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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. INDYK: Thank you for joining us here at Brookings. I'm Martin Indyk. I'm the executive vice president of the Brookings Institution. It's a great honor for me to have the opportunity to welcome and introduce a good friend of mine, of Strobe Talbott's, of the Brookings Institution, Jean-Marie Guehenno.

Jean-Marie is the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, a great organization that does incredibly interesting and important work of reporting on crisis situations all around the world. If you haven't looked at the web site or the publications, I strongly urge you to do so.

But Jean-Marie is also a non-resident senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the foreign policy program, which has organized this event today. Jean-Marie has had a very distinguished career, first of all, in the French government, where he was director of policy planning in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1989 to 1993, but then, he took on the job of undersecretary general for peacekeeping operations at the United Nations from 2000 to 2008.

He has been the longest serving head of peacekeeping in the United Nations institution's history. And during that time, he led the biggest expansion of peacekeeping in the history of the United Nations. But he did much more than that during those eight years, because during those eight years, as no doubt he'll talk about today, was the end of the Cold War, and the rise of civil wars across the Middle East and Africa.

And he met that challenge to the United Nations and in particular, the challenge to the United Nations' peacekeeping role in what was a truly admirable way. He oversaw the modernization and professionalization of peacekeeping, developing core concepts for dealing with these civil wars and ending the civil wars and peacekeeping in

post conflict situations, developing in the process UN peacekeeping into a genuinely professional tool of international crisis management.

His book is an account of those experiences. "The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century" is a highly readable and fascinating account of the different case studies of peacekeeping that Jean-Marie was involved in from Afghanistan to Iraq to Georgia to Cote D'Ivoire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Darfur, Lebanon, Kosovo, Haiti, and finally, at the sad and tragic story of Syria and his experience there, where he worked for Kofi Anan when he was the special representative, the UN secretary general for the Syria conflict.

Gareth Evans, former foreign minister of Australia, former head of the crisis group, the International Crisis Group, a good friend of mine, because we hail from the same continent, had in his blurb what I thought captured my own feelings about this book, when he said, what shines through this thoughtful and detailed account is the admirable way in which Jean-Marie Guehenno maintained his own moral compass amidst a swirl of competing, pragmatic and political imperatives, never succumbing to the weary cynicism that so often afflicts international public servants -- like Gareth Evans (Laughter). No, I didn't say that.

(Audio dropout)

MR. INDYK: But it is that moral compass that Jean-Marie has that is so attractive and admirable about his time as a professional UN public servant. We here in Washington, don't hear enough about the role of the United Nations in so many different areas. It's not on our radar screen enough, so I'm very glad to have the opportunity to host Jean-Marie and have him talk about his book.

To conduct the conversation with Jean-Marie after he presents his arguments from his book, I'm very glad to have my colleagues, Bruce Jones here. Bruce

was the head of the International Order and Strategy Project at Brookings, and he's not the acting vice president and director of the foreign policy program at Brookings.

He is, himself, a former UN civil servant, where he had extensive -- developed extensive experience in intervention and crisis management. He served in the UN operations in Kosovo and was the special assistant to the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, Terry Larson, in the period when I served as ambassador in Israel, and so therefore, had an opportunity to work with him in that capacity in those good old days.

He's the author of many books and publications. In particular, his most recent one, which was published last year, "Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint," which is a great book about the emerging global order. So, ladies and gentlemen, please welcome me Guehenno. (Applause).

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, thank you for your kind words. It's great to be here at Brookings. When I left the United Nations, I was welcomed by this great institution, and so it's very good to be back with very good friends.

I will just say a few words on why I wrote this book, what I intended to do, what I hope I have done with this book. Peacekeeping is a very misleading word. It's a very appealing word. Sometimes, I remember discussions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations where, should the department be called the Department of Peace Operations rather than Peacekeeping Operations, which would more accurately describe what it does, but every consultant in public relations told me, no, keep peacekeeping. It is a good brand, even if peacekeeping has had its share of failures.

Peacekeeping is a misleading word, because people see first and foremost, the blue helmets, and indeed force matters. And if you don't have the leverage

of force, you are in a much weaker position than if you have it. But at the same time, the peacekeepers, they are just part of a much broader enterprise.

When people wanted to flatter me, when I was working at the United Nations, they'd say, so you are the minister of defense of the United Nations. And I said, no (Laughter). No, it's a much more -- I mean, at the risk of sounding pretentious, I'm more than that (Laughter). Because in reality, the troops, they are there to support a political process, to underpin a political process.

And if you see them dressed as the swat team, so to speak, of the world that comes in, brings order, you are deeply wrong, because actually, in the bad neighborhood, the police can operate only at the margins, because the vast majority of citizens abide by the law, because there is an order they trust. And in conflict, there is no such thing. And the troops, if they pretend to establish that, unless you have overwhelming force that the UN never has, and even when a country has it, as was the case in Iraq, one sees the limits of that force. Unless you have that overwhelming force, you cannot establish peace. So, the troops are there to support a political process.

And I thought it would be useful to explain those complexities, but to explain them through a memoir, rather than just a series of abstract analytical points, because if I did it through the theory of peacekeeping, I would miss the confusion, the messy side of politics and peacekeeping. And that's why I called the book "The Fog of Peace." Of, a reference to Clausewitz, but also, a reflection on our world, precisely because the neat distinction between war and peace does not apply.

We would like it to apply. There was a famous report that was in a way, my road map when I started at the UN; a report done by a commission led by former prime minister of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi, that says a lot of good things. But a lot of the good things, many of them are not applied. I'll come back to that, but many of them

cannot be applied (Laughter). Like for instance, the simple sentence, no peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep.

We would all love that to be, but the reality is that except for a few old missions like Cypress, the peacekeepers, they are deployed in that gray area where it's not full-fledged conflict, but certainly not peace. And so, "The Fog of Peace" reflects that situation, where the transition from war to peace is not as clear cut as it was in an age of confrontation between states, where sometimes you sign an armistice and the war ends. That is not where we are.

That's one reason for calling the book, "The Fog of Peace." The other, where it refers -- I hope I have a moral compass, but what my point in the book is that this very political activity raises enormous ethical issues. And at the center of all of them, the question of what peace is good enough. And it's a question that one can ask fighting in his own country, when do I make a deal with the people I am fighting.

It's a much more difficult question to answer when you're a third party. Who are we to decided when peace is good enough? And that question, the international community has to address it in many of those peace operations, and that's another reason why I gave that title of "The Fog of Peace," because we have really, in that situation, the ethical challenge that I have just described. We also have the operational challenge, because the peacekeepers, they were invented to monitor ceasefires on a well established ceasefire line.

They were invented to be the buffer between Armies responding to states, and with a clear chain of command. What happens when there is no clear ceasefire lines, whether you are in South Sudan, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or most of the peacekeeping operations were peacekeepers are deployed today?

What happens when the chain of command is fragile, to put it mildly?

And so then, the question of the use of force comes in, because -- and then, the question of the balance between the minister of defense hat and the political diplomatic hat comes to the fore. And it's a debate today that is very alive.

We have seen how there has been a demand for the UN, after the horrors of the '90s to be more robust in its protection of civilians, not to let people be killed under the watch of the UN. And it's a basic requirement, I would say, of any decent human being. If you can stop someone from being -- if you can prevent someone from being killed, you must do it.

But behind the simplicity of the tactical response are very complicated strategic issues, because there's a trade-off between fighting and mediating. And as you engage on the path of fighting, of shooting, which is for instance, what has happened in Eastern Congo, you forfeit other means. And you have to be sure as you engage on that path that you're not going to lose that battle.

And so the challenges, they are very operational and very political, and that is why I thought rather than describing the abstraction of it, which I can only refer to sort of principles in the 10 minute presentation, I think it's important to see that fog of operational uncertainty that is a characteristic of operations. When does a patrol commander in South Sudan, if he's shot at -- does he retaliate? Does he back off? It depends.

In the early days of the deployment of the mission in Darfur, there was such an attack, which was clearly by government forces. The tactical judgment of the commander of that patrol was, I don't fire back, because he knew that there would be much stronger powers on the other side, and he would have his people killed.

Now, it was a tactically sound judgment. Was it strategically right? If he had retaliated, it would have elevated the whole question of could the peace operation be

viable in Darfur. It would have forced the Security Council to confront the unanswered that he wanted to keep unanswered. That's where you see how tactical issues have strategic implications.

I don't want to speak for too long, so let me just, in the last few minutes that I speak, before having a conversation with Bruce, say that this book -- I wrote it also with the sense that peacekeeping is just a reflection of the state of the international system. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was about preventing local conflicts to reach the level where they could affect the central east-west conflict.

We are in a different world, obviously, where peacekeeping is much more today about the evolving form of conflict, where now, the question of the legitimacy of states is very much there in many parts of the world; in states that were the result of decolonization, states that were the result of the break up of empires. We look at the Middle East, the whole question of the legitimacy of the state, how you define a state along sector in-lines, non-sector in-lines.

These are issues that are at the heart of today's confrontations. These are issues that illustrate, really, the crumbling of traditional structures, and these are issues that are not going to be resolved in four or five years. These are generational issues, and so the book is about that, too. It's about the level of ambitions we have.

And of course, when you define stability, when you define stability of peace, you don't have the same answer if you are in China or if you are in the United States. The stability -- the capacity of a state to control dissent is the stability, the capacity of a state to have institutions that will be strong enough to manage dissent, that's not the same answer. The Security Council has a clear view on that.

When it puts elections at the center, is it just to bless the leader, or is it to establish a democracy? We have seen the dangers of election. And I speak to that

about Cote D'Ivoire. So, this book is also about the level of convergence, or rather today, divergence among the main actors in the international community.

And in a way, it is an attempt to answer the question -- I mean, that -- and to answer negatively the recommendation that Ed Luttwak made many years ago, when he said give war a chance. Give a war a chance is the idea that peacekeeping sometimes prolongs conflict; that negotiation just creates unclear situations that should be better sorted out through a military victory.

I personally, think that the cost of a hot conflict will always be much higher than the cost of a frozen conflict. And I also believe that if we look at the overall situation historically, what we see is that Europe indeed, has now stable, we hope (Laughter), states, although now there are all sorts of questions in a few countries, but it has reasonably stable, peaceful states. But we should not forget that this is the result of several centuries of very nasty wars.

And the question which is before us is whether we believe that for the rest of the world, they have to go through that same experience at a time when the capacity for killing, the capacity for violence is infinitely superior to what it was in previous ages. And so, I think there is a lot to be said to avoid the repetition of that experience, and this book, in that sense, is about muddling through, not having a clear recipe, but muddling through so as to avoid war as a solution to creating national identities and a stable world order of states.

I strongly believe that having those compromises, which raises all of the ethical issues that I have mentioned, is a much better option than giving war a chance. Thank you. (Applause).

MR. JONES: Jean-Marie, thank you very much. That was terrific. You know, for Martin and myself, being involved with you and having sustained conversations

with you in this book as part of our ongoing effort bureaucratically, we organize it under a project called Order from Chaos, in which we're trying to grapple with these new forces of challenge to the international system and to the state system. And I think it's a very helpful reminder, among other things, to reflect on the muddiness and the chaoticness of the business of managing crises.

But also, very importantly, the important ethical grounding that it takes to find your way through that muddle. And I think one of the things that's very nice about the book is it's cast in the tradition which I have an enormous respect for, which is about the moral responsibility of avoiding war, and it's an important intellectual tradition, and you've made a huge contribution to it.

I had the chance to read the book in its early stages, as well as in its late stages, and I profited enormously from doing so. And it's a personal pleasure to have you back at Brookings. I was a refugee from the UN. I am now fully settled in my life at Brookings (Laughter), but it's occasionally nice to touch back to friends and colleagues who spent time at the UN together.

One of the things that I was reflecting on as you were speaking, and I'm rereading the book, is that sitting here in Washington, Martin said we don't hear a lot about the UN. But we do hear a lot about the use of force, and we do hear a lot about the debate, about to what extent is force the right answer in a place like Iraq, et cetera.

And one of the things that struck me about the book and about your comments is that actually, a very thoughtful on exactly this core debate -- whether you have it in the UN framework or you have it in the U.S. framework, but what is the role of force in helping to produce a political settlement and reinforcing a political settlement? When can it be useful or not? And you highlighted the importance of a political framework.

At the UN, one of the things I encounter these days is that there's almost a kind of reverse problem, which is that there is now a deep skepticism about the use of force, essentially coming out of Libya. Right? Where force was used to overthrow Gaddafi in the end, debates about how far the council was or wasn't fully authorizing that kind of action, and the kind of skepticism that's grown up about the use of force, and a kind of -- almost a retreat back to a kind of 1990s vision of an over emphasis almost, on the political framework.

So, maybe you could just talk a little bit more about that tension between an emphasis on a political framework on the one hand, and then what utility force does have within that context.

MR. GUEHENNO: Yes. I think the discussion at the United Nations is a bit contradictory, because on the one hand, there is that insistence now on force intervention brigades, shooting your way through peace in Eastern Congo which may or may not work, actually, to be honest, because the key problem in Congo is to have institutions that will sustain the protection of the people, because if the people don't trust the security forces of their country, there will not be peace. And the day the peacekeeping mission leaves, we'll be back to square one.

So, there is that, and then, what you say -- you're saying that peacekeeping is costly, complicated and so, it's so much cheaper to a point, an envoy with a political advisor than to deploy thousands of troops. Obviously, there's a great temptation of countries to do peace on the cheap. I think it's going far too far in that direction, if that's the conclusion, because in my book, I talk, for instance, about the early days in Afghanistan.

And I think it's a good example, because again, in Afghanistan, there was a sense -- the Taliban had been toppled. I remember discussions at the end of 2001

with the U.S. government, and then in early 2002, with various -- I mean, UK and the security council of various countries. No appetite for deploying any significant force.

The solution of Afghanistan had been delegated, essentially, to the northern alliance. Meanwhile, the Taliban were reconstituting, and with a sense or so that because the government was so much in the hands of the northern alliance, the security, indeed, that was another recruiting argument for the Taliban. And I think Afghanistan is a good example where we play catch up, instead of going strong at the beginning, when you have a window of opportunity, when you can change things, when you have maximum leverage, you think you can do things on the cheap, so to speak, so you minimize your strong leverage.

And then, when things don't go as well as you expected them to go, then you have to deploy your force, and it's much less efficient. And so you can -- of course, some people would say, Afghanistan -- an example of big force, not so great results. I would say the opposite -- an example of force that was not deployed at the right time; that is, early on.

And I think that is a point that is valid for many missions. It's much better to start strong, to maximize your leverage when you have a window of opportunity, when everything is in flux, rather than try later on, when your legitimacy, the expectations are beginning to diminish, when you are less welcome. It's much harder then to establish your credibility and to use leverage.

MR. JONES: Something you just said, though -- you talked about the challenge of building domestic institutions in which the population can have confidence in local security services and local political processes.

Most of the experience shows that the business of building those kinds of institutions is a generational business. And peacekeeping is a short or at best, a medium

term solution. So, what is your conclusion, after having done this for a long time, about what is it that peacekeeping needs to leave in place to allow for the possibility of those institutions being built over the period that follows?

MR. GUEHENNO: I think -- I mean, I alluded to that in my initial remarks, the level of ambitions. I think in many cases, we have been much too ambitious in the last 15 years. In a way, the last 15 years have been a decade and a half of interventionism, the sense of sort of -- whether the conservative side of politics, I mean, the Bush administration, or the UN, more liberal minded international civil servants -- the sense that you can re-engineer a society, which is good to sell a mission at home.

I remember the cover of *Time Magazine* with an African woman on the cover, in the sense that you are going to create a fundamentally new country. You oversell what you can do. My sense, to answer your question, is that one needs to have lesser ambitions and be very focused, and that what is really needed is a security sector, a judiciary and a capacity to raise revenue, and everything else, because of course, you want to build schools. Of course, you want to build health systems.

Of course, you want to do many, many things in a country that has nothing. But if you don't have the security, the judiciary, the revenue, the schools will burn down, the civil servants will not be paid, the police will extract bribes. And so, it will all be built on sand, and it will have no staying power.

MR. JONES: I'll ask you about a different aspect of this. You spent time and worked closely on issues like Iraq and Afghanistan, where the great powers, the major powers have huge stakes. And then, you spent time and worked on issues where there were very modest stakes. Which is worse, the great powers looking over your shoulder closely, or the great powers neglecting what you are doing?

MR. GUEHENNO: The reality is that there is a sweet spot. You want

some interest (Laughter) from great powers, and not too much.

MR. JONES: Right (Laughter).

MR. GUEHENNO: Because if you -- they often conflict, so to speak. You don't have the few -- the energy that is needed to push, and you need -- again, because peacekeeping is essentially a political enterprise, if you don't have political few, it will peter out. So, you need some engagement from great powers. At the same time, you need a space for the United Nations.

And say, for instance, I think Liberia -- this is not a strategic interest of the United States, but this is a country, for historical reason, in which the United States has an interest. So, that's a good balance, where the United States were interested enough in Liberia to support the mission, but were not interested so much that they would dictate everything in Liberia.

Sierra Leone was a -- the United Kingdom, the former colony had some interest. Not too much, so it helped. Iraq, much more difficult. I think in Iraq, the UN was there in the sad sentence of Kieran Prendergast, was the (Inaudible) of political affairs at that time. He said to add tone (Laughs), which is not enough, especially when then, you risk the lives of people.

MR. JONES: So, that's connected to the follow thought. We look at patterns of war in the world, and wars have been declining steadily in every region of the world. In Europe, in Latin America, in Asia, even in Africa -- one big exception -- the last five years, which was an increase in wars in the Middle East.

And I think everything out there tells us we will face more conflicts and wars and multiple forms of violence in the Middle East. But it's a very different context to operate than Sub-Saharan Africa, which has been the kind of bulk of UN peacekeeping over the past 15 years. Do you think that the UN can add value to the current situation in

the Middle East, and what is likely to come?

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, there is one big issue, I think, which is the issue of what we call terrorism.

MR. JONES: Yes.

MR. GUEHENNO: And the definition of terrorism. And I think it's very dangerous to conflate a tactic, terrorism, with the political movement. And that a very loose use of the word terrorist at the moment, is shrinking the political space in which the United Nations has to operate, and that the less the United Nations become a party to so-called war on terror, the better.

And I think the United Nations, if it is to play a role in many of those difficult situations, should as a matter of principle, be willing to talk to anybody who is willing to talk. Of course, there are people who are not interested at all in the talking and just want to kill you. But I think the policy which is the policy of the United States, which has been the policy of the Europeans that talking is legitimizing, is not a good policy.

If you take as a position of principle that you talk to anybody who is willing to talk to you, then there is not legitimacy gained when you talk. If you begin to make the distinction, then of course, as soon as you talk to a particular group, there is an element of legitimacy. And so, I think for the UN to play a political role, it's important that it's not -- it doesn't fall in that trap.

MR. JONES: So, how would you view the current UN operations in Mali, where you have a more traditional peacekeeping function and you have a counter terrorism function that are kind of blended together there? Do you see it as problematic, how the UN is positioned in Mali?

MR. GUEHENNO: Yes (Laughter). I was in Mali recently, and I'm enormously worried. In Mali, there is a big push to have a peace agreement no matter

what. There is a risk that an agreement, instead of being a basis for peace will be an excuse for war, in the sense that okay, whoever hasn't signed the agreement is fair game -- will be labeled a terrorist.

While I think a smart strategy is to try to peel off terrorists, so to speak, is to divide, rather than to unite those who are challenging you. And I think in Mali, we have a situation where of course -- the French intervention, I think, was very -- that history -- there was a risk that Demarco would have fallen otherwise.

But I don't think it has been followed by a real political strategy. And now, you have an elected president who is not under much pressure, frankly, to address the underlying issues that are plaguing Mali. And I think it's very important for the international community, for France, for the United States to put some pressure there.

There also has to be pressure on those who are challenging Demarco, and there has also to be a much more sophisticated approach to the problems of the north of Mali, because what you see in the north is not -- it's not just the Tuareg versus the south. The Tuareg are just the biggest group in the north, but they are not the majority, and all the other groups are not -- wouldn't be happy if there was a complete dominance of the Tuareg.

And so, Mali is a good example of a situation that we see, and I see it now working at the Crisis Group. We see more and more where you have local conflicts with complicated grievances that remain unattended for a long time. And then, they are hijacked, so to speak, by transnational groups, some criminal trafficking, et cetera, of human beings, of drugs, of weapons is a big part of the economy now.

These local conflicts, political conflicts at the beginning, they're hijacked by criminal networks, and they are hijacked by terrorist groups who use them. And it's really another -- I mean, prevention has always been better than reaction, but this is a

very strong argument, because once one of those conflicts morphs into a more global conflict, because it is being used by transnational, well it's infinitely more difficult to solve.

And I think in Mali, it's really very important to address the local dimensions of the conflict, if we don't want that to merge into a broad style conflict that will be very hard to resolve.

MR. JONES: Okay. I'm going to come to the audience in a minute, but I just want to ask you about one other thing. In the last couple of weeks, there have been accusations in the press, as you know, about French troops in the CAR involved in sexual violence against children or sexual violence exploitation in children.

You describe in your book, the 2004 episode as your worst moment in peacekeeping, and you talk about it having almost broken the peacekeeping. What lessons do you take away from that experience? How do you think the UN should handle these kinds of situations?

MR. GUEHENNO: Well first, the UN should be totally transparent. I think any notion that you're not accountable to the world on that. The beginning of everything is to do no harm. And so, for the UN, it's unconscionable if you're not totally transparent.

I think in the particular case of the CAR, I don't know the facts. I know that the High Commission for Human Rights is one of the people in the United Nations that fought the hardest, actually, against sexual abuse. So, I don't buy for one minute the idea of a cover up. I'm absolutely convinced that he would never condone such a thing. I don't know exactly what happened, but I'm sure there was no cover up.

I do think that for that scourge to be eliminated, you need the support of the states that provide the truth -- the full support of the state, because the essence of an Army is its discipline, is its national discipline. And so, if the command and control chain

in the contributing Army is not determined to eradicate sexual abuse and violence, you, as an outsider, you can do your best.

But if you don't have the cooperation of the Army, you won't go very far, and I think the French will do their best there, but I think there are many situations where we have seen Armies that were ambivalent. And that places a broader issue on the UN. Is the UN the instrument of member states to make the world a better place, or is it a facade behind which they hide when they don't want to take responsibility?

And in that way, the lack of determination, sometimes, of troop (?) contributing countries to address the question sexual violence raises a much bigger issue, which is, are the countries that form the United Nations -- are they really serious in maximizing the capacity of the United Nations to make a difference?

And sometimes, you feel that they pass a problem to the UN, because they don't know how to handle it. Sometimes, actually, often (Laughter). And that is a recipe for failure, because the UN is as good as the support of the countries behind it. If it is well managed, it can enhance that support and use its impartiality to gain a credibility and influence that a member state would not have. But if it does not have the support of the member states behind it, it's an empty shell.

MR. JONES: Let's go to the audience. I have more questions, but I'll refrain. Let's start at the back. There's two questions there. All right, we'll take a few questions and come back to you, if that's all right.

MR. SMITH: Dane Smith, former senior advisor to the U.S. government on Darfur.

In the case of UNIMED, a number of people said that it's really not possible for UNIMED to do its job in peacekeeping without having at least a modicum of support from the Sudanese government, and have contrasted that with at least marginally

more success in the Congo, because the government more or less backed the peacekeeping force. Would you elevate that to a principle, or would you say that there was more that could have been done in Darfur, in spite of the role of the Sudanese government?

MR. JONES: In the blue shirt?

SPEAKER: (Inaudible), the former scholar. I rephrase NDI, but not at this meeting.

I would like to ask you about the future of the UN and the Security Council, and its role in terms of maintaining international world order and peace and security. You mentioned that Europe is stable at the moment with Russia's actions in Ukraine, to put it mildly, and with Russia's actions in Georgia in 2008, and potentially, further expanding into Eastern Europe.

And if you talk to people in Baltic countries, they don't necessarily feel safe, either. And Russia being one of the permanent members of the Security Council, how do you see the Security Council and the UN responding to the potential conflicts further getting into the -- from the Eastern Europe further into the more European land, if you will?

And do you think this will finally get the UN to the point of, you know, make it or break it of finally getting to the real reform, or how do you see things being shaken up? And I know it's a super hypothetical question, but I thought that I could throw it out for a difference.

MR. JONES: I'll take a couple more in the back. Yes?

SPEAKER: Thanks. Jonas Paul. Congratulations on your book -- I am from the embassy of Denmark.

(Audio dropout)

SPEAKER: We also had the pleasure of you're working on foreign policy score card and other things. You mentioned in your introductory remarks, that the good old world via the Cold War, where peacekeeping was much about basically stabilizing in that proxy -- wars didn't break out, and now we're in a different world, with much more sort of multi polar and many more different sort of influences also on peacekeeping.

So, I was wondering if you could comment on that, particularly on the influence of new actors and here, I was thinking particularly of China in peacekeeping. And perhaps, you could zoom in South Sudan, where China both has big interests, human persons and oil interests, and now is also contributing sort of with the combat forces for one of the first times for them. How do you see some of these sort of different influences in peacekeeping playing out?

MR. JONES: Why don't you take those on?

MR. GUEHENNO: Okay. First, on UNIMED. I had hoped when -- I was not a great fan of that mission. I thought that the fact that the government didn't want it would be a major problem, and that the government was preventing the UN from deploying the right capacities in Darfur, would put the mission in a position of weakness from day one.

And as I said earlier, referring to Afghanistan, I'm a strong believer in starting strong. And so, starting weak, I think was a bad idea, because it's much better to stay on top of a cliff than to have to climb up a cliff. So, I was -- I had -- and I warned publicly, the Security Council on the risks that it was taking in a public meeting of the Security Council.

So, I do think that a mission without the cooperation of the government is bound to -- probably to fail, to be frank. My hope in Sudan was -- in Darfur was that the government, which had unleashed the militias of the (Inaudible) defense forces of the

Janjaweed might see -- and I know there were some in the Sudanese military who saw it that way -- might see that in a way, it was no more fully in control of that, and that it might have an interest in a mission that would help put that back in the box.

But from Khartoum's standpoint, the sense that there would be a strong -- there could be a strong political actor that would weaken the control of Khartoum on the politics of Darfur. That was much more important than controlling the Janjaweed. So, that didn't work. Could the mission make a little difference in spite of that? It could have, if the opposition of the Sudanese government had not been so efficient.

There are some cases where government is not so supportive of a UN mission, but it has not been as effective as the government Sudan has been in blocking the mission, influencing the composition of the force, the structure of the force. I think the notion of having a hybrid mission between the African union and the United Nations was not a good thing, because it diluted their responsibilities.

I said that sometimes states use an international organization as a facade to hide behind. I think there they had two facades to hide behind -- the facade of the African union and the facade of the United Nations. So, it was a double handicap.

Europe -- the crisis in Europe, no, certainly, I do not under estimate the gravity of the crisis in Ukraine. I think it's the most serious crisis, not just since the end of the Cold War, but I think in decades, in many decades in Europe. Linking it to the reform of the Security Council, make or break, frankly, during the Cold War, the United Nations did not solve the Cold War.

As I said, it played on the margins of the Cold War. It played a useful role in the margin of the Cold War. On Ukraine, I think the United Nations is unlikely to play a fundamental role, unless at some point in the de-escalation, it is seen as an intelligent compromise, a bit like Resolution 1244 for Kosovo, after the deep division over

the bombing campaign in Kosovo was overcome.

But the Russia of today is not the Russia of 1999. And so, I am not at all convinced that that will happen. So, I personally think that the United Nations will probably not play a significant role in the resolution, if there is a resolution of the Ukraine crisis. There has been talk, for instance, of deploying peacekeepers in Ukraine. That would be a great idea, if the politics were resolved (Laughs), but otherwise, it just doesn't work.

Could there be some arrangement along the lines of what happened in Abkhazia until 2008, where you would have a force that would be a reassurance to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, but there would be some kind of United Nations monitoring, which would be a counterweight to that? Maybe. But that requires a long diplomatic de-escalation that -- the beginnings of which we do not see at this stage.

The multiple world of today and the new actors. During my time at the United Nations, I actively pursued greater engagement of China in peacekeeping. I went to Beijing specifically to push for that, and I think it's a very good thing that China now has a strong participation in peacekeeping.

It started with engineering units, medical units, transport units -- battalions, a fighting force, I mean, although not really fighting, but it moved on to police in Haiti and it's now battalions. It reflects, I think, both in China and especially in the foreign ministry of China, a sense that being an active player in the United Nations, peacekeeping is one of the most visible activities of the UN, and China -- and it's been wanting to emerge as a responsible member of the international community, that's a way to do it.

It also reflects, I think, a political concern about terrorism and non-governed or weakly governed spaces. And that is a good thing. I think it would be good

if all the P5 contributed more to peacekeeping. That being said, the contribution of China compared to what the People's Liberation Army is, is small, even if compared to the other P5 it's bigger. It's very small.

So, I think it's a beginning. I think we should see more of it. But I think again, because peacekeeping is a political enterprise, what will really make a difference is China getting more involved in the politics underpinning strategies to stabilize countries. And that's important.

It would be important to have greater political engagement of China in South Sudan to manage a country that is in terrible shape, and to bring some kind of reconciliation in South Sudan. It would be good to have greater engagement of China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; to build institutions that are credible.

I think all that is important, and that, we don't see too much yet. And so, there is still some way to go. I mean, your question is broader on the multi polar world. I think what we see is regional actors becoming more active, which can be the best of things or the worst of things, to be honest. It can be the best of things if you have more peacemakers at a time, where as Bruce reminded us, there is an uptick in conflict. But it can also harden positions.

That's what we see in the Middle East at the moment, with the position of Saudi Arabia, the position of Iran, the confrontation between the two, the hardening of Israel. In a way, it's a reflection of the fact that the United States was, for a long time, anyway, the ultimate reassurance. And when that ultimate reassurance is not seen as certain as it was, when countries feel that -- not that they are on their own, but that they are more at the forefront, they take a harder position. And so, it makes the international scene -- I mean, the edges are becoming rougher because of that, I think.

MR. JONES: So in fact, we'll come back to those things. So, let's do the

front row, and then we'll do a third round in the middle. So, gentleman here?

SPEAKER: My name is Joel Gillen. I'm with the New Republic. I wonder if you could comment more on Libya, because you mentioned it. It's in the epilogue of your book. Specifically, what you thought or how far UN Resolution 1973 actually went, and sort of the wisdom of what ended up being a regime change. That's really it.

MR. JONES: Right behind you?

SPEAKER: Eddie (Inaudible), retired journalist. I was wondering whether you could follow up on your remarks about the China participation as regards to the Southeast Asian contingents. For instance, in Lebanon, it is believed that (Inaudible 00:54:54) and the Indonesians are especially helpful, because they are not only fellow Muslims, but they don't have any axes to grind, so to speak. Could one envision any extra role for them in the future?

MR. JONES: Thank you.

MR. DROZDIAK: Bill Drozdiak, Brookings and McCarty Associates.

You mentioned Jean-Marie, the risks of seeing a conflict more across borders and complicated things. But there's also the axiom, when faced with an insolvable conflict, in large, the context. So, when you look at Syria today, which has drawn in actors from various borders, across borders, do you see any prospect of progress through some kind of a multinational peace process that would encompass a number of players that could be held under the aegis of the United Nations?

MR. JONES: Thank you.

MR. GUEHENNO: On Libya, the resolution -- the Security Council muddles the concept, because it talks about the protection of civilians, which is essentially, a tactical consideration. When you have a force close to civilians that are in

danger, you should protect them.

And then, it talks about the responsibility to protect, which is the more strategic concept come (Inaudible) or even the -- what was said at the 2005 summit. So, it mixes the tactical and the strategic. And Libya -- I discussed it with Gareth, actually, who believed that one should limit the actions of -- the international actions against Gaddafi to when the people were under direct threat.

My point at the time to him, was, this is not a practical issue. If the leader of the country has become the main threat to his own people, you cannot just have a kind of international police force that whacks them each time there is a problem with his people. So in a way, the protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect merge.

But where I think the Libyan operation went wrong is, I think there could have been much more efforts during the campaign to negotiate an exit for Gaddafi, and that was not really attempted. There was no interest in that. I think that was wrong.

And I think the second thing that was wrong was then to promote the notion that this was an illustration of the responsibility to protect, which was a great incentive for countries that have doubts on the responsibility to protect, to make the point that indeed, no precedent had been created. And I wouldn't say that Syria is a collateral victim of Libya, but certainly, the rhetoric about Libya hasn't helped. There are many other factors. I wouldn't push it too far, but I think it hasn't helped.

I mean, the broader question of course, is, was it right to bring Gaddafi down the way he was brought down. One can make the point, as it could be made for Iraq, that aging dictators, horrible dictators in both cases, but who have teeth, so to speak, in their horror and who are in their fading phase, the best option would be to manage an elegant political process out. And that is, I think, what could have been attempted maybe for -- in the case of Gaddafi.

And the notion that behind every dictator, there is a happy family waiting to blossom is wrong. On the contrary, the more a dictatorship has been absolute, the more the society beneath is dysfunctional, because the human fabric of society has been considerably weakened, if not destroyed by the dictatorship.

And so, when you remove that cover, you have a very difficult situation to handle. And that's, I think what we see now in Libya, where in my view, it's very important to support a political process between the various groups that exist in Libya, rather than to think the problem can be solved now by force.

I think force will be needed at some point in Libya, but as on the foundation of a political agreement, among Libyans, I think force as a preliminary to a political agriculture would be the wrong way to go. And I think at the moment, there is some pressure to do that, and I think it would be dangerous.

Now, intelligent youth contingents, Muslim contingents, I agree with you that I think in many peacekeeping situations, one has to be very subtle on the use of -- on the composition of their force. You don't want to make religion a key criterion of deployments. I think the UN is not there to reinforce sectarian divides. I think that would be bad, but that does not mean that one should not be practical.

It's a question of proportions, and more generally, apart from the question of religions, I do see that contingents that come from countries that are not too right, often, when the Armies have a decent training, they offer something that contingents from very rich Armies do not offer, because they don't have the same distance with the society in which they are deployed.

Syria. I'll start by saying that I think Syria today is -- it's much more difficult to see the political resolution of the Syrian tragedy than it was in 2012 when I was working for Kofi Annan on Syria. Today, it's much more fragmented, much more radical,

and therefore, much more difficult.

I think to address the Syrian crisis, one needs to work from both ends. You need to work from the very local -- because of the fragmentation, and I think that one will have to try and try again for local ceasefire -- you can call them freezes, to avoid the idea that ceasefires have to be capitulations.

You cannot abandon those efforts, but those efforts will fail if they do not develop in a broader framework -- a broader framework at the national level, which itself depends on the regional dimension. And there, I think consultations -- but personally, I would make them less public than presently done by the (Inaudible). And I'm sure he has his reasons to proceed the way he does, but my sense is that the most quiet approach to engaging with Iran, engaging with Saudi Arabia, engaging with Qatar, engaging with Turkey, that is very much needed, and it's very unlikely that you can make progress in Syria if you do not make progress on the regional level.

And it's true, this very sad example of Libya is very representative of many conflicts today which have a local dimension, a regional dimension and a global dimension. Clearly, on Syria today, the global dimension, the United States, the UK, France, Russia is not the most hopeful one. So, one has to try to work at the regional level, which is not that hopeful either.

But there may be, at some point, an interest, because there is a growing realization that apart from the enormous human cost, letting that conflict fester will lead to more and more radicalization, more and more fragmentation, and in the end, that will hurt Iran, that will hurt Saudi Arabia, that will hurt Turkey, that will hurt countries that are not on the same side of the battle, but that should see that they have an interest at some point in coming to a resolution.

MR. JONES: We have time for a quick final round, so we'll take one,

two, three quick questions and comments.

MR. MARSHALL: Yes, Brian Marshall. I've served with an international agency in various countries and also, with the State Department on temporary assignments and peacekeeping missions. And could you discuss, perhaps, the situation to be addressed when seeking to end a mission, and you have parties in that country with axes to grind still?

MR. HADDAM: Jordy Haddam, Better World Campaign.

You mentioned in the book that you kind of oversaw the greatest increase in peacekeeping, and so that also means there was the greatest increase in contributions from the United States, as the largest contributor. And over that time, there was kind of huge fluctuations in how much the U.S. participated, but there was a time of significant arrears of 500 million, and at times, a billion dollars.

I wonder if you could talk about how that -- or did it hamstring your efforts for the peacekeeping operations? And is it something that troop contributing countries relayed?

MS. SERVILLINO: Hi. I'm Katie Servillino. I'm now with Save the Children, formerly Amnesty International and Physicians for Human Rights.

I have a question about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by UN peacekeeping operations. MONUSCO popped to mind. One, could you comment on what it takes, I guess, politically to allow for a peacekeeping mission to use UAVs for surveillance? And then two, are there or will there be plans to use such surveillance footage as evidence, say, something that demonstrates violations of the IHL, attacks against schools, healthcare facilities, and also, to assist aid agencies and others in the provision of assistance to geographies that they may not be aware of? Yeah, that's it. Thank you.

MR. JONES: And Jean-Marie, one last question from me. Building on the comment about U.S. financial contributions, you talked earlier about wanting to see all the P5 do more in peacekeeping.

There was an old lure that said the P5 shouldn't, right, because they have interests, et cetera. But the world has changed. Do you think that the United States should do more? And if so, what?

MR. GUEHENNO: Okay. (Laughs) When to end a mission. There's one good example is Sierra Leona, actually, where benchmarks were established which were real benchmark. And so, there was a plan, and this was not just fatigue. There was a sense that the country had gained sufficient stability, institutional stability.

I think there should always be a strategy for exit, and that strategy should be based on the judgment on how robust the institutions are to withstand the tensions that will remain in the country. That's the key. Are the tensions in the country likely to lead to further violence, or do we believe that the political institutions that have been built are sufficiently robust, that they can withstand such tension? course, it's a political judgment, and it's not so easy to make. But I think that's the rational way to look at it.

Arrears. This was -- the question, the way it was brought, and the challenge that was posed to the UN was, the financial aspect was one thing, which of course, delayed reimbursements to -- in some cases to troop contributing countries. I don't think it led troop contributing countries to decide not to contribute.

So in that sense, the impact was limited. But the United Nations needs the support of the United States. It cannot be seen and it cannot be the puppet of the United States. It loses its utility if it is seen as such. But it has to have the support of the United States. Otherwise, it is in a very weak situation.

And during the Bush administration, there was actually a difference

between the first mandate of President Bush and the second mandate of President Bush, and there was a recognition that the United Nations was quite useful in a number of situations where there was no appetite in this city, in Washington, for direct U.S. engagement, but at the same time, a need to address situations.

And I find since in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that even during, actually, the first mandate, there was support from the Bush administration for the United Nations. What did not help was the consistent attacks of parts of them, and the right of the Bush administration against the UN, which did take a toll on the moral of the United Nations and on the effectiveness of the organization on the constant attack.

The use of technology in the United Nations. I'm all for it, and I think it's good that now, UAVs have been deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other places. I think at the same time, one should not make too much of it, because again, there is always a tendency to think that there is a technological fix to what are essentially, political issues.

And just as the troops would not be -- are an important part of peacekeeping, but they are not the full dimension of peacekeeping. Technology in peacekeeping is important, and the UN should have everything up to -- that technology makes available. But I don't think that will detract -- that will eliminate the fact that peacekeeping is about human beings engaging other human beings, and that indeed, it's important to document.

It's important to have incontrovertible facts. It puts you in a stronger position if you want to challenge a group that denies it has done this or that. But an important part of it is the human beings who will challenge the group. And I think sometimes, there is a tendency to hide behind technology, not to confront again, the political dimension, which is a much harder dimension to address.

What can the United States do for peacekeeping? First, as I said, the political support and engagement. And it's tricky, because it doesn't mean that the United States should put all its weight in every conflict, because there are situations where it can be counterproductive, because the United States does not have only friends around the world, and because of the very enormous power of the United States, sometimes it can create counter reactions. So, that has to be done with subtlety.

But the capacity of the United States to politically engage in every situation and hopefully, to coordinate that engagement with the United Nations when it can help the United Nations peacekeeping, I think that in itself, is enormous, when it happens. That is very important.

Now, on the physical operational practical support that the United States can give, I think politically, it's probably hard to imagine U.S. troops under UN command. So, I'm a practical person. I'm not going to push for something as unlikely to happen anytime soon. I do think that in a number of situations, it's important to have a capacity to escalate vis-à-vis supporters, what in the jargon of nuclear deterrence, people would have called the escalation dominance.

If you do not have the capacity to escalate when there is some group on the margins of the peace process that would like to sabotage it, and if that group, with little force, can really create a problem, you have a real difficulty. If you can escalate, if you can convey a message that you can't fool around with a UN mission, that is very important.

And there, having a quick reaction force, not necessarily under UN command, but that can be called upon, that could increase the leverage of the United Nations a lot. Then, there are other aspects. There is all the intelligence that can be shared with the United Nations, because all these conflicts that I've described, the fog

that I have described, one way to navigate through that fog is to know a bit beyond the fog.

And so, intelligence has become a much more important dimension of those complicated conflicts the UN is operating in. And obviously, the U.S. has considerable intelligence assets, and whatever it can share on an ad hoc basis with the UN helps. But I think the most important contribution of the U.S. is its political contributions.

I would mention the training it can provide to peacekeeping troops of other countries. I think that is good, provided it is really attuned to the needs of peacekeeping, and that -- because sometimes, it can be -- there can be a -- it can be not quite attuned. But the most important -- and I want to end on that, is the political support. Peace operations are a political enterprise. If the greatest power in the world is not behind that political enterprise, it's unlikely to succeed.

MR. JONES: It's a perfect point on which to end. I strongly recommend the book to you. Those of you who are interested in the UN will find it fascinating. Those of you who are interested in the Middle East will find it fascinating. Africa, American foreign policy and the use of force -- it's a terrific book. Thank you for writing it and thank you for being here today. (Applause)

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