

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
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ANXIETY, NOSTALGIA, AND MISTRUST:
FINDINGS FROM THE 2015 AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: Good morning, everybody. I'm E.J. Dionne, a Senior Fellow here at Brookings. I want to welcome everyone here today for another in a series of extraordinary studies conducted by PRRI that we at Brookings have been honored to be part of over the years. Anxiety, Nostalgia, and Mistrust. It sounds almost like a philosophical treatise. As I say we've had the pleasure and good fortune for the last several years to collaborate with Robby Jones and Dan Cox at PRRI and it's been a real joy. And if I may invoke Robert Bork, an intellectual feast to be engaged with PRRI. This is the sixth annual American Values Survey and the fifth that we've had the pleasure to collaborate on.

I just want to begin my thank yous because those always get lost if you wait until the end and there are a lot of people who've worked very hard, both on the report and on this event. Joanna Piacenza of PRRI, who prepared the report and helped coordinate this event. At Brookings I want to thank Anna Goodbaum, Liz Sablich, Beth Stone, Elizabeth McElvein, and Elizabeth Thom. This morning Robby will present the findings of this new survey and then we will hear from a distinguished group of panelists and my colleague, Bill Galston, who has been a partner, a great partner in all of this work we've -- Bill always sees things in these surveys that no one else does and they are right there. I also want to acknowledge Henry Olson, Joy Reid, and Karlyn Bowman who are joining us today. I feel like at Brookings we're a bunch of rock promoters, and at first we gathered these great people from different rock bands and now they have formed a super group. This is I think the third or fourth time that we have asked this same great group of people, Joy, Karlyn, and Henry to join us and we are very grateful.

So to get our event moving I'm going to introduce Robby and our entire panel. Robby is going to do one of his patented powerpoints for you. Then the panel is going to come up and we will begin our discussion of this survey. Robby is the CEO of PRRI, a leading scholar and commentator on religion, values, and public life. He is the author of two books, numerous peer reviewed articles. He writes a monthly column for the *Atlantic* on politics and religion. He holds a PhD in religion from Emory University and an MDiv from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. Am I not supposed to mention that you have a book coming out (laughter)? And your book is called?

MR. JONES: The End of White Christian America.

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MR. DIONNE: The End of White Christian America, which will be published in June of next year, am I right?

MR. JONES: In July.

MR. DIONNE: In July of next year. Look out for that book. It's going to be a great book. And I don't just say that because Robby is my friend.

Karlyn Bowman is a Senior Fellow and Research Coordinator at the American Enterprise Institute where studies American public opinion and U.S. politics. Her research examines polling data on a variety of subjects including the economy, taxes, trade, the working class, and women's attitudes towards the United States. Karlyn also writes a weekly column for Forbes.com. And at the risk of making both of us seem very old, Karlyn edited a piece I wrote when I was 25 years old and remains one of the best editors I have ever had. I was a token liberal in AEI Publications.

Henry Olson is a Senior Fellow at the Ethics & Public Policy Center where he studies and provides commentary on American politics. His work focuses on how to address issues consistent with conservative principles and how to address the electoral challenges facing modern conservatism. And he will elaborate this in his new book, The Four Faces of the Republican Party: The Fight for the 2016 Presidential Nomination, which will be released in December.

And Joy Reid, my dear friend and MSNBC colleague. She is a national correspondent for MSNBC. She was the host of the Reid Report on the network. She has been managing editor of TheGrio.com and the Reid Report political blog. She was a freelance columnist for the *Miami Herald* for several years. She also produced and hosted a talk radio show called Radio One. Her new book, which has actually been out for a little bit, is called Fracture: Barack Obama, the Clintons, and the Racial Divide. And I want to say a special thank you for Joy who also did a wonderful presentation to my students at Georgetown yesterday. Someone once said I am the only person they ever met who would go 2000 miles out of his way just to impose and I have imposed on Joy twice this week. And we are so grateful to have you here.

So without further ado, Robby and his magnificent powerpoint. (Laughter)

MR. JONES: Thanks. I'm so glad to see everyone out here for a report titled Anxiety,

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Nostalgia, and Mistrust (laughter), but I'm happy you're here nonetheless. It is sunny outside here in Washington so hopefully that will maybe lift the spirits a bit. You can look outside and see the nice sun if you get too down as we move through the data.

I do want to say just a few words of thanks to my team, coauthors of the report Daniel Cox, Betsy Cooper, Rachel Lienesch. Our Board Chair, Melissa Deckman is here in the front row; that her for her support. And also Charlotte Gendron for her support in editing the report, and our colleagues at West End Strategy Team for helping us get it all out there and for helping all of you know about the event today here. So thank you to everyone involved. I also would be remiss if I -- since E.J. has plugged everyone else's book -- that E.J. has a book coming out (laughter) in February and the final title is?

MR. DIONNE: Why the Right Went Wrong.

MR. JONES: Why the Right Went Wrong, Simon and Schuster, February -- January, it got moved to January now.

So I do want to echo E.J.'s comments. It really has been an amazing collaboration over the last five years for our team to be collaborating with the Governance Studies Program here at Brookings. And E.J. and Bill Galston in particular, I think an intellectual feast is right. And one of the things that I think doing public opinion surveys, it can often feel like you're measuring sort of just one damn thing after the other. You get a kind of measure here, a measure there, but I think one of the things that working with Bill and E.J. has been is that trying to making meaning out of the patterns has been really -- I think the right word is like fun, challenging, engaging over the years. So I want to say a thank you to E.J., Bill, and Brookings for that.

So hopefully we'll make some patterns out of this. This is one of the longest surveys we've actually done. There is a ton of data here; it covers a lot of ground. Our American Values Survey every year does cover multiple issues. This year, because we're looking ahead to an election, we did try to give us a little peek into what we can tell about the candidates, but really majoring on what are the big fault lines that we're seeing in American society as we look ahead to the election that are going to be guiding campaign strategies, the kind of rhetoric that we hear from people, which populations candidates

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are going to be appealing to. So try to kind of paint a bigger picture beyond just the horserace as well.

So let me jump in. I should also say that the beautiful photograph for the cover came actually from an amateur photographer that we found online, Jonathan O'Reilly, so I want to say thanks for that, for allowing us to use it for the cover for today.

So what are we looking at? Just a quick -- I won't spend a lot of time on this, but it's basically a survey of nearly 2700 Americans conducted online and by telephone. We also have a supplement. We went back in the field because the original survey came out of the field in early October. So we went back into the field with a supplemental survey of 1000 interviews from November 6-10 to give us some updated numbers on the candidates. So we would have a kind of more recent look. So you'll see some data at the beginning from the supplemental data. There's also a handout that has the supplemental data along with the report. All interviews were conducted by the National Public Research Center at the University of Chicago as part of their America Speak panel. And for the entire survey the margin of error is +-2.6 percent points.

So let's just jump in. Looking ahead to the elections, we're going to take a look at the candidates, some key constituency groups, and what Americans issue priorities are, including the partisan divides across some issues. So the democratic race has seen a lot of changes over the last month. So the green is our data from early October and then the sort of teal color here is from November. We see Hillary Clinton still with a commanding lead that she had in early October, still holding on. The one difference between the early October date is that we actually had Joe Biden in as a choice there. So some of this difference is actually Biden's disappearance out of the possible candidate list plus the time period here. Martin O'Malley down to three points here among democratic likely primary voters.

The republican field, much more interesting as everyone knows; been following here. So here are Ben Carson's numbers just from a month ago and really more recently. So really improved his numbers among republican likely primary voters from 16 percent to 27 percent. Trump falling off a little bit, not a lot, from 25 percent to 20 percent. And then here is everyone else. So down around 1 in 10 or less among the rest of the republican field. Maybe the most notable thing here is Carly Fiorina has sort of dropped off pretty dramatically in the last month. And we actually had zero respondents among

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republican likely primary voters picking Rand Paul in this last survey, so from two percent down to this is really zero here. So I'll point that out.

So we want to take a look at two constituencies that are interesting as we're looking ahead. One is more interesting for the primary race and one is more interesting for the general election if we're looking at republican candidates. So the first one is white, Evangelical Protestants. And looking at favorabilities here -- I'll just kind of put it the favorable side -- you can see that Ben Carson holds a sizeable advantage among white Evangelicals Protestants in terms of favorability, 55 percent hold a favorable view. Jeb Bush and Donald Trump are right around 4 in 10. Rubio and Cruz down around less than 4 in 10, but you can see that they're in different situations. So Trump has a 52 percent unfavorable rating among white Evangelicals and Jeb Bush almost has half unfavorable rating. The real difference here between Rubio and Cruz is that basically a little more than a third of white Evangelicals say that they either haven't heard of the candidate or don't know enough about them to give an opinion. So there's actually quite a bit of room here for some changes among Rubio and Cruz. And even for Carson about one in five white Evangelicals say they haven't heard of him or don't know enough to issue an opinion. So clearly Carson with the advantage. Trump has probably hit a ceiling here with about 4 in 10 and Bush as well. So unless they change the dynamic there's not a lot of room to pick up people who are undecided in the race.

Looking ahead to the general election the other key demographic in the electorate are Latinos in the country. So we wanted to take a look and just see how are republican candidates are faring among Latinos in terms of favorability. And the answer is not that well. So no candidate has more than a third favorable rating among Latinos looking ahead of the candidates. And then when I put up the rest you'll see a couple of patterns here. (Laughter) So Donald Trump, which is the laughter I'm sure, is 80 percent unfavorable rating among Latinos in the country. But interestingly enough Jeb Bush also has a 45 percent unfavorable rating among Latinos in the country. But I think the overall pattern is not a lot -- but Ben Carson though half say that -- a little more than half actually don't know of Ben Carson, don't know enough to offer an opinion. Even Cruz has got a -- Cruz and Rubio also in that same situation, about half, running about even among people who have an opinion, but about half of

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Latinos don't know enough to issue an opinion for those few candidates. So we'll have to kind of keep an eye on this as the campaign goes forward and people start paying more attention, and particularly as we turn toward the general election. But it does seem that the republican candidates, whoever they are, have got their work cut out for them to reach out to the Latino voters in the coming year.

The other thing we have going of course is the possibility of kind of dynasty, political dynasty, a Bush or a Clinton in the -- so we decided to ask a question about whether electing another president from the Bush or Clinton family would be bad for the country. Would you agree or disagree with this statement. And what we found is that among independents, republicans, or the tea party is not a big fan of that idea, of having either another Bush or a Clinton. About 6 in 10 independents or republicans saying this would be bad for the country. Among the tea party, about 7 in 10 saying that this would be bad for the country. Interestingly enough, though, look at democrats, only 4 in 10 democrats say this would be bad for the country. So here Bush has got a much more uphill road just in terms of the dynasty sentiment than Hillary Clinton does. And there's the overall numbers. Overall Americans say it's more bad than good, but again much bigger problem for Jeb Bush than it is for Hillary Clinton.

One other thing that has kind of marked the American Values Surveys over the last five years is that we've been tracking very carefully the tea part movement, and the fact that the 2010 Survey that we released here at Brookings was kind of our first deep dive on the tea party where we really were looking and were one of the first research organizations to really uncover this overlap between the Christian right and the tea party movement, and found about half of -- in that survey about half of tea party members also considered themselves part of the Christian right. That was something that we -- so in the meantime we've been tracking tea party affiliation over time and this chart represents over 30 separate surveys over the last 5 years where we asked about tea party affiliation and the trend line in terms of who is affiliated with the tea party, and basically we've seen a decline over time in the number of Americans over all who identify with the tea party. It was 11 percent in our first survey back in 2010; we're down to 6 percent in the current survey. So a drop almost by half of 5 percentage points over the time. Interestingly enough, tea party affiliation among republicans has also dropped. You'll see it's been a little bit more all over the map, but when you put at trend line through it you still see a pretty consistent

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drop from about a quarter in 2010-2011 of republicans saying they consider themselves part of the tea party movement, and we're down to around 15 percent today saying that. So a decline in the general population, also a decline among republicans saying -- consistent with that is declining favorability of the tea party. So among all Americans, just over the last year we've seen a 10 percentage point drop, 35 percent down to 25 percent today with a favorable view of the tea party. And we'll see this -- it's consistent really across all partisans here -- so a drop among republicans, a drop among independents, a drop among democrats as well over the past year.

So let's take a look at issues here. One of the interesting things in the survey that we found is that -- so the top three things that Americans overall say are critical issues to them as they're kind of thinking about the election and their lives, healthcare, terrorism, jobs and unemployment. About 6 in 10 Americans cite those three things as the most important issues, most critical issues to them. What we did on this chart though is we tried to put dots in here to show you the distance between republicans and democrats on each of these issues. And what you immediately see really is that terrorism, education, the growing gap between the rich and the poor, are the three places where there is the biggest partisan gaps on here. So for example, terrorism here, which is relevant -- was relevant before the election, obviously very relevant after the Paris attacks, and the current context we have, so -- and I should say that these numbers are -- we were well out of the field. We were out of the field on October 5. So we were well ahead of the Paris attacks. These numbers don't reflect attitudes that may be in place now. So even then though terrorism was the number one thing that republicans said was a critical issue to them; 79 percent of republicans said it was a critical issue compared to 53 percent of democrats here. And you also very big differences, 30 point gaps on the cost of education being a critical issue, the growing gap between the rich and the poor being a critical issue, with about 6 in 10 democrats saying those are critical and only about 3 in 10 republicans saying that they're critical. Also a big gap in immigration down here on the bottom. So one of the things -- you'll see a pattern here and this is kind of a clue on the way in, big partisan gaps, big racial and ethnic gaps as we're kind of moving through the data. So this is kind of preview of things to come.

One of the other things though, kind of getting to the title of the report, about anxiety, that

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we found that not only when we asked about kind of big issue up here like critical issues in general, but when we asked people about their own communities, like what things are major problems in your own community, we generally saw an uptick in crime. And this is just from three years ago, from 2012 to today, 33 percent in 2012 said crime was a major issue in their community. Nearly half of Americans today are saying that crime is a major issue in their own community. Illegal immigration, we saw an 8 point uptick in illegal immigration from 28 to 36. And racial tensions. And this perhaps not surprisingly given Ferguson, Baltimore, and the kind of debate around killings of African American men by police and responses to that. So a major uptick in racial tensions as well. So I think a kind of anxiety in general kind of even on the local level.

To kind of put a finer point on this, this is the same question, which of the following problems are problems in your own community, but when we look at this by race -- so here are white Americans and the things that they say, that white Americans say are major problems in their community. So nothing gets above 50 percent, right. So 45 percent. The highest ones here are 45 percent say lack of opportunities, lack of funding for public schools, 40 percent crime, and it goes down from there. Mistreatment by police on the left, 1 in 5. So the next one I'm going to put up are African Americans. So here are African Americans saying these are major problems in their community. Sixty-four percent, nearly two-thirds, are saying mistreatment of people by police is a major problem in their community, sixty percent saying racial tension, that's twice the number of whites saying racial tension. Not a lot of differences in illegal immigration. A 30 point difference in crime, 20 point difference in lack of funding for public schools, and about a 30 point difference in lack of opportunities for young people. So really dramatic differences in people's life experiences in terms of thinking about what are major problems on the ground. This is Latinos, who are somewhere in between African Americans, but closer to African Americans than to whites on these questions as well. So you'll see this pattern emerging. So that's just sort of general problems on the ground.

I'm going to turn to economics now, economic anxiety. One of the things, and the big headlines from last year's survey actually, was that 7 in 10 Americans thought we were still in an economic recession, and that number was not that far off from 2012. There's the number today, right,

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dead on. Seventy-two percent of Americans continue to think -- despite we're getting good news from macroeconomic indicators -- continue to think that we're in a recession still today. We see some of this coming out in people's attitudes, though. So we've been tracking this question about equal opportunity. It's a paired opposite question. Which data comes closest to your view. It's not really that big of a problem as some people have more of a chance in life than others, or one of the big problems in the country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life. We see a fairly steady, well, actually kind of table top flat, steady responses to this question over the last four years, but this year we saw a 10 percentage point movement on this question, with nearly two-thirds now of Americans saying one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life. So the sense of the deck being stacked against you is I think really alive and well. And it shows up in some other numbers as well.

It leads us to pretty strong support for populist policies. I'm just going to show one here. We also have paid sick leave, paid family leave, and we show 8 in 10 support. We decided to ask a question about minimum wage. We split the forum and we asked it two different levels, \$10.10 an hour or \$15 an hour. Overall Americans support both of these levels of raising the minimum wage, but there are big partisan differences here. I'll just put them all up. So democrats strongly support both. Republicans get off the train when you go to \$15 an hour. So strong support, 6 in 10 at \$10.10, but only one-third support for \$15. So bipartisan agreement at \$10.10 and then partisan divides when you get to \$15 an hour. So that's sort of a look at the economics.

Let's take a look at ethnic and racial tensions. One question that is relevant. Again we asked this question before the Paris attacks, but how have Americans' views of Islam fared over time. What we found was an uptick in negative attitudes toward Islam. Americans have typically been fairly divided on this question in past years when we've asked it. Usually 47 percent agree with this statement, we're not up to 56 percent of Americans saying they agree that the values of Islam are at odds with American values and way of life. Here is the breakout by religious groups on this question. And one thing you'll basically see is that all Christian groups here are in majority territory agreeing with this statement. The only two groups in the religious landscape that don't agree are religiously unaffiliated

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Americans and those who are affiliated with non-Christian religions which includes Muslims, so Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, in that category who do not agree with the statement, but fairly strong agreement from all other Christian groups in the country. And white Evangelicals Protestants really standing out here, nearly three-fourths of white Evangelicals Protestants agreeing with that statement.

Another kind of barometer I think of kind of tolerance of others that we have here is a question about whether it bothers me -- agree or disagree, it bothers me when I come into contact with immigrants who speak little or no English. In 2012, 40 percent of American agreed with that statement. It's up 8 points, 48 percent of Americans agreeing with that statement, sort of expressing that it bothers them more. So you can see the sort of differences between 2012 and 2015. There are some notable -- so this is all Americans, this is the same question. Notable class divides among white Americans and notable age divides. So if we look at the different between white college educated Americans and white working class Americans they're essentially mirror images of each other on this question. So for white college educated Americans only 43 percent agree with this statement. Among white working class Americans, 63 percent. So a 20 percentage point divide by social class among whites here. And then we see similar divides by age, with a majority of seniors agreeing with this statement, only about a little more than a third of those under the age of 30 agreeing with this statement as part of a much more cosmopolitan generation here. So we see big generational differences there.

The other piece -- we have a whole section on the report -- I hope you'll take a look at it, but I only have room to kind of put one thing up here -- one thing we found is people really feeling disconnected from government and feeling like the government is really on their side, looking out for their interest. And we have a whole battery on this question, but around page 30-31 in the report, but how well does the federal government look out for the needs and interests of -- and we have a whole battery of people. I picked out just three to kind of give you a sense of the data here. One is people like you, blacks or gay and lesbian people. And one of the things that we've seen here is that -- so this is the tea party, and of those members of the tea party and republican, only about 4 in 10 say the government looks out for people like them, and more than 7 in 10, almost 8 in 10 of tea party saying the government looks out for African Americans in the country. So a real sense that the government's not looking out for me, it

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is looking out for various kinds of minorities in the country. And democrats look sort of fairly even here, the majority of democrats saying the government looks out for people like you and less optimistic really that the government is looking out for African Americans or gay and lesbian people in the country. So again, very different partisan views of just like what is happening in the country.

You're going to see a similar pattern here. We asked in the U.S. today is there a lot of discrimination against -- and again we had a whole battery of questions of different people groups that we asked about. Going to put similar groups up here to kind of see the pattern. So here I have whites, blacks, gay and lesbian people. So among all Americans only about a quarter say whites experience a lot of discrimination in the country, more than 6 in 10 say that blacks and gay and lesbian experience a lot of discrimination in the country. So we can kind of go across here. These are the numbers for the tea party -- so the tea party doesn't actually distinguish here between these groups -- are as likely to say that the government -- not the government, that there is a lot of discrimination against whites as they are to say there's a lot of discrimination against blacks and gay and lesbians people in the country. Republicans, you can see a little more daylight between the three groups, but still 36 percent say there's a lot of discrimination against whites. And the independents are here and then democrats are here. So only 16 percent of democrats saying there's a lot of discrimination against whites, but 8 in 10 saying a lot of discrimination against blacks and gay and lesbian people. So again, if you sort of think about a conversation happening here, they're just very different assumptions about what is and isn't true in the basic landscape of the country. When we ask people directly, do you think today discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities. We also see this -- you know, this is again a so called reverse discrimination, this partisan pattern here showing up again. So among all Americans 43 percent agree, but it's basically about two-thirds of those members of the tea party and republicans agreeing with this statement, 45 percent of independents, 28 percent of democrats agreeing with this statement.

And the last one on race I'll do here and then I'm going to wrap up in a final section, is directly related to Ferguson, Baltimore, and this debate, the kind of Black Lives Matter debate. And the question we had is do you think recent killings of African American men by police are isolated incidents or

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are they part of a broader pattern of how police treat African Americans. So these were the two options for the question. You look at African Americans, it's very clear what they think, 8 in 10 African Americans say this is part of a broader pattern of how police treat African Americans. Only 15 percent say that the killings of African American men by police are isolated incidents. Latinos largely in the same boat to lesser intensity, but 6 in 10 saying part of a broader pattern, 4 in 10 saying isolated incidents. Here are white Americans. Two-thirds, isolated incidents, one-third part of a broader pattern. So, you know, if we're wondering why this debate is a bit intractable, it's not just because people can't agree about what to do about something, it's that they can't even agree that there is something to talk about right here in this debate. And there is all Americans.

So, you know, looking to the future, I wish I had a kind of bright, sunny ending here leave you with (laughter). I'm not sure that I do. There's no sort of appendix to the back that is sort of cutting back against the anxiety and nostalgia and mistrust, but I did want to kind of step back a bit. We had a couple of questions in the survey that were picture kinds of questions. One that I don't have here but we could talk about is whether things have gotten better or worse in American culture and way of life since the 1950s. The other one I do have some data here on is whether America's best days are ahead of us or behind us. And I this will tell us something about what we're hearing from candidates, right, what is the assumption, is it progress or decline? What is the narrative here about the country? And one of the things we've seen overall though is that the number of people over the last three years, percentage of Americans who say our best days are ahead of us has dropped overall. So 2012 we had 54 percent saying our best days were ahead of us, that number is down below majority at 49 percent today. Here's the other side of it, in 2012 only 38 percent saying our best days are behind us, dead even now, 49-49 here with these -- on this general sentiment. And just to kind of give you a little bit of a window in here, here are religious groups on this question. If you kind of look and you kind of stare at this a little while you'll notice the pattern. It's basically white Protestants anchoring the top here. So if you think about sort of white kind of Protestants and kind of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, the kind of WASPY core group that used to sort of have the handle on the kind of power, the center of power in America, saying our best days are behind us, very pessimistic. Catholics, African American, Protestants, religiously unaffiliated,

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and groups with other kind of ethnic minorities, like non-Christian religious groups, all much more optimistic about our best days being ahead of us. And here's the partisan divide, which I'm sure most of you could probably draw by heart now, not surprising on this part. But what really does sort of strike one here is the intensity particularly among the tea party, two-thirds saying best days are behind us. Even among republicans, 6 in 10 best days are behind us. Independents, basically split, and democrats on the other side. So very, very different sort of views of kind of what's ahead, where we are, what it means.

And with that I think I will wrap it up and turn it over to the rest of the panel. (Applause)

MR. DIONNE: So as you just saw, Robby really is the Justin Bieber or Tom Brady of PowerPoints. And I'm a Patriots fan so that's a high, high compliment to Robby. Just for folks in the audience and out there, the hash tag for this event -- we welcome tweets -- is #AVS2015.

And we're going to in alphabetical order here in the responses and we're going to start with Karlyn Bowman. Welcome back, Karlyn.

MS. BOWMAN: Thank you, E.J. It's a pleasure to be here. And I'd like to begin by congratulating Robby and his team on a great survey and also a great cover. That really is a beautiful cover.

I want to begin this morning by saying a few words about the polls. We've all heard a lot about the problems with the polls in recent weeks, response rates for even the best designed surveys are now below 10 percent. There have been a series of embarrassing miscalls here and abroad. But there is another problem with the polls that I think is more serious. Most of the pollsters cover a subject only when it's hot. So we may have a smattering about let's say the police at the time of Ferguson, and then most pollsters drop the subject and move on to something else. The thing that impresses most about PRRI is that they're committed to continuing investigations in some of the really deep fissures in society today and also they're able to tell us what really makes a complex public tick.

Now I'm going to say a few words about what struck me most in the surveys. There are times in public opinion when the public's voice is truly distinct. The collective drop in public confidence and government at the end of the Watergate was one of those times. In the mid-1980s and at the turn of the century, at the early part of this century, optimism soared. American across the board felt unusually

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positive about the economy and their good feelings spilled over to many areas that had little to do with economic performance. People felt better about the environment, people felt better about race relations. After September 11, of course the country felt the tragedy as one. But another distinct period came in the fall of 2008 when many Americans feared that the country's economic system would collapse. The poll results from that time were dire and I think it's only in looking back on them that we can appreciate how unusual those responses were.

Fear is not an emotion that you see often in public opinion polls, but it was clearly there in the fall of 2008 and early 2009. Americans aren't confident that we've fixed what went wrong. The hangover from 2008 and the long period of stagnating wages explain why 72 percent in one of the slides that Robby showed earlier told PRRI's pollster that the country is still in a recession. But I think it also explains a number of other results in the poll as well, particularly concerns that Americans have about opportunity, about being able to get ahead.

When asked about the problems in their community, 51 percent, the top response, said that lack of opportunity for young people was a major problem. Concerns about opportunity outweigh concern about inequality in almost every survey. In an Atlantic Aspen Institute survey earlier this summer 64 percent said as long as I'm able to provide the life I want for myself and my family it doesn't matter if others are substantially wealthier than I am, while 36 percent said the concentration of wealth and privilege within the top 1 percent is a problem.

Persistent economic anxiety may also explain why 64 percent in the survey said that hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people. From the 1950s when this kind of question was asked for the first time until recently, most people told pollsters that our society provided opportunity to advance for those who were willing to work hard. The crash and stagnating wages have had a significant negative impact on that core belief. The economic crisis probably also explains why 79 percent in this survey say that the economic system in this country unfairly favors the wealthy. This is a very familiar finding in public opinion polls. Since the 1970s when Louis Harris asked people to agree or disagree with the statement that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, majorities have always agreed. But today the numbers are higher than they've ever been. Although Americans in other surveys

believe that it is still possible to start out poor and become rich today most Americans, white and black alike, believe it is mainly just a few people at the top who have a chance to get a head. Interestingly, in this survey as in many others in the past 10 years, African Americans and Hispanics are more optimistic about their own and their children's chances to get ahead than are white Americans.

I don't think the economic anxiety explains the strong support in this poll for a minimum wage hike. This has been a very consistent finding in the polls since Gallup first asked about a wage floor in June of 1937. The persistent economic pessimism probably also explains the sharp increase in the view that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life. 65 percent gave that response in the poll while only 28 percent said that it's not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others. Persistent economic concerns also explain the negative sentiments in the poll about corporations, the sharp increase in the numbers saying that corporations do not share enough of their success with their employees. This is one reason I think that we're hearing from both democrat and republican candidates about crony capitalism on Wall Street excesses.

The anxiety may also explain the nostalgia for a better time and the belief shared by nearly two-thirds in this survey that every that everyday Americans understand what government should do better than the experts. Again the nostalgia impulse is a very powerful one in public opinion polls. Many, many decades ago Gallup asked whether or not life was better in the horse and buggy days, and many Americans in fact said it would. But I think it also explains the view from the public that government hasn't solved many of these problems, and that perhaps ordinary Americans could do a better job.

As we all know confidence in the federal government and congress has been bumming along at low levels for a long time. In the abstract Americans want the government to do something about the economy, and about inequality, but they aren't confident of government's ability. Here's an interesting question that Bloomberg has asked four times in the last three years about whether it is better for the government to implement policies to shrink the gap between the rich and everyone else, or whether it is better for the government to stand aside and let the market operate freely, even if the gap gets wider. Again, four questions, the results have been virtually identical in every asking of this question; Americans are split evenly on that response.

So the economy, terrorism, healthcare, and government dysfunction will be the issues that will engage voters, but I think the lag effect from October and November of 2008 is still having a profound effect on public psychology.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you, Karlyn. Henry.

MR. OLSEN: When you said, E.J., about bringing together the stars of the rock bands I actually was thinking that's the way I feel when you guys call, but my reference is the Blues Brothers (laughter), that either Joliet Jake Olsen calls or Elwood Dionne calls me and says we're a band, we're bringing back the band. (Laughter) And the thing about a band is that there's always a role. Some people are the bases, some people are the singers. I'm the drummer. I'm here to drum into everyone's consciousness that white working class Americans have different attitudes than most of us in the room and what that means politically.

So let me go through what that means. And the two points I'd like to raise with you are one, the data show that on virtually every measure of anxiety white working class respondents are more anxious and more depressed than virtually any group, and particularly white college educated, and two, I'd like to go off of the poll to argue why this actually might make sense for them and what that means. Going through the white working class are much likelier to think we're still in recession, 78 percent compared to a smaller percentage among all Americans. They are more likely to think that America's best days are in the past; 56 percent say that America's best days are in the past. They're more likely to say that U.S. culture has gotten worse since the 1950s; 62 percent say that. They are more likely to say that hard work does not lead to success; 68 percent say that. On cultural matters they're also out of step with the average American; 66 percent compared to a much smaller number say that illegal immigrants are somewhat responsible for America's continued economic problem. 67 percent say that Islam is incompatible with America's way of life. And when it comes to who should be solving the problem, the answer is not us in the room. One of the biggest differences in the poll was between college educated whites who tended to split on the question of whether or not average Americans are either better situated or should be trusted more to run American life than experts. 71 percent of whites without a college degree say that the average Americans understand the problems in America better than experts, and 73

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percent say that government should listen more to average people than experts among college educated people. For some reason I suspect we might think that we're more likely to be in the expert category, tend to be split on that.

So across the board you see a deep -- as Karlyn also mentioned, surveys have shown for many years now that white working class Americans are much more pessimistic about their own future than white college educated Americans or African Americans or Hispanics. Now some of this I think is mediated by the attitudes of white Evangelical Protestants, which is to say that white Evangelical Protestants tend to have a lower educational background than other whites. So it's worth nothing that white Evangelical Protestants share some of the white working class angst; 60 percent of white Evangelical Protestants say that America's best days are behind us, and 73 percent say that Islam isn't compatible with American life. It would be interesting if one thing Robby could do in a future report would be to tease that out and see when we look at white working class, are we looking at Evangelical attitudes that are seen through white working class because of a greater representation of that group, or are there a distinct white working class attitude independent of the composition of its cohort.

So why are these groups more anxious than the rest of us? Well, it might be because they face different cultural cues and they might face different economic incentives. For college educated people, this has been -- the last 30 years have been a wonderful time, particularly those of us with post graduate degrees. Our incomes are going up, our choices are going up, our standards of living are going up. For people who have not graduated from college, and often even worse for people who don't even go to college, this has not been the case. They have been facing stagnant or falling wages. I did a study in what's happened to Americans without a college education since 1999 and basically for the people who have not had a college education, regardless of how you cut it, you have seen a decline in median income. Most Americans who have not been to college have not seen a raise in real terms since the Clinton administration, something I suspect we will hear about in the fall. (Laughter) This has led to greater disengagement from the workforce, particularly among whites without a college degree, either early retirement for men over the age of 50, increasing going on disability, and for people who remain in the workforce, continued and greater dependence on public subsidies in order to maintain their standard

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of living, whether those are benefitting from the Medicaid expansion, from being able to purchase subsidized insurance on the exchanges, greater use of food stamps to make up for low wages in service industries, greater reliance on college loans or grants to provide the opportunity that their children might have, or greater reliance on a public education system that seems increasingly focused on sending their children to college whether or not their children will prosper in college.

This also adds I think with a loss of public respect. That if you think back to what America's virtues were in the '50s and '60s I think -- think about the Flintstones. This was a working class family that was considered to be an average family with the virtues that were respected. I don't think you would go into most white working class neighborhoods now and consider that their virtues, their way of life is considered worthy of respect in popular culture. This in a sense is also similar to white Evangelical Protestants. There are a whole lot of theological questions that one could get into if you want to debate this with white Evangelical Protestants, but I think if you go back to 1955 you would see that virtually every cultural indicator that they care about was more on their side. Both sides, the white Evangelical Protestant and the white working class, has seen a massive decline in their public influence and in the respect accorded to their views in the public square. It's no wonder then that they think that America's best days are behind us because for them they are.

When it comes to the white working class I often talk about how my party, the republican party, seems disconnected. And we take a look at these -- survey after survey show that white working class voters who are ambivalent between the two parties hold distinctly more distrustful views of big business, the wealthy, and the role that the private sector can play in spreading not just aggregate growth, but growth that actually benefits them. You can see that in the poll, as Karlyn mentioned, distrust of wealthy and large businesses, or belief that wealthy people and large business corporations have outsized power is always high. It's higher now. Middle class people are the group of people in the poll who have the lowest percentage that the respondents said that the federal government looks out for those needs very well, only 5 percent, half the total of women, one-third the total of low income people, one-third the total of blacks.

The white working class today sees an America that has them out of public respect,

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facing declining economic prospects and an elite that doesn't seem to care about them. They are right on every one of those things. And when my party begins to understand that and they don't offer up a uniform cornucopia of tax plans that basically ask how much can we give wealthy people to increase growth that we believe and argue will benefit them despite the fact that white working class people no longer believe that, well then you can see as many republicans at the state level who do not advance the sort of ideas and plans that you see coming out of Washington, then I think you can see the beginnings of a populist-oriented center, right majority of the sort that seems to be dominating state governments in the Midwest. I'm not expecting you're going to see that in 2016 at the national level. I'm expecting that you're going to see more of the same on the right, more of the same on the left, and more of the same in terms of dissatisfaction and unhappiness by the people who are forced to choose between two points of view, neither of which they really think meets the needs of them.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you so much. You are the Max Roach, Tony Williams, or Keith Moon of drummers (laughter) and I am always grateful --

MR. OLSEN: Not Gene Krupa?

MR. DIONNE: Oh, if you want Gene Krupa I'll give you Gene Krupa. First of all thank you for your voice for white working class people who are not addressed enough in think tanks, and also thank you for being the first person on a Brookings panel of my knowledge who has brought up the Flintstones. (Laughter) And all I can say about your presentation proving my age is yabba dabba doo. (Laughter)

And now I'm really happy that Joy Reid has joined us. Please, Joy, it's your turn here.

MS. REID: Well, Henry mentioned the Flintstones, I'm going to attempt to one up him by mentioning All in the Family. What I think is one of the most brilliant television series ever created -- of course Norman Lear, who also created the Jeffersons and other spin offs of that show, I want to build a little bit on what Henry says. The last time we were here I agreed with Henry and I thought it would end his career as a conservative scholar (laughter) because you don't want to be in agreement with me, but I can't help it because I cannot disagree with anything that you just said.

And to build on what both Karlyn and Henry were talking about, the most fascinating

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numbers I think in this survey really are about the anxieties of white working class voters and white Evangelical voters. And I think that is what's driving a lot of what we're seeing in the election cycles. So going back to my Norman Lear show, All in the Family. All in the Family was actually the pilot for -- it was actually created in 1969, which is of course a very volatile period in American history, it was a copy of a show called Til Death Do Us Part that was a British TV show that was meant to depict the anxieties of a white British man who's getting on in years and who is dealing with cultural change that he didn't understand and couldn't accept, and he was trying to navigate this sort of brave new modern world in his own curmudgeonly way. So Norman Lear creates an American version of it, he does the pilot in '69, the show actually debuts in late '71. But by 1972 it is the most popular television show in America and remains so for about five years. So 1972 is a really fascinating period in American history. It was sort of a pivot point between the civil rights era and the more modern political era in which the party that used to be the party of the white working class, which is the democratic party, was really very rapidly seeding white working class voters to the republican party. And Richard Nixon of course going into his reelection in '72 was the principal beneficiary of that change.

And so just a couple of stats. Nixon in 1968 gets 47 percent of overall white voters, splits them with George Wallace, George Wallace gets 15 percent, that's 62 percent in total. That's between Wallace and Nixon together, they get 62 percent. In 1972 he gets 68 percent by himself of white voters overall. And now these are Gallup numbers, they didn't break them down by working class versus non-working class voters. But if you then look at the blue collar workers, and these surveys were overwhelmingly white voters, but of course not 100 percent, but there are other people mixed in, but you have Richard Nixon and Wallace together in 1968 getting 50 percent of blue collar voters. So 35 percent for Nixon, 15 percent for Wallace. By 1972 Nixon gets 57 percent of blue collar voters. And what All in the Family really depicted was exactly what the democratic party was losing, people like Archie Bunker who was a character, lived in Queens, and who was experiencing cultural change and resisting it in the same way that his counterpart in the British show was. And you're watching all of his anxieties on everything from economics to race, his attitudes on everything from policing to the civil rights movements. You see those -- and they really do reflect I think a lot of what was happening in the hearts and minds of

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white working class voters that's now being really reflected and mirrored today. And if you think about sort of the economic situation in the early 1970s, the kind of stagnation that people were experience economically, but also the fact that that was the epicenter of the busing period in which northern white Americans in the suburbs were experiencing what southern white voters had experienced in the decade earlier, which is forcible integration. And there was the combination of school busing and housing desegregation. If you recall the third leg of the Lyndon Johnson sort of three legged stool of cultural progress or civil rights, the war on poverty, but also a housing bill that passed in the late 1960s that was forcing housing discrimination changes that were really hitting the north more than they were hitting the south. And so you have this shock of white working class voters in northern cities suddenly having visited upon them the same kind of cultural critique that they were accustomed to seeing visited on southern whites. Now they were the bad guy in the narrative that they saw being told by the media. They felt that they were the ones being put upon by an increasingly aggressive group of minorities that wanted into the schools, into the neighborhoods.

And you also had a period that was combining anxiety over war, anxiety over Vietnam, with the roiling campus movements which really peaked and hit their peak in the late 1960s. In '69 you had incredibly, in some cases, violent campus demonstrations taking place. And so you had a lot of cultural change happening. And of course the year after the '72 election you then had *Roe v. Wade*, but before that you had all of these changes regarding the availability of contraception and the women's rights movements, the attempt to have an equal rights amendment to the Constitution. So there was tons of cultural change happening in 1972 that I think affected white working class voters in a lot of the same ways you're seeing today.

So fast forwarding to today, one of the pieces of the poll that really struck me was the data on people's perceptions of not just the declining influence of white Americans, but specifically of white men. And so when you look at this poll a majority if white Americans, 55 percent in the poll, believe white men are facing a decline of cultural influence in American society. That's to Henry's point, the idea of a loss of public respect for their values and for their person. Fewer than half of African Americans, 46 percent, believe that and 42 percent of Hispanics agree that white men are facing a decline in public

influence. And there are only small gender differences among whites, meaning that white men are only slightly more likely than white women to perceive this loss of influence, specifically for white men. But what was even more interesting than that was the correlation between that figure and the belief that America is in decline and that its best days are behind us. So that nearly 6 in 10, 58 percent of Americans who believe that the American culture has changed for the worse since the 1950s also hold the belief that white men are losing influence. There's a great correlation between those two figures.

And why I think that's fascinating is that if you look at the republican field right now and you look at -- you know, we have numbers here but there are also the real clear politics averages that are taking the rolling average of the horse race polls, Donald Trump in almost every way reflects the anxieties and priorities of white working class voters. White working class voters form the bulk of his support. They and not Evangelical voters are really the foundation of the Trump electorate. They're very concerned about immigration. They have great anxiety about the economy, not so much things like income inequality, but just their own raw ability to get ahead and to pass along to their children sort of the same kind of economic world that they lived in, or the same world that they grew up in. So what you have if you look at just the Trump piece of it -- see I always have my theory that the republican party is sort of a three legged stool, right, between kind of the Archie Bunker voters, the blue collar white voter, the Evangelical voter, with some Venn Diagram overlap between the two, and the more establishmentarian sort of business minded, sort of one percenter voter. And if you look at Donald Trump and add him to the other sort of populists in the race, they do come up to about a third. Donald Trump and the real clear politics averages is holding down about 24.3 percent. And then if you look at the Evangelical piece and you add up the three Evangelical voters, poor Rick Santorum who's at like *, or I think he's at 1 percent (laughter), Mike Huckabee who's at maybe 3 percent, and Ben Carson who's average is at 23.3 percent as of today, in that average, that's holding down about a third. And if you add up all the establishment candidates, the Jeb Bushes, the Rubios, and everyone else, you get about a third. So you really do see the republican party dividing into these three legs of its three legged stool and that's why it sort of looks like the furniture is falling apart because they're not pulling together.

And when I look at these candidates, these 14 or so who are left in, the question I ask

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and have asked a lot of republican strategists that I've talked to about this, is which figure -- is there a figure in the party today that can even corral two out of three of those factions, because in the past what the republican party has been able to do is to field presidential candidates who can appeal to at least two of those. So Richard Nixon is able to say that he's going to get crime and rioting under control and bring back order, law and order, but at the same time he's going to bring back values, which appeals to that values voter. You can sort of get two out of three. Of course Ronald Reagan was able to appeal to all three. George W. Bush made a big push for Evangelical voters, but he sort of played the every man and was able to get the blue collar voter as well, and of course he is an establishment figure, the son of a president. So he was able to pull together all three.

What's really kind of incredible about this current election cycle is I can't think of any of those candidates that could even get two out of the three. And so that the Ben Carson cohort is specific to him, and I don't see a ton of evidence that they would go to a Donald Trump. The Marco Rubio is sort of more neo conservative, more establishment. You know, the media deeply believes that Marco Rubio is sort of a phenomenon that republican voters cannot resist. How could they resist him, he's got everything they need, he's Latino, he's young, we like him in the media. I mean come on. (Laughter) I don't see any evidence whatsoever that the base of the Republican Party agrees with that because the issue of immigration being so provident. So I think the real puzzle for the Republican Party is figuring out if they can find someone who can get two out of those three.

And then the other thing that I'll just briefly say before I pass the mic back to E.J. is on the subject of race, the fragmentation in the country on issues of race really is I think as intense now as it was in the 1960 and '70s because of the diverging views of black, Hispanic and white Americans on even what constitutes racism. Some of the other striking numbers in the poll are the intensity with which a lot of white working class voters and republicans, white republicans in general, believe that the real focus of racism now is against them. That they are now the real true victims of racism and that the beliefs among African Americans even that they are the victims of police brutality are false. And that essentially incidents like what happened to Michael Brown, what happened to Freddie Gray, are one offs and that they're not a trend, whereas African Americans, you know, to a very, very high degree believe there are

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trends. So we're not on the same page and I think we are kind of balkanizing into two different Americas, what I've called an old America and a new America. Whereas the old America believes itself to be in decline and with it the country, and the new America has more optimism even as it has an equal amount of economic anxiety.

MR. DIONNE: Joy, thank you so much. And I agree with you very much that it is a really disturbing finding of this survey when we look at this fragmentation and the radical differences. Also thank you for bringing up Archie Bunker. Some of you may remember a famous exchange between Mike and Archie. Mike says, you know, you are totally incomprehensible, to which Archie Bunker replies, maybe so, but I make a lot of sense. (Laughter)

I want to turn this over to my colleague, Bill Galston, for the first question. I am hoping that he also -- he's done a lot of work inside this survey that bears on a lot of what's been said. So I want to encourage Bill to offer a couple of observations as he asks a question. I want to do that in part because I have an observation I want to make before I ask a question, so I'm asking Bill to open the way here.

MR. GALSTON: Well, thanks, E.J. These were three absolutely fabulous sets of comments. Thank you so much. And I have to say that I can't disagree with a word that anybody has uttered in the past half hour.

So let me begin by quoting a certain democratic candidate. I'm from the '60s (laughter) and, you know, I can tell you that the holy trinity in the 1960s was race, class, and gender. I think since then we've spent a whole lot more time talking about race and gender than we have about class, but this year is the revenge of class. And whether you're talking about Trump on the populist right or Bernie Sanders on the left, the issue of socioeconomic class is front and center in a way that it hasn't been in quite some time. And within the Republican Party, Ben Carson is a much more familiar figure, given recent history, than Donald Trump. I mean Carson is the latest in the long line of white Evangelical champions. Donald Trump has given a voice to the white working class, you know, he made have blotted his copy book with his comments about the minimum wage, a voice they haven't had in decades.

And that raises the following question which I'd like to put first and foremost to Henry, but

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anyone else can chime in. As Joy emphasized, since the '60s white working class voters have deserted the democratic party in droves and they now form a key component of the republican base. For most of this period the republican establishment -- and here I'm going to be blunt -- has bought off these voters with social conservatism and a tough sounding foreign policy. But now these voters are in full revolt against economic policies such as trade treaties, immigration reform, and crony capitalism, among others that they see as inimical to their interests. And the republican establishment, which has been caught flat footed, is left to hope that this is all a bad dream from which their party will awake in time to choose a credible nominee. I'm not so sure.

So, for Henry, the Republican Party is almost all white and it's divided between the white working class and white college educated folks. They have very different economic interests. What is the program that brings these divergent economic interests together?

MR. OLSEN: Well, okay. (Laughter)

MR. DIONNE: Then you can announce your candidacy at the end of this answer.

(Laughter)

MR. GALSTON: This is a way of asking Joy's question.

MR. OLSEN: Yeah. I write a lot about this in different ways. I think to give -- not to hog the remainder of the time with the answer to this -- the white working class wants a fair shake. What they want to know is that people have their back and that they're on their side. They want to know that citizenship in this country matters and that they're not simply pawns of some elite's tool, whether that is as they would perceive it, a more academic focused elite that wants to sideline them in favor of things that don't serve their interests, like they perceive don't serve their interests, like climate change or on behalf of groups that they feel are not as deserving or only equally as deserving as they, or business elite that sees them as commodities within a mode of production and doesn't see a difference between purchasing their labor or purchasing the labor of somebody in Bangladesh. A Republican Party that wants to win a national election and not divide the party needs to come to grips with this because not only is it a populist sentiment within the republican party, it's a populist sentiment that is crucial to winning the middle class and working class votes that are necessary in order to win particularly the states of the Midwest and the

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North Atlantic, but also is essential to winning over the votes of more Hispanics, which is something that the elite desperately craves. I think it means a new tax policy that focuses less on cutting the tax for the top bracket and more on dealing with tax reform for people who need the help. I came across a picture in the *Weekly Standard's* encomium to Jack Kemp that was talking about his role in tax cuts, and the picture was Ronald Reagan and Bill Brock and Jack Kemp standing in front of the 1978 republican campaign for Kemp-Roth and the banner in back of them said, "working people need a break". Contrast that to the talk of job creators and entrepreneurs that comes out of the mouths of virtually every republican candidate. Working people need a break, and that doesn't mean cutting the top rate. It means focusing less on reforming entitlements that work for the vast majority of American people and focusing more on reducing expenditures that go to people who don't need it, both at the rich and at the bottom. It means thinking about how to attract people on economics without adopting a statist or a government planning mode, or as I know E.J. is going to call -- about social democratic America. I think there's a populist conservative America that can -- the same concerns and forestall social democracy in America. But it means the elite needs to understand that the reason people don't vote republican is not because of barriers of race and class and gender, the reason people don't vote republican when push comes to shove is that they don't think that when the chips are down they'll have their back. And that's different for different people, but for the white working class it's primarily an economic question. And a republican party that understands that is a republican party that can win the presidency. And a republican party that doesn't is one that's going to complain about President Clinton a whole lot. (Laughter)

MS. REID: Can I just add one thing?

MR. DIONNE: That was an excellent announcement for the democratic nomination for president, Henry. Thank you.

Joy wanted to come in.

MS. REID: Yeah, I just wanted to add really quickly that one of the things that Henry just said is that -- so two of the goals of the republican elite are in direct conflict with each other, because two of the goals you just mentioned cannot live in the same body, right they can't live in the same host, which is that republican political elites will tell you that they must add Hispanics to the base of the republican

party. They've given up on trying to add African Americans because the part is just, you know, having swept up the former southern part of the democratic party, the party just tonally just turns off African Americans so much that I think most republican elites have given up on ever trying to get African Americans back in unless they somehow think for whatever reason Ben Carson will bring them in, which he won't. (Laughter) But the elites are also essentially constantly lecturing their own base of white working class Americans that you need to understand base of ours that in order to bring in more Latino voters we have to do immigration reform. And Ben Domenech of the *Federalist* has written a lot about this, that this sense that the elites are ignoring the base's fundamental anxiety about immigration reform and ignoring the base's sound rejection of the idea of doing what Ronald Reagan did, which was -- Ronald Reagan did straight up amnesty. He was able to do that and still be an icon of the republican base. That won't fly now. And so this idea that the elites can sort of get the base to somehow accept the idea they're going to do immigration reform in order to enlarge the base of the party and still be seen to respect their base is just not true. And I think Donald Trump's persistent seat at the top of the polls in the republican primary is proof of that.

MR. OLSEN: One thing, the republican elites have this belief that immigration is a barrier, and if you remove the barrier Hispanics will start to flow more towards the Republican Party. And one poll question that Robby asked is one I bring up to them over and over and over again, and that's the poll question from your Hispanic survey about which of two economic development theories do you think most, will produce more economic growth. And the one is raise taxes and increase spending on education and infrastructure, and the other is lower taxes on everyone but also on the wealthy and private sector. Hispanics by a margin of 58 to 33 in your poll, and you've asked it a couple of times and the numbers are only slightly different, they're all within what you would expect of standard random sampling error, agree with what is -- only be called the democratic approach. So I tell this to people and I say okay, well guess what, so what that means is that if you remove the barrier and suddenly you focus on Jeb Bush's economic plan you still lose the Hispanic vote. And the increase, even if you assume that that means that well, Romney got 27, now I'm going to get 33, you know how many states you move? Florida. One. Which is also the closest state and you could probably get with gently removing the name Mitt

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Romney and putting on generic republican because of the negative votes he got (laughter) among the Cuban and the Hispanic community there. In other words, the standard republican approach gets nothing, literally nothing.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much. I want to put a thought on the table to ask the panel to respond and then we'll open it up to the audience. And I'm going to rise to Henry's provocation and yes, I will talk about social democratic America instead of merely populist America.

I think there are two very different stories told by this survey. They are not contradictory stories, it just depends on which aspects of the survey you focus on. On the one hand, as Robby already began to outline, there are stark differences between our two parties on a whole range of issues relating to race, to immigration, to social issues. Robby put together a racial inequity index, meaning whether -- taking a series of questions about whether people perceive lingering effects of discrimination. 74 percent of republicans, 75 percent of tea party members are at one end of that scale, 22 percent of democrats are at the other end of that scale. Do the immigrants strengthen the country or are they a burden? Democrats, 63-32, strengthen the country. Republicans, 66-26, are a burden. Trump supporters, 80 percent say they're a burden. You see it on the issues picked by republicans and democrats. Stricter gun control, 81 percent of democrats, 56 percent of independents, only 35 percent of republicans. Death penalty or life without parole, 67 percent of republicans for the death penalty, 47 percent of independents, 33 percent of democrats. And I could go on, but there is a long list of really sharply polarized questions. Just on the isolated incidents question on the police issue. Are they isolated incidents or part of a broader problem. 82 percent of republicans, isolated incidents only 32 percent of democrats.

But then there is social democratic America where there is broad unity on a whole series of issues across party line. Require companies to provide sick leave. Well, 96 percent of democrats, 86 percent of independents, but 69 percent of republicans. Paid leave for a birth or adoption, 89 percent of democrats, 81 percent of independents, but 75 percent of republicans. The lack of wages paid by corporations are at least somewhat responsible for our current economic problems, 88 percent of democrats, 75 percent of independents, but 67 percent of republicans. And there's a much longer list here, and attitudes toward business corporations, having confidence in government. You know, do you

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have a great deal of confidence in large business corporations, 8 percent of democrats, 5 percent of independents, 9 percent of republicans.

So it seems to me it is not surprising that you are seeing democrats talk a great deal about economic issues and republicans staying away from them, trying to push it toward another place. And it reminded me -- we're all doing these '60s and '70s nostalgia here -- and it reminded of Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg's book, The Real Majority published in 1970. On the one hand, they're demographic analysis would not apply to today, it would be wrong because of the changing demographics of America. They were good demographers so they would have noticed that, but their basic argument was the economic issue pushes people democratic, and the social issue pushes people republican. That's a little less true because there may be a new majority for social issue liberalism. Nonetheless, I think that split they describe is very much still with us. And you hear it in the rhetoric surely of Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton.

I would love to ask our panelists, starting with Karlyn and Joy, and then to Henry, what you make of that aspect of this survey.

MS. BOWMAN: Quickly, while I agree the fissures are very deep on the issues that you've cited, I think that if you -- there are many issues as you suggested the differences are not that great. But I think if you had asked a different question, for example, as many pollsters ask on gun control, would more gun laws make a difference, you get democrats and republicans saying no, more gun laws aren't going to make a difference, and the differences are not that vast. There are whole series of other kinds of questions like this; if you change the wording you can get a slightly different result.

I agree with something Henry had said earlier. We bonded over the group in the poll called some conservatives when we met --

MR. OLSEN: Some college.

MS. BOWMAN: Some with college. We bonded over that group many years ago and have been looking at the white working class for a long time. But in getting back to the previous question, I think that the growth tempered in the way that you suggested it should be by republicans could make an enormous difference if you could get an atmosphere as you had at the end of the Clinton administration in

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terms of people's perceptions of the economy. They wouldn't erase these deep partisan differences, but they would certainly act as a solvent for the kinds of deep fissures that we have today. So I think growth tempered by government intervention in a lot of areas would be enormously important in changing the picture that we see in this poll overall. And different question wording on a lot of the questions here would also I think change our view slightly.

MS. REID: Well, I would say that I think one of the reasons that you don't see more symmetry between working class democrats or democrats with economic anxiety and republicans with economic anxiety in terms of their voting patterns and their issue beliefs is because on the right republicans have been very successful at framing economic policy as cultural. And so when you look just at healthcare, you saw the recent election in Kentucky, in which you had only about 30 percent turnout, an overwhelmingly white turnout, and fairly decent turnout in rural parts of Kentucky that are the most dependent on the Medicaid expansion, that have benefitted from the Medicaid expansion, which they call connect because they didn't want it to be affiliated with Obamacare, which it is Obamacare, but it -- Kentucky is a fascinating case in which you saw voters turn out the democrats in terms of the Governor's Mansion, although democrats did win some statewide offices or were re-elected to some statewide offices, including the Secretary of State, but in the case of the governor this was a tea party candidate who ran against Mitch McConnell, who felt Mitch McConnell was too weak -- now this was Mitch McConnell who led the filibuster everything strategy in the United States Senate -- was too weak and who vowed to repeal the Affordable Care Act in Kentucky, vowed to get rid of Connect so that you had what from the outside of Kentucky looking in looks like voters forcefully voting to remove their own healthcare. And so when you look at that kind of voting there or in Kansas where you have hugely unpopular policy on the part of the republican leadership in Kansas, all of which was on the table when the election happened that elected that very government, you do really have a phenomenon where the power of reframing economic issues as cultural issues is still there. Even as in this survey we've seen issues like abortion and gay marriage actually decline on the scale of what is the most important thing to voters so that you'll have conservative voters saying, you know, the economy and healthcare are very important, but very proactively and assertively voting even against healthcare they get. So I think that I'm less

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optimistic that there is some way that you can bring these two sides together as long as that cultural framing is so powerful.

MR. OLSEN: I agree, Karlyn, that growth would be a huge solvent. The problem I have is that it needs to be a growth that is felt by the people. You know, one of the things that befuddled me a few years ago when I was looking at polls on your desk was attitudes about -- I was a pupil -- I've never been able to find it but I can still see the graph and chart in my head -- which was asking people about their personal financial situation and dividing it by income quintile. During the Bush years, when there was growth, and the more you were down the only group that they saw was getting better was the top 20 percent. It almost completely mirrored what was happening to actual family income during a period of growth. So, you know, when I look and I hear people say growth, the question is when we are in a world of free trade, when we're in a world of the elites have their way of relatively unregulated immigration, and when we're in a world where capital can flow freely across national borders, exactly how are you going to produce a growth that produces rising wages for people who are in direct competition with people who can perform many of the same tasks at a fraction of the cost? Innately, that's what the white working class gets. And innately, that's what the republican business group has no clue about.

With respect to social democratic America, I would argue that some of the things that you talk about in the poll I noticed and would take away from that is that there is a very large consensus in America that economic activity should serve life rather than the other way around. I think that that's an issue, a perception that often is at odds with the republican elite, but it does not need to be channeled into the sort of directed government centric approach towards wealth creation that often comes along with social democratic governments. That would actually be a place where I could see a dividing line between a populist conservatism and a social democratic approach that would focus -- might agree on questions like paid parental leave, which was inaugurated in Australia recently by the supposedly hard line former Prime Minister Tony Abbott as part of his election campaign in 2013, but not be as focused on how government ought to be involved in wealth creation as perhaps a social democratic regime would.

MR. DIONNE: I'd welcome that debate. I want to bring in like four -- I think we're close to our time here. Is that right? So could I bring in four -- do we have mics floating around the room? Let me

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bring in four people that see right away that they -- the lady over there, the gentleman right next to her, and then the gentleman in front. Yeah, that lady, the gentleman right next to you, the gentleman in front. I'm going to collect all four. If you could please be brief I would be very grateful. And if you could identify yourself that would be good.

QUESTIONER: My name is (inaudible) and my question is about a chart that was shown that says which of the following are problems in your own community. It shows up as table 5 in this report. So my question is -- this chart shows wide differences in perceptions about crime, quality of public schools, opportunities for young people by race -- so my question is to what extent is this driven by the spatial separation between the different racial groups, in particular between whites and African Americans where we still see a great deal of segregation. So what extent is it driven by that?

MR. DIONNE: That's a great question. Thank you. The gentleman right next to you.

QUESTIONER: Sergei (Inaudible), Financial News, to Moscow, Russia. My question is did the issue foreign trade in general and TPP in particular come up in your survey? Could you comment on this? Thanks.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. And then the gentleman right in front there. Yeah, right there. I saw your hand next. And then we'll go to somebody on the other side and then we'll start -- or maybe we can end with Robby, to give you the last word. Maybe we'll briefly go all the way down and Robby you can then put anything else on the table you want to put on.

Sir?

MR. CHECCO: Yes, thank you. Thank you very much. Larry Checco. This is a great performance here by all of you.

One question I would have for Robby is why didn't you ask about the capacity for these people to be president of the United States?

MR. DIONNE: Go ahead.

MR. CHECCO: I didn't know what that was about. But at any rate, you know, do people know that Ben Carson has trouble distinguishing between the debt and the deficit, or that he's a creationist and if we want to put ourselves forth in the world as a leading technology, science country,

how do we get away with that? Thank you.

MR. DIONNE: And then anybody on this side of the room? Let me go to the lady in front here. And I apologize to everyone else. You can come up afterward and ask us. Ma'am.

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. I'm from Wisconsin, an area of a lot of white working class so I actually I think kind of get that area to some extent. And I'd like to follow up on Mr. Galston's comments about -- and others -- about the fact that the white working class doesn't actually vote its economic interests in terms of Social Security, Medicare, even Obamacare. These are all programs they benefit from and they tend to vote republican particularly at the state level. Thank you.

MR. DIONNE: I'll answer only one of these questions on why didn't Robby include "X". This is one of the longest surveys I've ever seen people stay online for and we could just -- there was a limit to how many questions we can ask. But I promise he'll do more surveys and probably explore that question.

But let me just start with Henry and we'll work all the way down the line on any of these good questions and end with Robby.

MR. OLSEN: I'll just answer the white working class question. I think when you actually look at the state levels, white working class vote much differently in the north than they do in the south. And in the north white working class voters gave only slim margins to Mitt Romney. In Iowa they voted for President Obama. I also think you find that they would not support significant cutbacks in a lot of those programs, and I think that's one of the things that republicans may find to their chagrin, is that the standard entitlement reform argument that is national republican dogma is not something that white working class voters will want to support. You know the polls really demonstrate that when it comes to things like Social Security and Medicare, that they don't want to see those things on the table as part of a budget balancing. So white working class voters do not always see -- now that there is a basic safety net that still has holes but that covers a lot of things, white working class voters may not necessarily see expansion as being directly in their interest. But I do not see that there is a lot of proof that they will vote for significant cutbacks in these things. And Wisconsin I think is one example, is that here you've got a governor and a republican majority that has a reputation for being strongly conservative and in many

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ways has moved Wisconsin to the right, but they have not done a statewide version of what is national republican dogma. They have not proposed dramatic cuts to "an unaffordable University of Wisconsin", they have not proposed radical restructuring of what could be argued to be an unaffordable public education system. You know, Scott Walker was able to expand the number of publicly subsidized people receiving health insurance by changing the way BadgerCare is run and putting people on the federal exchange and was able to say, hey, I expand -- again he did very well among white working class voters. They were the reason why he carried Wisconsin whereas President Obama carried Wisconsin I call it the Fox River valley independent as being the -- yeah, there you go -- Oshkosh is an important place. So is Sheboygan.

QUESTIONER: So is Appleton.

MR. OLSEN: So is Appleton, exactly. A republican presidential candidate who gets that is one who is actually capable of winning, but notice what he was able to do, but what he was not able to do. So whether or not -- as far as retrenchment is concerned, I don't think the white working class generally votes against their economic interest, if you perceive that's in their interest. And I'll be very interested to see whether Matt Bevin as Governor --

QUESTIONER: Can't pull it off.

MR. OLSEN: -- actually is going to get rid of Connect when that as opposed to the general cultural question becomes the focal point. Being against Obama is being different than for the repeal of Connect.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Joy.

MS. REID: I can tell you that in Ohio when Governor Kasich attempted to do what Scott Walker did do, which is to go after one of the pillars, the former pillars of elevating white working class people into the middle class, which was unions, he went after them in a thorough going way. When John Kasich tried to do the same thing in Ohio he was beaten back thoroughly and soundly, in part because he included police officers in their cutbacks on unions. And that's the last strong union left in America and were able to get a referendum and he had to reverse himself. He also expanded Medicaid, which is actually quite popular in Ohio just as it was in Kentucky. So it will be interesting to see if Matt Bevin can

actually pull off taking away about 400,000 Kentuckians' Obamacare/Connect.

On the question that the young lady asked about whether physical lack of proximity of these different communities impacts their varying views on what's taking place in their own community, I think one of the things that's really stunning 50 years after the height of the civil rights movement is just how segregated this country really remains. And the experiences of white, black, and brown Americans are really still so distinct that I think we don't live in what you really could arguable call this exact same country. You have a lot more reliance on public schools among African Americans and Latinos. And so at the same time you have a withdrawal from the public school system in a really broad way, particularly in the south. One of the outcroppings, one of the results of broad desegregation across the south was the withdrawal of white families from the school system, and the passing of bills that allowed parents to make choices about where they send their kids to school that took them out of the neighborhood schools, so that once the neighborhood school was integrated, white families could just opt out, and a lot of them have. And so you have a public school system that's increasingly black and brown and at the same time being increasingly defunded. I was just in North Carolina where that is one of the issues, that because you have the bulk of the students still using the public school system are black and Hispanic, in the view of a lot of civil rights leaders, that's given license to the republican government to just gut funding for those schools because their kids aren't in them. And I think when you look at issues of crime you also have greater instances of African Americans and Latinos tending to live in community that tend on balance to be poorer and are experiencing crime, and thus you have the 70 percent of black non-Hispanic voters that are saying crime is a really important issue, versus only 40 percent of non-Hispanic whites. And then to my previous point, you have 7 in 10 African Americans saying lack of funding for public schools is important versus on 45 percent of non-Hispanic whites.

If you look at the unemployment rate for African American young people it's catastrophic, it's at plus 20 percent and just stays there and has for a long time. And so therefore you see 74 percent of African Americans saying lack of opportunity for young people, versus only 4 in 10 white. So I think continued segregation, continued deep divides in the access to opportunity, to jobs, and to economic uplift, I think just still exists. And it's a sad state of affairs for our country that likes to brag about its

progress. But I think if you dig into where the country is 50 years later, not just for white working class voters where a lot has stagnated, but I think across the board we have not progressed as far as we think.

MR. DIONNE: Karlyn.

MS. BOWMAN: I like that question in particular because very few pollsters ask about your own community. And while I agree with much of Joy has said about the responses to that, if you ask Americans their views about what's going on in Washington, what's going on in their state government, what's going on in their local community, you see that views generally about solving problems in your local community are just enormously positive. And I think that that's one reason for a lot of hope in those particular areas because people really -- and particularly young people -- are getting much more involved at the local community and much less interested in what goes on here in Washington because they think they can make a difference in those communities. So I think that actually some of these responses were very hopeful.

And to look at two very long-term trends in the polling business, one question asked by the *LA Times* starting with race riots there many, many years ago, and another one asked by CBS News and the *New York Times*, very long trends about attitudes toward the police in those communities after every incident of police behavior after a short period of time attitudes returned to where they were before. Now there was still a gap between black and white Americans in both LA and in New York City, but when these issues are front and center, and I think they are more so now than they have been in a very long time, these fissures may appear larger than they are in some of the other surveys when times are not quite as bad. But I think there's a lot of reason for more positive views of the state and local levels.

Also another reason why you see governors, many democratic and republican governors doing so much better than politicians in Washington, because they're solving these problems overall.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Bill.

MR. GALSTON: Well, I just have one comment. And that is that when Henry was responding to Karlyn by talking about the kind of economic growth that people who are outside the top quintile are really looking for, I had to smile because of course a few months ago the Center for American Progress and the British and Labor Party got together to write a comprehensive report called "Inclusive

Growth". And I am driven to the following question, the following observation. How can we restore vigorous economic growth that benefits everyone, not just those at the top? That is or ought to be the central question of the 2016 presidential election, because as Karlyn has emphasized in her remarks, broadly shared growth is an incredibly powerful solvent for lots of our social ills. And at the end six years of inclusive growth in the year 2000, attitudinally we were a different country. And the 15 years of stagnation that we've experienced since then have rolled the heavy rock all the way back down the hill, and now we have to start again.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you, Bill. Amen. Robby.

MR. JONES: Well, I'll be brief and then we're all out of time here, but thanks for your patience. I do think that, you know, the sense of scarcity I think is a real issue here. That the pie is just not big enough is driving a lot of the anxiety. So I think that's absolutely right, and certainly a better economic picture would help across the board here that was seen and felt as Henry said, felt all the way down, right, not just sort of some economist here in D.C. telling us that things are better, but people actually looking at their paycheck and looking at their budgets and saying oh, actually I have some money left over now that I didn't have a year ago. I mean that will make a difference.

Having said that I do want to emphasize the realities of the cultural changes. We've spent a lot of time talking about the 1960s, 1970s that were clearly a big time of cultural change, but what we're experiencing now in terms of sort of race and even religion is in fact in some ways unprecedented in the country. And so just a couple of quick numbers. If you like about like white kind of WASPY American, white Anglo Saxon Protestants, 1993 was the last year that white Protestants were a majority of the country. In 2014 even if you had add all white Christians together, including white Catholics, into that white Protestant mix, white Christians are now less than a majority of the country, even if you add all white Catholics into the picture. Now among voters, right, that's less so because whites turn out at higher rates than minorities do. But even if current projections hold, by 2024 white Christians will not even make up a majority of all voters in the country. So we've only got two more presidential elections where white Christians will make up a majority of voters. Having said all that, so I think the sort of the sense of anxiety, the sense of dislocation that many white working class -- is both cultural, it's religious, and it's

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economic, it's all of those things. And so looking around there is a sense -- and then the other question I wanted to sort -- I guess I'll kind of leave it with is that the kinds of things Brown v. Board of Education that were supposed to kind of help with the public schools -- I mean the best studies that I've seen of that said that we basically lost all the ground that Brown kind of put on the table in the '70s and '80s, it's gone. Now whites tend to attend white schools and nonwhites tend to attend school with nonwhites. And the other institutions -- the thing that I think is the most troubling is what is the institution that is going to bridge the racial divide? I don't know what it is. It's not churches for sure. It's not labor unions, because there's not any left. So churches for example, 80 percent of churches today are essentially mono racial. So that's not an institution that's going to make a lot of progress. If we look at like white's core social networks, those people that they talk -- we did some research in 2013 on this and in 2013 the average core social network -- that is the people that people say I've talked about important matters in the last 12 months -- the average core social network of whites is 91 percent white. So there are not just these kinds of social conversations across the ground.

And then the last thing in terms of institutions in the religion ground is that the white main line Protestant churches provided a lot of bridging during the civil rights movement for white Christians. So the *Christian Century* for example was the first publication that published Martin Luther King, Jr.'s letter from Birmingham Jail. When it came out Martin Luther King was on the editorial board at the *Christian Century*, which is the flagship magazine of the mainline Protestant churches. And compared to the kind of institutional history, the main line versus the Evangelical churches have had is very, very different. But one of the things striking in the survey today, and I'll kind of leave with this -- it's maybe a downer of a note -- but what has happened to white main line Protestants in the pews on race? Because we see very little daylight. On this question for example of isolated incidents, whether killings of African American men are isolated incidents or broader patterns, white Evangelical Protestants, 72 percent say they are isolated incidents, white main line Protestants with this kind of grand history of civil rights activism, 73 percent isolated incidents. There's no daylight between those two. I think one question on the religion ground is like where are the main line Protestants in the pews on race issues, when they don't actually look that different than white Evangelical Protestants in the pews.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you so much. A small point, I want to salute Henry for making the point about the white working class north and south. It is radically different. In Mississippi and Alabama, Obama got 10 percent in Mississippi, 15 percent of the white vote, in Iowa 51, Minnesota-Wisconsin 48, Ohio 41. You're just not going to have white working class voters or any other whites in those states voting democratic, whereas in other parts of the country it's more competitive. I think that's just essential.

This is a great study and I urge you all to read it. And I want to end in tribute to Robby with a quote from Arthur Conan Doyle, the author of the Sherlock Holmes stories. He said, "I never guess. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories instead of theories to suit facts." Robby, thank you for a lot of data. Thank you all very much.
(Applause)

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