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PROCEEDINGS

MS. MOON: Good morning, everyone. We're very happy to have you here. And we were discussing among us -- has the President touched down yet? Is she on the ground in the United States? It's an exciting week. I'm sure everybody related to Asian studies in Washington, D.C. and Asia policy, everyone is terrible busy with too many events. That's partly why we decided to team up.

On this panel, you have four people who represent four of the top research institutions in Washington, D.C. We also have David Maxwell from Georgetown University so now we have five.

And we thought instead of making you run all over town to go to four or five, six different events, we would try to bring ourselves together and offer ourselves to you in one place, four voices, four perspectives on this occasion of President Park Geun-hye visit to Washington, D.C. to meet with the U.S. president, Mr. Obama.

And I would like to just thank everyone at Brookings, our staff at the Center for East Asia Policy, and all the videographers and everyone else involved. This is being videotaped and we will have video casts available online probably within the week or so.

And just in case you don't know, my name is Kathy Moon. I am a Senior Fellow in CEAP, our center, and also the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies.

I'm just going to introduce Emma. Emma Chanlett-Avery. Do I have that right? We met today. She has a very firm handshake so I decided we're friends already. And Emma was kind enough to come from CRS to be our moderator and also to offer some comparative perspective on Japan and China.

We've recently had visits by Prime Minister Abe as well as President Xi, and so this is a nice medley of Asia summits that we can offer to you. And Emma will be introducing each speaker.

We will begin now. Okay. Thank you.

MS. CHANTLETT-AVERY: Thank you very much, all of you for coming, and to Katherine for offering me the opportunity to moderate this very distinguished panel. I'm going to introduce the two
other speakers, you’ve already heard from Dr. Moon, and let them speak for about 15 minutes each. I will offer just a few minutes of thoughts, and then I’ll turn to the audience for questions after that.

To Katherine’s right is Duyeon Kim. She is a Nonresident Associate in the Nuclear Policy Program and Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. You have the rest of her bio here so you can read about all of her various accolades there.

And at the end of the table is James Person. He is the Deputy Director for the History and Public Policy Program, and the Coordinator of the North Korea International Documentation Project. I’ll let the speakers start now. James, would you like to begin?

MR. PERSON: Sure. Thank you. Just a quick correction on that. I’m now in charge of the Hyundai Motor Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy which was recently launched. And if anyone has a suggestion for an acronym for that, we’re still working on it so, please, do share.

Let me just quickly thank Kathy for suggesting this and for hosting us. I think this is a fantastic idea to bring the research institutes together, saving people on Metro fares and taxi fares, and replacements --

SPEAKER: Time. Time.

MR. PERSON: And time. And time. I hope this is something that we do very often moving forward.

So in preparing for this event, I’m a historian. So what do historians do? I went to the archives. And we assembled a collection of, with the assistance of my great research assistants, we assembled a collection of over 600 pages of documents on summits between the U.S. and the ROK going back to 1954.

These include, again, the meetings, the actual records of the meetings, the memoranda of conversations. They include scene setters. They include some diary materials from people who were involved in the meetings. They also include other materials that were released after declarations and what not, communiques, that were released around these summits.

And what I tried to do then is I tried to identify patterns, trends in the U.S. ROK-Alliance through these summit meetings. It was a bit of a challenge for me. As a historian, I tend to focus on very
specifics and analyze briefer periods, but I'll do my best here to extract some broader insights and general tendencies.

So I think we can identify three periods, more or less, in the Alliance through the records of the summit meeting. The first period, of course, is after the Korean War through the mid-1960s. The second period then lasts from the mid '60s through the late '80s. And then after the late '80s, after the end of the cold war through the present.

This third period I'm not to talk about too much. There are records available, a limited number of records, that have been released legally. There are others that were illegally released which I do not work with. Coming from a federal instrumentality, I'm not permitted to.

But in each of these periods though, these three periods, the Alliance’s institutional arrangements took on really different an increasingly larger number of functions in response to events and to security issues and to changing collective objectives.

So in the very early stage of the alliance, it was primarily a military arrangement that was characterized by a dependence of the ROK on the United States. It was a very asymmetrical alliance designed to defend the ROK against North Korea and against the communist bloc.

Summit meetings between the U.S. and the ROK, of course, reflected these realities, especially, summit meetings with Korea’s founding president, Syngman Rhee, and in 1960 after Syngman Rhee was forced to step down for a very short period of time until the July elections, the Prime Minister Ho Chong. Meetings with these two people, both with Eisenhower, focused primarily on the security of the ROK, questions related to training and strengthening and funding the ROK army. And also to strengthening the ROK economy, although it should be noted that (inaudible) was less focused on economic development, more on security which was much to the frustration of U.S. officials. He was focused on marching north and reunifying the peninsula. He maintained this policy of (inaudible) or in marching north.

And you can see in this 1954, July, 54 summit meeting where he is really trying to push Eisenhower to allow him to actually march north and to get the support and to find out where the U.S. stands on this.
So another important function of the Alliance in this early stage was for not only defending, but, also, restraining because of Sig-man Rhee’s desire to mark north. Eisenhower had to really do a lot to get Sig-man Rhee to hold back on his ambitions to launch another attack on, I’m sorry, but to march north or to try to achieve national reunification.

We know that from the transcript of the first summit meeting we see that he really had to also get Rhee to finally agree to recognizing the Armistice Agreement which Rhee didn’t sign, and, in fact, tried to sabotage by releasing prisoners of War. So a lot was done to try to restrain Rhee and this was a major function of the alliance early on.

So if today then we talk about an alliance based on trust and mutual respect. These attributes were really all but absent from the very early summit talks.

Eisenhower, in fact, was discouraged from even going to the airport in ‘54 to greet Sig-man Rhee because there was concern that Sig-man Rhee would intentionally try to embarrass him, say something that would embarrass President Eisenhower in front of the media cameras that had audio. It was decided instead to have the greeting ceremony at the White House where cameras would not have audio.

So for Rhee too though, trust was absent. He didn’t put much stock in the U.S commitment to the ROK security. We see this in the transcripts of the meeting where he is trying to really find out where the U.S. stands on reunification and on defending the ROK because Eisenhower wasn’t, in fact, trying to encourage Korea to cut the number of troops to make some major reductions in expenditures on the military.

And we see also in letters that Rhee was writing to people like James Van Fleet where he’s basically admitting that he doesn’t think the mutual defense treaty that was ratified in 1954 was worth the paper on which it was written. He really didn’t believe in the credibility of the U.S. at this time.

So another thing that emerges in the early years of the Alliance was some concern about relations between the ROK and Japan. We see that Rhee was pushing back on Eisenhower’s request to normalize relations with Japan. Then we see that also Prime Minister Ho Chong, again, in 1960, vented about the U.S. not doing enough to get Japan to recognize that it mistreated Korea during the colonial period and that it was continuing to mistreat Korea after the colonial period.
And there was a lot of frustration about the U.S. doing more to help rebuild Japan which
was a defeated nation, but not enough to help Korea build up its economy. Apparently, he wasn’t aware
of President Rhee’s resistance to pressure to focus on the economy.

He was also, Ho Chong was also quite frustrated that, for example, the U.S. did not step
in when Japan made an agreement with North Korea to repatriate ethnic Koreans from Japan to North
Korea starting, I think, in 1957. There was a lot of frustration over this because it seemed to provide
some legitimacy to North Korea. It was in the eye of ROK officials.

During this period, also, summits really did a lot to provide legitimacy. We see this in the
1960 summit meeting between Park Chung-hee and Kennedy a few months after the military coup. And
so by being invited to the White House, it gave a lot of legitimacy to the Park Chung-hee government.

So the next stage in the evolution of the alliance that emerges through these materials,
through these records, was again from the mid-1960s when the ROK decided to commit combat troops to
Vietnam. It had already committed non-combat troops from ’64, but in May of ’65 the Johnson
Administration was increasing pressure on the ROK to send in combat troops as well providing an
assurance that the ROK could have access to $150 million in economic development loans, and also
providing assurances that the U.S. would not unilaterally withdraw or reduce troop levels in Korea. This is
something that, in fact, had been threatened if the ROK did not send combat troops.

So with the dispatch of ROK troops to Vietnam, the U.S.-ROK alliance then became, it
became more concerned with more than just deterrence or external threats to Korea. It came to play an
increasingly significant role in addressing challenges outside of the Korean peninsula.

So for the U.S., the Alliance then was becoming less about restraining the ROK. With
Sig-man Rhee ousted in 1960, and this march north or (inaudible) being replaced by a policy of economy
first, reunification later, the U.S. was able to, it became less of a focus. And so, again, this restraining
influence was not important.

The economy of the ROK was also dramatically improving during this period and there
was a greater emphasis on burden sharing. This actually shows that it was becoming less and less of a
dependent relationship.
We can see from summit records that it was more symmetrical and the ROK was trying to, in fact, negotiate for more of its economic and military interests. And it achieved a lot of this, actually. Was able to successfully negotiate for a lot of their interests.

There were difficulties though during this period. The ROK economy was improving, but there were also difficulties with the U.S. economy. Runaway inflation, budgets, and this pressure for more burden sharing led to tensions in the relationship.

There were also a lot of external challenges to the alliance during this period, including in ‘68 the attempt to assassinate Park Chung-hee at the Blue House Raid. Two days later, the Pueblo incident and the U.S. effort to resolve or, rather, the U.S. decision to focus more on the Pueblo and not to really do much of anything in response to the Blue House Raid. This frustrated Park Chung-hee.

Moreover, the individual, or the unilateral decision was made to withdraw troops from Korean, despite the fact that Johnson said this wouldn’t happen. And in 1971 and again in ‘77, the decision was made to withdraw troops.

And this really made Park Chung-hee begin to question the commitment of the U.S. to the ROK’s security. The ROK was strengthening its national defenses but was not yet able to carry that burden alone. And so these troop withdrawals were quite frustrating.

So this issue combined with the criticisms of Jimmy Carter of Park Chung-hee’s human rights record led to one of the tensest summits in the history of U.S.-ROK relations. Cyrus Vance provides some fascinating discussions of this saying that you could feel the temperature in the room cooling as Carter was sitting there listening to Park Chung-hee go on for 45 minutes about troop withdrawals. And despite the fact that they actually, Carter’s people contacted Park Chung-hee’s aides and said make sure that he does not, that President Park does not bring up troop withdrawals. And that’s the very first thing he does. And for 45 minutes talks about this and led to some very tense moments.

The relationship again improved though. Summits went a lot smoother especially in ‘81 when Chun-Doo-hwan was invited by Regan top the Blue House showing that the commitment to anti-communist allies was greater than other concerns, including human rights.

The third stage of the Alliance which I will let my colleagues describe more, the alliance really, again, was much more symmetrical and, you know, faced many and continues to face many new
and complex security problems that come from beyond the traditional geographic, and continue to come from beyond the traditional geographic boundaries of the alliance beyond Korea, including international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and then you have nonmilitary security issues, international crime, privacy, human trafficking, drugs trafficking, natural disasters. And these are things that continued to be discussed and I’m sure will be discussed at the upcoming, or at the summit this week.

So thank you, Kathy. Sorry for --

MS. MOON: No problem. I start to play music to get you off the stage. Thank you so much particularly for doing the heavy lifting of actually going to the archives and bringing that up. And it’s funny to note that even back in 1960 we were concerned about Japan’s and South Korea’s relationship and concerned about burden sharing. So it’s certainly illuminating to look back.

We’re going to turn now to Duyeon, who is now based in Seoul so can give us a little bit of a perspective from South Korea.

MS. KIM: Thank you. I first want to thank Kathy as well and Brookings for hosting this excellent event and we should do this more often. It will make everybody’s lives easier, your lives and our lives easier to do a combined effort.

This is a good segue because I, and we actually didn’t coordinate this way, but it works out perfectly. I will speak more on more recent history of summits and discuss it from the vantage point of South Korean public expectations and perceptions. Public slash media.

And I’ll define public more around media writ large rather than the policy elite or pundits in South Korea. To give you my bottom lines up front before I go through the themes, throughout modern Korean history or modern summit history, we can see some reoccurring, overarching themes manifested through public slash media demands on certain direction or action on policies and issues.

So basically, we can break these up into different categories. In terms of policy, a reoccurring theme and priority is, of course, North Korea, policy towards North Korean and this is no surprise.

In terms of themes, we see, in general, reoccurring themes of sovereignty, national pride, and trust. And as grateful as Koreans are to the U.S., they do not like to be treated as subordinate or
perceived as subordinate, especially after the economic miracle on the (inaudible) and Korea’s growing stature on the international stage.

So we see, and this also links to expectations and demands for a more, and James touched upon this, from a asymmetric alliance to a more symmetric alliance between equal partners.

Another reoccurring theme and take aways that we can see is perception and the importance of perception and atmospherics of the summits between the two leaders. And perception and atmospherics are regarded just as important as policy in a lot of instances.

And also, lastly, the South Korean public slash media just like any public slash media in most countries around the world pay more attention --

SPEAKER: Could you speak a little bit closer to the microphone?

MS. KIM: Sure. Yes. They pay more attention to tangible issues that affect them directly, more urgent issues like North Korea and not theoretical, bigger vision issues. And I put the bigger issue category to include turning a points in the alliance, whether it’s most recently in 2009, a joint vision statement release between Presidents Myung-bak and Obama.

So I will go through in three different categories of the worst summit, the best, and the upcoming summits.

So to start with, a most recent history. To start with the summit that was considered the most disastrous. Some pundits even called it Nightmare Summit. And this was between President Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush in March of 2001.

Pundits I think pretty much hands down have all agreed, there’s a consensus that the alliance ceased to function effectively since the summit. This was right when President Bush came into office.

And one week before the summit, the reason why this summit was considered a nightmare the way the two leaders walked into the summit. So a week before the actual summit, South Korean publicly took Russia’s side, basically, in the debate over Washington’s plan for national missile defense.
So basically, the South Korean president and the Russian president, they both released a statement saying that the anti-ballistic missile treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability and that it should not only be preserved but also be strengthened.

Now this upset President Bush because this was a remnant from the Clinton Administration and President Bush during his transition years came into office saying that he wants to scrap the anti-ballistic missile treaty. He wants to withdraw from it.

So this went against the grain, went against President Bush’s preferences. So the two, the two leaders walked into the summit with some clouds over their heads. And during the summit President Kim Dae-jung reportedly also lectured President Bush explaining his sunshine policy of engagement and how he wants to approach North Korea more from an engagement strategy rather than a hardline policy.

And President Kim was reported to have said, told President Bush that if you get to know Kim jung-(inaudible), he’s actually not a bad guy. And this also astonished President Bush. This clearly upset him. And that was the start of a wonderful relationship between the two presidents during that period.

So that’s the backdrop and that’s a bit of a back story. But in terms of the public expectation before the summit, again, North Korea policy was at the top of the list. North Korea policy and direction. They were confused about what South Korea and the U.S. would agree upon in terms of President Bush’s national missile defense project that he wanted to implement.

The public wanted more. The atmosphere in South Korea was, of course, President Kim Dae-jung in office and more of an engagement policy. In general terms, the South Korean public wanted improvement in South/North relations. The public also expected the two leaders, not knowing a lot of this back story, they expected the two leaders to reconfirm the traditional alliance. And they also expected the two leaders to discuss North Korean leader Kim Jong-pil’s return visit, return meeting to Seoul, so this was after, on the heels of the (inaudible) summit in 2000. So they’re expecting American and South Korean leaders to discuss a visit by Kim jong-pil to South Korea.

After the summit, the reaction in the public was generally more or less positive, perhaps because based upon the joint statement that was released between the two leaders despite the fact that
they had some heated conversations behind the scene which is normal in diplomacy where you have heated conversations behind the scenes but in public. In the photo op you've got smiling faces and shaky hands for the photo op and a nice positive joint statement.

But the media and the public also still, nevertheless, expressed some concern and some confusion. They picked up on the disconnect and the perception gap between the two leaders towards North Korea.

Progressives called for South Korea to take a lead on North Korean issues. They didn’t trust President Bush. They believed President Bush’s animosity towards Kim Jong-pils was too strong and too severe for any improvement on North Korea.

Conservatives also called for a fundamental review of North Korean policy. And also some progressive media outlets called for, in line with taking the lead on North Korea issues, they urged President Kim to persuade Kim Jong-pil directly to improve relations. They called upon South/North militaries to start building trust between the two militaries.

Now in terms of the best of times of the alliance, I’ve chosen, we could have chosen several different summits, but I chose the Myung-bak-Obama summit of June, 2009 because this was also, I guess we can in general terms calls this a bit of a turning point in the Alliance because it really, this was when the two, when the allies released a joint vision statement.

And this statement firmly committed to building a more comprehensive, strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope based on common values and mutual trust. But here again the public’s expectation before this summit was heavily focused on North Korea, and this was after the second nuclear test and missile tests.

They were expecting Presidents (inaudible) and Obama to send North Korea a strong message. They wanted and expected the two leaders to devise a detailed plan to deter North Korean aggression to solve the nuclear problem, and to establish future oriented alliance.

And some outlets, some media outlets also called up the two leaders to discuss an exit strategy for North Korea.
So as much as some media outlets wanted a firmer stance toward North Korea, they also called up the South Korean and American leaders to think of an exit strategy for North Korea so that it can join the international community.

In terms of the public and media reaction after the summit, generally, it was very positive. They noted the joint visions statement not in much detail because, again, North Korea is at the top of their list. But they did recognize that strong cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea is inevitable, but the media seemed a bit unsure in terms of deliverables, in terms of concrete plans of action that came out of the summit, in terms of how do you induce a change in behavior by North Korean.

And so some media outlets expressed some regrets saying it’s unfortunate that the two leaders could not think of better inducement to bring North Korea to the dialogue table. And as you all remember, ever since December, 2008, we have not seen the resumption of the six-party talks.

Again, because the public naturally and understandably is focused more on tangible results and deliverables and polices that affect them directly, there was not too much in-depth reporting on the joint vision statement, and Kathy is going to talk more about that and how that really brought the alliance to a different, a new level.

But at the same time, in terms of the public, in terms of pundits in South Korea, yes, they also noted this is the best of times for the alliance. But at the same time, they did note part of the reason why it is the best of times is because not only the personal dynamics and the relationship between President Xi and Obama, but also because the tough issues, the tough bilateral issues were left for the next administration to handle, of President Park Geun-hye and the Obama Administration to handle. So they attribute some of that, some of the best of times to that.

In terms of the upcoming summit, again, North Korea is a big priority. And this is where you see in general terms, and, of course, we can parse this and unpack this in more detail, but in general terms because we have not seen much movement on the North nuclear issue, both progressive and conservative media outlets are concerned about the issue. They do want to see some movement. Whatever that movement is, they want to see a proactive policy on North Korea.

And the media and the public generally has a perception that President Obama is not interested in the North Korean nuclear issue. They believe that President Park needs to persuade
President Obama directly to do more than just watch North Korea develop its nuclear weapon and missile programs, although they are split on (inaudible) and how to approach it. Yes, you have those who want more engagement, and on the other hand, you have media outlets who want a tougher stance towards North Korea.

Another point of interest is the rise of China and tensions with Japan. So the public in South Korea does expect and is hoping that President’s Park and Obama can discuss the evolving geopolitical and security relationship in North Korea, in northeast Asia, and to elicit more of Washington’s support and help to -- I have to be careful using either mediate or facilitate -- but facilitates relations between Japan and South Korea. And also to give South Korea more leeway as it deals with, as it cooperates with China economically and as it cooperates with the U.S. on security issues and other global and regional issues.

Sovereignty, national pride, again, is a reoccurring theme for this upcoming summit. Yes, most pundits and experts and even journalist in South Korea do believe we are still at the best of times of the alliance. But at the same time, they do send words of caution that this summit still, President Park still needs to walk away, and this is also the perception issue and atmospherics issue, as an equal partner and not as a subordinate.

And so the far left media, even blatantly says that President Park will need to oppose all of Washington’s initiatives and policies that it wants. So, for example, TPP. President Park needs to oppose U.S. arms sales to South Korea. President Park needs to oppose (inaudible). And so there’s a whole laundry list.

But at the same time you’ve got on the other hand conservative media outlets who do value the relationship and see the strong bond and yet at the same time this is, again, a reoccurring theme of sovereignty, wanting more quality and parity in the alliance.

So I’ll leave it at that and I think Kathy can pick it up from there.

MS. MOON: All right. So the message to take from that is you can never escape criticism from the left wing media, right, no matter what you do?

MS. KIM: But that’s the beauty of a democracy.
MS. MOON: I also wanted to say that I agree with you identifying Myung-bak summit with Obama is the best because if you remember, they also (inaudible) while he was on the ground. So that really hit it out of the park.

MS. MOON: Thank you. I think you now have a sense of why it’s important to have both a historical and a comparative look in time at these summits, and why these kinds of documents as well as interviews and conversations that are current are so important.

We often just focus on the issue at hand or the visit at hand in D.C. But almost always it’s taken out of context. The larger context geopolitically, regionally, but, of course, the larger context historically, and I think it’s a wonderful retrospective in a way to think about the evolution of the U.S.-Korea relationship in general not just the alliance, and how much it has grown and evolved and transformed into as of 2000 the constantly touted, emphasized, comprehensive strategic alliance and relationship versus the straightforward, narrow military relationship that had been the hallmark or the main characteristic when it began.

So another question we have for all of us is from this visit of President Park and President Obama on, where will the evolution of the relationship go. What other issues, what other frameworks, what other responsibilities not only bilaterally but regionally and globally will both countries take on independently and together. I think these are questions we should always keep in our head for some time to come.

What I’d like to do is also show off my much shorter stack of documentation. We’re competing here as scholars on who has the bigger stack.

(Laughter.)

MS. MOON: Of course, you’re the former journalist. He’s the historian, and I’m the political scientist. It makes sense in terms of how large our stacks are.

But we all are serious analysts and I am a wannabe diplomatic historian as I always tell James. I found it interesting. I went through, I focus mostly on joint statements, press conferences, some of the very short, simple, condensed versions of the historical record rather than the longer, elaborate versions that, of course, James works with regularly.
I also found some wonderful documents, a compilation of, it's the American Presidency Project, a compilation of all sorts of records on U.S. presidents dating very far back through the University of California, Santa Barbara website. They have archives there. It's [www.presidency.ucsb.edu](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu).

And so we have a richness of materials I think we should all take advantage of. And even journalist from time to time you would find some interesting tidbits that would enrich the kind of reporting you do.

When I went through these, I was really amazed at some of the common threads that are woven together over, you know, over a half of century of summits and relational meetings.

On the other hand, I was also very surprised at strange inclusions, and I'll mention, for example, when President, was when President Park and President Jimmy Carter met in 1979, what I found amazing -- was it '79? '79, right? Yeah. What I was amazed at was that President Carter really asked for South Korean President Park Chung-hee’s assistance to help with the Indo-China refugee crisis. And I had never thought of South Korea as a country back in the '70s that had serious development, overseas development or humanitarian aid policies at that time partly because Korea was still a struggling economy in need of help itself.

And President Park, lo and behold, said, yeah, we already have increased our contribution to the U.N. HCR, to the High Commissioner of Refugees, to assist. So that was a really surprising tidbit.

Another interesting tidbit that the issue of terrorism that we deal with constantly in all presidential summits involving the United States now actually had seeds in the 19, of course 60s with the terrorists or you could say North Korean invasions, which were terrorist invasions in today’s parlance, into South Korea, but also during Chun Doo-hwan and Ronald Reagan’s summits and discussions, diplomatic discussions about the bilateral relationship really focusing on the terror experience in Rangoon, the Korean Airline bombing, as well as, of course, what was going on in terms of the bombing of U.S. troops and facilities in Lebanon.

So this issue of terrorism is not new and I think we need to keep that in mind and think how did the two countries deal with issues way back then, how were the issues different versus now, and,
of course, you know, future issues regarding terrorism or refugee crises which we are in the thick of in Asia as well as Europe and the Middle East now and going forward.

So rather than just continuing off my stack, and, you know, mine color coordinated because I did my homework. I don’t know if you’ve actually done your homework highlighting. But let me go through very briefly what I think are some very interesting observations that we can make based on just my very limited search and research of these kinds of summit documents, mostly joint statements, press conferences, et cetera.

When I looked at these documents, of course they are for the historical record. But they are also, it’s like watching a play. You know, Koreans love (inaudible) drama series, right. This is a mega diplomatic (inaudible). This is a drama series that goes on and on and on every year, maybe not every year, but every few years with every presidency, right?

So I started looking at these documents as scripts for plays or for TV shows. Scripts. And when you look at these as policy scripts, you can find some interesting observations. They contain the two countries’ textual assurance. Assurance by text, the written word. Textual assurance and textual criticism of each other. Assurance to each other of their mutual and respective commitments, and criticism in very diplomatic terms.

They also contain a mantra, the repeated prayer or the repeated om in yoga, okay, the repeated mantra of alliance stability and the reaffirmation of U.S. commitments to the ROK, security and economic prosperity.

Now, of course, that’s not the foundation of the bilateral relationship. But most of the time it’s really boring because they just go through it and it’s just a script. You know, we are mutually committed, we’re very loyal, we’re very grateful to each other, blah, blah, blah, blah.

However these mantras are important and really necessary when there are moments of rupture in the alliance relationship as my two predecessors have already mentioned. The period of the alliance during Jimmy Carter and Park Chung-hee when President Carter had wanted to withdraw troops from South Korea and South Koreans of all political colors were opposed to this.
And so during that summit when President Carter went to Seoul, I was actually I think 15 or 16 years old, and my father was very involved as a Korean-American in politics in the Democratic Party at the time, and he made us, my sister and me, we were 15 and 13, 16, 14, wait in our first high heels in the heat of Seoul’s summer to try to, to catch a glimpse of President Carter. We didn’t manage and I was so angry at my father for the rest of my visit to Korea.

But during that summer visit, the reassurance by President Carter of not only the mutual assistance treaty and the U.S commitment to it, the maintenance of, retention of U.S, troops, and the extended nuclear deterrence. It’s in the actual joint statement.

The nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence, is not often mentioned in the joint statements. And it’s interesting to note when they show up and when they don’t. And it showed up with Carter and Park during that time.

Carter was also on President Park’s U.S. Enemy No. 1 list because of Mr. Carter’s insistence on human right regimes all over the world, and President Park was not exempt. And so this was a bad time and so this emphasis on the stability of the alliance, the reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment. It was very important. It was not just a repetition among numerous repetitions.

The alliance stability, reaffirmation of U.S. commitment also becomes important in moments of geopolitical changes and big shifts. Again, President Carter and President Park Chung-hee in 1979, President Carter felt compelled to go to Seoul partly to explain what was going on in China, with China and the U.S. and China and Japan.

He wanted to explain personally the changing geopolitical context in Asia and, of course, globally, and to reassure President Park that the U.S. was not going to abandon South Korea because South Koreans were afraid that the U.S. had abandoned Taiwan as the Taiwanese felt at that time, and Japan’s peace and friendship treaty with China which it signed in 1978, and then the U.S. diplomatic normalization with China in early 1979 that these major diplomatic geopolitical shifts were not intended to worry South Korea.

So during these big moments of either alliance rupture, crisis, or geopolitical shifts, the mantra of commitment to the security alliance becomes particularly weighty.
The documents also contain summaries of main issues that are already on the bilateral agenda or in diplomatic process. And sometimes the two presidents emphasize specific issues because they need extra political public boost or support. One of the most recent best examples is the need for President George W. Bush and President Myung-bak to get the FTA in motion, in progress, and to get South Koreans and Americans behind it.

So during their meetings, this became, the FTA became a very important issue. And it was not only because it was a salient issue bilaterally, but because both sides needed the public boosting, the public support.

Summaries of main issues also include moment when presidents need to be particularly grateful or come begging. And it’s not always the, quote, weaker, smaller ally to the bigger. It’s also the larger ally. So, for example, George W. Bush every time he met President (inaudible) with whom he did not have a good relationship, but when I went through these, I thought they had some of the most successful summits. Because their relationship and their policy orientations were so different, actually their summits were quite harmonious, and both brought much flesh and meet to the table. For vegetarians, I’m very sorry. They brought a lot of tofu to the table, lot of protein. That’s what I’m trying to say.

And so President George W. Bush every time he met President Moo-hyun thanked him for South Korean’s assistance in the U.S. fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, for humanitarian assistance, for troop assistance, troop contributions, and for continued political diplomatic support of U.S. policy. So these moments become very important, these ongoing issues.

North Korea is another issue that is what I consider the constant refrain. You know, if we think about rather than a script, a musical score that these documents can also represent, North Korea is the regular melody with hardly any variation on a theme. It is also the unfinished symphony, okay, ala Mr. Schubert, and what I found really disheartening and depressing is that North Korea is a character as in a script mentioned every time, but the character actually, and the plot line, the narrative plot line of North Korea, it really doesn’t develop much, and this is really disheartening when you look at this historically.

So North Korea though as of around the early 1990s takes on much more of a robustness in its character description. You know, when we watch dramas, movies, we want characters
to develop. And until the 1990s, according to these scripts, North Korea has very little character development. It’s just mentioned. It’s there in the background.

From the early 1990s on, it takes on fuller form and more flesh and personality, and there is much more textual room given to North Korea. And why? I think South Korea’s democratization had a lot to do with it because South Korea was free. South Korean were free to discover and explore North Korean in all sorts of ways and get more information about North Korea, and able to come up with new ways to think about North Korea.

Also, the end of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S. freed up North Korea from the Soviet and Chinese sphere of influence. So, again, more freedom to think about North Korea, to envision North Korean, imagine North Korean, to talk about North Korea and give it more form in these documents and in real diplomacy, and the reality that North Korea from the early 1990s became a nuclear menace and so, of course, it takes up more space.

I’m asked to stop but I’m only three-quarters through my first page so let me just go through very quickly some other key points and then I will try to add some during the Q&A, the remainder of my points.

So the other thing that’s mentioned in summits that I think we don’t pay enough attention to is sometimes there are little tidbits, information, bargaining chips, issues to think about that are thrown out that sometimes are not taken up by other administrations or even by the same leader.

And this is an interesting one. In January, 1992 in Seoul when President George Herbert Bush met with President Roh Tae-woo, the bargaining chip was thrown out for North Korea or to North Korea regarding when the U.S. President George Herbert Bush basically stated very clearly that he and president Roh are prepared, and this is a quote, to forego the team period exercise for this year if the DPRK would abide by the IAEA obligations to the NPT which it then was party to, and take steps to implement inspection agreements based on the Joint Non-Nuclear Declaration of December 31st, 1991 that both Koreas had signed.

This is a momentous tidbit of information that we now forget about or many in Washington don’t want to think about. And what I throw out to you is should the cessation or the
refraining of joint military exercises which North Korea hates ever become, should it ever become another bargaining chip, I throw it out to you to think about, or should it be forgotten.

It was useful once. Might it be useful in another circumstance for specific goals?

The other areas here are economic relations and democracy and human rights. What I found fascinating is that as much as summit focus and the media in the U.S., in Korea, in East Asia focus constantly on security relations, economic issues are the mainstay of these summits.

You know, it's like if you play the piano or any instrument, okay, I'm trying to awaken all your senses. Not just your policy senses but your musical esthetic senses, you have a treble clef, the high notes, and then you have the base clef and low notes. If the security relationship and issues are the low notes, the base clef, in my view the economic issues are the treble clef. There's constant melody being played about economic issues and they are much more specific than the security issues. And there's much more progress, actually, that's made, much more movement on the economic issues.

And for the United States, I would even venture to say that economic issues sometimes are more important than the security. For the South Koreans, the security issue seem sometimes more, most of the time more important.

And what's interesting is that from the early periods of the 1950s, '60s, '70s on there's constant push by the United States to try to get the South Koreans to open up its markets and to move toward a liberal model, economic model, especially in trade.

And then it's really with the (inaudible) FTA very recently that there is very little constraining of frustrating remarks made by U.S. presidents even in these very manicured diplomatic documents about the need for South Korea to do more.

The FTA basically, I think, has stopped the U.S. from constantly knocking on South Korea's economic door saying open up, open up, open up, open up. And over time from the FTA on, the documents reveal the U.S. using phrases about partnership, emphasizing partnership with South Korea and the South Koreans and the Americans taking a joint leadership in regional and global economic affairs, and I think this is a very positive move.

On democracy and human rights, if you'll indulge me just a few minutes here, I found this also to be interesting because during the time of (inaudible), the U.S. could not do much about human
rights, democracy partly because the U.S. had accepted that the bigger fight was communism, ala Soviet Union and China, and North Korea was part of that bloc.

But American presidents used these kinds of terms whenever they met in summit formats. They talked about the wish and the hope of American for South Korea to move toward democratic institutions, or sometimes democracy was not even used, institutions that would allow more freedom or flexibility. Institutional changes. And these were in a way key words for democratization and more freedom. And, of course, only with President Carter did democracy/human rights become full-fledged, explicit demands that the U.S. began to make in these diplomatic formats.

What I find interesting is that it’s really President Clinton in the 1990s first with President Kim Young-sam in 1994, and then, of course, with President Kim Dae-jung in their summits where the emphasis on democracy and freedom really get highlighted.

First, from the U.S. perspective, South Korea is not touted as a democracy as the outset even as South Korea is undergoing democratization, but there was an emphasis on the individual presidents as embodiments of democracy and freedom. Clinton focused on Kim Young-sam and the later on Kim Dae-jung as these personal embodiments of democracy and freedom, and, therefore, South Korea was in the good graces of American’s democratic vision.

Over time, and it’s really the joint vision statement that Duyeon talks about of 2009 between George W. Bush and Myung-bak where they talk about this comprehensive strategic alliance that includes freedom, democracy. It’s amazing. Our open societies. Our commitment to free democracy and market economy. Comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope based on common values and mutual trust and democracy and freedom become ensconced fully institutionalized since 2009 or in the late, in the late 2008 period, late 2000s onward.

For those of you who look only at the present moment, this is a really short time in which the two countries are focusing on democracy and human rights in this kind of script and for the historical record. The two countries have talked about it for a long time, but it has not always been on the historical record. Very short period of time.

Now I have to talk about North Korea and human rights, and then I will end since that’s another issue that has more recently become part of the historical record and the script. And, of course,
every script from now on within these summits most likely will contain the reference to North Korea and human rights.

George Herbert Bush and Roh Tae-woo in January of 1992 when they met in Seoul during a joint press conference, it was not part of the joint statements or any kind of a negotiated manicured statement in which the human rights of North Koreans came out, but it was President George Herbert Bush who said during the press conference when somebody asked, when a reporter asked, “Does the U.S. have preconditions for upgrading the relations with DPRK?” and George H. Bush responded this way. “I would add in some respect in their case,” North Korea, “because of the miserable record for individual rights, human rights before there would be an upgrading with the United States.” Meaning that he would add that the upgrading of human rights, the improvement in North Korea would have to be a precondition.

Americans today don’t often go back to that period of President H. Bush. People think it was George W. Bush, that administration, who really raised the issue of human rights with North Korea.

George W. Bush in his summit with, I have GWB and LNB, Myung-bak and George W. Bush when they met in their summit, they explicitly stated their commitment to, “For North Korea to integrate into the international community, it has to reaffirm the commitment to improving the human rights situation in North Korean and the U.S. and the South Koreans have a shared view that in the process of normalizing relations, meaningful progress should be made on improving North Korea’s human rights record.”

So, again, these are now on the template, on the record, in the script and we shall see what this week’s template, record, script, musical score provide us to think about.

Thank you.

MS. CHANTLETT-AVERY: Thank you very much for drawing out those themes as well as for the tidbits which are great to hear.

I also want everyone to just take a moment to appreciate how well you matched the screen right here. We’ve spared no detail for our audience here.

MS. KIN: Absolutely. We’re on video.
MS. CHANTLETT-AVERY: And after these presentations, where there have been some great looks back, I'm actually just going to go back as far as April and give some of my own personal observations, not those of CRS, of course, but my own observations about the previous two summits from Northeast Asian leaders that we've had here in Washington.

Looking ahead to this visit, I anticipate at least that because basically the U.S.-South Korean relationship is in very good shape right now, a lot of the issues that had not been ironed out, the 123 Agreement, (inaudible) transfer, some base issues, if not actually resolved are certainly being well managed right now.

And that somewhat as a result, I think there will be some emphasis on South Korea's regional relations. And I think that the leaders of Japan and China will be watching this summit looking for messages there and possibly comparing their own visits in the last year or to President Parks.

Of course, the most recent visit was president Xi Jinping, and even though it was somewhat overshadowed by the Papal visit that preceded him, it certainly garnered a lot of attention.

But it's pretty difficult to compare that summit with the upcoming summit. I mean, obviously, the visit and the relationship as a whole was of a completely different nature. I mean, I anticipate that this is more of a, first of all, it's not a state visit, of course, so there's not the same degree of pomp. And it's more of a checking in with an ally compare to the Xi visit which was a more rigid, more structured, probably a bit more tense when U.S. official were engaging with their Chinese visitors on particular issues, whereas, I think that this will be much more of a feel-good summit.

It's actually somewhat remarkable I think that given the number of serious issues the United States has with China, and some of them involving national security, we do still lay out the red carpet and have these visits. It's hard to think of another country with whom we have these high-level, high-profile visits with whom we have such significant concerns. But I guess it's an indication that diplomatic channel remains open which I suppose is a good thing.

One point of possible contrast here with Xi’s visit. Of course, there’s an obsession in Beijing with the ceremonial aspects of the visit and how it plays back home. I think that all leaders are concerned with that, but, obviously, as we’ve heard, the media scrutiny will be much more stringent, I think, on Park. It's not as controlled, the message that comes back from Washington.
Turning just briefly to Japan then even though I sort of hesitate to get into any sort of report card comparing the two visits because of the two countries' tendency to painstakingly observe each other's interactions with Washington and where they fall relative to each other which would suggest a zero-sum game, I will talk a little bit about Prime Minister Abe’s April visit here because it was historic.

It was historic because it was the first time that a Japanese leader has addressed a joint meeting of Congress as compared to South Korea. South Korea has had six leaders, I believe, address a joint meeting, including the previous two.

And, of course, this was also a state visit of a very high profile. President Park’s first summit here in 2013 really had those atmospherics. She did the joint meeting and really I think that summit maybe not quite as high as Myung-bak’s summit with Obama but it really did was successful in terms of setting the tone for the relationship back in 2013.

The Abe visit was also very notable and seen as a big success because he was seen as really delivering on some key U.S. priorities. Entering into the TPP negotiations. Right before his visit to the White House they signed a revision of the mutual defense guidelines which some planners see as possibly transformational. And so this was another reason that it got a lot of attention.

And another sort of interesting contrast here though is I think that the U.S.-South Korea alliance doesn’t necessarily need for the leader of South Korea to be particularly popular for the alliance to be seen as very sound and strong. I mean, originally, President Park was going to visit a couple months ago when her political standing was somewhat weaker, but I don't think that there was concern on the U.S. side that this was going to damage the summit in any way.

Whereas, with Abe, it’s really essential that he maintains some political capital in order to push through the kind of changes that the U.S. has been asking of him.

And then there’s just one other point that I'll make that I don’t want to overplay, but it’s worth mentioning. While Abe was here, there was really a sense at least in the context of the visit that he was fully embracing the U.S.-Japan alliance and aligning Japan’s strategic views really to a tee with the United States.

And whereas, the U.S.-South Korean alliance has been seen as really hand-in-glove in terms of our approach to North Korean and, of course, North Korea provides that central ballast to the
relationship, there’s some concern in some quarters that South Korea and President Park have drifted further into Beijing’s orbit, and they would point to probably her attendance at the Chinese military parade last month as one indication of this.

So for those who are concerned with this drift, they’ll looking probably for some reaffirmation of the U.S-South Korean alliance while President Park is here that extends beyond just the Korean peninsula, but in terms of a strategic vision for the whole region.

Those are just a few points that I’ll make. And I’d now like to turn -- we can go ten minutes over? Okay. Then gear up your questions. I’m going to turn to the audience and if it’s okay collect two or three at a time, and then ask the panel to address them.

Please state your name, your affiliation, and a question. Please limit your comments and be as succinct as you can with your questions, and wait for the microphone.

David, I’d like to do a few more. And right here also. Right there. That’s number two. We’ll start with that. That one is not working? Do we have a back-up microphone? Okay.

SPEAKER: Why don’t we come back? Why don’t we come back to -- oh. All right. We’ll go to you

MR. MAXWELL: Thank you. David Maxwell, Georgetown University. And thank you for putting this together. This was excellent and I hope that there are people at the White House perhaps could take 90 minutes and view this, especially those writing the script or the musical score.

Two quick questions. James, a great rundown. Duyeon mentioned and talked about the 2009 joint vision statement, and you mentioned, of course, Sig-man’s focus on unification back in the ‘50s, but has there ever been a time in any of the summits where a statement like the joint vision statement has been written and articulated that also emphasizes unification to that extent?

And the question I would really have really for Duyeon and Katherine, if President Park were to ask for something concrete from the United States in terms of supporting the Dresden Initiative and supporting unification, what might she ask for something that would be concrete? I think your points about trying to get something concrete out of any summit is important and I think unification is on everybody’s mind right now and what do you think that President Park would like from the United States?

MS. CHANTLETT-AVERY: Let’s collect one more question and the go to the panel.
SPEAKER: Thank you for the speech about historical perspectives. But my generation and I are more interesting about upcoming future. The thing is that I have two questions. Sorry, my name is Young Han from George Washington University and I have two questions about, related to North Korea’s nuclear programs.

The first one is about concerning the current (inaudible) nuclear agreement. So do you think this kind of like (inaudible) some kind of significant meanings to North Korean nuclear programs, and about (inaudible) sanctions on nuclear program of North Korea?

And the second one is about I’m just wondering is there any more concrete action plan or framework between U.S. and South Korea about to bring out North Korea to negotiation table again? So I’m just wondering about this. Thank you.

MS. MOON: Okay, I’ll take one portion of David’s question. What are the specific issues regarding unification that President Park might ask of President Obama. I personally think that she won’t be asking anything very specific partly because the time is not ripe, R-I-P-E. I don’t think neither Korea nor the U.S. have a clear vision or a roadmap about unification. And I think even though in South Korea there has been a lot of talk and a lot of meetings around the presidential preparatory committee, etc., Koreans themselves are questioning what the roadmap could be and should be.

I think it would be premature to bring that out in a summit. I think what would be reasonable is to just feel out the temperature in terms of what are the areas in terms of unification, what are the aspects of unification where the U.S. would be able to assist, support, and not? In what ways might the U.S. be concerned and have to become involved? For example, if it’s a military or a non-peaceful process, of course the U.S. will somehow be involved. If the Chinese are involved for whatever reason, the U.S. will have to, you know, be concerned.

So I think they can talk about scenarios, but I don’t think we can expect any kind of a more concrete plan. I think though what is important is for the South Korean president to lay out at least South Koreans’, emphasize South Koreans’ desire for unification, but also to clarify the sequences. And by sequence, I don’t mean nitty gritty steps toward unification, but what I found interesting when I went through these documents, summit documents, is that when unification is mentioned in the past, most U.S.
presidents whenever they mention it, it’s always put in this way, that the unification issue is between the two Koreas, and that in consultation with the U.S. when appropriate.

But basically, the U.S. has sent a historical message, loud and clear, that the U.S. is not going to take the lead. And I think that’s the right position. The problem is that a peace treaty, if there ever is to be one, of course, needs to involve the U.S. since the armistice was signed by the U.S. So we have a, you know, a disconnect here in terms of the actual historical actions versus new history that is to be made.

MS. KIM: Yeah, just everything that Kathy said, but just to add to what Kathy said, if we look at it in a more macro sense, because I really don’t know if President Park is going to ask for anything concrete on unification. We just don’t know that

But perhaps thinking more geopolitically in terms of if we define support in that sense for her vision for unification, I do, I can imagine some circles in the South Korean political and policy elite who would want President Park to garner support from the U.S. for a, strong support for unification as a hedge against potential Chinese involvements in unification so as to insure that unification happens the way that South Korea wants it to happen and not have great power tensions and difficulties and challenges.

On the question of the positive results of the Iran deal and implications on North Korea, quite frankly I do not see any spillover in terms of positive implications because, first, the reality is that this administration has very limited or actually depleted political capital to spend on such a big issue like North Korea when it is so heavily invested in the implementation of the Iran deal. Getting to the deal is tough, but implementing a deal would be even harder going forward.

There’s also preoccupied with other urgent issues on a global scale whether it’s Isis and Cuba and those issues. So political capital is an issue.

The other challenge is limited time on President Obama’s calendar. If we wanted to do something on North Korea whether it’s talks, you have to think about the actual physical calendar because it takes time to get to talks. It takes time to devise some sort of agreement or a deal, and then it takes even more time to try to implement it and we just have months left.
The reason why, the biggest reason why the Iran deal worked is because Iran wanted to talk. Right now it's uncertain whether North Korean wants to have serious discussions on denuclearization. Sure, recently last week North Korea sent, released a statement proposing peace treaty talks, but putting aside peace treaty talks, in terms of denuclearization talks, it's unclear that North Korea wanted to engage in these types of discussions.

And the reason why it worked with Iran and the reason why Iran wanted to talk is because sanctions worked on Iran. Sanctions really affected Iranian people and the people wanted the Iranian government to engage in these discussions. And so 'in terms of sanctions on North Korean, they do not have the same effect as they do on Iran because North Korea has the biggest life support which is China to help out.

So I don’t want to be pessimistic, but I’m, frankly, in all honesty, if you look at the reality of the situation, I don’t suspect we’ll see great overtures and a lot of activity on the North Korea front.

MR. PERSON: David, thank you for the question. Perhaps a reflection of the reality and the inability to actually absorb or to reunify earlier, you really don’t see much discussion of reunification in earlier years. You see, aside from Sig-man Rhee talking about marching north and reunifying by force, there is from the ‘70s more of a discussion on having dialogue. Especially after the first inter-Korean dialogue of ‘72, 3, and 4, you see U.S. supporting efforts in summit meetings, supporting effort for continued dialogue, discussions at times of expanding that to include the United State and, perhaps, other parties, but it’s more an expression of supporting this ongoing discussion reducing tensions on the peninsula.

I can’t think of any single document where they’re really going into any great detail on unification before this joint vision statement.

MS. MOON: The moderator is allowing me to add. One of the questions was about might there be talks, et cetera, with North Korea, and six-party talks, et cetera. Probably not, but we never know.

I think what’s important is I want to try to tie together your question with your comment about Koreans, in my view, overly- sensitive concern about President Park’s visit to China for the observance of the end of World War II, and attending the military parade.
I really hope President Park does not overemphasize or overly explain, or even apologize or in any way like that. Basically, she should just let it go. If I were President Park, I would say, hello, President Obama, wonderful to see you again. We have so much to talk about, and here are the issues, and this is where not just unification, but the issues that we mutually need to focus on.

Of course, North Korea and different contingencies around it because even though the North Koreans did not test new missiles, et cetera, when we all expected it might, you never know when they might. And so what would happen? What might we do about sanctions if that’s the way to go to make them more effective if that’s what people choose, et cetera.

But also a common agenda that the White House really cares about, and that Koreans increasingly care about, the environment, climate change. Global health security is a big issue for Mr. Obama and this White House. Disaster relief. Humanitarian assistance.

The U.S. government was very pleased that the South Koreans were very forthcoming on some of these areas of humanitarian assistance, development assistance, et cetera. So these are reflections of this strategic, comprehensive strategic alliance. Looking out for the world not just for ourselves or each other.

And I think that should be the larger message. The U.S. government understands very well why President Park went to China. And, actually, I think very positive things have come out of it. And Korea is a sovereign country. Doesn’t need to explain that much and everybody knows who follows U.S.-Korean relations that South Korea’s ability to play with China so well is grounded in the security and stability and the strength of the U.S.-Korea alliance.

If the alliance were shaky, South Korea would not have this maneuverability room to go play with China. Okay. So I think that needs to be just emphasized. We are secure, therefore, there are many things that we can do and make friends. It’s good for all of us.

America also needs Korean to be a good friend with China in Asia because Japan certainly is not going to be that friend for China. And no matter how much Japan tries to be America’s best friend, America cares so much about its relations with China so Korea can become a very important partner in improving U.S.-China relations as well.
Which comes to your concern about talks. I know for a fact that the Chinese very, very, very, very much want to get six-party talks back in motion. But the problem is under what -- even if North Korea was willing to be a willing participant, a constructive participant, I think the six-party talks need radical transformation.

It’s going to have to become an umbrella for multiple types of isms. Bilateralism, trilateralism, multilateralism, in terms of diplomatic negotiations within the rubric of the six-party talks.

And I think Japan is going to have to think hard about the role that it wants to play in terms of agenda setting because American officials and Chinese officials know for sure that the Japanese emphasis on, or insistence, not just emphasis, insistence on making the abductee issue part of the six-party talks, and constantly a driving force for Japanese interests in the six-party talks is absolutely not the way to go if we really care about denuclearization of North Korea.

And so I think it is not just about U.S.-North Korean-China’s interests, but also, and, of course, South Korea’s, but also Japan needs to think hard, and Japan’s friend and allies need to talk to Japan to help it think out, if it wants to continue to be a player in the six-party format, it needs to put the larger regional security and stability as the priority rather than its immediate interests on this particular issue. That actually is as much an obstacle as North Korean is actually.

MS. CHANTLETT-AVERY: Okay, let’s collect a few more questions for the panel. In the back, here on the side, and right there. Thanks.

SPEAKER: Thank you. My name is (inaudible) with Tangyan Daily News. This might be a little bit (inaudible) question, but let me ask you. President Park yesterday announced her plan to allow the school to use the government authorized history textbook only in classroom.

Since Dr. Moon mentioned the democracy and freedom elements in the summit between Korea and the U.S., do you think this might meet the criteria that U.S. (inaudible)?

SPEAKER: My name is (inaudible) Singh. I just want to say I really appreciate the thoughts that you shared, Katherine. Absolutely agree. I think when people look at South Korea, they think of only the peninsula. They don’t realize the strategic importance it’s having in the region. And so I just wanted to elaborate and ask further, you know, given that developments are going on with China, India, Japan, especially with the military buildups, modernization programs, the United States did not join
AIAB that was just recently created. Same with Japan. What role can South Korea play to be kind of a mediator, to kind of facilitate to keep the communication open and to make sure that whatever the new economic architecture is going to be in the Asia Pacific, all parties will be able to have input regardless of any disagreements that may arise, especially between, say, the U.S. and China relations?

MS. CHANTLETT-avery: Just one more right here in the middle. Yeah.

SPEAKER: (inaudible), George Washington University and Yeungnam University. What are some sort of your expected talk items on the table in terms of economic issues instead of trade because we talked about politics and geopolitical issues so much and sort of wanted to hear more about that.


MS. MOON: Okay. Well, this will be whatever closing remarks you want to make if you gather them because we’ll have to wrap up.

Textbooks. I think it’s a bad move. Very simply. It is -- there are many Koreans who say this is not a democratic move. But I would have to say that we can’t compare this, from a U.S. perspective, we can’t compare it to what goes on in the U.S. because the educational system is so different. We have truly a federal system and all these different localities have so much freedom. Sometime in my view too much freedom. We need to have a little bit more of a centralized system in the U.S., I think. But South Korea has a centralized system. And so it needs to free up to allow the localities to be able to provide the kind of education it needs.

Now there are -- I have read reports that there’s concern that if the government actually does not require this common text that private choices might actually lead to more nationalistic and less accurate depictions of history. And so that's an interesting thing to think about.

So I think it's not as much about democracy to me as it is about people taking scholarship seriously and fact-finding and accuracy seriously, and to have an open mind as producers of textbooks, as teachers, and as officials in the Ministry of Education that it’s not just the book but how you teach something and how seriously you provide alternative perspectives. And I think those are elements of democracy that we need to think about.
As far as the economic architecture, just very quickly, I think in terms of South Korea, TPP, I am sure, I would bet money on it that it will be an issue that the two presidents discuss this time, especially because of the timing of TPP having just been negotiated in the completion stage. And this is a very important issue for Mr. Obama. It is going to be one of his legacy issues, but another issue he’s going to have to fight for like crazy.

So in that sense, it will be on the agenda, and President Park will, I’m sure, have open ears and open mind to consider that.

I think TPP is very important for South Korea in the sense that this is part of the Asia pivot or the Asia rebalance for the U.S. government. And in that sense, if South Koreans care about the rebalance, which South Korea does, and always, South Korea has wanted more symbolism, more gestures to actually show that the U.S. rebalance is taking place, this is it. This is a big one, the TPP. And so in that sense, South Korea has some interest in learning more about it, considering it, and possibly taking it on.

I think if South Korea were to be able to try to get Mr. Obama to think about joining the AIB, which I don’t think will happen, it would have to be a quid-pro-quo. TPP for AIB. But that is not going to happen, as we know.

But I think the larger issue as far as China’s role in East Asia, India, Korea, all of these countries that are just rising, rising, I think it’s not so much about what would the U.S. do in terms of playing along the rules that the Asians set in Asia, in Asian institutions, but also the current Bretton Woods system that has fallen apart in many ways, what kind of restructuring and reforming and changing of rules must occur there for Asian and other countries to be able to just play better in these institutions.

You know, I look at them as playgrounds. Don’t take this all so seriously. (inaudible) so serious, you know, but think about it. Every playground. You need to set up new structures and also new safety nets and you need to have monitors and rules to make sure things go well.

You can’t keep an old, you know, structure that is, that more and more people want to come. You can’t have a park where more and more people want to come and you never even change the structure and you don’t change the safety standards and you don’t change the rules and you don’t
change the monitoring. It doesn’t make sense, you know, even if we think of it on a very, very parochial level.

So I think the larger issue is both not only new institutions, but how can the old institutions adapt and work together with the new institutions and I think that’s a better way to think about it.

MS. KIM: I feel like you said it all. Just in closing, if we bring it back to this upcoming summit, sure, the joint statement that’s going to be released I’m sure it’s all finalized except for maybe the North Korea portion where they are still probably working on that just in case North Korea does something.

But that said, still I really hope to see this joint statement of the summit really lead to, perhaps, the statement may not be able to be so concrete and detailed, but I hope the summit does lead to a detailed action plan for really cementing the comprehensive strategic alliance that was envisioned in 2009 with the joint vision statement and the joint declaration in 2013.

So that’s, you know, North Korea handled North Korea, yes. The old North Korea, yes. But also really broadened the scope to tackle global issues. Not just regional but also global issues.

MR. FOSTER: I would just agree with Kathy on the, on both the textbook issue. Going back to your question, I think it’s misguided and for the upcoming summit I agree also. TPP is probably going to loom very large.

And thank you again very much, Kathy, for organizing this.

MS. CHANTLETTE-AVERY: Thanks to all of our distinguished panelists and to you for your questions and let’s see how it plays out. Thank you.

(Applause.)
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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