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MR. KIRIŞÇI: Good morning, to you all. I would like to welcome you to our European Migration Crisis Panel.

Two huge crises dominate the European Union’s agenda these days. One of them is what’s going to happen to Greece and its debts. But the other one is a function of the ever-growing waves of regular migrants and asylum seekers coming across the Mediterranean to Italy, and then making their way to the rest of the European Union.

As much as the situation in Greece and the financial crisis surrounding it is a very topical one, as the infamous June 30 deadline approaches, today we are going to focus on the latter crisis here.

To discuss this crisis, we are very fortunate to have Cem Özdemir, a very good friend, and also an insider in, as far as decision-making in Germany goes. Cem is currently the co-chairman of the German Green Party, and a member of the German Parliament. I will not go into the details of Cem’s bio, but mention that he has a very long past in German politics, and an interest in immigration issues that also is related to his background as a second generation German-Turk in Germany.

But what I find more fascinating about Cem is that he’s not only politician, but he has also an academic side to himself. He has written extensively, published, and I think my favorite, as far as his books go, is “Currywurst und Döner,” currywurst being a Berlin specialty, and döner corresponds to gyro here in the United States. I won’t say much about it. Cem is also familiar with Washington, D.C., he was a transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, not far from where we are.

Welcome, Cem, to Brookings, and for me it is a treat to host you here at Brookings.
We have two migration experts in the panel this morning with us, Professor Susan Martin, from Georgetown University, and director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration. I cannot think of anyone else, who has a long list of publication in immigration issues, and I can't think of anyone who would not be aware of those -- that publication, if they have an interest, a genuine interest in the issue.

And I must say, Susan, you always made my life easier at university, because whenever a student walked up to me about what they should be reading about migration, I would say, just go and look up Susan Martin. Susan has also, a background in policymaking, and was the executive director of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. Welcome, to you too.

Kathleen Newland has a similar background and bio. She is the co-founder, and now a senior fellow at the Migration Policy Institute. There is another address that I would always direct students to, to get them off my back. Kathleen's special interest is on the relationship between migration and development. She, too, has extensive publications as well as experience in the policy world.

I am Kemal Kirişci, and the TUSIAD senior fellow at the Center for the United States and Europe, here at Brookings. I would like to get the panel started by making just a couple of general observations to warm us up.

We are gathered here, right about a week or 10 days, after the United Nations, UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has published their global trends for 2014. And that the image that they are reminding us of migration is not a very optimistic one. Almost 60 million people around the world have been displaced as a result of war, violence and instability. This figure, 10 years ago, was 37 million, so almost 25 more million people have been displaced compared to 2005.

Now, of the many crises around the world that are provoking this
displacement, at least three of them are around the European Union. The first one I've already made references to, but there is also the one that we refer to as the Syrian displacement crisis.

Again, according to the UNHCR, there are about 11 million Syrians that have been displaced as a result of the violence in Syria that has now gone into its fifth year. Four million of them are refugees in neighboring countries. My good friend and colleague here at Brookings, Beth Ferris, we've just come back from a 10-day trip to the Syrian border in Turkey and observed, first-hand, last week, refugees -- another wave of refugees pouring into Turkey from Northern Syria, and it doesn't look like it's about to stop.

The third displacement crisis is one, oddly enough, that we don't hear a lot about. It's the one provoked by the Ukrainian crisis, or the crisis in Ukraine. I mean, 1.3 million Ukrainians have been displaced, and 0.5 million of them have become asylum seekers including amongst them, my ethnic brethren, Tatars.

Now, Cem, I have always admired your commitment to the European project, to its values, and especially to the European Union soft power in helping to make Europe, but also the world beyond it, a better place.

Yet, the last couple of years, EU has been going through rough waters, and the gloss over its shining image has been damaged by the failure to live up to its own values and standards, and one area where this where this has become very visible, and somewhat disturbing, especially for human rights circle relates to the immigration-related issues, and the way in which the European Union looks paralyzed in responding to the European -- to the Mediterranean immigration crisis.

Now, what is going on? To help us to make sense of all this, if possible, in just 20 minutes; and then we are going to turn to Susan and Kathleen, who will
respond to you in 7, 8 minutes, and then you will have the right to respond to their responses before we turn to the floor for questions and answers. Cem, it’s our pleasure to listen to you.

MR. ÖZDEMIR: Well, thank you, for the kind introduction. It’s both a pleasure and an honor to speak here at the Brookings Foundation. So, I would first like to thank Brookings Foundation and, of course, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, for making this event possible.

And let me add to that, you mentioned my book, *Currywurst und Döner*, people always tend to get disappointed after reading the book, because there is not a single recipe in the book. You cannot imagine the kind of letters I received after the book was published by people who invested so much money for the book and then they found that it doesn’t help them with anything at the kitchen. I hope it helps at least with policy.

Well, just coming here, I checked my emails, and what I saw was, you know, the discussion in Europe, maybe you follow that, with Hungary, and then they had to take it partly back, so it shows that, you know, that this topic will stay on the agenda, on top of the agenda for a long time. And it’s clear that this is also maybe a topic I will come back to that at the end of my remarks.

Which also, maybe, helps us to understand on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, that we have so much in common, even the other topics, you know, that divide us. I’m not going to talk about the more difficult topics, we are also facing, because another thing I read today, in the morning, was regarding French Presidents, and that is another topic, which will keep the U.S. busy to explain, but I’m lucky that that’s not my problem, I have enough problems myself, with our situation.

Well, coming back to the challenge, Kemal Hodja, and by the way, I call him Kemal Hodja because this is one of the few things, you know, that survived after so
many centuries, that the people of Turkish region called people that went to university, studied and then became professors, Hodja.

MR. KIRISCI: Thanks.

MR. ÖZDEMIR: It will never go away, so in any language I will always call you Kemal Hodja.

MR. KIRISCI: Thank you.

MR. ÖZDEMIR: This Ottoman title at least will stay. This is the largest refugee crisis worldwide that we've seen since World War II. You've just quoted 60 million people that had to leave in 2014, and if we look at those figures, I don't want to bore you with figures; that it's a horrible situation, just in 2014 more than 620,000 asylum applications we had across Europe. This year, 500,000 applications are expected, just in Germany.

These figures remind us a little bit, too, what we had in the beginning of the '90s in Germany, but we should never forget, when we talk about European figures, that we have to put that into context, and once we compare the situation of the neighboring countries, of Syria, for instance, and Iraq, and we compare that with our figures that we have in Sweden and Germany, with those countries, I would even say that, you know, a lot of mayors in (inaudible) and elsewhere, would love to have the problems that a Mayor in Stuttgart and in another town has.

And having said that, I don't say that they have easy problems but, as I said, sometimes is important to put that in context; and, again, I don't want to bore you with figures, but just, if you compare that with Lebanon, 1.15 million refugees, and the total population of 4 million people, and if you look at the total figures, Turkey has the highest number of refugees in that region.

And a part of these people, obviously, come to us, or try to come to us, I
have to say, because unfortunately so many people lose their lives in between, 280,000 refugees made it across the Mediterranean to us. The reasons for that are obvious, we all know that and follow that and then use the wars in the Middle East, in Africa, extreme poverty is another reason, but it's also a topic which I think should be put on the agenda, because it cannot be excluded when you talk about the reasons why people leave their country, and that's climate change, obviously, and the consequences of climate change are reasons why people, as I said, become refugees.

There is one thing that every European, whenever you wake him or her in the middle of the night, up, remembers and knows that is the famous speech of the Former French Foreign Affairs Minister, Robert Schuman, which was the founding document of the European Union, which first became the European Community, and then later European Union. We all know that quote as Europeans.

We all admire him, we loved his quotes, but none of us has fully read the quote, because in the second part of the quote, and let me read you that, because it's really worth to listen to that. He speaks about a something which we never listened to, and never followed. The first part of the quote, "This production --" he means the joint Franco-German production of coal and steel; "Will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards, and to promoting peaceful achievements." And now comes the second part of the quote which, as I said, unfortunately people never read, including myself, in school, "With increased resources, Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent."

So when the European Community was founded, the founding document, the most important document, describes already the goal of the European Union that we have to help our neighboring continent. And, by the way, the way he talks
about helping, not colonizing, Africa. If Schuman would be alive, I'm sure he would say, we have to help our neighboring continent, Africa, and we have to help our Eastern neighbors that they become democracies, free market economies, and so on.

That was not so much, maybe, you know, the orientation of a French politician of that time, given the fact of the Cold War, but today it's clear that these are the two directions Europe should head to, helping our Eastern neighbors and helping our southern neighbors and, as I said, this is also in our very interest. It's not that we do something good for them, by helping them we also help, obviously, ourselves.

And if we look back, I have to say, that the promise of Robert Schuman was not fulfilled, at least not until today. About the whys, just a few brief remarks so that we have enough to discuss. I think so far, unfortunately, Europe's policy is dominated by development and trades interest.

Just to give you one little example, the EU Senegal Fisheries Agreement, from 2014, we pay EUR50 million over a period of five years, and on the other side, we get the right to harvest 14 tons of tuna annually in Senegalese waters. What it leads to is that fishers from Senegal, practically, lose their jobs. We take European taxpayers’ money, to subsidize agricultural products that go to Asia, and go to Western Africa, but the result is that we destroy local markets, so that people cannot, you know, earn their living by their agricultural products, because our products are cheaper, because we exclude transport cost to the environments, and so on.

So, it's an absurd result, because we use taxpayers' money to subsidize a product, which we would have market prices, would be much more expensive, and we also destroy local markets, and then we have to spend money to help these guys or to make sure that they do not arrive at our borders. So it's such a waste of money, and I haven't talked about the humanitarian disaster it also involves.
So, I believe there is a lot to discuss. Just to jump a bit to our response so far. If you look at the legal framework, the Dublin Agreement, as you all know, it limits the responsibility to the first receiving country. What we see right now, that that obviously leaves countries like Greece and Italy practically alone. I don’t want to talk about the situation of Greece, you are all familiar with that.

But it’s obviously clear that Greece is not the country which has as its first or second or third priority to deal with refugees. They have other problems right now. And if you follow the situation of refugees in Greece, and by the way, also, how it leads to right-wing extremism in Greece, it’s obvious that we have interest that this is not continuing, that we help these guys for humanitarian reason, but we also should help these guys, because I don’t want the right wing, or a more right wing development in Greece, because it also, again, it harms us, and it’s the opposite of being wise.

When we take the Mediterranean crisis, you are all aware that Italy did something, by the way, and I think it was not appreciated enough after the horrible event where more than 800 refugees lost their lives, and they started with the Mare Nostrum. But it was clear when they started the Mare Nostrum mission in the Mediterranean to save the lives of refugees, that it was a temporary thing. That Italy is not going to do that forever.

And Italy announced it, publicly, right from the beginning, it said, and at one point European Union has to take over. We didn’t do that. The reason why we didn’t do that, because we feared pull factors. We feared that we were going to make it more attractive for refugees to come to us. If one has ever been in Iraq, I’ve been in Iraq, Kurdistan, if one has ever talked to refugees, and know the reason why they are leaving their countries, and what they are running away from, and it’s clear that none of these people looks, you know, at legal ways to come to Europe.
It's not that they first read any information about how they can come to Europe; that their agenda is only one thing, and that's to save the lives of their families, and their own lives from unacceptable situations. So, to make it unattractive to come to Europe, will not solve the problem obviously because if you follow the situation in the country, like Eritrea, it's obvious, that you do not concentrate on how you go to Europe, the only thing you concentrate on is how you can leave Eritrea as soon as possible, before you are the next one that is targeted.

And at the same time, of course, and this is maybe also food for thought, for the discussion, we are facing an incredible pressure by right wing movements in Europe, and that includes countries where we were not used to that, Scandinavian countries. That's become so strong, that they not only have a say in politics, but they are part of governments. Just take the most recent election in Denmark, or before in Finland, so it's obvious that this forces us to discuss the impact on our topic today.

What should Europe's response be? Well, first of all, briefly, it should be saving lives first. I think there cannot, there cannot be a discussion about that, otherwise we give up all humanitarian, you know, aspirations of this project. So saving lives first should be out of dispute, and everybody should agree upon, and that that of course, you know, again, as I said, figures don't matter that much, but in this case, just the annual cost of the G7 Summits, in Elmau, in Germany, were higher than what Frontex -- sorry -- Mare Nostrum would cost.

If you divide to 28 member states, you know, it's a joke to say that that is the reason why we cannot afford that. Second, we need legal ways of access, 90 percent of all refugees enter the European through illegal ways, so it's clear that the destroying of ships, fighting human smuggling will not solve the problem. Again, I don't want to go too deep into that. I doubt whether the Security Council will passed that
through. I doubt whether Libya will give permission to that, and I also doubt whether, for constitutional reasons, Germany could participate in such a mission.

But forget about that. It will not simply solve the problem, so we need to create alternative ways of access and for asylum applications. We have to increase the official quotas, and we have to also tell our population that we will take more refugees in the near future. And it's also clear that we have to help those countries that are neighboring Syria and Iraq with their refugee crisis, if we don’t want countries like Lebanon to destabilize and to go into wrong directions.

My final point about Germany, we have now, together with Sweden, the highest number of refugees that were taken also by unaccompanied children refugees. And I think the good news is that we have a complete different situation than we had in the ‘90s. I remember quite well in the beginning of the ‘90s, the reason for me to run for office in Germany, and to become a member of the German Bundestag was that I remember the racist attacks towards such families at that time.

And to one of -- my personal turning point was in the City of Solingen, where five Turkish children, and grandchildren of Mrs. Gench were burnt in a fire in the middle of the night, and I wanted to run for parliament so that somebody who speaks the language of Melruda Gench, is in the next German Bundestag.

At that time parties, some parties were playing with racism. Today, we have -- and that's that good news -- a national consensus in Germany, that we do not play with racism. I would say this also, for the German Bundes Councilor to imagine that one day we have a German Chancellor being a Christian Democrat, and saying that Islam is part of Germany, I would not have, you know, imagine that possible when I was elected 1994. You know, that somebody coming from the conservative side, saying that. Or when we had the right wing movement of Pegida, in the City of Dresden; that she
publicly criticized them, and not everybody liked her in her party.

I think it really is remarkable and shows that at least there is a consensus, but it's not only a consensus on the level of the politicians and the public leaders, that also includes civil society, that also includes municipalities, that also includes from the churches, you know, to all kinds of groups that take responsibility for refugees are willing to share their apartments, are helping them, assisting them.

But, again, it's clear that it's not guaranteed that this will stay forever, and it's always a question mark what will happen in the future if it continues over the next years.

So, to conclude, I would say that I think that the U.S. and Europe, and the U.S. and Germany, are challenging similar questions, how we can manage diversity inside our societies, in the Western societies, and of course the U.S. is much more known for a long-time country that has that vision, and is built upon that, and that is what distinguishes us to authoritarian regimes that are built on ethno nationalism.

So I think we should value that, and we should appreciate that, and discuss together what that means for the future. All those liberal values are threatened by right-wing movements, by nationalist movements. I don’t want to compare things that are not comparable, but when I see, you know, what happens in South Carolina, and when I see attacks towards homes of asylum seekers on our site, I think that we have discussions where we should work together and collaborate.

This is a threat towards liberal democracy, towards open societies, and I think it's a real challenge for our societies, but at the same time an opportunity to a discussion on your side of the Atlantic Ocean about immigration reform, and the discussion on our side of the Atlantic Ocean about belonging.

When you do belong to a society? What is required to belong to the
society? Which role do jobs play? Which role plays the language? Which role plays citizenship? What has the state as an obligation, what has the civil society as an obligation, and what do those have an obligation for whatever reason, came to our countries? Thank you. (Applause)

MR. KIRİŞÇI: Cem, I'm very grateful that you have actually proven to the audience why I always greatly appreciated to associate myself with you, when it comes to what the European Union is about, and how you have really worked hard in the kitchen, to try to defend those values. I wish at Brookings, moderators were allowed to say more than what is permitted.

The issues you have raised are fascinating issues, and also fascinated with a distance that Germany has covered. You made reference to this concept of ethno-nationalism, and Germany for many, many years was known, and given as the ultimate example of ethno-nationalism. But today, as you rightly pointed out is recognized as a state, as a society, that tries its best to address that diversity you made references to.

I'll stop here, and I know Susan has much more to reflect upon than I would. So, Susan, the floor is yours.

MS. MARTIN: Thank you, Kemal. Let me thank Brookings for bringing us together, and Cem for a fantastic speech. What I want to do is pick up on one element of what you were talking about, and that I think underlies most of your recommendations, and that's the need for greater solidarity, and burden sharing in addressing the state -- what it's often referred to as the crisis in Europe.

But, also, what I think is becoming a crisis throughout the world, and in terms of the willingness of states to respond in a generous manner to people who were fleeing their homes because of conflict persecution, a combination of factors that require that they find protection. And it is amazing to see how German has shifted in terms of its
concept of itself, and concept of the role that it can play with regard to other countries, in trying to take leadership in this area.

I want to start with a little bit of an historical perspective on this, because if you think about the regime that has developed over the years for the protection of refugees, to identify who are refugees amongst a mass of people who may have reason to leave their homes, and who should be protected by the international system. Solidarity and burden-sharing underlie that entire regime.

In fact, the Refugee Convention, when it was adopted in 1951, they said very explicitly, that countries would experience burdens, when required to assist and protect refugees, and at that point they were thinking of the displaced person in Europe after World War II. New people coming out as a result of the Cold War, and that the only way to be able to protect the refugees was if there was international cooperation in addressing the issues.

Part of the reason for the emphasis on solidarity and burden sharing was, frankly, because of the failures of the 1930s, when the international community refused to admit refugees fleeing Nazi persecution. And the concept of solidarity was completely lacking, and it's interesting, if you look to day, many of the problems are revolving around the people, and that has historically been the case where boat people tend to get much more visibility, much more attention.

In the 1930s the boat that really illustrated the problems in terms of this lack of burden sharing, was St. Louis, it's the ship that left Hamburg, mostly with Jewish refugees from Germany who thought that they had visas to get into Cuba, with the change of government, a whole bunch of bureaucratic and political problems in Cuba. And by the time they got to Havana the visas had been withdrawn.

And a call went out to every country in the world, saying, please accept
the refugees, and including personal appeals to the President of the United States at the
time, Secretary of State. And the U.S. said no, stocked up the boats so they could make
the trip back to Europe. Fortunately, Britain, France and Holland, initially said that they
would take the refugees, divided them up.

Those who were fortunate enough to go to the U.K., for the most
survived the war. Those of course who were in France and Holland just fell back in once
the occupation occurred and most of them ended up dying in concentration camps.

So, that was a very, very vivid symbol of what happens when
cooperation breaks down. Even more so was the Evian Conference, which was
supposed to solve the problem of refugees in Europe. And it turned out that no country
pledged to admit refugees. And reportedly, Hitler, having heard that, the Evian
Conference broke down, announced to his -- the leadership of the Nazi Party, that the
next step is to go on to the Final Solution, and we know what occurred there. So, burden
sharing is fundamental to saving lives, and when you are -- you talk about the first
priority, saving lives, burden sharing, is at the heart of that experience.

During the Cold War we had more successes, although, also some
failures. When the Hungarian Revolution was suppressed by the Soviet Union, and
refugees came out of Hungary, there was a worldwide effort to provide protection.

It's ironic that the Hungarians today don't remember that past, and that
they were the beneficiaries of an international consensus with regard to solidarity.
Probably the largest numbers were Southeast Asians after the Fall of Saigon, but then
particularly in 1979, when there were mass movements, the boat people out of Vietnam,
people crossing the land borders from Cambodia and advance into Thailand, and the
U.S. called, after having failed in its call, in Atheon, called an international conference,
and there was leadership from many countries and hundreds of thousands, if not a million
-- more than Southeast Asians were resettled.

And burden sharing has always involved two elements, and Cerreferred to both of them. One is financial burden sharing, and I believe that the last time that I looked at the appeals for funds for Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, et cetera, maybe a quarter of the funds had actually been pledged, and those that were pledged were not coming out. So, faced with a type of numbers that they’ve seen in that region, it's not surprising that the doors are closing. And to keep those doors open, and to ensure protection in the region, Europe, America, Australia, Japan, all of the wealthy countries, need to really do much more in terms of righting the financial support for protection and assistance.

But the other form is resettlement, and relocation of people. We saw great successes in Southeast Asians, and Hungary, as I mentioned, Kosovo for temporary protection, but admission until the situation changed there. And so I really want to support your list of things that need to be done, and really reinforce the fact that without greater solidarity we won't find solutions to these problems.

And that means that we need to be at the table, and certainly Europe needs to be at the table, and figure out ways that, not just share the burden, but share the opportunities that come from admitting refugees, because it's not all burdens, we all have a responsibility, but there are many, many benefits, not just to those refugees whose lives are saved, but to all of the rest of us. So, thank you. (Applause)

MR. KIRİŞCI: Thanks, Susan. Actually, if I may, I'd like to add another dimension to burden sharing. With burden sharing, comes the possibility of also to silence anti-Western rhetoric in the countries that are struggling with a large number of refugees in the Middle East, but secondly, it also strengthens the hands of those in these countries that fight for the protection of the refugees. You know, they feel that there is
somebody behind them that will give them a helping hand and with Beth Ferris we saw it in the field last week.

MS. MARTIN: Yeah, if I could say on that. When I was in the government I remember visiting Kenya at the time, and the Kenyans had admitted a very, very large number of Somali refugees, but were at the time of my visit considering, in fact, pushing them back. And I was there as part of a government delegation, and we were trying to make the argument that they should keep their borders open and allow people to stay in the refugee camps.

And I was immediately asked by the Kenyan Government officials, saying, look; what's happening with U.S. policy that you are interdicting Haitians? You know, why don't you practice what you preach before you go about and tell us to do a better job.

MR. KIRIŞÇI: Thanks, Susan. Kathleen? There is another dimension to this crisis, and that's the sending countries, and the way in which the lack of development is one push factor out there, and I suspect this is the angle that you may be addressing.

MS. NEWLAND: Well, it's one of them, although I think it's a great, sort of, dilemma in thinking about long-term solutions to this problem, because one of the things we know for sure is that development is not a cure for migration, and yet that often seems to be the hope. That if you can just develop the African Continent as much Schuman hoped that this will solve the problem, but of course migration is a very dynamic phenomenon, and it's full of bumps along the road, and unintended consequences.

But what I really wanted to pick up on some of Cem's comments about the EU's disarray in the face of this crisis in the Mediterranean. And I think there are -- it has been a story thus far of crisis-driven responses, we saw very little action on the part
of Europe until October 2013, when nearly 400 people died in a shipwreck within sight of the coast of Lampedusa.

And that generated a sort of (inaudible) in Europe that something must be done. The creation of the Italian search and rescue operation, the Mare Nostrum which Cem mentioned, and a great deal of, sort of, soul searching on the part of Europe, and then, very little. The Italians eventually gave up on Mare Nostrum having failed to persuade other European countries to assist in funding and staffing it.

And until another crisis, on April 19th, in the Mediterranean, the tragic shipwreck that Cem mentioned, where, something on the order of 800 people were thought to have died in that single incident. We will probably never know the real toll, because most of the bodies were not recovered, only 29 survivors from that incident.

And yet in the -- so that has galvanized another series of high-level conferences within the EU, both of the Home Affairs Council and the Council of Heads of Government, and we have at last seen an end to the expressed, or at least the dampening down of the expressed ambivalence about search and rescue, as a pull factor, there is no evidence to support the pull factor, the upsurge in the Mediterranean had started before Mare Nostrum, and the upsurge has continued up to end of Mare Nostrum.

So we've seen a correlation there, and I think the moral outrage, on the part of European populations, and with the outspokenness of figures like the Pope, and other leading figures, the German President, have sort of generated a response. So now, at least we see a much more robust search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean with seven or eight countries lending maritime assets, ships and helicopters, and planes.

But the disarray on a longer-term solution remains very much in
evidence. Of the numbers of are very compelling, about 280,000 crossed the Mediterranean last year. So as of June 10th of this year, it was already 105,000, and it's probably by now, 110 or 115 we've seen weekend surges of 4, 5, 6,000 people in the space of a couple of days.

Over 5,000 have died, that we are pretty sure about, in the last 18 months. And they are probably man deaths that were unrecorded. So, that's part of the reason that maritime migration gets so much attention, and I think one of the characteristics of this crisis, is in part because so much of the flow is the maritime flow. It takes place in an arena that's not covered by any single country's law.

And there's also the fact that building barriers in the sea is an exceptionally difficult undertaking. Sea barriers were never fixed, unlike land barriers, although the land barriers may not work very well, you can't fix a sea barrier without great expense, and commitment over a long period of time.

Maritime migration, of course, is also exceptionally dangerous and visible, and heartrending. And added to that, is the fact that the majority of people who are coming across the Mediterranean, are people who would be regarded as prima facie refugees, in any other context. They are coming -- the largest group are coming from Syria, the next largest from Eretria, and then you have Somalia, and people from -- the Afghanistan, still, quite a high proportion, about 12 or 13 percent from Afghanistan.

And yet, the responses are uncoordinated, short term. There's a sort of blind man and the elephant quality about them, both among European countries, and within European countries, where the way authorities are defining the problem depends very much on where they sit, and what their experience is of the onward movements. So, some people see it as a law enforcement issue, others as a humanitarian issue, others, as a foreign policy issue in the European neighborhood.
And it's very difficult to get these different actors talking to each other, to say nothing of the Hungarians and the Swedes, and Germany is sort of at opposite ends of the spectrum of response. Apart from the blind man and the elephant, the other metaphor that I find sort of compelling here, is sort of squeezing the balloon because of one thing that we have learned, is that in this arena you can't do just one thing. That it's replete with unintended consequences.

So the thing the Europeans have found most easy to agree on, is enforcement, deterrence, attacking the smugglers, and it's -- they don't really seem to have followed on to the next step. Of, okay, what would be the result if you really did stop the smugglers? And the first result would be somewhere between even 500,000, half-a-million people bottled up in Libya and in countries in transit where the humanitarian consequences would beyond imagining given the behavior that we know about from the smuggling syndicates that are controlling this traffic.

So, to cut it short, I think what is urgently required from Europeans is a long-term, multi-faceted response; and then understanding that you can't do just one thing. Susan mentioned the international response after the Vietnam War, when this massive maritime migration was finally brought to a halt, but it took a long time. It took 20 years. It took serious commitment and attention from policymakers.

It took bringing in all the actors, all the legitimate actors, not the pirates, although there was an anti-piracy initiative, was an important part of it, but also bringing in agreements with commercial shippers so they wouldn't just turn their backs on people in distress at sea. And bringing in the country of origin, even though we didn't like them, the countries of origin, even though we didn't like their governments, but arranging for an orderly departure program from Vietnam, so that people would not have to take to the boats, and of course the massive resettlement operation that Susan mentioned.
That's the kind of effort that we need to see to face the Mediterranean crisis, recognizing that it's a long-term phenomenon with complex causes, and the solutions are going to be -- have to be equally complex.

And just as a final statement, this is not just a European problem, this is a global problem, and it is something where the United States, and the countries of origin, the countries of transit really have to be working together to come up with approaches that can be constructive and save lives, and reconstruct lives. Thank you.

MR. KIRİŞCI: Thanks, Kathleen. (Applause) I really appreciated the way you both brought the historical context, but then as I listen to you, and especially the case from the 1970s, and the boat people, one thing struck me that in some ways, unfortunately, brings us to face and even more -- gray pessimistic picture. At least the states with which the international communities have to cooperate with to ensure orderly departures were states. Whereas today, many of the refugees and migrants are fleeing geographies where states have collapsed --

MS. NEWLAND: A very important point.

MR. KIRISCI: -- and that brings, and that brings an added challenge to what we are facing. And now, Cem, it's your duty to find solutions to how we address these challenges.

MR. ÖZDEMIR: We agreed that I'd make some comments to the comments, and then they make some comments to my comments, and then we go back. Well, first of all with your -- because that really strike me when you said, that Germany was in many ways as an ethno-nationalist country.

I think the good news is that, when it started with the New Naturalization Law on January 1st in Germany, that this whole process continued and that we have a situation, when I look back to myself, I was first elected 1994, and at that time when I was
first selected to German Bundestag, I was the first one coming from a Turkish working-class family being in the German Bundestag, and I realized some of the people looking at me, not exactly like you guys looking at me today, but more like, you know, does he have his flying carpet? Does he have, maybe, a water pipe, a Sheik, you know, with something illegal to smoke, and maybe some knives to circumcise, you know, the men, and headscarves for the women in the parliament?

And today we have Members of Parliament of all kinds of origin in all groups in the parliaments. I think that in itself shows the normalization process of Germany, and that's the case for a number of member states.

Coming back to Susan, you underlined burden-sharing, solidarity. We have now roughly, 100,000 refugees from Syria and Germany, and what I sense is, we haven't talked about that. There is now a notion, and it seems like this is the new consensus, in order to get such majorities of supports. That is, we have good and bad refugees. That is now the current debate.

So the ones coming from Syria are good refugees because everybody understands immediately the reason why they are here. Because just look at the news, and then, you know, you don't have to discuss anything, whereas refugees coming from the West Balkans are bad refugees. So that is the danger that we have to address. I mean, having said that, it's also clear, you know, I mean a country that wants to become a member state of the European Union has to, you know, fulfill some necessary criteria, and should be able to make sure that all children go to school, and you know, that people get jobs, and that they fight corruption and fight discrimination of Romans.

That should be obvious, but I don't see the same efforts in the fight of root causes, as I see the efforts of talking about these people, why they are here. So, you see, that's a danger and, you know, it would very easy to immediately join that and
say, you know, we all agree, that we have good refugees, and bad refugees, so I just wanted to touch that briefly.

Then regarding the situation of the neighboring countries of Syria, there is also difference about the will of cooperation. The case of Jordan, they are concerned with the pull factors, so they are not that much interested as, for instance, Lebanon to take refugees out of the country, whereas in the case of Lebanon, it's very obvious that they immediately need help, and with the most vulnerable ones, we should start with them, and take them out, and there, I think, even my country, Germany, could do more and has to do more, and go beyond that.

But I also want to come back to the fight against root causes. Another country which has so many refugees is Turkey. I mentioned that. But with Turkey we should not only talk about how we can help them with the refugees, we should also talk about that, how we can prevent the reasons why people leave their country, and then talk about ISIS, and talk about al-Nusra.

Talk about, you know, all these news about weapons distribution to terrorists, you know. I mean, I'm not practicing that as a person coming from a Muslim family, I would say, if this is not an insult to Islam, what is it then, you know, what these guys are doing? They are al-Nusra and ISIS, and if, you know, they Turkish President is a believer, it's his first obligation to, you know, fight against these people and not help them -- help him.

You know, the idea of, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, leads us to nowhere, that never led to good results, so I think we also have to talk with our NATO partner, and with our close friend Turkey, at least join us in the fight against them, and stand on the right side, you cannot be on both sides at the same time, sometimes you have to make a decision, on which side you are.
And one point that you mentioned with Kenya, while you were saying that I have to think about something more recent with Myanmar and the Rohingya. Did anybody hear something loud from a European politician criticizing that? Well, there is a reason for that. Exactly the problem you faced in Kenya because, imagine we criticize them.

What will be their response? They will say, first solve your problem in the Mediterranean, then give us good advice. So, you know, it immediately backfires if you are not, you know, good with your own problems, when you want to talk about other problems.

And to Kathleen's remarks, in the beginning, I cannot agree more with what you said, that there is not one single reason that -- should be easy. Politicians are in danger sometimes of that, to promise easy solutions, you know, we have the key, and if you that, then everything will be like in paradise. We are talking about a very long-term thing.

But, I mean, in a situation where, obviously, the U.S. is more occupied with its domestic problems, and will -- I don't know who is going to be the next President of this country, but it looks like whoever it will be, the U.S. will not go back to the old days, that, you know, all problems, in a way, you know, need a U.S. solution. So, it's clear that they will focus more on such cases which have a security relevance to the U.S.

Africa and Eastern Europe have a huge impact on the future of my children in Germany. So, independent for whether it takes long or very long we have to develop a joint strategy. And just take Libya, I mean, there was this debate about whether it was right or wrong in Security Council, Germany abstention, but forget about that.

We all have a problem if we win a war and lose the peace afterwards.
So where is the knowledge? What happened to the knowledge that the U.S. used to have and, you know, after Second World War in Germany? What happened to this knowledge that, you know, it's not enough to fight a dictator that you need to think for the day after what happens with stability, with security, with distribution of goods?

So, this is certainly something that needs to put on the table if we want to fight some of the root causes, because I could not agree more, as what you just said with, you know, that the fight against smugglers or lose the problem. That won't solve the problem, obviously, for reasons, you've just given so. And in the case of Eritrea, I mean, if you -- to me, you know, I ask myself, why do I get up in the morning and work if I don't have any response to what's happening in Eritrea?

So, it makes me question my job. It makes me question whether I have the right job. If I just read it, and then I end up with, well, there is nothing I can do, just accept refugees and the help them once they are here. I mean, there must be a way that we can stop this from happening, because this is not about, you know, this or that orientation, it's a corrupt regime that is just there to make its people suffer.

The only reason to exist for the government in Eritrea is to make its people, life hell. And if I understood correctly, the world has come to a point where it said, after Rwanda, after Bosnia, that there are some very rare cases where we need joint solutions for such cases, and I think if Eritrea belongs to that category we should discuss that. Of course having said that, that also involves a discussion about, you know, good governance in Africa.

So my party is always, you know, the ones being the world masters of giving more money, but that's only one part of the solution. We also have to talk about the countries, what they do with that money. Where does it end up, and what is the responsibility of the governments?
I think, to sum up, that, to my opinion, would be one of the most important projects of the European Union, and my government should support that. You know, that Europe develops a strategy, how we deal with Africa, how we help and, you know, one of the things I learned in U.S., that you always have to say, as a last sentence, something more optimistic, that's not very German.

So, let's give some optimistic impact. You know, if you look at the debate about climate change, it's obvious, you know, that they have a huge opportunity, particularly in Northern African States, with using affordable tank. Not only for their own country, but also the midterm for us, that is certainly something to develop a project, you know, that can help young people have jobs, be less dependent from Saudi Arabia and others, and be more stable. And I really think that is very good invested money.

MR. KIRIŞÇI: Thanks, Cem. I think we appreciate your effort to put an optimistic twist on an otherwise difficult, very difficult topic. I'm sure there are a number of questions from the floor, and I look forward to them. The way I think we should proceed, let me take three quick questions, responses, and hopefully we'll have time for another round. Yes, sir? And then at the far end, and we'll come to the front, and I will have another round.

QUESTIONER: Yes. I'm Anthony Oddie, formerly with The World Bank. We've had a good discussion on what we might call prescription; things that the speakers would like to see the EU do. Is anyone willing to take a shot at prediction? What we think might actually happen; and perhaps that's best dealt with in terms of alternative scenarios, different courses that things might -- ways that things might play out?

MR. KIRİŞÇI: Very good. Thanks. At the far end?

QUESTIONER: Elena Geddes, (inaudible) TV. This is a question for Mr. Cem. Have you discussed the German Bundestag, or European Union about the
refugees in the candidate countries, like Macedonia and Serbia? We have hundreds of
refugees from Syria and Iraq since the last year.

MR. KIRIŞÇI: We'll take one from the front.

QUESTIONER: Hi. Steven Rymer, Middle East Institute. I have a
question that -- I'm a little bit disappointed actually, that so far in the Panel we haven't
reached this distinction between refugees and economic migrants. And I'm wondering if
perhaps the reason it hasn't come up is because we feel like that distinction is maybe not
useful. So, I suppose my question is, is this distinction useful? And if it is useful, how will
making the distinction play out in future long-term structural solutions to this problem?

MR. KIRİŞÇİ: Thank you. Cem, I think I'll turn to you, and then we'll
follow with Susan and Kathleen. Especially the last question, I think is on your line.

MR. ÖZDEMİR: Well, thanks for the questions.

MR. KIRIŞÇİ: Predictions.

MR. ÖZDEMİR: The prediction is always dangerous. I would say that --
let me talk about, since I mentioned Schuman, about Germany and France, maybe that's
a good example. Germany should see more with French eyes, you know, how important
Africa is when it comes to the mission on Mali, I think it's important that we strongly
support our French friends, you know, to help to guarantee stability.

And the French should see more through German eyes, vis-à-vis the
Eastern Europe. How important that is. Probably we'll get a little bit difficult after what I
saw with, you know, remarks of French President vis-à-vis Merkel, with illegal spying. I
hope we can ignore those remarks.

But I believe that this is very crucial, you know, that all Member States of
the European Union, independent from where their positions on -- vis-à-vis geography,
understand that Africa and Eastern Europe matters for us, and that we have to develop
joint strategies.

By the way, for Eastern Europe that also involves the perspective of membership, we cannot take this out of the table, because this is one of the most powerful tools to transform societies into more democratic, free-market societies. We do not have that tool with Africa, even Northern African countries, but there we have other tools, case by case we should develop those. With the figures, if I understood correctly the second question. I already mentioned 100 -- Was that a question?

MR. KIRİŞCI: The candidate, you know, what about refugees, asylum seekers in candidate countries, candidate countries to the European Union, such as --

MR. ÖZDEMIR: Ah.

MR. KIRİŞCI: Such as Macedonia and Serbia. Well, she mentioned Turkey too.

MR. ÖZDEMIR: Well, mainly they are transit countries. Mainly they are transit countries on the way to being Member States of European Union, and inside the European Union we also have some transit countries. Obviously Greece is a transit country; most of the people don’t want to stay there.

So, that makes it also complicated, and it's clear that we have collaborate on the process of membership, the problem right now is that collaboration during the membership process is not targeting, you know, a humanitarian way of dealing with asylum seekers, by making sure that they don't come to us. That's not exactly what I mean with collaboration.

And the third question. You are perfectly right, refugees on one side, and migrants or economic migrants on the other side. But, you know, if you look at the education level of those coming to us as refugees, what you realize is, you know, that they are the poorest ones, the lowest-educated ones from those counties. By the way,
which is also really tough because, I mean, imagine these people could live in their countries under good living standards, how this region could look like.

You know, I mean, look at Syria, look at Iraq how these countries could look if they would have good governance and everything, really breaks ones heart. But for us, of course, and there we have a strong voice from the business community which is new. Saying, you know, make these people work immediately; make these people have excess to learn German, because they were completely excluded until now. And only recently we opened the labor market for them, and make it easier.

I think we have to go even further than that. Even those people who won't stay in Germany, it doesn't harm anybody to learn German. It doesn't harm anybody -- I see that some people obviously suffered by learning German -- but it also doesn't harm anybody to get job training in Germany. Maybe we can agree there.

And, you know, even if you have to go back, unfortunately, it's a good thing, it's a smart investment and, you know, having people spending their days without working, without learning anything, that's so stupid, you know, that's something we should change, and if it's clear that they stay, of course we shorten the process of -- decision process for asylum seekers, so that we can deal with these people as soon as possible.

And regarding economic migrants, I believe that Germany needs legislation on immigration, like Canada and Australia, and other countries have it. In my opinion, we should look at all those countries, and then find the model that fits to the German situation. There is nothing that fully fits to our situation, but there is a lot to learn from other countries, how they deal with economic migrants.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks, Cem. Susan?

MS. MARTIN: Let address, firstly, the third question. I've stopped
making predictions a long time ago, so I won't even go there. And I think Cem responded to the second. I think my remarks were primarily focused on the refugee asylum system because of the countries of origin from which most of those who were trying to get into Europe across the Mediterranean.

That doesn't mean that every single person who is coming in is a refugee, but there needs to be a process of determining who is. And many may not meet the official definition of a refugee in the, either European Union or National Legislation, or the Refugee Convention, but many of them are nevertheless, would be facing life-threatening situations, if they were to returned home, because of the conflicts of repression, et cetera, going on in those countries.

That also say, though, that there is a lot of mixed migration, and that we see two forms of mixed migration, one that the same boat may have bona fide refugees as well as economic migrants attempting through the same transit to get into countries. But more often what we are seeing is that people have mixed motives. That they are leaving -- they can't go home, or they have to leave their homes because of life-threatening situations, but they still have some agency in determining where they want to go.

And as conditions in neighboring countries have deteriorated, as the pressures go -- I mean, one of the things, particularly with Syria that we are -- I will predict on this one is that the U.N. High Commissioner for refugees has he definition of a protracted refugee situation, and it's five years or longer. We are getting close to that for the Syrians, it's very like will be a very protracted situation, and the more that people are living in places where they don't have work authorization, their children have a great deal of difficulty accessing the schools.

And in which the impact on the host community are huge. You know, in
looking in -- I was in Lebanon a couple of months ago, and hearing about the school systems there, Jordan as well, in which you have double --

MS. NEWLAND: And triple.

MS. MARTIN: -- and triple classes, you know, stuck on through the calendar, it means Lebanese and Jordanian kids are getting less education than they had been before, and the refugee kids are getting less education than they would have if there hadn’t been a conflict. You know, we can't just think about refugees and economic migrants as being in totally separate boxes; that there will be a lot of movements just because the opportunities for people close to home -- at home and close to home are just drawing up.

MR. KIRİŞCI: Thanks, Susan. I'd just like to interject a point. I think compared to the '70s, you know, you refer to this international conference to resettle the boat people. Having just been in Turkey, we really with that how the educational issue is so central. And what is good is that both civil society and, Cem, it might come as a surprise, officials recognize too.

And having just heard what you said, I wonder if it might not be a good idea to think of an international conference that addresses how are we going to help these host countries to address the education issue, because at the end of the day it impacts the world at large, not just the refugees and the host societies. Yeah. Kathleen, your turn.

MS. NEWLAND: Yeah. I very strongly agree with that, although I would not confine that international conference just to education, because I think, you know, last year, saw the lowest level of return of refugees to their home countries in the last 30 years, 31 years I believe. The situation has really fundamentally changed, and I think what we have to accept is that today's refugees are not going home.
A very small proportion of them are going home, and yet, the international system for responding to refugee flows is still based on a premise --

MR. KIRIŞCI: That you work on it.

MS. NEWLAND: -- that you give people temporary assistance and put them in a tent until they can go home. Well, they are not going home, so we really need a new strategy, and that has to be a livelihood strategy, of which education is a central part, but working with the countries of transit -- the countries of first asylum, as well as preferred countries of destination to get through this dreadful waste of human resources.

The sort of warehousing the people is -- which is also, you know, a breeding ground for radicalization, and so on, is the number one priority, as far as I'm concerned. And I think, you know, that certainly applies to refugees, but also to a lot of the people who are maybe not falling under the conventional definition of a refugee but are, as Susan mentioned, in such desperate circumstances, that they are going to do anything in order not to come home, or be sent home.

I'll make a prediction, which is that what we are going to see over the next few years is an awful lot of muddling through.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Mm-hmm. Very good.

MS. NEWLAND: And it's going to be -- it's not going to be pretty. There will be high points, I think, you know, we will see more resettlement programs, and I think there's a lot to learn, although our resettlement program in the U.S. is very far from perfect, I think there's a lot to learn from it, because it's big, it works with civil society to help integrate people, and it gets people into work as the first priority. Into work, and gets kids into school.

So, I think -- I think that's an international discussion that should be taking place. I think we are going to see some countries going for the Australian solution.
You know, just hard, merciless deterrence, blocking people in dreadful circumstances, so
that others will learn from their example. And, you know, we've seen some attraction.

But on the brighter side, I think we've seen in the last few weeks, some
African leaders stepping up, the new Head of the African Development Bank, Jacob
Zuma, not normally one of my favorite people, but they both spoken out and said, what
are African leaders doing about this exodus of desperate people from their countries?

And never mind the Eretrias, but let's look at the Gambias and the
Senegals, and though -- you know, well Nigeria is a mixed case, but that's something to
build on, I think, as African leaders. So, it's going to be a lot of different pieces, there are
going to be bright spots and some really, really, dark spots.

And eventually, I suspect that this will die down, at least because the
demographics will alter, and it's a bit like -- and this may be too controversial to say -- but
I'll say it anyway that, you know, the crime wave in the 1970s, '80s in the U.S. was -- very
closely followed the peak of a demographic youth bulge, and I think, you know, that until
there is some approach to youth unemployment in Africa, particularly of young men, that
the pressures for exit are going to be tremendous.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Okay. Thanks, Kathleen. I got kind of bit worried when
you say you didn't want to make this long-run prediction, that you were going to say, we
will all be dead by then. Yes, I meant to take questions up from this side, but let me have
yours, and then any -- Yes, ma'am? Maybe one from the far -- Yes?

MS. RISER: Thank you very much. My name is Mindy Riser, on several
NGOs, Boards, and other things. I'd like someone to talk about some success stories
from the refugee camps that have housed people for generations. We all have heard the
sorrowful stories, the tensions, the crime, but sure there are some good things that have
been learned, but might be relevant to what we face now?
MR. KIRİŞÇI: Thank you. Yes?

MS. FAGAN: Patricia Fagan, Georgetown University. I would like -- This has been an excellent Panel, I've rarely nodded my head so many times at so many comments. Thank you, all. But I want to come to one issue. We've talked about international policies, we've talked about national policies, we've talked about development, collaboration.

Cem, in his early remarks mentioned, that Germany was normalizing in a rather positive way in terms of accepting diversity, and also said, well, I recognize that the problems of Stuttgart are great but they are not as great as anyone had described. How much greater the problems are -- than in other country.

MR. KIRİŞÇI: Other areas, yeah.

MS. FAGAN: But I would like to -- I would like some comments about the local politics as local authorities, local institutions, as a force in this dilemma that we all face. Historically, we could look back in the U.S. on the local acceptance of the sanctuary movement in the U.S. that let Central Americans in, you know, a more or less blinking and letting them in; or, in Quebec, in Canada, modifying immigration laws in Canada, so that Haitians, after the earthquake, could come in and be accepted. Can you say something about local politics, not Europe, but at least Germany, local political positions? Thank you.

MR. KIRİŞÇI: Thanks. And in the back, there, please?

MR. FULLERTON: Hello? Danny Fullerton, Public International Law & Policy Group. I was wondering what Europe can do to kind of overcome its shortsightedness, with its --addressing the root causes of these problems that we've hit on, tangentially, here today, because if you look at, for instance the cartoon process, of funneling money for a joint program with Africa, it doesn't place conditions on the money
or engagement to give every African leaders that are perpetrating the horrific humanitarian conditions they are creating a migrant problem.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thanks. Cem, you are our guest, so you get two minutes, and then Susan and Kathleen, one-and-a-half minute each.

MR. ÖZDEMIR: Maybe we share the questions so we are quicker than -

Regarding Stuttgart, I mention that because it's my constituency so I want -- because whenever you mention cities' it's dangers, so I select my own constituency.

First of all, what I think is very crucial is that the city itself, the leadership is in charge of this policy, and explain to its citizens what's going on. Let me give you an example. On the Swabia, out where I'm born and coming from, it really depends if you have a town hall meeting, and the Mayor is delivering a speech that refugees are going to come, his remarks are defining the climate in town.

When he says, unfortunately, these people are coming, you know, it's beyond my saying or my control, we all think the same that we don't want these guys, but now they are coming, I can -- I guess you can imagine that you won't get a very nice climate in that town. Whereas if the Mayor says, you know, you all have seen on TV the living conditions of these people that are going to come next week, 500 people are coming, we citizens will do everything to welcome them to help them right from the beginning, and then he announces the first two seconds what they are going to do, and we see a lot of those examples right now, which is very good.

Stuttgart is a very good case for that, Stuttgart opened a welcoming center, and this is really interesting maybe for other towns, what we decided in Stuttgart is not making a welcoming center, what you usually would do with the easy task for the economic migrants, you know, that every business person wants to see, we added refugees to the welcoming center.
We did not divide it, so everybody who comes to Stuttgart, whether it's a family reunification, economic migrants, whether it's refugees, is welcomed in its welcoming center where there is, you know, a one-stop office, where they get information about whatever they need.

Whether it's school, whether it's jobs, whether it's contact, whether it's, you know, religious needs, whatever it is. And then they are directed to other, you know, parts of the society. I think that's extremely important. We are a country that has a lot of experience with assimilation.

We do not have that much experience with integration, but that's what's the topic right, and the good news is, and that's why I'm on the long-term more optimistic, that because of change in demographics, our business community is pushing hard, all parties, to be more liberal.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you, Cem.

MS. MARTIN: You know, let me respond to your question with regard to refugee camps. For many years a lot of the focus within the refugee field was to improve camps. Make them a more livable shelter, the way food was distributed, you know, firewood issues, things of that sort, education for children, and there is a lot of -- there is some improvements, and we have seen just during my career, a lot of improvements in terms of camps. But I think more recently the consensus is growing that no matter how good you make a camp, it's still a camp.

MR. KIRIŞCI: A camp, yes.

MS. MARTIN: It's still a place which is detaining people, and really preventing them from living normal lives. And we have too many places where people have living in those situations for 30, 40, 50 or more years, on that. So, the U.N. High Commissioner for refugees released a policy this past year, which is alternatives to
camps, saying that rather than to default the -- let's build a camp when people come out, the default should be we build a camp, only if every other alternative is unavailable.

And in fact, now more than half of our refugees are living in urban areas. And we certainly see that throughout the Middle East, but we are seeing it in lots of other places now. That presents its own challenge because means the integration of refugees into local communities is much more of a challenge; they are not marginalized off here. You can't -- they are not out of sight out of mind, they are living in communities.

And I think because this is such a recent trend, we don't have a lot good examples to raise in terms of even helping countries that are newly getting this type of refugee flows. You know, the Lebanons, the Turkeys, Jordans. You know, how do you integrate refugees in that circumstance, where you have no idea when they are going home?

And I agree completely with Kathleen on that, that that's not the norm anymore. The most recent statistic on this issue is that the medium number of years people are displaced now is 17. So that means more than 50 percent of refugees have been displaced for more than 17 years, and that doesn't count the Palestinian refugees, so it's, with them it would obviously be even higher on that.

And so finding solutions for people who are in these protracted situations, whether it's cities or camps, I think is one of the biggest challenges, and one that we are not doing all that well, as of now.

MR. KIRİŞCI: Very good, Susan. We saw that with our own eyes last week, the dilemma between camps, five-star camps.

MS. NEWLAND: If you say camps, five-star prisons, yes.

MR. KIRİŞCI: Kathleen?

MS. NEWLAND: Okay. Well, I will try to address the question of what
Europe can do to address root causes. You know, it's not -- it's not easy. The first thing is abandon hope of quick solutions. And then, I think there's been a huge amount of cynicism and short-termism in the kind of partnership that European countries have formed with countries of origin and countries of transit. And that is a model that really has to go in favor of building genuine partnerships with these countries, and identifying common interests, and identifying reliable partners, and working with them.

So, on the one hand you have, you know, I think what is shaping up to be a positive experience with Morocco, which has recognized that it's not only a country of transit and origin any longer, but it's becoming a country of destination for migrants, and indeed that migrants can play a part and role in its economy. And has new legislation, and I think, you know, the Europeans were being supportive of that in many ways including, with some countries of opening their labor more to, at least, temporary migrants from Morocco.

So, forming a genuine multi-dimensional partnership sort of like that is one thing, and the opposite end of the spectrum, I know it's not a European example, but Australia's agreement with Cambodia, the height of cynicism, and the opposite of humanitarianism, which is, we will give you a $40-million aid package, and you will accept refugees from the offshore centers where we have trapped them.

Of course, there is no relation between these two things, but they are coincident and will pay all the cost of resettling refugees. That -- you know, that is really the opposite of addressing root causes, and I think what the Europeans need to do is really seek to build those genuine partnership with the countries of origin and transit, focused on livelihood strategies for migrants and refugees so they can contribute rather draining the public purse.

MR. KIRİŞCI: Well, please join me to thank Kathleen, Susan and Cem
as well. (Applause)

MS. NEWLAND: And thank you.

MR. KİRİŞÇİ: Well, I hope you can still enjoy the rest of the day, and this is a topic that will stay with us for a while to come. Thank you.

MS. NEWLAND: Thank you, Cem.

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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