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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming, especially on a Friday morning. Delighted to see you. My name is Bruce Jones, I'm the Vice President of the Foreign Policy program here at Brookings. And it's a very distinct pleasure to welcome David Malone back to Brookings to talk about his newest venture, the *Oxford Handbook on Indian Foreign Policy*, along with our distinguished panel.

I was thinking about it this morning, I've known David for a long time, and I was trying to decide how to describe his career. He serves now as the Rector of the United Nations University, where he holds the title of Under-Secretary-General in the UN system. He was the president of the International Development Research Council, one of the largest and most influential development foundations in the world. He had a storied Canadian diplomatic career serving in the Middle East, twice at the UN, as the Director General of the Global Affairs Department in Ottawa. Along the way, ran the International Peace Academy. And ultimately became Canada's Ambassador to India.

But that's not actually the most impressive part of David's career. The impressive part of David's career is that along the way while doing all of those things, he managed to be one of the main intellectual contributors to the multilateral enterprise in the post-Cold War period. Oversaw dozens of projects and authored himself or edited a series of important books on the UN Security Council, on Iraq, on development policy, and notably on India, which is what brings him back to Brookings today. So we're delighted to have you, David.

David is going to present the book and the rationale, and the argument of the book for a few minutes, 15 minutes or so, and then we'll come to the panel, where he'll be joined by two of my colleagues here at Brookings. Steve Cohen, who you all know, a long time scholar on India and South Asia. Tanvi Madan, who runs our India Project here at Brookings. And Rani Mullen, who's an Associate Professor of Government at William & Mary, I'm delighted that she's joining us today.

So, David, over to you.

MR. MALONE: Thank you very much, Bruce, also co-panelists. Great to be with you, well each of them authors in the volume. This is the volume it's quite a big book and it was for those of us editing it, a wonderful adventure. But first, I'd like to say that there are people in the room I hugely admire

from whom I learnt a great deal as I was gearing up to start writing about India. And, of course, Steve was one of them, hugely admired in South Asia by all sorts of people.

And it's a great pleasure to be back here. I spent a year at Brookings in the Economic Studies Program 27 years ago, I realized. But it feels like yesterday because I had a great time and I learnt a great deal about how business is done in Washington, which is actually quite different from sleepy Ottawa, so an exciting period on my life. And the Economic Studies Program was going through a golden age at the time, and I benefited hugely from that.

I think you all know the Oxford Handbook Series. It's the flagship series of sort of selected essays on a given topic by authors and it's been quite successful I think commercial for OUP, hence there are more of them. They did a first generation of about 40 of them, and then decided to do a second wave. And early in the second wave, they noticed, because they publish a great deal in other formats, that books on India were selling quite well. And so they thought perhaps an Oxford Handbook on Indian foreign policy would, and the jury is out on whether it'll sell well or not. But, as I say, huge fun to work with.

Everybody's obsessed with data nowadays, so a bit of data. We have 50 chapters, 55 authors by my count, poor ratio of women overall, between 20% and 25%, I'm ashamed to report. But there's an exciting kicker to that statistic, amongst the young authors, because we had a particular focus on having young authors who were making their names, rather than exclusively big named people, amongst the young authors women are basically 50 and 50 with guys. So it tells you something about how things are changing, have changed, and I was very pleased to discover that the other day when doing a count of various things.

Reading Americans, or Canadians on India can be really rewarding, as I say I learnt a lot. But what matters ultimately is what Indians think. And so our authors, 44 of the 55 are either Indian, or of Indian extraction. And, again, that wasn't a coincidence. We didn't just go out and choose people at random when we were approaching friends and colleagues to write in the book. Many of you, well some of you may know that in 2007 a compilation of essays on Indian foreign policy was published by the Indian Foreign Service Institute, the very good training arm of the Indian Foreign Service. It was written nearly entirely by highly intelligent and very literate practitioners.

We reversed the ratio in this volume. We have only five or six people who are primarily practitioners and the rest are primarily academics and think tankers, although in this city of all cities people do go back and forth between those categories. So it's a book that aims to be fairly scholarly, although I'm sure we've failed in some respects.

I had two wonderful coeditors, both Indian, C. Raja Mohan, I think many of you know. Raj had been a friend of mine for a long time. I'd read him for years. We'd never actually worked together. And it's always a bit nerve-wracking when you decide to work with a friend, because it might wreck the friendship, but actually the reverse happened. And we're still speaking each other. He's an extraordinary figure. And a younger extraordinary figure, Srinath Raghavan, a standard bearer in a rising tide of brilliance young Indian historians. Some of whom are looking at the past of India's defense policies, strategic though, foreign policy, and Srinath is one of those. And he has a military background primarily in the past.

Funders of the project, interestingly the two principle ones were Canadian. One was the leading Canadian think tank on foreign policy, CIGI, which sits in the small town of Waterloo for reasons too complex to go into. And the other was IDRC this funder of research in the developing world that Bruce mentioned, which has a very large footprints in terms of support for researchers in South Asia, in all sorts of subjects.

The construct of the three editors, you need to have in a way a construct even for a compilation, is that the foreign policy of countries is nearly always shaped by three factors and there can be additional factors. The three factors are history, geography, and capability. Luxemburg may have a great deal of history, it certainly has very nice geography, but capability to alter the world scene fairly limited. So each of these important. And in the case of India we thought actually leadership both before independence and since independence, has been a very important factor that isn't always the case for countries. So there's quite a bit about leadership here.

I think a key idea was articulated by somebody who isn't an author in the book, but who's well known to nearly all of you. I think Pratap Bhanu Mehta, who in speaking to us said the great source of Indian power will be the power of example. And I think that is very important the way Indians think about their place in the world, their role in the world, and what one day perhaps already now gives them

access to power.

History, you all know India is a country of great civilizations over the millennia. A bit like a neighboring country, Iran, which has been quite lot in the news recently. And countries with a lot of great civilizations in their past tend to think differently of themselves than countries like Canada, which is about two years old. And whose aboriginal peoples have a long history, but the rest of us had suitcases when we arrived.

In the case of India, great civilizations have mattered. During this period when civilizations would generally flow into India from places beyond India's current borders, India demonstrated huge syncratic capacities, the capacity to internalize influence from invaders and traders of all sorts, which I think have served India very, very well indeed. Most of the influence and most of these waves of visitors, to put it one way, have come from the West. Not necessarily very far west, but they've come from the West. Whereas India's influence, until recently, has radiated mostly to the East through Buddhism, through Hinduism, and in a number of other ways. And when you live in Asia it helps to see India that way, because India's influence in Asia even where it's underdeveloped in the contemporary sphere, is often very, very deep in other spheres.

The colonial period was a disaster for India, as you well know. It was producing 17% to 20% of global GDP when the Brits arrived, 2% when they left. That's really all you need to know about The Raj, a project of naked economic exploitation, with some positive byproducts. But the foreigners tend to focus on the positive byproducts, rather than the underlying disaster for India. It was a disaster. And what this meant for Nehru and his generation is there was no capability when they came to power, or very little capability. One of the partings gifts of the Brits through administrative neglect was the Bengal Famine. India was still subject to famine is those years.

And by the way, one of the great advertisements for democracy is since 1947 many Indians have been hungry but there has never again been a famine.

So all this Raj nostalgia, you're welcome to it.

Now, I'm not going to go into the succession of India's leaders and how they differed and what they thought. I think some of you know much more about me, than that. But what's interesting as an observer of India, and India's intellectual life, at least in the English language, is how these figures are

constantly being reappraised in India, as well as outside India. So the way Nehru is seen today is probably much more complex, to some degree more sympathetic than the way it was 20 years ago. And the same could be said of virtually of India's historic leadership up to and including Indira Gandhi.

Enough about history, geography became most obvious for us when we thought of what really matters to India. And what really matters to India is its neighborhood, its geography, so to speak. And so quite a lot of chapters in the book are on the neighborhood. The Maldives didn't quite get a chapter, nor did Mauritius, important as Mauritius is in some spheres. But the neighborhood really predominates. That would not be news to Steve Cohen, but for those of us mapping out the book, rapidly that became clear.

We do deal with other partnerships, major partnerships. China is included, of course, in the neighborhood. Huge border between the two countries. The principle non neighborhood relationship is with the United States, and has been for quite a long time through a great deal of contention. But also a great deal of positive sentiment between the two countries, not least at the level of public opinion, which in India is very open to the United States, unless something truly dreadful is happening in the relationship.

The Russian Federation, I think Washington misread in many ways India's relationship with the Soviet Union. I doubt if Indira Gandhi would have signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, had it not been her only option as Pakistan was beginning to fall apart and India feared it might need great power of protection later in the year, which turned out to be true in terms of the UN's Security Council. I think Indians are grateful to the Soviet Union, and they're happy to have a partnership with the Russian Federation today, but I think neither of those two countries ever loomed as large in India as sometimes people in the West imagine. It's a very disputable personal view of that.

And a number of other countries are dealt with, including the European Union, which for Indians is a nice place to shop and have holidays, and occasionally receive some cultural impulse from, but really punches under its weight in India, I'd say much of Asia.

What can we say about India's capability at the global level? Well first it continues to be tied down too much by its neighborhood yet to be a full-blown global power. It has the potential to be a power of the first rank, but it's not there yet because if you look at how Delhi spends its time, a lot of it is on the Maldives, on Nepal, on China, big and important economically and important in every other way

neighbor, Pakistan, and there's just not that much bandwidth for the rest of the world. And until there is more bandwidth for the rest of the world beyond soccer stadiums adulating the current Prime Minister, India's power will remain circumscribed. But it's a much more welcome, meaningful power globally than it would have been 30 or 40 years ago.

I'm going to stop there except to note that book ending, the essays, are a number of chapters that I think are quite interesting on theory relevant to India's foreign policy on the literature of India's foreign policy by Steve's great student, Kanti Bajpai, and two very good concluding essays one of them by your recent neighbor down the street, Sunil Khilnani. So I think the book is worth the price of admission just for those chapters, but it would be for any of the chapters of those who follow me. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. JONES: Okay, David, thank you. Let me bring in the other panelists. I'm going to start with you, Rani. David, quoted Pratap in saying that the great source of Indian power will be the power of example. It's a kind of classic argument for soft power, do you agree?

MS. MULLEN: Thank you, Bruce, and thank you, David. So India's capability. I want to thank, first of all David for not only editing the whole book, but editing my particular chapter which went through many rounds on India's soft power. India's soft power and its Indian capability is not just determined by India's hard power. I think here in Washington, particular, there tends to be disproportionate focus on security, and India's hard power, but increasingly India's foreign policies drawing a perception of its rising soft power, the power to entice, to influence, to attract other governments. And it's important to look at this issue because in the 21st century the use of hard power for geostrategic, economic gains, is often just too costly for countries like India.

Using soft power tools on countries like Sri Lanka, Cambodia, or even in countries in Africa, where India just can't hope to compete with the deep pockets of China, make rational sense. India engages in these tools by appealing to common culture, highlighting the contributions of its diaspora, but also through new tools such as its increasing development assistance program.

If Indian soft power India soft power and its power to attract is effective, it should open other countries to Indian viewpoints. Indian soft power is then about the attraction of the country's culture, political values, and foreign policy. Culture, well you're probably all familiar with Bollywood, Yoga, and

Indian icons such as Gandhi.

On political values, I think it is important to note that India is the world's largest democracy, and it was a democracy when other countries like Brazil and South Africa were ruled by authoritarian governments. The appeal of Indian democracy to other developing counties is great, because it bucks the conventional wisdom that countries have to be of a particular economic level for democracy to endure. It is then a more relevant feasible, democratic example than other high-income countries for much of the developing world.

But it's on foreign policy that my chapter focused. Foreign policies both a soft power resource, as well as an instrument for leveraging India's soft power. It is in this area where the Indian government has started to foster its soft power cards more systematically, as seen by the recent India Africa Forum in New Delhi, where India hosted over 40 heads of African states.

One of the tools of Indian soft power has been Indian development cooperation, which in the last dozen years has quadrupled in dollar terms. But it has indeed increased even more in purchasing power parity terms, if we think about it in those terms. And just to give you an example there of why soft power matters, in Afghanistan India is the fifth largest donor. Afghanistan is India's second largest recipient of foreign aid. And it is in Afghanistan where India's widely popular without having to flex a hard power muscle.

The Ministry of External Affairs has set up a public diplomacy division in 2006. It has also set up a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs about a decade ago, starting to court diaspora more systematically. There is a marketing of India campaign through the Incredible India Campaign. So India has soft power in many developing countries where India's status as a consolidated democracy, as a growing economy, has great pull. But it also has a pull because India's a country that is increasingly using its soft power to highlight the unequal allocation of power in places like the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN Security Council. Which makes India, I think, an attractive development paradigm.

But Indian foreign policy often lacks coherence and has significant capacity constraints. The favorite, I think, in policy circle, the favorite number to highlight there is that India's Ministry of External Affairs has less personnel than Singapore's and actually has less also than the US Embassy in Delhi. So these constraints need to be addressed. And addressing them with be key

to bolstering India's soft power tools and thereby India's soft power appeal. Thanks.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much. I have to say listening to you, and listening to you describe the kind of features of Indian soft power, one of the things that struck me is that the power it thus most emulates is the EU which David described as a place that Indians don't bother to care about other than to shop. So it'll be interesting to kind of tease that out.

Steve, the question of geography, your thoughts from your comments, and if you can answer this question, too, when one of your neighbors is China, is there a meaningful distinction between being focused on your neighborhood and being focused on global affairs?

MR. COHEN: I promise just three sentences, so they'll be long sentences. (Laughter) But let me acknowledge Ambassador Howard Schaffer's presence. Howie was the first American Foreign Service Officer I ever met and we were attending the 1964 Annual Congress Party Meeting, which was the nuclear meeting where a lot of ideas were discussed, and I met a lot of people there, including Krista Men and Casey Pon and others who later on either had or would influence policy, so glad Ambassador Schaffer's here.

Let me just sort of make three large points. First, the idea of South Asia is a new one that is the term South Asia is a new one. It was first introduced in India in the '60s both School of International Studies, and Rajasthan University. But the idea of South Asia goes back to the Mughals, not to the British, but to the Moguls. The Mughals called it Hindustan. It was a 600-year gap between the Guptas and the Mughals, but the Mughals ran a diplomacy which interacted with the Ottomans, with the Turks, with the Arabs, and with the Chinese, based in northern India. Their ultimate goal was to get back to Central Asia where they came from, but they never made that. So in a sense South Asia was created by the Mughals. The British ruled in the name of the Mughal Empire. They collected taxes. They raised an army, all in service of the Mughals.

Then when the British left, they portioned South Asia. It was one of the great human tragedies, or strategic tragedies of history. Because at the same time the Americans had unified China by defeating the Japanese. So between two years, '45 and '47, '47, '49, '50, India was divided and China had the potential for unification and that's where we are now. So China is a single entity, India is a divided entity between two powerful states, both of them nuclear.

So both India and Pakistan claimed legitimacy in the mantel of the British Raj, and also the Mughal Empire, which makes it difficult for outside powers to manage relations with either of them. So our relations, American relations, of China, of the Russians, and others have been basically expedient. You work with the bigger power, which is usually India, but sometimes the smaller power, Pakistan, is more useful especially say in Afghanistan where both during the Reagan Administration before containing the Soviet Union and containing China. So in a sense, outside powers have been frustrated by the relationship with India and with Pakistan.

The India Pakistan dispute is analogous to that of Israel and Palestine. That is it's an intractable conflict. It's gone on for 25 years, 50 years, it's gone on, it will go on for another 50 years I think unless something dramatic happens. And I don't see any way it can be solved, except perhaps through the emergence of a greater threat to both pairs. And the great threat could be really radical Islamic extremism, which seems to be troubling the Pakistanis now after a long period of toleration of these groups. And of course India, and of course Israel, and the modern Arab states. But that's an optimistic assumption.

Otherwise, they're divided in terms of state identity, territorial disputes, e.g., Kashmir. But they're united in some ways, that is they both have a shared interest in economic development. Of course it's the least integrated region in the world economically, so I think the economic development of both countries and the region is frustrated because of that. And also they're both nuclear weapon states, and that was they're united in their interest to be nuclear weapon states, and that's another interest of America in South Asia.

So I don't see any major change in the geography of the region. It's gonna be the former Hindustan divided. So Indian power is Indian power, whatever that might be soft or hard, minus Pakistani power, and I think that's the way it's going to be in the inevitable future. And since Pakistan does not want to become West Bangladesh, I see that going on essentially forever. Thank you.

MR. JONES: Just one sentence on China. How do you think about the Indian China relationship in these terms?

MR. COHEN: Well, you know, the Chinese certainly are now a South Asian power, whether the Indians like it or not, they're imbedded in South Asia. India used to have that role in China.

India was a major power in Tibet. It had trade and military missions all over China, now the Chinese have trade and military missions all over South Asia. So in a sense, if you want to deal with South Asia, you're gonna have to deal with China as well as India.

MR. JONES: Tanvi, your chapter exists as the intersection between capacity and leadership. So say a few words about which you think is the more important factor in India foreign policy now.

MS. MADAN: I think, I mean we're seeing this with Prime Minister Modi's government, leadership is a necessary but not sufficient condition. He has very ambitious goals for Indian foreign policy, but at the end of the day, not just in terms of formulation, but very importantly in terms of coordination and implementation, that capacity. And not just in the Foreign Ministry or the Prime Minister's office, which have been seen as the traditional venues for kind of foreign policy formulation and some people have even seen it in terms of implementation, but across the board, across the ministries.

My chapter looks at -- it's called Officialdom, South Block, and beyond South Block being where the Prime Minister's office and the Foreign Ministry's housed. And the reason that I cover all these ministries is that they are now in an essential part of foreign policy making, not just for Prime Minister Modi, but over the last kind of I'd say couple of decades, you see how there's been a blurring of kind of what I call vertical and horizontal policy making lines, where you see it's very hard to kind of separate what are foreign policy issues and domestic issues, but also across ministries. So you see this including when leaders have tried to kind of, if you look at any bilateral relationship, or any global issue, you see this kind of blurring of these lines. You see the number of ministries involved whether it's the Finance Ministry, even the Home Ministry, which you wouldn't think would necessarily be involved, but is, as well as the Intelligence Agencies, the Ministry of Defense, the Energy Ministries.

And I think one thing that you see in a good signs of this, if you look at any joint statement, bilateral joint statement whether it's the statement Prime Minister Modi's in Brittan right now, but also if you look at the U.S. India joint statement from earlier this year, just the sheer number, there is a laundry list of not just activities, but also the number of ministries and agencies involved in both sides. And I think that's a good reflection. Another reflection in terms of implementation for Indian foreign policy, is that the fact the Indian Embassy in the U.S. now has, and has for a while, has more members of the

Indian government who are non-Foreign Service officers, than it does Foreign Service officers -- and the reason capacity is going to be essential, and I think as Rani pointed out, there are serious constraints, is because of something Ambassador Malone did, which is the bandwidth issue. Not just in terms of if you look at just the sheer ambition of how many relationships, not just the neighborhood as Steve and Ambassador Malone pointed out being important, but also trying to get beyond it. And capacity will be key along with leadership.

So the chapter covers capacity as a major constraint. What's been interesting is we have seen, and we could talk about it in discussion, this government take that on very much head-on, realizing of course that even to kind of implement the leadership, and Steve always says implementation, implementation, implementation when it comes to India, and capacity I think is key, as much as leadership is.

MR. JONES: David, I want to ask you two things. I want to ask you if you have any thoughts or comments on points that your co-panelists have raised. And I want to also ask you the following. You now live in Tokyo, so you're in the other Asian power, which is worried and obsessed by its own region as China's shadow grows. And I'm just curious what you see in the texture of the comparison or indeed in the relationship? It was one of Modi's first big visits was to Abe. And maybe you just have some reflections on working on either side of China.

MR. MALONE: Great. Well thank you very much. I'd like to echo Steve on Tezi and Howard Schaffer who have done so much to education me and others. And I'm delighted to hear they have a book of their own coming out soon that I can now look forward to amongst many other things they've written. I think what we see in the care China takes with India relative to how rude it can be with Japan, a sense that in China they can afford to be as rude as they like with Japan, but they can't with India.

So I think the only real competition into the future in Asia that China needs to worry about beyond the United States of course, which is an Asian power of a sort, is India. And it must be in a sense exasperating for Prime Minister Abe to see that Chairman Xi and others do, while occasionally denouncing the errors of India's ways, treat India with kid gloves relative to how some other Asian powers are treated.

Your so right about Modi and Abe, they got to know each other when Abe was very much out of power after a failed term as Prime Minister. He's an extraordinary politician. He ran a campaign based on, I was a terrible Prime Minister, I learned a lot. I'll be a better one this time. More politicians should try it. He was massively elected. And he has been a much better Prime Minister this time. He's a master of parliamentary politics. And it may be that actually Prime Minister Modi could learn something from him in that respect. Because Prime Minister Modi is going to have to be dealing with an upper chamber he cannot dominate for many years to come. So I don't know what they talk about, these two gentlemen, when they meet, but that's something they could discuss.

In all of this I think I used to hear from people fantasies that India would align with the United States against China or some other power, but usually it was China. I think there's no reason why India would do that. If I were India that would not strike me as a brilliant strategy. Because ultimately there's a limit to what the United States can do to help India in its sometimes fraught relationship with China. I think where this is quite a lot of overlapping interest is in how security in Asia will be managed in the future.

So I think the two countries will discuss that a great deal. I hope we'll cooperate quite a lot on it. I think that in itself will be of interest to China, and will be something China will need to deal with. But the idea that the United States could do much to solve India's bilateral challenges with China, I think was always a bit optimistic perhaps.

MR. JONES: Tanvi, how do you see it? I mean you spent a lot of time looking at the U.S. India relationship, as well U.S. India China relationship, how does the United States see India as a hard or soft power in Asia?

MS. MADAN: I think it's interesting, especially vis-à-vis China. I think both those elements play a role. And I'd say there are broadly four imperatives for the U.S. relationship with India. One is strategic, especially in the context of the rise of China in Asia and globally, but not just because of that, kind of India's potential role on the global stage.

I say the second imperative is very much economic.
The hope that this kind of potential turns into performance, even already in the last 15 years much has changed, sees India as a market, but also now as a source of capital and skill, and potentially even

technology. The third element, to me, and I think this is where the kind of soft power element plays out quite directly, and is almost enshrined in U.S. policy, is kind of the values based thing, and it's not just kind of the democracy thing, I think it goes back to what Pratap calls the power of example. Which is the concept, and this actually goes back to the Eisenhower Administration that if India, a democratic India can develop and succeed rather than have to go to expensive and sometimes futile democracy promotion exercises, there's nothing like a rising India, a democratic India, that will show through the power of example that democracies can succeed as well. And I think that's been kind of a key element in terms of therefore you saw the statement of kind of even the Indians saying that the U.S. is a principle partner in India's rise. That they've acknowledged that role, there will be a key role in terms of helping.

And I think finally there is a political element, I think for President Obama, if he can leave the relationship as good as it is today and even better next year that will be a key foreign policy legacy of his administration. But I think the kind of soft power element is very much there. You see it in NSC statements. You see it in speeches. China's never mentioned. But it's always there in the background, and you see this in they've got a joint strategic vision on the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean, which talks about India's role and the U.S. and India's partnership. I don't think necessarily that many Indians expect when push comes to show the U.S. will necessarily do anything for India. If it's in U.S. interest they do. But I think in some ways the U.S. relationship with India and how the U.S. has seen India has both benefited India's relations with China and Japan. You'll have foreign ministry officials say that Beijing and Tokyo take us more seriously because Washington does.

MR. JONES: Rani, before we go to the audience, let me just go back to the question of soft power. I'm partly thinking of our colleague, Subir Gokarn, who's just been announced as the Executive Director for India at the IMF. And I'm wondering what advice you would give him around the following issue. You know you talked about India's soft power example being particularly salient in developing countries, and modelling or sort of taking the lead on the charge of the unequal distribution of power. China played that game for a while, but relatively quickly found that it's essentially impossible to simultaneously sort of model, or to lead the global south on the one hand, and push hard in the kind of clubs of hard power, not of hard power, but in the kind of top power clubs. And it's very hard to do those two things. And China's sort of pretty rapidly moved away from that stance. And so I just wonder how

you see that tension in Indian foreign policy?

MS. MULLEN: Well I think it perhaps also speak to Chinese soft power relative to Indian soft power, the question there.

MS. JONES: It's not quite as soft, is it? (Laughter)

MS. MULLEN: Exactly. Or its hard power. I actually think that India's strategy is starting to gain momentum in terms of the recent India Africa economic forum, where there was a clear sort of understanding that a slew of trades, education, all kinds of further negotiations and MOUs signed with African countries in exchange for African countries pushing the issue of India not having a security council seat so far, right. So pushing India's agenda there.

So I think that some of that is working. It's not going to happen overnight. And I think if we here in the U.S. don't think more strategically about, is it in our interest to have a BRICS bank, having been formed. Because that was an outcome of us not thinking strategically about IMF reallocations. And we'll see whether the new development bank based in China will have much pull. But I think there are indications that unless some of these institutions reform, China, India, and other rising powers will go and form their own institutions.

I just wanted to comment a bit on the issue on India's relationship with Japan. India has just started borrowing pretty heavily from Japan, about $8 billion annually. Four times as much as it borrows from the World Bank. So I think there's this closer alliance between India and Japan, a possible India, Japan, U.S. alliance to counter some of Chinese dominance in the Indian Ocean and South China Seas, I think is important to keep in mind.

But I think there is also weariness on the U.S. side when the U.S. forges ahead with the TPP, for example. And what I heard, you know, many a times, I was based in India for four years until last year, was we have not been invited to TPP. And if we are such an important partner why are we not being asked to join that alliance?

MR. JONES: David, think back to your time at the Council, and you've watched India on the global stage and from a variety of perspectives, how as that evolved, and does the UN matter to Indian foreign policy at this stage?

MR. MALONE: I think it matters symbolically. And Indians are very good at working the

UN system. They've sent a number of very good people to the UN often very different from each other. And so I think the seat does matter to them. I don't think any new permanent members will get a veto that may be a problem for India. Would it prefer to be a permanent member, but a second-class one, or would it prefer not be a permanent member? That's something Delhi will have to think about when the time comes. But I think it's an accomplished multilateral actor.

That being said, on something Rani mentioned just now, one reason perhaps not to have invited India to the TPP is that Indian negotiators particularly economic and trade negotiators often over negotiate, don't know when to declare a victory. And wreck even the best intentioned negotiating processes which are often bilateral. So I think India needs t be more strategic about what it wants. And when it wants the big prize, be prepared to comprise in small ways, which the rest of us do all the time. But I think doesn't come naturally to Indian trade negotiators.

MR. JONES: Great. Well let's open it up and go to the room. Tezi, you wanted to kick us off.

MS. SCHAFFER: Thank you, Bruce, and thank you Steve and David for the shout-out. Yes, Howey and I have a book coming out, Brookings Press, hopefully in the spring which draws quite extensively on our relationships with the people on the stage. And against that background I wanted to pick up kind a package of themes that have come up. The power of example, the question of soft power, and how India works the multilateral organizations.

First point soft power, I'm not sure where the size of India's economy fits in your typology of soft versus hard. But it has become a consequential part of India's international persona whatever label you give it. And that's implicit in what you've said, but I wanted to put it on the table. The power of example, as I think it was imagined in the early days when India had relatively few other sources of power, is something that isn't altogether a fact or nowadays, and may have been more of a factor in the heyday of the nonaligned movement and so on.

The examples that Tanvi cited of India as a successful democracy, for example, these are things that have been very meaningful in the minds of Americans dealing with India. My perception is that India has not seen democracy as an export product. And as a practical matter, in our bilateral relationship, both democracies have probably created more problems than they've solved. Simply

because of the politics of many of the things that would solve foreign policy problems between them.

The UN in a sense is an exercise in India's soft power except when India sees a result coming down the pike that it really, really doesn't want, at which point it's very good at just saying no. But I think I see India as perhaps a little bit less effective on the UN scene than David's description. I know that David has accurately characterized both the good and the bad in their negotiating style multilaterally, but it's interesting to me that twice India's Security Council campaign got in the view of Ministry of External Affairs, within striking distance of succeeding. And in the end, they had a lot of countries that were willing to say, "Yes, yes, you should be there," but were not willing to vote that way.

They succeeded in their campaign to get an Indian Commonwealth Secretary General, and that was in the language of American politics, that was a retail campaign. He did a lot of traveling. His staff did a lot of traveling. They went all over Africa. They collected votes. Is the African India forum going to work that way? Is this, amongst other things, not exclusively part of a long game to get India into the big leagues? Where I think Bruce is absolutely right, that they will face a tension between how you play in the great power game, and how you play in the third-world game. Also, where they face the dilemma that when they're on the Security Council permanently or temporarily, they face a lot of situations where whatever position they take is going to annoy somebody they care about not annoying.

So I think there are a lot of interesting issues on the table, but inevitably in a compressed timeframe like this, I think there's probably more barnacles on the issues than our speakers have lucidly elaborated.

MR. JONES: Do you want to start by highlighting some barnacles?

MR. MALONE: Yes. I'd say one of the reasons India's interest in a permanent seat in the Security Council has been frustrated is directly to do with China. China by blackballing Japan, indirectly blackballs the other candidates for a permanent seat. So it's a sort of twofer. It doesn't even need to mention India, it just blocks the whole game. And it did that in large part through something that Rani has mentioned a couple of times, China's very engaged Africa diplomacy.

When something is about to occur at the UN that China doesn't like, it campaigns in Africa and with Africans with an energy not seen since the Cold War years anywhere else. So I think that has been the primary cause there.

I think there is a long term difference though. I think to the extent the Security Council goes on being meaningful, which may not be the case by the way indefinitely, Brazil and India will eventually get permanent seats if they want them. Who else might get permanent seats, probably an African country, isn't entirely clear. Because the industrialized North, which has been in nonstop crisis since 2007 roughly, is overrepresented on the council already. So one of the difficulties in making the face for Japan or Germany is enough already of these not so rich, rich countries.

MS. MULLEN: Yeah, that's a good question, I think. I think it depends. I think it can be both. Whether it's used coercively the issue with Nepal currently at the border, the question of whether India's stronger might and its economy, or is it used through persuasion by offering trade possibilities, greater interaction also through India development cooperation.

So I think India's rising economic power, if it's an example, I think then it is a soft power example. You know, I was struck a few years ago when I was living in India, Ishrat Husain, who I used to work at the World Bank, and who was my director there, and of course he went under Musharraf back to a cabinet position there, gave a talk in Delhi and he said we in Pakistan would like nothing better than to hitch our bandwagon to India's economic growth. And I thought, "Wow, that's quite a change for a Pakistani to say that they're very much looking at India and India as economic growth, and want to be part of that."

So if it's an example and persuasive example, I think there's the soft power pull there.

This continuing tension of how does India play the game. And I sort of glossed over, I think there are actually differences in India's ability to and willingness to pursue getting greater say so in the IMF and the World Bank versus the UN. Because of course what is the alternative to the UN? There isn't any, right. There's no other possibility for India. Whereas, you know, if the IMF and the U.S. in particular, continues to not reallocate the reallocations that were promised five years ago, India's just going to start joining other forums. It's going to go to Japan and borrow money. And it is already doing that. And that will make the IMF, the World Bank, increasingly irrelevant.

So there is a different kind of game it's actually playing with some of these international institutions.

MS. MADAN: Just a couple of things. Both kind of the UN, but also India's role. And I

agree with Rani that India will kind of go not -- I think they'll be supplemental forums. It won't be kind of replacement. But just on the UN point, Tezi, it's been quite interesting to watch what they've done over the last year and a half. Modi's visits abroad get a lot of attention. The few things that don't get -- I mean there's always kind of when a permanent member of the Security Council endorses, or kind of doesn't endorse the idea of India as a permanent member that gets attention. But what's been really interesting is the number of countries he's actually in some way engaged in, or somebody senior in the Indian government has. And if you look at every statement that comes out, there is always a sense that India's pushing not just for support at the UN, so you see endorsements of that. But at places like the nuclear suppliers group, people barely notice this when Modi went to Canada, on the way he stopped for a one-day visit in Ireland, or it was a like a day and a half. And the two kind of takeaways was support for India's seat at the Security Council and NSG membership. You see him meeting with the kind of the South Pacific Islands group, and so slowly kind of making that a campaign of being part of it.

And the additional aspect of it has been, and you've seen this government highlight both explicitly and implicitly you can say that it's exaggerated or it's not, but the ways India has contributed to the global order in the past. Not just today, but going back to the First World War and the Second World War, et cetera. The idea being to say you guys keep saying we're free riders, we haven't been. This is the way we've been contributing. And I think Modi has addressed this quite explicitly in Paris. He said we are not going to beg. And if you don't find a way to kind of make sure we get a voice, we'll go and find places that will.

The other thing that's interesting to me, is who they have named as the next permanent rep at the UN, a very active Foreign Service Officer, close to the leadership. This is not gonna go away. It's gonna be a major area where they make a push, whether it's for a Security Council seat or a greater voice. I will just say one thing on the multilateral thing, I would say that we should now look at this kind of break it down, because there is not one-size-fits all in terms of how India's dealing with. I think trade has been very different, because it involves domestic political elements that some of the others don't. You've seen a change on the climate change side. You've seen it in cyber governance. You've seen it in terms of regional security and the role India's willing to play. So it has, I think a little bit moved on from just saying no. Perhaps I think trade is the one hold out. And one of the things I think it's interesting that

Indians will often say it hasn't been invited to the TPP, it doesn't want to be part of -- it won't want to be part of the TPP because it can't meet those standards. So I think that's one of the aspects. At the moment they're working towards APEC membership. I think TPP is a step too far at the moment.

MR. JONES: Steve, is Pakistan going to hitch its economic wagon to India?

MR. COHEN: To India, it would like to. But I think I've read a memo done in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which hasn't come out yet, and the memo argues that China should support India in the UN Security Council, excluding Japan. But if India accepted Pakistan as a member of the nuclear suppliers group. That would advance Chinese interests, it would advance Indian interest, it would advance Pakistani interest. Actually it would advance American interest. But I can't tell you where I saw the memo.

MR. JONES: Let's take a few questions and then we'll come back to this. Let's take these two over here.

MS. CARTIE: My name is Frantica Cartie. I'm a researcher for International Conflict Management Initiative. I do not know if you have brought the issues of India foreign policy to South Asia or Southeast Asia, because in the past India was very actively engaged with Southeast Asia states or Asian states for the meaningful control, you know, closer relationship you can see strong Indian culture in Burma and in other country, but I would like to bring up a country which is Indonesia. Indonesia is so much political and economy and cultural relationship with Indonesia through the founder of Indonesia President Sukarno, and friendship with President Nehru and they're affiliated actively with nonalignment movement and many other things.

And now with the rising of China aggression, and South China Sea, it brought up India into the danger, I don't know. And my analysis is that China aggression in maritime that will taking the way how to enter the Indian Ocean through Indonesia, I know. And now it's my question is what sort of hard power that you can give, how to elevate India, Indonesia diplomacy and stronger relationship so then India and Indonesia would be partnership, especially in the security sector and economy sector, as well as inside Indonesia now is very much with the China influence? Thank you.

MR. JONES: Gentleman right beside you.

QUESTIONER: Hi there. My name is Strimonka Genmis with the American University. I

had two questions first of all Modi element has been in this Middle East policy very much hedged towards Israel and has kind of ignored other big powers in the region when it comes to bilateral visits or engagement. So with India being very much with Israel right now, changed from the previous government, does that affect India's opposition in the region, and possibly when it comes to pay out again some country like China, I mean Saudi Arabia, Iran, the other Middle Eastern countries have not seen as much as an engagement as India has seen with Israel. So how does India's position in the region get affected by that?

And the second question that I wanted to bring up that when it comes to space politics, I think India has made a lot of strides in the recent past, and it has increasingly been seen like a partner for many countries for space research and information technology. How can India exploit that position to become a power that is being reckoned as something where we can cooperate with when it comes to launching satellites, information technology on climate change, and also the main thing is increasing global communication? So how does the role of space politics play in India's role in the world today? Thank you.

MR. JONES: There was one more on this side of the room, so let's.

QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Chu Jung Hwa. I'm a recent graduate from George Washington University. My question is for our panelists is do you think India really have a specific and clear soft power agenda? Or is it just a byproduct from the rising economy, perceived by many as a soft power? For example, India there's no specific institutions as in change of public diplomacy, like [inaudible] China. Second, it doesn't seem to have a consistency in its foreign policy to its neighborhood, for example, toward Nepal. What's happening, like the relationship between Nepal and India is totally public diplomacy disasters. So do you think there's a specific agenda for soft power? Or just it's because of this rising economy that perceived by many as a soft power? Thanks.

MR. MALONE: Great. Well on Nepal, I'd say it's a country I have a real interest in, like several in the room. I think you know Nepal India relations go up and down. If you look at it over a 50-, 60-year period, say since 1950, there are these accesses of fever in the relationship and then finally they calm down. Partly because India doesn't want Nepal to turn to China. But also because Nepal can't really turn to China. Tibet really is still a very significant barrier for a very close multidimensional

relationship between China. I mean a geographic barrier with China.

So it actually has developed, and I think Rani documents this in here chapter, a number of new instruments to market, so to speak, it's soft power. They aren't you're quite right, as well endowed or as ambitious as China's, but actually India hasn't been asleep at the switch at all on soft power. And one of its great champions in India, who's actually the Chair of the Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee in the Parliament in India, is Shashi Tharoor, who has always harped on soft power as a very good theme for India.

On Mr. Modi and Israel, I think you're right. I think there's been a strong accent on Israel, but by the way, India can't afford to have negative relations with the Gulf countries from Iran, Saudi Arabia to some of the smaller Emirates. Why? Two things, oil, which it desperately needs from the Gulf. Secondly, there are so many Indian workers in the Gulf that it has every interest in maintaining good relations with those countries. So while it may seem at times to tilt in one direction or the other, that's often the serendipity of who's visiting who at a given time. Because actually Riyal politic dictates for India, and it's had a very skilled Middle East policy, I would argue, that it needs to maintain good relations with just about everybody in that region so critical to its economic development and its history.

MS. MADAN: Just a couple of things in the Middle East and the Southeast Asia, I agree with Ambassador Malone, and I think you might want to go and look at not only what the previous government did in terms of Israel, it was in the last ten years of the ten years the UPA government that Israel became India's third largest defense supplier in which trade shot up. In which agricultural, business, and kind of water technology cooperation shot up as well. The difference was that they did it under the radar. I think what Mr. Modi's government had done is essentially bring the relationship with Israel out into the open, do much more high-level visits.

But remember the Modi government has also pretty much de facto recognized Palestine. They held the first ever Foreign Office consultations with Palestine. He met with Mahmoud Abbas. He's also, as Ambassador Malone said, Indian policy has been fairly consistent. They have maintained relations with Israel. They've maintained relations with Iran. And then maintained relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. That's something that's fairly consistent. Mr. Modi went out to the Emirates and it was a very prominent visit. So I'd say that they've actually been quite active. And Iran

even moving ahead on the Chabahar.

Just in Southeast Asia, I think it is a major focus. I don't think they are actually trying to act East. One of the complaints that the Southeast Asians always had, as you probably know, is that India never showed up. That's one place where they have actually you've seen visits from whether the President, Vice President, or the Prime Minister to Indonesia, to Singapore already, to Brunei, to Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar as well. Prime Minister Modi will be going out to Malaysia for the EAS and the India ASEAN Summits. But also then going to Singapore for a key bilateral visit. I would look out for his speech that he gives there in terms of India's vision towards Southeast Asia, but also the India Singapore Partnership. So it is going to be a major part.

The problem for India with Southeast Asia, is more that while strategically there's a lot going on, maybe bilaterally India is not part of the regional economic picture in Asia. It's not part of supply chains. It's not in TPP. So there is going to be a disconnect. So that's something they're gonna have to be working on.

MS. MULLEN: There is quite a bit happening, I think between India and Southeast Asian countries. And I think the recent island building in the South China Seas has highlighted the common interests, also on the security front between countries like Indonesia and India.

On the foreign aid, the Development Partnership front, there's quite a bit happening between India and Vietnam, for example. We just don't hear about it as much over here. India's pushing its relationships also in terms of service sector agreements with ASEAN, so I think under the Modi Administration, particular there has been a turn eastward, because to some degree, and I think some of the panelists might disagree here, I think India has just sort of given up on looking westward, because of that never-ending complicated relationship, and sees that economic growth and trade and relationships to the east are in many ways more important to India's future in terms of India's economic growth.

So I think there is quite a bit happening and there are common areas of interests with many of the Southeast Asian countries there.

On Modi and Israel, I think Tanvi's already mentioned I think it's key to remember that Israel has become a key defense supplier to India. But India has also it works on several different fronts. It has had a strong relationship with Iran, for example. Iran strategically important for India in terms of

getting in and out of Afghanistan. It's building up the Chabahar port there. So a multifaceted relationship with the Middle East. But this question of whether India has shied away from the big issues really, right?

It's one thing to use your soft power bilaterally to address issues of how do you have easier visa exchange regimes, quite another when it comes to issues of sovereignty and taking a stance on R2P and other important issues. And I think that's where we're going to see is India really going to be able to leverage its soft power, but big power you have to have big responsibilities that come with that. And we'll see how India addresses some of these issues.

Does India have an agenda? How does it use its soft power? I think the relationship with its neighborhood is complicated, as Steve had mentioned. It's the least economically integrated region in the world. And the current relationship and exchange with Nepal, of course, has been difficult, but it's also had a difficult relationship with Bangladesh, and never the less we saw this past summer they were able to have this historic enclave's exchange agreement. And that will do much for security and opening up of trade on the India Bangladesh border. So not to say that there aren't issues, but I think a focus more on bettering its relationship with its eastern neighbors, some of which I point in my chapter, you know, Myanmar and there I had some feedback also from David, it's not always been a straight forward relationship. So much soft power that India could have leveraged and yet it chose to play the Riyal politic card rather than building on its own power of democracy in its relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi and her family. So a complex relationship I think with its neighborhood and the region. But I think there's much going on that we just don't hear about here in the press.

MR. JONES: Steve?

MR. COHEN: I don't have much to add, except to say that the Chinese built their first railroad in Africa in the 1960s. So it's not a new development. And the Chinese see this kind of technology as revolutionary. And soft power is going to be carried on railroad tracks. The Indians lag behind that both internally and externally. And until India can figure out a way of accommodating Pakistan, can't destroy of it because of the nuclear factor, this interrelationship between technology and power will be really critical and in China's favor. Although the Chinese have discovered when they do show up after a few years they're not beloved anymore. So in a sense that India often gets countries on the rebound, I'd say, especially Myanmar.

MR. JONES: Okay. Last round, so I'm going to take questions on this side of the room. Come to you, then to you. And then we'll come back, take one more come back.

QUESTIONER: My name is (Vikay Gogia 1:15:09). The question is for Rani. I think you mentioned about soft power, and gave an example of soft power, and one of them you mentioned is the value of Gandhi. Could you elaborate on that, what do you mean by this really in terms of a soft power which India can use? And the second, some examples of hard power really, I think which could be used by India but have not been used. Maybe it is the capacity issue, but again, some examples of those would be appreciated.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: My name's Paul Zimmerman. I lived and worked in India during the early years of Independence and have visited many times since. Dr. Malone you referred to The Raj as a case of economic exploitation and I think that's correct. However, do you not think that the British are responsible for the beginnings of some improvements in India such as infrastructure, railroads, telephone, and realizing early on that they, the Brits, could not govern this country completely, this massive country from Delhi and so started immediately to train Indians to take charge of local matters such as via the IAS.

And Dr. Cohen, you referred very strictly to the

fact that you felt that partition was a tragedy, how did you arrive at that conclusion with which many Pakistanis would not agree?

MR. JONES: Okay. One last question, the back.

QUESTIONER: Hello, my name is (Acrediva Sridiva 1:16:53. I am a researcher at the (Stensom 1:16:55) Center. We've spoken a lot today about the power of example. So I'm wondering if democratic values is something that India wants to export, why haven't we been more active on democracy promotion? I mean we've done a few things helping countries with know-how on electoral policies, and like helping Afghanistan build its parliament building. But haven't we been more active?

MR. JONES: Okay. Let's go from Steve across and give David the final world.

MR. COHEN: I said that partition was a strategic tragedy. And I learned this from field marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck and others who argue that the division of the Indian Army was a strategic tragedy, because it dividing Indian power between India and Pakistan. Indian power is Indian power minus that of Pakistan. Meanwhile the Americans were busy defeating the Japanese which enabled

China to be unified. So it was a strategic tragedy. And it shifted the whole balance of power in Asia.

From an Indian perspective, or from a Pakistani perspective, partition was desirable but not necessary. Had Jinnah been made Prime Minister of an independent India, united India, I think everybody would have been content. Which was the offer that was on the table. But some people in Congress vetoed that. So in a sense I think, are Pakistanis better off not being a part of India than being part of India? Well that's debatable and I think in many ways they're not. Because they've been under military power, military rule for most of their history. (BRM Veckar 1:18:22) the untouchable schedule cast politician, was in favor or Pakistan. You can find his books in Pakistan, not in India. And Veckar argued that get the Punjabi Muslims out of India because they would dominate whatever state they were in. And it turns out they are dominating Pakistan.

MR. JONES: Rani.

MS. MULLEN: Well I think Gandhi and South Africa his time there, he still has great influence I think not only influencing Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King, but the continued idea that power is not only about hard power and you can drive large colonial powers away by persuasion and your example, civil disobedience, nonviolent civil disobedience. On the question of power of example and why is India not using more active in democracy promotion, I think this is really a question I struggle with, because it has so much to offer in that, but when push came to shove with Myanmar, for example, it did not use that power adequately.

I think we will see more clashes on this issue as India's Riyal politic of wanting to obtain a UN Security Council seat clashes with its ideas that -- or trying to build up relationships with other countries that might be under authoritarian rule, but vis-à-vis its relationship with China. So I think we'll see more of that. I think it's unfortunate that India has not promoted its democracy because it is such a persuasive example I think in many ways. Not that is a great example, it's a messy example. From issues of corruption to the government not working very well, and not being able to pass bills. But I think it's an example that many developing countries can relate to. That here's a country that for 68 years most of the time has been a democracy, and has been able to come through and has seen its economy in the last decade or so, in particular do quite well. So I think it has much to offer on the soft power front. It has severe capacity constraints and actually marshalling those examples.

MR. JONES: I'll use the occasion to do a little advertising. You should look soon for a book by Ted Piccone, who's here, a book that looks at the emerging powers India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, and one other, through the lens of this question of what role democracy does or doesn't play in their foreign policy and why it plays such a limited role so far.

Tanvi?

MS. MADAN: I draw a distinction between India promoting its own democracy, which you see including Mr. Modi to a lot. He's been using it quite instrumentally, but also talking about India as an example in terms of messy as it is, policies not sustainable, et cetera, I draw a distinction between promoting its own democracy in its example, and exporting democracy. If anything Indians will point to things like American efforts of active democracy promotion and point to why that might not be such a good idea necessary. And essentially in the neighborhood, India has always tended to prioritize stability over democracy. There is a sense that democracies over time are more sustainable and stable. But in the short term in terms of interest, ironically the one place where India has not done that arguably is Pakistan. Where it doesn't talk to the military, it insists on talking to the civilian leadership even, you know, you have a President Musharraf. But I will say one thing on the Myanmar thing. There is a big debate was a major issue in terms of U.S. India differences on Myanmar. One of the things that both will claim success now, but one of the things I think Aung San Suu Kyi, and it's been great to see her come out victorious in this, but she understands Riyal politic. Look at her approach towards the Rohingyas. So I think this is all leaders and nobody looks at values purely in both the short and long term.

MR. JONES: David, final thought.

MR. MALONE: Thank you. Well I'll comment on just two of the interesting questions and comments. One on the Brits, again, I'm sure you're much more knowledgeable than I am on that period, and you lived through the transition. I would say that whatever the Brits did in India they did in their own interest by and large. And that's why I don't give them very much credit. But I agree with you that some of the institutions they did build up were useful to an independent India, including the India Administrative Service, and a number of others. But that certainly wasn't the British design.

Probably for Britain it was all over in India by the end of the First World War. But its desperate efforts to hold on in India through many inglorious historical episodes until the end of the

Second World War, I think is an indictment of British fantasies about empire being able to endure forever.

On Pakistan, it's a country I love. I spent so much time there when I was a student very happy time. And when I was finishing my monograph on Indian foreign policy a few years ago, I went to Pakistan as my very last stop in research, because I felt I couldn't not go to Pakistan and hear from Pakistanis. And the saddest of many sad things I heard there, I heard repeatedly, which was more or less what we can't stand about India today is its pulling away from us. And others would say partition was such a mistake.

Well it's true, India in that sense is pulling away from Pakistan. It doesn't mean that that will be good for India because Pakistan will always have the means to make trouble, if it wishes to. And so I think for Indian governments to focus positively on the relationship when they can, occasionally adopting unilateral steps of a friendly nature can only pay dividends. At worse they'll fail.

MR. JONES: Join me in thanking the panel, and in particular, David Malone. (Applause)

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