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PANEL II - OLD PROBLEMS, NEW FUTURES? REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL:

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Closing Remarks:  

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KATHARINE MOON: Good morning, everyone. My name is Kathy Moon and I am the SK-Korea Foundation chair for Korea Studies in the Center for East Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, so I welcome you all. And this is a first ever event at Brookings, hopefully with many more to come in the years ahead.

I want to welcome you to Brookings. You are awfully lucky and privileged to be at the first ever conference on Korea policy and politics in Washington D.C. that features experts in their 20s. Would you all stand? They’re right here. Thanks. I met with them yesterday and I’m already a better person for it. I’ve learned a lot of new things, and also realized how inspiring they are. Their work, their vision, their passion, and also just a whole lot of fun to be with.

They’ve already been, apparently, discussing serious, heavy topics here this morning. You know, normally people get nervous before presentations, but no, this crew, they don’t waste time. They just go right to work and discuss heavy topics on the Koreas, so they are well-prepared.

I think I want to offer you some food for thought to introduce this conference. Washington, as you know, if you’re in this room, loves power. Access is power. Access involves gatekeeping and those of us in established positions serve as the gatekeepers, and I emphasize serve, the term serve, because power, access, gatekeeping require responsibility to manage important issues today and to prepare for the future. Not for our own interests, but for a greater good. Greater good regarding the Koreas being primarily peace, the lack of conflict, as well as well-being and prosperity for many.

So how do we prepare for the future if we want to be responsible gatekeepers? We have to develop and nurture people. Human resources are our most valuable assets in assessing and solving big problems, and we have on the Korean Peninsula many big problems, or challenges if you want to look at it on the bright side. We also have big challenges in Korea’s neighborhood. The two are not separable, and that is why the young and the brave, the title of our conference, are so urgently needed.

Korea observers spend a lot of time and energy thinking about the future of the alliance, particularly after reunification. If unification takes place in 10 or 20 or 30 years these, the people before you, are the people who will have to navigate the process. The young among us today will bear the responsibility and consequences for the alliance, for unification, for peacemaking for the rest of their lives. I hate to burden you with such humongous responsibility. The young and the brave. That’s why the brave part is important.

In 20 years, I was thinking, in 20 years I will be 71, and I plan to be enjoying margaritas, reading great novels, and maybe playing with grandchildren. I won’t drink margaritas while playing with grandchildren. The point is that I am relatively on the young side in Washington policymaking, and yet, in 20 years I will not be part of that, at least, I don’t plan on being part of that. And if I were or if my cohort were we would be advisors. We would not
be the main actors. It is the generation in the front of the room who will be the main actors 20 years from now.

Yet, policymakers and scholars today do not invite these young peoples’ views on the future they will create. Our omissions today could hurt us tomorrow. Nuclear weapons, human rights, democracy, prosperity, peace in East Asia huge challenges we live with today. But they will live with it for a much longer time. We gatekeepers must create room and invite, welcome young experts into our midst because it is their future at stake. So it is in this context that we offer the presentations and dialogue today.

I want to introduce the first panel or roundtable. We’re just going to have an intergenerational dialogue on topics of, hopefully, interest to everybody, and so I invite the speakers to come up and I will introduce them one by one. I also ask people in the audience to turn off their cell phones or to mute it. You don’t have to turn it off. You can tweet, our hashtag is up there, #nextgenkorea, so busily tweet away, do your social media thing. All the various platforms that I can’t even follow, but please do shut the ringer off. Thank you.

So we wanted to have a talk show style here, but given that Brookings set up policy is we can’t move tables in the middle of a conference we decided we’re just going to have everything here, so we’re going to awkwardly have to position ourselves to try to look at one another, so bear with us. We have here today a wonderful group of folks who represent a variety of institutions in town and also from Korea, and the variety of perspectives, and work experience, and educational experience.

We have Darcie Draudt. She works at the Council on Foreign Relations on Korea issues together with Scott Snyder, who many of you know or have read about or read of. We have Matthew McGrath whom I owe a huge bucket of thanks to because both Matt and Hyo Won, whom I will introduce next, were instrumental in coming up with a very long list of young folks working on Korea related issues. Not only in the United States and in South Korea, but all over the world, and I think that is one of the most exciting things that we have an international cohort of young people who are interested in the Koreas. And so that should enrich our learning experience and our analytical experience, and our actions in the future.

So Matt comes to us from SAIS, right across the street. He has been involved in so many different kinds of Korea related activities, East Asia related activities. All of these folks have lived in Korea. Some of them have traveled to North Korea. They’ve worked on NGO related issues, scholarly issues, policy related issues, an incredibly eclectic group of people, and I think that is one of the main differences I’ve noticed between my generation and older. We tend to have boxed ourselves in and try to find a niche to do Korea studies and Korea policy making during the 70s, 80s, 90s, 2000s. This generation actually feels entitled to do Korea related work.

They’re not asking to carve out space in the China sector or the Japan sector or saying, you know what? This is an interesting area. These are important countries, societies, and we freely study them in a very creative way, and we use all the kind of resources at our disposal to understand the Koreas and the politics in the region. I think you are much luckier than my generation and older every have been because you just have more to work with which
means you’ll have more to do.

So next we have Hyo Won Shin. Hyo Won flew in from Seoul, Korea, from Yonsei University. She has worked with Professor John Delury at Yonsei University and has finished her master’s program there. She will talk to use later about her experiences living in and growing up in Burma, Myanmar, and how that relates or doesn’t relate to what is going on and what might go on in North Korea.

And then we have, I got to get the full name, I call him Jin, Jin Keol Park. He is originally from Korea and now a U.S. citizen, and a student of law at Georgetown. Last night sitting next to him I learned so much in a ten minute conversation about North Korean defectors, refugees, young refugees who are doing incredibly interesting work for human rights and other good causes related to North Korea. And what was fascinating was listening to Jin go on about, how for four years you said, you have been thinking about what is the next step? Not just raising awareness, but what is the next step to action to actually help people in North Korea improve their human right situation.

So these people are young, but they have been at this, in terms of thinking and caring, for a very long time in a very intense, focused way. So with that introduction I’ll open up with a question, and this is how we’ll get to think about this intergenerational change. My generation, as we spoke last night at dinner, my generation and older are all steeped in cold was mentality and a cold war framework. That was the context in which we studied at college. We grew up as children, studied at college and grad school as well.

You are a post-cold war generation, and so I’d like to know, what is your world view, if any, for your generation or for yourself that helps your frame your thinking, your perspective on the Koreas, the region, and the relationship with the United States? So let’s just go with Darcy and we’ll have a nice exchange.

DARCIE DRAUDT: First of all, thank you so much for hosting this conference. It’s rare in D.C., so I think we all appreciate the opportunity.

DR. MOON: You’re welcome.

MS. DRAUDT: I was thinking about this question, whether we see the world bifurcated, which I think in generations past have seen coming out of the cold war, and I don’t think I’ve ever seen the world in that way. I grew up in the 90s, and I think we came of age in an era marked very much so by globalization, increased media flows, increased flow of people, the ability to access remote places around the world just from your computer desktop.

And so being able to meet other people makes us see markers like nationality as a little less relevant than the human element of populations around the world. So I think this certainly has influenced the way I see the way we draw borders, the way we draw lines around the world. And it certainly will be interesting as the next generation goes forward how much, those of us that are based in D.C., are able to push those ideas through in the policy realm as well.
MR. PARK: So one thing I want to say is there are differences among groups. I’m a first generation Korean because I immigrated when I went to high school, but we called it a 1.5 generation because I came here when I was young. I was old enough to find a job right away.

DR. MOON: You’re still young.

JIN KEOL PARK: I went to school here. Yeah, I feel I’m still young. I’m very young, but there are differences between second generation which were born here whose native language is English instead of Korean.

So I know what it feels like to be in Korea back in 1990s. So the cold war mentality that Darcy just explained she said she’s free from that kind of mentality that’s the cold war, nuclear war fears, etcetera. When I was young I still had that kind of stuff. In 1994 there was the first nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula. South Korean people were actually buying and rushing to convenience stores to buy stuff, water, food because they were actually afraid of war. It was really close.

I had that mentality. That fear of North Korea might invade South Korea is possible. It’s still possible. And South Korean young generation, my generation were raised in that situation. So that’s something the second generation Korean-Americans don’t understand because they’re really free from  -- they’re like Darcy. They’re really free from any fear of nuclear warfare because when they’re still young, like in elementary school, and even before, the cold war was over, the Soviet Union was dissolved. There’s no war, any possibility of that.

So when second generation Korean-Americans came to South Korea when they first found about North Korean human rights violations they were freaked out. They were just shocked. And they’re even more shocked to see young South Koreans not interested in the issues. And I understand that, but that’s not the right attitude, right direction because South Korean students they knew about North Korea. They have been living in this fear against North Korea.

So when the second generation Korean-Americans go to South Korea and tell them, guys, North Korea’s really bad. They’re like, we know North Korea’s bad. And they’re like, no, no, no. It’s not like that. It’s really bad. Oh, we know it’s bad. North Korea’s bad. But they’re thinking differently and there is still some kind of that cold war mentality remaining, and that still hovers around Korea, and in many cases that’s the significant or that’s the core issue in many parts of South Korean society. So I want to talk more about that, but I think I’ve over, so I want to pass it to other people here.

DR. MOON: Thank you so much. Not all young people are the same, so this conference is not about a monolithic view and I’m very happy to hear these diverse viewpoints. Hyo Won, you just came from Seoul, so maybe you can fill us in a little bit more.
HYO WON SHIN: For me, I grew up in Burma so I spent elementary, middle school, and high school there in an American school. So during my studies there the history I learned was Chinese history, American history, world history, but nothing about Korean history. So when I came back to Korea the hostility towards Japanese, hostility towards North Koreans, that was not there for me. And for a while I felt I was not nationalistic because that’s how Koreans are supposed to feel about a certain country, a certain event.

But at the time, even though I felt am I not Korean? Like, what am I? But as I grew up, as I graduated from college and I went to graduate school to really think about the issues I felt that maybe it’s okay to be different because I can look at some issues from a different perspective. Not everything that average Koreans would see the issue as, so maybe when I grow up and when I go into, you know, possibility of policymaking I can provide a different perspective and maybe get over those issues that are very emotional, and right now many people are not able to get over it because of the emotional, not propaganda, but the way we are supposed to feel about a certain thing. As Jin pointed out, his and my background, it’s really different. So I think this kind of, like, living abroad when I was little or living abroad when you have this, sort of, Korean education really shapes a person differently.

DR. MOON: Many of us know that we have, in South Korea, for the last decade and a half or so tens of thousands, not only of graduate students in the United States, Canada, Australia, Europe, China, Japan, and so on, but also children, right? Some of whom are sent alone abroad to be educated. And so there’s all sorts of questions about the relationship between their identity, personal identity, their national identity, their global identity. And I think you’re raising some of that. And then when you return home to South Korea and you mix with all the people who have been more homegrown, facing these issues in a very intimate way, there, obviously, will be differences. I think that’s one of the main differences even from my generation.

I got to go to Korea when I was in high school or college during summer vacations, and my father was my sole tour guide and my teacher. There were hardly any programs. And, of course, now language programs at Yonsei and so many other places. The GSIS Institutions, Graduate School of International Studies at almost every major and minor university in Korea that attracts international students. They learn in English, etcetera. It is a radically different world in terms of information access, global perspective, even if you are in South Korea, so it’s a very fascinating change. Matt, you have the last world on this question.

MATTHEW MCGRATH: Well, thank you Dr. Moon for inviting me here. I guess when I thought about my response to this question it was a little more academic. So for our generation, I was thinking about it, you know, in comparison to the cold war Korea was a very different place during that era. They were still developing their economy and their political system, but not Korea has really emerged as an international player in the arena of the states.

When we look at South Korea now it is the first country that has gone from being a recipient of aid to a donor. So I think for our generation looking forward, we need to think about what Korea’s role will be in the future as a global player. And then, in particular, if we
look at what Korea’s doing in Northeast Asia now you see that -- I feel that South Korea is sort of moving from a position of confidence where they’re operating as this middle power kingdom, which you hear talked about often, where they are balancing sort of a very strong military alliance with the United States, strong cultural relationship with the United States. But then at the same time they also feel confident that they can reach out and engage with China as well in economic relationships. So I feel for us in the future as -- and those of us that work on Korea issues that’s going to be a relationship and a dynamic that we will have to watch very closely.

DR. MOON: Thank you very much. Another thought I have been having is on the domestic politics within Asia. As we all know, South Korea was the darling of those around the world who believe in democratization as a positive, progressive measure. And, of course, South Korea’s democratization, the history of it, is a phenomenon. It’s something to be celebrated. But we also know that democracies around the world, and in East Asia in particular, have been slipping. I call it democratic slippage, regressing a bit.

So, for example, I shared with the speakers up on this panel Freedom House rankings of this year that look at -- Freedom House looks at and ranks how robust a democracy is or how far from democracy a country is. And, of course, North Korea is at the very bottom. And South Korea slipped in rank, one rank down, okay? I take that very seriously, and yet, this kind of change, this kind of ranking change has gone pretty much unspoken and unnoticed by many.

In a way I think we take democracy for granted, not only in South Korea, United States, so many other places, but in East Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand. These are all countries who have worked so hard for democratization and democracy building, and right now we are seeing serious signs of some slippage. So I am curious, what are your thoughts about the prospects for democracy, the transformations of democracy in the future in your life, and how might you also think about the prospects for democracy in North Korea or a Korean Peninsula in the decades to come? Let’s start out with Matt.

MR. MCGRATH: Sure. I guess when I was thinking about this question I was looking more broadly at Asia, and there has been a lot of democratic movements. If you look at Hong Kong they have the Umbrella Revolution, and then you have the Sunflower, the student movement in Taiwan as well. And then I was thinking in South Korea, perhaps there are -- South Korea has already achieved free elections and open elections, but many governance could -- what’s going to move forward in their issues such as the national security law.

Also, if we’re thinking about, you know, a future unified peninsula. If you want to have you’re going to increase the population of the entire country by 50%, essentially, adding those voters to essentially your voter base. How would you facilitate that process? That’s another major question I think that we have to be concerned about.

DR. MOON: Excellent points. Darcy?

MS. DRAUDT: Sure. Something that I think, for the South Korean case in particular, that they’re having to deal with right now, and this is something that you’ve written
about a lot, and I know you’re doing some long term research about it, is the demographic change that’s going on in South Korea. I think this has a lot of potential impact on its status as a democracy and its vision of itself as a democracy. How it’s including new types of people in its population. Not only foreign born residents who come for long term, but the children of marriage migrants, in particular, I think is something that they’re learning how to deal with.

There’s some policy changes, some cultural centers, they’re learning how to deal with this particular issues. I think it gets to a lot what Hyo Won was talking about earlier is about this balance between this traditional sense of national identity that’s really based on common ethnicity, a history that’s -- I don’t want to start to get too obtuse about it -(inaudible) with the nationalist in the early modern era, but this history of, like, a common identity that in the event of unification also presents other concerns. Whether recognition that someone can have similar blood, but think differently, and think about governments differently, and think about government participation differently is something that groundwork needs to be laid right now in order to facilitate that in that eventuality.

DR. MOON: Thank you. Jin, do you have some thoughts?

MR. PARK: Yes, sure. It’s somewhat related to the first question that you asked. I think the main reason that South Korean democracy has some issues, I don't know too much about other Asian countries. At least in South Korea their main reason that South Korean democracy is struggling is that they’re still under the cold war mentality. They’re still going through this cold war against North Korea. North Korea’s not just a communist country. It’s different from East Germany, Poland under communist, it’s much worse.

And it’s not even communist, it’s totalitarian country. And the reason that South Korea’s neighbor and the partner of reunification is totalitarian is why South Korea cannot be a fully democratic country. See, like what happened during the dissolution of Tongyeong dang in the progressive party. To give you a little bit of background on myself, I used to work at a North Korean human rights group that were former activists, former student activists in the 1980s, and they were hardcore communists, and they were pro-North Korean communists. Their colleagues with the former Tongyeong dang people, and they’re in the same underground KWP Korean workers’ party. They knew each other. They were closely working against South Korean military dictatorship at the time.

In the mid-1990s they converted. They changed their views, and those who remained committed to pro-North Korean type of ideology they remained underground. They became the core of the Tongyeong dang. That explains what’s going on in South Korea. It’s the existence of totalitarian country. Some young South Koreans don’t understand. They don’t have any experience of their former generation, we call it 4-8-6, now Professor Moon said now they are 5-8-6. The experience they had is so much different. Young South Koreans don’t understand how could you support North Korea. It’s unbelievable. South Korean government should be making something up because they can’t believe somebody can be a supporter of the North Korean regime.

But in the 1980s things were different. There was very limited information about
North Korea and a communist block was still very active, and it seemed like they were doing well in the 1980s. So to the point of the question, I think the fundamental solution will be the tradition of North Korea. If North Korea changes from totalitarianism to something more normal like Burma, hopefully China, then there will be a lot of South Korean problems ranging in politics to economics. Like Korea has a Korea discount because of the existence of North Korea and the possibility of war. These will be solved.

So I’m telling every South Korean friend of mine that North Korean human rights issues, North Korean dictatorship, North Korean nuclear is not North Korean’s problem. It’s your problem. It’s South Korea’s problem. It’s creating issues and problems in South Korea. So I believe that South Korean democracy has issues. South Korea consolidated government and South Korea at least are using North Korea as an excuse, but if North Korea’s gone, if North Korea changes, transitions to a better country then they cannot do it anymore. So I think the issue depends on North Korea.

DR. MOON: Wow. Have you gone to a panel in Washington where you get such candor and deep thinking? I rarely do, so thank you. Hyo Won, you have the last word on this.

MS. SHIN: Mine is just from living in Korea and looking at what kind of democratic country we live in. But right now I feel that they’re -- because Korea has rapidly developed its economy in such a short time that compared to the time of economic development the individuals in society have not been able to develop their civic awareness. This disparity causes a lot of problems.

For example, there is very little tolerance for difference. For example, as Darcy has pointed out that our society is very homogenous which means that foreigners very much feel isolated if they come to study in Korea. LGBT issues are very, very big, but nobody wants to really solve it because if they try to stand in their side they’re just marked as someone that’s being very leftist or, you know, they’re not being portrayed as a normal citizen in Korea.

I feel that there’s also this sort of materialism that has been poisoning our society which blocks them from moving towards a more democratic country. For example, like, even as a child parents don’t encourage them to take on a very ethical path that may be more like do what you need to do in order to get your grades, in order to go to a university, in order to pursue something that brings you a lot of economic benefits in the future. This leads to adults who think that it’s okay to use bribes and use corruption as to pursue individual wants and desires. That I see has been going on in the country a lot. I think that is one of the reasons why maybe Korea dropped in its rankings for its democratic levels.

MS. DRAUDT: I wonder how much you think that is an issue of, kind of, at the social-family level or how much you think that is more at the structural-economic level? Because, I mean, I remember living in Korea problems with -- like, having to buy an apartment is really expensive, competition for jobs is really, really high. So how much do you think it’s more a structural issue? How much do you think it’s a reaction to the structure in South Korea?

MS. SHIN: Competition is fierce and in order to buy a house I heard that a
person needs to work for, what, 30, 40, maybe even their lifetime to just buy a house.

MS. DRAUDT: Do you think, like, the solution’s at the structure? Like, if we change certain things at the macro level do you think that would help trickle down?

MS. SHIN: Yeah.

MS. DRAUDT: And it could solve the materialism and the competition.

MS. SHIN: Definitely, definitely. Because people are always perceived to -- like, based on their titles, based on their materialistic possessions how they are perceived by society, where they are in society. But maybe in terms of changing the structure in how much possession it doesn’t really define who you are. Maybe those kind of changes will result to the changes in the mindsets of the people of what does democracy really mean. Where do our rights, like, lie in? So I do agree with what you say.

DR. MOON: Jin, do you have extra comments for Darcy’s question?

MR. PARK: No.

DR. MOON: Matt?

MR. MCGRATH: No.

DR. MOON: Okay. I’m learning a lot. Another question that I would like to put on the table, and feel free to come back to any of the questions from the other two questions if you have additional thoughts. If you could change one thing about Korea policy, East Asia policy, and you could define it whichever way you want, what would it be? And I ask this because out of sincere curiosity as many of you in the room know that since the 2000s, since the turn of the century, the United States has gone from one extreme to another of a very assertive, aggressive foreign policy under President George W. Bush, axis of evil, etcetera, to a more passive strategic patience, non-policy policy of President Obama.

I say this not to criticize as to just tell it like it is. I don’t think it’s a big secret that the United States has been stuck in terms of how we deal with the DPRK. And, of course, the U.S. is so obsessed with China and we have recently seen, especially since Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Washington, the renewed strength of the U.S./Japan alliance. So we get to see where the priorities are and where the priorities are not. So sitting where you sit with your multiple social media platforms talking, you know, with your friends, having coffee, beer, what have you what is your generation critiquing? How are you critiquing current policies in East Asia, towards East Asia, and what would you change and why? Let’s start out with Jin.

MR. PARK: So Professor Moon asked me for one thing to change, but I think she mentioned both East Asian policy and Korean policy, and so I’ll answer one for each, yeah?

DR. MOON: Okay.
MR. PARK: But I’ll make it short. So for East Asian policy our big, kind of, macro because you want some perspective as a person who will live for the next 30, 40 years in this field. I want to give you an example. I think 20th century can be summarized in one phrase. America came to save Europe. America saved Europe from German military regime in the first World War. From Nazism and the fascism from the Second World War, and from Communism in the Cold War. That summarizes the history of the 20th century.

How was it possible? Because America was not ready to get involved in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century because America was really isolationist until the Second World War. You guys know about the Rhodes Scholars. Rhodes Scholars is the most prestigious scholarship in the world. American young elites get a scholarship to go to Oxford to study in England. The Rhodes Scholar started in the beginning of the 20th century. So the goal of Rhodes Scholar was to allow still young American elites, and America was a young country too at the time, America alleged to learn, to know, to experience the value of Europe to America. Because of that American elites in the 20th century they made a different decision from what the American public wanted.

The American public didn’t want to go to war in Europe. They didn’t want to sacrifice their young peoples’ lives in the futile European wars, but American elites decided against the public will and they decided to come to save Europe, and that changed the course of the world. Imagine, like, what would have happened if they made different choices. I think the thing is now changed in the 21st century. As you said, President Obama is, not just President Obama, but everybody in Washington they’re obsessed with China and President Obama declared the people to Asia. They’re turning attention to Asia, but I think it’s really different because it was easier for American elites to understand the value of Europe because they share so many things. They share race, they share history, religion, and culture, but they don’t have that much to share with Asian values and culture.

It’s really dangerous because American elites don’t understand what Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and other Asian people think then they’re going to make the wrong decisions. There was one interesting recent development by -- if you know, there’s a very big investment bank called Blackstone and their founder is Stephen Schwarzman. Stephen Schwarzman recently established his own foundation called Schwarzman Scholarship modeled after Rhodes Scholarship. He’s envisioning that this will be the new Rhodes Scholarship, Asian version of Rhodes Scholarship.

He’s sending young American elites to Tsinghua University in Beijing to study for one year to learn about China and Asia. I think it’s a good move. It’s a great move because it will help the next generation of American elites to learn about and to know more about Asia, to interact with the next generation of Asia and Chinese, Korean, Japanese elites. But that’s not enough. Because, like I said, if there’s a fundamental barrier between the American elites and Asia. They’re different. You guys know that. Their thinking, their way of life, their culture. They’re all different.

So why is it important? Because if they do not understand each other they could
make wrong decisions based on wrong evaluation of things happening in the countries. So the one thing that I want to suggest is, it’s very macro, but let American young policymakers, next generation of experts and scholars to study more, to learn more about Asia, what’s going on in Asia. Let them go over, study abroad in China, Japan, and Korea. That will change the course of history in the long term and in the bigger picture.

The other recommendation for Korean policy is also macro, but I want to really emphasize this because there are things changing in North Korea right now. Kim Jong-un is really different from Kim Jong-II. Kim Jong-un, I think his understanding of what’s really going on in North Korea is very weak based on some bizarre policies or building, like, ski resorts in Kangwon-do and stuff. But still, he’s different from his father. He doesn’t want to maintain a country totally isolated like North Korea was up until 2000. He wants some changes. That’s why he set up some free trading zones, 13, 14 free trading zones. He’s trying to do some kind of reform. Doesn’t know what he has to do exactly, but he’s at least pretending or trying. That’s different.

But we are ignoring the signs, I guess, and I think -- I really believe that a nuclear North Korea can go hand in hand with reforming North Korea. People just are afraid of the idea of a nuclear North Korea. I think it’s a reality now. As a North Korean human rights activist it’s really hard to say that because that means that we have to ignore, neglect some bad human rights’ violations in North Korea. But if it helps in the long run then I think we should pursue the policy, so I think U.S. policymakers and policymakers of other countries should be more creative and should have more leeway in terms of North Korean policy so we can think of -- because what Kim Jung-un wants is let’s go nuclear and let’s do reform. The outside world doesn’t allow it. We cannot think of it at this point, but I think we should be more creative in that matter. So that’s my recommendation. It could be very drastic and macro, but that’s what I’ve been thinking.

DR. MOON: Thank you. My head is filled up right now with various things to think about. Thank you very much. Matt, you have a comment?

MR. MCGRATH: No. I just want to say that I totally agree with Jin, but I feel like there’s a little more optimism though. Because I think there’s -- didn’t Hilary Clinton start the 1000 Strong Foundation to send young Americans to China to sort of facilitate that understanding process? And even some of our other young leaders they’ve participated in State Department programs like the Fulbright or Boren to help, sort of, bridge those gaps. I do agree more of that should be done, but I feel like we have some frameworks that can help us in the future.

DR. MOON: While you have the microphone do you want to give us your thoughts on the one thing you –

MR. MCGRATH: I shouldn’t have answered that.

DR. MOON: -- would change?
MR. MCGRATH: I shouldn’t have said anything. Actually, when I thought about the question I had originally -- my thoughts were very similar to Jin’s. And I do agree, particularly, with North Korea. I feel like the situation has really stagnated. There’s been a lot of hardliners on both sides, both from in Pyongyang and in D.C. So we, as the next generation coming up, are going to be tasked with either finding some creative way around to resolve that issue.

I think some of our panelists have some very interesting presentations they’ll be coming up with. They have projects that they’ve worked on with the DPRK. Maybe through more engagement or more discussion and closer analysis we can, hopefully, find some sort of path through that. I don't know what that path would look like, but I think events like this help us have those discussions are very useful.

DR. MOON: I think you’re pointing out that your generation is much more active, not only in thinking about North Korea now and in the future, but also active in terms of action. Not only regarding human rights, we can’t do human rights activism in North Korea, but outside, of course. And then as Matt eludes to we have people who will present later who are engaged in science diplomacy with North Korea, an area that is still so new and that we’re still exploring, and info technology in North Korea.

So this is really the generation that is acting in much more diverse and creative ways than my or older generations have been able to do. Partly out of access, partly out of mindset. Hyo Won, do you want to add your thoughts?

MS. SHIN: So I really like Jin and Matt’s comments about more understanding of the other countries’ who you’re dealing with when it comes to policymaking. I agree because right now I feel like the world framework, because it’s based on the cold war mentality, there is so much suspicion towards each other. The baseline is suspicion. That if we don’t do something they’re going to do it to us first which leads to a lot of confrontation.

I think that instead of building more confrontation with each other there should be more trust building mechanisms between countries. So this comes to, like, the Sunshine policy. Although there is a lot of criticisms by some people I feel that these were the best years for South Korea and North Korea relations because this was -- even though it didn’t stop North Korea from building its nuclear weapons, but I’m sure that the North Korean officials and leaders did have some sort of amicable feeling towards the South, and just started realizing maybe the South isn’t as hostile towards us, maybe they do have some kind of relationship with us, maybe they do want to pursue this relationship in the long term.

Right now we’re isolating the country and we’re threatening them with sanctions and possible military confrontation, and saying just give up your nuclear weapons. If you were a person and you were just being bullied by a bunch of people but saying, like, don’t drop your, I don't know bb gun or whatever would you do that? I don’t think so. All human beings have the instincts to protect themselves at this, sort of, threatening situation.

So I think that in order to move on from this current situation there needs to be
trust building framework which should start with the U.S., I think, because right now we are living in a world where U.S. is the hegemony. U.S. instead of trying to build trust building mechanisms has been calling North Korea axis of evil, and they’ve been threatening these countries with sanctions. I think in order to be a good leader you need to be the one to step up and say, you know what? Let’s try to build some trust between the countries.

DR. MOON: Thank you very much. Since you emphasized trust and since Darcy will talk to us about confidence building measures when she speaks on the panel, Darcy, you have the last word.

MS. DRAUDT: Sure. Just to kind of wrap up, and I think it picks up on a lot of the themes that the other three panelists have discussed, is I think there are two general themes in Northeast Asia, or in East Asia generally that both the United States and the states in the Asia-Pacific all need to think about in its policy, and come to some real -- I think more clarity on these particular issues.

The first has to deal with the possible resurgence in nationalism throughout Northeast Asia. I think some of the solutions that the other panelists have mentioned, more people to people exchanges. There are increases in tourism, for example, between China and Korea right now. That sometimes these people level trends get a little short shrift I think in D.C. when we think about policy. And so we can fund things like the Schwarzman Scholarship in China, to have something similar in Korea, to have something similar in Japan would be beneficial, both with the United States and among each other.

But I think that there’s a silver lining to this. Just today the Asan Institute for Policy Studies just released polling that 56% of South Koreans would want to see a President Park, Prime Minister Abe summit which surprised me a little bit. But there is a recognition. I think about 70% still see Japan as the instigator for the historical disputes that are going on. But I think there’s potential for positive movement.

Then the second question that I think, again, is this resounding question of what to do with China. And what is this new type of great power relationship? This is something that all of us that deal with Asia-Pacific -- actually, anywhere. This is kind of one of the defining questions of U.S. foreign policy at the moment, and countries like South Korea are getting caught, in many respects, trying to balance their partnership, like you said, and their economic relationship with China.

So in the future, and I can talk about this a little bit later in my presentation, there are a lot of regular meetings on the MOFA State Department side in the areas of defense. There are lots of tri-lats of various sorts and mini-lats in Northeast Asia. But whether we want to make a step into developing an institutionalized multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia is something that, with the question of China, will help make some of those answers, I think, a little clearer to us.

DR. MOON: Okay. Thank you very much. The audience won’t get the chance to ask questions and engage with this panel right now, but you can rush up and talk to these
speakers during our coffee breaks, etcetera. So we're going to close this session. Thank you very much for a great kick-off, putting out many ideas, historical, policy, scholarly ideas as well as visions for the future. I think it’s a wonderful way to start our conference. So we’ll close it and we’ll move on to panel number one very soon. Thank you very much.

(Recess)

DR. MOON: Okay. So, I would like to introduce -- take your time bringing your coffees; you can pour, pick up a cookie, and listen at the same time. We're multitalented people.

I would like to introduce our moderator -- and this is now my privilege to introduce someone closer to my age -- Shaun and Nat Kretchun, who will serve as our moderators, are already well-established in their respective fields. And they are the old guy and gal, frankly, for our conference this morning.

Shaun Kim will be the moderator for our next panel, focusing on the international and regional aspects of security, economic relations, also cyber issues, a variety of issues concerning the East Asia region.

Shaun is a diplomat, a Foreign Service Officer for the United States. She is currently working in the State Department, in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. She is an expert on political and military affairs, strategic planning, and communication, nuclear nonproliferation -- and specifically addressing the Korean Peninsula.

And she's working in D.C. now, but she has also served in Korea for the U.S. Forces Korea -- in Korea, as well as in Hawaii -- Pacific Command.

And so it's a very impressive dossier, but I think the most impressive thing -- or endearing thing -- for me is that she's my former student from Wellesley College. And I have been privileged to have maintained a close friendship --and now colleagueship -- with her. And her sister, Liz Kim, also graduated Wellesley College. I sat on her honors thesis committee -- and wicked, wicked smart woman. You've got a good baby sister. And so I know the whole family. And so it's a very special way to introduce Shaun.

I draw your attention to all of our speakers', and presenters' and moderators' bios. They're long, so none of us are going to introduce all aspects at the microphone, but please do study them yourself. I think for Shaun, it is important to let you know that she is an avid scoreless golfer who loves to travel. So, it's not just about competition; it's about the game.

SHAUN KIM: Thank you so much, Kathy. It's truly a pleasure to be here today. And just in my mid 30’s now -- I didn't realize I was so much older. But I think in hearing some of our panelists earlier today, around the round table, I think one distinct difference that is very evident is, in my 20s, I had all kinds of ideas about the Korean Peninsula -- which I then had to kind of quickly put in the box when I crossed over into my 30s. And what's really refreshing about this event -- and it's a fantastic platform, frankly, for these emerging experts in the Korea field -- is that they don't even have a box yet to put these ideas in. And so I'm so looking forward
to the discourse and just the conversations that will take place today.

So, thank you again, Dr. Moon. It's really a great pleasure to be here. So, the panel that I will be moderating today is called "Old Problems; New Futures?"

And our first panelist is Kent Boydston. He is a Research Analyst at the Peterson Institute, and he works on issues related to economic development and international relations. He spent three years living -- and, also, working -- in Korea. He was a Boren Fellow at Yonsei University. And without further ado, I would like to invite Kent to come up to the stage and give us his presentation. Thank you.

KENT BOYDSTON: Well, thank you very much for the warm introduction -- and to Dr. Moon, for organizing this event. It really is an honor to be here at Brookings.

So, my presentation today will be on the territorial history issues between South Korea and China, and why I believe these issues will be a bone of contention in the future between these two countries.

Recently, there's been a lot of discussion about the potential for territorial disputes between China and Japan, in particular -- the Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands -- to boil into conflict, as well as what we're seeing in the South China Sea, where China is, right now, building new bases and being a little bit provocative over there.

So, we've seen diplomatic rows between Japan and China over the case of the Japanese Coast Guard and a fisherman in 2010 -- and then, like I just mentioned, what we're seeing in the South China Sea with the land reclamation activities right now.

So, although there's less attention given to it internationally, the Dokdo-Takeshima issue between Japan and Korea is also -- it's certainly relevant in South Korea, as well as history issues, particularly since Prime Minister Abe has come into office. These have been miring Japan-ROK relations in the clay for the last few years.

And the general consensus, if you go to enough of these conferences or panels, is that Japan-ROK relations are quite poor. And I agree with that assessment. Even cooperating on relatively simple, intelligent sharing agreements is very complicated.

In 2013, when Kim Jong-un was threatening a nuclear attack on South Korea, and Japan said, "Well, we will come and defend South Korea if there is an invasion," the South Koreans says, "What are you talking about? You know, we didn't ask for that." So, things are pretty bad.

You also see the issue with Dokdo, in terms of education in South Korea -- this territorial issue. And you see this being promoted in the education of young people in South Korea, but then, also, to foreigners.

So, just a little anecdote: When I was in Korea last year, when I was a student,
the Northeast Asia History Foundation, along with the Dokdo Research Foundation, was offering a free history class course that included lectures on Japanese history issues, and then culminated in an all-expenses-paid trip to Dokdo.

You see it, like, on the buses. I saw it in the buses in Korea sometimes. It says "Dokdo neun uliui ibnida." You know, this is, "Dokdo is our morning." So, it's quite this tension on history and territorial issues between Japan and Korea. It is quite palpable in Korea.

And then, of course, you see in the opinion polls that Asan puts out that, you know, Kim Jong-un has higher approval ratings than Prime Minister Abe -- at different times. They're usually about on par with each other. I think right now, Abe's doing a little bit better.

But despite these challenges with the Japan-ROK relations, I think that another issue that has been overlooked is the issues going on with China. And this is something that's been left out of foreign policy debates right now. It's been something that was an issue several years ago, but I believe it will come back. So, these disputes are particularly complex, because they deal with the contended territories -- or the most contentious territories are actually near the North Korean border.

And so South Korea has limited ability to pull on the diplomatic levers in that area, but it has very strong long-term interests in the region. And much of these issues will come into play after some kind of major transition in North Korea.

And my former professor, Steph Haggard, used to say that being a North Korean expert is an oxymoron. It's just impossible. And I think this could probably not be more true -- trying to make predictions about a North Korean collapse scenario. So, I'm not going to go there. But I'm going to keep that crystal ball of international relations on the shelf and not bring it out.

But I am going to talk about -- simply bring back to surface some of the Sino-Korean issues that I believe will bring frictions into the relationship in the future. So, let's look at a few of the issues.

So, first, there's the Ieodo issue, also known as Suyan in Chinese -- or Socotra. So, it has multiple names, just to cover your bases. And this is an island -- or it's a submerged rock off of a reef that's 149 kilometers southwest of a small island off of Cheju Do and 349 kilometers east of China -- of the closest Chinese islands. It's four to five meters underwater, and South Korea's been building a science research facility there -- or they built one there from 1995 to 2003.

And this has made China not happy about that. They've protested this unilateral action, as they called it. And the main issue is over, whose exclusive economic zone is it?

So, you saw in China's Air Defense Identification Zone that they rolled out in November 2013, they covered this territory. Next month, the ROK unrolled theirs, and they expanded theirs to include it.
And in 2011, there's a Chinese fisherman who stabbed a South Korean Coast Guard official, and President Lee Myung-bak pledged to increase patrols in the area. And he said if there was ever a conclusion to this exclusive economic zone issue, that Ieodo must belong -- or should belong -- to Korea.

So, I don't want to draw too many parallels between what China is doing in the South China Sea and what South Korea is doing in Ieodo. They're not entirely the same issues, but they're both a disputed non-territory, if we want to call that. Since it's submerged, it can't actually be called a territory.

The other issue is, there's border disputes -- and this is what I think is actually more contentious in the long run. This area -- there's about 2 million ethnic Koreans in China. Most of them live in the northeastern region, near Yanji in the Yong'an area. And this area -- there's been different Korean-ness -- identities kind of mixing there, especially since the late 1980s, when China started developing the area. So, it's a center where identities are shifting, and there's North Koreans who are going there; there's South Korean firms. It's a very interesting place.

And another issue is that Koreans, historically, if you look at the long arc of history -- they haven't necessarily held this border to be sacrosanct. It's been disputed. And then in 1909, it was finally conceded to Japan -- or Japan conceded it to China when they had colonized Korea. And so this region that was not completely established, as far as Koreans were concerned, got established by the Japanese when they colonized Korea.

And then in 2004, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade presented a report to the National Assembly, declaring that this Gando area, this area in Northeast China that they decided on -- the agreement to make this in 1909 was null and void -- which is a pretty bold thing to do.

Now right after that, Ban Ki-moon, who was then the Foreign Minister -- he backpedaled. But still, there are people in the government who put out this report, and I think that means something -- even if it was ultimately in error of something in the bureaucracy -- or maybe it was an intern's fault; I don't know.

But you can see that this is certainly a contentious area -- or it hasn't been completely resolved, which is what I would argue.

In terms of history, both China and Korea have also their own funded history projects. So, I mentioned before the Northeast Asia History Foundation, which Korea runs -- and they still run. And then China also has a Northeast Asia Project, which they started -- this was in the early 2000s -- claiming that Goguryeo, the old empire of Korea -- it actually was part of Chinese history; it wasn't part of Korean history. And this was a big contrast to even from the 1950s and '60s -- a very fervent time in ideology, when Mao was running China. The Chinese didn't even claim that at that time.
And then the South Koreans have fought back, and created their own. But you can go to MyGoguryeo.com, and on the banner, it'll say, "Goguryeo -- a proud history of Korea." So, you see this -- it goes back and forth, and the South Koreans have also made moves to revise history textbooks. So, there's quite a bit going on on both sides.

And then the last issue I wanted to mention was about the Paektusan area. So, Paektu -- or Changbaishan in Chinese -- has historical linkages to both the Korean Peninsula and to China in history and folklore -- although in Korea, it's the birth of the nation, and there's lots of different folklore. It's allegedly the birthplace of Kim Jong-il, too -- which is not true -- but it holds an important part in Korean history, both in South Korea and North Korea.

So, Beijing is rapidly developing this area. And in 2008, they applied for UNESCO heritage status for this as a Chinese site. And they can do this because they have the economic leverage -- well, not the UNESCO part -- but the economic leverage; they can develop it, whereas North Korea can't. They just don't have the power and the resources to do it. And South Korea -- they're so far removed that they can't do very much, either.

And in 2007, there were actually five South Korean ice skaters -- after they won medals in the Winter Asian Games, they held up a banner that said "Paektusan eun uli ibnida" -- so like, "Paektusan is ours."

So, you saw this kind of nationalism that later, you saw with Dokdo in the London Games in 2012, where the winners -- they made these statements or held up these banners. This also happened with this issue, but it's been tabled. So, if these issues are so important, why have they been tabled?

So, I think there's a few reasons. First, there isn't a whole lot that South Korea can do diplomatically. These areas are bordering North Korea, so South Korea obviously can't administer them. If it was a more typical dispute, they could do more with the military -- keeping it there -- or posting troops there, like you see -- even with, like, Dokdo, they have people stationed there -- even if it's a small contingent.

Another issue is that Park Geun-hye has been particularly friendly towards China, and so this has been part of her grander policy, and we've seen that in the last few years.

So, one thing I would also caution against is the argument about economics -- that economics are keeping them from these issues. You see China and Japan -- and Japan and Korea -- have very robust economic relationships -- and still, a lot of territorial disputes. So, I don't see that as the answer to that.

So, I'm not predicting that ROK and China in the future will be fighting a war over Ieodo or Gando. That's not what I'm arguing.

But I am arguing that the lessons have taught us that there is a framework and even institutions from the governments that are inciting nationalism, and that this nationalism is well-established in both countries. And the people can be very nationalistic, and nationalist
sentiments -- they shift over time.

Whereas 10 years ago, ROK-China issues were getting much more attention, they're not right now, and the Dokdo-Takeshima issue is much more of a salient issue within Korean education and their minds.

So, it's not necessarily that I am being an alarmist and saying they're going to fight a war, but that these issues -- they hamper or they hold back some of the diplomatic wiggle room that the countries will have. And that's a technical term.

And you can see that this happened with the ROK-Japan relationship, with the information-sharing issues -- which basically got cut off, basically because of populist sentiment. And they were about to go forth with this in 2012; it leaped out, and they had to pull it off the table. Lee Myung-bak had to do this.

So, I think this is even more probable in the future with China -- who they don't share as many interests with -- than in the Japanese case.

So, thank you.

MS. KIM: Thank you so much, Kent. I think here in Washington, certainly, we're in the habit of putting out fires. And so any time we're able to become reacquainted or introduced to longer-term problems that could come in the future, it's always refreshing. Thank you very much.

Our next speaker today is Ms. Darcie Draudt. She is currently a Research Associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She also serves as an Assistant Editor to an online site that I frequent, which is called Sino-NK.

So, without further ado, I'd like to invite Darcie to the stage. And it's not written in her bio, but I also would like to add, I just found out she's a golfer, and she's also another avid scoreless golfer. So, we'll probably be meeting on the golf course sometime soon. But, Darcie, welcome.

MS. DRAUDT: Thank you. Thank you. Yeah, we'll be hitting the links. Thank you so much -- and thank you again, Dr. Moon. This is such a great opportunity.

This is part of a longer project that I'm looking at -- prospects for tension reduction under the Park administration with North Korea. And I'm going to shift a little bit from land territorial disputes to maritime ones.

I think the Yellow Sea is currently -- unlike future hypothetical disputes between China and the Koreas -- currently, there are disputes between China and both Koreas, with respect to lines drawn in the Yellow Sea.

I'm looking at the Yellow Sea as a way to examine how much inter-Korean
disputes are so closely intertwined with greater regional tensions, on the premise that if we start working on reducing tensions at the regional level, eventually, over time, the trust that would build will trickle down to the inter-Korean level, as well.

On the Yellow Sea, all literal nations -- all have naval presence. So, the risk for rapid escalation is there. It's more than just the run-ins between coast guards and fisheries, as Kent mentioned earlier. There are some stakes for escalation in the future.

So, for its part, China -- Xiangzhou has three nuclear attack subs and ten destroyers. The ROK ports at Mokpo and Pyeongtaek have three Aegis-equipped destroyers, they're considering more. And North Korea has several naval bases along its coastal areas, as well. Additionally, 60 percent of North Korea's naval posture is along the Northern Limit Line, just as 60 percent of it is along the DMZ, as well.

The Northern Limit Line, for those of you who maybe aren't as familiar with inter-Korean issues, is the line that was drawn on the maritime border outside the -- it extends past the DMZ. It was agreed by the U.N. one month after the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, and North Korea does not recognize this line.

Here, you can see the red dash line is the 1953 Northern Limit Line, whereas the blue dash line is the line that North Korea claims. And inside this area are also nestled Yeonpyeong Islands, which in 2010, you'll remember, had a deadly shelling from North Korea.

And earlier that year, also -- the sinking of the Cheonan is also marked on here, which occurred quite close to North Korea, but still on the southern side of the Northern Limit Line.

There's altercations regularly on this line, as well. Just this month -- actually, last week -- North Korea patrol ships crossed the Northern Limit Line and infiltrated toward the South. The ships only withdrew at South Korean-fired warning shots. The tensions in the Yellow Sea are exacerbated by Chinese fisheries and overlapping EEZs in the Yellow Sea.

As you can see here, the yellow line represents the South Koreans' exclusive economic zone, to which they retain the rights for fishing -- and can give the rights to others, as well, I should add. The red line is China's exclusive economic zone. And then, of course, on the east, is Japan's exclusive economic zone. But for this presentation, I'm going to mostly focus on the China-Korea portion of it.

Under the U.N. conventional law, the sea -- both China and South Korea joined in 1996 -- exclusive economic zones extend 200 nautical miles out past the territories of any given country. But in the case of the Yellow Sea, these limits don't apply. There's no place in which it's wider than 400 nautical miles. And so you can see, this is why some of them overlap.

Chinese fishing vessels -- because of overfishing in the area, because of changes in the ecology of the area, Chinese fishing vessels are forced to go further and further out, into the South Korean exclusive economic zone, which has led to numerous incidents -- in fact, more
than one per day. In 2010, there were 370 incidences between South Korean Coast Guards and Chinese fishing vessels. And the number in 2011 jumped to 470 -- so much more than one per day.

There is some movement to reconcile these disputes. In the late '90s and early 2000s, joint fishing committees were set up to negotiate -- as I will show you in the next picture - - both transitional and provisional measure zones, in which case fishing vessels would gradually be scaled back to reconcile the difficulties for the fishermen in catching the fish and the legal lines that are being drawn, sometimes in arbitrary ways.

All right. And, again, last year, in late December 2014, China and South Korea set up a committee comprised of both maritime government officials, as well as scientists, to help further investigate where exactly the lines should be drawn and enforce them in a mutual manner.

So, because of all the tensions here, I'm setting out a few recommendations. I think we can go into more during the Q&A session, but for now, I'm going to just explain them for right now. I see them in two different areas -- and as a gradual reinforcing manner.

So, first, I think the lowest bar would be to work on reducing South Korean and Chinese tensions with these economic zones, because a lot of the groundwork has already been laid -- first, for continued ROK-China dialogue on these exclusive economic zones, and the patrolling of axis control, which has been an issue not only for China and South Korea, but also for U.S. interests in the area, as well.

Second, continued coordinated patrolling of these maritime fault lines. And third, I'd suggest training for fishermen in all three countries, and exploring the greater socioeconomic issues and the ecological issues that are really causing this to be an issue for the fisheries.

So, eventually, as these lines are solidified, the gradual hope is then for reconciliation on the Northern Limit Line and the inter-Korean maritime tensions to be reduced, as well.

Through that, I think some of the first steps could include joint training on maritime tension reduction at the working level. And this might be best served by occurring out of area. I think in Europe, there are some cases -- either through the Helsinki Process or with the OSCE -- that have cooperative patrolling of borders. That might be helpful for the Koreans to learn from.

And then secondly -- and ultimately -- negotiations to settle the Northern Limit Line disputes and eventual reduction of forces and exercises along the border. Of course, the climate right now isn't right for especially the latter two. But just because it's intractable doesn't mean it's not something to which we work. I think that the volatility of the maritime lines -- not only in the Yellow Sea, but around all of China, as well -- really undercut the importance of working with China to develop a common understanding about the rules-based order around the
maritime tensions.

So, for here, I'm going to stop here, and then I look forward to your questions -- and Shaun's questions. I know she has several for me, as well.

MS. KIM: Thank you so much, Darcie. Our next speaker is Esther Im. She just recently completed a two-year rotation as an Adviser on the United Nations Security Council, of which the Republic of Korea recently had a seat. She's also my hubae -- or my junior, I guess -- from Wellesley College. And this fall, she will be traveling to Korea as a Fulbright Scholar. So, congratulations on that.

And without further ado, Esther?

ESTHER IM: Thank you, seonbae, I suppose. So, thank you to the Brookings Institution -- and particularly Professor Moon. So, obviously, we have this relationship established here from Wellesley -- and there's so many Wellesley connections in this room.

But I'd like to particularly highlight Professor Moon's -- and thank you, Professor Moon -- highlighting her role as my former professor, as well. I can't reiterate enough how much Professor Moon challenges her students. And even today, I don't think I would've been here continuing to study North Korean issues had she not really inspired me -- and to really challenge me to think outside of the box. She truly is somebody who is not only an expert but really an educator. And these are her own words, too, but they're so true. And I'd also like to thank Paul for all the logistical support.

So, yes. So, I will admit, I was very nervous when I was preparing for this presentation, because I wasn't sure that I really had anything new to provide. But I think that, you know, as mentioned, my experience at the Korean Mission to the U.N. -- during a time when North Korea was -- the tensions between North Korea and the rest of the world were quite high. You know, South Korea joined the Security Council in 2013, and literally the membership went off with a bang, you know, from the ballistic missile test in December and then the nuclear test shortly thereafter and in February.

And so I'd like to talk about that experience. But before I start, I would just like to reiterate that these are my own personal opinions, and I do not represent the Republic of Korea in any official capacity. I'm not a diplomat, in that sense.

And, also, you know, this panel comes at a very timely juncture, as I am leaving. And as I'm leaving, I'm trying to think about, what role does the U.N. have in addressing the Korea question, right? The Korea question -- and, subsequently, the North Korea question -- has been on the U.N.'s agenda since time immemorial, since the U.N. began. And, you know, in many ways, Korea's birth was, you know, in the halls of the U.N., so to speak.

In some ways, there is no better place to discuss it. But I think we've lost our way, in that sense. The U.N. is very well-mandated to address all of the challenges presented by North Korea -- everything from the nuclear, to the human rights, to humanitarian assistance. But
I think that we have become so entrenched that the U.N. unfortunately -- because of its structure and because of the system -- is not able to address it. And we do need to make some changes, and we need to think a little bit strategically different about what the U.N. can contribute.

And I would like to caveat that this presentation is not necessarily about, you know, criticism or critique about the U.N. I have the utmost respect for the United Nations as an institution, and I think the diplomats there on the ground get a lot of flack because, you know, they're representing their governments. And, you know, when you're radiating your country line and your positions -- you know, they are really trying hard on the ground to really, you know -- they're diplomats, right? They want to see things go well. And I think that's the unique atmosphere that the U.N. provides.

So, I want to focus more on, what does the U.N. add to the Korean question, and what does it detract? So, a few points that I would like to highlight is that I think the U.N. allows for great norm-building on North Korea, such as building consensus that its nuclear weapons are a threat to international security, and that its human rights violations are a serious concern. And as a result, the U.N. is able to design and to organize multilateral efforts to address these concerns.

But second, to kind of counteract that -- not counteract but to assess that first point -- unfortunately, the U.N. structure and its inherent makeup of 193 countries complicates discussions and introduces unhelpful debates -- and especially politicking by the DPRK in the United Nations.

And three, as kind of a way to move away from these two -- one good and one bad -- how can we move forward? I think, unfortunately, prolonged disagreement within the U.N. will only further entrench the situation. And so we need to find a better consensus on what a peaceful Korean Peninsula will look like. And until it does so, I don't think the U.N. will be able to really resolve tensions; it will only be able to mitigate -- and, to borrow some words from Shaun, to put out fires -- but not really address why the fires are starting.

So, to start out, I think it's useful to make some distinctions on what the U.N. is and is not. And, you know, what is the U.N.? I don't mean this to sound elementary or trivial, but there is a tendency to talk about the U.N. in this very abstract manner that I think obscures its functions and sets expectations that are not very realistic.

And, you know, there's also this assumption that the U.N. is this world government, but it is not. It is first and foremost an intergovernmental organization that includes the membership of 193 countries. And these states, these countries deliberate across a wide range of bodies and entities, and, you know, each body has their own procedures, and their own makeup, and their distinct style.

And on the other side, you have a very dedicated and independent executive body, called the Secretariat, which is made up of independent civil servants who implement the decisions that the member states make -- and then plus, you know, the very specialized agencies attached.
And, you know, if you were to look at an organizational chart of the U.N., I think it's very clear that you can't really explain or attribute the various processes and outcomes with a blanket term like "the U.N." There are various moving parts, and I think we should really distinguish, you know, the U.N. Security Council or, you know, the permanent member of the Security Council, China -- you know, X, Y, Z. You know, I think that helps to clarify how we can move forward in the U.N.

So, to start off, to go to my main point, the U.N. has a unique ability to allow for greater norm-building in North Korea, as I mentioned. And perhaps the biggest area, most recognizable part of the U.N. involvement on North Korea is its nuclear weapons program. This debate mainly occurs in the Security Council, which is the principal organization of the U.N., meant to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council is also characterized by its 15-member structure and the veto authority of its five permanent members.

And compared to some of the other issues on the Council's agenda, the North Korea issue enjoys a fair amount of consensus, if I'm allowed to say that. There is clear agreement that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons is a threat to international security, and there's a sense that the Council needs to take firm action -- actions on provocations.

And I think this is, in part, because China does play a bigger role on this issue -- just because if you look at some of the other issues -- the U.S. and Russian relationship, and their entrenched interest in world views has really paralyzed the Council to be able to move forward. And it's well-known that Russia follows Chinese lead on North Korea and vice-versa on Iran.

And the continued provocations and just the intransience of North Korea has really created, also, a mood and momentum towards increased action by the Council. And there's also broad support for non-Security Council members for the Council to take action, the end result being that when the Council does take action by adopting resolutions or additional sanctions -- or make clear condemnations of certain actions -- I think this builds further consensus and reiterates international will for denuclearization of the peninsula.

And part-and-parcel to this is the benefit of the Council being able to design multilateral efforts towards this end, through sanctions and designing sanction obligations by countries to mitigate proliferation and procurement of illicit items that will contribute to its building of its nuclear and ballistic missile program.

And likewise, another area where the U.N. has built a lot of consensus was recently exhibited by the recent publication of the Committee of Inquiries's recent report on the human rights situation in the DPRK. And this had a really unprecedented experience in building international awareness and condemnation for North Korea's human rights violations.

There's very broad, palpable support for this issue, and even the General Assembly voted in favor of submitting the report to the Security Council, encouraging it for an ICC referral of the DPRK -- to the International Criminal Court.
So, it's easy to see these outcomes and think that an indicative change of wind or progress has been made, but I don't think that we can easily make those kind of conclusions, because when you peel back the surface and look at how these processes, how these outcomes have come about, you can see that there's no real change in strategic thinking, merely compromise and efforts to mitigate risk -- and mitigate the issue with the least amount of risk.

So, as much as we like to think of the U.N. as being able to resolve differences, at the end of the day, it's still a political arena in which countries prioritize its national interest and work towards those.

And, you know, I think despite, you know, my earlier description of the Council as, you know, having favorable conditions, China and Russia do still put a lot of weight behind not rocking the boat. You know, their line has always been, "We must think of the bigger picture and not to add to tensions any further." And they would prefer that the Council and the Committee that implements the U.N. sanctions do so in every decision that they make.

And, you know, action usually doesn't even occur until there is a serious provocation, like the nuclear test or a ballistic missile test. And, you know, that's the Security Council, but then when you look and step back at the other bodies in the U.N. which encompass all 193 member states, consensus just deteriorates. And this is perhaps the biggest pitfall of the U.N., because you introduce a lot of actors that want to have their say, and a coalition of support built by the DPRK to that end.

And, you know, we tend to think of the main actors of the U.N. as being the P5 -- and they certainly are, but I think we're seeing a definite trend towards voting blocs made up of countries that provide a formidable opposition to the big powers in the U.N.

And I'm sorry; I'm speaking a little bit over, but the few more points -- I think this is well-exhibited by the COI report submission to the Council and its adoption in the General Assembly, because Cuba had introduced an amendment to the resolution, trying to remove all mention of the ICC referral. And fortunately, it was not passed, but it failed 40 votes to 77.

And I think 40 countries is a very sizable number, and a trend that we can't just easily ignore. And it's not that these countries necessarily agree with North Korea, but I think that stems from a more political need to stick together and, you know, to ensure that what happens to DPRK doesn't happen to themselves.

And so kind of the final point -- so where do we go from here, and how do you reconcile clear calls to action with a clear lack of political will? The U.N. has been dealing with the North Korea, Korea question for 70 years. This is the 70th anniversary, and there's a lot of retrospective analysis, but, also, future-looking analysis on this.

But at the core of the problem is that there's not really consensus on what a peaceful Korean Peninsula looks like; only -- you know, when we talk about the U.N., we discuss reunification, and what can it contribute to reunification? But that's a very theoretical
exercise at this point.

And what I wanted to posit is, what has the U.N. been missing by not considering that a peaceful Korean Peninsula can also be a divided Korean Peninsula? I know that's a little -- I don't support division in any way, but I think, you know, at the U.N., when we're dealing with member states, we can't ignore that they are member states, but we treat it often like it's not, in that the North Korean issue is -- the way we're dealing with it now is just a placeholder until we can get to reunification, and then dig into what peace really means.

But I think we should really engage North Korea at the U.N. What better place to engage it than -- because we don't have diplomatic relationships, the United States and South Korea -- what better place to engage a country that you don't have diplomatic relations with than the United Nations, built just for this purpose?

So, thank you.

MS. KIM: Thank you so much, Esther. And before we move onto our final presenter for this panel -- I'm sure everyone is jotting down questions. We'll be moving pretty much straight in Q&As following this last presenter, who is Scott La Foy.

He is currently a graduate student at Georgetown University, and working on a report on North Korean operational cyber capabilities at CSIS. He'll be providing a panel, I think, with PowerPoint presentation, as well, on clandestine North Korean capabilities.

So, Scott?

SCOTT La FOY: Let me get the PowerPoint up and running before I try and say anything; embarrass myself. There we go.

Hello. Like they said, I'm Scott La Foy. I'd like to start by thanking Brookings, Dr. Moon, and Paul for arranging all this and inviting me.

Today, I'm talking about North Korean clandestine capabilities, specifically their cyber programs. And the main point to take away from this is that managing cyber threats in Asia-Pacific -- emerging cyber threats -- is going to continue to be difficult for years to come, not only for North Korea but for the region as a whole.

Asia-Pacific is at risk of an increase in both frequency and intensity of cyber events in the coming years, unless some sort of multilateral legal framework, some sort of balance, some sort of stronger defensive structures are established for the purposes of threat and risk management.

However, the biggest problem with this is that frameworks, treaties, balances, and everything are incredibly difficult to pursue in cyber security. Many cyber capabilities that one would want to regulate end up being clandestine capabilities that help nations act in some way, and are highly desirable capabilities for nations to keep secret and keep using -- which makes it
very difficult to regulate.

The most effective management solution, which it's not an ideal one -- the most effective one -- and realistic -- may end up just being individual or collective national cyber defenses, instead of some sort of regulatory body or deterrent structure that relies on honesty and transparency for clandestine activities.

So, before going forward, cyber security is a particularly buzzword-y field, so I need to define exactly what I'm talking about. And that's -- cyber capabilities, as I'm using them today, are just means of accomplishing goals or exerting influence in or through cyberspace. This can cover everything from data mining, snooping on emails, to disrupting information networks and civilian critical infrastructure. It's a wide gamut. Think of it similarly to how military would use the phrase "air power" or "sea power." It's a wide domain of capabilities that one can use.

This will not include information warfare, or narrative control, or propaganda. That falls into more of the psychological end of things. This is a little more of the technical capabilities. As well, I will not be really addressing non-state actors or criminal elements. This is state-to-state cyber capabilities.

So, why will threats in Asia-Pacific continue to be numerous and particularly difficult to manage? As everyone has said today, Asia-Pacific has some seriously fractured political problems. There is rising nationalism in countries. There are rising and falling powers, which is particularly frightening for international relations theorists. There are arms races, and it's at risk of general conflict, let alone a cyber conflict.

Clandestine activities and cyber capabilities don't require an open conflict to be used, but they certainly flourish in an environment where numerous states with a lot of money perceive that other places are their rivals or hostile nations. And Asia-Pacific in particular -- nowhere else in the world has the unique mix of powerful, productive, high-tech economies, large-scale military investments, and semi-stable governments that distrust or openly disdain each other.

The second point is that cyber capabilities are becoming a more and more integral and fundamental tool of clandestine activity -- whether that's clandestine operations similar to special forces usage or just espionage. There are certain operations that cannot be completed without cyber capabilities. It's considered its own domain right now, but that's shifting a little in military theories.

But it's almost unthinkable for a strong nation's intelligence and security apparatus to lack a cyber component. They would lose any competitive advantage they have internationally, and Asia-Pacific is a particularly competitive region, where places are looking for advantages over perceived rivals and great powers in the region.

And these are not particularly good omens for managing cyber threats. These two points are meant to show that nations in Asia have the motives to act against each other, a lot of
incentive to do so, and the means to do so as the cyber capabilities proliferate and become more common.

So, a good example that demonstrates these two points is the North Korean case and the issue with threat management originating from North Korea. North Korean cyber capabilities mainly evolved out of two traditions -- the electronic warfare tradition. Electronic warfare is the disruption of, like, communications networks and radars -- any sort of electronics - - but not data-driven things; that becomes cyber -- and the sort of special forces irregular tradition. It comes from these two different traditions within North Korea.

And the electronic warfare one, we're not talking about today. That's a fairly conventional capability. That's not really a controversial thing. It's becoming a normal part of all militaries -- and are more relevant to a warfighting environment, which we certainly are not talking about today.

The special forces tradition, on the other hand, is immediately relevant -- because special forces are, by definition, irregular and are not to be used -- well, are not exclusively to be used in warfighting environments.

North Korea, since the armistice agreement, has pursued a national strategy that embraces asymmetries and clandestine activities and operations, in an attempt to better the North's position by undermining the South and allies. The North's position on the peninsula is fairly poor. Trends are poor, as well. And while there has been some economic recovery in the last few years, the trends are not still putting them on a path of becoming economically -- or even conventionally militarily -- competitive. So, things are not great for North Korea right now.

The deadlock on the peninsula obviously precludes conventional major military actions from occurring and shifting the balance. However, actions that fall short of war have continued uninterrupted since the end of the Korean War. North Korea has put significant investment and significant development -- and R&D -- into developing capabilities that allow it to act both politically and militarily around the deadlock and against conventionally more powerful opponents.

One of the main institutions for this capability is the Reconnaissance General Bureau, also called the RGB. These guys are kind of becoming the infamous group that shows up in the news a lot more recently. And the RGB is -- it houses North Korean special forces units and a lot of their asymmetric special forces/clandestine activity type of units.

This organization and the predecessor organizations that went into creating it are associated with some of the largest asymmetric provocations on the Korean Peninsula. They are credited with the Blue House Raid in the 1960s, in which they attempted to assassinate President Park Chung-hee with an infiltrated commando group; the Rangoon bombings in the 1980s, in which they tried to assassinate President Chun Doo-hwan with a bomb -- and succeeded in killing several South Korean government members. They are allegedly the ones who planned and executed the destruction and bombing of KAL Civilian Flight 858.
Their predecessor organizations are associated with the kidnapping of Japanese and South Korean citizens, as well as the continued insertion of commandos, clandestine units, and espionage units into Korea, which has continued up through the '90s -- and by submarine, specifically. They're associated with the maritime insertion.

And so these predecessor organizations, in 2009, were all combined into one organization, which is, to some degree, very convenient for open-source analysts, because now we don't have to jump between the Korean Workers' Party, Ministry of People's Armed Forces. They put them all in a nice little box for us.

And the RGB basically has a lineage and a history of provocative, irregular, asymmetric activities, as does its leadership. RGB Director Kim Yong Chol and the National Defense Committee Vice Chairman, General O Kuk-ryol, are both associated with the planning and execution of numerous clandestine activities.

And the reason this matters is that the majority of North Korean cyber capabilities that are known in the open source are controlled by these guys now. They are controlled at a level that is institutionally either equal to or higher than the commando and infiltration units. Their exact location within the hierarchy is a little opaque, because we are dealing with North Korea's black-box clandestine activities, so a lot of details have to be taken with a grain of salt.

And while this doesn't mean you can predict their specific missions -- we don't know who they're specifically aimed against at any given time -- we can estimate what they're used for strategically. And that's going to be clandestine activities against South Korea and allies.

And so the cyber units give the North Korean government a means of acting outside their own borders and trying to upset the status quo in any way they can. This is the type of organization people are trying to manage via legal framework or deterrent when they say they want to manage state-to-state threats.

And a clandestine unit within a military institutional structure already known for being opaque within one of the most opaque governments in the world is, to say the least, a very difficult unit to regulate via international legal treaty, let alone deterrence, which requires understanding what the opponent fears and what they see as something that could stop them.

Frameworks for cyber don't work the same as against kinetic capabilities. A lot of people try to compare cyber deterrence, which cyber security people will beat me up for even saying that phrase, with deterrence for nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, which is a fundamentally incorrect thought. Ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are fairly taboo to use, and are politically more valuable to not fire. Once you fire them, you've opened up a horrible international taboo, and are going to have the United Nations coming after you and all sorts of things.

Cyber capabilities are more valuable when they are constantly used, constantly developed, and constantly acting in favor of the national interest. So, creating a deterrence or a
multilateral legal framework akin to nuclear weapons -- it's simply not applicable in the same ways. One is a weapon that is valuable when not fired and threatened; one is only valuable when it's being used heavily.

And so that leaves us with defense, which is sort of the basic, not terribly complex idea of just creating national cyber defenses and teams to mitigate threats when and not if they hit.

Attacks will continue to happen, and the best we can do is set up defenses, maybe set up collective defenses if possible, and prepare to mitigate threats, continue developing technologies that can undermine what is attacking various countries, and be prepared to deal with the consequences that occur -- because stopping them ahead of time is going to be very unlikely, and it may be easier to just solve the political underlying problems, compared to controlling the clandestine units of China, Russia, the United States, and North Korea from attacking each other.

Thank you very much.

MS. KIM: Actually, at this point, if I could ask all of the presenters to come up to the table, and we'll start, I guess, our broader panel discussion, and move into Q&As.

As our presenters come up, I would just offer a couple of thoughts and just clarification. I'm actually a Foreign Affairs Officer, not a Foreign Service Officer -- at the State Department. And any views that I express are my personal opinions, and do not represent the views of the United States Government or the Department of State.

We had such a diversity of topics and of views today, and I think just -- what I would like to do to start off is to basically pose a question to each of our presenters. And I'll go in the order that the presentations were given.

But in general, I think -- here in Washington -- and those of you who have operated here a long time -- or it doesn't even take a long time -- generally, when you offer a solution, you're told many, many ways of why that just won't work; it's just not possible. And so you immediately begin to think that way. And so if someone says something to you, you think, "Well, that couldn't possibly work, because of X, Y, and Z."

And so what I tried to do as I read through the abstracts ahead of this conference is to put all of my shackled thinking in government -- and as a consultant to the government -- to the side, and really keep an open mind in terms of the solutions that are offered based on the experience of our panelists.

So, starting with Kent -- I think on the topic that you presented today -- which I found very refreshing, in the sense that we never -- I personally generally don't think much about Chinese-ROK territorial disputes. But it's a topic that will become very real, potentially, in the future, depending on how the Korean Peninsula -- what it looks like in 10, 20, 30 years.

But I am curious to know, how much of a consideration do you think it will be to
China -- just the possibility of an enduring, or strengthening, or strengthened ROK-U.S. alliance? So, will China -- I doubt it will make a big land grab, but, you know, let's say that Mount Paektu really increases in currency. How much of China's calculus will, do you think, factor in the potential of an enduring U.S. presence -- and even a more strengthened ROK-U.S. alliance on the peninsula -- or unified Korean-U.S. alliance?

KENT BOYDSTON: Yeah. So, as I tried to back step from talking about how the Korean Peninsula might unify -- I'll go ahead and talk about that.

So, I think that I don't see it -- if there is some kind of unification scenario, I don't see that this -- the lines have been drawn for a pretty long time, even though they haven't been officially set -- or they were in 1909 with Japan. Korea was a colony of Japan at the time.

That being said, they've been established for quite a long time. So, it's hard for me to imagine that they really are going to be, like, fighting a war on these borders. That wasn't my intention.

But I think that what China and Korea are doing are, they're posturing. They're thinking about what's going to happen in the long term. And they want to shore up and make very sure that either China's not going to think that it can go farther south, or that, you know, on the Chinese side, that maybe the ROK military and the U.S. -- if there is some kind of contingency -- are going to be going too much farther up north.

So, I think that this area certainly could play -- or it will play a very important role when there is some kind of -- something that happens on the Korean Peninsula, whether it's a sudden thing or something that happens gradually. So, yeah, I see it as posturing, is mostly my sense.

MS. KIM: Great; thank you. And I will continue to selfishly ask questions of the presenters before I open it up to the floor.

I had a very brief conversation with Darcie about her presentation this morning, actually. And confidence-building measures, I think, in my profession, at least -- and having worked with the Defense Department and with the State Department make me cringe, because I'm just not convinced that it could work in this climate.

And based on North Korea's demonstrated behavior and its coercive diplomatic strategies -- and we always cite 2010 as being that year when, especially in the Yellow Sea area that Darcie presented on -- how do you even begin to get to the point of having discussions about confidence-building when 46 sailors died and, you know, an island was shelled with artillery and two civilians died? And there's so much emotion that runs, I think, for all the parties that were involved in those clashes.

And so what I'm curious about, Darcie, is, how do we get to that point? So, I don't disagree with the value of confidence-building measures. And if we could get to that point, that would be fantastic. But how do we get there with an actor that is clearly, number one, not
interested -- at least has signaled that it's not interested and, through all of its actions, demonstrated it's not interested? So, how do we lay a bridge to a party that doesn't maybe want that bridge to ever reach their side, I guess? And that's laden with my own assumptions, but –

MS. DRAUDT: Sure; yeah. I think there are a lot of assumptions built into a lot of our recommendations across the board.

You're right; the current climate is just not right for any immediate reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula, and it certainly is important -- with any confidence-building measure -- that it's accompanied by an appropriate defense posture -- with which you're so familiar, I'm sure.

There's three points that I think I'd like to make in response to that. First, the mandate of both Koreas -- both South Korea and North Korea -- is such that they frame their national goals, their grand strategy as aiming toward eventual peaceful reunification of the peninsula. There's a lot of debate and discussion about -- I think we've made some assumptions about what reunification is, without really getting into it. But if we are aiming for a peaceful reunification, that would need to be prefaced with a long process of gradual tension reduction -- and the trust-building process.

The Park administration has built this into a foreign policy, very much so. I think there's a lot of questions that, on their -- and a lot of it will have to be led by the South Koreans. There's a lot of questions that need to be answered, and I'm not sure whether it will happen under Park, whether her successor will, or whether her successor's successor will.

But I think all of this is couched in the larger issue, which is what I tried to draw out in my presentation -- was that this isn't just about the climate between the Koreas, but there's larger geopolitical moving target points in the region. So, the big question, I think, is -- and this one is China, especially when we're talking about territories -- just as Kent pointed out, China has been maneuvering in the South China Sea.

It's, you know, cabbage -- called cabbage maneuvering, right -- taking over islands, and positioning -- they surround an island, and they're forced to get off. And salami slicing is another one of their tactics. Lots of food metaphors, huh?

But this is a big question, and it's how this is going to unfold over time. Because trust-building, because tension reduction is a path-dependent process, it's a question that China and the United States, mainly, are going to be having to answer -- and the smaller nations in the region are going to have to respond to that.

So, for this, the third issue would be, as I mentioned earlier, the importance of considering a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia. There's been several that have been proposed. The Park administration has its own version of it, the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, which they've been promoting, not just in D.C. but also Tokyo and Beijing, with the eventual hope to get on other members, mostly of the six-party talks -- but also Mongolia.
This is one version. This isn't the first type of multilateral security mechanism proposed for Northeast Asia. They haven't gotten on the ground. So, I think there's more work to be done on the reasons why these -- despite strong economic partnerships in the region, despite strong flows of people, of goods, of information -- the groundwork, I think, really does need to be laid for these institutions to be built in Northeast Asia at the regional level.

MS. KIM: Thank you.

And moving onto Esther -- you ended your presentation by saying, "Where do we go from here, and what has the U.N. been missing?" And I'd like to recycle a question that was used during the roundtable, actually, and ask, if you could change one thing, based on your experiences over the last two years -- specific to the Korea problem -- where you think that if, structurally or normatively, if one thing could change, and you had the power to press that button and change it, what would it be to make either progress or -- I won't use the word "progress" -- to change things with North Korea? What would it be? And it's a big question; I apologize.

MS. IM: Yeah. So, I mean, you know, my last point was, I think that we do need better thinking on what a peaceful Korean Peninsula looks like. And part of that, I posited -- you know, we have to assess whether a divided peninsula can be peaceful. I think the assumption currently is that it's not, and the desire, obviously, is towards reunification. And I have those same desires.

But I think one thing that I would really like to change is for countries like Korea and the United to consider whether they could live with North Korea long term. I mean, we have been living with North Korea long term, but I think in a more formal way. And I don't mean to go as far as to suggest diplomatic relations, but I think there just needs to be a better recognition of what North Korea is, and treat it like it is so.

And I think -- especially this is very important for South Korea, because, you know, obviously, they have the most stake in it. And I would really like to see Korea -- especially in the U.N., to really engage North Korea.

And, you know, this is more of an off-the-record comment, but, you know, it's funny when you're in the U.N. -- and I was talking to Paul, one of my coworkers about this -- and it's funny when you're at the U.N., because we tend to think of North Korea in this very abstract way, but when you're at the U.N., they're literally sitting across the room from you.

But you're not really allowed to talk to them -- or there's this sense that you have to avoid any engagement with them. And I think that's a really unfortunate aspect, especially in the U.N. context, when, you know, you are supposed to be able, I think, to engage with your colleagues. And like I said, you know, what better forum than the U.N. to engage?

And so I would definitely like to see Korea take a different stance. And, you know, one thing I would like to mention, too -- it's funny because I think one way that the conversation does get really entrenched in the U.N. is that, you know, there are certain -- even if
you're in a meeting, especially with a DPRK diplomat, you know, if they say something, you know -- like, for example, you know, U.S.-Korea military exercises are a very big sticking point, and, you know, they like to reiterate how this is, you know, very -- this is a hostile policy, right, and that, you know, that this is either practicing taking over Pyongyang -- you know, everyone's heard the line, right?

But what's also hard is that, you know, ROK has a policy where they have to react, and they have to set the record straight. But then you get into this very long, drawn-out, you know, you have to reply to each other -- and I don't think that really inspires a lot of confidence. And while we are talking about building confidence measures, I think that is one way to start -- is by not necessarily engaging in this vitriol with each other.

MS. KIM: Thank you so much.

And lastly, for Scott, I have to admit, I know just enough about cyber to be dangerous -- especially cyber and North Korean capabilities. But one thing that's very exciting, I think, about cyber security -- and vis-à-vis North Korea -- is that it's really -- and for all of the countries, actually -- it's an open, unexplored, or undefined domain. It's a field that is just now -- whether it's multilateral frameworks and other norms and things like that -- so, you know, it's an open frame -- I'm seeing signs go through, and I'm trying to interpret signs.

And so I'll be opening up the floor to questions once this question has been asked. So, essentially, I mean, it's open terrain, and you talked in your presentation about how deterrence is kind of a -- I don't want to say it's an inapplicable concept to this particular arena, but it's not as well-suited as when we talk about nuclear deterrence.

But in terms of defense being certainly an option, have you given any thought to what proportional responses could be, and how proportional responses -- not necessarily kinetically and not in the defense realm, but cyber to cyber -- what those proportional responses could be, and how they could serve in some way as a deterrent in the future?

And, again, I know just enough to be dangerous. And so the Sony attacks, for instance -- whatever happened after that, or whatever we may or may not know about that, I think could perhaps send a stronger signal to nations who possess this asymmetric capability. So, I'm very curious to hear your thoughts on that.

And then once Scott answers this question, I think we have mics throughout the room, so please raise your hands, and we'll go ahead and take questions from the floor.

MR. La FOY: So, the first part I would like to address on that is the idea of a proportional response. There's a lot of scholarly literature on what a proportional response is. After the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack, President Obama said that we will -- I believe he said the phrase, "We will respond proportionally," or some very similar word.

But proportional response is very hard to measure, especially when it's going to be a clandestine attack. In the North Korean case, it's very hard to sit down and quantify exactly
what a proportional response to a multimillion dollar hacking and data breach against a United States company would be; especially as international law moves more towards compliance-oriented law, instead of, like, reprisals and punitive notions, proportional responses slowly become a little more awkward to perform, because they start looking like tit-for-tat. You attack me; I'm going to attack back.

And we're past that in the international -- we're supposed to be past that in international law. And we're not supposed to be at a point where we're just looking to stick it to someone because they got us with something. We're supposed to be at the point where we sit down and say, "We've been attacked. Here's a set of perhaps sanctions" -- perhaps it's going to be additional trade regulations, which I guess are sanctions -- additional sets of something that will bring you into compliance; perhaps it does involve a little more transparency in these organizations.

And that's kind of what I was getting at -- it's almost impossible to do for some of them, because if you're not going for proportional responses or some sort of response -- because we're better than that -- and you can't bring them into compliance, because you're trying to bring a fundamentally noncompliant national body -- and that doesn't just extend to North Korea; North Korea was the case here.

Think about any country trying to sanction the U.S. based on NSA activities, or China, which some have tried to do, based on Third Department activities. These are groups that are designed to dodge around whatever rules have been established.

And so to get back to proportional response again, that's what people do suggest -- is, at the end of the day, if you can't regulate it, then you do need to just -- it's going to be a Wild West as things develop, and you do just need to get them back. And you always risk escalation.

Now as the United States, you have a pretty good position, because we're fairly decent at -- the phrase I've heard people use is "escalation dominance," which is a very aggressive phrase. But we're good at escalation. And that's a really bad thing to have to say, but we can handle that. And so if we get to that point, we could do that. But you don't want to be at that point.

And so I'm not sure if that fully answers your question, because it's a very controversial thing. When I was even writing the presentation, I referred to my CSIS team member that I was using the phrase "deterrence" in it. I just got this angry tirade of, like, Kakao Talk messages, which is, like, you don't talk about this. Then we'll hate you, and we don't believe in deterrence.

MS. KIM: Well, we don't hate you.

And on that note, I would like to open questions to the floor -- and if you could state your name and affiliation. I see hands up here in the front, as well.

QUESTION: Hi. My name is Jackie Kim. I'm a Researcher for the Committee
for Human Rights North Korea. So, I have a question for Esther and Scott.

So, Esther, you have experience working with the U.N. But when I look at the U.N. from a North Korean perspective -- I'm not from North Korea, but just, like, trying to think in its shoes -- I see the U.N. as a very Western organization. Like, for example, the United Nations Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations -- like, they're all written by Westerners.

So, why do you think trying to engage North Korea through the U.N. is a good idea, and, I guess, what do you think is a limit of foreign countries? Like, when should they stop engaging, I guess, like, North Korea? Like, do you think it should be left up to South Korea to, I guess, like, do the majority of the process? And, yeah, just why do you think the U.N. is so important in trying to engage North Korea?

And for Scott -- clearly, from your presentation -- which I really enjoyed -- I can see that North Korea has very capable, I guess, like, cyber, you know, capability. So, do you think the government will, at any point, share this knowledge with its people? And if so -- I guess, like, the North Korean people can have access to the internet or access to this information -- like, what would change? Like, I guess, like, how would the role of North Korea change in the world, and would reunification be more possible with this knowledge? Thank you.

MS. IM: So, that's an interesting question. I think that's also a misconception, too, because we like to, I think, supplant our own understanding of the U.N. without having experienced it. And I don't mean that to be, you know, derogatory -- or, you know, to be mean in any way.

But when you go to the U.N., you realize that some of the most savvy diplomats at the U.N. are not the Americans or, you know, the Western diplomats. They're very, you know -- Egypt, Morocco -- they dominate in some of the committees. And so even to say that it is a Western organization, I think, discounts how these smaller countries have been able to maneuver the system and to manipulate the system.

I talked in my presentation about this growing trend towards voter blocs. And I think that's something that we're increasingly seeing at the United Nations, you know, especially at the most recent NPT Review Conference. My assessment is that the failure to adopt a final document there was not necessarily just on the U.S., but it was a lot of pushback from the Middle Eastern countries not willing to step aside. So, I think you're seeing these other countries being able to dominate.

And likewise for North Korea -- I think they're able to really capitalize on that, because they have their friends, like Cuba, who are able to come to their defense, especially, you know, during the GA and especially the Third Committee discussion about the human rights support. You know, they're not alone at the U.N. by any means, and they're very savvy with how the system works, as well. They regularly talk to press, and hold their own press conferences to really frame the narrative at the U.N., as well.
So, to say that -- I think that makes it a prime place to discuss North Korea, because you can engage North Korea, and you can see what it's doing there and react accordingly -- or engage accordingly, hopefully.

MS. DRAUDT: So, also, to follow up on that -- because I think what you're asking is, why, from North Korea's perspective, they'd be interested in participating in the U.N. and working with people on it.

Something to remember is that the North Korean leadership is really seeking international legitimacy. This is a lot of what's underwriting some of the current actions, even while they're retreating from diplomacy, even with some of its most friendly historical neighbors. So, in that sense, I think the U.N. would be, as a recognized setting for dealing with international disputes in the absence of others of its size, from North Korea's perspective, it might be the best setting for those.

And then secondly, from our perspective, it's helpful, because North Korea has tended to peel off a lot of its interlocutors and work kind of bilateral -- fostering bilateral relationships at different times. And so from our perspective, the more we can pull them into multilateral settings underwritten by internationally-recognized laws helps us to bring them into compliance with international standards on nuclearization, as well as the human rights issue.

As you know, this year, the U.N. has done significant work in raising global awareness with the publication of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea. So, from our perspective, this is the ideal setting, as well.

MR. La FOY: Just to quickly answer the second part of that -- the people who would probably be more appropriate to answer this would be Cristina and Jieun. They both have presentations about information technologies domestically within North Korea that are being consumed by the population -- or potentially consumed.

To answer the immediate question of, would the DPRK share its knowledge with people -- from the clandestine side, no. That's just a no. NSA doesn't share a ton of things with us. They're not going devolve a lot of technologies out of that.

However, there is a relatively robust -- for North Korea -- electronics industry and information technology education. It's expanding slowly, but it's there. Some of it's several decades old at this point. There's a lot of research going into it and a lot of education. So, something is being devolved down to the population, and knowledge is being expanded -- because they know that a smart population makes your country stronger. But the extent of that, I can't answer so much as those two could.

MS. KIM: Great; thank you. And I think we had another question in the front.

QUESTION: Hi. My name is Azu Kim, and I'm a student at GW Law School. I had a similar question to Esther. Sorry to put you on the spot, but -- so when the Korea reunites, there are a lot of scenarios we could think of, but one could be U.N. intervening and
putting the two Koreas under U.N. trusteeship. What are your thoughts on that? I know you're not here on behalf of the U.N., but, like, your personal thoughts.

MS. IM: I'm not really sure. I haven't actually thought too much about how the U.N., practically speaking, would serve as a role. In my mind, I think the U.N. can play a role, but I think -- my perspectives on unification are much more, what can South Korea do, and what should it do?

I think definitely, from the Korean perspective -- not that I'm speaking for the Korean perspective, but for them, it's much more important for it to be a bilateral process, as well. But I think the U.N. has a lot of experience to offer, especially, you know, in its peace-building and peacekeeping ventures, to apply to the Korean situation -- and especially as a venue to discuss what is possible.

So, I think it's hard for me to say what they would realistically do in a trusteeship situation. But I think, yes, we should definitely explore what the U.N. can do in that regard.

MS. KIM: Thank you. Are there other questions from the floor -- and, also, from our presenters who have presented already and will present in the afternoon panel? This is open to all. I'm astounded; no questions. Here we go.

QUESTION: Hi. My name is Channa Yu, and I'm coming from Johns Hopkins, SAIS, just across the street. And my question is actually towards -- it's for Jin and for Matt from the first panel. So, I remember that -- he's not here? Okay. Well, this is for you, Matt -- okay. And if any of you in the front would also be willing to answer this question, I'd greatly appreciate it.

So, there was the idea that there are ways to be creative about policy, especially U.S. policy towards North Korea, and that a nuclear North Korea can indeed go hand-in-hand with reforms at the same time. So, my question is, do you have any concrete ideas, you know, just ideas that you may have, where we can actually be creative at this point?

Also, how will we ensure that we're monitoring and preventing the diversion of economic aid going towards nuclear weapons programs?

MR. PARK: So, yeah, that's an interesting question. We were trying to answer that question, like, 20 years ago, 15 years ago, 10 years ago, and now we're trying to answer that question, too.

The reason I think it's possible is that China did reform when it was nuclear. It is still nuclear. It's a nuclear power. And they successfully did reforms and opening while having nuclear weapons. It's nothing to do with nuclear weapons, and reform is not an opposite word. It's not something that's inherently opposite, to reform an opening.

And, also, the problem is, unlike Burma or China -- why Burma and China were able to reform and open -- because they had no security threats like North Korea had. North
Korea had security threats -- not against the United States, but against South Korea. North Korean people always have option to turn to South Korea, like East Germany did.

So, that's why they are not able to -- within North Korean elites, who are more reluctant, more hesitant to open their country, because they're always afraid of being next by South Korea. And it's a real option for North Korean people, and that option did not exist in China in the 1980s and in Burma right now.

So, I think it's kind of inevitable, too, because only if North Korea has some kind of sudden collapse -- which I think is not entirely a good option, but it's possible, so we should be prepared for it -- but unless that happens, we either should drag on this current situation of, like, talks without having any outcome or just thinking about different options. And that's why I tried to recommend that option.

So, is it possible? Yeah, it's possible. It happened in China, and it might happen in other countries. Israel is nuclear owner, but they're doing very well in market economy, so market economy is not anything opposite to nuclear weapons.

So, U.S. policymakers -- the reason I said we should be creative is because there's no precedent like this. North Korea is -- some people will say, "Of course, yeah, North Korea's not compared with China. It's a small country. It's not a member of U.N. Security Council, so there's no precedent." And that's why I said we should be creative and use some imagination.

And what was your second question? Oh, yeah. So, that happened all the time. I mean, whenever there's international aid to North Korea through official channels, it goes to North Korean regime first, and then distributed among people. Yeah, that happens.

But now things have changed, because North Korean regime is corrupt now, they cannot control everything. So, when aid goes to the regime, it's distributed among the military. They're appropriating first, and they go to the people.

So, that means, yeah, we are seeing a corrupt capitalism in North Korea right now, like China was able to do reform, because the military controlled a lot of their market economy. And that's why the Chinese military supported reform by Deng Xiaoping, unlike the Soviet Union. In Soviet Union, military didn't have any stake in the market economy or market economy reform; that's why they opposed.

And in China, a lot of military groups, military corps, commands, they actually owned hotels and even, like, airlines and pharmaceutical companies, too. They have stakes in market economy, so they support it, because they could profit.

North Korea is the same. North Korean system broke down; it's collapsed. So, they're not relying on the government for revenue generation. They rely on, like, markets, black markets, jangmadang.

So, we can do it. So, international aid, yeah, is complicated. We cannot prevent
the diversion of resources 100 percent, but I think we still can use them to develop this burgeoning North Korean market economy. It's not exactly related to -- I mean, some of them might go to the regime. Some of them might go to Kim Jong-un's coffer. Some of them might go to nuclear weapons development program, but it's not 100 percent guarantee. But we can still benefit the market participants, *jangmadang* participants, because the resources go all the way to the bottom. I hope this answers your question.

MS. KIM: And, Matt, I think we just have maybe, like, one or two minutes, and then we'll have to wrap up. But if you want to come to the front, actually.

MR. McGrath: Channa, you could've just asked me at school later. Thanks for your question. I think it's a very important question. To build on a little bit of what Jin was saying, they have actually found U.N.-distributed food, I think, in some of the *jangmadang* markets. So, it's very interesting. I don't know; I could find a report about that later.

But I personally don't know how we could really -- I think that actually, throughout history, because the international community has been so concerned with this issue -- the U.N. and other organizations have actually developed sort of, like, programmatic aspects of their aid distribution systems, where they can more accurately ensure that the aid that's given does actually reach the recipients it's intended to. But I don't have that specific information, but I think that does exist -- because I know that there are humanitarian organizations who do work on developing wells or, you know, they do tuberculosis treatment for people in North Korea who have tuberculosis -- which is a big issue, as well.

And then I guess on the nuclear issue -- the reason I said I think we need creativity -- because there's really not a lot of productive dialogue, in my opinion. I think that, like - so to tell you a story -- I guess a brief story -- as a reporter, I did an interview with the former British Ambassador who founded the embassy in Pyongyang. And something that he said in that interview that was very telling and it stuck with me until this day was that diplomacy is talking. And if you don't talk, it's very difficult to resolve any of your differences.

And so I feel like right now, maybe there is a need for more talking, formal or informal. I know there are some informal discussions going on, as well. So, that's my two cents. Yeah, thank you.

MS. KIM: Great. Thank you so much.

MS. IM: Just because I would like to set the record -- I mean, the Security Council resolutions do try to account for this preventing diversion of economic aid to its weapons program. And 2087, when it was adopted, expanded some of those sanctions. And there is a clause in there calling international organizations to ensure that their activities in Pyongyang or DPRK do not divert to the nuclear weapons program.

And they do consult the committee on those issues. And so there is understanding that agencies have to mitigate it, and there are resources for them to consult.
MS. KIM: Thank you. I'd like to thank all of our presenters, our wonderful panelists today, and, also, audience members for asking questions and participating in the conversation. We will be adjourning for a very short period for lunch next door -- or in the hallway next door to the Falk Auditorium -- and reconvening at 1:05 p.m., where I will be handing the torch over to my friend and colleague, Nat Kretchun for the "New Information; New Approaches" panel. And I would just like to say as I sign off, it was really refreshing not to hear six-party talks and all of these things that you hear at the other panels that Washington hosts. So, thank you very much.

DR. MOON: Okay. Please feel free to keep munching and if you quietly go out to get more drinks or napkins or what have you -- that's fine. But we do need to start our afternoon panel. So now we're going to move to the domestic politics and some comparisons that we can make. And this panel will be led by our moderator -- the wise old Nathaniel or Nat Kretchun. Nat is already the associate director of a company called InterMedia where they do a lot of research for the U.S. government, for foundations, for various centers, et cetera. And he is handling the Asia field research for the Melinda Gates Foundation's Finance Inclusion Insights Program -- a multi-country program. He does many other things and you can read his full bio in the bio sheets here. I think what I would like to highlight is that he has written a book called A Quiet Opening. He is also fluent in Chinese, Korean, and English. And Texan English I believe, right? He is a very talented guy and so I will turn the microphone over to Nat who will introduce our panelists for the afternoon. Thank you.

NATHANIEL KRETCHUN: Being fluent in Texas English -- I guess I'll start with howdy. Hi everybody -- I'm really excited to be part of what is really -- I think it's been said several times already today -- but really a unique panel, and one that I'm particularly excited to be a part of just because of the title. New Information and New Approaches -- and those are two things that in North Korea research that I kind of focus on -- but in research in general I'm very much obsessed with data for the information and the methodologies around our approaches.

And on kind of a more personal note I feel like this has given me an opportunity to really fulfill my destiny in terms of -- I've always been since I was a little kid everyone said I was an old soul. And young and hip were never really my forte. And as the participants we were all going to dinner last night. Jieun said to me, oh, I googled you and I expected to see a picture of a super old guy. And so I've made it. I'm a super old guy now. So I will not take any more of our time before our very exciting first panel. New Information, New Approaches: The Koreas.

And our first speaker is going to be Hyo Won Shin. She recently was a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. She has an M.A. in Global Affairs and Policy from the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei -- where she worked on International Security and Policy. And of interest to her presentation specifically she spent a lot of her formative years in Myanmar. So I will turn it over to Hyo Won.

MS. SHIN: Thank you everybody -- thank you ladies and gentlemen for taking the time to attend this conference. I would like to make a special thank you to Professor Moon for actually making this happen. In the initial stages she brought up this idea and I thought
that -- why would anybody want to listen to young professionals? But I guess you guys are here to support us and thank you. Okay.

All right so I am honored to be presenting my presentation titled Political Transition of Myanmar -- Adequate lesson for the DPRK. So this is for refocusing application of Myanmar's political transition case on the DPRK with special reference to the role of China. So my curiosity regarding the possibility of North Korea taking on a Myanmar styled open and reform path arose after Obama's speech in November 19th, 2011 in which he compared the two countries and urged Pyongyang to follow Myanmar's example. After this the media and various scholars followed this comparison and tried to see whether Myanmar was a suitable model for North Korea. Although the two countries share various similarities such as a history of colonization by the British Empire and Imperial Japan, military as their dominant political institution -- high poverty rates, poor human rights conditions and high reliance on informal economy, there are still differences that still set the two countries apart. Therefore in order to heighten our precision regarding the common speculation on DPRK adopting the Myanmar model for reform we have to look at the differences between Myanmar and North Korea. So the initial question I ask is pretty simple -- can DPRK take on Myanmar's path of open reform? My hypothesis was that due to the influence gap which I will talk about later -- between Myanmar and North Korea and its relations with China where Myanmar has greater influence than DPRK. DPRK will not be able to take on the same path for political transition. So the significance of my research is to contribute to the ongoing comparative studies of Myanmar and North Korea which still there has been very little done. There has been a lot of talks -- and a lot of speculations but the two countries have not been thoroughly analyzed in comparison.

So also it will contribute to the determining possible solutions for the North Korean issue. And this timeframe for my research was from post-Cold War era to the recent. I took 1990 as the starting point because this was when the demise of Soviet Union left North Korea deprived of economic and political support. And Myanmar after the coup d'état in 1988 -- it left the country in international isolation, which left no choice for DPRK and Myanmar to turn to China for support.

So the methodology for my research was a qualitative comparative method. So I took the two cases -- Myanmar, North Korea and compared how much influence the two countries each had in its relations with China. Myanmar and DPRK were some of the few countries that had recognized brother-like relations with China right after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. China since then has played a crucial role in Myanmar and DPRK's political and economic development. Although Beijing provided military and economic support to sustain Nepeta and Pyongyang the two countries always perceived Beijing as a threat to its sovereignty and the increase of Chinese influence over time has raised fears in North Korea and Myanmar as a threat to its sovereignty and raised fears of becoming China's vassal state. Therefore one of the critical reasons for Myanmar's political reform was its asymmetrical relations with China. Due to Myanmar's international isolation and depressing economic situation prior to its political transition, it had come to rely heavily on China for support. As a result Myanmar had to succumb to many of China's aggressive political agendas and investments.
So contrary to the common understanding of asymmetrical relations that obviously dominant powers that have all the power in the relationship. Robert Keohane stated that weak states are also capable of bargaining in the asymmetrical relations with dominant states. So in order to see how the weak states here in Myanmar and DPRK deal with China and their asymmetrical relations. I measured the influence of weak countries in its relations to China and whether they are capable of balancing the asymmetrical relationship. In order to do this I looked at Myanmar and DPRK's domestic and foreign policy, high level meetings with China, and finally China's behavior towards Myanmar and DPRK by looking at official statements -- trade and aid volume, China's foreign policy change -- whether it was hostile or friendly in order to see how Myanmar and DPRK's relations with China changed over time.

So after doing this I came up with four major differences which contributed to the influence gap between Myanmar and North Korea and its relations with China. Where is the political system? So Myanmar's military junta which came into power after the 1988 coup d'état promised that it would eventually transfer its power to a democratic government. It also had an opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi as many of you know. I think her present was an optimistic symbol to the people always having this -- people always had this hope looking at her that one day our country will turn back to the democratic ways it had once been. But on the other hand DPRK's Juche ideology, personalization of the government and absence of opposition parties left little room for a political transition.

To add a study by Barbara Geddes proved that military dictatorships just were far short lived than one party regime due to a relatively great power concentrated in the hands of leaders of one party dictatorships, which further proves that there is very little chance of DPRK's political transition.

Second, Myanmar, despite speculations regarding nuclear weapons, President Thein Sein -- the current president -- has shown willingness to abide by the non-proliferation treaty. North Korea however as you all know -- its nuclear and missile possessions and testings have severely limited its engagement with the international community and thereby increased its reliance on China.

Thirdly, Myanmar -- although it was sanctioned by the west for its poor human rights conditions balance its relations with China by engaging in diplomatic and economic relations with India in its look-east policy and also ASEAN members. ASEAN, despite their non-intervention code, was always encouraging and supporting Myanmar's political reform. When Myanmar decided to take on a political transition -- the U.S. was also there with its pivot to Asia policy. Therefore they were fast to re-engage diplomatically. In contrast DPRK's relations with U.S. further deteriorated as President Bush labeled them as the axis of evil and worsened after North Korea's nuclear test in 2006, 2009 and 2013, along with its missile tests in between.

With RK in Japan, for most of the times, the two countries remained hostile towards DPRK for its provocations and abduction issues. As a result, unlike Myanmar, DPRK did not have much choice again but to turn to China for its support.
So finally, coming to the China factor, the differences between DPRK and Myanmar as we have seen in its political system, nuclear weapon development and diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, we can see that these kind of things also contribute to the influence gap it has with its relations with China.

Myanmar in the 1990's, they had a pretty strong relation which was labeled as Paopa which in Burmese it means cousin like. So if you're cousins, what are you like? They're very close. So the two supported each other but this rapidly deteriorated in 2011 as Myanmar transitioned into a quasi-led government from a military dictatorship. Prior to the transition, there was a period where anti-Chinese sentiments grew amongst military members and civilians as resources were sold at very cheap prices, an infrastructure project brought on negative impacts to society. Also China kind of bullied Myanmar in international, such as for ASEAN to press its political agendas regarding territorial issues and they kind of forced Myanmar to support China, even though Myanmar didn't really want to. So they were sick of this -- China's asymmetrical relationship, that they took a political transition in 2011.

DPRK does not have much leverage in relations to China. Rather, their highly isolated environment leaves the country no choice but to continue its dependence on China for economic support. DPRK's distress which arose at national years of its brotherly relations led to Pyongyang's attempt to diversify diplomatic relations in the 1970's. However there was little success as their nuclear weapon development, poor human rights conditions in aggressive domestic policy such as military first, Songun policy, it led to harsh criticisms and heavy distinctions by the international community.

In turn, DPRK's reliance on China increased to the point where China, I heard that it's beginning to view North Korea as a burden to its existence, which is evident because China has begun to seek out multilateral efforts to solve the North Korea problem. So currently, Sino-Myanmar relations remain strained to its diplomatic diversification, followed by suspension of major Chinese investments, such as the Myitsone Dam. China has taken on a wait and see policy towards Myanmar, meaning that Beijing will temporarily refrain from additional commitments and focus on only existing ones. Also, Beijing has recently been trying to mend its relations with the China friendly presidential candidate, U Shwe Mann and most recently, invited the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to Beijing, which is analyzed as CCP's efforts to suit the strained relations. Kim Jong Un on the other hand, has not made much progress as he took on the byung-jin policy and the continued nuclear testings and provocations have further increased criticisms and sanctions from the international community. Also its attempts to diversify relations under the (inaudible) offensive policy has proved not to be successful. As you all know, he was planning on going to Russia, but he didn't because he had to solve domestic issues.

So to conclude, my research tried to answer the question, can DPRK take on Myanmar's path to open reform by determining the defenses and the influence gap between the two countries and its relations with China? DPRK's environment compared to Myanmar is highly limited and therefore the possibility of open reform remains very low. To end, North Korea's change -- it's -- I don't see it as not impossible. I think that it can be done, but in order to do so, as I talked in my -- as I mentioned in my panel -- the first panel -- there needs to be trust within the DPRK government and amongst international players. But most importantly, as
Myanmar did, the leaders' desires must come from within for change to happen. Thank you.

MR. KRETCHUN: Thank you very much Hyo Won. Very fascinating stuff. Our next speaker is Mai Huong Canh and she is a Masters' candidate at Yonsei at International Trade, Finance and Management. Her research interests include East Asia regional integration with a focus on ASEAN and I think she probably wins the award for most dedicated for this, simply because she took a final at 4 AM this morning. So a round of applause for that.

MAI HUONG CANH: Okay, thank you for the kind introduction. Before I open this one, I want to say many thanks to the Brookings Institution for having me, especially Professor Katharine Moon. So my topic today as you can see is going to be a little bit different from the state to tape and macro view of two day conference. And it's going to be about international student policy in South Korea. The reason why I picked this topic is because I have been in Korea for the last six years. I finished my undergrad in Ewha University in 2013 and I go to Yonsei University and I'm going to graduate this year. So it's a topic that is very personally concerns me. The second reason is that, we all know that South Korea is changing from inside, and it's growing into a multicultural society, whether it wants this or not, right? And so you look at this graph right here. International students only made up of eight percent of total foreigners in Korea. How are the eight percent is 80,000 something of people, and this group is not problem free. And unlike other groups like migrant workers, (inaudible), they have more visible issues. This group doesn't have a lot of attention for media and everyone else, so through this presentation, I want to raise some concern, maybe attention to this population's growing in Korea.

And with that being said, I'm going to first talk about why we are even talking about that in the first place, why it matters to South Korea to have international students coming in. And I am going to go over the study career project, which is the South Korea government's flagship program for international students' policy. I'm going to evaluate its past record and analyze its valuations plan. I'm going to conclude with giving some thoughts on how to improve the current policy.

So firstly, why international students matter, right? The first reason is that higher education market in South Korea expects very looming oversupplying problems. As you can see in this one, current studying abroad has always been over 200,000 since 2008, while the number of international students coming in in South Korea has been a relatively new issue happening. Second reason is that as we all know, South Korea has been one of the lowest buffering country in the world and that leads to according to the head of Education Ministry, Kim Jae-Kum in 2024 there will be 160,000 acceptances in university and by the same times, around one third of them will be forced to close (inaudible).

Another reason for that is they might want to go the Korean Dream, the American Dream, is going to allow the coronation of reign. It actually has been. And finally, it is going to increase South Korea's competitiveness in education in regional areas, as well as in global arena. And so with that in mind, South Korean government has formed government led initiative in
2001. It's formally been implemented in 2004 and (inaudible) was having 50,000 students by 2010. They achieved that in 2007 and so they have been revised twice since then, in 2008 and 2012.

So let's see how this has been working so far, right. This is the number of international students from 2003 to 2014. And you can see that it's very pretty pictures. Seven fold of international sales increase, so you have been very internationalized, however, if you look at it from a different angle, it's a little bit less optimistic and slightly more dramatic, and so the number has been peaked from 2004 to 2007, in fact at this time, they have the highest growth in international students among own OACD country, but has been going down since 2007 and in 2012, from 2012 to 2014, has experience negative growth. So it's a big question about why it happened.

You break it down a little bit more you can see that the number was dropped out because students stopped coming to Korea. So it's not so terrible as you can see. However, the desire was not (inaudible) satisfaction in there. This is a research survey done by (inaudible) which is one of the major magazine in South Korea. And you can see that they have students usually came to Korea with high expectation. However not all of them was met, especially Asians, as you can see here. In fact, except for European and North American, Asian students feel like expectations are not met once they came to Korea. And why is this significant? It is significant because Asians have 86 percent of international in South Korea. Among them we have 60 percent of them are Chinese students and these were not happy. So the indicator shows that this is really not sustainable nor desirable. Thirty percent of international students in Korea say that they experience some sort of discrimination in Korea, especially Asians. Thirty percent of Chinese students develop some sort of anti-Korean sentiments once they came to Korea.

Why don't we compare that to Japan, the next country? You see the mixed disparity in how they manage the international students. So among Chinese students, most Chinese students in Korea would not recommend their friends to come to Korea to study and in Japan more of them plan to -- significantly more of them plan to stay in Japan after graduation. And so it seems like their plans have not been working very well.

So I'm going to analyze the revised plan in 2012, which is study career project 2020. And I only want to focus on the first one, which is how to increase international most of students. Sorry. And okay, there are action plans in here. I'm not going to go over all of the details in here, but I want you to focus on the expecting number of international students and the action plan of that period. It seems to be they are having quite concrete plans of how to systemizing their promotion process, however they are more vague in how to actually refining the management system, and so the problem is with South Korea, in that they're doing really well with attracting international students, but then after the students are enrolling, the systems went kind of up here. And so my argument in this presentation is that the next, the revised version seemed to follow the same problem. They focus on promotion and delaying the quality improvement so according to the action plan, this will not be enough quality by 2020 and by that, they already are expecting 200,000 students, and that is not a sustainable strategy. So in order to do improving the quality of international students in South Korea, I want to look more at the -- what kind of problems they are fixing and I'm going -- if I have to break out college life
into academic life, social life and career support apart, I would only focus on academic life and career support today because it's time limit.

So in terms of academic life, the most biggest problem they have in university is the language qualification, the language problem, and the thing is that South Koreans in university has been compromised in terms of what kinds of qualifications they require of the students before they're coming in. As you can see in these screen captures, this is from one of the top five universities in South Korea, and you don't need a Korean qualification when you come into the school, which is, topic three, is the low intermediate level of Korean. And you only require topic four, which is conversational Korean to graduate from that school. And with conversational Korean, it's extremely difficult to follow the class. What that has led to, language difficulty incorporating. Incorporating is basically that you are graded on a rank in the class. It affects negative academic performance of its students and therefore, the international students may risk being seen as not academically excellent. And one of these consequences I currently have here is that Korean students tend not to be in the same group with international students. You can read some of the testimonies in here. The upper one is from the inaudible 2011 article and the lower one is from my friend from Ewha University. So the problem is actually very visible for international students. So the conclusion for academic life is that this problem cannot be solved with more students coming in because they will suffer the same problem over again. So what they should do is they should have tutor selection with more qualification requirement from to students, but that would mean less students in short term. That would go against an original plan.

For current support, the revised version of the policy promised to have more internship and job postings. But I would give that would only make a half of their problems; it only solves part of the problem, which is visibility pass. As you can see in this graph, there is the percentage of internationals doesn't have job experience in Korea. And the number is real alarming to me. It's over 70 percent. It has only been increasing since 2012 to 2014. And very few of them actually want to stay in Korea to find a job or to continue to higher education. It's even more interesting here. I want you to focus on that graph over there. And they break it down into the year of enrollment. So from the first, the upper two items, is the plan to study to find a job in Korea, and it's drastically decreased by when they come to fourth year, and they don't even want to study in higher education after four year university and so it's something to tell you. According to studies at Korea, international students have the lowest and significantly below that of other job seeking foreigners, so the average of a foreigner is like 67 percent, while for international students, it's 50.6 percent, you can see in 2012. And it decreased by nine percent in 2014. And so they're having a very hard time finding jobs in Korea.

Other problem is that companies only usually take last year students to do internship and so companies are extremely high, legal aspect is still kind of refining, so it's a lot of like less in flexibility and subject to interpretation. The bottom line is how this can be solved with more students coming in. I don't see how it's going to be not exploding to a bigger problem.

And so in my conclusion, I want to draw some reference to my major in Yonsei right now, which is management. And that is to say, once a company wants to have a more sustainable desirable result, they need a strategy, which is very different than operational
efficiency. And by that they need to be different, making sure having a career to fit. And here I want to draw reference to the making sure in this part, that's choose not to do, choose not what to do. Sometimes the staff's limited and capability is limited. You have to choose what not to do in order to success. And so my conclusion is that Korea needs a better strategy to want international students and that should be the quality over the quantity. Thank you so much. (applause)

MR. KRETCHUN: Thank you very much Mai Huong. I think we can all agree that the stakes are not insignificant for Korea on this front, and a lot of really interesting data brought to bear there. Our next presenter is Jieun Baek and she's currently at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School where she's researching opportunities for change in North Korea, with Graham Allison and Ambassador Steven Bosworth. And actually, Jieun now has a book deal that will be coming out on information access in North Korea and I believe it's going to be published next year. And with that, here's Jieun. (applause)

JIEUN BAEK: All right. I'm going to start by talking about something that has nothing to do with Korea. So hydraulic fracking, as you may know, combines advanced technology and clever tactics to liberate large reserves of oil and gas from rocks that have been previously beyond the reach of man. This occurs by using pressurized bursts of water, chemicals and small rocks to penetrate deep rock formations, and once sufficient pressure pierces through these hard surfaces, gasses start seeping out. The fracking revolution in the energy field could point the way to hopefully a new successful strategy when it comes to North Korea. We're not going to frack oil in North Korea, but this is just an analogy. The big idea here is that the U.S. government and other interested actors such as civil society groups, dissidents and private companies, must mobilize and analogous mix of knowledge, innovation and radical techniques, to frack North Korea, with pressurized bursts of foreign information and democratic ideas. In return, the pressure for change inside may start seeping out through the cracks of the regime, so much so that Kim Jung Un will not be able to merely eliminate or dismiss them.

This is all about the power of information. So why should we think about information fracking? The North Korea problem is a hodgepodge of enormous issues that we all know about too well here. Obviously there's a nuclear weapons threat and the egregious human rights violation and there's a stunted population due to chronic malnutrition across generations, and so many more issues. North Korea's intractable leadership, their reliable re-negging from international treaties and the seemingly bizarre yet perhaps hyper-rational foreign policy on their end, has led to displeased policy makers and negotiators to say the least. North Korea has both frustrated and also intrigued the international community, giving rise to a cottage industry of news and media stories that showcase and often exaggerate the spectacularly violent nature of executions and also victimizes population as 24 million brainwashed Communists with no personal agency or entrepreneurial survival skills.

The collective exasperation among practitioners and North Korea watchers have inadvertently led to somewhat of a normalization of North Korea's unacceptable behavior. They have become more immune to punishment for its bad behavior than any other sovereign state. They shoot missiles. Many of us have talked about this before. They make bombastic nuclear threats. They test nuclear weapons. And they call our President, President Barack Obama, and
other world leaders, sexist and racist names that not even kids say in the school yard. They get in trouble too if they say those things. They use hostages as a microphone to make erratic demands. They have hacked into South Korea's banking and governmental computer systems, and they most likely hacked into SONY. Such recent events underscore the fact that North Korea's collecting more and more offensive capabilities. And so as a novelty of such behavior on their part has worn off however. Their -- North Korea's domestic and foreign policies and actions have become almost white noise in our day to day affairs as non-North-Koreans.

Track one and track 1.5 and track two diplomacy absolutely ought to continue, along with targeted sanctions currently in place and those that may be amped up in the near future, to aim to squeeze certain revenue streams into Kim Jong Un’s coffers. But these decades old measures alone are not going to create much damage to his hardened regime and his leadership.

Despite China's growing displeasure with Kim Jong Un’s government, a collapsed North Korea is the worst among really bad options for China. North Korea knows this and will continue to leverage this fact to lean on its biggest trade partner for the foreseeable future, however irritated China may be with their cousin, or their brother, or with North Korea.

Therefore, it is time to add a new strategy, or at least test it, to the policy mix towards North Korea. The U.S. government and other interested actors as well as an assortment of civic organizations, defectors, tech people, business people, can collectively marshal resources to sponsor information campaigns to create and sustain pressures for North Korea, to re-evaluate its domestic and foreign interests and priorities.

So how do we send information in? This is the interesting part in my opinion. I have been studying and speaking with all sorts of people involved in psychological warfare and non-violent resistance movements from different countries to inform some of my thoughts on how we can get information into North Korea. The good news is, information is and it has been getting into North Korea through both covert and more formal ways -- mostly more informal ways -- into North Korea for about 20 years or so, and he knows all about this. Visiting groups, with the help of others, have been sending information that we may have heard about in the news -- South Korean soap operas and American TV shows and movies in the forms of CDDs, CVs, CEDs, which have then been turned into DVDs and then smaller forms of USBs and micro-SD chips. Novels, political articles, self-help books, pornographic movies and even a few Bibles have been snuck in through a profit-driven and sometimes compassion driven network of defectors, activists, religious groups of all sorts, Chinese middle men and sometimes Joseon-jok of businesses as well. Radio stations run by former North Koreans and others, paid for by the American, South Korean and British governments all help to disseminate information inside North Korea in a piecemeal fashion.

Anecdotes illuminate the phenomenon that outside information coupled with this widespread dependence on the black market and gray economy, has led to a younger generation of more savvy, risk taking, somewhat independent thinking compared to older generations of North Koreans and more skeptical North Koreans who crave to know more about what they simply don't know. And Mr. Kretchun, or Nat widely cite an intermediate report details sum
of -- I wrote this before I met him, so I call him Mr. Kretchens (laughter), detail sum of this -- the social domestic changes inside North Korea sparked by outside information. But there is so much more that can be done and should be done. Although information fracking does not promise rapid or dramatic changes inside North Korea, it does offer the best prospect for creating conditions for the government to consider incremental political changes. Simply put, the more informed citizens are, the less the North Korean leadership will be able to eliminate all the bad seeds inside by relegating alleged criminals for accessing information and their relatives to camps or worse.

Empowering individuals with independent sources of information is a way to transform a political system without resorting to drastic regime change measures. Therefore, the U.S. government and other interested parties should pursue or hopefully consider pursuing the following three strategies to promote information fracking, if the operational objective is to force North Korean government to rethink its priorities. And success certainly requires enlisting a broad range of stakeholders as part of this three prong strategy.

So, number one, the first strategy I'd like to have us think through together, is to strengthen the covert operations, to break into North Korea's information channels and to support internal dissidence. One tactic could be to collaborate with dissidents and their contacts inside Pyongyang to infiltrate the regime's propaganda machines -- Rodong Sinmun, which is their state newspaper, their domestic cellular network and the state's intranet, called Kwangmyong, could all be potential targets. This would be a one-time game but something to consider.

Another tactic is more subtle and perhaps more sophisticated which is to cultivate and empower more delicate acts of self-determination inside. The key to creating domestic pressure on the regime will be to develop a critical mass of people who refuse to cooperate with their government's oppressive measures, despite expected punishment. A North Korean spring, or Pyongyang square demonstrations are unfortunately unlikely to take place anytime soon. However, quietly turning citizens away from their government inside their hearts and minds by opening their minds to the rest of the world, could incrementally encourage self-rule.

The sky is the limit when it comes to crafting the creative content to deliver on these tactics. For example, using the non-physical dimension that the regime does not have a monopoly on is one idea, such as spreading stories or songs, jokes and fables with particular morals or ideas by word of mouth. Also funding projects that can build horizontal social relationships centered on non-political issues is important, because the same social horizontal relationships could then be later primed for collective action.

The second strategy to think about is to increase funding for NGO's in the U.S. and South Korea who do this work. Strengthening NGO capabilities to disseminate information is essential, especially those run by North Koreans. Also, I'm going to speed up a little bit, also, just like how tech companies invest money in testing and iterating on products to come up with the next best version of the iPhone, Chromebook or this driverless car, money ought to be put into a venture fund for information access, to test projects that touch as many people as possible.
The third and last strategy is to bolster training for North Korean defectors in journalism, IT and social media. Defectors are the primary liaison between North Korea and outside world, outside world from North Korea. Saving North Korea does not only advance human rights, which is of utmost importance, but it also bolsters national security. Defectors are North Korea's Achilles Heel, because they undermine the country's most prized asset to sustaining its power, which is secrecy. By investing in this unique human capital, we can provide their networks of people inside with information that may be used to ultimately undermine the regime.

How we're going to find and operationalize some of this -- I'm going to skip over some stuff, but essentially, I have come across some individuals in D.C. and New York and Boston, who want to invest a lot of their individual income and capital into these initiatives. This is good news. Think about the possibility of wealthy individuals in New York and other cities, funding North Korean defectors in South Korea, with their projects conjured up by tech geniuses in Silicon Valley, with the political support of policy makers in D.C. to collectively tackle a decades old problem of a hardened North Korea. This is a phenomenal strategy, I think, among practitioners and scholars, to jointly address a foreign policy problem -- at least give it a shot. I am certain the funding exists for these ideas, and if not public, then private. The demand inside North Korea exists.

And so to wrap up here, these ideas are not ground breaking, but it would be considered ordinary if the target country was any country other than North Korea. Access to information to a 24 million strong population in this day and age of instant communication should be considered an obvious provision by the international community. It is time to test a new strategy towards North Korea and if implemented, the three recommended strategies could successfully create unprecedented attention inside North Korea and force the Kim regime to re-evaluate their interests and priorities, domestically and foreign, and foreign priorities in their long term interest. And hopefully this could lead to a brighter future for North Korea and its people and peace for its neighbors in northeast Asia. Thank you. (applause)

MR. KRETCHUN: Oh, Ms. Baek, you are speaking my language. I can't comment any further, because you won't shut me up for hours. (laughter) Our next presenter is Cristina Atencio. She's an incoming Master's candidate at the Fletcher's School for Law and Diplomacy at Tufts. During the last several years working at CRDF Global, she organized more than 40 workshops from more than 2600 scientists and engineers in 11 countries. And she's going to talk to us today about some of her experiences in North Korea, specifically with virtual science libraries. Cristina?

CRISTINA ATENCIO: Hi. Good afternoon. Let me open my presentation. Oh, here we go. Okay. First, Professor Moon, thank you for having me and to The Brookings Institute, thank you for inviting me and I'm very happy to be before you and share about the DPRK Virtual Science Library Project, which I undertook with my former employer CRDF Global last year, in the spring of 2014. So I'm going to tell you a little bit about the project and how we implemented it in Pyongyang when we traveled there.
So this is, as many of you have seen, I'm sure, the news in North Korea. This is the weekly paper for the week that I happened to be there. I scanned it in. Kim Jong-Un of course on the front page, Kim Jong-Un's works published abroad, and the commemoration of his grandfather's anniversary death. These were -- oh, something happened with the slide. But these are postcards that I purchased while there, but these are very similar to the billboards that you see all over the city. As you can see, we are prime enemy number one.

So there is hope though. There is new information that is coming into the country, that the government is allowing to come into the country. They have -- the DPRK government has come to the real -- they have acknowledged that the internet and science -- scientific research is important to the improvement of their country, of their agricultural sector, their health center, their environmental sector. And they've started to loosen restrictions on the access to the internet in the DPRK. So to give you some background, the U.S. DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium was formed in 2007. It involved AAAS, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, CRDF Global and Syracuse University. And under the U.S. DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium, the three organizations and universities have taken different routes to work with North Korea on academic science collaboration projects. AAAS did a facilitated research involving monitoring of seismic activity on Mt. Paektu and the seismic monitors are still there and I think this year they're wrapping up that research. Syracuse University has done English language trainings in North Korea and they've also done English language training outside of North Korea, for North Koreans. They've brought them outside of the country in Daleon in China.

And I'm going to be speaking mostly about CRDF Global's work with the State Academy of Sciences in North Korea. They have ten branch academies, 95 research institutions and 34 affiliated institutes. In 2011, my colleague, Dr. Charles Dunlap traveled to North Korea and gave a training on access to academic journals. If you're not familiar, think about Elsovir and Springer. These are journals that scientists read, publish -- publishers that publish journals that scientists read to stay up to date in the most recent developments in their field, be it nanotechnology, soil erosion technology, wind turbines, and my colleague gave this training and outlined for the North Koreans, for the State Academy of Science, what they could access if they only had access to the internet. And he outlined for example, Research for Life, which is four journal sets. It's a program run out of the U.N. by four independent U.N. agencies. Owari covers environmental research programs and that's run out of UNEP. Hinari covers health research journal sets run out of the Hu office in Geneva. Agora covers agricultural research and the newest addition to this lot is the RD program, which covers research for innovation, and that's run out of the World Intellectual Property organization.

Together these journal sets give access to more than 150 publishers of world renowned research and in the case of North Korea; it's free, for them to access. Total -- over 100 countries have access to these journal sets, with either free access or low cost access, depending on where they fall -- where their GNI, GDP falls.

The North Korea and other countries also have access to other open access sites including the directory of open access journals. Cogprints which is the repository that covers
access to neuroscience, neuroscience research, psychology, linguistics. High wire, Sight Seer covers computer and information science research. Most up to date research in the field.

So why does this matter? This matters because scientists don't necessarily care about the political situation in the country. On a day to day basis, they care about their research and they're interested in getting their research and talking to their colleagues. And not just talking to their colleagues inside their own country, but talking to their colleagues on an international level. So the Academy of Sciences listens, because they're interested in collaborating with other countries. They want to talk to the rest of the world. And in March of 2012, they opened an internet connection at the Academy of Sciences. And this is the internet room. One of my other colleagues traveled there and they were very happy to show her what they had accomplished in the eight months prior to that. So after we saw this, we were like, well, we can do more -- we can help them even get even better access, easier access, to all of these -- all this research that's available out there so they can collaborate and they can talk to the rest of the world. So in the spring of last year, we launched the DPRK virtual science library. This is what the home page looks like when you land on it. The menu items are in English and also in Korean. You -- the first thing you see is it looks like this, but -- so this is all that's available. And the search function is right on the home page. So you can search more than eleven million -- currently more than eleven million research articles, academic research articles and more than 3300 journal titles. So rather than having to go to different repositories or different web sites to look up whatever topic you might be interested, this gives you access -- easy access to all full text available articles in the country. And I say full text because anyone can go and read an abstract online. I can go online and I don't have to pay for it, but I can read the abstract of an article, but I can't necessarily read the full text edition of a research article.

My colleague and I, we traveled to Pyongyang and this is me giving a training to -- we gave a training to eight science librarians, and the director of the education office at the State Academy of Sciences. So this is us. We're using the DPRK VSL in the computer room which had expanded, so now it had 12 computers rather than the previous six. And I'm going through and teaching him how to use it. There you can see the site a little more clearly. This is the group of the science librarians. We left all our materials in both English and Korean with them, so that they could train others on how to use the system.

We also conducted an authorship workshop for research articles -- how to author articles for publication in academic journals and an article -- and here they are. They're asking questions. I'll get to that in a minute. And an article on grant proposal development, so how to write grant proposals to get funding for your research, internationally, so going to European organizations, Asian organizations -- how to get that research published.

And I'd like to highlight, some of the questions that they asked were just great and unexpected. They talked -- we were talking about how you go about looking for a collaborator and they were interested. They were like, how do I -- do I need to email them? And we were like, yes, you need to have email. And you could see they were writing it down. They were like, okay, and just kind of planting seeds of; this is what I need to do to get my research out. We had one gentleman ask us about patenting his research, about intellectual property. How do I patent?
That was very unexpected for us. And they were like, how do we communicate with journal editors? How do I know which journals to publish in? And we were very happy to talk about that. We left them all the materials for them with guidelines about how you go about looking for the journals that matter to your research. Like how do you know which journals to publish? There are thousands of journals. Which ones are the good ones to publish in? How do you reach out to potential collaborators in China, in Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, the U.S.? So the questions were great and I was very happy to hear their interest and their -- they even took us aside afterwards and they all spoke English so it was actually easy to speak with them and they asked questions of us of like, how do you go about doing this -- more specific questions.

So what's the next step you might ask? So like I said, right now, the Academy of Sciences has access to this web site, more than 11 million articles and more than 3300 journal titles. They want more trainings. They're interested in more trainings. And we are also interested -- I no longer work for CRDF Global, but just because I worked on this -- I'm interested in getting them more content, which is freely available right now in North Korea. And also providing this same website -- can be opened up to other institutions in North Korea. So we could go to another university, a university in North Korea, one of the several universities, Kim Chek or Kim Il Sun and open up the web site. It would be -- it's already paid for, for the next two years. It's been paid for up front, and it would be easy for us to open up access for them. So that's it. Yep. (applause)

MR. KRETCHUN: Thank you very much Cristina. And may I ask the other panelists to come back up for the Q&A. I won't hog too much of the time here before we open the floor for questions. But I did want to make just one brief comment on the treatment of the topics that our panelists have chosen. I think generally the role of discussant after -- especially after so many diverse and very interesting presentations, is to wrap everything up in a neat bow and show how each of these pieces contributes to our understanding of some broad and important hole. But I'm not going to do that. I'm going to do something slightly more epistemological. Because in my own work, I rely a lot on primary research in the field -- not only the data that brings out but also the kind of experiential lived part of being in the field and understanding these issues as they happen. And I think it's tempting, especially for an event framed like this one has been, the young and the brave, where we are focusing on creativity and youth and exuberance and energy and all those things are definitely true with this group, and definitely things to highlight, but I don't want to sell them short and not acknowledge the true rigor that's going into the studies here and also the amount of lived experience that our panelists are putting into the work they're doing. I think that's really important to keep in mind. And you may have gleaned this from their bios, but seriously, everyone on the panel who presented, has a lot of first hand experience in the topic that they were speaking on.

So I am just going to kind of ask one blanket question of everyone, which I guess I can nuance a little bit, just to brag about you guys a bit more. But essentially, I just want to know how your experience working directly on the topic has influenced how you've come to feel about it. So maybe we'll start with you Mai Huong. Like, if you had written this paper or done this research six months after you arrived in Korea rather than six years, how would it be different?
MS. CANH: Thank you for the question. Actually if I had to write this paper representation six months after arriving in Korea, that would be very different. I think it's two very visible things that happened. First one is practicality. Most of these results are valuable in Korean and it's very scattered across the web, so it takes a lot of effort to find which sources, look into which kind of studies I can find to cite. So practicality is Korean, my current six months in Korea would not be able to go over on that side and get all the information. But more importantly, the mentality of me six months in Korea and six years in Korea were very different. So six months in Korea would be all this I set up for myself. If I had any difficulty that would be on me and I'd have to work on that. But after six years, I feel like the government of Korea should do something as well. When they, the Thai thing, the education at the best, and trying to get us into, they should have some responsibility as well, you know, to create, smoothening the process and to minimizing the frustration of living in a foreign country.

MR. KRETCHUN: And Cristina, you have done similar virtual science library projects across a number of different countries, so have a great comparative perspective, however, we saw a picture of you working directly with one of the people you were training, and so you have that direct human interaction. And so, how, coming, how did the trip to North Korea and that actual engagement with them shape the way that you thought about it?

MS. ATENCIO: So I worked with a virtual science library in about seven or eight other countries and the intellectual curiosity present in scientists all over the world is equally present in the scientists in North Korea. And that is something that we need to foster, because they care about their research and that's a common area that we can work together on. And so what you realize is that it doesn't matter. Scientists behave in very similar ways, despite where they come from and how they grow up. The need for more information and the curiosity is always present in that community.

MR. KRETCHUN: And Jieun, I mean, you've worked at Google Ideas, and I know with NKIS on some of the cool stuff they do, on information access. And I'll nuance yours a little bit just because you know, we have to go a little bit inside baseball on this stuff, but how did your experiences actually kind of working with implementing groups shape your thoughts about this, particularly on how do we measure impact and what are we going to look for in terms of knowing whether or not our efforts are succeeding?

MS. BAEK: Sure, so I don't have the answer to implementing, or, excuse me, accountability measures. That's something that I'd love to talk and think more about. But one thing is, for the past 10 years or so, I constantly spend time with people from North Korea. These are people who have made the decision to leave without their government's permission. So whether it's hosting people at my house, staying with -- I have a lot of relatives in Korea, and rather than staying with my relatives, I stay with North Korean students, and invite them to stay -- constantly just spending time, because I think that is the -- from an academic standpoint -- that is the primary source. And oftentimes I do conflate academic and personal social interests, but I don't know if that's a blessing or a curse, but that's just kind of constantly having that on top of mind. Working at Google has certainly shaped my interests, because my interest was initiated with a human rights angle and only the very green naive perspective of a college freshman thinking about just, you know, how can people do this to each other. And I
think that question still rings true with much more complexity. But when I went to Google, everyone was -- I mean people are good people, but the question wasn't, let's solve this awful regime. It's, how could we use technology to solve a very difficult problem? So trying to then align interests from the executive level at a corporate company with my -- it forced me to think about how could we use technology to address the same issues, basically trying to serve a very repressed population. So that personal experience certainly did shape my thoughts. In terms of accountability measures, I didn't say -- I didn't get to the point in the preezo, but the number of USBs or DVDs that can be pushed into North Korea is not that important. A lot of organizations like the one that I have worked with in addition to NKS pride themselves in saying, we have sent in 10,000. We have sent in you know, 20,000 or one million or whatever, but not one million -- but it's not that important the number of USBs they are -- that are wiped out and sold on the black market as empty USBs or they're caught and people get high, high risk involved in consuming the stuff. So I think that a lot of accountability measures are required, just because it's North Korea, we shouldn't just throw up our hands and say, let's just put some money out and see what happens. There should be more rigorous monitoring and evaluation and the kind of ROI measures that I don't have the answers to. Just kind of thinking about things we should be doing. And so that's certainly a question I'm seriously thinking about. I would love to talk to people more about.

MR. KRETCHUN: Cool. And finally, Hyo Won. You know, very robust comparative qualitative methodology that you brought to bear on Burma and North Korea. But I'm interested because you had a very unique experience, being immersed in Myanmar for a long time. And I think that often gets undersold, just how much the social context matters in something like a regime transition. And so I wonder how you looking at Myanmar is different than say if you have looked at whether or not the DPRK can follow Chinese style agricultural reforms. What did your experience growing up there have?

MS. SHIN: Thank you for the question. While growing up there, there were still a lot of restrictions by the government. Especially, the Caucasians were not allowed into the country because the country didn't trust Westerners. So I think there are a lot of speculations, guesses, about the country without having actually been there. That's what a lot is happening in North Korea. But as a person who lived in Myanmar and kind of saw changes over time, Myanmar was fairly very open. A lot of the people were informed. They were watching CNN. They were watching BBC, so I could see the drastic contrast between North Korea and Myanmar as in terms of everyday people. How much information are they exposed to? What do they know? Since I'm a Korean citizen, I would never be able to go to North Korea unless we get unified, so I can't say much about that, but in terms of Myanmar, having lived there, I can -- I just realize so much about how the everyday people's knowledge about the world has actually had an impact on the political transition in Myanmar. They were -- the journalists who were in prison, the students who have actually tried to protest. Their efforts went into where the country is today. So I don't know if this answers your question, but yeah, looking at this, I think I have a more personal understanding of the country, yeah.

MR. KRETCHUN: Great, thanks so much. And so with that, we'll open the floor up for questions. I think the plan is to take two or three questions, and then let our panel respond
to those in turn. So I think we have folks coming around with mikes. If you have a question just toss up a hand.

QUESTION: Hi, I'm Aju again. I have a question for Jieun. I think it's a really good idea, like what you were working on, but because I don't know what the occasion is now, but back in the days, people in North Korea, when they were exposed to foreign information or when they watched like drama or TV from other countries, they used to be punished. They would be sent to like jails and stuff. But although it's a good idea to send more information through technology into North Korea, wouldn't that -- and even though that's going to bring some good impact in the longer term, but in the short term, wouldn't that put more -- put some North Korean people in danger?

MR. KRETCHUN: Okay, and then, oh -- we're going to try to take a couple more questions, and then we'll just answer them all rapid fire, if that's cool. Thanks. Darcie?

QUESTION: (inaudible)

MR. KRETCHUN: Yeah, no, we could get -- we can take one more after these two.


MR. KRETCHUN: Very official.

QUESTION: My question is also directed at Jieun. You mentioned the pathways for bringing in media to North Korea is largely driven first by altruism but more importantly by profit driven motives. So I was wondering, how do you see the intersection of the media and the technology in getting the in, and what you're seeking to do with the marketization that's going on in North Korea, and then secondly layered on that, North Korea as the state's co-optation of the markets and co-optation of tech, the cell phones, the media. How do you see these factors relating with each other?

MR. KRETCHUN: Okay, do we have one more before we let Jieun go? I think our fearless leader here of the young and the brave, Kathy, would like to ask one.

DR. MOON: Thank you. I have a question for Mai Huong and Cristina. The first question is about the international students in South Korea, and I'm particularly interested because I'm writing a book that incorporates immigration and foreign nationals in South Korea in a variety of ways. But can you talk a little bit about the relationship between the different types of foreigners in South Korea? For example, the international students, regardless of the home country, would represent a higher -- a more elite level of foreign residents or foreign nationals in South Korea versus some migrant workers, not all, and also some of the foreign brides. And so I'm curious what the inter-foreign national community dynamics are, if you have exchanges at all or interactions, or if it's really separate, and then of course that leads to, if you're separate, that leads to a different kind of social political influence, you know, in South Korea and society, than if you were gathering together as a collective. And then for Cristina, I'm curious if you could
Talk about your experience or knowledge of other hard to access countries that the virtual science library or other types of science diplomacy had been conducted in and if you know about some of the results, in terms of how people use the information, who can access it and then, was CRDC able to see signs of change, constructive change, knowledge creation, et cetera. Thanks. Thank you.

MR. KRETCHUN: Cool, okay. Jieun, do you want to start us off?

MS. BAEK: Sure. Aju, thank you for your question. I think this is the most relevant and most difficult question to think about, because, sorry, I'm really bad wit the mic. Is this okay? Okay. I'm hogguing the Mike. So this is I think, not just a moral hazard question, where you know, I'm like sitting in my little office and then writing up these things, and punishment is complete -- all the risks are consumed by the consumers inside North Korea. This is something that I take very seriously, which is why -- something I take very seriously.

We do -- and then -- also North Koreans are consuming that information inside, no risks more than anyone involved. They know most intimately what happens if and when caught with the wrong information and bribes are just not going to do it in their really bad time at the moment to be caught. But what we do know based on a lot of the North Koreans who have come about, and again, this is a self-selected group, is that there is a huge demand for information. I'm not saying that like sending in copies of Titanic and Friends is going to liberate the regime. (laughter) There are so many news articles saying that I'm like, oh my God, if it were that easy then they would have been liberated a long time ago. (laughter) And so the demand for information -- the demand of what they don't know -- the most mundane things. How are North Koreans resettlers in South Korea surviving? How are they -- how are they managing? Those type of information and a lot of North Korean drift -- North -- information come up that's organized by North Korean defectors who know what they wanted to learn when they were inside I think is important. I think that's why it's really important to invest in technologies that make sure that it's good information getting in to the people who want it. I'm not trying to force feed anyone democratic ideals or you have to watch copies of like Seinfeld. It has to be targeted people, for the people who want to consume information from outside, knowing it's illegal, and knowing that the personal cost and perhaps the cost of others around them, is really, really high. And so, I think it should be demand driven and sophisticated. And also another thing is that I don't work solo ever. It's always worked, working with North Korean people. And other activists and other people who have worked in similar situations where there was inside the Soviet Union who were involved in like (inaudible) activities or whatever, as well as in Burma, and in Vietnam as well. Also not sending in information despite knowing there's demand in there, due to a short term punishment, I think is also -- in my opinion, I think it may be wrong, is, they are paternalistic. Like just because we can't send in micro-SD chips with a weapon, like with a gun, to protect themselves, I think it is very paternal. If the demand is there, and it costs us nothing relatively to send it in, I think we should, and I think there's a duty we need to fulfill. To Darcie's point, intersection of media and altruism, I think that the cost -- kind of combine the state co-optation and the first point together. So the border guards are cracking down. We see the number of defectors who enter South Korea halved by the year, and we don't know how many people are trying, and obviously there are many more people who try and don't make it to South Korea, which is -- I -- yeah, but I think that if we target the profit driven..
informal networks of all the middle men who are involved -- if some people say yes, the hundred dollar commission I get for sending in 100 USBs along with the formal trade items they're sending into China, or into North Korea, the 100 dollars is just not worth it anymore. If we -- I don't know who we is, but whoever the implementers are, up that reward -- fine, that 100 dollars -- 1000 dollars, 10,000 dollars, and that will be your commission for sending this in. Profit, I think -- if it's a dollar driven initiative, information will get in to the people who want it. And so I think that is a very capitalistic way of getting around some of these problems. I think it could work if the rewards are as high if not higher, than some of the costs that are involved. Done. (laughter)

MS. CANH: Okay, thank you for the question. I have two things about that. The first one is, I think there is some sort of dynamic between different groups of foreigners within Korea, but it's not like mass stigmatized structure to do that. It seems to be -- there's some programs that involve second generation and like South Koreans foreign brides and it's involving the teaching them Vietnamese or like Filipinos because there are lot of them as wives as well, and so there's a small funding in trying to create multiculturalism within the second generation of South Koreans. But I don't think -- I don't see any mass (inaudible) of that happening and I would expect it to happen more; having Korean government do have plan to smoothen out the process of becoming a multi-cultural society. But on another point is that I used to be interested in how the perception of South Koreans to was a specific group of foreigners, like migrant workers, or foreign brides, and how is the shape the perception of them to was another group of foreigners. And I haven't been able to see any primary research done on that topic yet. And it's very interesting because I did some literary review and it seems that for foreign brides, they prefer someone who is very similar to Korean, so you cannot really tell, is that the Korean, or is that a foreigner's. But for international students, as you can see, more Western people are prefer that Asian students. So it seems a disparity between what they perceive by younger generation more outward looking and by older generation where they see still want to get homogeneity with Korean society. So it will be interesting if anyone wants to do research on that topic. (laughter) Thank you.

MS. ATENCIO: So in terms of science diplomacy and outcomes that we've -- that I've -- that we've learned, or that we've gathered from some of the work that I've done, I can speak to, in Georgia where we did -- we didn't have a virtual science library but we did workshops on authorship -- research authorship publication and proposal development workshops. We always leave our materials with the people that we train, because the idea is for us to become obsolete. We can't keep coming back for 10 years. We need to do this for a few years and then it needs to be incorporated within the country. So in Georgia, we did a long term assessment outcome -- a year after the workshop. And we saw one to eight -- for every person that we trained, they passed on that information to eight people, but whether it be their colleagues, their students, some other relations. We also saw the -- they also made a book in one of the universities in Georgia. They took our materials, changed it maybe a little bit and then made a book to incorporate into their curriculum so that they could start teaching these co-curricular classes, because it's so important to scientists. If you're a scientist, publications are very important to your career development. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan we had virtual science libraries in each country. We worked there for two years and we saw over the course of two years, we launched the VSLs in both countries, and we also do these workshops. So we're trying
to build capacity and get them to use the site. We increased the publication rate in both countries in the sectors in the research fields that we concentrated on. I can't remember the exact percentage. It's in my computer. I could look it up later is anyone's interested. But the publication rates for those countries in international journals did increase, so.

MR. KRETCHUN: Great. Any more questions? Oh, we have one in the back and then we'll come up to you, yeah.

QUESTION: My name is Stanley Cobert. On the question of changing North Korea, I used to lecture in the former Soviet states that studied in the Soviet Union. People there had fear. It was fear of the government. I don't think it was so much a lack of information of the outside world. It was fear. I called Romania in particular, the land without smiles. The people were unhappy. What happened in 1989? They lost the fear. There's a famous saying -- Ceausescu addressing this crowd, and he's stunned by the reaction. He immediately flees Bucharest but his helicopter lands. The people seize him. He's killed immediately. Once the people lost the fear, his life span was measured in hours. That is, I think, the model for North Korea. But what will cause the people to lose the fear. I don't think it's an absence of information. How do they lose the fear?

MR. KRETCHUN: Okay, can we get a microphone up front for Ye-Eun?

QUESTION: Hi, my name is Ye-Eun. This is -- my question is toward Mai Huong. I was just wondering, what would a multi-cultural Korea look like, mainly because, yeah, I'm just curious because, what do you think needs to change just societally, for it even to exist, like, America's seen as a melting pot, but obviously we have a lot of issues going on right now, and they've always existed, so what would it mean for Korea to tackle on a multi-cultural front?

MR. KRETCHUN: Okay, do we have one more? Don't be shy. Impressive experts. Ma'am? Oh, right up front, here.

QUESTION: Hi, I'm Jenny Ho. My question is for Cristina. Just want to know, the countries that you work with, that invite you -- how did it all started? Thank you.

MS. ATENCIO: So the countries that we have worked in the past, we always go in at the beginning and make -- have meetings. In the case of North Korea, it was different, because it's not easy to go into the country, but we have meetings with -- set up meetings with the Ministries of Education. In many countries there's a Ministry of Science and Technologies, so we have meetings with them and then that way we can establish linkages with universities and institutions from that point on. So then we work directly with universities and institutions to set up our workshops and our trainings and we -- or we can, in some cases, in Indonesia, there's a strong group of professional societies, so we work with them, the chemical professional society, biological, physical, and we work with them to reach populations of scientists that we can train and work with, so.

MR. KRETCHUN: And Jieun, I think the fear is for you. (laughter)
MS. BAEK: I was trying to stall as much as possible. I have no answer and sir, I certainly agree with you, that the role of fear in an oppressive government, and a brilliantly bound state is something that's not easily able to be addressed. I think there's two parts to your question -- two parts to the issue. One is the fear of leadership losing its power. So if, let's say one day the country is liberated or what not, all the individuals are going to -- the idea of being facing justice, or what's going to happen to Kim Jung-Un and the top .1 percent of his comrades. I think they certainly -- I'm sure they certainly have fear. Kim Jung-un has 100,000 personal security guards and I am not certain that he is safe, despite that number. I'm sure that he lives in fear as well. So there have been all sorts of ideas floating around of maybe offering a really sweet deal for Kim Jung-Un and his relatives in some offshore island, saying hey, we won't kill you, just get out, and let something else better happen to your country. There are ideas of paid group incentivized defection of people above a certain military or political level, to just, pushing the top level out just to let more gradual and incremental changes happen at the grass roots. I don't know -- I'm not convinced by any of those, but there is certainly thinking around how to address the fear on the top. But I think the most relevantly is the fear of the 99.9 percent who live under that really direct fear. This is something I don't have the answer, but some thoughts is that -- Serge Popovich, he is a good friend of mine. He is a big democracy activist in Serbia and he gave a talk and it sounds funny. He coined this term called like, laughtivism -- the power of laughing in an oppressive government inside former Serbia, or wherever else, where it momentarily dissolves that fear, and it gives people just instants at a time, the thought that they have the ability to do -- to kind of rise above their situation. And so I don't think instilling laughter is going to do anything really big, but I think the idea of building trust among people, which has been happening, especially since the mid-90's. They're forced to collaborate, forced to get each other's backs, forced to bribe their military guards who previously were less immune to corruption because they were better off. It started to build trust among people. Some people, including Victor Cha say that the mid-90's famine was the worst and the best thing that happened to North Korea. It just forced people to innovate, despite the punishments they were facing -- any capitalistic measure previously forbidden, currently still technically forbidden but largely a blind eye. So I think continuing to build domestic horizontal relationships could -- there's something there that people could have a sense of collective action on a very small scale. Last thing I'll say -- Sondra Fahey, she recently put out a book, Marching through Suffering with Columbia University Press, an amazing book. The book basically talks about how people are able to fill a void during the famine and how people were able to avoid punishment by talking about illegal things, complaining about being hungry, because they were, but they knew that certain language would get them in trouble, so they figured out a language, and jokes and stories that weren't blatantly critical, so they're having these very critical conversations about their situation by being able to be human and talk about what they were going through without getting in trouble, and having these conversations in front of military and political people. So North Koreans are experts at survival. Humans are experts at survival and I think that fear is certainly a thing, but I think they'll continue to manage, given the increasingly desolate, increasingly desperate and increasingly corrupt situation of the country. So, I think that population will manage a way to incrementally get over it.

MS. CANH: For the question of multi-culturism in Korea, I think it's the question that South Korea also government is still struggling with in defining the question. The answer of
how it's going to be looked like, because we all know that South Korean society is very homogeneous and whether they want it or not, they are moving into multi-culturisms. But for me, I would say that that would need to be a more tolerant society, to different people, different kind of thinking, more understanding, more feeling free to be in your own skin, to be different than the rest of other South Koreans. And equal opportunity. And there is one thing I wanted to add is that a lot of factors, a lot of actors that we've seen in Korean society right now that are contributing to that fact. So it's sometimes been overshadowed by the big trends. So I always think that this is better for South Koreans to look into different angle as well, you know to in (inaudible) and you know making a smooth transition to multi-culturisms. I hope that answers the question.

MR. KRETCHUN: Okay. I think we can take one final question before we bring up Paul to wrap us up. Anyone? Last killer question? Yes.

QUESTION: Hello. JR, my question is for Cristina. You mentioned that the funding for your project with North Korea is only for a couple of years. May I ask, where are the sources of support for the Virtual Science Library and how is that going to continue?

MS. ATENCIO: So the DPRK and U.S. Scientific Consortium has received funding from the Luce Foundation, from other private foundations. This last project was actually funded by the State Department. So they have a policy of engagement, so, yeah.

MR. KRETCHUN: Wonderful. Well, fascinating panel. I'd like to -- oh, never mind, sorry.

DR. MOON: I just have a question. I know that yesterday when we were having our workshop as a group, some people were curious, but Cristina, why is it and how is it that this project has not been well publicized, whether by your organization and also, I didn't realize it was State Department funded. Is this something that the State Department wants to keep quiet, or? (laughter) Because I would think, this is a very practical useful thing to do.

DR. MOON: And that I would think that there would be able to get more people interested in this kind of work, for the sake of growing the world of science as well as political engagement.

MS. ATENCIO: When we were working on the project, I think we didn't talk about it as much, because we didn't want to perhaps not be able to go and do our trainings and we wanted to come back. Now that we've done the first training, the web site, the web site portal, is still open and it's going to be open for two more years and then hopefully we can get more funding to keep it open. It actually only costs 20,000 Euro a year for the entire country to run this web site. That is very cheap. Usually, for this sort of web site portal access, universities, for one single university, pay hundreds of thousands of dollars. The -- our partner in Denmark, Semper Tool, they're very interested in helping developing countries get access to academic journals so that's why it's a -- but the same system that runs this, he's set up -- Semper Tool has set up systems in universities in Europe, other developing countries, so it's a very well operating system. So the plan now, like I said, I no longer work for CRDF Global but would be
for them to -- or anyone who's interested to look for more funding. Like I said, to add more content, they could even add paying subscriber content. There's a lot of free content out there, but there's a lot of content that needs to be paid in order to access. But like I said, adding more institutions is easily done and it's free. So if any Korean universities were interested, North Korean universities were interested in being added and having access to the system, it would take not very long to do it, so yeah, things are slow.

MR. KRETCHUN: Okay, and with that, I think we're going to conclude our panel. Thank you so much. Very interesting stuff all around. And I guess a round of applause for our participants. (applause)

DR. MOON: I wish we could just have videotaped this and send it out into cyberspace and find a way to frack through North Korea and all. But really, even frack through the United States. I mean, this is really valuable information that you're sitting on, and now we share it. But I think more people need to know it. I would like to tell you that we will have the audio cast, the pod cast and the transcript available probably next week, on the Brookings web site. So Brookings will play a small role in helping disseminate this into the larger cyber space through which and in which various people around the world can navigate and listen to your words and learn from them and hopefully build on them in their own ways.

I would like to, in closing, introduce the most valuable person in the organization of this conference, my research associate and near family member now. I work with him -- I spend more time with him than I spend with anybody else it feels like. And it is a wonderful, wonderful thing to be able to have someone that you can trust absolutely 100 percent and know that he will come through, and to be able to put our heads together and that is Paul Park. So Paul will offer us some closing remarks and then we will be able to move along. (applause)

PAUL PARK: Thank you. At the outset, I would like to thank all the participants for their insightful presentation and discussion. I truly hope that this conference was a valuable learning experience for everyone involved. Aside from the knowledge that I gained here today, I personally was encouraged to strengthen and improve my own work and research.

We heard today about the difference in generational approaches toward Korea and what shapes them. We also heard about potential regional issues and CBMs as well as international approaches to unification and cyber instance. In the final panel we learned about the problems that international students face in Korea and the lessons we can take away from Myanmar's political transition with regards to the DPRK. Lastly we heard from two presenters who offered two different approaches to providing outside information to North Korea.

I think it's fair to say that we received a healthy dose of food for thought on a wide range of issues concerning Korea. But more than anything, we hope today's events served as a channel for all of the participants to share their research to the D.C. community, and we hope today's event leads to more opportunities for you to share your ideas. As Dr. Moon might have mentioned earlier, the exchange of views and ideas between different generations is critical for advancing Korean studies and devising a consistent and future oriented policy. However, I think it's very important to bear in mind that as receptive as the current generation of experts may
be, we must thoroughly frame our ideas after careful analysis and reflection of previous attempts, errors, and successes.

Looking ahead, I think the immediate task is relatively straightforward for the next generation. Building on the comments and questions you heard today, we hope you all use this opportunity to further refine and supplement your research. We also hope that the connections you've made through this conference -- we hope that you use the connections for possible future cooperation or joint projects. Another key element that I would like to encourage is the utilization of resources, especially social media for providing -- as a channel, to publicize your work. As you can see today from our hashtag, Twitter has become indispensable to spread the word about events and as a method for research. I am a relative latecomer to the twitter sphere and I now fully realize its potential. And now that the President has a twitter account, there's no excuse not to create one. (laughter)

While preparing for the event, Dr. Moon and I were amazed at all of the various research topics being conducted today on Korean history, politics and policy, and so on. More than the sheer volume of research, we were in awe of the different ways people were approaching these issues. But just from what we heard today, I think all of us should be more than encouraged about the future of Korean studies and policy. And rest assured that we have a very capable and forward looking generation of experts ready to take the reins.

Before I close I would like to thank Dr. Katharine Moon for asking me to deliver part of the closing remarks. I have the pleasure and privilege of working with Dr. Moon here at Brookings and it is really through her guidance that I am able to do what I do here. Given that we are the next generation of Korean experts, and sooner than later, we will overthrow the current generation. (laughter) That's including you Dr. Moon. (laughter) I'd like to end with a --

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

MR. PARK: I'd like to end with a quote from the late great artist, Notorious B.I.G. “You know very well who you are. Don't let them hold you down. Reach for the stars.” Thank you very much. (applause)

DR. MOON: I had hoped that Paul would do a little bit of rapping there, but I guess he's got too much gravitas and dignity for the Brookings stage, on which to do rapping. At any rate, it's been a real treat, and I am really moved, I have to say. I've learned, but I'm also very moved at the passion, just listening to some of our speakers convey their thoughts, their experiences and their hopes and I think -- I'm getting all choked up. When you work on the Koreas, it's really hard not to be impassioned -- one, to have witnessed South Korea's unbelievable growth from the ravages of war to an economic dynamo, from dictatorship to a thriving democracy, from a place that hardly had modern telecommunication systems working after the war to a place that now dominates the cyber sphere, the info tech sphere, and the cultural sphere. I mean, if I could, I would have gotten Psy here to do a little side show but I think he would have been overshadowed by our own presenters. And then, it's hard also not to get choked up and impassioned about what goes on in North Korea, whether it's your own hopes
for peaceful change, or whether it's your empathy for what people suffer. But I think we talked about fear a little while ago. And I think it's a nice way to think about the subtitle of our conference, which is, the young and the brave. If you think about it, and I thought about it a lot as I was preparing for the conference. Most societies have no problems putting young people into harm's way as soldiers, right? We make decisions -- old people and older people make decisions all the time about where young people should go and face danger and possibly die. Why do we not include them in our policy and decision making process? It's not my generation that goes to fight the battles. It's those in their teens and twenties, sometimes in the thirties. And so if you keep that in mind, I think it really takes courage for people who are a little older to remember that, to be mindful of it and to seek out young people's opinions, advice, experiences and I think no one here who has listened to today's panels can say that young people are naïve or uninformed, because we surely know that they have brought us more information and lived experience than some of us could ever have imagined for our own selves at that age.

So I think it's something to keep seriously in mind for those of us who are the so-called gate keepers, but also for those of you who are going to be stepping into seats of power or overthrowing us, as Paul says. Keep the courage up, and keep that bravery up, and the vision up, because it's so easy to lose it, as one gets older. And it's so easy to lose it as one gets habituated to one's everyday work. And it really takes a lot of self-reflection and self-discipline to pull back from our daily tasks and all the hundreds of emails that we just want to disappear -- make disappear, and try to remember why is it that I'm doing what I do? What is it that I'm doing my job for? And I think the panels today -- we're very clear about why you do what you do and what you are doing it for. And I think that's a good lesson for the rest of us to take with us.

So we will close and I would like to thank many people at Brookings -- Aileen Chang and others who are standing in the back. She's like the guardian angel. She manages our Center for East Asia Policy Studies now, and we have numerous staff members and interns and others who have helped out. Paul Park, again, and I don't know if Jean Lee is still here, but Jean Lee -- she had set up the first western media office -- AP Associated Press office in Pyongyang and she was heading it for about four years and she's currently at the Woodrow Wilson Center and she helped us yesterday with some media training for our panelists and also shared her own experiences in her line of work, so I wanted to thank her and if you could -- those of you -- you could tweet it. She'll get it. She's not here.

So thank you very much and I hope that we can make this a next generation event and annual event at Brookings. And I would like to let you know that once the message went out that -- once our announcement went out that we were holding this conference on the Koreas, I had colleagues at Brookings who are Directors of the China Center, the Middle East Center -- they emailed or called or talked to me and said, oh my God, what a fantastic idea. We have to do this for our own program. So I'm hoping that all over Brookings, all over the think tanks in Washington, that we will focus on the next generation and that you might be able to have more young people come and engage in this kind of conversation. So thank you, and we hope to see you in other events in the future. (applause)