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DEVELOPMENT POLICIES TO FOSTER STABILITY IN WEST AFRICA

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. SY: Good morning, everybody. Thanks for coming to Brookings for this event which we hope you will enjoy. There are some empty seats in the front, so if you would like to come closer, please feel free.

It's my pleasure today to welcome you and welcome our distinguished panelist and speaker. So today the topic is "Can development policies foster stability and security in West Africa?"

By the way, my name is Amadou Sy, and I'm the director of the Africa Growth Initiative here at Brookings.

So to speak about that, we have Mr. Marc Alexandre, or Alexandre Marc. I always get confused. So it says Alexandre Marc, who is the chief specialist, Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group at the World Bank. The resumes are too long so I'll just give the titles. We have also Dr. Raymond Gilpin, who is the academic dean, Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. And last but not least, Michael O'Hanlon, who is a senior fellow and co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, and director of research at the Foreign Policy Department here at Brookings and with whom we are collaborating in the context of the Africa Security Initiative.

So in 2011, the World Bank had this World Development Report, and actually, I brought it, which you may have seen, which is called "Conflict Security and Development." And I think this is still a very relevant publication. And what struck me when I read it out of all these pages, the only thing I remember is that you can think about like a medical analogy. Right? So you have a buddy and then the buddy is subject to stresses. And these stresses can be external or internal, and your ability to resist these stresses depends on your immune system. And so here the immune system, in the case

of the issue we're going to look at are institutions, and include issues of norms and culture and so on.

So with this, I would like to invite Mr. Alexandre Marc for his presentation. Thank you.

MR. MARC: Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure to be here. Thank you very much to Brookings and to Amadou Sy and the Africa Growth Initiative for organizing this event.

Also, I want to thank all the people who contributed to this work. Many are in the room. This was really a collective work that involved many of our units and our team.

Let me tell you a little bit about the origin of this work. I moved to this unit -- it was called the unit on Fragility Conflict and Violence Prevention at the World Bank, coming from another area where I was working on the same topic, and at that time, everything was focused on East Africa. And the vice president of Africa that had just arrived, Makhtar Diop, who is from Senegal, said, "You know, we're focusing on Sudan." And actually, I was being sad -- the position was based in Nairobi. I was being sad that I would have to travel to Sudan all the time, and then he said, "We need to do more on understanding what's happening in other areas in terms of fragility. Some of us are doing very well but there are issues that are latent, and we need to look at them." And so that's then when we proposed this big study.

A few weeks later, the event of Mali started. I took my first plane actually from Nairobi to Mali, which country I knew very well, so it was a great pleasure to go there. I started my career actually by doing the Ivory Coast. And from there, indeed, many problems started to appear. And then it appeared that we really needed to take stock about what was happening as a region there. So that's the work.

And what we are -- what we have decided to do was actually to first do a big literature review. So there was not primary work, not primary survey. It was mostly based on literature. But also, work with a team that had already done a lot of work on that topic, like the Institute of Security Studies that is based in Dakar and Johannesburg, like International Alert that did a lot of work on youth. Like Francis Stewart and his team that worked a lot on horizontal inequality. So we had six papers on the most important -- what we felt were the most important drivers of fragility in West Africa.

Also, the World Bank has started since four years to systematically do what we call fragility assessment, which is analysis of fragility. That does not mean the country has to be really fragile, but we see that there is an issue, whether on cohesion or institution that require some sort of more in-depth work. And we've started to do that systematically. And for the fragility assessment that came out in West Africa, and actually, in Africa, we saw really a pattern. We saw issues that were coming back and back again. And so we said, well, there are really certain issues that are linked to development that are really, really important to work on.

Then, you know, I think the recent event, and now it becomes really a bit common to say that, but what really awakened people on the need to really focus on fragility in the long term was, of course, the Ebola crisis. In an area where countries were actually moving very successfully out of fragility, suddenly they were hit by the fact that actually you carry this curse of conflict for very, very, very long. And when you looked at things like ratio from doctors to population, things like ratio from nurse to population, you could see how different it was when you had been affected by war even 20 or 30 years before than when you were not. So that really awakened that rebuilding institution, getting out of fragility is really a very long term and diverse. Something that was already mentioned in our report, the World Development Report.

Now, the real message that came out of this report is that there's a very strong role to play for development policy on security; that security is probably primary an issue related to development; and that therefore, the way you do development in a country that has certain cohesion fractures or certain institutional weakness or that is going for important institutional transformation is not the same that you do in a country where you just focus on growth and poverty. So integrating the stability factor into development policy is absolutely essential in all countries that are facing conflict fragility. And that's not only the fragile country. You talk about Ukraine. You talk about Syria and others.

So that's the main message of the book, and we're going to try to look very, very fast, because I only have 15 minutes, a little bit on the main conclusion.

So first of all, I want to apologize from the beginning that I'm just going to skim through. You have a little synthesis at the entrance of the report. You can also download it. So you're very welcome to do that, but here you're going to only have a very, very quick snapshot of the issues.

So first, we have to see the really interesting and positive news of West Africa. Actually, while we were starting to work on West Africa and we're looking at East Africa, other regions, the same way, we realize that Africa, despite the Sierra Leone issue, the Biafra issue, was one of the subregions of Africa that had less battle death-related deaths for the history since independence than any other subregion of Africa.

So that was already a surprise of discovering that, that Africa had actually been a country probably less affected by conflict overrule than many other regions. And we'll come back on why.

But West Africa is also going for very positive transformation, and we'll see robust economic growth, improvement of many social indicators. A number of

countries that had really interesting trajectories in coming out of fragility -- Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, now Guinea Bissau, all countries with still fragility but have done a really interesting effort that you can learn from of how they actually moved out.

Democratic consolidation. That's probably the big difference between West Africa and the rest of Africa. There's a real impressive progress on democratic consolidation, with absent (inaudible), with all the problems (inaudible). But the fact that systematically now not one president I think since the (inaudible) in Senegal had managed to impose a third mandate or fifth mandate or whatever in this region is -- really tells something when you compare with some of the other regions of Africa.

And finally, a model of regional cooperation. At least on the conflict side, really, the role of ECOWAS is a model in terms of if you compare with what other efforts are going on in Africa. But even in the Middle East or other places like that, ECOWAS is a much, much more diplomatic, effective institution. So all this is the good news.

Now, let me go a little bit and I'll try to really move fast. So you see here West Africa in red, you see that West Africa has actually -- has been more or less always at the lower end scale of the number of -- of course, battle death is a very incomplete number, but it's at least something you can relate to and you can compare.

You see the episodes here of the Jaffna war, and then, of course, you see the episode of the Sierra Leone and Liberia war. And then it goes down. But what's a little bit worrying is that in 2012, this actually reached one of the (inaudible) with what is happening now on the continent, especially in Nigeria and the Chad Basin.

Now, the nature of conflict is really changing. So one thing that was really particular in West Africa, and probably explained the lack of little conflict, is that a lot of the independence war is what has created a lot of casualties in other regions of Africa, especially the independence from Mozambique, and if we can say the war around

South Africa. And that has created a huge number of casualties. With the exception of Guinea Bissau, a small country, you then had really violent independence war. That makes a big difference from the start in the 1960s.

Then the other -- so there has been, of course, the episode of the Biafra War in the '70s and the end of the '60s, but then in '70-'89, it was the most peaceful area or region -- subregion in Africa. So it's been actually a region that had a period of real peace. So actually really no level of violence.

Then we had the terrible episodes of the Mano River, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and then followed by Ivory Coast, but Ivory Coast was not a very little conflict, as you know, but these were really terrible. And then you had a period really of calm after 2003, where it was a bit like the end of history as we say. So that's it. The Cold War is finished. (Inaudible) the conflict to discover that it picked very strongly from the 2010 all over Africa.

Now, it's really interesting that some of the reasons why they were picked were actually the other side of a very positive coin. The end of military coup, because one thing that West Africa was actually on the record was military coups. The end of military coups and the start of the democratic transition meant that you had much more election-related violence. When you don't have elections, you don't have election-related violence. But when you start to be able to have actually competition, you have a lot of election-related violence.

Some of the explanation of the election-related violence is indeed the operation of democracy, but also really important, the fact that democracy is still incomplete in the sense that there has been very much a "winner takes it all" type of approach, and I think this will change over time but this perception that "winner takes it all" means that a presidential election is really tough, and especially tough for the group

that has an interest in getting their leader there, much more than it might be when power is much more distributed around many different areas of the country.

So I think with democratization, with decentralization, with a lot of things, you start to see a period of election, like the last election in Nigeria, that are actually much more violent. So we see really the increase of election-related violence as a problem of transition.

And then we don't have to forget that despite the big change in the threats of security in Africa, still, the longstanding (inaudible) of conflict is somehow there and we can see both what's happening in Nigeria and what's happening in Mali and many places. Yes, this is really just extremism but you have a lot of those threats build on all simmering conflict.

Now, two things on the nature of conflict that I want to talk to you about in West Africa. One is really this theory of regional conflict system. Now, this is really important because it has a huge implication on development policy and how you do development. When you look at the conflicts, you realize that none of those conflicts or none of those violence are really national based. They are all into a broader area that is not linked to specific countries.

Sorry?

SPEAKER: Use the mic.

MR. MARC: Oh, sorry, sorry. I'll try to stay -- I'll stay closer to the mic.

So you see that the theory of conflict system has been developed around the Mano River, so this is Sierra Leone, Liberia, to explain how the conflict moved from Sierra Leone and Liberia. But you can see that there's many others. The conflict of Guinea Bissau very quickly had the connections with Gambia and the regions -- some regions of Senegal, Casamance. You can see that the problems where with the Niger

delta spread in the forms of piracy now in all the gulf, and you know the spillover of Boko Haram.

Now, what is really interesting with that, I think, is the fact that this is not just a spillover of a conflict. It's just that the nature of the dynamic, social dynamic, institutional dynamic actually cross border. So if you have in Nigeria the young Kanuri, you see where the Kanuri are and they are the majority or they are an important group in Boko Haram. Their connection is with Lake Chad. Their connection is for trade in Lake Chad, and so that's where they go, that's where they move, and so logically things are moving in those areas. And they have also grievance on the other side of the border.

The other really important aspect is the sort of multiplicity of drivers, and that's what we characterize fragility, which is a little bit different than for other conflict. So you see the Ivory Coast case here, and you can see that you have actually a real reason. The reason that everybody talks is the problem of the succession of Ofed Winee when he died, but actually very, very quickly, the conflict built up on other lower sort of level grievances -- land issue, migration flow, economic stagnation, all of this on the (inaudible) of the economics.

So I'm going to run very quickly through the emerging threat because I'm sure you've heard about it. Drug trafficking has really increased in this region. Piracy. Now, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of the first regions for piracy. I think it's gone down a little bit. These are numbers of 2013, UNODC, and religious extremism.

Now, just a word on religious extremism. I think religious extremism that we see very much as an external influence, and it has extreme influence, is also very much homegrown. Homegrown and developing around old conflicts and old grievances. I mean, of course, the religious extremism movement would not have penetrated so strongly if you didn't have the latent conflict with the Tuareg and the Arabs and other

issues.

There's also an issue with increasing traditional values, intergeneration crisis, (inaudible) with the state, so we really need to see the deeper causes of this rise in religious extremism.

Now, the part that we really investigate is the one that I'm not going to talk much about, but these are six areas that we -- so on the development agenda that seems to us absolutely core to the problem of stability in West Africa. One was the youth inclusion, and that's not on the job. That's really about the role of youth in the bigger society when you have such a fast transition going on, demographic transition. Or not transition, actually; demographic growth. Migration. West Africa is a country with the most mobile population, probably the most in the world, and three percent of the population in this region are actually migrant, which is huge. So that has been a source of conflict. And then regional imbalances, extractive. So the problem with extractive is really the impact it has on stability. Political institution, security, and land institution.

Let me go to the conclusion because I don't have much time, but we could take each of those topics and really go into an in-depth analysis of each of those topics. But for gaining time, I want to move to rethinking the role of development policy.

So first of all, what does it mean? And I've already mentioned. Stability needs to become a key objective of development policy, and that means you don't do the same thing that when you just address growth and poverty reduction. You do things differently. That's what takes a lot of energy to explain to some of our colleagues on the development side, that just doing more of poverty reduction and more of growth will not address a lot of the stability issue.

The second issue is that we need to connect much better security reform issue, improvement of state institution, and social and economics fear. For the nature of

the way governments are organized and therefore development organizations organized, these things are silos. They are silos so you can have a great improvement in procurement system in all the government and the military doing whatever they want and spending the money however they want. So the question -- and we're starting as the World Bank to tackle that more and more. Why don't you apply the rule of procurement across the board? Why don't you apply the management of civil servants across the board? So you know, there's a disconnect. It's not the same actor. When you start to say that, you start to talk to a completely different group of people that now are starting to talk but it's not really happening.

On the other side is the socio and economic sphere that we need to think about what's the security implication. If you do rural development but the military is going to be on your back or you have no security, you just cannot do it, so this topic needs to be intimately connected. We will need to work much, much more together across those topics.

The other area that I think is really important is the area of political institution. We put very little money in what we call in the big sense political institution. So you know, again, we focus a lot of money on elections. Elections are important, but what about ombudsmen? What about all those areas that make government work much better? I'll come back to that.

And finally, to be able to do that you really need to enhance your partnership, especially UN, World Bank, donors, and others. Regional organization. In West Africa, we need to work with regional organizations. We need to reinforce them. They're the most powerful in terms of policy dialogue. And if I had time I would have showed how actually ECOWAS, with all its imperfection, had really managed to progress on the diplomacy around conflict. And now that you have most of the presidents elected

and in fair election, the pressure they put on their colleagues that don't really want to follow the rules is much more powerful than what any state department, any, you know, World Bank or any other can do. They are the ones that can be persuasive. So we need to work with them because they have this capacity.

I was in Guinea Bissau recently. It was impressive how ECOWAS was engaged. We need to address the conflict risk system. We just cannot say the conflict in Sierra Leone is around Sierra Leone. Let's forget about what's happening in Liberia. We need to work across border. We need to look at the dynamic and the grievances that work across border. When we work in northern Mali, we need to think about Niger. We need to think about Libya. We need to think about the conflict system. When we work on Nigeria, we run behind Boko Haram. We should have known that it would have moved towards Lake Chad much earlier on and we could have done more on development there.

Then we need to think differently about institutional transformation. We always say that, you know, there are two big aspects in what makes fragility. One is cohesion and the fracture that you have in the economy. The other one is the capacity of the institution to handle that. And then you have also, of course, comes the external stress, the quality of economic policy, but these are really very central.

Now, how do we improve institution and how do governments really improve on their institution? And I think we need to go out of the capacity building idea. I mean, this is really important but once you have all these issues of legitimacy defined and all that, it moves very quickly. Capacity is the easiest to do if you have the right legitimacy, the right incentive, the right elements that are there. So we need to do much more around social accountability, processes of internal discussions, helping check and balances, and that's what you cannot do it but with ECOWAS or other local institutions.

And then you need to focus on those seven priorities. All of them, I think, I mean, everybody talks about youth inclusion, but when you look at what you can manage to do it's very little. Lagging region for me is one of the most serious problems in West Africa, that you have an increase in equality between regions. And when this increase of inequality between regions as Francis Stewart is saying is linked to an identity consciousness, then you will have very probably a conflict, a very serious tension. So if you can say that I live in this region and that's because I'm like that and like that and therefore I don't belong to the political system of this country, that's the sources of conflict that are really important.

So it's not only developing lagging region, though that's really important when you look at the sort of development needs of a place like Borno in comparison of what's been invested in the Niger delta, you realize the sort of huge differences. But on the other side you also need to improve the governance on both sides, the local level governance, not only the central level governance.

Youth inclusion, we talked. Migration is things that you don't think about. Migration, you think it's about what? It's also about birth registration. How do you manage a migration policy if you don't have children registered and don't have papers? So the big problem in the Ivory Coast was actually having papers. So sometimes a policy on migration for the long term is also about just improving birth registration, improving archives and others.

The governance of extractive. You know, extractive is not anymore at the center of many of the conflicts that we had before, like the Sierra Leone, all the work on (inaudible) comes from datasets from Liberia and Sierra Leone. Today it's a bit different, but still it's really important to maintain conflict when they started, but also it's a source of constant grievances at the local level that undermine the capacity of

government to work. You know, the problem in Niger of the ARAVA mines is a constant problem there because of the situation of the Tuareg population around. We need to sort of work more on trying to deal with those types of small community-based conflicts that have impact.

Land management. This is the big elephant in the room. Land is present in all the conflicts we have in the region. All of them. It's at the heart of big conflicts like Ivory Coast. It's at the heart of big issues and tension in Nigeria, in Liberia, in Sierra Leone, in places like that. And this is a question of time because it's a question of changing system. It's a question of getting the culture of the people to adapt to a new system. So that will need time. Not much money, but constant policy dialogue, moving the agenda, strong attention on that. And finally, I already mentioned political institution.

So I'm sorry that I went so fast. I hope that you'll have a chance to look at the report where there's much more data. And I'm really looking forward to the discussion.

(Applause)

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you, Alexandre. That was outstanding.

I'm Mike O'Hanlon with the Africa Security Initiative in the Foreign Policy Program. I'm delighted to be joining my co-panelists here. The way we're going to proceed now is to have a little discussion with Professor Raymond Gilpin and Amadou Sy, both offering some thoughts. If we have a little bit of time after that before we go to you, we'll maybe converse a bit amongst ourselves to draw out one or two points and then we'll have about the last 20 to 30 minutes for your questions and concerns and ideas.

So let me just very briefly mention a couple of the big takeaways for me as a non-specialist in this. Not to review, but simply to really highlight a couple of issues

that I hope we'll delve into further, and then we're going to invite Professor Gilpin and Amadou just to go at the broad subject here as they wish.

As you know, we've been talking about 15 countries, a daunting array of different problems. You've heard of seven priorities here at the end, five different conflict zones. I was very grateful for the map. I was very grateful for this conceptual paradigm of the five conflict zones because it helped me begin to make sense about the challenges. Of course, there are all different ways, all different prisms we can use to try to understand the region. But just to reiterate, we had the Guinea and Gambia-Senegal conflict zone; the Mano River, which is more the Sierra Leone-Liberia area; the Gulf of Guinea, which has a lot to do with piracy, but also extractive industries -- oil, et cetera. And then, of course, Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria. And then, of course, the Maghreb. So that's sort of the five. Obviously, some overlap from one to the other, but also some fairly distinctive issue.

I'm just going to mention two other topics that I hope we'll hear some further elucidation and discussion about. One, just to be provocative, I came away a little confused about how to think about elections because you said very rightly that the wave of democracy, it's obviously something we all believe in at some deep, ideological level, and yet there was elections-related violence. As I study the graphs, it looks to me -- this is just my perspective -- that the election-related violence is a concern but it's not nearly as serious as the big wars that sometimes happened either in Nigeria with the Biafra secession effort or even the wars of the 1990s. So, therefore, I personally would hope that we would get some clarification or some emphasis on the degree to which elections are really potentially a problem or whether it's a manageable problem in the context of what's overall a very hopeful and positive trend. That's just an issue that I hope we'll get a little bit more discussion about.

Another issue is whether resources for this region from the donor community are adequate. Whether, for example, police and army forces need to be built up more in general across the region. Obviously, the answer is going to vary from country to country, but certainly, that's an issue that's in the book. And even if security forces in some countries may be approaching adequacy, is there a need for general increase in donor attention or is this a part of the world with the 7.4 percent growth rate that we saw in 2014 that's beginning, or at least, you know, starting to begin to graduate from aid dependency where the more important foreign role is one of enhancing trade and investment. It doesn't have to be either or, but for me as a generalist, that's a question that your presentation in your book raised in my mind.

So without further ado, I'm now going to turn things over to Professor Gilpin, who is going to comment in whatever way he wishes on this broad array of subjects. Then we'll go to Amadou, a little discussion, and then to you.

My friend.

MR. GILPIN: Thank you very much for those remarks. And I'd also like to congratulate the authors and the team that worked together. And thanks to you, Alexandre, for that excellent presentation.

I think it was really great that Amadou harkened back to the 2011 World Development Report because that kind of sets the conceptual framework on which a lot of subsequent work has built, and I think it's really great to think about Africa, and particularly West Africa, in terms of not just the silos -- do we have development? Do we have stability? Do we have security? But how do they all intersection, and how do we think through sustained engagements that will make a difference.

I'd like to start with actually the title of the publication. Okay, and before I start the title of the publication, I'd just also like to commend Alexandre and his team for

listing out a number of priorities and linking them to recommendations which I think are really forward-leaning in the sense that they don't just raise what the key issues and challenges are, but he talks about tangible ways to move the process forward.

But that having been said, I think if we go back to the title, "Can development policies foster stability and security? And again, the title itself, to some extent, is a little backward looking because it's looking at development policies as presenting them as an instrument in themselves. And the rich analysis in the book describes what some literature calls a complex emergency. It's not development alone. It's not politics alone. It's not elections alone. It's a complex emergency. So I think the issue definitely is stability and security, but the instrument is one that is a lot more comprehensive. Development policies have to be supported with a lot more to have a lasting impact across the continent. And we can go into some degree of granularity.

But what about the stability and security perspective? One chapter I really appreciated was the chapter on security sector reform, because a challenge, particularly in West Africa, where folks have really great structures for the military, the police, the intelligence, the coast guards and navies for those littoral states, they have really good structures, but all the structures have their roots in the immediate post-independence era. They're all about protecting the nation states, and not so much about providing security for all people. They are trained to fight wars and not to provide security as the WDR 2011 defines them. And there is a lag between a lot of the progress that's happened on the economic front, on the community front, and what's going on in the security sector.

And so the security sector dimension has to be less of reform and more of transformation because we don't have, I think, the right tools in the security sector to address most of the challenges. And Michael, you rightly pointed out, if you look at the

five zones that were highlighted, the issues there are nonstatist. It's nonstate actors. And so we need a different security complex and a transformation of the security paradigm to be able to address those effectively. And so that's one thing I will add.

The second thing I will add is in terms of the resiliency of the state, another chapter that I really liked, the focus there for me becomes how do you ensure you have a state within which there is a viable social contract where those in governments govern and those who are being governed benefit from the services and security. And for me, a critical missing element of this, which recently has started to get some focus, is who pays the government? Who pays the government? If it's extractives, that's going to define the political economy. That's going to define security. That's going to define politics and to lead to the sort of contested legitimacy issues we've had. If it's foreign assistance, again, that's going to be the orientation.

We need to invest not just in the instruments of democratization that facilitate elections and the electoral process, but the instruments of governance. And one key instrument is how you mobilize domestic resources. How people's tax dollars pay for their services and their security. And you asked the question about the adequacy of foreign assistance. That's one issue that is important, but I will say that if you look at a lot of the recent work on illicit financial flows from and through West Africa and the quantum of losses because of illicit flows, because of misinvoicing, because of the abuse of transfer pricing in the extractives and telecomm sector, if you add all of those up, they exceed overseas development, the quantum of overseas development assistance. So yes, if you do have a viable social contract, most of these countries in the near- to medium-term could start to pay their way and become more responsive and accountable.

And in closing, we talk a lot about transparency, the accountability of the governance structures to ensure stability and security, but to whom are they

accountable? It's usually to either the donor community or the investors. It has to be to the citizens, and that cannot be by fiat. It has to be organically as you reorganize the social contract and you ensure that there is that connection between what happens in the economic sphere and the services and security that actually get delivered.

In the interest of time I'll stop here and hope to have a bit more of a conversation about these and other issues.

MR. O'HANLON: Absolutely. That was excellent. Thank you.

Amadou, over to you.

MR. SY: Yeah, thanks. Actually, my main point really is shared with Raymond's. It has to do with this complex emergency.

So basically, in our daily work, we focus on the economy. We focus on basically policies that will make growth -- that will accelerate growth and make growth more sustainable and make growth more inclusive. So although we've had this impressive GDP growth rate -- we've seen 7 percent and so on -- if you go and take into account the demographic trend, the GDP per capita growth rates are not that impressive. So like, for example, a country like Niger has an astronomical demographic rate. So what it means is that -- and for example, for the average sub-Saharan African region, let's say you have 4 percent -- the World Bank forecasts 4 percent next year -- if you take, let's say, a 2.4 percent population growth, you end up with only 1.6 percent GDP per capital growth.

So if you really want to make a permanent dent on poverty and all the issues we're facing when it comes to human development, we need to grow faster, and we need -- that's one. Right? And the other issue is also we need to have growth. We need the elasticity -- the growth elasticity of poverty to be also much higher. So basically, we're growing faster but Africa is not -- basically, the rate at which higher growth is

decreasing poverty is not that high in Africa. It's one of the lowest because most of the growth is driven by extractives or by the services sector and so on.

So we are really in a fragile economic situation per se. I mean, the glass is half full. So what these conflicts do is that they can just derail this whole process while we're trying to transform our economies, while we're trying to grow faster, share the growth. You know, conflict violence is just taking us back -- a few years back. So definitely we do care about the risk that these violent conflicts bring to our growth trajectory.

The other issue also is if you think about again this analogy of the immune system and the stresses, you know, it's not like I'm a plumber who sees plumbing problems everywhere, but you see economic issues everywhere. In the drivers of conflict, you know, they include economic exclusion; right? In the factors of sustained conflict, well, you need to get the resources somewhere, and it includes economic activities. And the impact of crisis on economic is huge and even can create aid dependency, too. So suppose you're a government dealing with all these issues and suddenly you have a crisis. Your revenues go down because, you know, the companies to tax are having problems. Your exports or commodities are being reduced or sometimes let's say if you're exporting diamonds and there's a Kimberley process, suddenly, you cannot export your diamonds, like was the case in Central African Republic. Basically, your revenues go down, especially at the time where your expenditures go up because of the expenditures you have on health and security and all these issues. So you really, really become very dependent on aid and it's not very obvious how you can really rebound from this and go back to a cruising altitude where you are building your economy. So just to say that, you know, in this whole issue of stresses, economic stresses are very important.

Now, when it comes to the solution or to your ability to resist or to manage these stresses, when we're talking about institutions, we should definitely also focus on the economic institutions, the institutions that are in charge of economic policy. It's not just about growth but it's about where the budget money goes on. And one issue I have, especially for crisis countries, you see a very, very big focus on the security issues, and I agree. How can you -- let's say a country where agriculture is the main engine of growth, how can you have an agriculture sector if there is no peace, if the farmers cannot go or, you know, so definitely it's an issue.

But I think what the book does, and Raymond also mentioned it, is that everything is interconnected really. So if you look at the aid money and all these issues, there's this big focus on security issues and we forget about planting the seed for economic growth. And let's say DDR. Right? Even when it comes to DDR, so if you put money in DDR but you don't fix your agriculture, where are all these former soldiers going to work. Right? So you can have them taking back their weapons and coming back to this issue.

And sometimes also in addressing the problems and trying to find solutions you can have very quick wins by targeting your aid money or by targeting the government's effort. And one example I like -- it's not in West Africa, it's the Central African Republic, so it's midway -- but it's part of (inaudible). And Amy is going to laugh, but I like this example of the Bangiduella corridor because just by restoring security on the trade -- major trade corridor, the GDP of Central African Republic went up. Right? So everything is connected.

Finally, one issue which is making me think a lot is this issue of systems. So typically we think about policies in terms of country policies, or we are a big fan of regional integration, so we think a lot about regional economic communities. But having

this issue of systems where, you know, they don't mirror the regional economic communities, they don't mirror sometimes other institutional arrangements I think is very key because, you know, Lake Chad, for example, just looking around Lake Chad or the Mano River, in terms of, again, the economics and other policies I think is an avenue which we should explore even more.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent. So here's what I'd like to do. I'm going to pose one more question, just this one broad question, and then we'll work down the panel, finishing with Alexandre before we go to you. And the question is going to have a number of different variants. It's going to be brief, so I hope everybody can take one piece of it as they might wish or make some other general comment. Because what I'd like to do, so far I'm hearing a very good broad discussion about a region with 15 countries, and we're all being very ecumenical and politically correct and giving Gambia the same attention as Nigeria, and that's good at one level, but I also want to bear down a little bit, because as you all know, Nigeria has more people than I think the entire rest of the region combined. And I'm not going to make this question only about Nigeria. But I think that we need to be also specific about some of the problems. One of the things I like best about Alexandre's presentation as I said before was the five conflict zones. Identifying them, acknowledging that they are distinct, although I guess you could probably say that the Boko Haram-Nigeria part is somewhat related to the Magram piece, and you can make other such arguments. But I think that was very helpful.

And so what I want to do now is press people to offer one broad policy recommendation, but not too broad, somewhat specific and concrete, on either Nigeria or some of the other big countries of the region. And if my list isn't one that you like, that's okay. Make up your own example. But as we look around this region, we really have one mega state, but we also have three or four others that I would describe as key

regional pillars just because they're a little larger or a little more central in global politics, perhaps. Ghana historically has been one of those. Senegal has been one of those. Ivory Coast. And then perhaps because they've been in the news with Ebola, but also because they were showing such success and progress, at least in some cases previously, the three countries afflicted by Ebola most intensively -- Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. I will bring those together as another group.

So what I'm hoping is that each of you will be willing to offer a central policy recommendation, especially if it's different from what we're currently doing on either Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast, or the Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea group. And again, if you don't like my examples, choose another one, but let's make this round a little more specific because we've done such a nice job of framing the broad issues, and I'd like to set up the conversation with the audience by bearing down a little bit more with concrete discreet proposals as well.

Professor, if I could begin with you, please.

MR. GILPIN: Okay. I think you do make a valid point about the need for granularity, but you know, it's as if you're drinking from a fire hose. Everything is hitting you at the same time and, you know, what -- how do you best construct an entry strategy?

But let me talk a little bit about the Lake Chad Basin region. Most people view it primarily as an issue of religious extremism and an insurgency, et cetera. But it really is at its core part environmental. Lake Chad is now less than 10 percent the size it was in 1963, and that was the bread basket for the Lake Chad Basin region. It did two things. One, it destroyed the economy. Second, it led to forced migration and had groups move south into Northern Nigeria, and hence, not just the pressures on services, et cetera.

So I would say my one specific policy recommendation there would be find ways to engage with local civil society to start rebuilding the communities because if you look at the evolution of Boko Haram since 2002 to date, I think you have three broad eras. 2002 to 2009, they were hardly violent. They agitated a lot, and they got the name Boko Haram because the community saw them as champions. And in 2009, with the extrajudicial killing of their leader, it then became radicalized. And between 2009 and 2014, they were responsible for about 17,000 deaths. In 2014, they changed their name and joined the Islamic State. In 2014 alone, over 10,000 deaths.

So the issue is let's go back to where it started. Fix the community issues, invest in the community. It's not going to be easy. Address the displacement, and at the same time, transform the Nigerian security sector so the approach is not approaching it as an insurgency but approaching it as a complex emergency that has, particularly in this case, a community dimension.

And just one quick addition. The Lake Chad Basin is a really interesting subregion because it includes British interests, American interests, French interests. The whole issue of donor coordination comes in, and I like the chapter in the book as well, but I think that, you know, there is a fallacy when we talk about donor coordination. Donors are not going to coordinate. (Laughter} No, let's be honest. Because foreign assistance from any country is an instrument of national power, not an instrument of international power. And so by definition it's going to be flag waving and state-making. So I think we have to think about a more dispassionate way to coalesce national resources. And one of the things that I would say is I know that my World Bank friends would groan and say, "Oh, he's going down the trust fund road again." But not trust funds. I think we are in 2015, going on 2016. We have to think about an imaginative way to leverage foreign assistance dollars, maybe through a market mechanism, that would sanitize the funding

so that there would be not just adequacy but predictability over time.

One of the things WDR 2011 taught us is that institution-building, particularly post conflict, minimum about 12 years. There is no sovereign instrument available for a duration like that. So rather than have this Sisyphean task of, oh, we're going to coordinate and then roll all the way down to the bottom of the mountain again and we're going to coordinate, let us realize up front it's not going to happen. We need to have either a market-based approach or a deliberate international approach that will pool the resources and show the predictability and adequacy over time and address these issues, you know, in a meaningful manner.

MR. O'HANLON: Fantastic answer. Exactly what I was hoping for.

Amadou, over to you.

MR. SY: So if I had just one issue to focus on it would be the issue of regional integration or to use the vocabulary in the book, systems integration or management. So basically, we need free moment of people, free movement of goods, free movement of capital. And so if you take the Lake Chad Basin, you have Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and the solution has to be with all these countries working together, especially as Boko Haram is changing its strategy and, you know, hitting in some countries and so on.

So the same thing for Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, and even Mali and Senegal, because you have free movement of people and Ebola is transmitted as people move. So it was difficult. We were looking for a solution. There was some closure of borders and some back and forth, but again, it has to be a regional solution. Again, with the situation in Mali, you know, for Senegal, you know, it's a big neighbor. It's a big trading partner. It has to be also regional. Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire also.

So one interesting thing though is the role of C had, which when it has

this oil boom, it used a lot of its oil resources to beef up its security, its military, and now it's the jandam of the whole region actually. So they apparently feel vindicated but that's an interesting case to also study and see the lessons for other countries, too.

Two issues though that I think the book could -- I know it wasn't your question but I'll just slip it in -- is the issue of urbanization and the issue of environmental change. I think they are subsumed when we discuss land issues, which is okay, but in our mind we have to be very careful that these issues do not become orphans and this is a whole different problematic. You know, Africa has about a 40 percent urbanization rate and the continent is going to have this huge jump in urbanization rate. So one of the issues, we have to prepare now or else we're going to inherit some difficult situations, including maybe stability issues. We've seen some Latin American countries, you have the violence in the cities. You have the gangs very entrenched, so that's an issue.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Alexandre, whatever you would like to say at this point in the conversation.

MR. MARC: First of all, it's difficult to have a debate when you agree so much with the others, and I really, really like both your interventions. I think it's really right on the mark.

Now, what we tried to do in the book, which is really interesting, is we compare countries, which I hate to do because then I get in a lot of problems with our clients. But still, we compare countries because it's really interesting. You know, everybody was going to say, you know, the conflict in Mali is just going to switch to Niger. That's obvious. How come, you know, the same dynamics in Ghana are not happening -- the same dynamic in Niger is not happening in Ghana? You know, the north and the south conflict and all that. So then you look at how these issues have been resolved, and

again, you come to this complexity. It's always been a very complex way where small things that we don't pay attention to have actually counted a lot, and that's where you cannot as a donor substitute to a government in deciding those things. This can only be totally indigenous how you manage this type of subtleties. You need to be there as a backer to reinforce what you're saying but forget to say that, you know, we'll learn anything about the country so we can tell them what to do. That's gone. Long gone. Right?

So the issue now is when you look at Ghana, for example, how they manage their north-south relation, because I still believe that the regional imbalance is a major source of problems in West Africa subregional. So you see a subregional imbalance and a big subregional imbalance in Niger. Now, we have to know that perception in conflicts counts a lot, so when we were discussing that with our colleagues on regional imbalance in Mali, the government will come with all those things, yes, but more money went into the north than in the south. You know, we actually have poverty numbers that are lower in the north than in the south. Well, it's more complicated than that. It's how people overall perceive that they are part of the national element, and that might not be sufficient, the fact that there are more schools per capita. Right? It's very subtle. It's who teaches in the school. If you have someone from the south who teaches children from the north, it will be seen as something that is inadequate maybe. I don't know. But maybe we realize that a big problem that explained the Niger and the Mali thing was actually the dynamic of clan relation among the Tuareg of Mali versus the dynamic of clan relation among the Niger Tuareg. The competition for control was much, much higher among the (inaudible) than among the others. And that was creating this constant split and this pushing for more visible actions. Right? So this insight in fighting, inside structures of the Tuareg explains a lot the difference. But then how government

managed that, that is what is really interesting.

So Ghana, for example, (inaudible) and that's again (inaudible). It's not (inaudible). It's the politics has to come in. So in Ghana there has been a much stronger buy in. They boat in a lot of the leaders from the north into their system. In Niger, also, by the way, you know, the Tuareg was prime minister for a long time. They were more immersed in Mali so it was more justified, but there was that. And we see that the perception of northern Ghana had actually improved while the data on their situation vis-à-vis the south had not improved so much because what has improved was the outreach of the government, the recognition of the problem, trying to deal with all the corruption in the north, trying to address the land. And overall, we know that to change the balance will take a generation, but at least people have now a perception that things are being done right.

Unfortunately, I think that with all what happened and all that, that's not the perception you have in Borno state or places like that. Right? So as you say, it's a major complexity for which as a donor it's very difficult to find your place there, and you need to work with governments that are themselves very often at a loss about how to handle it or under political pressure, so I'm not offering a solution but I'm offering comparators that people can think about. Right? So Niger, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria. That would be interesting to see. I'm not saying that everything is perfect in those countries.

MR. O'HANLON: I'm going to take Raymond's one last point but I'm going to offer one of my own specifically, and it builds on what you said earlier that at some level, donor policy is going to be a function of donor interest and donor capacity. And while obviously coordination is important, we have to be realistic about aspirations. But one area where I'd like to see the United States consider a substantially greater role, and I made a similar argument about Congo, DRC, although I think it's actually a more

ripe moment right now in Nigeria than even in DRC, the United States military has developed new methods of interacting with indigenous armed forces, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. And one of the things that's happened in the course of these missions and the revolution, the wars that we fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, is towards the latter stages of at least our major role, we've rebuilt our main military structures that have been deployed, the regain combat teams, and turned them into what we first called advise and assist brigades and then later security force assistance brigades. The terms have changed. The concept is similar, that out of this group of roughly, let's say, plus or minus 3,000 soldiers, you retain obviously your command capabilities, some of your central intelligence gathering capabilities, rapid reaction force, but then you break up a lot of the traditional battalions and other formations that would normally engage in higher-end combat into 15-person advisory teams that are designed to go out into the field with an indigenous battalion of 1,000 troops or a brigade, 3,000, and actually really get to know the problems they're facing, work with them closely, not do the fighting for them, but be out in the field with them. And this gets -- the reason -- I'm not asking you to endorse this necessarily, but it's inspired today for me in part by what you just said a minute ago that in Nigeria we need to help the Nigerian army get to the next level in thinking about proper counterinsurgency policy. And not that we're always experts at it, but in our history we've had some ups and downs. Right now we're pretty good. Even though we've had the frustrations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our military is pretty good at understanding the broad range of capacities and approaches that are needed to be successful. And I'm not suggesting that we go out and pound lessons down the throats of the Nigerians who don't want them, but to the extent there's a receptive audience, I think the Nigerian military might really benefit from an American training program that's not just at the central national training centers but actually now focused a little more on deploying into the field.

Historically, the United States hasn't wanted to do this sort of thing with its armed forces in Africa. We've seen Africa as a place to minimize our involvement, but as the armed forces of the United States wind down their roles in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think we have the capacity. And Nigeria is at such a crucial moment that I think we ought to consider out-of-the-box ideas like this. So that's my one suggestion.

But sorry to keep you waiting, Raymond.

MR. GILPIN: No, no, no. Just a quick one.

On that, the United States and other external partners are revisiting their models of support to African countries. Last year I was part of a team that went to Nigeria and we met with them and we talked about lessons from counterinsurgency across the world and how that could help inform the Nigerian effort in the north. And so there are some ongoing issues but we really do need to focus a little bit more on how we ensure that they're as targeted as necessary for the theater. And we're not there yet.

But the point I want to make was on regional coordination. I'm going to push back a little bit on Alexandre's love for all things ECOWAS. ECOWAS is a great organization. They do great things, but as you rightly pointed out, the threats that we face in West Africa are regional, and they don't really adhere to the map of West Africa. If you look at Mali, Mali was as much about Libya as it was about the Sahara. So there's nothing ECOWAS can do about the Libya issue. And so I always grade and have this like visceral response when I hear the African solution for African problems. That might have been right in the 1960s, but most of the complex emergencies that we face now on the continent are not confined to specific regions.

If you look at the deployment of the African standby force brigades, there are seemed challenges and you also have capacity challenges within and across regions. And so, yes, it's great to focus on ECOWAS in West Africa, but we also have to be

realistic that there are some interventions that would require a coalition of the willing as we had in East Africa with the Amazon, in Somalia. It's cooled down because we have a coalition of the willing that, of course, became UN hatted and then AU hatted and then UN endorsed, but we have to be creative in our approach to regional coordination as well.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

So I'd like to go to you. I'm going to take two questions at a time. If you can be specific. If you have one person here that you'd like to pose the question to, please do so. And please limit it to one question per person because we don't have that much time.

So I'll start here. The gentleman here in the blue shirt, and then the woman two rows behind him.

SPEAKER: Thank you so much. Thank you so much for your presentations.

Talking about creativity, I want to focus on Nigeria. Now, what do you make of President Buhari's approach to -- regional approach in the war against Boko Haram? What do you expect in that set up? And is that a role for the United States to play in that architecture that President Buhari -- we are talking about a regional approach that involved Ghana, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. What do you expect?

I want to ask you, specifically you talk about counterinsurgency. We do know that you can't win counterinsurgency without the civilians being on your side when you have young girls (inaudible) in Nigeria, you know the Nigerian military is not willing. I know that things are changing on the ground. What role do you believe the U.S. government should play in helping the Nigerian military, specifically in fighting Boko Haram on the ground?

Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. And then two rows back.

MS. FREEMAN: Hi. Connie Freeman, currently with Syracuse University. I'd like to direct my question to Professor Gilpin, with whom I share a bit of background as I was once as he was. They had a defense economics at ACSS, so it was good to see you up there.

I want to applaud and underline two points that you made. The first one was that those who pay call the shots. It's something I think we have not looked at carefully enough in development issues thinking that if donors or extraction paid, people would still be responsive to a government and a government of people. The second point was that donors will follow their own self-interest. It's built into the system so you have to build a system to deal with that.

My question is, or my request is to ask you, Professor Gilpin, if you have a couple of specific examples of how to apply those two principles.

MR. O'HANLON: And I'm going to take a third question also because these two are primarily for Professor Gilpin. So I need a question that's not.

Over here in the fourth row.

MS. GAILLY: Hi. I'm Sarah Gailly from the Microcredit Summit Campaign.

I have a question on how to tackle local communities. You talked about advocacy organizations, civil society organizations. What are your recommendations for international organizations based in the United States? How do we link with them? Thank you.

MR. O'HANLON: Is there a person you wanted to direct that to primarily?

MS. GILLY: The one who wants to take the question.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. So why don't we go with those three and then we'll have time for one more round.

Professor, over to you.

MR. GILPIN: Okay. Two very excellent questions. And the first on the regional approach, what we should make of President Buhari's regional approach.

Two things. One, it's still unfolding. We know what he plans to do militarily, but the rest of the strategy will unfold, you know, after the cabinet is unveiled and people start talking a little bit more about what they're going to do beyond fighting a war. So I think we should applaud what's been done so far. The high command has been moved from Abuja to Madurai to make sure that there is a lot more focus and leadership up there in the north to ensure that the kinetic side is being prosecuted as effectively and as efficiently as possible, but the rest of the package we still have to wait.

Are the things that the United States could do to support? Absolutely. I think the first and most important thing that we could do to support is to ramp up our development assistance. USAID was one of the few donors who had active programs in the north, and I think that we should focus on not just our programs but supporting others who are already doing a lot of work.

One area that's an orphan right now are the internally displaced people. There's about two million of them, and you're not going to have stability and security if you have that many internally displaced. And we don't want to see the camps that we are now seeing in various states up north and a couple in and around Abuja. We don't want to see them become permanent fixtures. And so the first thing we could do is for USAID to ramp up development support. The second thing that we could do as we were doing before the last elections, provide advice and intelligence to the Nigerian military.

And then thirdly, there are some things that the Nigerian military might require that they don't have access to. Things like heavy lift, et cetera. And I think we could provide such support. But it should be in the context of a more holistic approach and not just going out to say we're going to kill all the insurgents, because we rightly pointed out the distinction between the insurgents and the communities is blurred at the best of times and you don't want to make things worse. And so I think there's a role for the United States, but also a role for the United States relative to Nigeria's other external friends who are all active in this theater.

Connie asked an excellent question, how do we ensure that we have a lot more focus on another "who pays the government" question. I think there are a number of initiatives ongoing to increase domestic revenue. I think in West Africa -- and Amadou will correct me, I'm sure, and I also see Franklin Moore in the audience. He might also correct me. But I think the tax effort in West Africa is still below 15 percent. That is the amount of tax as collected relative to the tax base. And that's not terribly difficult to fix as long as you have the political will and you invest in a few institutions. And if we could start ramping that up, then we start closing that gap. But at the same time while that is being done, I think we really have to think hard and long about how to bring the donor assistance dollars in line with domestic aspirations.

If you look across the African continent now, we talk about an increase in USAID support, it's mainly PEPFAR. And when Ebola hits, these were PEPFAR stars, but PEPFAR is useless when it comes to hemorrhagic fevers because that requires basic primary healthcare facilities. And so I think we have to be a little bit more honest and make more of an effort to align with reality in the various countries because that is the building blocks that provide the countries themselves a foundation on which to continue. And if we are only going with things that we find sexy or interest to us at a particular point

in time, we'll be missing the point completely.

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you.

Amadou?

MR. SY: Maybe just to add to that, we just concluded the Financing for Development meeting in Addis Ababa. And there's this big focus now on domestic revenue mobilization. And if you take a lot of issues like infrastructure, African governments actually are the ones spending most of the money. It's higher than aid money and so on. And there's really room to increase the tax effort and so on. For example, Nigeria has one of the lowest value-added tax rates in the world, but for political reasons it's not easy to just slap people with VAT and then you have to compensate the poorer segment and so on. But there's really room. And at least on paper -- we'll see with the UN General Assembly and the SDGs -- but in the financing of the SDGs, domestic revenue mobilization has definitely taken center stage.

MR. O'HANLON: Alexandre?

I'm sorry. I didn't realize.

MR. SY: So on local communities, I know that, for example, in crisis countries, like in places like Afghanistan, you know, it's a very difficult environment and so on, so the international community took the route of local development. You know, trying to have local projects, small local projects and so on, in such a difficult environment. So I don't know.

MR. MARC: Yeah, I don't have an answer specific on that. I think we can take that outside of the discussion.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. So let's do one more round then.

I'm sorry.

MR. SY: No, what I wanted to say was the really interesting case with

Nigeria now and what is happening. So I agree on the limitation of ECOWAS there, but I think ECOWAS has a very strong role to play. You talked about Somalia as another example where different African nations came together and sort of played a very strong stabilizing role. I think this is actually in the way, happing now with a lot of excerpts, but it's happening. And also, so you have to -- it's really interesting what actually is happening because you start to have governments that didn't talk much to each other that suddenly now meet all the time and exchange and try to work together their coordination from the military down to the development.

In the crisis like Boko Haram, we really need to look at the development aspects of it. Security has a very important role to play but immediately after development needs to come. You know how community moved from one to another, I haven't seen any -- despite the worst problem and all that, there's somehow sympathy or somehow connections with community that makes Boko Haram being able to. If not -- not sympathy to the message, but at least sympathy to the sons or (inaudible) that are coming back to their village. So unless you work with the communities, and unless you work on the development and the trauma, the displaced, all the people that have been traumatized by this situation, you need to address them very quickly because it's not only an issue of development; it's an issue of reestablishing some form of credibility for the state in those areas.

So I think that needs to be very central on the agenda, and I think people realize that. And we are certainly as an organization on displacement, putting a lot of money in that. But I think that's really important to keep in mind.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. Now it's time for the final round, which I'm going to designate the lightning round because we only have five minutes to go. And I'm going to take three questions. I'm hoping if we get lucky that there will be one per panelist.

And we're just going to go down the row and people will conclude as they respond. So I'm going to go here in the front and then the gentleman with the hat. And then to be geographically fair, the woman sitting next to my friend Drew about 10 rows back.

Okay. So --

MS. ROSS: I'm Sarah Ross from Jefferson Waterman International, and I was wondering if you could share your thoughts on the upcoming elections in Cote d'Ivoire and whether there will be continued political violence.

MR. O'HANLON: Sir? The microphone is coming to you.

SPEAKER: Thank you. I'm from Action Africa. The name is Efudu.

My question goes to Alex. There are several priorities that you were able to highlight. Did you see any significant difference between the Anglophone with Africa and the Francophone with Afghan countries?

MR. O'HANLON: Thank you. Great question.

And then finally.

I don't think we can hear you.

SPEAKER: I have a quick question directed to Mr. Marc. As we can see, there's been a shift of piracy location from Somalia to the Gulf of Guinea. I'm wondering whether you can address some of the underlying reasons for this situation and what kind of development policy can be formulated to attack this question.

Thank you very much.

MR. O'HANLON: Okay. So two of them will be for Alexandre. So we'll work to him in the meantime. Maybe you can each offer a brief word as you wish on the way.

So Raymond, over to you. And then we'll finish up with Alexandre.

MR. GILPIN: Okay. I'll probably take one from Alexandre in the interest

of time.

The piracy question. What a lot of people don't know is that before there was Somalia, there was Gulf of Guinea. So it started in the Gulf of Guinea, went to East Africa, and has come back home to the Gulf of Guinea. The reason for the reduction in piracy and the Horn of Africa are twofold. The first was the multinational agreement where I think at one point we had about 20 different navies patrolling the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aiden to make sure that they took care of any skiffs or boats that were out there, you know, causing trouble. And I think that really helped reduce the incidence of piracy. But second, and more importantly, was the effort by Amazon and others to address insecurity on the land because in the Gulf of Guinea, it was insecurity of the land that spilled on into the maritime domain. And so once they addressed insecurity on the ground and there were some efforts to provide communities with alternative income generating opportunities, we saw a reduction in piracy.

The upsurge in the Gulf of Guinea is a little complicated. I think partly it was as the Nigerian government and the oil companies I think got more attention to what was going on in the delta, the naval patrols became a little bit more effective and the amnesty program bought out most of the big groups like MEND, we saw the smaller groups move offshore. And one of the things that was very interesting is that unlike in the Indian Ocean where most of the attacks happened when the ships were moving, the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea were a lot more opportunistic. They happened when the ships are either moor or anchored, and they started a little away from Nigeria. They're coming back towards the Nigerian territorial waters, and what has been happening particularly over the last few months is that a number of the countries in the region have started beefing up their maritime domain awareness capability as well as their patrols. And so you are seeing the numbers in the Gulf of Guinea beginning to go down.

And the second more important thing is that there's something called the Yaoundé Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security in West Africa. And that provides an opportunity for all the littoral countries to harmonize not just their maritime security effort but also the legislative foundation that allows, you know, interdiction, prosecution, et cetera. And so the institutional framework to address maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is also becoming a little bit more robust. So that's more or less the story. The U.S. has been very instrumental in supporting. In fact, next month there is a maritime safety and security conference in Angola, which is going to continue the discussions about the Yaoundé protocol. Hopefully we'll have the Yaoundé declaration which will take it further south in West Africa because there are some concerns that it might move in that direction.

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent. Thank you.

MR. GILPIN: Sorry.

MR. O'HANLON: No trouble.

Amadou, I guess we have the Ivory Coast question. I was hoping you might be able to handle that and anything else you want to quickly add.

MR. SY: Well, I don't have much to say about the Ivory Coast, but I think that you have about 10 candidates, and so I think there is a big fragmentation there for the opposition. So I wouldn't bet my money on the opposition. It's rebounding very strongly economically, so I'm not pessimistic about the Ivory Coast, at least in terms of electoral violence or post-electoral violence.

MR. O'HANLON: Good. So a case study in hopefulness to remind us all of where we began on this topic.

And Alexandre, over to you.

MR. MARC: So yeah, Ivory Coast, I would be much more worried about

the next election, not about this one. But a lot of the elements that were on my chart remain very present. So, and the government is very aware of it. You can actually have a good policy dialogue with them on those things.

I bring up my favorite topic because I did my Ph.D. about how different systems -- French, German, and actually English -- had different influence on the Cameroons. So that's how -- so I would say that overall, on the general trends, I don't see much difference anymore. I think you don't see much difference. There's a different path. There's a different dynamic of the way we all know the story of the colonization, the French administrator, the British businessman. You know, they got where there was a lot of wealth to be made. They got where there was a lot of surface to administer. So there was a lot of difference of this kind. But where I think it starts to become very different is when you get down, you drill down and you start to get into the detail. For example, on policies of decentralization, I'm really amazed about how much then the system -- still the sort of French system (inaudible) top down and rigid system of the centralization of the concentration because that's what the French system is, and a much more open way to think about autonomy and community involvement and different groups among the English system. So I think on the overall dynamic, no. But when you start to drill down in policy dialogue on how you deal with those problems, I think that's where you start to see a difference of culture.

And I don't think one way is better than the other. I don't see one is preferable than the other. They're just the way the government of those countries approached the problems pretty different. And I see -- I give you the example of decentralization, local governance, and it's pretty different. Part of it is part of the problem and northern Mali is very much linked to that.

MR. O'HANLON: On behalf of Amadou and myself and all of us, let me

thank you for being here. And let me ask you to join in thanking them.

(Applause)

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