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# EUROPE'S REFUGEE CRISIS: HOSPITALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. HILL: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm Fiona Hill, the director of the Center on the United States and Europe here at the Brookings Institutions. And I wanted to welcome all of you here today for a session perhaps one of the most topical current issues, the refugee crisis in Europe.

We decided to this event as part of a series, some of you may have already attended some of our previous events, a word in advance of the really terrible and tragic terrorist attacks in Paris last Friday. Obviously that has changed the debate somewhere where in the United States and also in Europe. And I think that's actually one of the things that we want to do here today is to deconflict all of the issues that have very unfortunately been linked together in the commentary.

We want to do this in several ways, one of which was some of the photographs that many of you have seen when you came into the auditorium, which we've stopped now for during the course of the discussion, but that we will start showing again as the discussion wraps up. These are some pictures that have been taken by a young photographer, Peter van Agtmael, who is part of the Magnum photography group. Peter has a personal connection to Brookings. His father, Antoine van Agtmael is one of our trustees. And it was actually through that relationship that relationship that we were able to ask Peter to share with us photographs that otherwise would been displayed in some other formats.

Peter traveled just a month or so ago with a whole group of Syrian refugees all the way along the pass from the Middle East into Europe. And you will have seen from some of the pictures here about the way that he's captured the true nature of the refugee movement, emphasizing most graphically I think here the diverse nature of many of the refugees. And mainly the fact that this is women and children and families who are trying to flee from really terrible circumstances. And Peter's photographs you'll be seeing in a number of different settings. He's actually a very well-known photojournalist. And has recently had photographs in lots of different magazines and elsewhere. And I think you'll see more of these photographs later.

But the point that we're trying to get across here today is again that this is refugee crisis that is being dealt with in Europe. It's been conflated now with terrorism, with migration and immigration debates both in Europe and in the United States. But primarily is that the impetus for us to have this event was to put stress on the refugees. And we have with us a very distinguished group. I'm going to

hand over very shortly to my colleague and the moderator, Constanze Stelzenmüller, our Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, who is originally from Germany, which is of course at the center in many respects of these debates right now, and she will basically lead the proceedings.

But we also have with us Kemal Kirişci, our Senior TÜSİAD fellow, the heard of our Turkey project. Some of you have seen a report that Kemal, and another colleague of ours, Beth Ferris, produced some time ago on the refugee crisis and Turkey's efforts to deal with this. Kemal and our colleague Beth Ferris have been traveling around over the last several months to refugee camps in Turkey, in Jordan, on the borders with Syria. They're producing another major report on this, which is coming out shortly. So there'll be more events. And they were also featured in an event quite recently on the contours of the refugee crisis. And Kemal has also just come back from meetings in Turkey on the fenders of the G-20, where of course the refugee crisis was also a major topic.

We also have after Kemal Kirişci, our colleague Matteo Garavoglia, who is our Visiting Fellow from Italy. And he was an expert on the EU's efforts to deal with refugees, migration, humanitarian assistance, and development issues. And Matteo is also joined by another Italian, that was Nathalie Tocci, who came in a little late, because Nathalie Tocci, as well as being a very senior and distinguished Fellow at the Institute of International Affairs in Rome, is also the Senior Advisor to the High Representative of Europe, Federica Mogherini. And Nathalie is in town for a number of meetings, including meetings with the State Department. She has a very good reason for coming in late. And these are precisely some of the issues that Nathalie is dealing with. So we're very pleased that she was able to join us today, too.

And last, but certainly not least, is our other Brookings colleague Leon Wieseltier, who many of you know as a very astute commentator on a whole range of different issues, who is going to give us a perspective on the debate here in the United States.

And one of the parting thoughts I want to leave us with, is that as this debate unfolds, keeping an eye on the refugee crisis for what it is, is very important. The United States and many other countries have not exactly crowned themselves with glory, at similar moments in time, conflating refugee crisis very often with other issues. We think about 1939 and the turning away of a ship filled with refugees from the impending crises of the origins of World War II, in the United States, and many other

times during that period. And also as we're debating our immigration debate, we have our Presidential campaign, many of the refugees who were conflated with criminals and terrorists from Cuba, and who fled in the past as well. And I just hope that we can keep our minds on what it is that we're actually here to talk about today. So without any further ado, I'd like to thank my colleagues for taking part in this seminar, and thank all of you for joining us today, and look forward to a very stimulating debate. Constanze, over to you, thank you.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Thank you very much for this kind introduction, Fiona. I'd like to remind everybody that we are on the record and in fact there is a live webcast of this event going on. We will be doing a half hour or so of back and forth in the panel, and then all of you will get an opportunity to ask questions and make comments. But, again, remember that a question is a short remark followed by a question mark. You can follow it be a full stop, if you want. But if it was apposite to the topic at hand, that would be great. And if you could address to someone on the panel specifically and state your name and institutional affiliation as you do so, that would be even better because that tells us where you're coming from quite literally.

As Fiona just told you, I am German. The fact that I am moderator at this panel means neither that I am the puppet master of this conversation, or that I wish to take myself as somebody representing my particular country, out of the conversation. On the contrary, I assume that my four colleagues here, or in fact you, would have questions or remarks to make about Germany's role, and of course I'm willing to address those. So I am in that sense double hatted.

And I would like to turn immediately to our first speaker to Kemal Kirişci, and I've already held up this report, which I advise you to all read carefully. And as Fiona said, there's another one coming out. Kemal is a distinguished specialist on Turkish domestic and foreign policy, and I think it's well worth remembering as Europe, and particularly my country moans about the numbers of refugees, the indeed historic numbers of refugees arriving on its shores, that only 5% of the total refugees outside of Syria, are actually arriving in Europe. All the other ones, the other 95% are in the neighboring countries, and above all in Turkey.

Kemal, give us a little bit of a sketch of and an idea of what is happening in Turkey right now, how Turkey is grappling with this, what is it doing right, where are the limitations, and what is asking

for in terms of solidarity from Europe?

MR. KIRIŞCI: This is what you worry the most when you're sitting in an examination and you were hinted that a different question was going to be asked. So I'm a bit off balance here. I was hoping that I would say a few words about root causes, Constanze. Why is it --

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Oh, feel free. You can do that as well.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Why is it that there are half a million, actually around 600,000 Syrian refugees in the European Union right now, and they continue to stream in? Very briefly, two sets of root causes. One root cause, I think you're well aware of it, is what's happening inside Syria and the way in which the regime in Syria has inflicted the repression, the violence, and the destruction on its own people. Something that has been going on effectively since March 2011.

At the end of 2011 there were 26,000 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. That repression has continued and on top of it, has also come the violence that extremist groups, Islamic extremist groups including ISIS, has begun to inflict on the Syrian people roughly since June last year, June in 2014. And when you put the two together today we have 4.2 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries as far as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees registration goes. There is also people beyond those figures, and on top of it about 7 million Syrians who are displaced. Now that comes to roughly to half of Syria's population just before these events started in 2011.

Now the second leg two the root causes is the fact that these three countries, as Constanze has just mentioned, had been holding on their shoulders this burden for the last four years. And what's very ironic is that the High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, had ben pleading with the international community, but particularly the U.S. and the European Union to resettle some of these refugees. He had called for a 130,000 places quarters, but only 100,000 were made available. And roughly, at the time when this crisis was erupting, around June/July, only two or three thousand had actually been resettled from these countries. The way I put it is that as the frustration and the doom about their own future in respect to education, employment, etcetera began to increase, these refugees began to take the resettlement effort into their hands with the help, unfortunately of human smugglers who have mostly taken them across the Aegean Sea.

Now, protection of refugees, as far as international legal practice goes, is that it has to be

a shared responsibility. Not just the responsibility of host countries. And these are, with the exception of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are small countries. I was, as Constanze and Fiona referred, in a camp in Jordan, the big camp in Jordan, and one Palestinian, who had been working for UNRWA, as we were sitting at the camp under the shade, told me that the number of refugees that have arrived to Lebanon would correspond to about 100 million refugees arriving to the United States.

Now the mathematics of it sounds very bland. But when you're sitting in a camp, as you see 70-, 80,000 people in one camp, you begin to suddenly take a step back and begin to realize what it means. In Lebanon, for example, 50% of the students in primary schools are Syrians. And then these states, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey also have to attend to the health needs of these refugees.

Now the international community, it's not that they haven't chipped in at all. The UN runs two major budgets for the Syrian crisis, one for Syrians inside Syria and one in the neighboring countries. But these budgets have not been met. By the time the European refugee crisis erupted only one-third of those budgets were met. I just checked it today for this event, the international community's conscious has been mobilized clearly and now it's up to 45%.

The other leg of burden sharing is of course resettlement. And I made references to, but unfortunately just as the United States was putting into place a program to take 10,000 refugees. It had only taken about 1,500 by midsummer. And then promised to increase the overall quota, not just for Syrians, but the overall quota from 70 to a 100,000, the bombings in Paris has taken and you know the subsequent arguments that have been circulating with respect to the resettlement of refugees.

I think I'd like to conclude, I realize we're very limited time, that at the end of the day we must not forget that these are people just like us. And the UNHCR has done a tiny little survey that it hasn't yet publicized, but the survey reveals how most of these people are middle class people. And when UNHCR asked them why are you moving, a good proportion of them were saying for the education of our kids. Worrying about the future of their kids, not themselves in the first place. So neighboring countries, Europe and the global community at large, is facing a major challenge out there with respect to protecting these refugees and thinking about their future. Thanks.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Thank you, Kemal. Just to salvage the honor of the moderator here, this is a class case of Occam's Razor. Rather than the moderator trying to trip up her colleague,

she simply forgot what she was going to ask him. (Laughter) Apologies, Kemal.

MR. KIRIŞCI: That's gracious of you.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: With that, I would like to turn to my next colleague, Matteo Garavoglia, who is our Fellow by the graces of the Council on the U.S. and Italy for a year. And Matteo is a specialist on EU humanitarian policy and soft power. And in this case, I think it's fair to say you take the view that neither is much in evidence in this crisis. And indeed we have seen I think confusion on the European level and a great deal of dissonance and discord on the nation state level. Perhaps you would like to elaborate, Matteo.

MR. GARAVOGLIA: Thank you, Constanze. Yeah, indeed I think we should think about two Europe rather than one here. Because throughout the process I've seen kind of a split bipolar personality disorder here. We have I think three set or dichotomies. One is a geographic dichotomy. A second one is an institutional dichotomy. And a third one is a dichotomy in terms of the answers that we're looking for.

Now, the first one, when we look at geography. I hate to say it, but we, and there are some caveats, but overall we see that good old fashion split between West and Eastern Europe. It's not clear cut, but it is there. We see on the one hand certain members states that are willing and able to have a relatively open arms policy, bring in asylum seekers, allow them to lodge their asylum applications. And on that front Germany and Sweden stand out for two different reasons. Germany stands out in terms of the absolute numbers they are allowing to come in. And Sweden in terms of the relative amount of people that it's willing to accept. Indeed, if you look, we have now at the moment we have data just for the first quarter of 2015, and if you look at Syrians, which are the biggest groups of asylum seekers, over 14,000 Syrians lodged asylum applications only to Germany. When it comes to Sweden for the same period we're looking at, three and half thousand. In relative terms though, as a percentage of the population that is far more.

So we have these open arms, this willingness to accept people. On the other hand though, we saw unpleasant things, to say the very least in some other quarters. And I'm going to name names, it is a pleasure to do so. (Laughter) We've seen --

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Yes?

MR. GARAVOGLIA: Yes, let's so that. We saw Hungary putting up border fences, and effectively breaking the principle of no reform therefore make it impossible for anybody to lodge an asylum application. We saw Slovakia taking European institutions to court against a decision to share the burden in terms of asylum refugee policy. We can talk about that later. We see unfortunately the new Polish government that just came took over, making a lot of unpleasant noises at every possible level. Saying, well seeing what happened in Paris, we don't feel like taking anybody in anymore. Implicitly making that link refugee potential terrorist.

So there's a lot of unpleasant stuff. Last thing I saw yesterday was the Czech president going to an anti-refugee rally. So a dichotomy there. That's a geographic one. There is a second dichotomy and that's an institutional one I think. And I really wish to stress that because I think that is something that is missed. Sometimes we don't notice that I think adequately here in the United States in particular. Understandably so, because European Institutional dynamics are complicated to say the least for Europeans, as well.

We have the Commission, or European institutions, Brussels on the one hand, and the member states on the other. What we saw has been a continuous trend over many months now whereby EU institutions, and primarily the Commission has been ahead of the curve. Or maybe not ahead of the curve, but coming up with coherent long-term proposals to address these challenges. And on the other hand, the members states that have been applying the brakes to say the very least, dragging their feet, taking commitments and then not respecting these commitments.

Now let me give you a couple of examples. I look just at the financial and the operational side of things. On the financial side, there was an agreement in September, 23rd of September, to come up with extra funding to manage all this. We were talking about 5.6 billion euros in the region of $6 billion. The standard practice, let's put it like that, is that European institutions; i.e., the Commission comes up with half of the cash through its budget, and the member states have to match that. Now where do we stand today? Not even two months down the line the European Commission found the money in the budget and there put on the plate ready, 2.8 billion euros. The member states just over 500 million. So they are 2 billion short basically.

Again, the member states don't deliver when they're supposed to.

Finally, on the operation side, because I think that is telling and it gives an idea what's going on out there, you have two -- well you have many agencies in Europe, maybe too many, but you have Frontex, to begin with, that is an embryo of EU border agency that tries to coordinate things on the external borders. And you also have the European Asylum Support Office. These two agencies have been asking for extra resources, extra stuff, officers to help out, to actually help out the member states on the frontline, Greece, Italy, that are dealing with this. And they said, "Hey, we need just over a thousand extra staff to deal with this."

The member states said, "No, problem we'll pledge officers. We'll help out." And today, two months later, they have provided just over 500 staff. So, again, they don't do what they are supposed to do.

Just a final point there in terms of numbers, which I think says it all, it was agreed, and now we're talking about again over two months ago, to relocate 160,000 migrants that landed primarily in Greece and in Italy, and to relocate them to other member states across the European Union, in a way to share the burden. And say, "Hey, we all can help out hosting these people." Okay? Let's go ahead with it. Finally, we're putting this in motion and we are relocating people, so airplanes are being, you know, an airlift is being organized here and there between Athens on the one hand, and -- well not really Athens, Greek islands and Italy, to other member states. What is the problem? The pace of all this.

At the current pace we will have relocated 160,000 people, which is a tiny percentage of the number of people that we expect to arrive in Europe this year, which will probably be about ten times as that, 1.6 million, could be a realistic figure.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: A million of those possibly in Germany.

MR. GARAVOGLIA: Yeah. We'll relocate 160,000 at this speed, we'll be done with this relocation in the year 2101. (Laughter) This is not good enough given that most of these people will be very old or dead by then. Right?

I wrap it up there. So we have a problem again on the delivery, on an institutional level this gap. And finally, we have a gap and a dichotomy in terms of answers. On the one hand, you have those that say, "Well the answer here is to close borders." You know, seal borders, keep them out. Problem solved. On the other hand, we have those that say, "Hey, we need a common asylum or

refugee policy. We need an integrated Pan European framework to deal with this, effectively to welcome people."

How do we find an answer there? I do not know. But what I do think this answer will have to entail will be some sort of grand bargain. We will have to find a solution that brings these two elements together.

And I want to end just with a bit of hope. It is there. It is in the pipeline. It's not public really yet. But the European Commission is working on that. There are two main things. In December, more likely in January, we'll see some early proposals for the establishment of a European Coast Guard, and a European border protection force. So we're talking about the Europeanization of Europe's external borders.

On the other hand, a bit later, first half of 2016, the Commission will come out again and with more comprehensive proposals to reform the Dublin Convention which regulates together with other things asylum and refugee policies, will come out with proposals for a Pan European asylum and refugee policy effectively. I don't know how this will play out. My hope is that the commission will get traction with the member states. My fear is that the member states once more will prove themselves to be just a relic of the past.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Thank you very much for this critical assessment of where we are. I think that's entirely accurate. I will just add to this an observation from the reporting that I've seen in Germany, this whole notion of carting around people in Europe does hit one key difficulty, and it is what people want, the people being carted around. These people have family in certain places. They have heard that some places are better to go to than other places. And if you tell them well you're going there, and regardless of whether your uncles or parents are in another country. They often find ways of evading the carting efforts of the authorities, and that is something that the German authorities, in particular, are seeing a lot of.

People arrive in refugee centers to be processed. They're there for a couple of days, and then they suddenly disappear. This is not something that you can just control with force. And, again, it is something that we are going to have to find more subtle ways of dealing with than just Commission algorithms, airplanes, and carts.

With that, I'm going to turn to Nathalie Tocci, who's here in her capacity as the Deputy Director of IAI the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome. But who as my boss, Fiona Hill, said is also a Senior Advisor to Federica Mogherini. So perhaps you can tell us a little bit about your experiences and your observations at two levels, the travails of trying to forge a European policy at a time when European governments and my government, Germany's government in particular, have been radically espousing the reverse of that which is let's intergovernmentalize everything as much as we can. And of course, we also know that the issue that we're talking about currently, which is how to dispose of refugees within the borders of Europe is a matter within the terms of the competences of the European treaty a matter of justice and home affairs, and therefore is among the intergovernmental competencies anyway. In other words, you would have to actually specifically give this to European Union as a competence to deal with.

And if you want to add something perhaps on the Italian position, the Italian government's position, as you see it. Italy, like all of the southern coastal countries, is particularly affected, more affected than I think than many of the northern countries at this point, you're welcome. And glad you could, despite your incredibly tight schedule, that you could make it to be with us today.

MS. TOCCI: Thanks. It's a real pleasure. And I'm far less knowledgeable that then two previous speakers. Let me perhaps concentrate my remarks on three main points. Two of which I'll really try to squeeze, because I think they were largely covered, but I'll just give a slightly different take on them. And then concentrate really on the final point, which is the sort of what to do point. And in this respect, I am talking entirely with my institute hat, just to be very clear.

So first point, what's the problem here? What are we talking about? I think it's quite clear from what we've heard so far that essentially the problem is that this is the largest refugee flow that we have seen since World War II, as stark at that. The numbers you have heard. It's important, particularly when one talks about the European Union, to put those numbers in perspective at the same time. Yes, we are talking about a million. We're talking about probably 1.6 million. In the years to come, given this is not a phenomenon that is going to die any time soon, we will be talking in the millions. But we're not talking tens of millions. And we are talking about European Union of 500 million.

And I think it's important to bear this in mind, not only because it's important to put things in perspective, but also to be credible when we go and talk to the Lebanese, when we go and talk to the

Jordanians. I mean we can't really go with a straight face and talk about how unstainable it is for the European Union to host one maybe two, maybe even three million, when Turkey itself is coming close to that number. And this is just one single country. So I think it's a big issue. But at the same time it's important to put it in perspective.

And it's a big issue not because of the numbers. It's a big issue, I think for at least three reasons. It's a big issue firstly because of the humanitarian crisis and the humanitarian concern. We are talking about thousands of people dying. And thousands of people dying as they try and make their way into Europe, because there are no legal channels for them to make their way into Europe. They don't, if you like, opt to jump onto boats and try and cross the Mediterranean out of fun. There is no other way for them to go and ask for a visa in Damasks in order to apply for their asylum status in Sweden. So it's a humanitarian concern, because of the numbers of people die. It's a humanitarian concern because of the vulnerability of people as they make their way into Europe.

It's a concern that has to do with politics in society. And politics in society and the resilience of societies, mainly I would say not in the European Union. Kemal was talking about Lebanon and Jordan, and it is a real question to what extent? Sometimes I actually wonder how is it possible that Lebanon is still standing. So it's a question about the resilience of host countries. And to a very minor extent, it's obviously also a societal issue and a political issue within the European Union. But, again, I think it's very important to put this right into perspective and to know what we're talking about.

And then thirdly, and unfortunately, you know, I try always to be very careful in not associating the two, but after Paris, it is also a security concern. And this is the real danger. It's a real danger because precisely because we want to put the emphasis on the humanitarian, on the political side of things. The minute in which the issue is securitized, because of events, it becomes a toxic conversation. But I think that after the Paris attacks, that is a real danger. And I think it's important to have a very sort of lucid debate about these issues in order to, yes, if you like, acknowledge and recognize that thanks to the extent to which they exist, but at the same time not conflate the two too much.

Second point I wanted to raise, has really got to do with the response so far. And here I'm going to be very brief, because my Matteo really touched upon all of the things that have been done. I

would --

MR. GARAVOGLIA: Or not.

MS. TOCCI: Or not. Well, I'll talk about the not later. So what has been done? I think basically what we see is that there has been a rather considerable effort in the domain of containment and externalization of the problem. So we have stepped up border security measures with sort of reinforced budget for Frontex, the border agency of the European Union. There are plans in the making towards moving into a European coast guard system, so that has to do, if you like, with border security issues. There has been an effort in the direction of, if you like, saving lives along with anti-smuggling, the CSDP mission, the Common Security and Defense Policy mission, Sophia, which has now entered into its second phase, and this is about countering -- it's about saving lives. But it's also about countering smuggling routes, and now that it's in its second phase, it is operating in the high seas. So something has been done there.

And it has been about supporting. Supporting host states, but now after the (inaudible) also trying to step up involvement in origin countries. And the numbers, if we add, if you like, the amount of money committed which is a different pledge, which is a different issue, from implementation, if we group together UN grants given through trust funds, the trust funds for Syria, trust fund for Africa, a specific amount 3 billion pledged to Turkey, we're talking in the range of 9 billion euros, which is not small amounts of money.

So I would say that as far as, if you like, containment and standardization quite a bit has been done, or at least is in the pipeline. Something is beginning to move on the internal side, too, and Matteo was mentioning this. I think he's very right in saying that the big push here is coming from the European Commission and particular from the Commission President Juncker. Interesting the way in which we are trying to get around questioning the Dublin regulation by first asserting the principle of resettlement and relocation as an emergency measure, but of course this is an emergency that's going to last for years. So this is I think quite in a sense a smart way of getting at the problem, trying to affirm a principle. And then, of course, the idea is moving toward a more permanent system, but also a system which encompasses far larger numbers, because you know, 160,000, as you said, I mean it's ridiculous.

But I remember sort of in conversations with Commission officials, they're very conscious

obviously that the numbers are ridiculous, but for them what was important was to affirm the principle of relocation. And, of course, in order to affirm that principle of relocation it was important not to make that conversation more toxic than what it already was, and therefore to play down the numbers, if you like, as much as possible.

Now, this is as far as what's been done. Third and final point that I wanted to raise is really what should be done, and therefore what is not being done. And here I think that Commission included, but of course the Commission, as you said, is probably the one that is furthest along the way. But I think in general EU Inc. is just woefully behind the curve. I mean this is not a phenomenon that we're gonna stop. And the sooner we acknowledge it, and have a sort of lucid and sober conversation about it, the better it's gonna be in terms of equipping ourselves to deal with the challenge.

So what should be done? I think we're essentially talking about legal channels for the refugees to come in. I think secondly, and this is probably going to be the easiest part to do, stepping up even further particularly as far as implementation is concerned, the foreign policy, the external side of it. So that the money that is pledged actually making sure that that money gets to the places and that it's spent in the right way.

And then the third, and probably most difficult bit is the point that, Matteo, you were raising, moving toward genuinely common asylum system. But here, and this is the final point that I wanted to make is, what are the political conditions for this to happen. My hunch, and this is an entirely personally view, is that precisely because of the geographic mainly division that you were talking about, we are actually unlikely to see an EU of 28 moving towards a common asylum system that provides for the kind of things that I've been mentioning, legal channels, permanent resettlement schemes, etcetera. You know common asylum system Inc.

I think what is interesting about the way in which the situation has shifted actually quite dramatically over the last few months, is that whereas up until last summer, I would say, you essentially had Italy kicking and screaming and saying the EU's got to do more about this problem. And kind of everyone turning the other way. Now you begin to see a core of EU countries, which essentially revolve around the founding six members plus Austria, plus Sweden, plus probably Finland, but that's basically what we're talking about. Where I think it is possible to move towards a genuinely common asylum

system.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Let's remind people who the core countries are: Germany, France --

Ms. TOCCI: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, and to which I would add, as I said, Austria, and the Nordic countries. So that core, which is probably able and willing to move towards a genuinely common asylum system, and an outer core. And I think what's interesting about this, is that whereas we're getting used to having discussion of a two-level Europe when it comes to the Eurozone, the ins and outs of European economic governance, to me probably this is gonna end up being a more important and more interesting two-level method of moving forward toward integration.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Yep. Thank you, Nathalie. I think that this is it's odd, we really have three crises right now in Europe that seem to clamor for a common an EUized approach. One, of course, is the Eurozone crisis, the next is common security and defense, and the third one is the refugee crisis. And I think it's anybody's get right now which one will be the first where you have a move towards deeper integration. But I think all three are really clamoring for this. And this could be the kind of crisis that by its sheer magnitude pushes us through the sonic wall of deeper integration.

I have been asked by one of my colleagues to mention that we have a Twitter hashtag for this event. It's called #RefugeeCrisis. And also, I've been hearing an iPhone pinging rather insistently. It's immensely distracting. If you could check your iPhones and turn that off, I would be most grateful. And with that, I'm going to turn --

SPEAKER: But how do we Tweet at the same time?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Well, you can Tweet, but you don't have to let your iPhone ping at the same time. You can turn off the audio, I think as you know. Now, I would like to turn to Leon Wieseltier, another of our distinguished colleagues, whom I keep having to remind myself to call the Isaiah Berlin Senior Fellow. Although I will add that one of my favorite, I think probably my all-time favorite and loveliest of all Irving Berlin pieces, is the Russian Lullaby, which is about Russian refugees far away from their home country having arrived in a America. If you don't know Russian Lullaby, by Irving Berlin, go on iTunes and find it. It's one of his most haunting pieces.

Now, Leon, I think can speak to us on several levels that are of concern here. And

maybe sort of elevate this conversation from the mundane policy levels in which we live to some of philosophical levels. Two that concern me, for one in Europe we're now hearing talk of Europe is at war, France is at war, we are all at war. Which I have to say, for a German, are really difficult to handle, because of course, and me particularly being a German lawyer, I am minded of Carl Schmitt's Doctrine of Permanent War, which helped to empower a certain group of German politicians in a certain decade in the 20th century with ghastly consequences. And it was, as some of you may know, revived via the good officers of Leo Strauss, by the neocons post 9/11 to justify the global war on terror. That's one level I think on which me might sort of articulate some concern.

The other level of course is that this has started to play a role in the U.S. Presidential campaign and including with suggestions of forming an Army out of the young Syrian men who have arrived in Europe and sending them back to Syria to fight. So what is this doing? What do you think of the U.S. responses? What is this doing to our societies and to our relations with the rest of the world?

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah. There's so much to say. I'm happy to find myself in the company of people who know so much more about the details of policy and their implementation than I do. I'm not scholar or an expert on refugees, even though I'm the son of refugees. And what I propose to do is to answer your questions and discuss the American debate, not so much in terms of the policy dimensions, but in terms of cultural and political and moral dimensions. Because the response to the refugee crisis in Europe and in the United States is as much cultural as it is anything else. Even before the refugee crisis in Europe, Europe was in the throes of a bitter debate about its proper relationship to the other, to the stranger, to the migrant. And it needs no repeating that Europe's history in the matter of the other, and the stranger, and the migrant, is not exactly glorious. There are cultural traditions, even moral traditions that are at play here, that are impossible to quantify, but are nonetheless relevant.

If I were to use one word to characterize the American debate right now, speaking very analytically I would describe it as disgraceful. (Laughter) It is disgraceful because right now it is a debate between xenophobia and nativism on the one hand, and bad faith and cowardice on the other. I see no heroes in my country right now on this question. The xenophobia and the nativism are being expressed extravagantly by various Republicans, by Donald Trump. May the day come soon when we no longer have to mention his name in any context. (Laughter) But Trump speaks, he is the Viktor Orban of the

Republican party, only with worse hair. (Laughter) Jeb Bush, as the President pointed out the other day, recently said something disgraceful about accepting only Christian refugees and not Muslim refugees. When these Americans speak this way, they are betraying one of the truly revolutionary aspects of the American dispensation. That is to say the United States, unlike Europe whose culture and history of the nation state has always consisted in the belief that a nation should be incarnated in a state, and a state should exemplify a nation so that ideally the cultural boundaries and the political boundaries coincide, but of course they never do, so there's this thing called the problem of minorities, which Europeans have been dealing with now for a hundred years. Unlike that entire tradition, the United States is a democracy, which is naturally multiethnic. We are a naturally multiethnic society. We were a multiethnic society long before we became an officially multicultural society. Multiculturalism is simply the doctrine and culture of the multiethnic realities of our population, and of the fact that membership in our society, or rather legitimacy in our society is conferred by that sacred hyphen, by that gorgeous little hyphen that all Americans bear with the great telling exception of the Native Americans, who of course weight more heavily on our conscience than almost any other group.

But these Republicans who speak this way obviously have no understanding that they are actually being treasonous about one of the primary philosophical gifts of the United States to the world. Now having said that, I want to say that President Obama was absolutely correct to denounce what Jeb Bush said as shameful. But when I heard him say this, I wondered by what right he says this, because in fact the Obama Administration is unbelievably delinquent on the question of refugees. Since the beginning of the Syrian war 2011, we have accepted 2,179 Syrians. That's it. And since October 1st, when the crisis began in Europe, we have accepted a sum total of 305 Syrian refugees into the United States. So the President is perfectly right, as he always is when he rises to a high moral level, to castigate the Republicans for what they're saying. But the policy of this administration has to be accused of bad faith in this regard.

Moreover, if you've been reading the papers or listening the news, you will have noticed that Democrats on the question of the security argument against accepting refugees, are as cowardly and as craven as Republicans. Everybody is in a panic by this argument. Nobody has the guts to get up and explain exactly why the panic about security is unjustified even though obviously there is some slight

danger. Between 1880 and 1924 the United States accepted 4 million Italian immigrants. With those 4 million Italian immigrants, we got Enrico Fermi, Joe DiMaggio, Frank Sinatra, Antonin Scalia, and Al Capone. Right, and Al Capone, right?

Now, I gather that for some of you Scalia might be the deal breaker (laughter) but that's not what I'm here to say. That's not what I'm here to say. No one in his right mind would suggest that we should have turned away 4 million Italians, because they brought the mafia with them, etcetera, etcetera. But no Democrats, that I know, have the guts to say anything remotely like this.

Moreover, when the administration talks about raising its quotas of refugees to 70,000 and then finally to 100,000 by 2017, in the first place, they are speaking globally. These are all the refugees from the entire planet that we will accept. And secondly, to the best of my understanding as far as I know, the United Nations there already exists a list that the United Nations has recommended to the United States of 16,000 Syrian refugees. Which is to say, that if the White House actually acts upon its willingness to accept 10,000 Syrian refugees, which is extremely unlikely for political and other reasons, that will only leave 6,000 more on the UN list before we even get into the rest of the problem. So, as I say, the debate right now in this country strikes me as a debate between people who are wrong and don't want to do anything and people who are right and don't want to do anything. And this is a very, very discouraging situation.

There are two ways not to think about the refugees crisis. And the first one is this, first it is important not to absorb the discussion of the refugee crisis into the larger discussion of immigration. And the second one is that it is important not to absorb the discussion of the refugee crisis into the discussion of intervention and foreign policy. Both of these mistakes are being made everywhere. Refugees are not ordinary immigrants. It is very important to understand that. And this has been recognized in all the international conventions. You know more about this than I do. But the definitions of the refugee are clear, they are in an especially urgent set of circumstances. And we'll get back to the urgency in a moment.

It is also important not to absorb the discussion into the larger debate about what to do about the Syrian war. And that, for a start, is for a practical reason which is that it is not clear what to do about the Syrian war. Nobody, as far as I can see in this country, is especially exercised about ending

the Syrian war. And if we are to wait for a political solution in Syria for the people whose photographs you saw on that wall to find asylum, they are going to freeze through many, many winters in those woods. They're going to freeze through many, many winters in those woods.

So I think it is important in order to refine the debate in this country, I think it is important that we refresh our understanding of certain things. I think it is very important to recognize that in the last six years humanitarianism and human rights has disappeared as a pillar of American foreign policy, and as a consequence our sense of rescue and our sense of relief as primary objectives of American foreign policy have atrophied, have seriously atrophied. And we will not be able to craft a vigorous and effective response to the refugee crisis, unless we restore the centrality of the concepts of rescue and relief to our foreign policy. Which is to say, unless we get passed the kind of political tone that we've adopted and are no longer embarrassed to adopt a more moral tone. Now I understand that a more moral tone was adopted at the outbreak of the Iraq war, but we cannot live in a world in which it is forbidden to order the spaghetti until we ascertain that George Bush never ordered the spaghetti. This refugee crisis calls for immediate action.

Now when I say immediate action that means also we must refresh our understanding of what an emergency is. What sort of set of circumstances is an emergency? In an emergency certain conventional categories and processes have to be suspended and accelerated, otherwise you simply have misunderstood the situation. There are circumstances in which the normal turning of the wheels, the normal processes, if they persist it's a sign that you simply have misunderstood where you are. For example, genocide would be the most obvious case. It makes no sense to respond slowly to a genocide. It makes no sense to escalate, as one is taught to do as a strategist, in a genocide. There are certain crises that are above all characterized by an element of time, of urgency. And when on reads about the slowness of the processes that are even now being put in place by our government, when one reads that the vetting process will take 18 to 24 months, you wonder if the people who are making these policies actually understand the problem for which the polices are being made.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: And instead of which of course we're applying the term emergency to the powers of the executive at home.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's right. That's right.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Even more morally problematic.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's right. Now it is true that not everything is an emergency, but it is also true that some things are emergencies. And the question I have for us, as Americans, about our government, generally is whether or not we are any longer capable of acting quickly about anything. And whether or not we are intellectually prepared for the kind of historical contingencies with which we are now presented, which after all not could have been predicted, were predicted. Three and four years ago people warned, myself included, and I'm not a rocket scientist, that unless we do something in Syria the following things will happen.

And when people told us well we cannot say with certainty what the outcome of our efforts will be, we would say that's right, but we can tell you with certainty what the outcome of a lack of effort would be. And we are witnessing consequences that were foretold. And yet we are intellectually unprepared for this and operationally unprepared for this. And we need to take lessons, because otherwise we are always going to lag behind evil, even in situations in which we decide to do something about it. We will always come too late. And if you come too late to a genocide, or you come too late to a refugee crisis, or you come too late to an ethnic cleansing, you have not covered yourself with glory. You have not acquitted yourself of your duty. You've merely prevented a disaster from becoming complete, which is something, but it's actually very little. Thank you.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Well I will only add, as the German on the panel, that there are a couple other issues raised currently that we haven't mentioned yet. And I'm just going to, as it were, point to them and perhaps somebody in the audience will wish to take them up. Which is that, of course, what we are looking at here creates not just issues of domestic stability, but also of Europe's ability, Europe's capability, Europe's legitimacy as a foreign and security policy actor. The French president, two days ago, specifically raised the Solidarity Clause in the Lisbon Treaty, Article 42.7, to those of you who don't know the Lisbon Treaty by heart, as of course we all do, this is the EU Treaty equivalent of Article 5 of NATO.

So far there has been no explicit response to this, although the German Chancellor Merkel in one of her more emotional and forceful speeches right after the Paris attacks said we will fight this with you. So the German government, I would say has deliberately hasn't said, "We will join you in

call to arms." We won't send fighter planes to Syria, some of those by the way are patrolling the areas over the Baltics, because Russia and the Ukraine conflict are still out there and still unresolved. But it also hasn't excluded that possibly. So there are a number of weighty and potentially consequential options still out there. With that, I'm going to remind you of your Twitter hashtag #RefugeeCrisis, and I will invite questions and short comments from you. Again, please identify yourselves or your affiliation, ask a question or a comment, make both of them brief, snappy, and addressed to a person or two.

All right. There are microphones heading your way, how about this lady here?

MS. DELO: My name is Barbara Delo and I'm from the Leadership Institute and I'm addressing my comments to the other three panelists, except for the man with the --

MR. WIESELTIER: With the white hair, yeah.

MS. DELO: I'm sorry, I'm not good at names. (Laughter)

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: So Wieseltier.

MR. WIESELTIER: That's fine.

MS. DELO: Moderator, who addressed it already, given both the enormous human tragedy that's occurring and the occasional but real danger that will continue to occur as a result of mass, but sometimes chaotic migration, are more countries now, and I think you did address this, and you did address this, reconsidering an interventionist policy to stabilize the countries of origin, so that safe areas could be established within those countries, and the people could stay closer to their homes?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Thank you very much. I'm going to take two more. The gentleman over here.

MR. SCHULTZ: My name is Karl Schultz. I'm a visiting Research Fellow at American University, sadly from Poland, not from Germany although my last name is Schultz. I want to sorry for that, because my society, society full of Donald Trumps, just like and Orbáns and Kaczyńskis as our chief or leader of our site right now. So my question is to all of you, because as Nathalie mentioned we are going in a new direction of two level, as we call it, in Poland (inaudible) Europe, European Union. And it's not an issue of Kaczyńskis, Orbáns, Trumps, and whatever fanatics are there, but the societies that are electing those people. So what can we do? What should we do? And how to convince societies that refugees are not scums, they are not parasites, and we should not reopen death camps? And this is

actually the narrative that this president in Polish republics feel from now. Thank you.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Thank you. How about a third one, here, man? I've got you covered in the back. Next round. No, no, go ahead. You're next.

MS. HAMAS: Eva Hamas, retired professor. None of you have mentioned the fact that so many of these refugees are Muslims and that accounts for a lot of the hostility towards them. And I wonder if any of you have comments on that? And also just as a corrective neither nor the United States has a very good record about refugees from World War II on. So to act as if we did so much better a long time ago, is just not the fact. And European countries turned people back at the borders knowing they would be killed and the United States didn't accept very many. And under very strict circumstances.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Well if I might perhaps add a response to that. I think that that's definitely true between 1933 and '45. After '45, I mean population movements in Europe were so large for a policy of exclusion to be basically useless, my country alone I believe took in 13 million deportees. And while they were Germans, by the standards of the time, Schliengen Germans were not considered Germans by Rhinelanders. And they were treated with great unfriendliness for the next 20, 30 years. Some of my friends are children of those deportees and they can tell you long stories about this.

I mean I think it's useful perhaps to compare what's happening now, the more than one million arriving in Europe with the Yugoslav wars. Where I think the biggest number of, I don't have all the numbers at hand, but my country took in I think 390,000 refugees. But most of whom actually returned within two or four years after the Dayton Peace Agreement. So this is we're looking at, yes, and my former GMF colleague's nodding, I mean in other words this is just for Germany alone is three times as many.

Kemal, would you like to take up the Muslim point? I mean I'm sure we could speak to this as well, but I mean it's, and I don't want to put Kemal on the spot for this alone, but since you are from Turkey, I think it's worth giving you the first word on this. And we'll come to your support.

MR. KIRIŞCI: I'll be rebellious and respond to the safe zone one first.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Okay.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Because it happens --

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Do you notice a pattern here? (Laughter). I do.

MR. KIRIŞCI: They're like this in private by the way.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: All the time. The entire institution.

MR. KIRIŞCI: It happens that the Turkish government pushes very hard on the notion of a safe zone. And it advocates the idea because of the increasing number of refugees and recognizing that there are domestic political consequences of their presence there. Yet, safe zones are very complicated to implement. You send people there and then what happens if Savronika repeats itself? How are you going to create the circumstances that will actually ensure the security of refugees that might be sent back there?

And then secondly, are governments who call for safe zone, really call them for to benefit the refugees, or might they be having other political agendas in their minds? So our position, and here I mean our with Elizabeth, Beth, that we've been working on these refugees reports, is the one that upheld by human rights advocacy groups that safe zones it's better to stay away from them. Unless you're going to be able to repeat the kind of exercise that took place back in 1991, when two and a half million Kurdish Kurds fled into Turkey and Iran when Saddam's military tried to gas them.

On that occasion there was a UN Security Council decision and a determination on the part of this country to enforce a safe zone, which did allow Kurdish refugees to return back to safety and then open the way to today's Kurdish regional government. One of the few places that remain relatively secure.

Very quickly, let me take up a very difficult question.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Sorry, Kemal, if I might add something on the point of safe zones. I was a journalist before I joined think tanks and have been both in Africa and Balkans, and in Afghanistan. And I wrote about military insecurity issues. And I assure you that there are a great deal of -- there are misconceptions in population discourse about safe zones and I would just like to add a couple here. For one, we have catastrophic, bloody with dictators using safe zones and taking civil populations hostage by putting air defense on hospitals and schools. Safe zones also means that you have to take out the air defense of a country. If you want to establish a safe zone without putting in ground troops, you have to do a hell of a lot of bombing sorties and I assure you that the owner of the regime in question will

do everything to make sure that you create a lot of collateral damage while doing so by putting the air defense batteries on the schools and the hospitals.

In other word, Western experiences with this have not been great. And very often, we have had Western generals and politicians promising that no troops will be put on the ground, and they have had to break their word and put in ground troops, because that was the only way of coming to grips with the problem. So please nobody here should have any illusions whatsoever about the ease with which the concept of a safe zone, in particularly in a situation where the dictator in question still has his own armed forces and his own air defenses can be put into practice.

Sorry, Kemal, go on answer whatever question you want.

MR. KIRIŞCI: The question that you asked me to respond to is a very difficult and broad question, however there is a debate that is just starting amongst Muslims, or Muslim countries that tries to address the very fact that there are groups out there in Syria, and beyond Syria that are acting on behalf of the religion of Islam. They are resorting to kind of violence that is very difficult to stomach for Muslims themselves. However, this debate is only starting and yet I like to empathize with Karl's remarks that he just made, two days ago Turkey and Greece played a national soccer game with the presence of the Turkish Prime Minister, as well as the Greek one, which was very nice. Before the game started there was a call for a one-minute silence to remember those who fell in Paris. Amongst the spectators there were those who were whistling and throwing Islamic slogans.

So the problem you are referring to Karl, does exist there too. And when a hundred plus people died right across the Ankara train station, to which I have a personal attachment. And there was again a soccer game and a call was made to remember these people, again, in the stands there were people who were booing and whistling. This is a challenge. And this is a reality. Today in the news, I read in an opinion poll that in Turkey, amongst the people who were polled, there were 8% who sympathizes, empathizes, and supports at least at an ideological level ISIS. And 8% out of 70 million that's an important number. So the challenges are not only here in the West that Leon is making references to in the U.S., or in Europe, but also in the very countries that are trying to cope with this refugee crisis, but the countries of origin, too.

So I have a solution to it? I wish I had.

MR. WIESELTIER: Could I add to what Kemal said. I think you're absolutely right.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I'm not forgetting you.

MR. WIESELTIER: I'm sorry, am I not allowed?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: No, no. Of course you are. (Laughter) Jesus, I don't get no respect. Go ahead.

MR. WIESELTIER: No, I think you're right. I think that in so far as what we're witnessing is an internecine war within the Muslim world for the identify of Islam, that is an outcome that the West cannot bring about. We cannot do anything about. All we can do is, well not all we can do, this will be decided within the Muslim world. But I do think that since there are forces outside the Muslim world that support certain extreme elements within the Muslim world, it would be foolish for the West to just sit back and watch the fight, as it were. And I think that where we identify elements, parties, movements that are pushing back intellectually, theologically, culturally against our common enemies, as it were, I think we have an obligation to find ways to support them. I really do.

And it is not a sign of respect, you know, there is this view in the Obama years that if you intervene in a country you disrespect it. Now, sometimes that's certainly true. It used to be called imperialism. But sometimes that's not the case at all. So for example, in the Syrian conflict when we debate about western intervention, we seem to, on behalf of the moderates, ground troops, and I know this is heretical, I think we should permit ourselves to imagine the possibility of ground troops, it's not. But when we think about this, we seem to forget that our side already has Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah with him. Jabhat al-Nusra already has Saudi Arabia, and Qatar with them. So I fail to see the justice of the situation that the only elements in the Syrian conflict that will have no support from outside, will actually be the ones that are opposed to both these villains. And for that reason even though it is an internecine struggle, finally we have obligations to help certain elements, I think.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Nathalie, would you like to take up the question from our Polish friend, about civil society?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Can I answer just the other way around, as well. (Laughter) Because we were -- I'm sorry. (Laughter)

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I'm wondering whether I should just go have coffee and leave

you guys. (Laughter) What questions would you like to answer, and then what order?

MR. GARAVOGLIA: Because we were talking to each other behind the scenes.

MS. TOCCI: We coordinated.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Okay. All right. In that case, tell me how you'd like to do this?

MR. GARAVOGLIA: It's Italians conspiring against the Germans again. (Laughter)

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: And I would like to -- Leon Wieseltier's remarks have a distinct, had several references to Italy, if you will have noticed that, yeah? The mafia, spaghetti and so. There is something going on here. Anyway, Matteo, your turn.

MR. GARAVOGLIA: Unless Nathalie.

MS. TOCCI: Okay. Several very short points. I mean just I think, yes, in theory yes. But --

MR. WIESELTIER: It's not a good beginning.

MS. TOCCI: No. (Laughter) My question is can you introduce me to these moderates?

MR. WIESELTIER: Well that's a very interesting --

MS. TOCCI: I mean the six that are left, the six meaning the six vetted, CIA, (inaudible). I mean the problem is that I think your argument is correct, but unfortunately perhaps out of mistakes, we've gone past that point. Haven't we? I mean --

MR. WIESELTIER: I don't know. I'm quite certain that all the easy answers are behind us. That I'm sure about. I'm also sure that the same people who are telling me that we can't find moderates now, were telling me this three and four years ago when we could find them. So the question for me at least is rather a bitter one.

MS. TOCCI: Yeah. But let me --

MR. WIESELTIER: And thirdly, it is hard for me to believe that the entirety of the Syrian population consists of extremists of one kind of another.

MR. TOCCI: No, no, no. I mean absolutely. I'm absolutely agreed with that. But we're talking here about militants. I have, frankly speaking, problems in making the distinction between, if you like, good jihadists and bad jihadists.

MR. WIESELTIER: Yeah.

MS. TOCCI: And I think that these people morph from one group into the other, often depending on who's winning. So --

MR. WIESELTIER: And who's paying.

MS. TOCCI: And who's paying, absolutely. And who's paying.

MR. WIESELTIER: And we weren't paying anybody.

MS. TOCCI: Yeah, yeah. On the question of interventionism in general, I mean I think we have to go beyond assuming that intervention is necessarily military. I think it's a question of thinking about what more we can be doing, but not necessarily in the ways in which we're used to doing it. So for, I'm not going to say anything about the safe zones, because I completely agree with everything that has been said. But I think that there are more things that we could be doing at a local level. I mean there are some local cease fire, and this is not Syria, I mean this is Libya, this is a general trend.

In cases of state implosion, because this is what we're talking about, in some places you have pockets of peace developing because ultimately people want to survive. Should we be doing more there? Should we be helping and support local cease fires more? Should we be helping in there where you have a municipality that is somehow still functioning, making sure that it functions better? Basically looking at where local seeds of peace exist and trying to do what we can in order to make them blossom, rather than necessarily assuming that doing more means either military intervention, or banging heads together in a hotel in Vienna. Which doesn't mean to say that one shouldn't bang their heads together in hotels in Vienna, but one should only do that, because otherwise is doing too little and too late.

And Article 42, so this is again, just to reiterate, this is the Solidarity Clause within EU treaties. And I would link up sort of the interpretation of that, to what I just said. The natural instinct is to assume that the solidarity clause that we should all go and bomb together, is that necessarily what is meant? Shouldn't we interpret, for example, in terms of intelligence cooperation? There is bilateral intelligence cooperation in the EU, bilateral. There is actually not a functioning multilateral system across the EU on intelligence cooperation. Isn't that a possible, valid, and more meaningful interpretation of Article 42 at this point?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: All right.

MR. WIESELTIER: Could I just quickly, two things. One you speak as if, let me just

assure you that the United States certainly and probably the West is in no danger of launching any major military action in the near future. So it's not as if the sabers are being rattled and rational people have to rush and calm people down, because that's not what's going to happen.

Secondly, I think it's very important to point out, that if one is interested in a political solution, say in Syria, the condition for a political solution is a change of the situation on the battle field. That is to say, it's very important that we are so panicked, if you will, about the military uses of military power, that we forgotten the political uses of military power. And it seems to me that unless ISIS can go no further, because it is physically blocked, in the same by the way unless we raise the cost to Putin's aggression in the Ukraine, so that it becomes politically unpalatable for him at home, which can also I believe be done only physically, we will not get to the political and the diplomatic solutions which we all want and which, of course, are the only last thing solutions.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Matteo?

MR. GARAVOGLIA: I want to follow up quickly on something that Nathalie brought up at the beginning when she made our first intervention, and link to that to an old obsession of mine which is the fact that I think this policy area, like 90% of the policy areas we deal with, and we struggle with at the European level, boils down to a problem of governance. Now, we have this issues whereby politics; i.e., political life in Europe still takes place at a national level. The average European citizens lives political life at a national level, as a Frenchman, as German, as a Spaniard. Yet, policymaking has to be taking place at the supranational level, at a European level. So we have mismatch. We have gap between politics and policymaking. That is a general problem I think that underlines a lot of the struggles we have in Europe. But on top of it, we talk about a policy area that goes to touch the most atavic, primitive emotional dimension we all have. The stranger, the foreigner, the xenophobia, feelings, religion, all this stuff comes into play. So it becomes way more emotional, and I think that we should keep this in mind, because I do not know what will be the answer and the solution to all this. But these elements will have to come in when we craft a solution, as Nathalie was suggesting, which will have to be by definition something that will take care of this dimension, bringing together some member states that will move forward, and others that will not. Could be around that old European core, with some outer member states.

Because the social, cultural, political background of our countries, of our member states, are still too far. I close with an example in that respect, a few weeks ago I heard very, very, very high ranking Polish officials saying that, "Ooh, it's a problem if migrants and refugees come to Poland, because they carry diseases with them." Disease though that their bodies are used to, so they're not a problem for them, but we, as Europeans, we're not used to those diseases. Our bodies cannot cope with those. That's the feeling.

On the other hand, across the border in Berlin, 45 kilometers, that's what, 35 miles, that's the distance between the Polish border to Berlin, capital of Germany, 35 miles. You have the former mayor of Berlin that famously said two things. Well, Berlin is poor but hey it is sexy. And by the way, I'm gay and I think it's cool. The day after he won a landslide victory. Very different political culture. This will have to be part of the stuff we keep in mind as we craft a solution.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Now, we have two minutes to 5:30 and I fear that the time has come for me to no longer accept any questions. I think in conclusion, I will only remember you of the famous European soccer axiom which is, "It lasts 90 minutes and Germany wins." (Laughter) This is a case --

MR. GARAVOGLIA: We might go an extra time.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: This is an exception. Well, yes, there is also of course there is extra time, and Germany wins. (Laughter) This case we're sticking to 90 minutes, and you will agree with me it's been a clear case of foreign ill against Germany, which as it happens is a not inaccurate picture of how things are working out for Germany in this particular context at the moment. So I would like you to thank my panelists with me, who have been excellent. Of course, we haven't covered all the bases, but there will be many more events for the Center for the U.S. and Europe, with some of these colleagues, with other colleagues, with other quests from outside. Stay with us, follow our issues on the website, and I'm sure we will see many of you again. Thank you very much for joining us. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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