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**Welcome and Introduction:**

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. O'HANLON: Welcome to Brookings. I'm Mike O'Hanlon with the Foreign policy Program here, and I have the distinct privilege and pleasure today of welcoming David Straub, to discuss his book on Korea and the U.S.-Korea Alliance and relationship, and the way in which the United States and Americans are seen in Korea, and especially focused on the period of 1999 to 2002, when he was installed in the U.S. Embassy as the Political Affairs Section Leader, and went through a very tumultuous period.

David's biography on Korea is fascinating. He had no particular background in Korea in his family roots, except that his father was a marine who fought in the Korean War, and as he mentions in his book, he was already entranced at some level by Korea, as a concept and a country and a people, even early on in his life. But he joined the Foreign Service, and I think began in Germany, and then ultimately asked for a challenging assignment in terms of language, and in terms of just a big change from the broader European theater.

And I think at that point was agnostic as to whether he went to Korea, China or Japan. By the way, it's important to know he did wind up spending a lot of his Foreign Service career, his 30-year career, in Japan and working on Japan issues too. So keep that in mind for your subsequent discussion. But he wound out being assigned to the Korea challenge, the Korea portfolio, and spent two years learning the language early on. Went on his first tour to Korea in 1979 which, as many of you know, was also an important year in Korea, and a much difference place than it is today, or than it was when he returned in 1999 for that three-year stint that becomes the focus of his book.

And for those of you who are interested, like me, in what this whole

subject may portend for the future, he's your man on that too, because he has thought a lot about how the anti-Americanism that peaked in that period, and perhaps hasn't been witnessed in the same form since, under what circumstances something like it could return. Or at least to what degree a latent nervousness about the closeness of the U.S.-Korea relationship could affect the broader American's strategic planning for the longer term, as it pertains to North Korea policy, to China policy, Japan, and also the future of the U.S.-Korea Alliance, if and when the North Korea problem is ever mitigated or resolved.

And so I know you are going to have a wide-ranging conversation, and what we are going to do today, is to ask David to speak for a bit on his book. He will be coming here and replacing me at the podium. After that, Andrew Yeo has kindly agreed to respond, and then to lead a bit of a discussion, first by asking David a few questions, and then by involving you all.

Just a couple of additional details about each of these gentlemen; as I mentioned David spent 30 years in the foreign service with -- two stints in Korea, but also working on the Korea desk here in Washington, immediately after his return from Korea the second time. So, from 2002 to 2004, wound up being a key player in Six-Party Talks, as well as a number of other issues, and certainly the U.S.-Korea relationship I think it's fair to say was still challenging in the '02, '04 period. So, there will be thoughts I'm sure, on that matter as well. He has been at the Shorenstein Center on Asia-Pacific Affairs at Stanford now for almost a decade; and the Associate Director of their Korea Program there since 2008.

Andrew Yeo is Associate Professor at a Catholic University. He got his PhD from Cornell, and he has 2011 book on Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Sentiment, including in the country of Korea as well. So, we are very lucky to hear from

both these individuals today, and please join me in welcoming David to the podium.

(Applause)

MR. STRAUB: Thank you very much, Mike, for that very kind introduction. I would also like to thank Paul Park and Eileen Chang, and all of the other kind and very capable here at the Brookings Institution for putting this program together. I know how much work it entails. You may know Kathy Moon was originally going to moderate the program. She has taken ill, nothing serious, but she's not up to coming, and Andrew has very kindly agreed to come and participate and help lead the program today. So, I'm very grateful for both of them, for that, and also because -- I'm very happy because both them are two of the United States leading experts on issues such as I'm going to talk with you about today.

And I'm especially pleased to be back in Washington, D.C., where I lived a good part of my adult life, and to see so many old friends and former colleagues whom I've not gotten to see very much since I went to Stanford eight years ago. Thank you for coming.

I will try to speak pretty briefly today, because I think this is a forum better suited for a lot of discussion, and I hope there will be a lot discussion, and please, feel free to challenge me. I do not claim to be an expert on Korea, I know a little something about how American policymakers think about Korea, but I don't have -- I don't claim to be an expert, or to have the final word on this subject.

Today, I will tell you a little bit about my book, about anti-Americanism in South Korea during the period 1999 to 2002. As Dr. O'Hanlon said, I was the Head of the Political Section at the American Embassy in Seoul during that period, and as such I probably spent as much time as anybody in the U.S. Government liaising with the U.S. Forces Korea, and people back in Washington who followed Korea-U.S. relations, to try

to deal with this ever-worsening sentiment in Korea toward the United States.

So, I was very much seized with this for this entire three-period -- three-year period. And it made me -- there were a lot of questions that I had during this period, questions that remained, and I've tried to answer some of those questions through research and talking with people in succeeding years. I will tell you why I think that this subject is important, although, frankly, I don't think it's so important that you all should have missed one of the most gorgeous days of this fall in Washington, D.C., but I'll do my best.

I'll tell you a little bit about the book's contents, and my main arguments, and then I'll conclude by offering a few thoughts as to why maybe this subject still matters, and perhaps may have a few lessons for us here in the United States and possibly in Korea. But, as I assume most of you are fairly expert about Korea and the U.S.-Korea relationship, I thought it would be fun to begin with a very brief test, Okay.

Now, how many of you know what this is about? I believe this was December 14, 2002. This was one of the largest demonstrations in South Korea during the period that I'm writing about. This was a demonstration in response to the acquittals of two U.S. soldiers who, earlier in the year, accidentally killed two Korea school girls in a traffic accident, during military exercise. So, this is sort of the climax of what I'm writing about in the book.

And you all know these two young ladies, many of you do, these were the two middle-school girls, who, returning from a friend's birthday party, walking along the side of the road, toward their home, were accidentally crushed to death by this tank-like vehicle driven by the two American soldiers, a very tragic, tragic story.

How many of you know this person? Does anyone know this person? Please raise your hand if you do. Okay. So, the people we wrote about before, they

sparked the deaths and the acquittal of the people who caused the accident, or contributed to the accident caused this. If you Google them in English you will find thousands and thousands of hits. This is Major David S. Berry. In the year 2000, after this wave of anti-American feelings in South Korea was already well underway, Major Berry had been called back -- called to Korea to fill in during a summer staffing gap.

He was a pediatrician, a doctor. And he and a couple of his friends were walking near the American base, in Yongsan just strolling. I think it was during daylight hours, and they were just pleasantly walking down the street. All of a sudden a kind of homeless man leaped upon him, stabbed him in the abdomen with a long knife. They rushed him to the hospital, but he died right away. I think he has four, five children. You can Google this man, and I challenged you to find almost anything about him.

Now, the person who killed him was clearly a person with serious psychological issues, so I wouldn't say that you know, he was killed or anti-American reasons, but as we all know from the many mass killings that occur in the United States, usually the killings are a result of what, three factors. One, mental illness; two, the availability of some sort of a weapon; and third, the cultural setting, so that in the United States we have copycat killers on schools these days, and so forth.

In South Korea the hostility towards U.S. Forces Korea during this period was so great that although I do not know it for a fact, I'm confident that this deranged person was influenced by that climate. And that he stabbed him under that delusion. He actually told the Korea police or the Korea media that Major David Berry said something offensive to him as David Berry was walking along.

Now, Major Berry's friends said nothing like that ever happened, they were just walking along and he was jumped upon. And yet, the Korean media reported what this deranged person said, uncritically. Moreover the Korean media reported almost

nothing about this incident, I think the Korean media and people were embarrassed about it, and the less said, the better.

What was the reaction in the United States? Were there protests against Korea? Was there massive anger? Questions about what Korea really means to the United States? Zero, zero. How many of you know this person? Everybody, right, PSY? Okay. How many remember this PSY Concert? This took place in 2004, now this is after the main period that I'm writing about in my book, but much of the anti-American feeling extended into this period and President Bush's foreign policy had a role in that, especially his North Korea policy, and his invasion of Iraq.

So this is a concert at which PSY sang this song, pretty powerful stuff. Now, some of you may remember that after he became world-famous he issued very quickly, an abject apology saying something like, well, that was the mood in Korea at the time, and I should know better, and I'm sorry, please don't think about this anymore. But he did apologize.

Now, let me read this to you. This was at the first summit meeting between President George W. Bush and President Kim Dae-jung, when President Kim visited in March of 2001, shortly after Bush was inaugurated. At their joint press conference, President Bush began by saying everybody in, "It's been my honor to welcome President Kim to the Oval Office. We had a very good discussion. We confirmed the close relationship between our two countries, and we talked about a lot subjects, and will be glad to answer questions on some of those, but first let me say, how much I appreciate this man's leadership in terms of reaching out to the North Koreans. He's a leader, he's leading, he's a leader."

Now, some of you may remember that something in this became a huge controversy in South Korea almost immediately. What was it? Calling Kim, this man,

earns Bush (inaudible). The Vice Speaker of the Korean Assembly was outraged that President Bush would refer to President Kim as "this man". He actually did send an open letter to President Bush taking him to task for this serious, serious breach of etiquette, he even confirmed it with his brilliant close American friends, that this was something verging on casual, and without an appropriate apology from the President of the United States, this man fringed on the integrity of the Korea peoples.

And I don't know what that meant, what he was thinking or whoever drafted that for him was thinking, and that was in Korean, but clearly he took great offense at this. Now, if you think this was only passing and had no consequences, Mike Chinoy, a friend of mine and a very distinguished former journalist and author and scholar, wrote a very good book a few years ago called *Meltdown* and he writes in there that Bush, in his press conference, did refer to Kim Dae-jung as "this man" and this is his commentary, a casual reference, possibly indicating he had forgotten Kim's name, and chose not to refer to his title.

Now, you'll remember, Bush referred to him by his title immediately before that, and he referred to him as President Kim. I don't think he forgot President Kim in the space of 20 seconds, but this is after being influenced by this mood in Korea, this is my friend, Mike's interpretation. "And Kim, South Korea officials, and media and citizenry found this disrespectful and offensive." He is absolutely right in reporting that, that is factually correct.

And years later when Mike actually interviewed Kim Dae-jung, years later, the memory still wrangled. "He humiliated me, by calling me, this man." Now for those of you who don't speak Korean, the reason -- I think I have this right, and correct me later on if I don't, but in Korean, if you quite literally translate "this man" you can say, *i salam*, which is pejoratively -- has a negative connotation, but of course if -- all of us who



study a foreign language know you can just do word-for-word translation, right?

Now, how many -- This scene many of you saw just a few weeks ago. When was it? A couple of -- two weeks ago when Vice President Biden said he is not going to run for the presidency; and do you remember the last words he said were? "Thank you for all being so gracious to Jill and me for the last six or eight months, and for our whole career for that matter, but I'm telling you, we can do so much more. I'm looking forward to continuing to work with this man, to get it done. Thank you very much. Thank you, all, very much." Okay?

Now, just one final thing, this should not have been a controversy to begin with, or if it, momentarily, had been a controversy, it should have been readily resolved. I told my Korean friends at the time why this was not offensive. In addition to, you can't do word-for-word translation, I put it in context. I said, my wife was born and raised in Korea, and when we married, we married twice, once in Korea in Korean, and once in the United States, as a lot of people do, with our pastor here.

And, you know, the pastor asked my Korean wife, "Do you take this man to be your lawfully wedded husband?" So, there you have it, I just wanted to do that little test to get us started. And I many have taken too much time on that, but I think it's pretty revealing about how we can get into a certain mindset. And I don't mean to say that it's just Koreans who do that, Americans do this on different issues all the time, and it profoundly shapes the way we see things, in very distorted ways.

Okay. Why is this period 1999 to 2002 an important episode? Why should we be spending our beautiful summer day here talking about it? After all, relations between the United States and South Korea today are said to be the best ever, and actually I believe that's quite true. I can't think of another period when the bilateral relationship, overall, was better, more smoothly functioning; friendlier than it is today.

Well, I think it's important because it was a period now largely forgotten, even in Korea, when there was a great deal of hostility, harassment, even abductions and other, violence including murder, committed against Americans inside Korea. Now Koreans don't like to think about that, so it wasn't reported very much, and therefore it was not remembered very much.

Second, it actually caused a lot of American soldiers, and some American leaders in Seoul and elsewhere, to start worrying and questioning the basis of the Alliance, contrary to the views of many Koreans, the United States is not in Korea forever, and the U.S. will, at some point, leave Korea, and it will especially be more prepared to leave Korea if it's hated as it was, to some extent, in Korea during this period.

It's also important because this situation ended rather abruptly, and pretty soon, the relationship was on a steep upturn, but that's not the only future we could have had. It could have deepened, and it could have worsened, and it could have lasted longer with much more serious consequences.

And finally, some of the elements that were responsible, or behind this outbreak of anti-American expressions in South Korea during this period, remain to this day, and could affect the relationship in the future.

So what happened? In the introductory chapter to the book, I'm trying to explain very briefly and simply because I'm not a historian of Korean, but as best as I understand it as an American official who worked in Korea, the history of modern Korea and of U.S.-Korea relations, as they relate to the way Koreans feel about the United States, and I try to underline the feelings of the Korea people are much more complex and nuanced about the United States than most Americans could begin to imagine.

The central part of the book is a series of chapters that are essentially case studies on various issues and incidents in U.S.-Korean relations during this, all but

two involving U.S. Forces in Korea, which was the focus of anti-American feeling during this period, and I try to show, how, as time went by from 1999 to 2002 the situation sort of snowballed. Now, in the second chapter I talk about the No Gun Ri incident at some length, and I do that because it's my impression that the AP series of stories on No Gun Ri, basically suggesting that there was a large-scale massacre of Koreans, innocent Koreans, during the opening weeks of the Korea War by American soldiers.

That the series of stories was picked up, of course, naturally in Korea in a very big way, and the interpretation of the Korean media was, well, this makes us think about what America means to us. So this is a very negative sort of interpretation, not that this was an historic issue incident, a single incident or a small number of incidents during the early days of the Korea War that was tragic and painful and should be investigated, but that somehow what happened 50 years earlier, some told us something about how Americans regarded Koreans even to this day. Okay?

And it is my impression that this catalyst started the Korea media, both Progressive and Conservative to look much more critically at the United States, and especially U.S. Forces Korea than they had ever done before. I think they felt empowered to do so, very importantly, by the election of President Kim Dae-jung, as South Korea's first Progressive President.

Now, I do not mean to suggest that President Kim was anti-American, I do not believe that is the case, but he was supported by a lot of people who did have some serious anti-Americanism in their hearts, and in their thinking, and they felt that maybe for the first time they could really vent and speak openly about they felt about how they felt about the United States.

Well, coincidentally many of the young reporters who were reporting, and responsible for reporting on these, were members of the 386 generation in Korea whose

views about the United States were shaped, in large part, by their perception, and in my view, misperceptions of the U.S. role in 1979 and 1980 when Chun Doo-hwan was staging a role in coup d'état, and when there was the tragedy that occurred in Gwangju.

So, with this No Gun Ri story as a catalyst, there were a whole series of incidents and issues that were treated as major, major issues in the Korean media, in the following three years, and I go through a number of those, in the central chapters in my book. Some of you may remember the formaldehyde story, the dumping by the mortician at the U.S. headquarters of some outdated excess formaldehyde use for embalming, down the drain, which went a long way, but eventually reached the Han River.

And this was reported by a Progressive, and some, I think to be frank, is somewhat anti-American major environmental group, which was a major coup for them, and the Korean media almost uniformly said, this shows that the American soldiers don't hesitate to poison us Koreans. Now it's too complex a story to go into in detail here, but it was absolutely clear, including to Korean scientists from that time, from the very beginning, that this was not a danger to the health of the people of Seoul.

Furthermore, the American soldiers drank the same -- from the same water source, but it was a huge story, and it's a lasting story. How many of you know about -- you've seen the movie called, I think in English, *The Host*, right, which is based -- a sort of a science fiction movie based upon this, but the Korean media picked this up in a huge way. And I'm quite confident that Korean experts who knew better were intimidated against speaking out and saying, look, what the man did was wrong, but it's not going to -- it's not going to kill or even hurt anybody, so we don't have to focus on that. I saw that much once in a Korean paper citing a Korean scientist saying that.

I could tell you more about the Maehyang-ri village, Koon-ni Range incident, which I think is the one incident that was virtually, completely invented in this.

Not that there was a problem with the use of a U.S. Air Force bomber in practice and shooting range so close to a Korean village. But the way the Korean media basically took a false story, which was that, an accident involving an American plane that resulted in the pilot intentionally dropping some bombs on the far side of an island, in the Yellow Sea, off the coast of the village, somehow caused massive injury to the villagers, and damage to their houses. A completely false story, which was a huge story in South Korea, for several months and even after that.

I also talk about the SOFA issue, which is a fundamental issue in the U.S.-ROK Alliance. There is this religiously-held belief among Koreans, even to this day, that somehow the U.S.-ROK SOFA is fundamentally unfair to South Korea and South Koreans. That is not the case. As you can see partly in the fact that now South Korea has some of its own troops stationed abroad, and they have copied the U.S.-ROK SOFA for their own practice.

I talk about two non-USFK case studies here. One is the short track controversy during the -- what was it -- the 2002 Winter Games. Apolo Ohno was the American hero, and Kim Dung-sung the Korean hero. I have a funny anecdote I've copied from Ambassador Tom Hubbard's experience trying to figure out what that was all about. And we can laugh at it now, but this was serious when it happened. Koreans were furious, not at just Apolo Ohno, not at the Australian referee or umpire who called this, but at the entire United States.

And Ambassador Hubbard was just berated when, the day after the incident, he was ignorant about it, and didn't know what it meant, or what the Koreans thought about it. There were a huge number of cyber attacks on the United States, a huge number of death threats, death threats against Apolo Ohno, originating from Korea. Well, you laugh about it now, but that's not funny.

And then the final case study that's not about U.S., okay, is about the controversy over President Bush's diplomacy and especially his North Korea policy. And that was indeed a factor in later years in South Korean's feelings about the United States, but it's often conflated in South Korea today, as if this period of anti-American feeling in South Korea resulted from the election of Bush and his behavior. I'm arguing that it started in 1999 when President Clinton was President.

And the final case study is about the terrible traffic accident. And, you know, it should not have happened, there were some -- a couple of things that the American soldiers should have done that would have probably made sure it didn't happen. It was not intentional, but as we all know, terrible accidents like that, are almost always the result of a bizarre set of multiple circumstances. The removal of any single one of which would have prevented that freak accident. And that's the case in this one too.

It was a terrible accident, but the way the Korean people reacted to it, was interpreting it as what the U.S., and especially U.S. Forces Korea really mean to us, Koreans. Now, South Korea, even today, I think, if I'm not mistaken, has the highest highway accident rate in the entire OECD, and there are literally hundreds and thousands of young people killed each year in traffic accidents in South Korea. What does that mean to South Korea? We need to put these things into perspective if we are to understand not only the other, but ourselves. So, that's the general progression of the book.

The final chapter is my conclusion. I try to make sense of why this happened, and what the implications may be for the future. So, why? As I put in the first -- the introductory chapter there was a long, complex history that Americans were not aware of in the U.S.-Korea relationship before 1999.

That the election of Kim Dae-jung made the left and 386 generation journalists felt empowered that Do Gun Ri, sort of served as a catalyst, especially for the Korean media to focus on USFK, and that because the Korean media is so competitive, that both Conservative and Progressive media competed like crazy to see who could find, dig up, and exaggerate, and even take invented stories about how bad USFK, and the Americans were to Koreans.

They were fed a lot of stories by, frankly, left-wing organizations, some of which, quite clearly, had as their ulterior motive the removal of U.S. forces from Korea. But those same people know, even then, most South Koreans did not want U.S. forces to withdraw from South Korea. So, obviously as a tactic, they could not say, we want -- you know, simply stand up and say, let's have the Americans go home.

Instead, they tried to portray the Americans as the sort of beasts, and uncaring, and disrespectful people towards Koreans, so as to remove the political basis of support for continuing the Alliance. And that this is what contributed, after three years almost, to such a misinterpretation of the Highway 56 accident.

So, if this was so serious, why did it end? And why did it end so suddenly? Well, it's important to note that the year 2002 was a presidential election year in Korea, Nu Mishon was famous in South Korea for being critical of the United States, if not anti-American. Many South Korean conservatives called him anti-American.

But, interestingly, throughout this period, he said very, very little about all of this. Why? He didn't have to, everyone knew he was critical -- he must be critical of the United States, but because this, especially the traffic accidents and the acquittal of the American soldiers was such a big and negative story in the United States, and conservatives tend to be associated in the popular mind with the United States and the Alliance in particular. The conservative candidates' popularity in the polls was going like

this, and so that candidate Lee Hoi-chang became desperate, and he started participating in candlelight ceremonies -- candlelight protests about the incident.

He called -- demanded revision of the Status of Forces Agreement, and finally he actually summoned Ambassador Hubbard in a very demeaning sort of way, and put him in front of a bunch of -- kept the journalists in the room, and berated him and the United States for the situation; a very ugly thing to do, even during a presidential campaign.

But when, the President would know, just about the time these final demonstrations were held, he won the election, almost certainly the protests were decisive in mobilizing the base that would come out and support him. But interestingly, this was not nose-focused. His focus was on making progress with North Korea. So the last thing he wanted was controversy over extraneous issues like USFK with the United States.

He actually wanted to try to be on good terms with George Bush, and the U.S. Government, and make progress on the North Korea project. And so one of the first things he did, after being elected was to go to USFK headquarters and meet the American soldiers, very unusual, and say, you are "precious" to us Koreans, extraordinary.

The other thing is that just about this time for the first time these huge anti-American demonstrations was ripping apart American flags and singing terrible songs about the United States, finally got the attention of some U.S. political leaders. There were some U.S. Congressmen, who came to Korea during this period, and they saw these protests outside their windows, and they were shocked and they were furious, and they told their top Korean official counterparts. And I think it's quite clear that many of these officials became very worried that the entire basis of the Alliance might be under



threat, and pass that word onto the political leadership in South Korea.

There was also, because of this, in part, a phenomenon in which the South Korean conservatives began organizing themselves, sort of as equivalent to the left-wing NGOs, and they in counter-protests against what the leftwing NGOs were doing. We saw more and more, and bigger and bigger public protests by Conservatives and Ultra-Conservatives in South Korea.

And finally, the President (Inaudible), very quickly, became very unpopular in South Korea, for reasons too complex to get into here. And North Korea acted so badly that the ideas of the Sunshine Policy also lost some popularity. So, all of a sudden, for all of these reasons, the Korean media, suddenly after three years, switched its primary focus on the U.S. and the USFK, on how bad they were, to the domestic political situation specifically President Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea.

So I think, I don't claim this as a perfect book by any means, this is a very big and complex story, I've just told a part of it from my perspective as an American, as U.S. official, as someone who really likes Korea and appreciates, and wants there to be a good U.S.-Korean relationship. But I believe that what I've done in this book, is to challenge three or four narratives that took hold in Korea at the time, and I don't ever -- I think have not been reflected upon.

First that this anti-Americanism basically started in 2002 when we saw the big demonstrations; as I've said, I tried to show that this was the climax of something that began, a wave that began in 1999, when Clinton was still in office. Second, the narrative in South Korea is that, well, this was caused primarily by USFK misbehavior in Korea toward the Korean people.

Now, USFK is not a perfect institution, they make mistakes, but I believe that if you have a chance to glance at the book, you will see that the stories about these

case studies, are much more complex than most of the Korean media have reported. And that, in fact, there's some blame on many sides for some of these incidents and issues.

Third, the narrative in the United States and Korea, is sort of that, oh, well, this was because George W. Bush was such a cowboy, and was so nasty to Kim Dae-jung, and his North Korea policy was so bad, in contrary to South Korea's President's wishes and so forth. And I would agree there's an element of that, but it started before Bush was even elected, and as I've tried to show, Bush was sometimes blamed unfairly.

You know, he was not belittling President Kim when he said "this man". And ironically, U.S.-Korean relations started to improve dramatically early on in Bush's term, by his third year or so, even while we had the Iraq problem and disagreement over North Korea.

And finally, I dispute the notion that this was primarily a result of U.S. officials, and U.S. military officers' insensitivity, and incompetence in dealing with South Korean public opinion. I was there, I know how we tried to explain to the Korean media, what we saw as having actually happened in the case of many of these incidents and issues.

And the Korean media and public were so angry at the United States that their reaction was this. I can't believe this. You Americans have done such terrible things to us, and here you are trying to explain this away, to justify it. What shameless people you are. Now, I'm not suggesting that this is unique to Korea or Koreans.

How many of you remember just a few years ago, when the leadership of the Toyota Corporation was summoned to Capitol Hill over their secret electronics that were secretly killing Americans, and causing unexplained acceleration? And the

Chairman of Toyota is in tears trying to explain, that's not the case we've tested. It can't be that. And you had no one in the United States believed him, and he was a made a spectacle of on American television. So it happens all over the place.

Why this matters today, when relations between our countries, the best ever? I do not expect to see an exact repetition of this again, but I believe that certain aspects or certain factors that explain this earlier period remain relevant in South Korea. I would like to highlight what, to me, is common in South Korea, a simplistic, cynical, even conspiratorial view of U.S. policymaking.

There is also, more broadly, based in the population, a tendency to see Americans and other foreigners as different than Koreans. All peoples do this; Americans to some extent do this too. But Korea has been pretty homogenous population-wise for a long time, and naturally I think it's fairly strong and stronger in Korea. And Koreans tend, still, fairly strongly to see Korea as a victim of great powers.

Well, Korea certainly was a victim of great powers in earlier decades in the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, but when Koreans go around the world today, telling most of the 7 billion people that we are victims, and we are sandwiched between the U.S. and the PRC, and we are helpless, and what can we do? And most of those 7 billion people look at Korea, having one of the world's most -- biggest and most powerful military, one of the world's most successful, economies, and a Korean citizen is the Secretary General of the United Nations, I think most of those people in the world think: victims? Koreans, victims today?

And I think this is, again, particularly reflected in the Korean media narrative today about Korea being sandwiched in between, helplessly sandwiched in between the U.S. and the PRC. The thing I'm most worried about in terms of the future of the Alliance, which involves some elements of anti-American stereotypical thinking in

South Korea, is about North Korea policy.

In South Korea today, the Progressives are embittered about U.S. policy toward North Korea, they are terribly still angry and bitter and about George W. Bush's policy, because they believe that the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, would have exceeded had it not been for President Bush's terrible diplomacy. I think they would like to criticize President Obama, but they are reluctant to do that for a number of reasons.

One, of course North Korea has behaved so badly, it makes it harder to criticize the United States. Two, Conservatives are in power in South Korea and the presidency in South Korea is, institutionally, very intimidating, even today. And finally, President Obama is very popular in South Korea, and it sounds of mean-spirited to criticize him even on something as important as the North Korea Policy issue is to Progressives in South Korea.

And finally, lessons. I wrote this book primarily for an American audience, I hope a few score Americans read it, and that it will generate a little discussion, and maybe I can learn a little more about this. If there's a message in here for Koreans, I would bluntly say this: If the United States is important and powerful to Korea as many Koreans assert, then the South Koreans really need to understand the United States and the Alliance better.

In particular I hope Korean journalists will become more aware that some Americans actually do read what Korean journalists write. And daily, I read the Korean media daily in some detail, and daily I find things in there that are just deeply offensive to me as an American. And that's not -- I'm an American who is quite critical of my own country on its foreign policy, whenever an American says something a little critical of Korea, it's a huge issue in Korea.

Today, and yesterday I found that, again, talking with some Korean friends, people in Korea are really focused on Donald Trump saying that Korea is getting a free ride in the Alliance. Who gives a -- about what Donald Trump says about anything, much less the U.S.-ROK Alliance. I could say something very vulgar like he would about just how little he knows about that.

But if Koreans can be so sensitive about what other people say about them, we Americans can be too. If Americans had known in 1999 to 2002, how the Korean media and others were talking about and treating American soldiers and Americans during that period, they would have been furious, and they would have made it perfectly clear, they just weren't paying attention.

Because the United States military presence, is guided by our military-industrial-congressional-intelligence think tank academia complex; and the American public doesn't pay attention to it. But if they did, as their leaders started to do at the end of 2002, they would have been even more furious than those congressmen who saw what the Korean protestors were saying and doing.

For Americans, I think this is a cautionary tale about our foreign and military policy, a warning against being too bold about foreign entanglements; Korea is a case study in one of what most people regard as one of the most successful U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship and alliances. And I basically agree with that. And even so, it's a terribly complex nuanced and difficult to manage relationship.

If this relationship is that complex, my goodness, how could we ever imagine we could go to Iraq and run the country? What hubris. And yet, members of the Bush Administration, and I won't name names because some are at Stanford University next to my office, actually trotted out Korea and Japan as examples of what the United States could do with democracy building in Iraq.

This situation makes for a very distorted relationship -- situation in our bilateral relationship, so the kind that I've been talking to you today, where Koreans are really, compared to Americans, very knowledgeable about the United States and the U.S.-ROK relationship that have many, naturally, many misunderstandings and misperceptions. And the American public knows next to nothing about it.

So, how could the Korean people really know how the American people felt when the American people were not engaged? They didn't know about it, it was just, say, people like me. But I didn't count, because I was a tool of the U.S. Government in the eyes of the Korean people, when I or my USFK colleagues tried to explain some of these issues, well I said, naturally. You are paid to do this job; your feelings are not genuine.

Now they were in this case, in other cases I have been paid, and I have spoken untruthful statements as an official, as all officials do, but these were genuine feelings, so how are Koreans to know if the American public is not engaged in these -- in the management of these alliances and other bilateral relationships that we have.

So, I will stop there. Thank you for your patience, and I'll turn it over to Andrew. (Applause)

MR. YEO: Okay. Well, thank you, David, for those insights, and thank you for bringing the one Bay Area weather back here to the East Coast.

You know, we chatted briefly about South Korea and civil society and (inaudible), a couple of years ago, (inaudible) is in Palo Alto so it's just really wonderful to see the book. If I may, I'll say congratulations. I know we are running a little bit behind schedule, so I'm going to just keep my comments fairly brief, so that we leave enough time for Q&A with the audience.

But before I jump into David's book, I wanted to start with a brief

anecdote. So, my first time in Korea as an adult was in August, 2000. I was just fresh out of college, and raised began intensive language training, and my first day, at Seoul National University, I watched students carrying signs, placards that read, "Yankee go home," and the unequal status of course is agreement.

So, I kind of looked at them, and then I shrugged, I shrugged off the protest and I just, you know, quietly walked passed. When I started graduate school, in fall 2002, anti-American protests were just impossible to ignore at that point. Even outside of Korea. Our mainstream news outlets were regularly covering stories about rising anti-Americanism, and I saw images of American flags burning. I read about protestors attempting to topple the statue of General MacArthur in Incheon.

You know, and as a Korean-American this really bothered me. It really bothered me to the core, so much that I ended up writing my dissertation on anti-US-base protest. So, I can imagine as a diplomat posted in South Korea, this instance would have troubled you greatly as well. And so, you know, I'm thankful that you are able to share a little bit of your insights with us from your time there.

Now, David's book, *Anti-Americanism in Democratizing Korea*, provides and explanation and an answer to this frustrating but critical moment in U.S.-South Korea relations. As David writes, "The events of those years did not fit the American narrative of Korea as a successful, pro-American ally. But David's book helps us understand who we arrived at this moment of intense anti-Americanism, and of course as the former political section, Head of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul at that time, he carries a unique vantage point in describing the series of events which snowballed into an alliance crisis.

And I realize that isn't a personal memoir, but maybe in the Q&A, I would love to hear thoughts about this real time with all these series of incidents happening. Was there a point where you felt that, okay, well this is the end, you know, is this going to

stop, or did you predict, or did you sense that there might be a huge crisis looming head?

So that's one thing that I'd love to hear about but, you know, I don't have to go over the different series of incidents that David mentioned earlier, but what makes this book fascinating, is not the recounting of these incidents, about Apolo Ohno, the speed skating incident, or the tragic deaths of these two junior high schools run over by an armored vehicle. It's not the series of incidents that makes it fascinating, but it's his ability to place such incidents within the deeper context of Korean identity, politics and culture.

His brief and insightful observations on Korean nationalism and political culture in the first chapter are really spot on, I found myself just nodding in agreement, just reading through that chapter last night. And he does, you know, a splendid job explaining how such factors shape the lens in which Koreans might perceive incidents, and injustice is perpetuated by, you know, U.S. Forces Korea, or the U.S. Government, or even American citizens.

So, the book is highly readable. I'm glad to see, David, the post -- in your post-diplomatic career being in academia hasn't poisoned your writing with academic gibberish and jargon. So, it's highly readable, and it really is a must-read for anyone who wants a nuanced yet concise understanding of U.S.-Korea relations. Not just the incidents from 1999 to 2002, but U.S.-Korea relations more generally.

Now, I wanted to ask a few -- raise a few questions and points about the book, and the first one has to do with explanations leading up to this diplomatic crisis, and you are very clear that this was multifaceted, there were numerous factors, that came together to produce this crisis, but I remember a few years after the wave of anti-Americanism had passed, there are studies, published books, in South Korea and the United States attributing anti-Americanism to a generation of phenomena. It was about



the 386 generation, 386 standing for those at the time who were in their 30s, who went to college in the 1980s during the democratization period, and were born in the 1960s.

And so there are a lot of commentators who are stating that it was this generation that came to the forefront, and you do mention it a few times in the book, but you don't really dwell on this, because again, there are so many other factors. But I was wondering if you could share more of your insights about the 386 generation, and explain why, despite this generation now, having come to the seat of power in South Korea Government, why we haven't really seen a shift in the direction of U.S.-ROK relation; because I remember at the time there were these predictions that will -- from the future here on out, you know, that the Alliance is going to stand up, it's not going to be as stable, because we have this generation now coming (inaudible). I was wondering if you could comment on that.

The second is the question I have is really looking forward and it goes -- it points to the conclusion of your book. I was wondering if you could maybe explain how anti-Americanism, particularly at the mass level, at the level of public opinion, may correlate with a decline perhaps in the U.S. -- a decline of U.S. influence on the Korean Peninsula.

For instance, it's often debated in Washington whether or not, or to what extent Seoul is leaning towards Beijing or Washington. And if, you know, one argues that Seoul is leaning towards Beijing or Beijing influence is rising, relative to that of Washington, could that also open up greater political opportunities for anti-American sentiment to rise.

And I guess my last question for you is about the type of anti-Americanism that we witnessed. And in the introduction, if you read the book, David tries to qualify what he means by anti-Americanism, because it can mean a host of things, but

for a lot of other scholars, they try to be specific about what it is that's anti-American -- were Koreans opposed to the United States as a country, as a whole, or was it really about U.S. policies, was it about USFK?

These days, you know, you mentioned that U.S.-ROK relations are at a high, and I think public opinion reflects this, but barring some, you know, accidents or mishaps from USF; you know, are there any other -- are there substantive issues, are there any latent issues, latent historical issues perhaps, which might result in a wave of anti-Americanism again today? Because right now it seems like -- it almost seems like a thing of the past.

If there's any anger it's all directed at Japan or, you know, again, the relationship is doing very well, but I'm wondering if you could just probe a little bit deeper into, you know, potential issues beyond just accidents or incidents that might push or instigate another wave of anti-Americanism. So, I'll let you respond and then we can open, it up to the floor.

MR. STRAUB: Well, thank you very much, Andrew. Can you all hear me? Thank you very much for the kind words, and for the very good questions. You know, before your formal questions you asked how I felt during this period; was there any time when I said, okay, this is ending now, or this is -- we are going to have a crisis? Well, of course, in real time, one has no idea, you can get a feeling but the real world is just too complex and you'll never know.

So as someone who cared about Korea and the U.S. Alliance, and who was professionally responsible for it, I frankly was under a great deal of psychological stress. What's going to happen next? And how does little ol' me, deal with these complex issues? Even with all of the people above and below and around me, helping me, these were really, really tough issues. Really, most of them had no resolution; so,

that sort of, I guess, the counterpart to the fog of war, or something like that, except it's diplomacy in this case.

Very good questions about whether the generational explanations for this phenomenon; I do write about the 386 generation, and I do believe -- and I don't have factual proof of this, but I believe that many 386 generation reporters had a great deal to do with the media tone at that time. And, yes, there was a speculation as you suggest that, well, younger people are increasingly anti-American, and as they constitute a greater and greater proportion of the overall population, then U.S.-Korea relations are going to be in trouble.

But of course, not all 386-ers were Progressive. Some were Conservatives from the very beginning, some as they got older and more experienced in life and work became somewhat more Conservative. And moreover, the generation that followed them, in some ways, is more pro-American, less anti-American in their instincts than the 386 generation. And finally, the last two Presidents we've had have been Conservative, and that exercises a great deal of influence over the mood in South Korea.

So, it is a multifactorial, a multicausal phenomenon that we witnessed, but the feelings and perceptions have some of the 386 generation formed by their experiences with Gwangju and Chun Doo-hwan, did play a significant role, I believe. Whether the United States, the perception that the U.S. is declining in power, at least relative to China, has had some impact upon the way Koreans feel about the United States?

I think probably some -- I think most opinion polls show that a lot of Koreans both appreciate the opportunity that China represents, especially in economic and other areas, cultural areas, but are also concerned over the long-term that China is becoming so powerful, represents at least a potential threat to South Korean autonomy.

And that for that reason probably more Koreans want a little more than before for the U.S. Alliance to remain and even for U.S. Forces to remain in Korea. But I don't think it's a huge factor. I don't think it's a very big factor, yet, at least at this stage.

Finally, future issues that might involve anti-American feeling in Korea, I suppose -- and it's hard for me to imagine but perhaps if U.S. PRC relations get worse, and worse, and worse, and very threatening, and we have another President like George W. Bush, who is so obviously a cowboy, and so unpopular in Korea, that that could cause real problems in the Alliance; whether that could be called anti-Americanism, I'm not sure.

MR. YEO: How much do you think might be tied into relations between North-South, North Korea-South Korea relations?

MR. STRAUB: The North -- The division of the Korean Peninsula is very fundamental, I think, in the way South Koreans look at the United States. I mean, after all, we, the United States, unintentionally are responsible for the enduring division of a Korean Peninsula, and because of that division of the Korean Peninsula, and because of that division South Koreans whether they want to or not, mostly feel that they have to keep U.S. forces in Korea.

So this creates -- sets up a very complex psychological situation, and moreover, because of the division, and because of the history of the division, as we all know there's this deep divide, not only politically in the U.S., but in South Korea as well, between left and right, which is focused on the North Korea problem. And Progressives and Conservatives have radically different views of North Korea, and radically different views of the best policy approach to the country.

And up until the Bill Clinton administration, South Korean Progressives had reason to believe that American leaders might agree with their, at least policy prescription. From their perspective, however, if they are watching the United States

closely, they now know that both Republicans and Democrats have given up on the current North Korea Regime, unless it changes its basic attitude. And Washington is very unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to ever itself adopt the Sunshine Policy, or even to strongly support a South Korean Sunshine Policy. So that is a potential major break point in the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. Thank you, David. And I want to say, that even David has retired from the State Department, his work as a diplomat continues by helping us dispel misconceptions across different cultures and bridging perceptual depth, between Seoul and Washington.

So, I'd like not to take the opportunity to open the floor for the audience to ask questions. And I see a hand immediately going up, up here. If you could maybe just state your name and affiliation, and then ask your question.

MS. WELLS: Hi. Thank you. My name is -- Can you hear me? Oh. My name is Dr. Donor Wells. So, if we can take the politics out a little bit, and I'm hearing the anecdotes and what we did, and the Korean reaction to it. And then kind of this whole time on the other side of a DMZ, are not the North Koreans kind of cold and starving, right? Like this whole time the South Koreans are angry at us, and meanwhile, you know, 10 miles away there are all these North Koreans cold and starving. So, can we not talk about the regime, perhaps, but isn't that strange that they are kind of related to these people, and doesn't that bother them that the North Koreans are cold and starving, right?

MR. O'HANLON: You are next.

QUESTIONER: Sure.

MR. STRAUB: (off mic) -- it is a very good question, and many, many Americans, especially Americans who are new to South Korea find it very interesting that South Koreans seem to be less interested in North Korea, than Americans who are

interested in Korea, are interested in North Korea. And, you would have to ask a knowledgeable South Korean to really good answer. Maybe Andrew can give you a better answer.

But I think there must be many reasons why South Koreans pay less attention to North Korea than we might imagine. Probably the fact that South -- you know, they have had, every day, South Koreans wake up to the fact that North Korea and their former -- and their family members are living just 30 or 40 miles away. And that every day this regime is a frustration, and every day they have to be a little concerned that there might be another Korean War.

Well, after a while, I think, psychologically, it's just too much, it's too overpowering to have to think about this all the time. And one also becomes cynical that things are going to change, or so forth. That's not the full explanation, but I think that's part of it. To the issue of the starvation of the North Koreans -- Well, by the time that we write about -- that I write about in this book, the worst of the famine was over in North Korea. People still were suffering, but the worst was over.

But I also find it difficult to understand why South Korea has not or did not provide more food aid and other such humanitarian support, particularly during that period. Now the Kim Dae-jung Administration did, but because of the hostility between the regimes, and because of the increasing sense of alienation, between the two peoples I think it's, psychologically, somewhat easier for people just not to think about it. An incomplete explanation.

MR. YEO: Not just that, but in the period that David was writing, you know, the question is more about why did South Korea -- Why they pay no attention to the North, and why there's all this anger at the United States. At that time, you did have the Sunshine Policy, and so South Koreans, were very much thinking about the North,

but they were -- there's all this euphoria about engagement, and being able to give aids to the North, but the reason why then, the anger is directed at the South and not the North Korean Regime, it's because the South -- the United States is seen as the impediment of being able to effectively implement the policy, because the Bush Administration had taken a harder line. So I think that was another source of friction between the U.S. and South Korea.

Other questions? Oh, yes, gentleman in the -- Yes?

QUESTIONER: Hi. My name is Tong Kim. Thank you, for your wonderful presentation of your book, and I noticed you cover all the incidents and cases that really are attributed to the worsening of South Korean anti-American sentiments. I would not use the term anti-Americanism, but sentiments, because if you say there are a few, I believe, a fraction of the population, who really pursue to do something against U.S. policies, but I want to just ask you for your view of my contention.

I always thought it has more policy issue than the Americans Forces South Koreans, and you mentioned a division of the Korean Peninsula, I wouldn't go back as far back as the chapter (inaudible) agreement at the turn of the century, but you also mentioned 386. These are the (inaudible) generation, who were on the street demonstrating against it, the Authoritarian Regime, of Park Chung-hee all the time, and later during the Chun Doo-hwan.

But I think the emergence of anti-American sentiments in South Korea, in the course of democratization of the South Korea, has a lot to do with the disparity between the rhetoric of American foreign policy, American policy for the Korea, which obviously supported a principle of freedom and democracy and human rights, and actions -- or inaction rather, at the disparity between there. And I think, as you pointed out, perhaps Chun Doo-hwan was the key trigger of anti-sentiments, because these

sentiments were there. I'm tracing these origins or source of anti-American sentiments in South Korea to U.S. policy, not supporting, not supporting the process of democratization, but supporting authoritarian governments -- regimes.

The Park Chung-hee who did a lot of oppressive policies against the distances, so of course I think that is the really issue. And I think I would agree with you, if anything else, I think the traffic accident, killing two middle-school kids, it's not the incident itself, but I think what happened afterwards. The Military Corps Marshall exonerated the two soldiers involved in a traffic accident, and it's just sending them back home. That really triggered that.

But these anti-sentiments being -- growing, brewing all over the years because of the U.S. policy, I would say, and especially Reagan who supported Chun Doo-hwan, and in their eyes Chun Doo-hwan was a dictator who really was the mastermind of a second military coup and that led to massacre in Gwangju, and these -- And a lot of these journalists have gone through these times when they were in school, they are very brilliant students, but they didn't study, but they would rather spend their time on the streets demonstrating against their dictatorship and authoritarian rules, and wrong policies that they pursued of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan Government. So, I'd like to hear your view on that.

MR. YEO: Do you want to respond?

MR. STRAUB: Sure, sure. Thank you very much, Tong. It's good to see you. Tong and I were colleagues working on the Six-Party Talks, and among other things for many years. Frankly, I disagree with much of your argument. You know, lots and lots of Koreans and experts on Koreans, or on Korea and the U.S.-ROK relationship tell me, don't talk about anti-Americanism in South Korea, because there's only a very few, a very small percentage of ideological hard-left anti-Americans in South Korea.



And I would agree with that, but it's a very significant and very active small percentage. But I think we must not -- I think it's important for us to understand that that is not the only anti-Americans. As Andrew pointed out, in the academic literature, and unfortunately, I'm not an academic, but nobody knows what anti-Americanism is.

Everyone tries to come up with a different definition. So, I didn't even put it in the book, but basically my interpretation of anti-American, or anti anything, is if there's one people here looking at another people, and so people A and people B, and people B do something that people A interpret differently than if people A had done the same thing, or if people C had done it, and interpret it negatively, and maybe even consistently so.

If that is the rough working definition we use, then there is a great feel of anti-Americanism in South Korea. And that anti-Americanism has a number of reasons, some of which I get at in the introductory chapter. Some things the United States has done in terms of policy, I would agree, I think was bad in terms of the Korean people, and in terms of U.S.-Korean relationship. On the other hand, the United States has done many wonderful things for the Korean people, at least since the Korean War.

And there is this consistent narrative in South Korea that no, nobody here is anti-Americanism, it's just we are criticizing policy. That is not correct. I've lived in Korea off and on for 40 years, and studied it, and I've met many people who hold views of the United States that are conspiratorial, harsh, hostile. Not to the culture, necessarily, but just in the overall way they look at the United States and its relationship with Korea.

It played a huge factor in the period I wrote about, and it continues to play a latent factor in South Korea. And therefore, that kind of prejudice about the United States and its policymakers explains why there was such a reaction to the acquittal of the American soldiers in the Highway 56 accident. They were quite correctly acquitted,

because they had not intentionally, or with serious neglect caused that accident. It was a serious -- a freaky accident, a series of complex things that happened all at once, and it caused a terrible traffic accident of the sort that we see in Korea, by Koreans, on Koreans every single day of the year.

So, why, and moreover, even in Korea, if the person who was involved in the accident, pays the other party, and apologizes, and does all of the culturally accepted things that person, usually, these days, does not go to jail. Certainly we don't go to jail in the United States under those circumstances. And these American soldiers were soldiers sent by the American sovereign to South Korea, they are not American tourists or business people who would be tried under Korean law, these people, because they are foreign soldiers sent and ordered under compulsion by their sovereign, they must be under American law.

Otherwise there would be no basis to send Americans anywhere in the world, including Korea, and the Alliance could not last. So, I do not accept the argument, that Highway 56 was some sort of policy error or some sort of bad behavior on the part of the United States. This was a politicized and historically-conditioned, misinterpretation of what happened by the Korean body politic.

MR. YEO: It's refreshing to hear that, even if you work at State that you can have disagreements and differences in opinion. Because of time, I'm going to collect a few questions, so if we can see -- your hands. And John I see, and in front of you in the blue shirt. And is there one more? Okay. Right here, in the black jacket. So we'll take three questions make -- I'll keep it three, think Jeopardy, ask a question.

QUESTIONER: I'm Jung Ling. I lecture at SAIS for Korea Studies. Congratulations, Professor Straub, and welcome back to Washington. And of course I do agree with your observations, or with Professor Tong Kim's observation too, but my point

is, I do see a kind of self-examination, or self negation might be too much, but self-examination process to, within this kind of anti-Americanism looking phenomena.

And plus, the second point is related to the first. And plus, I mean, we do see a kind of deep mistrust against our own government, and so all those things are actually intertwined together within anti-Americanism looking, again, looking, at the phenomena. So how would you differentiate for example, towards the post the (inaudible) disaster, protest or --

MR. STRAUB: How would I evaluate what?

QUESTIONER: How would you differentiate, yeah -- How would you differentiate other, that other, that kind of you know, like skepticism about our own existing system. And so that's my question.

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Thank you very much, for your comments Mr. Straub. I'm Barry Kayode, an Analyst and Consultant. As someone who studied anti-Americanism, and pro-Americanism in Turkey and Iran during the Cold War, I'm fascinated by the South Korea case. And as I said, as a student of anti-Americanism, I actually wonder sometimes if it really matters with respect to, U.S. relations towards allies or adversaries, or, whether -- Or, to what degree do you think, anti-Americanism, in general, has affected the South Korean -- the sort of cold real politic aspect U.S.-Korean relations? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: First of all, thank you for your informative lecture, Mr. Straub, so I'll make it just quick. So, today's conference the title was, the Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea. But in my opinion, so we heard lots of interesting stories of how he major, or even minor media is distorted, how they -- the misinterpretation during '99 to 2002, that was interesting. But my question is, more regarding your word choices.

So you said anti-Americanism in democratizing South Korea, so during that period of the chaos, and during the period of the misunderstanding for the United States. So how did you see the democratizing or the democracy itself? So, thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: So I'll let you synthesize, and wrap that questions all together in the two minutes.

MR. STRAUB: Okay. Great. In two minutes. Aun Jung, a pleasure to see you, and congratulations! Yes, here is, as you say, in South Korea, a lingering deep distrust by the Korean people of their own government. The South Korea do have a harsh, cynical, and sometimes even conspiratorial view of how South Korea Government makes its decisions. Of course, it usually is divided between left and right, with the party out of power being the one that's the most critical.

And after I wrote this book in manuscript, or actually sometime before, I guess when I was still working on Korea for the government, I was bemoaning, you know, how put upon I felt by how angry Koreans were, and how unfair it was to a Korean journalist, and he's a person very smart, and generally, you know, thinks the U.S.-Korea relationship is okay. And he says, but Dave, you don't understand. We write about everything that way.

So, yes, there is an element of that underlying the general South Korean way of looking at things. But I think it's a longer in the case of the U.S., because the U.S. has been such a salient feature as another, as the most significant other, at least until recent years for most South Koreans. But a very good question.

Does anti-Americanism matter in places like South Korea? Also, a very good question. In the short run, and on a day-to-day basis, no; there is a huge amount of vested interest and inertia all sorts of institutions, including USFK that are the essence or the objectification, to use an academic terms of the Alliance, and so that stuff just goes

on. But throughout my time in Korea, in 40 years, I've consistently heard Koreans say, the U.S. will never leave Korea.

You know, whether we like it or not, the U.S. will never Korea. Well, that's just wrong. If the Alliance relationship, if the U.S. leaders do not see the Alliance as being any longer in the U.S. interest, and part of that would be, do the South Korean people hate the United States now. The U.S. leaders will withdraw from Korea. Now when I was an official, and if I said that, South Koreans would immediately say, oh, you are threatening us. You are trying to force us to do everything the way you want to be in U.S.-ROK relationship.

I said, no, no, I'm just telling you a fact. If you push the U.S. too far, U.S. leaders will remove U.S. Forces from Korea and even end the Alliance relationship. The U.S. has done it in other places. I don't see that as on the horizon, or happening any time soon, but if you get beyond the vested interest of the militaries, and the fears of the politicians that we don't want, you know, anything that would get us criticism, and you get to a situation in which the President of the United States is engaged, and the congressional leadership is engaged, and the media, and the broader U.S. public is engaged, and they are upset because they don't understand what the partner is saying, as was starting to be the case, in a very small way, in Korea at the end of 2002. Then you can see an end to the Alliance. Then anti-Americanism can have a profound effect, but it takes a long time to get there because of (inaudible). Finally, why did we --

MR. YEO: Democratizing?

MR. STRAUB: Why did we -- What about democratizing? I'm not sure if I remember the gist of your question correctly, but frankly I didn't choose the title for this book. This is not very -- not a very academic work, and I wish it were more academic, it's partly memoirs, partly what I've tried to understand as a layman and a friend looking at

Korea and the U.S. for a long time. So this was sort of assigned to me as a title.

I think it's probably the least -- the most sexless title I've heard in 10 years, but to the extent that it does deserve to be there, I think the people who assigned it to me, were thinking -- and these were people originally born in Korea. I think they were thinking: all countries are always democratizing, there is an end state with democracy, and Korea, in particular, of course, you know, the democratic moment was in 1987, 1988. And what I'm writing of -- the period I'm writing about in particular is just basically started very shortly after Kim Dae-jung was elected, the first -- basically, the first Progressive President in the Republic of Korea's history, making that an important democratizing moment.

MR. O'HANLON: Well, on that note, why don't you join me in giving David Straub a round of applause? (Applause) Thank you, again, David, and congratulations on the book.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016