THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FALK AUDITORIUM

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED AFTER 20 YEARS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

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PARTICIPANTS:

Opening Remarks:

MARTIN S. INDYK
Executive Vice President
The Brookings Institution

PANEL 1: WHAT LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE WORK OF THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND THE BROOKINGS PROJECT OVER THE PAST 22 YEARS?

Moderator:

ROBERTA COHEN

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement

Panelists:

FRANCIS DENG

Former U.N. Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons

Former Co-Director of the Brookings IDP Project

Ambassador of South Sudan to the United Nations

WALTER KÄLIN

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PANEL 2: WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES FACING IDPS IN THE YEARS AHEAD?

Moderator:

ELIZABETH FERRIS
Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
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Panelists:

JOEL CHARNY

Vice President of Humanitarian Policy and Practice InterAction

HANSJOERG STROHMEYER

Policy Director

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

NIELS HARILD

Displacement Development Specialist

The World Bank

ALFREDO ZAMUDIO

Director

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. INDYK: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Martin Indyk, the executive vice president of The Brookings Institution. Welcome to all of you, both here in the Falk Auditorium, and also, those of you who are watching online. We're webcasting live. And for those of you who wish to Tweet, that's our hashtag for today's event.

I'm really delighted to welcome such a distinguished panel of experts and practitioners on the issue of internal displacement to this important event at Brookings, to look back at the lessons over the past 20 years when the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement has been functioning at the very cutting edge of the issue of internal displacement. And to put a spotlight on the many challenges that remain as we look at the horrendous situation and plight of the internally displaced, particularly, of course, in Syria today, but in so many other countries as well.

For over 20 years, the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement has worked to promote the human rights of these internally displaced persons. And toward that end, to support the mandate, first, representative of the secretary general, and now the special repertoire on the human rights of IDPs. The accomplishment of this small project has been substantial, and it's a record that we are very proud of here at Brookings.

While the number of IDPs is at an all-time high, and while IDPs continue to have unmet needs for protection and assistance, these are tasks which government and operational humanitarian agencies now have the responsibility to address. The Brookings Project has largely accomplished its purpose of raising awareness of the particular needs of IDPs and developing guidelines, providing guidance on how their

rights can, and should be, upheld.

As a result of the work of the Brookings Project and the leadership of some of the people that are on this panel today working for the secretary general of the United Nations, with the support of so many countries that had an interest in this, we know how to deal with internally displaced persons. We know what it takes. We have the resolutions of the United Nations, and the protocols and the guidelines, and people who have been trained to deal with this situation. What we don't have is the political solutions that can take away the source of internal displacement, and that is very obvious in places like Syria.

But the issue of IDPs is firmly on the international agenda. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are widely accepted as customary international law. The African Union has adopted a binding international convention on internal displacement. More than 25 governments have adopted laws and policies on IDPs. Training materials and guidelines have been developed, and there is now a rich and solid base of empirical research on internal displacement.

All of this has been spearheaded by a small team of Brookings staff, working in a unique partnership with a series of independent U.N. experts. This partnership made it possible for the U.N. representatives to achieve much, much more than a single individual working on a voluntary basis could have ever hoped to accomplish. That partnership made it possible for Brookings research also to have a policy impact well beyond those of most academic institute, and I would say well beyond much of the other endeavors across policy areas that as scholars here at Brookings work on. The commitment and vision of the project cofounders, Brookings senior fellow Roberta Cohen, and representative of the secretary general, Francis Deng sitting next to Roberta. Their commitment and vision in setting up this project back in 1994, as well as

overseeing the development of the normative framework on IDPs, and carrying out important substantive work, served as a foundation for the later work by Representative Secretary General Walter Kälin, who is also with us today. Brookings senior fellow, Elizabeth Ferris will be moderating the second panel. And special representative, Cheloka Biyani, who unfortunately at the last minute was unable to join us.

As the Project on Internal Displacement comes to an end, the Brookings Institution is proud -- very proud to have been a part of the making of human rights history, and is proud of the fact that over 30 million IDPs are benefitting, either directly or indirectly from the project's work and the partnership between the project and the special representative, and before that, the representative of the secretary general.

In our area of work, we are not often able to conclude that a program has definitively brought about lasting change in the international policy arena, but we can say that and more about this project's work. The many events, publications, guidelines, training materials -- guidelines, by the way, that are outside if you'd like to collect some of these -- policy briefs, et cetera, developed by the project, will continue to provide guidance on how to protect the human rights of those displaced within the borders of their own country.

And I hope that this afternoon's roundtable of discussions will contribute to our understanding of both the lessons learned from this unique project and the challenges that remain for those who will carry on the work.

I am now happy to turn over for the moderation of this panel discussion Roberta Cohen, who is, as I said, the cofounder of the Project on Internal Displacement. I want to say as a special personal word to Roberta, who was here when I joined the institution in the year 2001, Roberta is an unusual combination of great intelligence and knowledge policy smarts, but a deep commitment to humanitarian causes. And she

really has served as a marvel for us here at Brookings as we strive to improve the world through policy-relevant research and activities. So I want to thank you, Roberta.

Francis, I want to thank you for your leadership and vision, and Walter, as well. And Elizabeth Ferris. The project -- it's rarely in life that you get to a point where you feel you've actually managed to finish the job, and obviously, the challenge is still there. But I think that the IDP project and the work of the RSG is something that you both should be very proud of even though the challenges remain. And I think that we all owe you both a real debt of gratitude -- and you, too, Walter -- a real debt of gratitude. And I just want to say on behalf of Brookings, thank you. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. COHEN: Martin, thank you for those generous comments. That was a wonderful statement.

This is a historic occasion, and it is an extraordinary group of people on the panel, and also in the audience, who have been involved in this subject. But I want to thank especially The Brookings Institution, because it really was the institution that sponsored the research, and also mobilized the thinking that enabled us to break new ground on the new ideas, new approaches, new policies, all of this on a subject that we saw as a global crisis. We called it the Global Crisis of Internal Displacement in the 1990s. So I thank The Brookings Institution tremendously, and your leadership as well at this time.

I'd like everyone to remember, in the 1990s when we began, that there was an explosion of civil wars following and emanating mostly from the Cold War and that brought into view millions of people who were forced from their homes by conflict and human rights violations, and who are not refugees. They did not cross borders. They were destitute, and they received little or no protection or assistance from their own

governments or from the international community.

I first saw IDPs in 1984, in Ethiopia, where I accompanied an aid shipment, and I was told then that if these people cross the border, the U.N. would be waiting to help them. But if they stayed inside, which most of them did, they would receive little from their own government. And as for international institutional arrangements, they would have to be developed sort of on an ad hoc basis, and they were. But hundreds of thousands of people perished. And for me, it was one of those experiences we all witnessed that disturb our sense of how the world should be and compel our involvement.

In this institution, we work to bring the situation of IDPs to the fore on the full understanding that protecting people inside their own countries under the jurisdiction of their governments was going to be a challenge. Today, we are being asked to look at the lessons learned from the experience. And I'd like to point to one of the initial lessons, and that is something Martin Indyk referred to, and that's the value of a partnership between a think tank and the United Nations.

Francis Deng from Brookings was appointed, as you know, the representative of the secretary general on IDPs in 1992, and the project was established. But let me give you an idea of how far we've come and recall some of the questions that we were given at that time. How do you define an IDP? They're in their own countries; how do you deal with sovereignty? Should there be a legal framework? What should national laws and policies say? What national and international arrangements should be established? When does internal displacement end? The U.N. actually sent a letter to Brookings opposing that question.

I am persuaded that the work done from this institution on these questions could not have been done from within the U.N. system itself, and that is largely

because the U.N. system at the time was geared to avoid any substantial intrusion into the internal affairs of states, although some in the system were ready to push the limits.

I remember one U.N. official came over to Brookings and wanted to pose a question and said, "Do you and Francis know that you're making a revolution?" And that person was pleased. A man I remember, an official at the U.N. in New York, held up his arm and he said, "We don't do protection of IDPs. That is too controversial. But tell me your formulation."

So I began to realize that those within the U.N. system -- and there were a number who wanted changed -- preferred outsiders to rattle the house and to bring the issue forward. And that I came to see as an important part of the partnership.

A second initial lesson that I learned was the importance of forging links between the human rights and the humanitarian world. I brought with my involvement a human rights perspective and saw it was not part of how the international community understood internal displacement. And then it became clear that links also had to be forced with the security and development worlds, and that a coming together of all these different communities is essential to addressing internal displacement effectively.

Today, the term IDP is sometimes subsumed under broader headings, like civilians in conflict, populations of concern, affected communities, but always remember that IDPs have special needs. And that was one of the principal lessons we learned. If addressing their needs is overlooked or is lost in mainstreaming, internal displacement will not be effectively resolved or addressed. It needs to be because as Martin mentioned, there are today as many as 38 million men, women, and children forcibly uprooted by conflict and human rights violations, and the number has accelerated. There are also millions more uprooted by natural disasters and by development projects.

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countries. It deserves a great deal of attention.

Becoming internally displaced, as Roger Zetter of Oxford recently reminded us, is often the first step on a long and a perilous journey. It is often the precursor of cross-border movements, and an early warning of potential refugee and complex mixed migration. It is a source of instability and human misery in different

The history of the efforts to address the problem must be seen as part of a journey, and there's a long way to go. At the beginning of the journey was actually a lobbying effort to create the position of the representative of the secretary general, and that's where Beth Ferris and I first met. And I think we've come full circle, Beth.

The launch, the great moment was the actual creation of that position, and it's Francis Deng who we're going to turn to, who served as the first representative of the secretary general for 12 years, from 1992 to 2004, and he was a towering figure in the entire enterprise, and left an indelible mark on the approaches that were adopted by the United Nations towards internally displaced persons.

Francis's bio is in your packets or out on the table, as actually all the other people on the panel, so I'm not going to go into details about his illustrious career. I'll just mention that subsequent to his being representative on IDPs, he became the special advisor of the secretary general on the prevention of genocide and is now South Sudan's ambassador to the United Nations.

Francis, it was such a wonderful experience working with you, and I want to remind that you had to deal with, first and foremost, the issue of sovereignty. You had to balance sovereignty with, at the same time, advocating for the protection of IDPs. Can you describe the approach that you adopted and the impact this had on dealing with governments, and what do you see as the lessons learned?

MR. DENG: Well, thank you very much.

Let me begin by saying that it's a great pleasure to be back at Brookings where I was for some 12 years. And Martin, I want to add my voice to Roberta's, for thanking you for your very kind words. I also want to begin -- or I'm very tempted to begin with an anecdote. Some years ago, several of us who had been in various positions in government, went to meet with the then OAU secretary general, and after a very nice meeting with him, he took us to his group, staff who were assembled, and he said, "I would like to introduce you to our extinguished leaders." (Laughter) And the interesting thing is he was not joking, which made it even more serious. While it was funny to refer to individuals as extinguished, but I must say the institution that has really served a very important cause for some 20 years to be referred to as extinguished is not at all a funny concept.

I want to say that my working with Roberta -- in fact, the first time I heard of IDPs was in a conference that Roberta organized, and it was shortly after that that I received a surprise call from the then-secretary general, which was Riley, to say, "Francis, your name has come up to be special representative on IDPs." And I was delighted. "So I'm asking you to take the position." Riley and I had worked closely, had been minister of state for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and I had been minister of state for Foreign Affairs of Sudan. So I said to him, "I'm honored and pleased, but could you kindly have your people give me more details as to what this involves before I give you my final word?" And he said, "Come on, Francis. I know you quite well. I know how concerned you are with these kinds of issues. This is not only a global crisis; it's one that affects your country of Sudan the most. I mean, the Sudan, it's your people in South Sudan who are the worst hit. I cannot see how you can say no. So I will tell them you have accepted, and if later you have any questions, we can discuss." (Laughter)

I soon got to learn that this was a very sensitive issue. And as Roberta

has hinted, it was an issue that had been very heavily debated. The appointment of a special representative to the secretary general was a compromise. It was meant to be only for one year to do the study on this issue, and it was intimated to me by someone later that the expectation was that after the year I would come with my report, they would thank me and say, "Fine. You can go now. Everything is done." But then after I submitted my first report, they extended it for two years, and eventually, it was extended every three years.

And interesting enough, Butches Riley is also the one who suggested to me, "What exactly are we talking about? Who are the IDPs, and where are they, and what are their needs? Who is meeting their needs, and what are the gaps that need to be met? And I would like you to do this study in a neutral institution, a research institution that is not hampered by the sensitivities of the U.N. system."

And so that's how Roberta and I then started the project here at Brookings, and the leadership of Brookings was very supportive. I have to say, and I hope Roberta won't mind this, working so closely with her, and without her, there is no question at all that I could have done what we were able to do. And I can summarize our relationship and cooperation with the late Richard Holbrook introducing us as Mr. and Mrs. IDPs.

Now, once I came to realize how sensitive the issue as, I then asked myself, "How do you deal with this issue that is very much part of the sovereignty of the state, and we know how sensitive sovereignty is." Unfortunately, we had been working on the Africa project at Brookings that I started, looking at conflicts in Africa in the context of the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, we used to see conflicts, even internal or regional, as proxy wars of the superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of strategic interests and the global --

(Phone rings)

MR. DENG: I apologize. I should have known better.

So what we did was that with the end of the Cold War, problems would now be seen in the proper context as internal or regional, and the responsibility for dealing with them would have to be reconsidered. Instead of depending on the superpowers, countries would be then called upon to deal with their own situations.

Since human rights and humanitarian concerns emerge as the most important basis for international relations, it was obvious that sovereignty would be asserted by the states as a barricade against international involvement in these areas, and that is how we began to try to work on recasting sovereignty to make the case that sovereignty should not be seen as a barricade against the outside world. Sovereignty should be seen in a positive way as imposing responsibility on the states, and if need be, with the support of the international community. And if the state fails and people are suffering and dying in large numbers, the world is then called upon to get involved in a more robust way.

So, as I often say, the first five minutes with a president or a minister were critical in telling them, "I realize this problem is by definition internal. It falls under your sovereignty. I am respectful of your sovereignty, but I don't see it negatively as a barricade against the outside world. I see it as a positive concept of state responsibility for its people. And if it needs help, you call on the world to help." But then you say, in a careful way, politely, "But if you fail to discharge your responsibility and your people are suffering and dying, the world is not going to watch and do nothing. They will find one way or another to get involved, to intervene. So the best way of protecting sovereignty is to discharge the responsibilities of sovereignty."

Now, this notion that we developed at Brookings, ending with a volume --

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after a series of volumes called, "Sovereignty as Responsibility," gave me the framework, the normative framework for engaging governments as I said with respect to the IDP, and this was reasonably well received by governments. In fact, even countries that had been very critical of the idea of creating a mandate on internal displacement, to my surprise, their nice surprise, began to speak every year complimentary remarks about the way the mandate was being carried out.

And around the world, I saw governments changing dramatically once you begin to talk about their responsibilities. In fact, there was a minister of Sudan who was notorious for being very, very critical of international involvement in internal affairs and very protective of sovereignty. In a meeting we had at Ekasalk, and for the first time, I made a presentation along these lines. He raised his hand and surprised everybody by saying, "If this is the approach that is being adopted, we fully agree with it." And everybody was surprised by that.

Again, I can give quite a number of examples of responses I got to this approach. But let me say -- since I have very limited time and I'm not looking at my watch -- when I was appointed as special advisor on the prevention of genocide, I faced the same concern about how governments would respond. And I realized that although we all talk about preventing and punishing genocide, the reality is that precisely because of its sensitivity, people are usually in denial, those who suffer genocide and those who would be called upon to intervene.

And so what I did was to bring it down, to demystify genocide and perceive it or define it as an extreme form of identity-related conflicts. Conflict that resulted not from our differences but from the way we manage differences -- discrimination, exclusion, marginalization, dehumanization. And therefore, the remedy is constructive management of diversity, which means removing discrimination,

inclusiveness, and all of that, which again is primarily the responsibility of the government.

And so when you then present it to the government to say this really is an issue that deals with how you manage your differences, how you manage diversities, the response is always quite positive. In fact, in one country, somebody said -- the prime minister said to me, "You know, when we heard you were coming, and with your title, we were worried that you'd think there is genocide in this country. But the way you have now explained it, we do have very serious problems with diversity, whether based on ethnicity or religion or region, and we need help. And we need the United Nations to give us help."

In the ASEAN region, where governments were said to be extremely sensitive about sovereignty, I found the response also very positive. Somebody even said to me, "You know, the only problem you have is your title. Why don't you change your title?" You know, because it was not my choice.

Let me just say that the importance also of a partnership between Brookings and the United States was that we were able to use different hats. When I spoke as representative of secretary general on Internal Displacement, I could say that I had to be sensitive to the bureaucratic issues of the diplomatic approaches. When we were dealing with the project, we had more freedom to be outspoken, even in our research and all of that. But when we really wanted to be outrageous, we hired some consultants who could do the job for us.

So I have to say, as has already been said by Roberta and Martin, this partnership really proved to be unique to the point where many of the U.N. mandates began to look at the Brookings project as providing a model. In some cases, admired. In some cases, the element of jealousy came in. And all in all, it really is both sad to be

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seeing the project ending, but at the same time, we have laid a foundation which will continue in various ways. Many of the people here have responsibilities that are relevant to the IDP issue in their own institutions, and so I have to say that although, just as we were told that we were extinguished, we existed despite being extinguished.

The concept of sovereignty as responsibility has evolved to the point where we now have what we call the responsibility to protect, which has been documented as founded on the approach we adopted about sovereignty as responsibility. The only difference is when we speak of sovereignty as responsibility, we are clearly seen as placing primary responsibility on the state. But when we talk about our R2P, although they have the same three pillars, people tend to think about 2P as a basis for intervention, which is why it is controversial and is still ambivalently being seen and resisted to a large extent.

As I said, I haven't been looking at my watch.

MS. COHEN: I think we have to --

MR. DENG: I think I'll move on. So I'll end here.

MS. COHEN: That's wonderful. Francis, it's wonderful to hear your formulation again. And sovereignty as a responsibility did, as Francis said, become a building block for the responsibility to protect. So I think the conceptual framework of dealing with a problem that's intrusive of internal affairs was begun here at Brookings and is really underpinning many other concepts now internationally.

We're going to turn now to the development of the legal framework for IDPs, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. And if Francis and I were Mr. and Mrs. IDP, Bob Goldman -- Robert Goldman -- and Walter Kälin are Mr. and Mr. Guiding Principles.

We'll first start with Bob Goldman, who is a distinguished international

lawyer and professor at the Washington College of Law with expertise in humanitarian law. He prepared the initial draft of the Guiding Principles, and then worked with the other lawyers in a team, and broader groups as well, in reviewing and completing them. And the principles have become the standard reference internationally, and in 2005, the World Summit endorsed them as an important international framework for the protection of IDPs.

Bob, I remember you insisted on basing the Guiding Principles on the special needs of IDPs and on staying within the confines of existing law in addressing those needs. Did these approaches contribute to the acceptance -- wide acceptance to the principles? What are the lessons that you learned?

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, first of all, let me say I'm delighted to be here, particularly with the four of us. It's kind of like a reunion of the Beach Boys of sorts on a hot summer day. (Laughter)

But as we did -- the answer to the question is had we just taken a right spaced approach, it would have really led us nowhere. When I got the call from you on behalf of Francis to chair the American team and so forth to undertake all of the research, I had a meeting down at the American Society of International Law that called together some of the leading international lawyers and human rights people in this country, and I remember -- he will go unnamed -- an extremely distinguished professor of international law, and he sort of said to me, "What's the big deal?" He said, "They have the same rights as everybody else. They remain within their national territory." And that sealed it for me, that if we were going to really do anything, we had to really take an approach that was based on what the actual specific needs, which were gleaned from the work that had already been done in the field for IDP. So we took this needs-based approach.

And as a result of a study that we did that took some time but looked at a

variety of situations of tensions, disturbances, not encompassing IHL, and then different forms of armed conflict, we looked at the various principles of human rights law and IHL to determine whether or not they were sufficient to meet those needs. And in that study, we concluded that there were basically 17 major areas where there were gray areas or clear-cut gaps in the law.

And this is what led -- that is by identifying that, I think that helped Francis an awful lot, and being able to say, "Look at this." And the study was done -- I think it was quite careful. And fortunately, he brought Walter Kälin in to sort of reconcile some differences between the European approach and my team's approach. And Walter just did a superb job on this, and what emerged was basically a needs-based approach and so forth.

So when we put these things together, we were able to draw on existing law, which states, frankly -- it's no different in certain respects than, for instance, in the Helsinki process and so forth during the Cold War with the human rights basket, of reciting preexisting human rights standards and so forth that should guide the parties.

It was clear we couldn't do a treaty. First of all, it would have been destroyed, because you could never have gotten the inclusive definition that we wanted and which we ended up with. It's clear; there are many states that never would have accepted the notion of a development-based or manmade or whatever and so forth. So by opting for Guiding Principles and basing it essentially on preexisting hard law and by tweaking it to the specific needs of IDPs, I think we put together something that was extremely useful.

Let me mention now, even though in all of our writings, and particularly which Walter and I did, as we did some joint writing, we were very careful to say, "Look, this reflection is consistent with existing law." We did something, however, that eluded

most states, fortunately, and so I can talk about it.

If you look at Principle 2, even though we took the position that the duty and so forth was essentially with the territorial state and so forth, Principle 2 said that, "These principles are to be applied by all authorities, groups, et cetera." What does that mean? Non-state actors.

Secondly, what we did is -- and the innovation here was it applies human rights laws to non-state actors even in situations of armed conflict. This is a major innovation. And this is one of the things, frankly, that I think helped to kill the Turku Abu process that Ted Moron and a bunch of other very distinguished international lawyers tried to do.

So in effect, it was written in such a way that, fortunately, this was something that was not picked up on, but it enabled us to first do this major several-hundred page study to identify the gaps, and then to articulate a series of standards applicable to all who may be involved in situations entailing displacement.

MS. COHEN: I remember when the first draft went to the Commission on Human Rights. I was, just by coincidence, on the American delegation. And every -- I mean, every state that was concerned or wondered about the principles would ask me, because I was on the American delegation, "Does this exceed the law?" And I know that -- I always said, "Not at all. Rest assured." But I know that Walter has referred to what he calls "creative development," which has focused, I think, on some other parts of the principles, like on humanitarian assistance. And that states cannot deny humanitarian aid without being arbitrary if they don't have good reason. And those particular provisions I think are quite stand out also -- as I think maybe Walter can explain that -- as really being ahead of the time in terms of internal affairs and humanitarian aid.

But Walter, if we turn to you, do you have any comments on that? First,

on the humanitarian assistance part, because I think there was a bit of creative development, which is now accepted. We were ahead of, but not that much.

Walter is an eminent Swiss international lawyer and professor who chaired the legal process, as Bob has said, leading to the Guiding Principles, and then he became the second representative to the secretary general on IDPs from 2004 to 2010. And I had the pleasure of working with him. Let me say, he's currently the envoy of the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-border Displacement, and that seemed to follow well from his very strong mark as RSG of trying to ensure that protection extended to those IDPs uprooted by national disasters.

So Walter, I wonder if you can comment on the first. And also, I would recall that you saw with great vision that for the Guiding Principles to have impact on the ground, they'd have to be incorporated into laws and policies at the national level. And you influenced governments in a number of instances to adopt such. Can you tell us about that experience, too, and any lessons you consider learned?

MR. KÄLIN: Thank you so much, Roberta.

Even though I've never been working or employed in this building, I've been here so often that it's also kind of a return to a place for a part of my life that's become very important.

You referred to the notion of progressive development of international law. Yeah, we did some of that. Not in the sense of creating something really new, but just thinking existing law to its end. So, for instance, we saw that on the one hand there was General Assembly resolutions saying that humanitarian assistance only could be provided this -- the consent of the state concerns. We have such language in part of the international humanitarian law. But we also understood that the state has an obligation under human rights law to cooperate with the international community to implement rights

to food, to housing, to health. And thinking that through meant if a state was unable to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance itself, then it had to turn to the international community. And this meant that it had to authorize humanitarian access unless it could be denied for very good reasons.

I think we were the first to really write into a document, a soft law document, the notion of the prohibition of arbitrary denial of humanitarian assistance. And to me it was really a very important moment when last year, in February, in a Syria resolution, the Security Council used exactly that kind of a notion and made it very clear that denial of humanitarian access can amount to a violation of international humanitarian law and implicitly, also human rights law.

Turning to the issue of domestic laws, my very first mission as RSG in 2005 was to Nepal. When I arrived there, the government asked me, "What are you doing here?" Yes, we have IDPs. We have 8,967 IDPs. Okay. I'm very precise. I had a meeting with the U.N. Country Team and they said, "What are you doing here? We don't have any IDPs. We haven't seen any camps, any tents. I took both government representatives and U.N. Country Team members on my visits, and around each and every corner we identified IDPs. There were at least 100,000. IDMC said about 200,000, maybe even more.

One of my recommendations in that report was to the government, develop an IDP policy, adapt your laws and shrine it in law, because I had learned from Francis Deng sovereignty means responsibility. And how can you live up to that responsibility if first you don't have any agreement on who an IDP is, because this was the problem. The government said, "IDPs are those we have registered on the basis of a very complicated process." And for some U.N. colleagues, IDPs were people living in camps. The first thing that needs to be done is to agree on the notion of IDPs. And, of

course, I recommended to adopt a notion that was in line with the Guiding Principles.

And in fact, I did it when they adopted their IDP strategy.

But I also felt talking to authorities there, how can they -- now that they have seen there are more IDPs -- really react to that situation? Because nobody was responsible. There was no ministry on Internal Displacement. There was no budget line for people displaced in an armed conflict. There simply was a lack of attribution, allocation of responsibilities. There was a lack of tying those powers and responsibilities to the financial mechanisms, the budget. And that was a legal void.

I also saw that very first mission, and it repeated itself time and again when I went to countries, that the normal laws they had -- and this was, of course, also the response we have, all the (inaudible) are our citizens, so they fall under those laws, why do we need something specific? These laws were made for normal situations and had detrimental effects on situations of internal displacement.

There are such things as IDP children who are not admitted to schools? Why? Simply because according to the Nepal education law, when you moved and sent your children to a new school, you only could do that with a document issued by the headmaster of your former school, with all the grades, et cetera on it. Could you really go to the headmaster if your village is attacked and you have to run? There were problems later when they moved towards elections that you have to, according to the law, vote at your place of residence. And that's your usual place of residence. And again, IDPs by definition are not living at their usual habitual place of residence. So exactly those who had been displaced could not vote and determine the political future of the place they had come from. They had to give in somehow to their enemies, those who had been responsible for their displacement.

There are many people who have huge problems because they've lost

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their documentation and they could not be reissued because you had to go to the district headquarters of your district to do that, and by definition, they had to flee. They were not there.

So again, the specific needs are not reflected in the legislation. And this is why it is so important.

The Guiding Principles are great, but they are just mere paper unless they are incorporated into domestic legislation. In most countries' international law, yes, that's by the state vis-à-vis the international community. But they cannot be applied internally. So this is important. And it's important to clarify the powers' responsibilities, and it's important to ensure that the financing is there and can be made available because in most countries, batches depend upon somewhere a provision in the law. And it's also important to send out the message to the IDPs, we care about you.

And this is why we took up this issue a some of the priorities, and the Brookings project has really contributed a lot. I would say it has been for some time the main actor pushing the idea of domestic laws and policies. The project has developed guidance, manuals, different kinds; has conducted courses with government officials in San Ramo on how to draft IDP policies and laws. And wherever we went, Francis had started that in Uganda, but you still had to fight for the recognition of the Guiding Principles.

But there was a breakthrough in 2005 at the Millennium Summit, we had that acknowledgement and important international framework for the protection of IDPs, and this opened up room to talk about laws and policies. And the project during my time, and very much so under my successor, Cheloka Biyani has contributed to develop IDP laws and policies in different countries -- Afghanistan, Kenya, Yemen, Central African Republic (of course, before the crisis), and so on and so on.

The problem now is who will take over that work? Because you really can forget about the Guiding Principles and all the achievements if you don't have systematic work on implementing not only the Guiding Principles but all that comes with it. The allocation of powers and responsibilities, the institutional setups, the rights, the remedies. It has to be done. Without that, numbers of IDPs just will pile up, continue to pile up.

The huge number we have is still to protracted situations. People have been displaced even before project started in some countries. For instance, in Europe and the South Caucuses. And why do these numbers pile up, even a long time after the end of the conflict? Because governments do not assume their responsibilities. And often, still, it's a lack of these legal frameworks, the laws. So there's a lot to do.

MS. COHEN: I think what's really interesting here is that you do have some of the tools that everybody needs for working on this problem. The sovereignty's responsibility as the overall concept, and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as the legal framework. And I think history is made on those two. A lot of work is required, as Walter says, in the future. Bob Goldman has called such work "voluntary servitude." I remember he put a tremendous amount of hours into working on this because he felt it was so important, and I would hope that in following what Walter said, that there's a lot of voluntary servitude. I'm sure there already is in this audience.

Now, we are running rather short of time, but we are now heading towards international institutional arrangements for IDPs, which I sometimes see as a rather slow-moving train that periodically tries to adjust its course.

Shelly Pitterman is the UNHCR regional representative in the United States and has served in positions around the world for HCR.

Shelly, initially, the U.N. agencies resisted broadening their

responsibilities on a consistent basis to include IDPs, yet by 2005, there was some readiness to make the international response to IDPs more predictable with humanitarian reform, and UNHCR assumed then a lead role with regard to protection of IDPs in conflict situations.

Can you tell us about how UNHCR expanded its roles and responsibilities, and what are the lessons where with regard to IDPs? And I'm going to ask you to do it in a very short timeframe. Thank you.

MR. PITTERMAN: Well, yes, it was at that time that Erica Feller, the assistant high commissioner for Protection at the time, just newly appointed, turned the corner to basically say, yes, UNHCR will engage -- I think inspired as well by the Guiding Principles and all of the work that you've accomplished here. I have to say that I'm very humbled to be here, and actually, the person who should be in this seat is the current assistant high commissioner for protection, Volcker Turk, with whom you've all worked very closely, who apologizes for not being able to come because of standing committee and other responsibilities. But it's very clear that the Brookings project -- and I've been working with Beth more -- I guess I'm the second generation here -- has really been an inspiration and an impetus for concrete action.

And UNHCR has been under pressure from the outside, but also from within, to do more and to lead more and to coordinate more, and I think that there's been progress. You know, we read about the challenges with the Interagency Standing Committee, the challenges that are in terms of resourcing and actually implementing activities in support of internally displaced persons.

When the project started, I was in Guinea, and then I was in Burundi in the early '90s and '92-'95, and there were internally displaced populations there certainly, but never did we think of them in terms of internally displaced. And when approaching

the Burundian Army or the Burundian authorities to help Burundians displaced, it was all ad hoc. It was all relationship. It was all, "Well, what should I do?" It was basically instinctual. We were working without a framework. And now 20 years later, it's very clear that there is one, and it's operational, and it's institutionally embedded. Certainly, within UNHCR there's a pillar dedicated to it, very dependent on resources, certainly. But there is also a framework through the global protection cluster. There are country protection clusters, some 27 of them, as we meet. There's a commitment to train up staff to lead these protection clusters.

UNHCR just recently issued or reissued a guidance which talks about not just the principles but also the types of activities that we should be accountable for in a way in terms of results, in terms of activities and outputs, whether it's in relation to SGBV or coordination, coexistence with the community, children's rights, basic needs and the like. So there is an operational framework that needs to be -- that needs to be nurtured and continued. The fear is, and it was reflected in the Brookings report, that we'll mainstream this into oblivion is how it was put, and I think you can rest assured, at least on behalf of UNHCR, my understanding is that there's a very clear commitment within the Division of International Protection and at the highest levels to do as much as we can to continue to nurture that dedicated framework for dealing with IDPs, to working with governments, to continuing to help train, the capacity-building activities that need to continue in order to indeed firm up this state responsibility to protect.

MS. COHEN: Thank you, Shelly.

I'm going to turn to Susan Martin, and ask her to do Mission Impossible, which is not the first time I've asked her to do that in our time together.

Susan is a distinguished professor and director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown, and the past president of the

International Association for the Study of Forced Migration. She's originated many ideas in the migration field.

And we wanted to ask her to comment. First, I just wonder if you -you've written much on institutional arrangements, and I just wonder if you'd give a quick
comment on how you see the sort of future in terms of institutional arrangements and the
extent to whether agencies that have other core mandates can accommodate IDPs
effectively enough.

And then with regard to the research community, let me just throw a few questions at you because I know you condense very well. How do you see that community as having contributed to the development of new approaches for IDPs? And I know it has dealt with institutional arrangements. Did the growing attention to IDPs broaden refugee studies into studies of forced migration? Do you see policy advocacy as necessary to research? And was enough research paid to the third phase of displacement to recovery, reintegration, and development, which is now considered the weakest link?

So I'm going to ask you about lessons learned.

MS. MARTIN: Thank you, since I can give an hour speech on each of those issues, trying to do it in 7, 8, 10 minutes will be difficult.

MS. COHEN: Even less, yes.

MS. MARTIN: Even less.

MS. COHEN: Particularly since we do want to get to the audience.

MS. MARTIN: Let me just say on the institutional arrangements, sitting next to someone from UNHCR saying that IDPs are a part of their mandate is such a see change that's occurred over the last 20 years. What I would hope is that in the future though, what we work on -- and it's somewhere along the lines of what Walter and others

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were saying -- is that it's really implementation that is the challenge. Because even though there may a recognition, institutionally in a lot of organizations now that IDPs are a part of their mandate and a part of their activity, I think when we get to the ground level we're still too often seeing huge gaps. Just look at Syria. We don't have to go much beyond that.

So although one can see huge, huge progress, and I think the engagement of UNHCR in these issues has marked a major change, I think transforming what is a commitment to protection to actual protection is to lagging very far behind. And I'm sure that the next panel will talk much more about that.

With regard to the role of the research community, I think that this is an issue in which the research really helped to bring attention to internal displacement as an issue and to a much better understanding of what the needs of the IDPs were and where the gaps were. And in turn though, as recognition grew, that internally displaced persons had so many of the same needs, whether it was for assistance or protection, and that this was occurring regardless of whether it was conflict-related persecution, human rights violations, or development project natural disasters, that the causation in a way, or geography, was less important than figuring out how to protect vulnerable people who were in life-threatening situations.

I think we saw as a result of that recognition, a total transformation of what had been narrowly refugee studies into forced migration studies. And the research community now looking at both refugees and IDPs, but also looking at situations in a much more holistic manner, recognizing that if we're talking about Syria, to come back to that, one can segment refugees are here, IDPs are here. We have to have one system for this box and a totally system for that box, that I think too often that is a failure.

So research -- I'm going to say a few words about the project because

I've worked so closely with both Roberta and Elizabeth over the course of the years, as well as, of course, Francis and Walter, is that the project really not only benefitted from the fact that there wasn't external research, Brookings does now, because of this long history, stand before the IDP project, but a lot of us went back to the Refugee Policy Group, which produced a lot of the initial research, not least of which is what you were working on, Roberta.

The fact that the whole work on the Guiding Principles and the operationalizing of them was accompanied by Masses in Flight, Roberta and Francis's epic opus on IDPs, and there was a really serious evidence base for all of the advocacy that was going to happen on IDPs, I think was crucial to the success. And then Bill Froehlich and I were reminiscing yesterday about the efforts then at the U.S. Committee for Refugees and the Refugee Policy Group to try to get the data, to try to get numbers. That, then, was taken over by an IDMC. And again, without having that capacity, to be able to talk in concrete terms about the phenomenon, not just in, "It's big," but to try to understand just what the dimensions are. I don't think we've had the progress.

And if I just think about the number of projects that, you know, Roberta, you and Beth have gotten me into over the course of this period emanating from the project. I started noting them. "When Displacement Ends," joint. Brought in a lot of researchers to work on cases to understand that process. "How IDPs are Integrated into Peace Processes." Again, thinking about different cases. I see Patricia here who worked on that project. "Development-Induced Displacement." Michael Cernea is in the audience. I don't see Court Robinson, but he was engaged to try to formulate how the definition, which was very broad, became a definition, not just of conflict and human rights violations, but of development-induced displacement. The institutional frameworks, all of the work that we've done together. I noted Francis saying that when there was a

really controversial issue, you went outside of the project. Yeah, I ended up with 20 years of research in that area. I can plug my book that's now out.

More recently, planned relocation in the context of environmental change. There were all things that came to the project's attention because of the practical policy issues that were coming up -- the operational issues, the program issues. And it was the engagement of the research community, which I think helped to find solutions, but also by engaging us, helped to transform what we do into what I think is a much better formulation in terms of an issue that we all have concern about because these are life-threatening situations, and in which if we continue to think about our small boxes, will likely lead to, unfortunately, massive loss of life.

So I think the project has done a phenomenal job, and I just want to personally thank both you, Roberta, and Beth, for having gotten me involved in this situation after, of course, I got you guys involved even earlier on.

MS. COHEN: Yes, you did.

MS. MARTIN: And thank you so much.

MS. COHEN: Susan, thank you.

I just want to say, Francis Deng has to depart. Francis, it was wonderful to see you, as always. And we thank you.

(Applause)

MS. COHEN: I'm going to ask Susan if she would turn to the audience and ask for questions.

MS. MARTIN: Roberta asked me to moderate the questions. But before I actually open it up, I want to call on somebody in the audience who in a way should have been up here, but I want to just make sure that we get some perspective.

We haven't talked much about the role of civil society in this process, and

that, particularly at the national local level. And Jivan, I wanted to just really call on you for a few words in terms of the lessons you've learned as somebody working in the consortium of humanitarian agencies in Sri Lanka, and having come all of this way to join us. If you'd please say a few words.

MR. VIAGARAJA: Thank you very much. I hadn't planned to -- oh, stand up? Okay.

I hadn't planned to intervene today, but just listening to all that's been said, I'm trying to recap on some of the developments back in Sri Lanka and in the region.

Francis's words about outrageous sort of interventions, I think the project sort of commissioned many outrageous interventions, whether it was practitioners' handbooks. We looked very deeply at the annotations. We dug up the annotations and made it into handbooks for national use. Even the concept of Guiding Principles.

I remember Francis came to Sri Lanka in '93 and we were going to hand deliver a letter to get him back in 2000 but it was stalled because of some kind of institutional difficulties from outside. The prime minister's office actually issued the letter which was prevented from outside. So that was in 2000, which is sad because the next visit was Walter, which was in 2007 or 2008. We could have advanced the induction of the Guiding Principles into our national policy framework if Francis had been able to come eight years earlier. So that is the kind of difficulties that we had.

But subsequently, I must say, Guiding Principles has become the norm. It's part of policy. Not because the U.N. advanced the government, but the government on its own has gone out and done it. Various (inaudible) outrageous interventions, we have inserted those words in. It's a norm. But, Cheloka's last report on Sri Lanka, which is very true, it's outrageous that long after the conflict has ended, we still have displaced

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people with unmet needs. And that's an outrage.

And somebody else mentioned, I think Walter, about, you know, he rounds corners in Katmandu and Nepal and finds IDPs. We have IDPs we don't notice, which is outrageous, too. We have IDPs who are in urban context, not just development end use. Poverty induces internal displacement. They're completely forgotten. So there is a lot more work to be done, I feel.

The principles out there, Walter asked what's going to happen next, which is true. I think much more needs to be done. It's not enough just to have the principles. We've had advances, no doubt about it, but I do believe very strongly that both, regrettably, refugees and internal displacement contests and advocates for attention around the world. Very regrettable. And both numbers are high. I believe internal displacement is at 3-point some million at the million -- 3.8 million internal displacement around the world.

SPEAKERS: Thirty-eight.

JOVAN: Good grief. Right.

Then the question arises, what is the institutional focus? Where is it going to be looked at? Is it sufficient just to have somebody advising the secretary?

The other point I would like to mention to those in the audience, as well as to Brookings is, there are regional variations, there are regional advances. It's very important to potentially capture it. The project has given the foundation. Much work has happened. I think I've looked at partners -- Qatar, Oslo, London, Geneva, Jakarta, Bangkok, not to mention what's going on in the Americas, the Africas. It will be useful. It will be stronger. The work -- the focus on displacement will be stronger if the regional work can also be stitched together, held together, but done in the regions. We'll be richer. Maybe we might be sooner in getting to solutions in the regions than what we're

doing right now.

Thank you.

MS. MARTIN: Thank you. Thank you.

Let me open it up then for questions. We'll take three at a time. I suspect we may not have time for much more, but if you're short on your questions and the responses.

In the front here. Please.

SPEAKER: Good afternoon. Thank you very much for a nice presentation. I really gained a lot.

It is very ironic. First of all, my name is (inaudible), from the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

It is very ironic today that the Brookings Project is coming to a close when I'm trying to launch my career in displacement. So where to go from here? I have gained immensely from the Brookings Project, and I'm teaching courses on refugee and IDP analysis, so I have used a lot of material, a lot of research I've gained.

One comment I have on the Guiding Principles. The Guiding Principles, of course, have been very instrumental in national legislation, and implementation is also not so bad because many national governments have implemented. For example, Colombia has implemented a lot of Guiding Principles, have incorporated into their constitution. I think in addition to the Guiding Principles, what we might also look at is some principles at the global level on structure reforms, looking at the institutions that are in charge of displacing the people in the first place. So unless we look at structure reforms, I think the Guiding Principles by themselves will not go a long way. Guiding Principles have been enough in setting legislation for accommodations and provisions at a transitional level. But unless we reform the principles and the institutions that displaced

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the people in the first place, we are not going to be able to look at the long-term solutions for that.

And my question also is -- one question is about the role of the international community on disputed territories. For example, Kashmir, Abkhazia, South Ossetia. I know that it is sensitive, it is political to get into the disputed territories, but unless the international community focuses on that, we are not really addressing displacement at a local level.

MS. MARTIN: Thank you.

Yes, in the back.

MR. PICCONE: Thank you very much.

I am Ted Piccone. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings, and I want to make a comment and a question.

First of all, a comment on some of the lessons learned about this project. I did some research analyzing the role of special procedures in the U.N. system and how they have impact at the national level. And when I got to Brookings, I started that project without really recognizing the value and the importance of this particular relationship that Brookings has had with the now special repertoire on IDPs. And I can see, after doing all this research and comparing many different mandates and situations, that this partnership between a research institution and a mandate holder has made a huge difference in terms of impact.

Independent experts of the U.N. system are pro bono, unpaid volunteers, free labor for the U.N. and for the human rights system. And by having an anchor and a continuity behind the mandate to support the research work has really made a big difference. Francis alluded to some jealous even on this relationship, so I wanted to point that out.

It's also important to note how the follow-up visits that, in particular, Walter made to countries after an initial visit, going back a year or two later, has had a huge impact on following through on the implementation of laws and policies. So I wanted -- that's an important lesson learned for the whole U.N. system.

And then the question is your very interesting discussion about creative lawyering and trying to think about where we are now and what is the next move of creative lawyering that you see up ahead of us in this field or in the holistic sense, certainly, we've come a long way on R2P, but the controversy over Libya that's playing out now and Syria, I'm wondering is that a temporary setback in this general progression towards responsible sovereignty or is there something you see that will get us past this current impasse into something that goes even further.

MS. MARTIN: Since we are running behind, maybe we'll -- and we've had multiple questions in each question, so perhaps I'll come back and ask responses.

Walter, you --

MR. KÄLIN: Thank you for the questions. Let me address South Ossetia, Abkhazia.

Actually, I managed to go to both places. Lots of negotiations. But I'm very happy that you raised the issue because that's a more general thing. There shouldn't be kind of blank spaces on the map of human rights. Just because territories are contested or occupied, it should not mean that human rights shouldn't play a role there.

I think that's part of the creative lawyering. I did find some ways to get access and to make the argument that even though these territories regarded themselves as totally independent, they were still bound by the relevant laws, provisions, and frameworks.

I'm very happy about you highlighting the importance of the partnership.

Francis would say the same thing, but I can say very, very clearly, that without Brookings, I could not have done what I did. And there was a lot of jealousy among special repertoires because some had great support, including myself and others, and you can see differences that have nothing to do with the personalities of the mandate holder, but really have a lot to do with this kind of infrastructure that is needed.

And it's not so much that it's an unpaid voluntary position; even a full-time paid position couldn't achieve what the IDP mandate was able to achieve, because it's not just Brookings, it's a whole network. And Roberta has been great in drawing in everyone. I see familiar faces here in the room and beyond, and they all have contributed. And it was this kind of -- one could say almost movement that gave the great support to the mandate holder.

The next steps, I think your question was too big to be answered before the coffee break, but to narrow it a little bit down to the displacement issues, I do think there are two areas. The one you mentioned, development-related displacement. We have Michael Charnia, and we discussed it in the morning, the need is also there to really address it, to talk about the national responsibilities, the laws, the provisions, the strategies. And then the other big area is what I'm now doing and involved with all the displacement linked to disasters caused by natural hazards, effects of climate change. Global warming is a reality. And it has impacts that are huge in terms of pushing people to move and displacing people. And if it can advances also on that front, it would be very important. And then still, we have all these conflicts and more and more conflicts in growing numbers. So that's a repeat. It remains a huge challenge. Roberta was talking about the displacement crisis in the 1990s. We are really back to a huge displacement crisis.

MS. MARTIN: Bob?

MR. GOLDMAN: No, I have nothing really to add.

MS. MARTIN: Shelly?

One quick thing on the, what, next on it, is that in some regard I think separating the project from the -- or the research that's going on from the mandate may hold some opportunities and not just -- I think that in the formative stage of the last 25 years it was very important to have those two processes together. But because I think so many of the challenges we'll hear about are ones of implementation and ones where I think an ability to be a bit more critical with regard to the existing institutions may be very useful at this point. And I'm really pleased that Beth will be joining us at Georgetown, and I hope that we'll be able to play some of that role in the future.

MR. GOLDMAN: Susan, if I may make a comment since we're talking about the future, it would be to say that one of the lessons -- Walter, you mentioned that there are protracted IDP situations. In fact, most of the IDPs -- and most of the refugees for that matter -- have been in that situation for a protracted period, whatever that is -- 10 years, 20 years, for a very long time. And it's gone beyond simply dealing with it as a humanitarian situation. So perhaps one of the avenues to explore in the future and one of the issues to press for also within the context of the SDG reflection, is to include IDPs more aggressively in development -- I don't know whether it's development -- in planning for the future, including them, because their problems will be addressed. Their solutions will be found, not just through blankets and cooking pots, obviously, but through more integrated initiatives that cover whole areas. And UNHCR is not going to take the lead on that, certainly, but we want to prompt other agencies as well to engage international financial institutions and others, to engage from the onset of an emergency, or just as well from the onset of an IDP crisis, to look for that kind of solution or end to the

approach.

MS. MARTIN: And you have the last word. I'm giving it back to you.

MS. COHEN: Okay, I'll take the last word.

I wanted to thank everyone for being here. I also wanted to say as a follow up to Jivan Viagaraja's comments -- and there's also somebody in the audience, Jiminez Sanchez, who worked with the project and who has done so much in Colombia, that there is much greater need for international work and involvement with civil society in different countries. If this is strengthened, if resources and institutional structures are in place so that those groups within their own countries can really be following and promoting together with some regional and international support, the whole question of displacement, then it's seen not just as a national problem as one that has to be in partnership with the international and the regional community. So I think that there lies the -- it's a much bigger and sort of comprehensive coming together -- than just at the international level. And the laws, the policies, the just activities and the expectations of people at the national level and also at the international level coming together will bring us to this really international responsibility and national responsibility to protect these populations.

And I think the next panel -- and Beth is going to be dealing -- we've sort of handed over the future to her and her team. So it's a great pleasure to see everyone here and to recall how far we've come and how far we have to go. Thank you all.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Welcome back everyone, and thank you for sticking around. I know it's a Friday afternoon.

SPEAKER: Yeah. Friday afternoon, wow.

MS. FERRIS: I know. It's through real dedication, and we really

appreciate it. We do have a reception afterwards with drinks; it that will, you know, inspire you to remain seated for what we hope is a challenging discussion.

My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a Senior Fellow here at Brookings, and Co-Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

This is the last event we'll organize as a project. It is our 165th event that we've held here at Brookings, and when I went back and looked over the range of issues on which we've organized events, you know, it's everything from Darfur to Gaza to Libya. In many ways we've been a humanitarian arm of Brookings as well, in terms of trying to bring up the human dimension at the impact of foreign policies and other issues that affect people.

So, it's been a real pleasure to be here these years, and looking forward to this last session that we are organizing. It's going to look at the future challenges for work with IDPs. You know, we've just heard a little while ago, some of the stories of how this project came to be, and how IDPs made it onto the international agenda, and a legal framework was established, and some of the challenges of working with national governments.

Certainly, it's been a remarkable story, and I think, as Martin Indyk said; it's been one of human rights success story of the past decades. But much remains to be done. The number of IDPs in the world is at an all-time high, 38 million displaced by conflict, more displaced by disasters in development projects. And we may hear about some of the difficulties in counting those displaced for other reasons.

I can't remember a time when we've seen so many simultaneous megacrises. My sense is the international humanitarian system is close to the breaking point. It is trying to do it not only financially, with responding to large numbers of crises, but in terms of energy and creativity, and staffing.

And it seems like every time I go someplace I'm hearing about, our education and expert from Pakistan was pulled out to go work in Northern Iraq for a while. And I've been in Central African Republic, and now have to go South Sudan, the number of crises is really, really overwhelming.

Institutionally we heard about some of the positive developments with UNHCR taking on IDPs more. We have a whole cluster system that's emerged, in large part because of the awareness of the gap to deal with the issue of IDPs, the institutional structure has changed dramatically over the last 20 years and still there are gaps. Still there are cases where international institutions cannot or choose not to respond to IDPs because it's not my mandate, it's not so important, somebody else is doing it, and so and so, a particular personality may not give it the importance it deserves.

There is some confusion about how we address people displaced for different reasons. Are those displaced by disasters facing the same kinds of needs as those displaced by conflict? Where do development projects fit into this? And the whole issue of development-induced displacement is a, politically, very sensitive one for many governments.

And I think for some good reasons, the mandate has sort of tiptoed around the issue of development-induced displacement, because you can find the government such as Brazil, or India, or Bangladesh, or the United States about displacing people for development projects, can raise a host of different and sometimes uncomfortable questions.

There is another group of challenges related to where IDPs live. You know, humanitarians have gotten quite comfortable with running camps. You know how to set up a camp and ensure that services are provided, and when services aren't provided, you know who is responsible, there is a certain degree of accountability that

comes with camps, but when people are living disbursed in communities, it becomes more difficult to identify them, to figure out what kind of assistance they need, and what kind of assistance they need in relationship to host populations.

You know, should IDPs be singled out, do they have needs that are specific to their displacement when everyone in a given community may be poor. So, the challenge of dealing with IDPs living in non-camp settings, not just in urban areas, sometimes in very small villages and questions of disability, and targeting, and assessments, and accounting, all become more difficult when IDPs are disbursed among communities.

Perhaps the biggest challenge is one that was raised in the last Panel, and that is the fact that displacement drags on for years and years and decades and decades. And how do we get a handle on protracted displacement? What can be done rather than simply lament the fact that people have been displaced for far too long? Are there new and creative ways of this protracted displacement?

Which I think is really a scandal when you talk to people who have been displaced, and whose parents were displaced, and whose children face a lifetime of displacement. We need to take this very, very seriously.

We have a distinguished Panel today, this afternoon, and we are going to begin with Alfredo Zamudio, who is the Director of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. You know, in the whole world there really have been two institutions working exclusively in IDPs, Brookings and IDMC, we work very closely together over the years, trying to complement our efforts, pooling resources, sometimes lamenting developments in the world together.

And so we are delighted to have you, and really, really quite touched that you came all this way to be with us this afternoon, Alfredo. But Alfredo, tell us a little bit

about what the future is for working sovereignty issues? Are the issues all solved now that we've got the guiding principles, and so on?

MR. ZAMUDIO: I, first of all, thank you, and thank you to the Panelists. It's Friday afternoon. I am grateful that you are here to listen to us.

And, Elizabeth, first of all congratulations from the team in Geneva, and thanks to Brookings, and thanks to everyone here in Washington, who have done a marvelous job to do this pioneer -- pioneering work during all these years. It requires stamina and knowledge, and you have both in great amount too.

How, or has the situation changed because we have a legal tool, a legal framework that can be applied by countries? Let me tell you a story. Once, in 1994 and '95, I met a woman in Bosnia. And she told me, I know the war is over, or it's about to and to move forward. I think it was at the end of '95. And she said, in my head, I hear, still, the bombs, when I close the eyes, the bombs are still in there.

So when we discuss about protracted displacement, and to change that situation, we need to understand the individuals. The individuals' feelings, emotions, the compassion that we need to understand for what's happening with them.

The legal frameworks tell national governments, you have a responsibility, and because of your responsibility you have also the capacity to act. But how do we make governments to see the fellow citizens with compassion. That is sometimes it's possible, sometimes it is impossible, because national governments are the cause of the internal displacement in certain situations.

In other situations they don't have the capacity to respond and to protect.

Those are the actions or the situations where we can work together with national governments and use the legal frameworks, and use the capacity to work for the benefit of those who are displaced.

The challenge that's ahead of us, it's that, imagine a room which is the displacement room, the stock of internal displacement, that room is getting more and more crowded. There are less and less doors available to those people in that room where they can go out of that situation.

One of the challenges in front of us, is that because people have been staying for 15, 20, 25 years, waiting for restitution of land, waiting for justice, the international community may be tempted to say -- open the pressure on national governments to say, because you have been waiting so long, we need to change your status. You are not longer an IDP, you are something else. Therefore the situation it has to be observed very carefully, what is the future in front of us.

The volume of internal displacement is growing. You know, we have heard 38 million people internally displaced until December last year, 11 million people only in 2014. That means one person internally displaced every three seconds in 2014, by conflict and violence. Then, add on that, disaster-induced displacement.

And on those situations where disasters is compounded by conflict, like in the Sahel, you have drought, you have floods, and conflict. So the future in front of us is complicated, to say it like that. It's not as complicated as the U.S. may never win this --you know, the World Cup in football, it may happen sometime, but it requires some efforts. It requires some acknowledgement that it has to improve.

And the dialogue has improved. I have been in this business and trying to understand the language of this since I first became an internally displaced in 1973 in Chile. And then I approached the ICFC, my father was in prison, and the ICFC said, you are not affected, your father is. I was a 12-year-old boy, unaccompanied child, expelled from my house, but I, in the eyes of the international community at that time, I was not a victim.

That has changed. We have legal tools and methodologies that acknowledges and help us to see, but then do we act on what we see? That is one of the challenges in front of us. And, you know, in the IDMC is -- we are the weather center of this. We are always telling you the bad news, but we are also trying to identify the policies at work. Just let me use one more minute.

And we produce a document for the Sendai Conference on disaster risk reduction in Japan, in March. We analyzed data since 1970 to 2013 using probabilistic risk. The same that insurance companies use, and here in the U.S., you know everything about how good insurance companies are to, say, risk.

But we use this methodology, and we found five main drivers for internal displacement by disasters. Those five people say, oh, climate change is one, of course, one; then unplanned settlements, settlements in hazard-prone areas, unequaled distribution of wealth, and lack of governance for fragile states.

Of those five drivers, four are man-made policies for situations that can change. If we address those things, we can reduce the vulnerability and affectation of people, and internal displacement by disaster can drastically be reduced.

The same can be applied for some of the situations by conflict. It is about natural resources, it's about livelihood, it's about goods, it's about jobs, it's about political rights, and those are policies that can change. So in front of us I see an increasing number of difficulties, but it has not been static in the last 20 years, it has moved forward.

MS. FERRIS: And so we can expect to continue moving forward? Do you want to go on record saying this, Alfredo?

MR. ZAMUDIO: Yes. I would like to go on record and say, we are going to move on forward because we have -- look at the forum here, you have a huge amount

of young people who are taking over, learning, being capacitating, and taking over the situation, and learning how to do this.

So, I think the international community has changed, but it's difficult, and I am very happy to hear what Yunus Yah said, that it is something that -- the responsibility that Yunus Yah is taking. I know also the Global Protection Cluster is moving forward to do more on legal frameworks, to help national governments with that, we are very happy to see that.

I mean, we need to know more, and also because national governments is not the enemy, national governments are the tool for the solutions to do the solutions on this, we need to invent and understand how do we create that dialogue with national governments.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. We'll, turn now to Niels Harild, to the Displacement Development Specialist at The World Bank. He has been working on these issues for many years. And one of your calls has always been, let's stop seeing displacement just as a humanitarian issue, but see it as a development issue, and calling for the need for a paradigm change. What are your thoughts now Niels, as you look forward on looking at displacement as a development issue.

MR. HARILD: I'm pretty stubborn, so my thoughts are about the same. I think being here, in the Brookings Institution reminds me of some of the things I have done in the past, and also listening to Francis Deng earlier, soon I will join the extinguished group that he was referring to, when I retire from the Bank in a couple of months.

But, I was part of the Brookings process that was led by Ogata and Wolfensohn, and Michel is here, he was partner in crime too. And it's sort of -- it was a very important issue but it sort of fizzled a little bit, and I think one of the reasons was that

it was a little bit top-down, and then 9/11 happened, and other priorities came to high politics.

So when I joined the Bank, to do something else, 10 years ago, a few years after I saw the opportunity to maybe it would be better if we started to talk about displacement from the inside of the development institution. So I established a program that is called the Global Program on Forced Displacement in the Bank, to try and get the Bank to more systematically address the issues of forced displacement, be that country-induced that is, IDPs and refugees.

And I think we have managed to get more traction on this, and I'll mention a couple of examples of what we have done including, recently, managed to get the now High Commissioner to actually meet with the President to talk about this issue.

Again, that Wolfensohn and Ogata did, and hopefully, this time I think we have a more solid bottom-up foundation to work with.

I think -- when we talk about the scope, that Alfredo mentioned, I think the key issue is that we are talking about close to 1 percent of the world's population affected by displacement. But maybe it's actually more than that, because we have to think about directly-affected host populations, and return -- potential return populations as well, in often, marginalized areas of countries that are suffering from chronic underdevelopment.

And then we may talk about five or more percent of the world's population and making it, therefore, not just a small side issue. And the average level of protected displacement I think is now calculated as 17 years. Whether it is 17, 15 or 20, I think is not too important, the important thing is that's a long time. And we have seen very few solutions of large-scale over the last 10, 15 years, and this means that the needs of those people and affected host communities, becomes more developmental

than humanitarian.

But the policy shifts to change from the short-term handout mode, to the longer-term consideration is hard to come by. It's difficult. It's also tough choices for governments to take those decisions.

But I think we were also supposed to talk about challenges here, and I think you mentioned that the issue of displacement is seen as humanitarian issue, predominantly. And I think that is, still, to a large extent, a problem, and I think what is needed is sort of a mindset change to sort of -- to realize that the issue is political, it is security-related, it is developmental, and it is humanitarian as well.

And then you step back and say, now what do we do? And from the development perspective that means we also have role to play. And this is the work I've been working on in the Bank to get development thinkers and planners to consider the issue. Not because Gutierrez tells them to do so, but because it's a development issue.

And that's where I think we have made some progress, and I'll mention a couple of examples. I think in terms of analytics, when I listened to the first Panel, they talked about the lawyers and how they have prepared the guiding principles. On the basis of that, we were able to work with Walter on doing a piece of analytical work on the developmental implications of signing off to the Kampala Convention.

So that governments that do ratify the Kampala Convention, and sign it into law, actually realize that it's to only a humanitarian activity they sign off to, because many of the clauses of the guiding principle, when you look at that, are more developmental in nature than humanitarian. But the mindset change, or the mindset challenge is that people would talk about IDPs at the Kampala Convention. Okay, that's humanitarian.

Should we give it to the humanitarians to deal with? And that's the first

step in the wrong direction, or not only, but I mean, you have to also realize that there's more to it.

I think I'm talking too long here. So, let me see if I can just mention a couple of examples of Bank work on this, and then stop, if you like.

I think in Azerbaijan, we have been working with the government from the Bank side, for a long time, and in the beginning it was housing projects only, but we did a piece of analytical work on the potential for self-reliance of the IDPs. And now we have learning operations that promote both self-reliance and housing support to IDPs, which is an improvement on how the original situation was.

So this is an example of how a piece of economic analytics can lead to governments changing their policies and therefore how they deal with a displacement issue. We also spent many years largely behind the scenes working with colleagues in the Columbian Government of documenting IDP land rights; that was a very important foundation for the victims of reparation law that the present government is in the process of implementing.

So this is another example. I mentioned the Kampala Convention. Just one more example before I stop. Some of you may know that the President and the Secretary General visited Africa on a number of occasions recently, under what is known as Regional Initiatives, and the program I manage in the Bank, we manage to get a pillar of displacement into those regional initiatives.

And followed that up by pieces of analytical work that we undertook together with UNHCR; so that we created a different piece of work that could lead to a policy discussion with the affected government that included both The World Bank's counterpart in government, as well as the UNHCR's normal counterparts, and that's a little bit of a new way of doing business, because that hasn't really happened seriously,

anywhere before.

It's too early to say what that will lead to, but I think in my experience with this, this could be good examples for a new way of doing business. But as Joel, I'm sure, reminded me of, development solution to displacement is not magic number one, it's just one of the pieces, and it's not easy. But at least I think we have managed to come to -- we have improved the way that development actors think about it, and there are more development actors before, say then, 10 years ago, that are actually realizing that is an issue for them, because it's a development issue than before.

I'll stop here, and then we can maybe, if question comes we can go for --

MS. FERRIS: Yeah. I want to press a little bit though, when you are approaching development actors, what arguments work? Do you use a different jargon? Do you talk about resilience? Do you talk about long-term solutions, environment, gender? I mean, how really a different language?

MR. HARILD: Who approaches who?

MS. FERRIS: You know, humanitarian approaches, development actors. How don't you guys get involved in this?

MR. HARILD: I think the main challenge is not so much what the humanitarians can say and do to the development actors, it's about development actors themselves getting it.

MS. FERRIS: Right.

MR. HARILD: For myself, I call it the oops factor. When I meet with the Bank country manager, or a country director, or a sector leader, and I say, okay, you are working in country X, and you have this many IDPs, and you have this many refugees, and so one, what are you doing about it. And that persons says, I'm not doing anything about it, that's UNHCR, and for the Regional Refugee Council to handle.

And then I say, wait a minute, then what about this and this and this, and what about the implications of protected displacement on polity, and then they will come with whole argumentarium for why it is a development issue. And then often I'd say, hmm, I never thought about it like that.

Can we talk more -- in case I want to do something, what should I do?

And then the answer is often that you have to, in development work, you have to start with a piece of analytical work to make the developmental case for what you have to do, why you have to do something.

Hence the studies we've done, or assessments we've done in the regional initiatives in Africa with UNHCR, are pieces of development-led assessments that can be used by Bank thinkers to then design operations, and we actually are in the process of designing some operations for refugees and host communities in the Great Lakes and the Horn right now.

MS. FERRIS: And I like that phrase, "the oops factor" I think that's something we should all aspire to.

MR. HARILD: It's very unbankish, but still.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. We turn now to Joel Charny, who is Vice President of Humanitarian Policy and Practice, InterAction. He has followed IDP issues for many years, and usually has something provocative to say. So, let me just ask, what do you see as the future challenges for work in this area?

MR. CHARNY: Thanks, Beth. And I was -- I mean I came to Washington in 2000, so I think -- how many meetings were there, 185?

MS. FERRIS: Yeah, 165.

MR. CHARNY: -- sixty-five. Well, those 165, I think I have been to about 90 of them, as least, so. No, it's definitely the end of an era for the Brookings Project to

be laid down, and it was -- it's a privilege really to be on the podium and to be a part of this final session. And, you know, there are some giants on the stage, so I really appreciate being a part of this final event.

My sense on internal displacement is that we are losing momentum. I had a whole list, I'm not going to go into it for interest of time, but my gut sense is, we peak maybe in 2005, 2006, around the inclusion of the guiding principles and in the World Summit document, but somehow -- I mean, the Humanitarian Reform of 2005, as you'll recall, was actually drive by concern about internal displacement and the ineffective response.

The Cluster System, you know, was developed precisely to assign responsibility for key aspects of humanitarian response, again, with gaps related to internal displacement in mind. Now, you know, I've been involved in work with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee now for the last four years, pretty continuously since joining InterAction, and I'm struck that there is almost no mention of internal displacement.

This is about what Roberta was referring to. It's about vulnerability, it's about mainstreaming, it's about being objective about who is really in need, and while I appreciate that perspective, I think if there's still a case to, say, that internally displaced people have special needs, special problems that need to be recognized, that demand a special approach, I really feel that that perspective is being lost right now.

So, I kind of divided what we need to do into three broad categories.

One is, we need more advocacy. There's no one right now, really owns, and is driving an advocacy agenda related to internal displacement. And I distinguish the research and the data function from the advocacy function. Yes, we need good statistics. Yes, we need objective research, but what's lacking is a body or a set of organizations that are taking that information and saying, based on this, these are the solutions, this is what we

need to drive.

And I just, absent, kind of a rediscovery of advocacy, and an advocacy agenda, related internal displacement, I think we are going to remain kind of stuck where we are.

The second issue, is sort of the institutional frameworks and arrangements. I mean, honestly, Beth, I your statement about how our job is done and we are going to move on. I mean, we are going to miss Brookings.

I mean, the mandate holder needs support, let me just put it that way.

So, absent Brookings, where is that support going to come? Who is going to provide that support? I mean, Chaloka is already struggling, as was mentioned, as an unpaid individual, to carry this mandate along with the full teaching load, et cetera, et cetera.

So, I feel like Brookings is stepping down, I think that's going to create a vacuum that somehow is going to need to be filled. How, I'm not sure, but I think that's something we have to identify. I'm also convinced that I know all the bureaucratic reasons, but I think the fact is that moving the position from a representative of the Secretary General, to a special rapporteur within the framework of the Human Rights Commission, that is a step down. It's a step backwards.

It's a loss of prestige. It's a loss of access to the highest levels of the U.N. system, and I think speaking about of advocacy we have to make that a major priority that when Chaloka is replaced, he's replaced by someone who, once again, becomes a representative of the Secretary General, not a special rapporteur to the Human Rights Commission.

And then while this is somewhat related to institutional frameworks I think, the progress that we've made on the normative framework is indeed significant, but merely having a law in place, merely having the Kampala Convention doesn't necessarily

lead to concrete implementation. There's a whole scope, I think, for technical support related to the normative framework.

Again, who is going to provide that, I mean I did see that mention of, perhaps the Global Protection Cluster taking that up, that's great. Honestly, the GPC has a ton of problems right now. So, you know, I feel like, you know, something is going to supplement the work of the Global Protection Cluster to really make the national legislation real.

And then finally, this is perhaps the most sensitive issue that I'm going to raise, we need more operational effectiveness, and I come to this extremely reluctantly, I mean, I fought and advocated for at least five years, for UNHCR to be recognized as the lead agency on internally displaced people, for UNHCR to embrace that mandate, you know, to take the lead globally as it relates to internal displacement, but it's just not working.

Why is not working? Because fundamentally, and the High

Commissioner himself said this when challenged at a session at InterAction a few months
ago, the core mandate for UNHCR is refugees and the refugee protection mandate. And
when the two -- when the mandate -- when the refugee mandate conflicts with, or causes
issues related to the challenge of responding to internally displaced people, it's the
refugee mandate that's going to win out every time.

And I just saw a really stark example of this in Syria. In Syria, there are 26,000 Iraqi refugees who remain in the country and need protection. There are 4.5 million Syrians who are internally displaced. UNHCR in Syria has, by far, the most robust protection capacity in the country, that capacity is being devoted primarily, to carrying out the mandate to care for and support 26,000 Iraqi refugees. And UNHCR is not providing the support and leadership that's needed on the internally displaced people of Syria,

partially because they are afraid to offend the Syrian Government.

So, where does that leave us? Well, Hansjoerg bosses --

MR. STROHMEYER: That isn't what I mean?

MR. CHARNY: No. No. No. Hansjoerg's bosses said OCHA keep telling us to be bold. I don't know how bold, truly, we can be institutionally but, no, I'm not going to call for an IDP agency, that would be truly insane. But I do think we need to rethink overall responsibility for IDP protection, and if UNHCR can't carry it out, then we need to identify other ways for this to happen.

We need to re-conceptualize how IDPs are met by more effectively joining up the humanitarian response to internal displacement, perhaps under the leadership of the humanitarian country teams. I don't know. I mean, short of that, you do what -- you know, some crazy thing, I'm sure, Shelly is, like having a heart attack as I say this.

But, you know, you could really just say, let's just have UNHCR focus on legal protection for internally displaced people, and let's see how we can join up the capacity of UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF together, in responding to the concrete needs of people. Again, probably not politically doable, but again, it's just not working. It's not working in Syria, it's not working in Central African Republic, it's not working in South Sudan.

So, I just feel we need in the -- especially in the context of the World Humanitarian Summit, we need to own that. We need to recognize it as a problem, and see if we can come up with some creative solutions.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. And thanks for your comments as to what I hoped that you would provoke us to discuss. I mean, I think some of these issues about losing momentum, and where do we go on institutional arrangements need to be --

MR. CHARNY: So now you can press the Austin Powers-like button, and I can let go down into the pit of doom.

MS. FERRIS: I remember all that --

MR. CHARNY: And we can continue the conversation.

MS. FERRIS: But this whole issue of institution architecture and who does what, and really it's very much to you, Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Director of Policy, and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. I mean, I remember you signing this a decade ago OCHA has 30 staff people working in IDPs, and now there's one-half of one person. And that's a dramatic change. You know, as I've written before, IDP is being mainstreamed into oblivion. What do you think, Hansjoerg?

MR. STROHMEYER: I have nothing to say on Joel's personal views on the interagency setup, privately perhaps, after we both get -- And I have to explain to my boss that even a part of this panel, you know, that I -- But, look, I mean I think perhaps just to echo much of what Joel said. I think it's a very mixed bag where we are right now, if I can say that.

Before I get into this, and I want to say that from the bottom of my heart, just as Joel, I was really honored to be actually part of this, to see all these -- the fore-thinkers and forefathers of this. And I belong to whatever that second or third generation, but what I call the Generation IDP. And when I entered the U.N., OCHA, I remember Sérgio Vieira de Mello went -- was about to go to the Wolfensohn-Ogata dialogue, and of my very speeches that I had to draft in the first two or three weeks, was actually on internally displaced, and there was no difficulty actually getting good advice, because everyone was energized.

I mean, that's what people would talk about. In fact, the humanitarian crisis and IDPs was synonymous, the very fact that we have an emergency relief

coordinator, stems from the fact that there was an IDP crisis in Northern Iraq and, you know, in the middle of winter, some of you may remember people could just not cross these additional 5 meters into Turkey, and no one, she had an answer, no one was responsible, no one knew how to refer to these people.

And so someone said, well, someone needs to coordinate this, and that was the founding moment of what we call Resolution 46/182 of the Emerging Relief Coordinator, of the interagency system that Joel just referred to.

So, no doubt, there has been much progress thanks to you, thanks to the rapporteurs, and the representatives, and the leadership, but I do feel as, Joel, that there is backsliding, and there has been backsliding, from a variety of angles. You alluded very much to the various agencies. It's very interesting that the ICRC just in its latest strategic plan for the first time in years, reemphasize IDPs again.

I think there's a collective loss of literacy on IDPs. We started calling these because of pressure of governments, all sorts of things, and Roberta, earlier, referred to some of those things. We undermined the guiding principles and the very documents that guided us for the first two years -- 10 years, by just not calling them IDPs anymore, and by emphasizing, I think, to an extent that is not healthy, and not useful ultimately, delivery over addressing the very specific issues that actually make and keep IDPs. IDPs.

It is about -- It has become very much about assistance, about delivering food, water, shelter and other things, and not so much anymore about mobilizing the political energy of addressing some of these issues. Of sitting with governments around the policies and the shifts that are necessary.

So, when we've had some discussions two years ago starting to reenergize ourselves in OCHA, yet, several people said, but, I always speak -- I

constantly talk about IDPs, but we mentioned the numbers, and we mentioned the figures, and we mentioned what we delivered to IDPs. But that is not the IDP response that was envisioned by the guiding principles, and that the spirit behind this, that was not about assistance, that was about rights, and solutions.

And I feel that we've lost a little bit off that. I also feel that in the intergovernmental process there has been backsliding. I mean, you refer to advocacy. I mean, generally speaking, around the rights, protection, IDP issues and so on, where is the outrage? Where is the leadership on this outrage? It's been left and owned by us, the technical agencies, by organizations rather than by politicians.

Where is that leadership on some of these issues, at the very senior level? That political solution is required, mobilizing the moneys, and we see some of that in the various intergovernmental forums at the United Nations.

At the Security Council, if you have references to IDPs, it's formulaic. It's like, comma, including IDPs, women, children, and these types of things, that we've gotten used to, but there is no real consideration anymore to it. There is no resolution that I can remember in recent years that really reaffirms the right to return, that calls upon member states, or affected states, host states, to get on with policy shifts as strategies or action plans, or sets even the expectations on conference; a lot of things that we do on security sector reform, and other operational areas, but we have -- it's become very formulaic.

And lastly, the SDG Process, the Sustainable Development Goals, Niels referred a little bit to this. I mean, the report that prompted this entire current discussion around the SDGs by the British Prime Minister Cameron, and the Indonesian President, Yudhoyono, had five paradigm shifts that they suggested for sustainable -- to achieve sustainable development.

The first one was, no none left behind. We are about to leave 40 million people behind. IDPs, it was fought very, very hard, you couldn't even mention it at the beginning. It is not a goal, it is not a target, we have in the indicators, despite lots, and lots of efforts over a year now, not managed to put forced displacement into the core compendium of indicators. There is something on disaster-related displacement there.

So there is a real chance of possibility that sustainable development goals and framework, despite its many other positive successes, will leave 14 million people behind. Why? Partly because a year ago, when the working group, the membership came out with the first draft, we looked at the draft and said, isn't this fantastic, there's fragility in there, and vulnerability, and rich production, and all these terms, exactly as Joel said, that we've gotten used to it, that are also important. But we've started to forget about our core constituency, and that is internally displaced and others; and that has to do with some of this support.

So whereto, from here? If I can just look at three things, first of all, I do think that at the advocacy front, what we said, around the SDGs. Over the last year, with many of you on the podium here and others, we have mustered some energy around the recognition that this is actually is a longer-term issue, a development and political issue, first and foremost.

The fear is, if it is -- if we leave IDPs out of the SDGs, that there will still be humanitarian money, but it will be continuous -- the same story, year in year out, money for the humanitarian approach, there will not be enough money, there will be not prioritization of solving with developmental moneys, IDPs solutions.

The one thing that changed things around was the 17 years, the moment you started talking about 17 years, people woke up and said, 17, years, that is developmental problem, that is an institutional problem, that is a piece -- goal-related

problem. So, I think the way that advocacy can work, and what we are trying to do right now is, and we've proposed this to a number of states to say, if we assume that at the end of September, at the Summit, the Summit will adopt a largely transformative, sustainable development goals framework.

We cannot assume that IDPs will be left out. What we need, we have a responsibility to maintain that momentum, not just to say, well, sorry we lost that fight.

So, we are saying there will be 17 SDGs, 17 goals, we will propose an alternative 18th, an SDG 18, that's our campaign for the next 15 years.

By 2030 we will spell out a goal that says, we will commit to reducing 50 percent of the -- of the number of internally displaced, about 50 percent by 2030. We will have targets, we have socioeconomic indicators, we will monitor this. And for the one reason first and foremost. We need to get out of this narrative and the logic that we also have bought into, of every year, waiting for the latest IDMC figures.

So it's 33 million then, or 25 million before, 33 million then, 38 million, and with some absurd excitement we are sitting there right now, and saying next year is probably going to be even higher. Where is the reduction, where is the reversal of that logic? What are we doing to reverse that logic?

We need to force ourselves, to give ourselves targets to reverse that.

What is it that is necessary in a concrete context, programmatically? We have 1.5 million IDPs, to say, over the range of three to five years, what does it take to reduce the number from 1.5 to 1.2? Who has the mandate? Who has the comparative advantage? Who needs to intervene with governments on policies? Who can build the housing solutions for integration? Where can they resettled, the conference of approach?

That also means that humanitarians, we ourselves need to look at how we work programmatically, very differently. We are still annual, very annual, and where

we have tried multiyear plans, we quite frankly don't know how to do multiyear plans. We haven't done real multiyear plans, where you have flexible benchmarks and clear outcomes and so on. It's multiple, three years, the same project ties, the annual work plans that we put out.

So we need to look at ourselves and do certain things differently, and meeting the needs in protracted crisis is not enough. The way we have defined success so far, meeting the needs. That leads, actually, to us, over the course of 10 years, giving more and more and more aid to the individual, all the figures that we have, suggest that in the course of a protracted crisis, displacement, in particular, the individual aid amounts received grow, balloon out of control, at the same time developmental moneys, investments, and the moneys that affected governments themselves put into these issues, dramatically go down.

That cannot be the objective. That humanitarians do development on the cheap, in a way, on an annual approach. So, we need to look at -- accept that reality, that 80 percent of our business happens in protracted areas, in protracted crisis, and work accordingly, over three and five-year plans, with other actors, together, towards a goal that aims at not just meeting the needs, but reducing that vulnerability, reducing that need. And, as the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees recently said, to get out of this logic of us perpetuating a dependency, and stand in the way of promoting self-reliance.

I'll probably stop here, but I think the point of us, ourselves, needing to do much, much more to redefine and realize, redefine success. What it is that we are actually doing, that giving more assistance to IDPs in these places is not -- cannot be the solution that we are aiming at as an important policy shift that we need to buy in, and we need to think through? Thanks.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Hansjoerg. Lots of different issues, lots of suggestions, challenges, work has been done, remains to be done. We open the floor now for discussions, questions. Maybe take two or three at a time. Do we have somebody with microphones? I think we have somebody with microphones. Questions, comments?

MR. KIRIŞCI: No -- questions yes.

MS. FERRIS: We'll go Kemal, and we'll do one, two, three. Kemal? If you could introduce yourself; please?

MR. KIRIŞCI: I'm Kemal Kirişci. A Senior Fellow, here at Brookings. Hansjoerg, you made references to 1991 crisis, when more than 2 million, I think, it was Kurds, the flight to Iran, and (inaudible) or the Turkish. I would like to raise, or maybe politically incorrect issue --

MS. FERRIS: Before you do, can you move the microphone a little bit close.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah. I wonder if one should not go back and have another look at what happened in the Turkish case. Because with Beth, in October, 2013, we were at a seminar in Ankara, and the Minister who was responsible for handling this crisis on the Turkish side was saying, Turkey made a huge mistake by adopting the open-border policy on this particular occasion.

The world had change, obviously, in between significantly, but when we go back and look at '95, that crisis was resolved within, not months, weeks, and refugees were able to return to Northern Iraq, and subsequently KRG emerged in the long run. I wonder what the world would have for Syria, and this crisis would have looked like, if the Minister's advice was followed by the current Turkish Government.

I know it's an uncomfortable question. I have a question to Niels, too.

The Turkish Government keeps saying that they spend \$6.5 billion on assisting the Syrian refugees, but we were, again, on the border area just about two weeks ago, and what we also came to see, is the amount of economic activity that is occurring along the Syrian border, on the Turkish side.

Is there a study that looks at the contribution that assisting refugees in Turkey, and assisting IDPs across the border in Syria is having on the Turkey side?

Meaning, including like taxes that are being levied on humanitarian (inaudible) into Syria, to try to counterbalance this incessant argument, that Turkey spending is through sums of money in the international (inaudible) --

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, Kemal. We'll take a couple more; the gentleman in the last row?

MR. WILDER: Hello. My name is Johns Wilder. I work with AMAR U.S., and NGO operating on the ground in Iraq and Lebanon, assisting IDPs and other adverse populations. Firstly, I want to thank you all, not just for an excellent presentation, but for you work on behalf of this path-breaking project for the past 21 years.

My question is specifically for Mr. Harild, although I would appreciate the insights of any of the other Panelists as well. The contrast between development assistance and humanitarian relief is often emphasized, and you pointed out the focus in terms of shifting the focus towards development assistance, when it comes to towards development -- development assistance when it comes to IDPs.

However, do you believe that could it be more productive to focus on ways to merge the mandates of humanitarian relief in developing assistance rather than focusing on the differences between them, in terms of quality -- because that could help cooperation between the various stakeholders.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And Shelly, down here in front.

SPEAKER: I've taken note obviously, but the last talking point that I've got for the Standing Committee is that of the 7.6 million IDPs in Syria, 4.8 million are located in hard-to-reach areas.

So I mention that, that not in defense of you, and Hansjoerg, because I think that perhaps what you said has an element of truth, although I also see here that more than 120,000 people have benefited from protection interventions. Now what those are, psychosocial support, legal assistance counseling, principally in Damascus in the rural areas around Damascus, but still it gets to the issue of how much can we do if we are not secure ourselves, if we are not safe, if we don't have access?

And that's a particular challenge, in IDP situations, perhaps even more so than refugee situations, historically, although nowadays, we see as well, on the Nigerian border, for example, where the conflict is everywhere, where the risk of an incident, of a security challenge from a non-state actor, Boko Haram, or whatever. Or from one of the armies, puts everybody at risk.

So, the question is, whether it's UNHCR, or OCHA, or another organization or consortium, to how do we make -- how do we bridge that gap between the 4.8 and the 7.6 in the hard-to-reach areas, in situations like Iraq, Syria, South Sudan? It would have been nice if Francis Deng was here to answer that one -- South Sudan, Central African Republican, where we are just ourselves at risk?

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. I think we'll add Louise, and then we'll turn to the Panel.

SPEAKER: Thank you. I'm Louise, a recent graduate of a Master's Program at Georgetown University. And my question was, in sort of thinking forward about innovative solutions and better coordination. We've heard a lot about the dangers of mainstreaming IDPs into oblivion, but at the same time, when you look at the types of

complex emergencies, for example, in Northern Iraq, you have these sort of arbitrary categories of refugees -- Syrian refugees in one bucket.

And then Iraqi IDPs in another, and different U.N. agencies, or different development agencies, doing similar types of work, but specifically working IDPs, or specifically working for refugees, and that that creates a lot of confusion and overlap of work and efforts. Is it better to say all of these people have the same types of needs for the system, all in a coordinated fashion, or to continue to have these types of labels? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. A number of questions here on the Turkish Government policy in 1991, a particular question about looking at some of the economic benefits of humanitarian assistance, of studies that have been done. I think that was for you, Niels.

A question about merging development and relief organizations rather than trying to improve relations between them; the issues of access and these hard-to-reach numbers of IDPs; and then the question about, you know, should we move towards less of a focus on labels, and just, say, looking at needs. Who would like to jump in?

Okay, Niels.

MR. HARILD: On the issue of Turkey, no, we are not -- well I don't know, maybe some others are, but from the Bank's perspective we are not involved in the study of that -- of the trade issues and so on, but what the Turkish government has asked us to do recently, is to do an assessment of labor market implications of the presence of a large amount of Syrians in Turkey, so that they can -- the Turkish Government can consider what they want to do with their labor market legislation and framework once the study is done.

We have, from the Bank side, a number of impact assessments going on

in different parts of the world about the social and economic impact of displacement, which is also new. This was never really done before in the Bank. The Bank does a lot of impact assessments of all types of things, but has not, until recently done, started doing work on the implications of conflict-induced for displacement, and when the result of this comes out, we hope that this can sort of persist in the Bank to have some messages to the World Humanitarian Summit.

So, that's that one. The other one, merging the humanitarian and development mandates, I don't think that necessarily is the solution. I think the common wisdom, if you can call it that, at the moment is that we are all in it from the beginning, but we have different things that we are good at. And that in itself, anything -- those of us who have been involved in this for decade, we've said it.

But I think that things are beginning to happen also, that indicates that, what does it then mean? And it means that the Bank for instance would start in a new crisis, or when a window of opportunity arises in the protracted situation to do what it's better at, than others, and that's normally a sort of analytical work, and benchmarking, and stuff like that.

And when it gets longer, then it can be reorienting existing operations, and in a longer term. Again, designing new development operations, because it takes the time it takes. So I think recognizing that we are all in it from the beginning, and that we have different things to do is more important, and to make that work, or to act accordingly is more important than merging mandates.

But above it all, I think -- I refer to it earlier, the mindset change, because I've been grappling myself, and saying, why is it so difficult to -- for this relieve to development transition to happen? And I'm not sure I have the 101, but one of the issues is that there seems to be some phobia amongst many to understand that it is a longer-

term issue, and what this implies.

It implies that it is more than humanitarian. And so this mindset change is critical, because from the development perspective it's difficult for development actors to assist governments if their policy environment does -- the political space is not there. And if the government holds a short-term policy and views on an issue, it's difficult to have long-term discussions. So that, I think, is a challenge that needs to be overcome.

MS. FERRIS: Hansjoerg, and then Joel?

MR. STROHMEYER: Yes. First of all, on the issue of Iraq, and I don't want to comment on what Turkey believes of its own policies, but the point that I was making is not a judgment of what was right, or what was wrong, it was a point of fact, that because of what happened there, because of the pictures and so on, that this motivated the Secretary General at the time to say, we need to look at a larger coordination issue around -- coordination structure around internal displacement.

I mean, that was the point, and that was the birth hour, in a way, of ERC, in that humanitarian system that we got to know over the last 25 years. The point on, quickly, on who was responsible, well on the ground, the good or the bad answer, it's the humanitarian coordinator, and who is ultimately where the buck stops with, but we also have very different quality of leadership, and backgrounds, and skills among humanitarian coordinators.

And we do have coordinators who have more of an understanding that they need to address some of those specific issues and needs, of IDPs, and others take more, or facilitate more of that -- assist vulnerability and delivery approach. So, it strikes me that, unless we want to totally remodel and recraft the system that we have with all its consequences and enlarged effort, I personally don't believe that this is the time, politically, to look at major remodeling of mandates, rather we need to look at improved

management structures and systems of working together. We might actually risk undermining and weakening the mandates that we have. So that's where, I think we need to look at.

On the issue of -- very quickly -- the mixed context -- I can see Shelly -- on IDPs and refugees, obviously both HCR and OCHA have recognized that as a problem. It's not an easy issue, but I think some good progress actually has been made over the last two years, in recognizing this, and finding some operational solutions.

High Commissioner Gutierrez, himself, Valerie Amos, and now Steven O'Brien are very much involved in this. But this is reversing an interpretation of mandates throughout big structures and organizations that have grown over 50 years, so it doesn't happen just in a few minutes. I'm just saying there are also areas where I think then agencies themselves recognize that they need to do better, and they are trying to come to the solutions. That I would say, as a positive example.

The last point is on the humanitarian development, whatever we call this. I don't like the characterization of the divide. I mean, the first thing that I keep on saying, is this not an attitudinal issue. And I do believe that may, of course, be on all sides, the attitudes and whatever else, but the main issue for me is that the mechanics of these two sectors, in a way, don't speak to each other.

Let me give you one example. We have in the Sahel, the humanitarian have tried to have a three-year multiyear plan for nine countries. Well the same nine countries, under the SSCA process is all over the map. So it's not for the same three years, but in one place where we have, say, the SRP, the humanitarian plan for the next few years, from 2015 to 2018, you may find that as SCCA goes, from 2010 to 2015.

In the next country it starts in 2012 and goes through 2018, in the next country it starts in 2015, and runs through 2020. There is a disconnect, this extends to

financial tools and financial mechanisms, it goes to our planning mechanisms, it goes to the way we do share analysis, when we go into a crisis. And lastly, I believe that we just don't go into these situations sharing an objective, and operational, like the one I mentioned before, over the next three or five years.

By how much do we want to reduce food security? By how much do we want to reduce the number of displaced? And then if you go even further, neither humanitarian nor development actors actually work overarching, over a 10 to 15-year timeframes, to common goals. We don't have that even, you know, the longest planning framework that we have collectively owned around the United Nations, is five years on.

Now everything that we know, if fragility is not addressed within five years, it requires 10 to 15 years, but we also know that among -- as much as protracted as the new normal, and urban is the new normal, fragility will be the new normal. Eighty percent of our work will be in fragile countries. Not necessarily in conflicts, but fragile countries.

So we need to look at some of our mechanics and tools and the way we work together, which are insufficient. And the point that Niels made, a common operational objective aimed at reducing needs, reducing some of that vulnerability, matched up with comparative advantages, and there are tough choices to be made. Not every U.N. organization has a comparative advantage not -- in some instances international organizations shouldn't even be thinking that they have the comparative advantage.

We need to start investing in first-responder capacities, in municipalities, and some of those that are actually carried forward. Huge issues, around the funding of that, and may be mobilized, and that donors do not want to go it. So that the complications I think that may be attitudinal, it's just that the complications are in the

mechanics.

Of how these two sectors work very differently together. And then the last point, and Izumi Nakamitsu, my colleague from UNDP would remind all of us right now, that -- the issue of politics that's neither humanitarian nor development, and I do believe that we haven't had the focus as I said, earlier, on political solutions, on political investment. On how many times has the issue of policy shifts for a government been on the speaking points of a foreign minister who has been going to some of these countries that we talk about?

How many times? How many times has it been on the speaking points of the ERC? Sometimes. And is it coordinated? So there's a lot more that we, ourselves, can do and need to do to address some of those underlying and longer-term causes. Thanks.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. Joel?

MR. CHARNY: Yeah. So, on the merging, I pretty much agree with what Niels and Hansjoerg said. I mean, basically, the way I would put it is, unlike the -- we are all in it from the beginning, but we have complementary roles, and the key is to have joint planning that recognizes the individual strengths, and plays down the weaknesses of everyone who is trying to respond.

So you build on the -- you needed development intervention? Well, go to the people who are actually effective at doing that. You are not going to ICRC into a development organization, nor would you want to. You want them to be the bastion of the Geneva Conventions, and looking at IHL violations, and so on.

But again, where we fail, I think is we fail to join up, and we fail to think strategically, and that's what we need to do better, whether it's in Lebanon or South Sudan, or wherever. Now, on UNHCR, and the Syria situation, I mean, in a way I fell into

the trap that Hansjoerg mentioned of focusing on delivery, and obviously 4.8 million people are hard to each. That's a collective responsibility and it's fundamentally the responsibility of the parties to the conflict.

However, what we found on the Syria peer review, is that there wasn't a joined up advocacy strategy, that was looking at what should be done globally and by whom, around the violations of IHL and the hard-to-reach strategy -- hard-to-reach areas; and then what could be done from an advocacy perspective, at the national level within Syria, perhaps joining up with actors in the other hubs in Gaziantep and Oman.

And here, again, I do, unfortunately, insist that the need for UNHCR to maintain a good relationship with the Syrian Government in the context of the protection that they need to provide to the Iraqi refugees, hampers their ability to develop an aggressive and far-reaching advocacy agenda, even for the issues that are within Syria.

We don't expect UNHCR, or any other individual agency to start, you know, doing a global campaign on barrel bombing, but there are issues that can be worked on within Syria, such as documentation, which has been lost in the conflict. And what we found in the Syria OPR, Operational Peer Review -- sorry -- even though, you know, this is recognized as an issue, there is not a joined-up strategy around that.

And again, if my point is simply, let's be context specific, and if it's not possible for a particularly agency to develop and drive and protection advocacy agenda, in a particular location, then let's give space to some other body or entity to do that.

So, I think we've kind of -- I mean, I'm all for reinforcing mandates, but we've kind of ended up in a bit of a trap in some circumstances, where mandates become the be all and end all, and we are not thinking creatively about what can actually be done that will make a difference to people. And that's what we have to start doing.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. Alfredo?

MR. ZAMUDIO: I am not sure if I am going to answer some of the questions, but I'm going to answer of the inputs here.

MS. FERRIS: Okay.

MR. ZAMUDIO: Imagine -- Hansjoerg, imagine a situation in 10 years time when IDMC is going to report a significant decline in internal displacement by conflict? I will be, personally, very happy to do that, to report that. But that will require some substantial effort by the human bodies, the national government and structures.

It can be done. But also we need to -- the situation is more complex than that. It's not only to prevent displacement from happening, because internal displacement can also save lives, people need to move sometimes. And the situation in Syria as mentioned, one of the things that we have observed is that in 90 percent of the 60 countries that we have analyzed for this fantastic report that you can find online, the Global Overview on Internal Displacement.

In 90 percent of the 60 countries that we analyzed, there was displacement occurring in more than 10 years. So they have observed displacement for more than 10 years, in 90 percent of those 60 countries. So, then, if people are internally displaced for a long time, they will try to find solutions in one place, in the second place, in the third place.

If they don't find solutions during that route, you will see that the first internal displacement movement is the start trajectory of displacement. At some point people will also make a decision, I need to cross a border. I need to move on. So then we are talking about human mobility, and the longer people stay displaced, you will have those people who will make that decision, or someone will make that decision for them. You need to go.

So, therefore it is imperative that we need to find solutions both to

address the push factors, but also to help national government to assist those who are displaced. And we need also to identify those who are not fleeing. You know, we are very focused on the big numbers, but one example is that the Aboriginal Indians in the Amazonas. They cannot flee. They are under the threat of extinction because they are confined in those small territories.

So, I know that it's a controversial issue to compare that with internal displacement, but it's also a threat by the human rights regulations. So we need to see that sometimes displacement save lives. And we need to see the whole thing and address it properly. It's not only to reduce the numbers, but it's to find the good solutions for those people who are in terrible situations.

MR. CHARNY: I realize, well, we didn't address the labels issue, and I don't think we can, or should get away from the label. I mean, to be a refugee, carries with it a set of rights that are internationally recognized by the Refugee Convention, and there is just, again, there's no way around that, nor should there be. So we are never going to be in a situation where it's just a mass of undifferentiated, vulnerable people, because of the particular status that's carried through refugee status.

MR. STROHMEYER: Beth, can I just?

MS. FERRIS: Very briefly, and then let's take one more round.

MR. STROHMEYER: Just very quick. I just wanted to clarify. I very much agreed with what you said. I mean, my point simply is to reverse the logic. We need to make a bigger effort, to actually use opportunities, and if we are in situations, those 90 percent that you mentioned, where protracted displacement has happened, and that has been the case for over 10 years and going, and so on.

I think it's also an obligation for us to seek more actively solutions, whatever they may be, integration, re-integration and so on, and operationally add it. So

who provides the housing solutions, and that's where things, very often fall short. We do -- it's easier, it's more comfortable, and it's a perfect storm almost, it works for everyone.

For many of the donors, for the host governments and for agencies to continue the delivery footprint that we've had, even considering everything that you said. And that's my point; that we need to find a vehicle around the dynamic and the momentum that the SDGs provide to say, we also need to think differently about a reduction, the possibility of reduction. Not only of numbers, of the faith of these people, caught in these situations. Let's use that momentum, and let's use that opportunity.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Let's have another round of questions. This gentleman here, one, and then Patricia and the Susan, so if you could stand up and introduce yourself?

MR ROTHENBERG: Shaun Rothenberg, Consultant and Former UNHCR employee. I'm wondering if the problem isn't the tension between the two mandates as opposed to the problem of having to deal with the -- to be accepted by a government that in most cases, is the one that's causing the IDPs and the problem, and so you have tension of trying to not be kicked be out at the same time as you are dealing with the problem.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Patricia?

MS. FAGAN: Patricia Fagan, Georgetown University. I think this has been good Panel and a very --- I think it's been a very good panel, and a very thoughtful Panel. Everybody at the -- not table -- everybody sitting has been trying to grapple with reality and the disconnect between mandates and the realities that the mandates are supposed to address.

And an acceptance across the board, that problems are more long-term than mandates are supposed -- that international organizational mandates were

supposed to grapple with, that the protracted nature of displacement, the protracted nature of refugees, the development demands in order to integrate, in order to achieve integration, are all really beyond the capacity of any one international organization. You've all said quite correctly, I agree, that we should be, each doing what we can do best, and we should collaborate more.

Now the missing actor, which everybody has implied, and isn't really talked about much, is the government. The government locally, the government regionally, the government nationally, and so it's obviously, in a long-term it is the government who will be -- which will be the governments, the various levels of governments which will be in charge of implementing all the good things that international organizations want to help them to implement.

So, I'm wondering if, in your cases, have you done more strategizing about how your organizations, or how, in general, the international community can work more effectively with governments, including bad governments, like the Syrian Government? I mean, that's really the big challenge.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And, Susan Martin?

MS. MARTIN: This is primarily for Hansjoerg, but others may want to answer it. You've emphasized the SDGs at the September Summit. Could you talk a little bit about whether the World Humanitarian Summit will be an opportunity to revitalize the focus on IDPs and also thinking about both access issues that we've been talking about as well as the solutions?

MS. FERRIS: Is there one more question? Briefly, yes.

SPEAKER: -- from the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. I really like this noble goal of measuring outreach and effectiveness by setting a goal of reduction for the number of IDPs. But I'm just wondering about the mechanics of this,

this is going to be really, really hard, especially for the countries, the national governments who dismiss the issue of IDPs, or who label the issue in mysterious ways instead of calling them IDPs, they will call them migrants, or guests, and so on.

So I'm just wondering about the mechanics of how I'll be going to maintain and measure the effectiveness or production of IDPs, or when the governments are going to, you know, work around the labeling and call them in mysterious ways?

MS. FERRIS: Okay. So we have questions about the labeling again, a question about the role of government when government causes the problem, how to work with governments and governments that aren't so good. And a specific question about the World Humanitarian Summit. Will IDPs be on the agenda there? Who would like to begin? Okay. Hansjoerg?

MR. STROHMEYER: Yes. Sure. I'll start with World Humanitarian Summit. Look, the World Humanitarian Summit is of course an opportunity but we need to get there, but not just highlighting an issue that people have known about for 25 years, so to go there and say, look, displacement is a real issue, we now have 38 -- who knows how many we will have, you will know by the time of the summit next year, that's not enough to highlight this.

So, we need to go with more. And it needs to be something strong that will last for another 10 or 15 years. And so what we are thinking of, is exactly along those lines that I just suggested. That we need to even the thing through in this area of violence, conflict, displacement, protection, about a certain measurability, it can be done, we just haven't put our mind as much to it as we have on food, water and some of the commodities. That's the point.

Is it easy? No, it's not easy. Do I believe that at 2030 we will be able to reduce the number of IDPs by 30 percent, I don't believe in this, but we need to put a

different logic into what we are doing, and we need to prompt some reporting and some refinement of what the obstacles are.

This has led, for example, around the MDGs, to a whole industry, and very different understanding of the depth of development, you know, because the MDGs, did people believe that all the MDGs would be fulfilled by 2015? They didn't believe that. That hunger would be halved or so, they didn't believe his. But by putting this as a goal out there, they prompted a whole industry to think very differently about the Zero Hunger Challenge, is one such an idea to say, this can be reduced and we need to get a similar logic into this.

So I think, for me, there is around displacement, there is a continuity, that's what I should be saying, from CENDI where we fought very hard to get IDPs into it, via the SDG towards the World Humanitarian Summit.

You mentioned access, very clearly, the same thing. We've been pushing a number of years, right now, some work that looks at what we call Arbitrary Denial of Access. Walter and others have been part of this. When we say, of course it's the number of task of humanitarians to negotiate that access.

But at some point when fundamental commodities, like food, water, medicines, are not only blocked, they are actually, specifically taken off trucks before they cross lines, in order to harm civilians. We need to look for an access that needs to be a finding of something being arbitrary.

There needs to be a consequence to this type of behavior, because there's a consequence for those people on the ground. They die, suffer and so on and so forth. So there needs to be a consequence. That is something that will also peak at the World Humanitarian Summit.

The last point is, again, on the solutions. I think it goes to your question.

Is it easy? No, it's not going to be easy. But if for 10 years, 15 years, we keep people in some -- even if it's only one-third of the displaced who are in camps still, but to keep people for 10, 15 years, nourished, in shelter, in camps on an annual response cycle, and then you see these camps, like Zam Zam camp from 2003 to now, turning into medium-sized cities.

But our approach to that is not to treat them as a socioeconomic entity, as a medium-sized city of 150,000, 130,000 people, we treat them as a humanitarian caseload. That's what is wrong.

And whether the answer is integration, reintegration, resettlement or return, depends on the situation. I'm not saying that everyone, and it's an impossible solution, we need to keep these people in these terrible situations, unless they can return.

Also, political implications of course, but we need to think outside of the box. Keeping people for 10, 15, 20 years in these types of situations, for me, is irresponsible, and we continue -- contribute to that on a daily basis. That's my plea for rethinking and for looking at a more reduction agenda

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Joel, would you like to comment on any of the questions?

MR. CHARNY: Just very quickly. On the question of governments, I mean, I think that the fact is that the vast majority of the world's governments, for the most part actually do try to care of their people. So I think we shouldn't let the Syria's of the world define what it means to work with governments.

So I agree with you that there's a huge scope, say, for example, in the context of the Kampala Convention to -- that's where the whole, you know, legal support, capacity development, and so on, agenda starts to come in.

I mean, on Syria I think it's really very difficult. What my experience is, the further you get to the base, the more you find government officials who are in touch with the people and they actually still care. But I mean, you cannot change the fact that the national government in Syria is committing major human rights violations on a daily basis that are well documented.

And I think it's just a real -- it really is an impossible situation that the groups are in, that are working inside Syria. I mean there is a surreal aspect to it, and I mean I won't go into the details but, I mean, when a government official, a senior government official tells you that they don't initiate any offensive operations, it's all defensive. I mean you are in Alice in Wonderland, or you are in Kafka situation where, what does it even mean to talk to a national government that's denying that they are using barrel bombs, as Assad has done on several occasions on international TV.

So, I just -- I mean, I actually had spent a fair amount of my career liaising with governments that most of the world considers nasty, but I think those Syrians are almost beyond the pale at the national level.

MS. FERRIS: Niels, Alfredo, last comments?

MR. HARILD: No. I have nothing to add, no.

MR. ZAMUDIO: Since I have the pleasure to be the last one on the Panel, I would like to say that, on behalf of -- you know, let me say something so pompous, on behalf of those millions of internally displaced, that your work has benefited, it has counted. And so you have done, Brookings, you have done a fantastic job. You have been the pioneer in all these years.

Advance, we have heard during these two Panels, advance a significant amount of work. We are in the position that we can have all these open conversations on very difficult things, and that it is the benefit of this pioneer work that you have done, and

it will -- it benefitted millions of people before the situation on this, today. It will benefit millions in the future.

So thank you, to you, Elizabeth, and thank you to Brookings, and everyone who has been part of this project.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, to the Panelists. Thanks to the audience. (Applause) Now, please join us, right across the hall for a small reception. It won't be very long, I know it is Friday evening, and we appreciate the time.

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DISPLACEMENT-2015/06/26

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