very, deliberately, you know, neither-neither approach, you know, and sort of very strong criticism of Bashar al-Assad.

So, in the context that we have today, does that mean there is going to be some kind of shift? I must say that I'm quite worked worried about the French context actually. There is a huge emotional, you know, situation in France, and the political class especially on the right, as Joseph underlined, is maybe a line on this kind of change of policy. There's a very strong anti-American feeling growing in a country, in France, saying, look at President Obama, look at this America, it's surely, you know, feckless, they are not helping us. They actually created the situation with Iraq, and now they are not handling it, they are not sufficiently, you know, engaged and committed.

So, why don't we turn to the Russians? At the same time you have a huge propaganda operation which has been going on for, actually, quite a few years now in France, from the Russians. The Russians, you know, actually using a lot of different, you know, weak points to underline that America is this sort of decadent place, and that Europe should go back to its roots, to its Christian roots and that Putin will be, actually, the Defender in Chief of these Christian, European roots.

I see that it makes you laugh, but it's actually pretty effective in the current context, and you know, the ultra-right parties at the moment throughout Europe are becoming, somehow, I would see the new come in town, under which the -- some people say the Putin town, on which, you know, Russia, Moscow is sort of relying to spread this idea that you need strong leaders, like Marine Le Pen and other people, and that you have to have a change in Europe, and sort of de-solidarize Europe from the U.S.

And this is coming very strongly. What is striving, it's not only the ultra-right. At the

moment you have Nicolas Sarkozy, who used to be the best friend of America, the most pro-Atlantic person in France that was a political figure, when he became President the first time, who went to Moscow a few weeks before the attacks, and actually spoke in favor of a much more -- you know, closer partnership with Russia. He criticized, very harshly, the fact that President Hollande hadn't sold the Mistral to Russia in the middle of the Ukrainian crisis, saying it was absolutely despicable and horrible that Hollande had done that.

And you have also Francois Fillon, who is Former Prime Minister and also presidential candidate, who is also on this line, pro-Russian line, and you only have basically, Alain Juppé who is more or less staying, you know, away from that. So this is quite a strong pressure on the President, and so, really, the situation is fascinating because, you know, a bit like in the '30s France -- Europe was between two geostrategic, geopolitical threats, major threats.

On the one hand you had the Nazi Germany, and they have a hand -- you had the Stalin, you know, in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet threat, and then of course you can't compare, it's not the same that we have now, but we have clearly two -- dual strategic threats weighing upon Europe. One is an aggressive Russia which has, sort of, you know, destroyed the international law or order that existed in Europe by annexing Crimea, and which has destabilized by your sort of stealthy war, Ukraine. And is being extremely pushy and aggressive, intimidating countries like Baltic States or, you know, being extremely pushy, in its energy relationships with many countries within Eastern Europe. Trying to have a much better relations with the Germans, and actually having the Vice President of Germany, sort of, pleading for a big alliance with the Russians on the gas, despite the reluctance to do so, of Angela Merkel. So you have this whole context.

And on the other -- So, this is context of François Hollande, and next to him, tomorrow you will have sitting President Obama welcoming him to the White House. And President Obama, I must state, when I arrived in Washington in 2009, I was really struck that the spirit in Washington, was that Europe was a post-modern, even post-historical place where nothing would ever even happen; that there was only these 20 -- How many 27 countries? And what are you doing, you are trying to settle some kind of bureaucratic issues, it's not important anymore. Europe is some kind of, you know, slowly rotting;

maybe we should pivot to Asia.

So, there was very little interest in Europe, and I think, very little awareness of the dangers that were growing. I was very struck because, you know, because I had been covering Russians issues for 20 years, and I just went back from the Georgia War, when I arrived in Washington. You know, I had been in August 2008, and I arrived in December to Washington. So it was very striking, here in Washington the people didn't seem to see that Russia was becoming a serious, you know, an obvious threat to European security in 2008. There was not this awareness. It was strange.

And also there was a total underestimation of the Islam question in Europe. I know that it's kind of politically incorrect to talk about a Muslim question in Europe but, you know, despite the fact that the President and many people here think that there is -- it's not about the Islam, what is going on, I think it is precisely about Islam, not about all Islam, but about, you know, a branch of Islam which is radical Islam, Salafi Islam, which is at war with Western civilization, and wants to destroy it.

And I think this lack of awareness created a situation in which the elite in the United States prefer to blame the supposedly racist institutional system in France, and sort of, supposedly, anti-Muslim, and not giving any space for Muslims in France, instead of seeing that there was a very defined and brutal ideology which was threatening Europe, and also a huge part of the Muslim world. So, I think this is the context, and now you have the situation now, and I was very, actually pretty critical of this sort of lack of awareness of the administration in the past.

But at the same time now, I'm quite -- I understand, you know, the caution of President Obama. Why? Because the French are coming with a plan, a plan which is not a plan, actually, I think you said, that we need a strategy now. What is the strategy? You know, I understand why President Obama is asking; what is the strategy, because if it is just to embrace Russia and go for some kind of big coalition, we have to understand what it means. Does that mean for the French, to give up on the idea that we are going to push for Assad being away, or do we accept that Bashar al-Assad stays in power? We have to state that quite clearly, right?

The second thing is, are the French, if they want to go for a military option, are the French ready to for a serious military option, which is not only a few strikes on Raqqa, but I don't know,

some kind of a safe haven which would actually have some kind of consequence for securing, you know, the situation of refugees and preventing them from coming to Europe. A secure haven for potential, you know, military opposition which could actually be reinforced.

So, are the French ready to put some ground forces on the ground? Are the French sufficiently strong politically in Europe to rally Europeans and tell them, okay, you don't want refugees, so why do you also put some troops on the ground, and some peacekeeping operation? I mean, we have to really clarify all that before we, indeed, ask for some kind of grand coalition. I think these are very serious questions, and they have to be asked in a pretty blunt way. Thank you.

MR. SHAPIRO: Thanks. Kemal, France has a problem with Islam; I guess maybe Europe does, too. How do you see this affecting Europe's problem with Islam, if there is one?

MR. KIRIŞCI: I knew this issue of Islam would turn around and come to me.

MR. SHAPIRO: Eventually it always does.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah. I can't say that I'm a scholar of Islam, but let me address that question, Jeremy, by taking on Laure's early remark, that this branch of Islam, Salafis, is at war with the West. I frankly disagree with that. I think it's at war with all of the world. And so far, it is other Muslims, co-religionists who have suffered the most from what ISIS represents. And if today there are 4.2 million refugees in neighboring countries, a good proportion of it, maybe be still less than half, we could work on the mathematics of it, have been displaced into neighboring countries because of ISIS, and one could make similar remarks about the internally-displaced Syrians as well.

Today, in *The Washington Post*, there's a great piece on Kobani, this Kurdish town on the Turkish border in Syria. The destruction speaks for itself. A lot of that destruction was brought onto Kobani because of ISIS. So I think we need to be clear about that. And what I would like to tie this up with, is to a piece that a very good friend and colleague of ours, Mustafa Akyol, who is the author of *Islam Without Extreme*, Extremism has a piece today in the Turkish newspaper called *Hürriyet Daily News*. And he says, "Don't give ISIL the Islamophobia it seeks." It will be very critical when responding or developing the strategy that France, United States and other partners will need to develop to bear this in mind.

And also to address this issue of Islamophobia that has been part and parcel of Islam's or

Muslim's presence in Europe and elsewhere. Very critical not to drift into essentialism, which I think has happened on many occasions in the past. There was a brief remark to the '30s, late-'30s, and recently in the media here in D.C., there has been a number of pieces that drove similarities between the way Jewish refugees were treated in the late '30s, and some the reaction to the reaction to the Syrian refugees, coming out of the United States itself.

I'd like to make a second remark that in some ways ties up with a question that Jeremy raised. One of the greatest successes of the European Integration Project, is the removal of borders, and for someone like myself, who might be amongst the very few people in this audience who might remember the Europe of the late '50s and '60s, when crossing every single frontier be it in Eastern Europe, or for that matter, between, for example, Yugoslavia or Italy, Italy and France, could take anything up to two, three hours and you could sense, as a young lad, sitting in the back of my dad's car, I could sense that each border, there were huge walls, and those walls were not necessarily just physical walls.

It was walls about prejudice. It was walls about attitudes towards the other, be that when you cross from France into Italy, or for that matter from Britain into France. And to me, that great success of removing borders is what also needs to be reflected on when addressing this issue of what strategy to develop in the coming days and weeks.

The last point, Jeremy; there were references earlier on to refugees, and it has come up on a number of occasions. In that respect, in the context of what has happened in Paris, as horrible as it is, the bill should not be paid by these people, who are like us. A good chunk of them are middle-class people, teachers, doctors, shopkeepers, with their kids, and what is striking for the connoisseur, when you look at the pictures, is that the Syrians are usually families with their children. And the reason they are moving on, is precisely because what's happening in Syria, an inability to address those challenges. I think that's one point that must not be forgotten.

The second is today in *The Huffington Post*, I think there was a brilliant piece saying, "More of Europe." The Europe crisis, when it was first -- when it first erupted, there were doomsday scenarios of how, this is it, this is the end of European integration. And somehow, Europe, as it has done

in the past, has succeeded in addressing the challenge of the Euro Zone crisis as far as we can see. I think a similar attitude needs to be done, because the stakes are high. One must think, let alone of the '30s, but the '50s and '60s, what a different Europe it was then, and you can't write away the borders or the achievements of Schengen borderless Europe.

Maybe the answer, again, lies in not more France, more Italy, more Croatia or Hungary, for that matter, but more of Europe. These are the -- I think I'd better shut up here to allow some -- you know.

MR. SHAPIRO: Thanks for shutting up, Kemal. I guess, maybe I'll -- before we go out to the audience, I'll ask a question or so to each of the participants, because I have to say, in listening to these very rich presentations I started to learn a lot, and then I unlearned it, and then I learned it again, and then I unlearned it again, so I'm still a bit confused, and I'd like to try to bring it all home. And I think that the thing that most confuses me, is I guess something that Laure got at, which is, you know: What is the plan?

We've been talking a lot about reactions, and obviously we don't really know what each -- the French and the Russians and the Americans really want to do, but for me it's a lot -- it's very difficult to connect a lot of these actions up to some of the strategies that were discussed.

And so, maybe we'll start with Philippe, and ask you, there have been these military attacks on Raqqa, and they have a certain satisfying quality to them. ISIS attacks Paris, we attack Raqqa, and that's quite biblical, if we are talking about a return to Christian France, but how does that fit into a plan to prevent terrorist attacks in Paris, or in France? Joseph was talking about the fact that ISIS is the result of socioeconomic governance problems. I think that's what you said?

MR. BAHOUT: Among others.

MR. SHAPIRO: Among others, in the region. It doesn't seem like bombing a city from the air can really affect that in any great way, it can just male more victims. So, how does -- What are those military attacks actually for? They are just for this sense of revenge? Or do they actually have more strategic purpose?

MR. LE CORRE: As you know, I mean, the history of France and the Arab world is an

extremely old and complex one. And obviously there are different elements there. There is one element which is the fact, France is a military and diplomatic power, and does have alliances with a number of countries, like in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that in the Middle East it has decided to -- as it's been said before -- to go for a regime change, at least diplomatically.

Now, as far as the military actions are concerned, now obviously there is a similarity with what happened after 9/11, not necessarily for the --

MR. SHAPIRO: Does that make you nervous?

MR. LE CORRE: But the fact that, you know, after -- Yeah, it does actually, except it's much smaller scale, and I believe the post 9/11 Iraq invasion, ordered by the Bush Administration, was also about regime change. I don't think we are calling for regime change at this stage.

But, on the other hand, you have a French President who has got another 15 months to go in his term. There general elections coming up in two weeks, and we haven't spoken much about the rise of the far right, and things like that. But the French people have been shocked. There is a sense that something needs to be done.

So to speak, the headquarters of ISIS are in Syria, and those who have committed the crimes are in Europe, where in Europe, and most of them either blew themselves up or were killed by the police. So this dual approach of using counterterrorism and police actions, and military action, is some kind of political response to what the French public is asking. Now, arguably it's not a strategy because something just happened on November 13th. The strategy would be, a plan would be, you know, what are we going to do in Syria? What are we going to do in the Middle East? Now I don't think anybody has the answer for that.

Maybe Joseph has the answer, that's why I'm going to let him speak now. But, you know, I think on the political level, something had to be done, and it's actually quite painful for François Hollande who is a Socialist; I don't believe he has much military knowledge or background to become a war leader. And you could say that about a lot of electorate politicians, but he has a very strong, a very efficient Defense Minister, who was here a few months ago.

But, you know, that doesn't make them more powerful than they are, and the French

Military is overstretched, and the fact they have to conduct operations, both in France and overseas, also make their life complicated. And obviously if you compare the French Military to the U.S. Military, we are not talking about the same levels. I mean, the number of aircraft carriers, the number of troops everywhere, but because there's need for this political action, I think striking ISIS was probably right, but it's not going to go on forever.

MR. SHAPIRO: I don't envy François Hollande's position, but I think the idea that something had to be done, so he bombed the city is not a very encouraging concept for a strategy. Joseph, I would love to have you respond to that, if you want to. But I also wanted to ask you related but somewhat separate question, because you really got at the sort of critical divide between the U.S. and the Russians, and there was some disagreement as to which side the French were in on it, but over this question of Assad. And you made the case very strongly that you can't really deal with ISIS until you have dealt with or without dealing with Assad --

MR. BAHOUT: Without, not until.

MR. SHAPIRO: The Russian view is, essential that you can't deal with ISIS without Assad. That he is a critical part of the anti-ISIS coalition, in part because it's the only thing that's holding the rest of Syria together, in part because he has a lot of forces on the ground, and there are no other groups that can participate in that coalition. And I'm wondering -- and to listen to Laure, I think that that the French; and to listen to some people around here, even some of the Americans have been at least a little attracted to this concept. Can you tell us quite directly, what is wrong with this concept?

MR. BAHOUT: It is the same way to answer Philippe, or react to Philippe. First of all, very quickly, your three-point arguments to partner -- the Russian arguments to partner with Assad are factually wrong, the three of them. First of all, Assad is not holding Syria anymore he is holding 20 percent of the territory, second to Syria, the Syrian army has become a shadowy corpse, it is today reduced to maybe 25 percent of its original capacity. And three, so far, Assad has not been very -- I mean showing a lot of willingness to fight ISIS, either in Palmyra, or in Aleppo, or in Risør, we can multiply that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yes. But I think that the Russian view is that the Civil War were

(crosstalk) --

MR. BAHOUT: Yes. And the Russians -- this is where I also said before, that so far, according to all the reports that we read, that are probably serious, Russia has struck 20 percent of its strikes over ISIS, and the rest over something else. So, I will come back to that by answering, or by reacting to Philippe. First of all, I don't want to enter into a Franco, French argument, but Philippe, French socialism has sometimes been good at wars. I don't want to go back to Gimoles, because it's not a very fortunate example.

MR. LE CORRE: Indeed, I know.

MR. BAHOUT: But François Mitterrand made some good military, let's say, operations, Mali is well respected, I think, worldwide as in antiterrorist operation. I think France -- I mean France does know how to do that, but the question is not there, so if I take the risk to answer your question, what would be a strategy, and it will maybe help me bridge maybe this -- or connect the dots with what Laure said before.

What would be a strategy? First of all, I would be a bad ogre; we will have attacks again, okay. We will not stop that. So in answer to your question, attacks are to be expected, in France, in Belgium in England, maybe, I hope so not in the U.S. But we have to expect that, it's not something that we will solve in the coming months.

Yes, also, the military answer is required, of course you have to hit Raqqa, Mosul and elsewhere, not because you have to take revenge, but because you have to really hammer the operational capacities of these people to organize network, send explosive device to Europe, train people, and et cetera. But if you only do that, you will not do anything, you will have more ISIS and probably more attacks.

So what is the -- So, first of all the military answer has to be refined, and have to be -- has to be fine-tuned, and this is what is going to be partially discussed. Intel information exchange, better strikes, and probably better special operations, however, in coordination, and if you don't do that, and here I transit or I transition to my political part.

If you don't do that with local partners on the ground, you can do the targeted killings that

you want, and as much as you want, you will not tackle ISIS. You can kill the Finance Minister and the Oil Minister of ISIS, he will be replaced in the days after. So you will have to have a local partner on the ground. This is where the second part of the strategy is, and maybe here, precise what I've said, it is a much more integrated, political strategy that we need today. ISIS is both in Syria and Iraq, so you have to really approach Syria-Iraq Theater in one way, more or less, which is not so far, the American posture.

Second, while approaching it, why in Iraq would you say that we will have to find the political transmission? And we found it by replacing Maliki with Abadi, and working with local tribes on the ground. Why don't we apply exactly the same argument in Syria, where the case is much more compelling? So, you will have, at one point, to tackle this issue. However, where are the obstacles to that? He built and indigenous -- and indigenous you say in English -

SPEAKER: Indigenous, yes.

MR. BAHOUT: -- an indigenous force, to fill that gap. The problems are, I think, threefold. The first problem is Russia. We are not sure that Russia is on that point of the agenda. And here, this is why, Laure, I agree with you, I think that the possibility of building a grand coalition with Russia is a bit fragile because of that. And so we have to call the bluff of the Russians which is at a very strong challenge to Russia, but say to Russia, only that we have not only signed together, but co-produce and co-sponsored the Geneva II platform and the Vienna platform two weeks ago in which we say, we have to find a proper way to transition the power in Syria.

Call it regime change or not, I don't want to get into ideological words that could lead to blackmail intellectually. I mean, yes, this is a regime change. I mean transition in Syria is a regime change, but it's not a Bushian regime change, it's a device that will take 18 months, according to Vienna, that will lead to the ousting of Bashar from the picture. It is regime change? Yes, it is regime change, and the Russians have to agree that this is the only way to dry up with swamp within which ISIS is swimming. If you don't do that, you will have more ISIS.

The second obstacle is an American obstacle. You have a President that still has 12 months in office. He also still has to digest and finish digesting the Iran deal, so anything he will do or not do in Syria and Iraq is submitted to that, and I understand that from a political point of view. However,

this is where the catch-22 is, we need a more proactive President here, and a more proactive American strategy that needs to say bluntly to the Russians and to the Iranians, look guys, this is what we have to solve this issue.

However, probably he doesn't want to do it, because first of all the time is not enough, and second, we don't want to really antagonize the Iranians, which I also fully understand. The third obstacle is an Arab-Sunni, obstacle. Of course, you don't -- you are not today finding the Arab-Sunni partners in Syria, because you don't have an anti-Assad component in your strategy, this we talked about.

However, what is lacking also, and to be fair in the blame on everybody, you don't have a proper, Arab-Sunni geopolitical component, i.e. your Gulf partners are not fully onboard of that. They are not fully onboard of that because first of all, of course there is the Assad component which is lacking, and second we can say, because probably they don't really want to fight ISIS because of reasons, I don't want to get into that.

Brookings, today, had a paper on that, by your excellent colleague, Bruce Riedel, saying that the links between Saudi Arabia and ISIS could be murky. Of course there is that, and also operationally there is a problem, the Gulf States are today sunk in another theater of operation, which is much more vital for them, which is Yemen. So, in fact you have to take the broad picture, if you want to have a strategy. Of course when course when you broaden it too much you end up having no strategy because you have a lot of things to integrate, but if you want to have a strategy you had better take all the pieces of the puzzle and try to put them somewhere.

So, without a proper military answer, intelligent, and not only a kind of revenge, I strike, okay, fine. The first weeks it's okay to strike Raqqa because we have to show the French population that we are taking revenge for the blood. Okay. But then you have to do something more intelligent.

Second, you have to talk politics, and politics is about how to rebuild Syria, and this has to take a proper, frank, and (inaudible) dialogue with the Russians and the Iranians. We, the Americans, the British and the Arabs on one side, and the Russians and the Iranians, and we have to sit with our Arab friends and partners, and telling them, look, ISIS is partly something that comes from you, maybe

not willingly, but it comes from your habitat, and you only can deal with it, so please help us in doing that.

But for that, Jeremy, and this is something I mean you are very concerned about, we had this dialogue, for that you have to have a Western leadership and part of it is an American leadership, and part of it is an Obamian leadership, and so far, this is, at least from the point of view of France from the Arabs, from et cetera, something still a little lacking, not to say more.

MR. SHAPIRO: So what you are saying is, that the Americans need to get -- need to change the position of the Russians, they need to confront the Iranians, they need to get the --

MR. BAHOUT: Not confront.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. They need to round up the Sunni powers who don't have an interest in this. They need to create an indigenous force on the ground, in Syria, that can be the ground force. I mean, why don't they just drop manna from heaven? This seems to be --

MR. BAHOUT: No. Jeremy, Jeremy. I understand --

MR. SHAPIRO: This seems to be a very harsh requirement, for an America which just failed to do this in Iraq, over the last few years.

MR. BAHOUT: I don't want to monopolize this, but I mean, just one word. Two weeks from now we were sitting in Vienna, and John Kerry was the active story of Vienna. And were produced a paper that is saying exactly this, so either produce papers that we don't believe in, so let's stop producing them. Or we produce papers and we are standing to our words, and we implement them, or we try to implement them.

But when John Kerry says last week, "Solving Syria is, today, very close, it's a matter of weeks, not of months." Frankly I'm asking myself, where he is living, not where I am living.

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, on that I guess we could agree. I'm sorry. Laure, I'd love for you to react to that, but also, it's not quite related, but you mentioned Marine Le Pen. And I'm just wondering how the sort of French right-wing politics are affecting this response, and are going to affect response. And particularly, what is she, and what is the Front National going to do to take advantage of this?

MS. MANDEVILLE: Can I answer first?

MR. SHAPIRO: Sure.

MS. MANDEVILLE: I mean, Joseph is saying -- just said something very interesting sort of outlined the potential strategy, right, and saying that's what Obama should do. What is interesting is he also said that, is that, for the last few months, I think over the summer, as far as I know, from good sources, the Americans have been precisely trying to do that, I mean, that's exactly what John Kerry has been trying to do, going to associate meet with Putin and, you know, getting the Saudis to talk to the Russians, and --

MR. BAHOUT: And the Iranians.

MS. MANDEVILLE: Huh?

MR. BAHOUT: And the Iranians.

MS. MANDEVILLE: And the Iranians, et cetera, et cetera, so there was this sort of, not secret, but pretty sort of discreet game going on over the summers and the Americans telling us, you know, some sources, that it was actually going to work, it was not so bad, we are getting there, and now John Kerry is saying we are nearly there, we are going to be there in a matter of weeks.

The question is that, we are not sure at all it's going to work. I mean, you are saying you have to push -- you have to push the Russians, but why would the Russian give up on Assad? This is really a question I have is; why would they? What would push the Russians to give up on Assad when they can use Assad to sort of keep their very big influence in Syria, and at the same time, divide Europe, and the present Latin compliance which is according, that's just my position, much bigger geopolitical game for the Russians and that Syria is just a way to actually get to the central, what is absolutely the central point of strategy for Russia, which is the relationship with Europe, and the antagonism and confrontation of the United States, which I think is the sort of core of their policy -- of Putin's policy.

So these are the questions I have. I have another question which is a naïve question of someone who doesn't know anything about Syria, and which is; can Syria still exist as a country? I remember over the summer I had an interview with Michael Hayden, the Former CIA Boss, and NSA Boss, and his view which is probably more, you know, informed than mine, was that Syria was gone. That all these discussions and negotiations taking place in Vienna were actually useless because, you know, the West was sort of obsessed with the idea of getting rid of Bashar, but they are absolutely vague,

and I would say even mute on what do they put in place there. Is it even possible to reconcile all this?

And because of that I'm going to suggest a scenario which has been pushed by a few people for Syria, and you know, some people say, okay, they are three acts with real scenarios here. There is Russian scenario, which is the scenario that Putin has applied in Chechnya, which I call the maximalist scenario, which is quelling the adversary, just destroying it to the ground. And that's the Putin -- I think that's probably the dream of the Russian game.

They did not go, they are going to ration the hopeful that we would dream of doing in Syria, what they did in Chechnya, which is, they managed to quell huge independentists uprising, which was not radical Muslim at first, it was not at all, it was sort of a nationalist, you know, quest for independence and they just destroyed it. And they imposed a guy, Kadyrov, who has become the policeman of the Caucasus, and this guy has a sort of militia, I mean an army which has become, say the *Oprichniki* in Russian, the sort of guard of Ivan Groznyy, Ivan the Terrible, had an army of its own that he would use, you know, to quell rebellions throughout the Russian Empire.

And I think that Putin is really using Kadyrov as this sort of *Oprichniki*, and they are keeping the Caucasus in order, and it's in disorder in reality, but it's in check for now. They are sort of putting the lid on it. And so that would be the scenario, the scenario that you are crushing the Sunni uprising, Islamic State, and you are just keeping the lid on, you know, by force. That's one scenario.

The other scenario is the scenario you are describing, sort of fine-tuning what is happening now, making it more effective, sort of the attrition model of Obama, you know, you keep striking Islamic State, at the same time you have special ops, maybe more, you know, you get Obama more punchy, and you try to do something more, you know, as you say, with some kind of Sunni Army, you try to do something.

The other scenario in between would be what, you know, some people like, for instance, Hilary Clinton has hinted to that, I think and in different ways or so, Kagan has written a piece yesterday saying, okay, why don't we create some kind of no-fly zone in Syria, and we put troops on the ground there, to protect, actually these refugees and we just -- because we can't get to an agreement with the Russians, we put pressure on them, so that maybe at some point we get some kind of solutions.

And then what do we get? We get the federalization of Syria? Joseph, I don't know what you think, because if these people can't live together do we get an Alawi country, where maybe Assad even would stay for a while in another country which would be a Sunni country? I don't know. I'm just asking that. Would that be some kind of temporary, tactical move which would show everyone that the West is willing to act, and at the same time, push the Russians?

And one thing I wanted to say, also, is that you were talking about -- Kemal, you were talking about Europe. I think you have, somehow a very naïve and idealistic view of the European Union at the moment because you say, we need more Euro --

MR. KIRIŞCI: That's why (inaudible) he wants to --

MS. MANDEVILLE: I know, I know.

MR. KIRIŞCI: They don't know the reality.

MS. MANDEVILLE: We need more Europe, yeah, we do, but at the same time, Europe is not showing that it exists, so you can't -- What I always say is, you don't give up the prey for the shadow, as we say in French, on *lâcher la proie pour l'ombre*, right? That is we have not -- we have nation states still, they exist, more or less, they are weak, yes, I agree, you know, and the lead of our leadership is weak, but they exist, and Europe doesn't show that it's existing.

I mean, in September, before General Assembly of the U.N. I was just amazed that the Europeans didn't put together some kind of plan for Syria, because that was an existential question. The migrants' crisis for Europe is existential, and there was no initiative on the European side. There were discussions between Putin and Obama, and there was no initiative from Europe.

So my question is; does Europe exist? And in the meantime, because it doesn't exist, maybe the fourth solution is actually strengthening the borders of -- I'm sorry -- of Nation States and of Europe, because when you are attacked, when your house is attacked you don't open the windows and the doors, you close the windows and the doors until you are sure that it's safe outside, and you are not going to have someone getting in.

So, I think or now it would be -- I know it's beautiful, Europe without border, but maybe in the meantime -- I remember my youth, it was not so terrible to go to Spain for the vacation, and spend a

few -- even half-an-hour at the border of Spain, or even, moving to another country in a couple of hours. If the security of Europe is at stake, I think for a while, maybe we should put on the button Pause for that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Kemal, with a somewhat diminished view of Europe, do you still want to join, or?

MR. KIRIŞCI: I don't if we have time, but maybe the only remark that we make, I would have loved to have a bit more time, but on that last point, Laure, it's not about only movement of you and I as students or professor, it's also the movement of goods, and that's what is maintaining economic growth and prosperity in Europe. So the moment you put up the walls, the economy is going slow down, and then you are going to really play straight into the hands of those nationalists and xenophobic circles in Europe.

MS. MANDEVILLE: Don't you think exactly the opposite, that precisely, if you are not tough enough you are going play the absolutely game of these Alawite forces, because if the people feel they are not secure they will vote for the ultra-right next time.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay let's -- I don't think we are going to get --

MR. KIRIŞCI: My boss is saying that I should stop here, and we'll turn to floor --

MR. SHAPIRO: No. Why don't give a quick answer, and then we'll go to the audience.

MR. KIRIŞCI: No, I think the answer would be just to elaborate. Let me just say I disagree, and we will leave it at that.

MR. SHAPIRO: I don't think we've solved everything up here, it's true, but let's go to the audience to see if you guys can offer some better solutions, and we'll take three at the beginning to -- And when I call on you, please identify who you are. Please, you know, ask an actual question, and donations are accepted. Yes, Gary, right here.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks very much. I'm Garrett Mitchell, I write The Mitchell Report, and since you've solved the problem, there's really not much left to deal with, I'll pose the question this way. I would argue that discussion about strategy is interesting but not particularly relevant. We've got more strategies floating around, each of which has its various weak points, that the issue we are dealing with is execution. And it seems to me that the problem of execution has to do with the fact that each of

the parties in any of the strategies has different objectives in the outcomes.

So, having said that, are we focusing on the wrong problem or the question, i.e. what's the strategy? And should we be focusing on the more practical one which is, how the hell do we do this Rubik's Cube?

MR. SHAPIRO: Good question. I think it validates my entire existence, but let's go to the third row in the center there and get some more. Yes, right there.

SPEAKER: Russ from JAVB. Madame Mandeville, I have to confess that I'm actually surprised.

MR. SHAPIRO: Can you just identify yourself?

SPEAKER: Yes. Russ from JAVB, I speak on behalf of -- as a Frenchman, I don't speak on behalf of my clients. Madame Mandeville, the Italians and the Germans, had actually proposed a plan which France refused, because you see that -- we say that, well, you know, there was no united front in Europe, you know, to respond to what was happening in Syria. But once again, on record, the Italians and the Germans had proposed a plan which was refused by, you know, France, and other countries. So, we actually played a role in refuting or pushing back. Two questions --

MS. MANDEVILLE: The plan for Syria?

MR. SHAPIRO: What is the plan?

SPEAKER: Pardon me?

MR. SHAPIRO: What is the plan? I've never heard of it.

SPEAKER: Well, it was in the (Speaking French) in how to move and assist refugees who are already in European soil. So it's more of a different story, but it was kind of a plan which was not addressing the entire affair, but was some kind of a discussion of how to have a blueprint, you know, to kind of stop it from growing.

So, two questions, the very first one, Madame Mandeville, is in reference to President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Fillon. Well, (Inaudible), Villepin, and Védrine, three Former Foreign Ministers of France always say, you have to speak to monsters. So perhaps Sarkozy and Fillon were somewhat right, were they not? And if they were not what was the alternative, and I'm going to refer you

to a discussion with Bashar al-Assad as part of an equation, and Vladimir Putin?

The second question is, is it really true that only the Americans are the ones claiming that the lack of social economic mobility is the reason? I would like to say that maybe not. (Inaudible), Oh Lovely Peace, which was published on Brookings on the 17th, touches on -- I think it's one paragraph -- on the fact that there could be a reason why there are still identification problems. Alain Minc, and I will finish on this one; and Jacques Attali, two French of the upper echelon have touched on one issue, which is we have to look at the social economic mobility or the lack thereof, to kind of understand where there is some sort of identification problem. It doesn't explain to you the entire affair, but perhaps, you know, we could kind of wrap around one of the affair. Thank you.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. Let's take one more. That's go right here in the second row.

SPEAKER: Anna Douglas, I'm a PhD Candidate at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. And I was surprised by the responses that you prescribed in parts because I was particularly surprised that one of the first resolutions was to limit freedoms, or to actually to inhibit *liberti*, which I think is what Europe or France is about.

And I was wondering whether it might make sense, to maybe also look inwards and see how we can, within Europe, within Germany, the U.K. and France fight, you know, xenophobic tendencies without the military tasks.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. Laure, some of the questions were directed to you.

MS. MANDEVILLE: Yes.

MR. SHAPIRO: So why don't you start, and then we'll see if anybody else would --

MS. MANDEVILLE: Of course. So, talk to monsters, right, that was your -- I don't know about your plan, I don't understand which plans you are talking about, about Germany and Italy, so I'm going to talk about the monsters. You say we have to talk to monsters. Indeed, Hubert Védrine, that I know quite well, actually I have debated a lot with him on Russia and other issues, said that we have to talk to monsters. Yes, of course. But do we have to believe them? Yes, that's a question I'm asking about the plan.

So, talk to them, yes, but believe them, I don't know. And Bashar, frankly, I mean,

Joseph explained, you know, why Bashar? You know, keeping Bashar is not realistic. I'm personally not an expert on Syria, so it's a big weakness of mine, so it's difficult for me, even, to talk about, does he represent something yet, you know, and journalists like me don't have -- practically have no access with what is going on inside Syria, and I think that's actually one of the big reasons why we are so, you know, deprived of answers on the Syrian questions.

Socioeconomic issues; I'm not saying that there not socioeconomic issues, you know, in the minorities, in the mass minority in France, not at all. I know there are disenfranchisements, but what I'm saying is that, you know, it's not because you are poor that you start killing people in the street. What I'm saying -- What I want to say is that there was this tendency to think that because these people are disenfranchised, this is the word, and because the French system was -- had institutional racism, I've heard after, you know, the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo*, I participated in some debates, you know, at Cornell University, among others, and I was just amazed that, you know, professors with tenure, were telling me that the reason was that France was institutionally racist, that we had these terrible attacks on *Charlie Hebdo*.

And I don't agree with that because it's not a -- Again, it's not a question of political model, and it's not a question of how you integrate Muslims. Why do I say that? because when we take -- you take absolutely different models of integrations the French Republican model, okay, or the Dutch model, the Netherlands, that I've studied quite carefully in the years 2000s, which is very similar to the Americans, which is, each community is a different pillar, you don't -- you let a lot of freedom to each pillars in this community.

So it's really a community-based model on the identity model -- like the Americans, right, Dutch. Exactly, we are coming from absolutely the British model, very similar actually to the American model, in terms of organization of the minorities, exactly the same result as in France. You know vary -- attacks, you had murders by extremists, Muslim extremists. So it's not a question of model, it's a question of maybe the meeting of disenfranchisement -- a difficult word -- and an ideology which is coming from the outside and coming from within Islam -- I'm sorry, Kemal -- and it's coming from there and which wants to destroy the West.

And by the way, when you said, "I don't agree," I think that it's absolute not a contradictory what you are saying, and what I'm saying, because I said, precisely, that there was a war in Islam, there is a battle within Islam, and this battle has to be waged. And I'm not only one who says that you have Muslim thinkers, prominent thinkers saying we have to wage this battle in Islam, and you have to have a reaffirmation in Islam if we want to get rid of this terrorism -- Islamist terrorism. They say that. And it doesn't mean that this radical Islamist don't want to take on the West.

I remember Philippe Nigro who is a very prominent expert of ISIS and the Islamic State and terrorism, in general, who wrote a -- in 2013 he underlined that Dabiq, which is the journal of the Islamic State, had announced that one day we will get on -- we will get to you the crusaders, we'll get to Rome, and the flag of the Islamic State will be floating on the St. Pierre le Roma. So, if it's not, you know, an attack on the West, I don't know what it is, frankly.

MR. SHAPIRO: Philippe, do you see a relationship between the integration problems in France and these issues?

MR. LE CORRE: Just one word. I mean, you were saying, you know, it's difficult for -- you can't see yourself and President Hollande because it's difficult to deal with Syria, but it's probably even more difficult to deal with the integration issue. When you talk about xenophobia, obviously -- I think what we have to do really, is to get rid of the I of ISIS.

I mean, it's a terrorist organization, and the reactions from the Muslim community in France have been striking in saying that this is not Islam, and this has nothing to do with us. We have to make sure that, you know, in the upcoming elections, and there's one actually in two weeks so, you know, touch wood, some of us are pretty worried about the outcome but, you know, we have to make sure that learning how to live together becomes the critical goal, and making sure that this group is really not -- not identified with Islam.

As Laure said, the system is what it is. I personally spent some time in London, five years actually, the late '90s, and I saw the birth of a rather radical movement in some of the mosques near London, in London in fact, and the two systems did not prevent, you know, either way, really, for radical groups to become -- getting some support. And I mean we know they are getting support from

overseas as well. So, I mean, I don't think European countries should change their constitutions or change their religions.

I mean, there are Muslim schools in France; there are Imams in the military. I'm not saying it's perfect but, you know, people join a -- I mean including these refugees who knock at the door of Europe, they are also there to join a certain political and societal system. So, let's just make sure, you know, we ostracize the (inaudible) fairest.

MR. SHAPIRO: For those of you who interested, there is a debate on the relationship between Islam and ISIS on the Brookings website which is very, very good, although you probably won't actually find the answers. Joseph, I'd love you to address this execution point, but also if you could say some points on this integration question it will be helpful as well.

MR. BAHOUT: Strategy, execution, I fully agree. I mean without entering in a theoretical and conceptual debate, what is strategy, what is tactics, what is strategy without implementation? I think all of it is one part, but definitely, yes, on that case on this issue of ISIS, Syria, Iraq, much more than probably ever before in previous cases, within the same coalition interests are very divergent. I don't want to plunge into that, but very quickly.

I mean, for Turkey of course. If you have to say either or, it is of course the Kurds who are much a danger than ISIS. For the Gulf ISIS is worrying but having Iran and the Levant, and then Yemen is much more worrying.

For Europe, within Europe, the divergences are enormous, so yes. However, before that, I mean, on the Arab-Israeli process, in '91 when Saddam invaded Kuwait, in 2001 when we, all of us went to Afghanistan after 9/11; and by the way, 9/11 didn't produce the French-American discord, it was the war on Iraq that produced the -- not Afghanistan, we were together in Afghanistan.

People have different -- or differences in priorities and strategy, it took someone to put it all together, and it this is all part of strategy, and part of political -- I mean, of political wittiness and of leadership, again. So, today, someone has to put some order in chaos, to quote the Brookings blog. If the U.S. doesn't want to do it, fair, enough, I mean I'm not a kind caller for eternal American, let's say, preeminence or leadership, but if it doesn't want to do it, someone else has to do it.

But someone has to do it, and it won't be solved by itself. So I think that this is a way of, in a way, extricating ourselves from this problem, which is true, without a roadmap, an excellent strategy remains a very good paper, and it's not something that is implemented.

The second point which I think is very interesting although it's not our subject: Is Syria livable again? Look, I'm both an analyst and probably -- I mean, like everybody -- I have an opinion. I think it's beyond debate. Okay. You quoted --

MS. MANDEVILLE: Hayden.

MR. BAHOUT: -- Hayden, Mr. Clapper, Mr. Beaujolais, the Head of the French Intelligence, two, three weeks ago said, "Syria is broken beyond repair." I frankly, analytically believe that, I'm very convinced about that. I think that Syria is today broken. This is why, by the way, Jeremy, Assad is no more a partner because he's ruling about something that has disappeared. He's the head of a militia within other militias. So he can't rebuild Syria.

The question is, you know, before becoming French, I was Lebanese, and I lived in a country where, for 15 years, it was broken, and we thought at times that it won't be ever patched up again. So, of course, analytically saying something is broken, is true, but politically it doesn't mean that you have to accept it. I mean, you can let go the Syria process like it is, and you will have a fragmented Syria that at one point will be legitimized and legalized by an international process.

As people will sit around the table and say, these are the borders, let's accept them. In value I don't have anything against it, I mean, nations are born and they die, maybe one day Lebanon will disappear, Iraq has already more or less disappeared. However, we are today, all of us international community, bound to a process which called Geneva Vienna, where we are still saying, we want a unified secular democratic Syria.

I mean, if these words mean something, again, I say it, let's do it, if not let's sit on the table with the Syrians if they accept this far, and say, okay, people, you can't live together anymore, let us see where are the boundaries of your internal -- it can be a federalization, it can be a confederal state, a confederal state with federal parts of Lebanon and Iraq. I don't know.

I am of the people, I mean, who think that probably the old state order in the Levant is

dead. Okay. What will replace it, I don't know, and I don't think, analytically again, that it will be replaced soon by something. My worry is, how do you shorten this limbo period between something which is dead, and something to be born, and how to do it at the less cost possible in blood, time, displacement, horrors and et cetera?

For me, as both a political scientist and as a citizen of that region, and of the world, this is what worries me. But, I mean, I'm not -- nothing is sacred in these issues. I mean, if Syria stops, I know that some Syrian friends here would probably jump from their chair, but I mean, coldly, today, Syria is, let's say, comatose, advancedly comatose. You can still save it, yes, but with a lot of efforts, as you said. You don't want to save it, let's try to transform into something else at the least cost possible. This is what I'm saying, but this, again, needs a little bit of leadership.

MR. KIRIŞCI: And in that interim I know, Jeremy, you are going to ask me what I think about all this.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yes.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Just coming on Joseph's heels, in an interim, there are refugees out there, and it happens that the West, the EU and the United States, and a number of other countries are signatories of the legal documents, that promised that refugees are going to be treated differently than migrants or irregular migrants, and that this is an international responsibility. And this is what I'd like to remind us all.

And I would also -- would not want you to walk away, having listened to Laure, that somehow I'm an advocate of Salafism.

MS. MANDEVILLE: I never said that. I never said that.

MR. KIRIŞCI: All I said, was that -- but just a second, let me finish I'm not a very talkative person --

MR. SHAPIRO: I can testify; he's too big a drinker for that.

MR. KIRIŞCI: And all I said, Laure, was to respond to your remark and, you know, Brookings keeps transcripts of these debates here, you can always go and look back.

MR. SHAPIRO: Just for this reason, yes.

MR. KIRIŞCI: That a branch of Islam is at war with the Western world, and I said that branch of Islam is not at war just with the West, but it's at war with the Muslim world, and with Syrian people, et cetera. That's the only point I made. You didn't need to cite big literature that, you know, argues to the contrary. We've run out of time.

MR. SHAPIRO: Yeah. I think, I apologize for my bad time management, but we are basically out of time. I think that we have covered a kind of frightening array of subjects. I think we've plunged into the ways to maintain our values, the ways to fight ISIS, and the struggles over leadership and structure. I'm not sure we've resolved anything, but I hope we've given you a lot of food for thought and I appreciate you coming. And please, join me in thanking the Panel for some very rich presentation.
(Applause)

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016