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RESOLVING POST-DISASTER DISPLACEMENT CRISIS:
INSIGHTS FROM THE PHILIPPINES AFTER TYPHOON HAIYAN

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Let's go ahead and start.

Welcome to Brookings. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

We're delighted to be cohosting this event to celebrate the launch of our new joint study with the International Organization for Migration called "Resolving Post-Disaster Displacement: Insights from the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan."

Resolving displacement is not an easy issue we've discovered in many different situations from conflicts to disasters, from Haiti, where we did some work together last year. I think it's been a great experience to work with IOM on this endeavor and use some of our academic expertise, field experience the IOM has in many different parts of the world. And I commend IOM for the work that you've been doing these last few years to really build up here emphasis on learning and knowledge and research and publications. It's been a fantastic development over the course of recent years and widely appreciated.

I also want to acknowledge the presence of the president of your council. He is here visiting. Ambassador Sammie Eddico, if you'd like to stand up. Welcome to Washington and to this event. We're glad that you're here at this time and look forward to hearing about it.

We have a distinguished panel. All of our panels are distinguished, but this is particularly distinguished I should say. And I'll go ahead and introduce everybody. You've got the bios in the description of the event, so I won't go into detail.

Megan Bradley will begin by talking about some of the findings of the study. Megan was a fellow here with us at Brookings. Now she's an assistant professor

at McGill University in Montreal. For some reason, she wanted to work in the same city as her husband, so she made the trek up north. But it's good to have you back with us.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: We'll then turn to Brad Mellicker, who is a long-time IOM staff member working in the Philippines during and after the Typhoon Haiyan. Before that he was in Haiti, and before that in Timor Leste. I said a very long career, but I think it's only been seven years, which is long but not forever, so that's very good.

The next speaker will be Luca Dall'Oglio, who is a permanent representative here of IOM in Washington. And as the other participants, he, too, has had experience in Haiti and has worked with IOM in New York as well. And Luca, it's always good to have you with us.

And finally, we'll hear from James Fleming, who works with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of USAID. He's been an emergency specialist, worked on a number of operations, including the Philippines emergency. But in his bio, you'll notice that he's worked in 20 major international disasters, which gives him a depth of experience that I'm sure that he'll be able to share with us.

But tell us. Maybe we'll start with you, Megan, and tell us a little bit about the study and what you found about reflections on how you resolve displacement after disasters. Thanks.

MS. BRADLEY: Well, thank you very much, Beth, and thank you to everyone for making the time to join us today.

I'd just like to echo Beth's words on the real pleasure that it's been working with IOM. This has been a collaborative endeavor, and our colleague, Lorenza Russi, who is also a member of the research team, is here in the audience.

So as many of you will know, a year and a half ago, Typhoon Haiyan, who is known locally in the Philippines as Yolanda, made landfall, and at that time it was the strongest storm that was ever recorded. It displaced over four million Filipinos and damaged or severely destroyed 1.1 million homes. So Haiyan, of course, prompted a massive national and international response, and the reconstruction process is now well under way under the leadership of the government of the Philippines.

In contrast to the previous study that we did looking at issues around durable solutions after disasters in Haiti, what was really interesting and part about this case in the Philippines was the really impressive way in which the government of the Philippines plans and exerts such a strong leadership role in supporting its population in these kind of crisis situations.

So the reconstruction process is certainly now well under way. The vast majority of the displaced returned to their homes quite promptly after the storm and are now rebuilding. All of the tent cities that were housing displaced people have now been closed, and over half of the people who were living in bunkhouses or temporary accommodations set up by the government have either returned to their homes or received support to locate elsewhere.

So certainly there's been a lot of progress made in the last year and a half, and yet the questions that we were looking at in this study were, first, to what extent have really durable solutions been achieved for those who were displaced? In many cases, going back and trying to rebuild a home is not necessarily a durable solution insofar as in the context of future disasters they may be vulnerable to the same risks and again have to flee their homes. And second, what should be done to support durable solutions for those who have still not achieved a really sustainable situation in the

aftermath of the typhoon?

So we used a range of different methods to look at these questions. There was a household survey that was done that involved 4,500 households who represented a much larger population of over 336,000 households in Region 8, which is the most severely affected region. We also carried out focus groups with affected community members and interviews with members of the Filipino government at the national and local levels, as well as NGOs and international organizations who were involved in the response. So this was a great opportunity to really hear from a wide range of different stakeholders on how the process is going.

So I'll highlight some of the key findings and then I'll turn it over to Brad, who will talk about some of the implications and some of the findings in terms of the international response and the recommendations.

So the study was informed by the IASC or Interagency Standing Committee Framework on durable solutions for internally displaced persons or IDPs. This is a framework that might be familiar to some in the crowd but just in case, I'll just briefly describe what it's all about. So this is a framework that might be familiar to some in the crowd but just in case I'll just briefly describe what it's all about.

So this is a framework that lays out a right-spaced approach to trying to understand what it means to resolve a displacement situation. It identifies a series of criteria that help us understand the extent to which a durable solution has been achieved, and it applies both in post-conflict and also in post-disaster contexts.

So according to the framework, a durable solution has been achieved when IDPs no longer have any specific assistance of protection needs that are linked to their displacement, so that's their first component. And second, that they can enjoy their

human rights without discrimination on account of having been displaced.

So we found in this study that this issue of discrimination on account of having been displaced really wasn't a significant dynamic in the Philippines. In some countries it is, but this wasn't really a case where that was prominent. But this question of having lingering assistance and protection needs was something that really was a prominent part of the situation in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan.

So the framework identifies three durable solutions or ways in which displacement can be resolved. This would include sustainable returns, so IDPs go back to the community of the particular home that they had before they were displaced. Sustainable local integration, so they might stay in the community where they south shelter. Or third, sustainable settlement elsewhere in the country. And in the Philippines, this is a process known as relocation, and this has been a very significant part of the post-Haiyan landscape. So although the majority have returned, many of those who even have returned to their homes may eventually be relocated elsewhere because they come often from coastal communities that could be vulnerable to future disasters.

In terms of the process of seeking out durable solutions, the framework stresses that IDPs should be able to make voluntary and informed choices about the resolution of their situation; that they should be able to participate actively in the decision-making process and in managing the durable solutions process.

So in addition to this process side there are four key criteria that help us shape understanding of the extent to which a durable solution has been achieved. And it says IDPs who have achieved a durable solution should be able to enjoy long-term safety and security; access to mechanisms to restore their housing, land, and property; and they should be able to enjoy an adequate standard of living and restoration of livelihoods.

So this is clearly a very tall order, particularly in countries that have come out of large-scale natural disasters. The Philippines is a middle income country, but Region 8, the region that was most heavily affected was even before the disaster one of the poorest regions of the Philippines. So this is a real challenge in trying to achieve these criteria. And what's important is emphasize is that this is about progressive realization of a series of rights. It's not necessarily about, you know, trying to divide out IDPs from nondisplaced community members, but rather recognizing that this is a long-term process involving both humanitarian and development actors.

So in terms of our findings, we found that overall, less than 18 percent of the population in heavily affected areas of Region 8 felt that their life had returned to normal even one and a half years after the storm. So on a certain level, this is, I think, unsurprising, given the magnitude of what happened in the disaster. But we found that many families who were displaced continued to face particular obstacles over and above those that were faced by nondisplaced families. So there was still, in certain ways, an importance of focusing on the particular needs of these households.

In terms of the durable solutions process, we found that less than 50 percent of people felt that assistance had been fairly distributed, and just over 50 percent felt that national recovery and reconstruction plans reflected their needs and interests. So this is particularly striking because there was some effort made to try to engage communities in the planning process, but we can see that in many ways it didn't meet desires and needs at the community level.

We heard from many survivors that they felt that they couldn't actually speak up about their concerns around fairness for fear that if they were labeled as troublemakers, they would be bumped down on beneficiary lists. So we often hear,

especially from members of the international community, just what a happy group of beneficiaries there are in the post-Haiyan environment, and I think that this finding prompts us to look more closely at the ways in which discontent can actually be perceived underneath this display of gratitude for the support that has been received so far.

In terms of safety and security, displaced families were certainly significantly less likely to feel safe in their current places of residence. Natural disasters represented the primary source of insecurity identified by families who participated in the household survey. There was actually a threefold increase in perception of the threat posed by natural disasters pre- and post-Haiyan in the assessment of these families. And in particular, a lot of the concerns were around lack of access to evacuation centers, which were -- there were inadequate levels of access even before Haiyan, and many of these centers were destroyed in the storm. So that was a real concern for a lot of families.

In terms of housing, land, and property issues, as I've mentioned, the vast majority did return promptly to the land that they were living on and are now working to rebuild their homes. But families who were displaced face significantly higher barriers in terms of access to affordable and adequate housing.

One aspect that I found particularly interesting in this case was that there was quite high levels of clarity around housing, land, and property claims in the sense that even when people weren't formal occupants -- so they were sometimes squatters -- there were strong levels of general agreement at the community level in terms of who had been where and who had the right from the perspective of the community to rebuild and in which locations.

So on a certain level, this sets a strong foundation for housing recovery. And yet, the application of what has been called the no build zone or the no dwelling zone has left many families in limbo. So this is a policy that initially it was not a formal policy but there was the idea that the state was going to enforce a regulation that actually comes from the water code that would say that people shouldn't be building within 40 meters of the shoreline. But in an island nation like the Philippines, this meant that many just would have nowhere to rebuild. These families should at least hypothetically be on relocation lists, but this is a very slow and fraught process, and so for many people it was clear that there was a real need to address this kind of limbo situation for families who were from areas that were slated as no build zones but unlikely to receive relocation support anytime soon.

Last, in terms of livelihoods and enjoyment of an adequate standard of living, we saw major unrepaired losses, particularly amongst displaced families. So for example, we saw that 83 percent of families indicated that before Yolanda they were able to meet their basic needs, but less than a third said that now in the post-Yolanda context they were able to do so. So dramatic declines in terms of families' own assessments of their ability to provide for themselves.

For many people, this raised a lot of concerns around dignity. They didn't want to be dependent on assistance from the government or from outside actors, but increased cost of living, what some people refer to as Yolanda prices, and in particular loss of livelihood assets, meant that people just weren't able to restore their livelihoods. And this was particularly a concern that was faced in communities that had already participated in the relocation process. So we visited many communities that had been relocated, and people were already wondering how they could possibly survive in

the relocation communities because they were too far from the livelihoods that they had previously practiced.

Now, this is a common story in relocation processes but one that was certainly already quite pronounced and that I think should raise a series of questions for us about the future of relocation in the context of the Yolanda response.

So just in conclusion, I think it's important to recognize that these concerns that we found in relation to the ISC criteria are certainly rooted in preexisting socioeconomic challenges and vulnerabilities. So on the one hand, people who were displaced were more likely to have had concerns around poverty and marginalization even before the disaster, but these concerns have now been exacerbated by the realities that are faced in the post-Haiyan context. So this, again, points to the need for a long-term development approach, and one that in particular builds on the social capital of communities it the local level. So making sure that instead of dividing out those communities, we're really supporting this main resource that people draw on, which is their ties to their friends and their families, their community networks.

The study also looked at issues around the roles of local authorities and gender analysis. These are issues that there's not really time to get into now but I'm certainly happy to address them in the question and answer session.

So thank you very much.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Megan.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: And Brad?

MR. MELLICKER: Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much, Beth. Thank you, Megan.

As Megan mentioned, I'm going to go over a couple of key points I think, or key takeaways from the international response to Haiyan and then discuss a couple of the recommendations in a bit of detail. So I won't be able to go through all of the recommendations, but again, if any of them are -- yeah, we can discuss them in questions if you'd like.

So the response to Typhoon Haiyan was the first national disaster "level three" emergency or L3 emergency after the transformative agenda went into effect. I think it was in 2011. So this manifested itself in the Philippines in a very large-scale arrival of "certain staffers," certain supports in the form of international or foreign aid workers who arrived into the Philippines in the days and weeks following the disaster. Now, most of the local and national officials that we spoke with in the Philippines tended to regard this as a flood. A "flood" of international staff who arrived into the country.

Now, they acknowledged that most of these organizations and most of these individuals were well intentioned, but nevertheless, did not quite understand the Philippines context in general, and more specifically, the level of development of the Philippines emergency management and disaster risk reduction management systems and laws that were already in place.

Another issue I think was the notion that many of the international staff who arrived into the Philippines in the aftermath of the storm took a more adversarial approach towards the government. I think perhaps this came from many of their prior experiences working in conflict countries with more difficult governments or in other situations, and were perhaps less accustomed to working in an environment like the Philippines where the government is well organized, responsive, and works towards the best interest of its citizens.

Another issue I think related to the L3 activation and the subsequent flood again of international staff had to do with the establishment of parallel coordination structures. So the government had, several years prior to Yolanda, institutionalized or implemented, integrated the cluster system into its own emergency management mechanisms where the government could then activate or deactivate clusters after -- you know, there are very many typhoons that they have every year -- as a way to ensure government leadership over any humanitarian response and a way to sort of put the international actors into a framework.

So nevertheless, with the arrival of so many international staff after the disaster, there were, I remember, parallel clusters set up. So I remember one morning going to a government-led camp coordination, camp management class meeting at a government office and then having to go that afternoon to another CCCM meeting under international leadership. So this was an unnecessary duplication of efforts, but I think more importantly it bed a certain degree of distrust between government at both national and local levels and the international community.

The second issue related to the international response I think surrounds tensions around international standards. Shortly after the typhoon, the government began construction of what they call bunkhouses, which are almost dormitory-style housing where displaced persons can stay for a period of time until alternative housing arrangements are made. Now, the particular model that they decided to build in the aftermath of Haiyan had rooms that were below sphere standards. Right? This became the object of some criticism of the international community. I think this was an issue because local authorities and the national government, I think, found the manner in which the international community raised this issue in quite an adversarial or aggressive way

towards the government, as well as the fact that they thought that some of the standards might not be applicable or relevant to the Philippines context, especially considering the very vast body of experience the Philippines has in responding to disasters. However, that experience with the sphere standards early on, I think, made it difficult for the international community to discuss or to use other types of standards in the response, including ISC framework on durable solutions for IDPs.

Another, I think, issue regarding standards or international practices had to do with beneficiary selection criteria. Megan alluded to it a moment ago in terms of social cohesion, but numerous focus group participants and interviews with local authorities mentioned either inconsistently applied beneficiary selection criteria or a lack of clarity as to what those selection criteria were. So whereas it's a very common practice for international agencies and NGOs to prioritize on the basis of vulnerability at a household level, many of the communities considered this to be extremely disruptive and disruptive to their own social cohesion and their sort of collective recovery process. Again, as Megan mentioned, less than 50 percent -- 45.5 percent of the affected population felt that aid was fairly allocated to them. So part of that comes from issues related to people living in no build zones, but I think also part of it comes from skepticism or frustration over NGO and international agency beneficial selection methods.

So now I'll quickly go through a couple of the recommendations. One says, recognize durable solutions as a multi-sectorial concern involving both humanitarian and development interventions and extending beyond housing. So this was a recommendation that was also raised in the Haiti report that we did in 2013-2014.

Two important takeaways I think on this recommendation. Very often, in both the Philippines and in Haiti, there was certain -- I would say donors and

development agencies tended to review internal displacement as a humanitarian problem. Right? Whereas, longer term development seemed to concern the entire community. I think what we were able to show through this report and through the AT1 as well is that the achievement of durable solutions is a much longer-term process, and necessarily implicates development programming and development actors so that you cannot separate internal displacement or just classify it as a humanitarian issue.

Secondly, in the Philippines there was a tendency both among the international community and the government to consider a permanent house or concrete house as, in and of itself, a durable solution. So once a permanent house was provided, that was the end of that person's displacement. That person had been considered to be no longer displaced. But I think what we were able to show through this is that even those who have received permanent houses are in continuing need of assistance, especially related to livelihoods. And in certain cases, especially related to relocation, some of those individuals are actually in higher digress of vulnerability, so to speak, than they were prior to their relocation.

A good example of this, I think, is related to access to livelihoods. So while the decision was taken to move people away from the coastline for public safety reasons, into relocation sites further inland, this made it much more difficult for large percentages of the population who relied on fishing for their incomes to access their livelihoods. Right? And so there were instances where the cost of transportation plus the cost of renting a boat or other equipment would make it actually negative, and there were no other livelihood opportunities in their relocation sites that they could access.

The second is related to disaster risk production. So redeveloping investment in DRR. In a place like the Philippines, this seems like a fairly obvious point.

Right? But I think it's important to discuss in the context of IDPs because of its

importance in creating alternatives to relocation. Right? So one of the sort of advocacy

points that IOM had discussed with the governments repeated in the Philippines was that

it wasn't perhaps necessary to relocate all families living within the 40-meter buffer. First

of all, in some cases, the risk of storm surge is much less than 40 meters, but in other

cases can extend inland 40 kilometers, in which case the number of people by that logic

to be relocated would be vastly greater than if you just considered the 40-meter buffer.

The second point related to DRR, I think, was that there were -- you

could come up with ways in which people could stay in coastal areas, even in areas

which may have some level of storm surge risk in case of a future typhoon by

constructing solid evacuation centers, places where they can shelter during typhoons and

to combine that with the construction of more resilient housing, for example.

Additional interventions -- soft and hard infrastructure projects, planting

of mangroves, a variety of other things and different activities -- can render certain areas

which are at very high risk, at lower risk, and perhaps eventually more habitable for the

population.

The establishment of an interactive rights-based monitoring system for

relocation plans, policies, and projects. I think this was particularly important for two

reasons. One, the sheer number of families scheduled to be relocated, which is, I think,

205,000 households are planned -- the government plans on relocating 205,000

households from coastal areas. And second, the large number of government agencies

and international agencies who are involved in relocation and housing construction.

Some of the other points were already mentioned, but I think addressing

fairness concerns and aid implementation. So the exclusion of households that were

living in no build zones or are currently living in no build zones is something that should

be addressed. Even up till now, there are many families who are still living in coastal

areas in the no build zones who have received no assistance at all since the typhoon.

So I think to summarize, I think it's very important to reiterate that while

substantial progress has been made in the recovery from the typhoon, there remains

substantial amounts of work, and many people remain in very precarious situations, both

in case of a future disaster, but also in terms of their longer-term recovery and

achievement of durable solutions.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Brad.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Luca, what have you got to say about the report?

MR. DALL'OGLIO: Pleasure to be here, Beth. Thank you very much for

having convened this meeting, and particularly this special time when Brookings is

completing its project on internal displacement. So it's really a special time and it's really

an honor for IOM to be with you. And thanks again for taking this initiative.

There are a few other people who I would like to thank for promoted this

study on post-disaster displacement in the Philippines. First and foremost, the

government and the people of the Philippines, close partner with IOM. We have

unfortunately been engaged in the Philippines on several displacement crises, both

manmade, as well as natural. This, of course, is one of the most tragic ones but with a

very strong partnership with the government. And I think one of the (inaudible) is this

level of engagement that perhaps is unusual in other settings, which itself poses

challenges but certainly is a welcomed development.

For us, also, the Philippines is an important country because it hosts

hundreds of young staff members because it is one of our centralized hubs for the whole administration of the organization. So it certainly is a country where we have a strong footprint.

Then, of course, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development of the Government of Canada, which has sponsored both this specific study, as well as the previous one on Haiti, and it has contributed to not only studying the phenomenon, but also addressing it from the point of view of relief and recovery engagement.

And on that note, of course, I would also like to acknowledge OFDA, USAID, because they are strong partners of IOM in addressing this and all the issues. And as you know, in the division of labor that exists concerning IOM between the State Department and USAID, we cover this very important area of addressing internally displaced persons. Thank you.

And lastly, this, Brookings itself. It has been an extremely valuable partnership, and we are extremely, you know, institutionally and personally grateful for the cooperation that we have launched. Too bad this project is coming to an end, and we have already lined up a number of countries where we would like to work together, but I think the lessons that we have extracted from these exercises are very valuable. They certainly will be important for IOM to reflect on, and now that we are approaching the World Humanitarian Summit, we will try to do the best to encapsulate these lessons learned into what we bring to Istanbul next year in terms of policy development. And this is a very important period for IOM because, as you know, the organization is engaged in a number of reflections on its own humanitarian policy, its own protection policy, its own migration governance policy, and also on its relationship with the United Nations more

broadly.

So with this note, I would also like to thank Ambassador Eddico, the chair of the IOM Council, for his visit to this hemisphere, which not only covers Washington, but is being also to see how the structure at IOM works. The regional office in Costa Rica, the administrative center in Panama, IOM at Washington, and then New York. I hope that this visit, sir, will help you see how we are engaged in this -- you might say in development challenges and how these can reflect on the place of the organization in terms of the partnership that we have with civil society, with partners, and donors, of course.

I read with a lot of interest your report, and I couldn't help by putting together with the Haiti reports, because I was more engaged in Haiti. But also, there are various ways in which you express some comments. My comments are putting the relation through the lenses of the Brookings project 10 years after the humanitarian reform, how has IDP fared? I think it's an extremely valuable exercise, and in spite of the very different areas under -- through which that project was based, which was DRC, Somalia, and Colombia -- the findings are strikingly similar in a way both Haiti, and in a different way but still also in the Philippines, there is a lot of evidence that corroborates the main findings of your 10-year review of the humanitarian reform.

Both studies seem to validate the conclusion emerging from the other context. And in spite of the different contexts, the key conclusion drawn by Brookings of the overall positive but deeply uneven achievements of the humanitarian reform, on the one hand, it processes it through the cluster, through a more predictable (inaudible), yet short-based (inaudible) but predictable. And then the role of the humanitarian coordinator, a more assertive role of coordination, has certainly brought about

considerable improvements in the way on the short-term IDPs needs and protection needs are addressed.

And yet, on the other hand, while operational responses have improved in the short term, the shortcomings that persist seem to center on the repeated, perhaps systemic failure to find durable solutions for those displaced. The number of IDPs has dramatically increased in the past 10 years.

So while humanitarian actors cannot always be responsible for the macro trends, classes have inevitably developed, and while some have become the centerpiece of the humanitarian community response, such as CCCM, protection shelter logistics and others, at the same time, some have not found the common road to transition and basically remain parallel systems, particularly those dealing with area recovery. So the area recovery cluster has not been able to ensure its proper place within the system, and perhaps tentative solutions and more creative ideas will need to be discussed in Istanbul to see how this very critical component can be brought back into a coherent approach.

(Inaudible) entire recovery and development process appear unable to be dealt with within one single framework, and the efforts to develop interclassic coherence facilitating one single evolving process has remained elusive. Humanitarian development actors have not found a common house in the cluster system. As a consequence, livelihood projects, or longer-term urban planning and permanent housing, land, and property, rule of law, and other essential elements of durable solutions have remained peripheral to the prime humanitarian concern, finding, and expertise.

And I think the studies offer some examples. I just wanted to mention a few. Humanitarian actors do not seem to have the capacity to intervene in the process of

human mobility triggered by large-scale displacement. This is in reference to the urban to rural, and eventual return urban to rural population movements, often missing an opportunity to link these mobility patterns to processes of the concentration, urban planning, decentralization, and population redistribution.

Most communities have been left to fend for themselves. Both case studies seem to convene on this point, especially when director-censused (phonetic) criteria privilege those fitting the proper IDP definitions. And therefore, the community context seems to be left somewhat behind or eclipsed.

Similarly, both Haiti and the Philippines land tenure, social housing, and other constraints have limited access to safer areas, often creating dilemmas in terms of equity of services for a population living unsafe or unregulated in settlements, whether it is the Canaan region or the no build zones that you have mentioned in the Philippines. The two studies point at land availability, tenure statutes (phonetic), and lack of alternative housing solutions, even the recognized the presence of risk factors.

Planned relocation has at times proven to be more disruptive than offering other kinds of empowering solutions and specific livelihood. From this picture, you could either draw the conclusion of the desperation of the humanitarian reform was way too ambitious and that the quest for a system evolving from a humanitarian response to morphing into recovery resilience was misplaced. Yet, we could, on the contrary, assert our opportunities (phonetic), identify some niches of good practices in shelter, protection, CCM, and other areas, and the two stories offer evidence of both.

A key element refers to the consistent injection of disaster risk reduction and risk management as part of the solutions. In the Philippines, this is an ongoing practice, and in Haiti, progress had been made in that direction. Investments in

(inaudible) centers, in (inaudible) practices often represents for the population at risk a safer investment than relocation away from the areas of current residence. If that could be mainstreamed and managed, it probably would reduce the level of vulnerability rather than disrupting through mass relocation efforts.

This is an example. But durable solutions are not provided, but are rather part of the longer-term process led by the displaced persons that can only be supported by the international community and (inaudible) authorities.

Lastly, and I think recognition to (inaudible) or to you, Beth, and all your colleagues, the guiding principles on internal displacement seem to have been mainstreamed and are no longer (inaudible) communities. It was because other (inaudible) to the principle that in Haiti the phenomena of evictions from camps was contained, and it is because of the guiding principle in the Philippines, the national local authorities have institutionalized and mainstreamed the (inaudible) approach within their emergency management practices, putting firmly the government in the lead.

I will stop here with somewhat an optimistic note, recognizing the long way the guiding principle and the interagency standing committee framework for durable solutions have gone, and recognizing Brookings for having been at the forefront of this remarkable achievement. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Okay. And James Fleming, you get the last word.

MR. FLEMING: Thanks, Beth. Hopefully not the last word.

So, also, thanks to Brookings for the invitation to participate today, and also congratulations to our authors. This really was an excellent report, although I have

to admit to not having read every single page yet. Luca must read faster than I do.

So in working in disaster response, people always ask, you know, it must be depressing working in crisis after crisis, and you just have to read the news and you realize that, yeah, it can be depressing. But there are also very good things that come out of working in disaster response and having done a career out of it. But I have a saying that I say to myself. It's that the way we honor the people who have been affected by disasters and killed by disasters is to really learn lessons and do better the next time. And that's really important to always keep that in mind. And I think, you know, this effort really goes a long way to doing what we've done in Haiti and then carried that on to the Philippines as well.

So, for USAID, a little bit of background on our response in the Philippines. Obviously, we knew this storm was going to be a big one. Did we know it was going to be the largest storm to ever hit landfall? No, we didn't have that idea. But clearly it was going to be big. So even before the disaster we deployed disaster experts to Manila to prepare for the response. And within hours of the typhoon making landfall, we had a request from the government of the Philippines to assist with the response. And going on what Luca said, this partnership with the government is absolutely key to what we do. We do not respond unless we have that request, and that's a common tenet of humanitarian assistance.

USAID has had a mission in Manila for, you know, 50 years, so there's been a deep relationship with the government of the Philippines and the Filipino people. And on the emergency side, my office, we've invested years of disaster risk production and preparedness in the Philippines doing things like training first responders and training the Philippine Red Cross and the Civil Defense Forces on rescue. We've trained fire

fighters on search and rescue techniques, something else that came handy after the typhoon. We've worked with hospitals on emergency preparedness as well.

We've helped the government of the Philippines develop what we call an incident command system, sort of a centralized system that helps manage in emergency, and we saw a lot of those lessons applied in this emergency. This is not one of the issues that we're talking about, you know, after the emergency is the lack of coordination which is really a good thing. And even now we're collaborating with the government on a variety of things, like flash flood early warning and trying to determine how the storm surges will affect other coastlines within the country.

So with decades of experience working with the Philippines, really to be asked to help respond to the disaster is really an honor for us and we are happy to do that. And thanks to the generosity of the American people, USAID contributed -- or the U.S. Government contributed $143 million for response and early recovery.

And we did this working closely with the government, both at the central and local levels. We did a lot of coordination just within the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, State Department, as well as USAID colleagues. And engaging Filipino communities. This is -- a key piece of implementing any disaster response is working with the communities on what their priorities are. And then working with diaspora groups even outside of the Philippines, especially here in the United States. That was a key component of especially the early recovery plan.

And then we funded organizations, including IOM, to do projects -- water, sanitation, hygiene, such as restoring the Tacloban water system was a good example. And health, nutrition, protection, and of course, shelter programs.

So looking a little bit deeper into displacement, I think the report rightly

points out that there are a lot of things that were done well. There's a lot of room for improvement. I think we should focus on those, and still that there are still needs to be met. This is not a retrospective. There are a lot of things that we still need to work on.

In looking at displacement, what I think of first is shelter. That's the first thing that comes to mind when we look at major displacement. And looking at lessons learned from Haiti, in particular, one of the things that we have developed a strategy shelter for the Philippines. And that shelter was the provision of safe, adequate, and habitable shelters. The emergency shelter program also had to facilitate and expedite the transition to long-term shelter solutions. So we saw that as part of our job, is to set the tables for that long-term reconstruction.

And then we use this idea of what we call a neighborhood approach; is that what you do is you start with a shelter solution, but then from that you build on the other sectors that are important. So it may be a shelter solution but you're looking at what are the other needs and building that in, whether it's livelihoods or water, sanitation, hygiene, public health, and that sort of thing.

And then last, what we wanted to look at is alternatives to relocation. What we've learned in a lot of lessons is that relocating people a long way from their previous livelihoods increases vulnerability. So any possibility that we could have to have people not move quite so far was really a key for us. And what we recognize, is that even in Tacloban there were under-utilized land and unutilized land that could perhaps serve as a place for people to relocate rather than far outside the city which is, you know, identified as one of the problems.

So the range of activities that we looked at in shelter was, you know, the whole spectrum. And it was rebuilding shelters, which was, you know, pretty standard.

Rehabilitating damaged shelters, but also looking at rental support. Maybe people just need a little bit of support to rent shelters. And then providing shelters to host communities, those people who were hosting the displaced. And only through this broad view, looking at all these different things did we feel like we could really implement a shelter program.

Looking at challenges ahead, you know, these are just my own thoughts on looking at the report and challenges. I think one of the big challenges going forward is going to be resources. And when I say "resources," people think about money, and I think that's absolutely true. We've seen the appeals not funded very high, and that's sort of endemic across the humanitarian world, partly because of the number of crises that we're all facing. But I also think resources in terms of human resources, the challenge that is in front of the government of Philippines to work on no build zones and no dwelling zones, these are really complicated things. And to expect that the local government agencies are going to have that capacity to be able to deal with that, I think that's a real challenge and something we've identified as a strategy for reconstruction.

I also think we have seen some progress since Haiti, and I think the resilience agenda, you know, brings the development and the humanitarian sides closer together, but I still think we have a ways to go on that front.

You know, I take your point on the consulting with local communities. You know, I think that's also a tentative humanitarian assistance that you should not be implementing any program that does not take that into account. But I wonder -- this may be a question we can get into in the discussion, but I wonder if it's not just that initial consultation, which I think we've gotten good at as trying to decide what are the priorities of the community, but the follow up to that. Is it, you know, how do we explain what we're

doing and how do we explain that we're basing needs on vulnerabilities? That follow up, you know, could be just as important as that initial consultation.

And then I think it doesn't take a rocket scientist or a hydromet scientist to realize, you know, the needs are only going to increase with climate change and other factors. So again, a renewed commitment to disaster risk reduction is important, as well as capacity building. I think this is something that we take very seriously is building the capacity of local governments to better respond. And we've got a lot of technical assistance that we can offer in that regard.

So with that, thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Thank you very much, James.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: Before we open it up to questions, I'd like to just throw a few questions out to you.

I was struck, both Brad and Luca, in thinking about the way the international humanitarian system responds. I think we do better with weaker governments. I don't think we've figured out exactly how to work with strong governments. I did work in Colombia. Just got back from Turkey. And you see the same sorts of -- I mean, should we have a different model for working with governments like the Philippines that have structures and capacity in place, than we do for places like Haiti or Somalia?

MR. DALL'OGLIO: On the Philippines, perhaps you'll have --

MR. MELLICKER: I mean, for the case of the Philippines specifically, yeah, we got it wrong for sure. It's a very capable government for sure, and we went in acting as though it was Somalia. So in that sense, I think the response would have

benefited if we did from a model which can take into account higher preexisting capacities let's say. So yeah, it's a significant difference and we have a difficult time doing it, to be honest.

MS. FERRIS: Did the L3 designation help?

MR. MELLICKER: In some senses it made it more challenging in that regard just because of, again, the sheer number of people that were sent or that arrived in the Philippines very quickly with off-the-shelf systems that were, you know, had been conceived in Geneva for other contexts, contexts with less functioning governments, immediately arrived and put everything into place, but overwhelmed and ignored the preexisting systems.

MR. DALL'OGLIO: I want to say that every crisis is different. I mean, in Haiti, probably we worked with the authorities that were, themselves, shocked. They were going through enormous pain to recover their own personal balance and for months we couldn't deal with all the administrators that were in full control of themselves. Their personal lives had gone through terrible turmoil and perhaps it was unavoidable, the lingering period in which the international community filled that vacuum. And it took a year and a half to have the National Housing Commission established and interlocutors that could speak with credibility and authority. So again --

MS. FERRIS: The situations are very different. Yes.

MR. DALL'OGLIO: Situations can change from country to country.

MR. FLEMING: Yeah. And I think maybe the issue isn't so much the structure. I think that we talked about how the Philippines, the government of the Philippines had the cluster system essentially built into the response plan, so I'm not necessarily sure that it's the structure -- was the issue. And I think there was good

planning for that. But it may be the approach that maybe you don't have to come in with the cluster coordinators necessarily, but maybe you support it in other ways. So that may be something that we have to look at as a community, is, you know, how hard do we come in and where do we support.

MS. FERRIS: And Megan, a question for you. This is the second study you've done that applies the framework for durable solutions to figuring out when displacement ends -- Haiti and Philippines. Is it a useful framework? Is it too ambitious? Are there things that can be done to make it more useful to governments?

MS. BRADLEY: I think it's a framework that sets a really high bar, and on the one hand that could be very frustrating for the actors who are trying to work with it. I think it makes some actors feel like they are trying to achieve something that's just out of their reach. But, it's important to be aspirational. It's important to know the direction from a right space perspective in which we should be striving, and so I think that's the real value of the framework because it draws attention to issues that are often overlooked in both Haiti and the Philippines. A classic example of this was the tendency to just equate durable solutions with shelter and overlook other issues around livelihoods, around adequate standard of living.

MS. FERRIS: Maybe a question for all of you, and you alluded to this, James. Given the large number of simultaneous mega disasters right now -- and everybody is racing around to respond to Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq, and South Sudan Ebola -- I mean, do you have any suggestions for how to sustain the support for these post-disaster recovery periods? This isn't something -- you know, this is in competition, if you will, with some of these other burning crises. How can we make sure that the support is sustained to enable people to resolve their displacement?

MR. FLEMING: Yeah. I don't think there's a great answer for that question yet. I think that one of the questions that we have recognized is, you know, on the human resource front, that really the entire community has been stretched financially, but also human resources wise. And I think that this is a huge challenge from the U.N., to the international organizations, to the NGOs, to us, to have enough people in this field that can sustain that effort. Because you know how it is. When the next disaster comes, you take out you're A Team and you throw them at the next disaster and they've left the last one behind. Right? And so this is a constant problem. And I think that we're looking at -- one of the things we're doing is we're putting out an annual program statement looking at ways to work with the education community in the United States to develop the next generation of leaders to try to increase the flow of people coming into this field. So it's a very small solution and not a great answer to that question. But it's one area.

MR. DALL'OGLIO: Perhaps one of the more normative way of addressing my entire emergency needs but also displacement specifically, you know, the cash grants approach, the lighter footprint modalities (inaudible) having international community. You know, the hands-on heavy presence but rather these modalities of support (inaudible) capacity of the operation, you know, have been explored. And I think a certain degree of success has been recognized, both in terms of housing in Haiti, and there were bank studies in (inaudible) that this is a valuable approach, and I think (inaudible) would also be followed. But these perhaps are modalities of engagement which do not require a very heavy presence of international personnel.

MS. FLEMING: I think that's a really good point. And U.S. government gets started in a disaster with a disaster declaration, and we get these from -- the U.S. ambassador declares it based on a set of criteria. And when I first started in this field, we

averaged about 70 disaster declarations a year. But over the last three or four years, we're hovering around 40 or 50 maybe, so we're seeing a real decline that's been sustained. And what I think is the answer -- and we need to look at this in a little more detail -- but what I think the answer is that with capacity building in places like Latin America and Asia, the local governments are better able to respond to those small to medium-size disasters, which then relieves the rest of the international community to work on those big ones. And I think this idea of trying to build that capacity internally, inherently is, you know, a great solution.

MS. BRADLEY: Just building on what James and Luca have just said, I think there's also a need again to emphasize the importance of supporting the solutions that people are crafting for themselves. Sometimes we do return to this kind of vocabulary of the government or international actors providing solutions to people, but really, if you talk to anyone who has been in a crisis situation like this, it's clear that they are trying to think of a strategy for themselves that makes sense in their own family context and their community context, and at its best international and national support just supplements or strengthens what people are doing on their own accord. So I think that there's a real need to have this kind of community level focus where we can strengthen those kinds of grassroots network, and in particularly, in the Philippines, this is something that we heard very clearly was that pushing, for example, for relocation when people wanted to return to coastal communities and have evacuation options made available to them, you know, that could be a much more plausible solution for people that makes sense in the immediate term. And it's also less resource intensive in terms of what it requires from the national and international community. Often, the international community in governments will often have a solution in mind that is their preference and

that doesn't accord with what people want for themselves.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Let's open it up now for questions. We've got some microphones. And if you could stand and introduce yourself. This gentleman here. And we'll take three or four questions and then ask the panelists to respond.

Yes, please.

MR. ROTHENBERG: I guess there two-parts.

MS. FERRIS: If you can identify yourself.

MR. ROTHENBERG: I'm John Rotheberg. I used to be a disaster specialist. I was with UNHCR, an Afghanistan specialist.

So I was in West Timor during the Timorese crisis, and my impression was that most of the internationals there had come out of either the Great Lakes, Afghanistan, Central Asia, places where the governments -- even if the governments were solid governments, you had to be aggressive with. And my impression of the Indonesian government was that it was much more of an Asian situation where -- that it was a cultural thing that was taking place rather than that it was something to do with fragility. And so I was wondering about that.

And then the second part is that I've been involved with Afghanistan 25 years, and it seems to me that one of the things we're good at that we don't do much with but we're doing better with, is that we build up the capacity of the people. I mean, somebody that worked with me at IRC in my first job was Minister of Finance. And so that to me, the solution to the problem is to get people from either those countries or nearby countries to be the people that are working there during emergencies.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you.

Mr. President?

SPEAKER: Thank you. First of all, let me just take the opportunity to introduce myself. I've been introduced a bit but I thought I should say a few words about myself.

I'm the ambassador Ghana based on Switzerland, Geneva, and I'm currently the chair of IOM. It's a one-year tenure that starts from November last year to November this year. I'm in Washington mainly to study the operations of IOM here in Washington, and I'll be in New York in a few days to also study that operation.

I'm very lucky indeed to be here at this particular time when this report is being launched, and I'm grateful for the invitation extended to me to be here.

My comment or question should be looked at from another perspective, more of the government's perspective since I represent the states. For most of the reports, that usually comes out after such crises. There is one theme that runs across the reports, and this is about the proliferations of various humanitarian agencies that are so eager to provide support to the various countries. One of the speakers fell short of saying they create -- not conflict, but duplication of functions. I would say it could be a duplication of functions, but the important thing is that for such a proliferation of flooding assistance provides this, they may likely tend to have conflict with the governments. For a number of governments, they are not too sure of the motives behind the support, et cetera, and therefore, you may have some of these conflicts occurring.

And this is where I think the role of the IOM is very important in the field. IOM is an organization that works very closely and effectively with the governments of the various countries where they are located, and where (inaudible) play a lead role, these types of conflicts are greatly reduced.

And to comment on the question that you asked about the successes in

areas where the governments are weak, I thought about it and asked myself, well, you

may be successful in those areas, maybe also because the governments do not have the

capacity to resist. But where the governments have the capacity to resist or make their

voices heard, you really clearly hear their voices. So I think moving forward we need to

begin to look at ways that we can minimize why states are so eager to receive the

assistance that you provide. Their concerns should also be taken into consideration.

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you.

Let's take one or two more.

Yes, please.

MS. RAMON: My name is Roberta Ramon from IOM, Washington, D.C.

Thank you very much for working on this survey and also for presenting

the report today. I have two questions, one for Megan, one for Brad.

I was wondering, we have been working within the framework for durable

solutions for IDPs since a while, and we have seen more and more that sometimes the

categories that we propose as a durable solution, like integration and relocation and

return, sometimes are mixed with one another. So like in the case that you were

mentioning, like people maybe tend to relocate but then in the case of their livelihoods,

they want to return to the place where their land was located. So I've seen this also in

Uganda while was working in the north in a civil conflict environment. And the responses

we were able to provide were not taking into consideration this fluidity between the

different categories.

So I was wondering if you have seen this attention to this issue in the

response.

And for Brad, I was very interested in your first recommendation, the one of like looking at the response to IDPs, internal displacement, not only from the point of view of a humanitarian emergency but also looking at development intervention. So I would like to know what has been the response to these recommendations so far in practice. Like, have you seen an increasing cooperation between agencies that are more traditionally focused on humanitarian intervention with others that are more development oriented, or there is still this very clear separation between the way in which they assess things and they operate?

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. We've got several questions here. Who would like to respond? The first one to respond gets to pick which question you want to answer.

MR. BRADLEY: Well, I can give a quick shot at some of these questions. Thank you very much for the comments and questions.

One point that I just wanted to raise in relation to John's comments and also in relation to the ambassador's is that particularly in the Philippines, and particularly vis-à-vis IOM, we saw in the interviews a strong recognition of the value of the local staff as intermediaries between the international community and the government. So for IOM in particular in the Philippines because they have an administrative hub there, this was a real strong suit. I think in general, IOM -- please correct me if I'm wrong, Luca and Brad -- IOM is an organization that works a lot with local staff and the value of that was really made clear in this response in particular. Again, drawing on the particular bench strength that was there because of having the administrative office. You know, there were instances where, for example, high level government officials had worked very closely with some of the IOM local staff, who themselves held quite senior positions in the

organization. They'd worked together in previous responses. People moved back and

forth from government to international organizations and NGOs and vice versa. I think

that there is actually a lot to be learned there in terms of how to strengthen that process

and build on the advantages that the local staff brings. I think sometimes we just throw

away that kind of comment. It's like, oh, let's build on the local staff as a kind of --

something that's easy to say but really there are some valuable lessons to be learned,

and I think it merits being thought about in greater detail.

In terms of the question about the fluidity between the categories, this is

certainly something that I've seen a lot in these projects and also in other studies on

durable solutions. Sometimes we hear, for example, UNHCR talk about mobility as a

fourth durable solution. I have some qualms about talking about mobility quite in that way

because I think if mobility is only being pursued because the other options are not

actually available, then this is not actually a solution. It's some kind of a stop gap and it

can be a really significant strategy and something that should be encouraged. But I think

it's important to still, from a rights space perspective, be able to tell the difference

between whether or not people are making a free choice in terms of accessing mobility.

But certainly, this is a big dynamic and something that I think we need to understand\

better in terms of both humanitarian and development actors that are involved in this.

One thing that I think was very clear from this study and also in Haiti is

that the kinds of fluidity and mobility that we're talking about are often at a very micro

level. So people are moving from one neighborhood to the next, and from the

perspective of international actors, it might not seem like it's a big deal, for example, to be

moving from one commune to the other, or from one village to the next. But when we

think about people's livelihoods strategies and their networks, this is actually very

significant to them, and sometimes we don't have the context and the deep local knowledge to really appreciate the significance of that.

I'll let others weigh in on this question of the humanitarian development question, but I would say I think that this is really an effort of persuasion that is very much ongoing that has in no sense been completed. But part of the value, I hope, of these kinds of studies that we've been doing that have had a large-scale household survey component to them is to try to engage. You know, it's a platform for trying to engage development actors who really want to see those kinds of big numbers. That's how they plan. That's the kinds of research that they find more compelling, and so I hope that this kind of work is a starting point for a conversation.

MS. FERRIS: Any others? Brad?

MR. MELLICKER: Yeah. Just to follow on the displacement and development question. I think, to answer your question directly, I think we see sort of perhaps a growing willingness to include displacement of IDPs in development interventions. I think Luca gave the example of the World Bank's rental support interventions in Haiti. Now, the project in and of itself was not, you know, development per se but fit into a much larger picture for the World Bank in terms of its development and reconstruction priorities but taking into account the specific vulnerabilities of IDPs.

We had the reverse situation where we had other actors who didn't recognize IDPs as such. Or recognized IDPs as such but not as a category worthy of particular treatment. Right? So they were saying, well, in Haiti, IDPs are among a much larger group of people who are living in extreme poverty, and therefore, the development program will seek to (inaudible), so to speak, or to benefit all of that population. But I think what these studies have been able to show is that the displaced population are at a

distinct disadvantage, even relative to their neighbors who may be in situations of extreme poverty themselves. They were often more vulnerable prior to the disaster and their displacement causes even greater vulnerability and makes their recovery process that much more difficult.

And then just briefly on your question regarding the approach -- the different approaches I think towards government. I think perhaps there's a significant difference in the way some agencies approach their relationship with the government in natural disasters versus conflict. I think for quite obvious reasons, in many cases, the government is a party to the conflict, so you'd be in conflict with your own humanitarian principles by engaging as closely as you might in a disaster response.

Now, where I think we may have gotten into some trouble in the Philippines is I think what became a fine line between what was considered too aggressive an approach versus advocacy, whereas some agencies might have considered their engagement with government or their research as advocating for the rights of IDPs or whatever it was. The government perceived this as an attack against its policies, against its response, et cetera. So I think there were two very different ways to look at some of those initiatives. And from an international perspective, I think week need to be very conscious of this, especially as we're guests in all of these countries.

MR. FLEMING: Oh, do you want to --

MR. DALL'OGLIO: No, just to add to what Brad was saying about the mindset of many of the humanitarian workers that have been engaged in protected conflict situations where access is difficult, where national authorities are part of the problem, where the risks to the person and the corporate risk is high and the vulnerability are exacerbated by lack of security, and the disposition (phonetic) of these experiences

in a context where the source of the crisis, natural disasters can cause -- require some adjustments. And not everybody perhaps feels like the organizational (phonetic) mindset to make those adjustments and certain issues are transported in the context (phonetic) which is, in fact, wrongly assumed to have certain characteristics, and I think the examples that were given were, I think, very fitting for that purpose.

MR. FLEMING: I just -- in answer to a few of the questions, you know, on the cultural sensitivity of the disaster responders, I think that you're absolutely right that we have to take that into consideration. I think that the U.S. Government is very similar to IOM in that we put a priority on keeping people in the region so that people understand the regions, and you know, there's a lot of pressure to save money, and one of the ideas always is to why don't we just bring everybody back to the United States and we can all sit here and respond from here. But I think that what you're saying is a reason why both reoganizations take very seriously to keep, you know, people in the regions, and a lot of times our disaster response team leaders are, you know, from that region as well.

It also even goes farther. One of the things that we consider when we're making funding decisions on what organizations to fund, a lot of times a factor we'll look at is what organization has a presence in that country so that they understand some of those cultural dynamics. It's not always possible, but it's one of the things that we consider.

I also think that your comment on building capacity, I think that that's absolutely essential. I was thinking of Indonesia in particular after the Asia tsunami in 2004-2005. We recognized that there wasn't a good intrinsic response capability in Indonesia. So we funded an organization -- I may get the name wrong, but it was called

Ambulon 119. Or maybe it's 113. Anyway, I can't remember the number, but this was the name of this sort of Indonesian organization. And one of the things it was going to do was going to build that capacity to respond to those first responders. And flash forward a few years later, there was the Jakarta earthquake. Ambulon 119, I think, responded, and so the international community didn't have to provide as much search and rescue capability in that situation because you had those people that could get there very quickly, and I think that's really important to continue.

On the ambassador's note about taking the country government into perspective, I think that -- for me, I'll just give you an anecdote that one of the first times that our office had been asked to respond domestically was for Hurricane Katrina. We had received a request from FEMA for very specific amounts of assistance which we can do with their authority in the United States. But one of the lessons for me was to see what it was like to be on the receiving end of offers of assistance, and you're absolutely right. There were a lot of organizations that were not very pleasant about saying we have that capability already; that would duplicate efforts. They really didn't want to hear that. And so it did present a lesson in something we have to consider when we're responding overseas. And it's also why we consider it an honor to be requested by governments, not, I don't know, a requirement.

And then the last question about preserving flexibility in responses. I think that's absolutely right because usually in a shelter situation, the common response is, okay, one family, one house. And that's how it has to be. And I think that in a lot of cases that's right. You want to build a permanent shelter for that particular family, but there are lots of other permeations that you have to consider. And I think this rental issue is really important because not everybody wants to be permanently located in that area.

Maybe they need flexibly to move to another area, or maybe they're finishing their

university degree and they'll take a job somewhere else. So there are lots of options like

that. And, you know, we've talked a lot over many years of support to host families as

well is a very good solution to some of the displacement that, you know, may not be a

long-term solution, but seems to be appropriate in so many different places from Haiti to

the Philippines. We're even seeing that now in Ukraine where there's so much

welcoming of people into homes for the displaced, but those people need assistance to

make this work. So I think looking at the shelter and settlement solution with a lot of

different options and flexibility is key.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks again. It's time for a few more.

Anita?

MS. MENGHETTI: Hi. Thanks. My name is Anita Menghetti. I work at

the State Department, but I'm speaking as a taxpayer, not as a representative of the

State Department. And I'm hoping to break some glass here.

We know that disasters, you know, you mentioned, James, that there are

fewer disaster declarations, and yet, I can remember reading, back when I was young,

that, you know, the average disaster lasts, you know, three to five years. Now it's seven

to nine. It's climbing. A lot of the disasters that we were working on 11 years ago when I

worked as a colleague of James, people are still working on.

But there's also huge technological things that have happened in the last

seven years are shocking. This affects the people that are affected there. And I'm

wondering a couple things. Do we need three different offices with three slightly different

mandates in the U.S. Government to respond to humanitarian needs overseas? And do

we need five or six U.N. agencies that have variable mandates that take an arm and a leg

to coordinate amongst themselves, let alone with the agency? Particularly, not that cash is a panacea. I don't believe that it is. But that you can do a lot with a cellphone and cash, and you don't need to bring in all this stuff. And you don't need to replicate. And we all have -- the United States Government, at least the international part of it, has more employees that are not U.S. citizens than U.S. citizens, because every mission -- we have huge networks that already exist in these communities, and many of them do become ministers and this and that.

So my question is, are we missing opportunities where we could reduce, reuse, recycle, and innovate?

Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: That's an easy question.

Okay. This gentleman here. And then I'll give you a chance to think about the answer there.

SPEAKER: My name is Arusula. I'm with Friends of the Global Fight.

I think my question kind of folds into that one as well. I think -- I was just wondering if you could shed some more light on some of the best strategies that you've seen in terms of duplication efforts and how to address them. You know, coming from the global health sector, I've seen that this is a problem that exists throughout the development field across the board, so what are some of the best things that you have seen to avoid duplication of efforts and parallel clusters which might kind of play into that.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you.

Who would like to jump in?

MR. DALL'OGLIO: (Inaudible), you know, can give different names to the same thing. You can call it duplication. You can call it (inaudible) of partnership. It

depends on the lenses through which you look at the phenomenon.

In the context of Haiti, it was striking to see every sort of good intended people come to Haiti sometimes without any -- apparently any available resources. I'm here to help. And nothing. Others were there to help with the help of their community that, you know, private voluntary contribution received and transported with a very specific mandate. Perhaps without really knowing what exactly to do. See how on the ground what conditions assistance could be given. Nobody regulates private donations. I mean, individuals moved by generosity. So this is a new phenomenon.

Now, is there a system to be able to marshal those resources? Well, I think OCHA is the system, and if it's reported by donors and by host government authorities, those resources can be multiplied. If that coordination mechanism doesn't exist, those resources can be pulverized. So it depends very much on whether or not we have some (inaudible). And the (inaudible) are created not because somebody has raised the flag of, you know, I'm a cluster; you have to come through me. It's because I have useful information to give you. I have a map of needs. I have a map of gaps. I have a map of making your small contribution meaningful because I can't do it. So it's not so much the number of actors; it's the quality of those interventions that those actors can provide. And in review, there's no way of reducing the actors. You probably can't reduce the duplication, the wastage, the unnecessary, and sometimes wrongly thought out interventions.

MR. FLEMING: I'll follow up on that.

In answer to your question on duplication, I think that coordination is so important in reducing the duplication. And if you look at our budget from year to year, we probably spend between 5 to 10 percent of our budget on coordination, which is

counterintuitive. Right? You think most of it goes to shelter and water and sanitation and things like that. But coordination is so important in this, and I think that that is the major key. I do think that, you know, governments may have the responsibility to -- if there are organizations that they have given license to respond in a certain country that aren't coordinating, that you know, I think governments need to be empowered to address that. So then you don't have this duplication.

But I also think, going to Anita's question, I think that maybe we have to spend too much money on coordination. I wish I could answer your question as a taxpayer. Maybe after coffee we can have a different conversation, but you know, I think that -- I think maybe that is -- maybe we have to do too much coordination. Maybe there are too many disparate parts that you have to fit together, and I think, thinking ahead, I'm hoping that the World Humanitarian Summit that's coming up, this is my one hope for this summit, that we can address some of those issues, because I think that it's kind of a unique opportunity to talk through big issues that really, most of the time you don't have time to discuss because you're in the middle of a different crisis and you just have to work with the system that you've got. But hopefully, it'd be a contemplative time to address some of these things. Not really a great answer but at least a hope.

MS. BRADLEY: Just a quick example that came up in the context of our fieldwork in the Philippines that came to mind when you were talking about what can be accomplished with cash and some cellphones.

So there was a Taiwanese Buddhist NGO called Tzu Chi that was very active in Tacloban in particular, but also other areas, and they accomplished incredible amounts in a very short period of time using cash grants and cellphones. I mean, it was really quite remarkable. And yet, as the process moved forward and they began to

support reconstruction efforts, it became clear that they had a particular vision in mind of the way, for example, beneficiaries should be living in the communities that they were supporting. And so what might look from a certain level like duplication of efforts -- so, you know, similar kinds of community reconstruction efforts going on in different places -- was also from the perspective of beneficiaries or survivors that we spoke with, they felt that that was important in terms of increasing the range of choice that was available to them because some people just simply didn't agree with the kinds of visions that this particular NGO had in mind, even though they could recognize that they were incredibly effective in some areas of activity. And so, you know, I suppose just to say that there can be on a certain level a positive upside to some of the possibilities of duplication.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Well, I think our time is up, and I want to thank our panelists for coming.

(Applause)

MS. FERRIS: This afternoon, we'll be having two back-to-back roundtables looking at 20 years of history of the project on internal displacement and the many, many challenges that remain. You're all invited, and hope to see you soon. Thank you.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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