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Welcome and Introduction:

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First Session: 1915 and the Unmaking of Peoples: Deportations, Massacres, and Genocide:

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Second Session: The Making of an “Almost Intractable Conflict” and Attempts at Its Resolution:

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Historian and Former Senior Advisor to the President of Armenia

Third Session: 2015 and Its Horrors: A Century After 1915:

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Closing Remarks:

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MS. HILL: Ladies and gentlemen, can I ask you to take your seats please. We're running just a little bit behind time and I'd like to get things started. I'm Fiona Hill, the Director of the Center on United States and Europe here at the Brookings Institutions. And I'd really like to thank all of you for joining us today for a discussion of what is a very important, but obviously also controversial and very sensitive topic.

Before introducing the panel I want to stress that this is an event that's initiated by me and my colleagues. I'm here today from the Center on United States and Europe. Can people hear? Sorry, I had noticed somebody -- can everybody hear okay? Yes, okay. I thought for a moment that only I could hear myself and everybody else couldn't hear me which, you know, typical British person, keep on talking, you know, irrespective of whether people can hear you or not. Anyway, as I was saying, before introducing the panels I wanted to stress that the event today is initiated by me and a group of my colleagues here at the Center on United States and Europe, along with colleagues from the Carnegie Endowment and MIT Center for International Studies. Now the fact that we are holding this conference here in this auditorium is in no way indicative of any institutional position on the part of the Brookings Institution, or indeed on the parts of the other organizations. The views of Brookings scholars expressed today are their own and they should not be attributed to the Brookings Institution or its offices because the Brookings Institution does not take positions on any policy issue.

So the purpose of this conference is to highlight and discuss this topic and its sensitivities, and to offer some perspectives, obviously not all perspectives. We do not intent to thrash out all of the various positions, nor are we here to make any legal or political pronouncements which we're not empowered in any case to make. So our
aim, like all of the research conducted at Brookings, and like all of the other events that we host here is to inform the public debate, not to advance a political agenda.

Having said all of that we are here however to try to understand how the debate about the Armenian genocide has evolved over the years since World War I from the context of World War I 100 years ago to today in 2015. And today in 2015 we’re all bearing witness to other atrocities in the Middle East. In some of the successor state of the Ottoman Empire we see political upheavals and wars. In the territory that covers modern Syria, Iraq, and the Levant, that have led to renewed persecution and forced displacement of minority groups who have all been targeted on the basis of ethnicity and religion. So today’s events in the Middle East are creating new trauma and cycles of collective grievance and recrimination. And this is actually where we’re leading up to today in all of the panels. It’s the focus of the final panel of the conference, and I hope that you will stay on for this. I know it’s very difficult when you have a very long conference with three events and people have jobs, but I do hope that you will bear with us to the end of today’s events.

We’re also most importantly here in the spirit of reconciliation. Most of us here today have been working closely with the Hrant Dink Foundation on Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Many of us knew Hrant Dink personally, and he’s been a great inspiration for this and for other events. Now for those of you in the audience who don’t know, or did not know Hrant Dink, he was a Turkish journalist and civil society activist of Armenian descent who was devoted to the cause of reconciliation between Armenians and Turks, and who sacrificed his life for the freedom of speech. He was assassinated on January 19, 2007. Hrant Dink believed that history should not be legislated and that Turks should come to terms with their own past through their own open and frank discussion of the most painful issue at hand. Hrant Dink also very importantly
acknowledged the broader context of World War I and the fact that Turks and Muslims also suffered during the carnage of war and the brutal chaos of the disintegration of a huge, multi ethnic, and multi confessional empire. Hrant Dink once said to his fellow Turkish citizens, "Come, let us first understand each other. Come, let us first respect each other's pain. Come, let us first let one another live." Some of us were at a conference, a very ground breaking conference, held by the Hrant Dink Foundation in November of last year, November 2014 in Turkey. It was on the issue of reconciliation and the prospects for normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. Significantly, the conference was hosted by Ankara University and the School of Political Studies with many Turkish officials present. So this event in some respects is a follow on to the meeting. And the Friends of Hrant Dink organization and MIT have helped to bring some of the out of town speakers that we have today to Washington, D.C. to participate in this and also some of the seminars. So we're here today in the spirit of Hrant Dink's words and in honor of Hrant Dink's memory. And that's why we've convened this conference.

So I also hope that those of you who are here today with us who have different views on how this topic should have been handled will give our speakers a chance to offer their perspectives and will also engage with us in an open and frank and civil discussion worthy of the democratic values that Hrant Dink embraced.

We're going to begin the conference with a panel on the context of World War I and the events of 1915 chaired by Tom de Waal of Carnegie Endowment who is the author of a newly released book, Great Catastrophe. Unfortunately we didn't have flyers for the book today, but I hope that some of you have seen this and will think about buying it. There's my plug for Tom. We have to keep our colleagues in good order with their book sales. But this book is a very important discussion of all of the different aspects and dimensions of today's topic. The panel also features three leading
historians, Taner Akçam, Lerna Ekmekcióglu, and David Gaunt. And although there was widespread suffering during World War I as we will discuss today on the panel, the catastrophe that befell the Armenian Ottoman communities can’t be just contextualized away as collateral damage amid the chaos of this terrible war.

The second panel which will follow this one will be chaired by my Brookings colleague Kemal Kirişci, and it will focus on how the events and atrocities of 1915 have shaped modern Turkish-Armenia relations and how they've also played a role in other conflicts in the Caucasus. Tom de Waal will be a speaker on this panel along with Gerard Libaridian, who was the former Senior Advisor to the President of Armenia, as well as a long-standing historian of regional issues, and two experts from Turkey, Mitit Çelikpala, and Nigar Göksel, who have followed regional conflicts closely for decades.

Finally, as I already noted, our third panel will look at the present day. It will look at the difficulties of reconciliation as well as the current context in the Middle East. This panel is chaired by our colleague, Lily Gardner Feldman from Johns Hopkins University. And she and another speaker, Catherine Guisan, both work on themes of reconciliation in a broader European and international context. They’ll be joined by Ömer Taşpinar, a Non Resident Colleague here at Brookings, as well as a Professor at the National Defense University, and Arman Grigoryan, from Lehigh University. And we'll also have Hisham Melhem, who is the Bureau Chief of Al Arabiya on the panel who will offer us a view from the contemporary Middle East.

Now bios for all the chairs and panelists are in the handouts for the conference, and there's actually a mystery person in the bios which just goes to how you can never be sure what's going on here. (Laughter) David Hirschmann, who is not with us and is not one of the panelists, but seems to be an interloper from a previous event who is accidentally in the bios. So if all of you are wondering why is the CEO of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce here, he's not. We just noticed this when we were looking at this. We also had previously got the name of our own Center wrong. So if you find any mistakes in any of these materials, these are just accidents and artifacts of our own editing process and not the fact that some sneaky person has made their way into this event. Poor David Hirschmann. I'm sure he's now wondering why he is been associated with our event. So please don't anybody email him and ask him why he wasn't here or why he should have been here. He's an accident.

Anyway, thank you again for joining us. And I'm going to hand it over to Tom to frame the opening panel. Our speakers, as most of them are academics are much more used to speaking from lecterns so they are going to come up here to speak and then they will sit down and be mic'd for the Q & A. So please bear with us while we shift around. I do hope that nobody's falls from the stage as I'm trying not to when I get off. So that only happens to Madonna in concerts, but hopefully not to Tom de Waal and our colleagues.

Thank you again to all of you for joining us today. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. DE WAAL: Good morning, everybody. As Fiona said I'm Tom de Waal from the Carnegie Endowment. It's great to be here and I think we should all thank many institutions, Hrant Dink Foundation, MIT, and Brookings, for the great work they've put into organizing this conference. I think there have been many events on the centenary but I promise you this will be the best.

In my personal capacity as a scholar of the Caucuses I am also -- and on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment, we're also cosponsoring this event. I should say that a few years ago in Washington the idea that Carnegie and Brookings would be cosponsoring an event would seem almost unthinkable as Armenians and Turks
reconciling. So there’s some progress there as well I’m very glad to say.

We’ve got three historians here and I think this event today is really all about the intersection of history and politics. And as we’re talking books I should also briefly plug their books. Taner Akçam is the author of many books on the Armenian genocide, most recently The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity, the Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Then Lerna Ekmekçioğlu is author of a forthcoming book if that’s correct with Princeton called Recovering Armenia, Limits of Belonging in Post-Genocide Turkey. And David Gaunt to our right, who is Professor of History at Södertöm University in Stockholm, is I think a world renowned expert on the fate of the Syrians in World War I and is the author of Massacres Resistance Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Southeast Anatolia during World War I.

I think it’s important to say that the historians have moved the understanding, the debate about what happened in 1915 way beyond the politicians. I think the politicians I would say are still struggling, and the media is still struggling to catch up. The last 10 or 15 years has produced some excellent history and we no longer -- as 10 or 15 years ago people would have been, you know, exercised in very king of legalistic debates about did what happened in 1915 fit the definition of genocide. I see the media is still trying to answer those sorts of questions, but the historians have moved a long way beyond that I would say. And their sophistication in their analysis I think I'm correct in saying all three of us, four of us use the word Armenian genocide as an analytic term, but are less interested in the kind of legalistic politicized aspects of the use of that word. So it’s going to be great to have three historians to discuss, look back, and bring all their sophisticated analysis to the first topic.

So without further ado let’s hand over to Taner Akçam. Thank you.
MR. AKÇAM: Thank you very much. Good morning. I thank you for the invitation and a lot of organizations involved. I thank all of them all together. Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure for me to be here. What I'm going to do here is try to give a macro perspective to understand the Armenian genocide. And I have a new argument for you. This is maybe where I ended up after 30 years of research on Armenian genocide.

Armenian genocide has been debated for the most part as a phenomenon that occurred between the years of 1915-18. Naturally the historical roots were discussed and there were different explanations for the causes, but at the end the point of the discussion was to understand what had occurred between 1915 and ’18. In other words the genocide was taken up and debated as an event and an occurrence that took place between 1915 and ’18. What I want to do here is something different. I propose that we use the concept of genocide not to describe an event that took between 1915 and ’18, but as a process that started in 1878 and in one respect was concluded by 1923 by Lausanne Agreement. Genocide not as an occurrence but as a process. The theoretical background goes to Lemkin, the story in Lemkin. Maybe in question and answer period we can discuss more on that aspect.

No doubt that it has symbolic significance and that can be pulled in either direction. I want to use the 1878 Treaty of Berlin as a start date because of the Article 61. And the Armenian problem became an undeniable piece of international diplomacy, and from that day forward the great powers were not only active players, they were part of the problem and they were also the one who determined which direction it took. Another significance of 1878 for my purpose is that from that year onward the issues started to be called Armenian reform question. Please write it down, Armenian reform
question. This description provides us with the main characteristic of the period and the problem. Armenian problem as a reform, as a question of reform. So what I'm suggesting here is a very simple idea. The Armenian problem should be understood and debated as a matter of reforms that cover the period from 1878 to 1923. This period could be described within three different frameworks that are correlated with each other.

These three separate context frameworks corresponded to three different sides of Armenian reform questions. First context is that the Armenian genocide is not a stand-alone event that involved the Armenians alone. It must be treated as one part of the policies that were implemented towards other Christian communities, both before and after 1878 by the Ottoman government. After 1878 the Macedonian crisis of the early 20th century, the ethnic cleansing of the Greeks, (inaudible) population of the Thrace and Aegean regions following the Balkan War of 1912, the Assyrian genocide during the First World War, the genocide of Pontus Greeks of the Black Sea during 1921-22, the burning Smyrna Izmir in 1922, and in 1924 Turkish Greek population exchange are among the most well known events of this era. If the Armenian genocide is taken up as one part of the policies implemented against the Christian population it becomes comprehensible. It would be appropriate to define the period between 1878 and 1923 as the period of Ottoman genocide. This is the term that we started using in our research, to which the Armenian genocide constitutes only one part of it.

Within this context the demographic policies implemented during the years 1913 and ’18 played an instrumental role. What was driving these policies was an attempt to rescue the Empire rather than to establish a Turkish nation state. The empire that was on the verge of collapse and falling apart, and by homogenizing around the collective identity that called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, the Empire was to be saved or try tried to be saved by Committee of Union and Progress party. They want to prevent the
dismemberment of the Empire. I think this is an interesting theory for you, not that the CUP targeted not to establish a nation state, but their policy was that within the Empire context can be understood.

So then within that policy the two fundamental pillars was of this homogenization, the cultural Turkishness that still maintained a connection with Islam and assume the interpretation of it. And for that reason homogenization aimed not only the removal of Christians through first expulsion and annihilation but also the deportation and assimilation of non Turkish Muslims. During the 1913-18 period Bosnians, Arabs, Kurds, and Circassians, and other non Turkish Muslim populations were also relocated and settled in different places, and the term assimilation was used by Ottoman authorities themselves. This is not the term that I'm making up. Their purpose was to assimilate these small other ethnic groups, non Turkish Muslims within Turkish majority. This is the policy that they implemented. And as a result of this demographic policy of 1913-18 the ethnic makeup of Anatolia has been completely changed. The estimated 17 million people of Anatolia were so uprooted that by the end of the period at least one third of this population had been resettled elsewhere, deported or annihilated. The establishment of modern Turkey was possible as a result of these demographic policies implemented during First World War years.

Second context pertains to the massacre directly targeted the Armenians. Without wanting to ignore the massacres that occurred elsewhere like Sassoon 1904-05 -- you may never heard about it -- and Marash 1921. This period three huge massacres occurred during 1878-1923. One is what you we call it (inaudible)Abdul Hamid massacres 1894-96, approximately 200,000 Armenians were massacred. And the Adana massacre of 1909, approximately 20,000 Armenians were massacred. And the genocide of 1915-18, approximately one million Armenians were massacred during that
period. And up until now these three large massacres were examined independently of each other as unique, singular phenomena. No one had tried to interpret these three events by looking through the same window. This is what I'm going to do here for you.

Of course there have been some very good attempts at explanation which have described both 1894-96 and 1909 massacres as preparation, rehearsal for or precursor of the genocide of 1915-18. In the early genocide literature, these events 1894 or Adana 1909 was considered a rehearsal for the Armenian genocide. In these studies, however, the one thing that connected all three massacres was an abstract actor or agent deterred and some characteristic that we attribute to them as the causes of the massacres. These characteristics were searched within culture, ideology, or mentality. So I'm quoting some quotes from the authors, the quotes don't belong to me. In this approach such concept and subculture of massacre, or the Ottoman-Turkish propensity to resolve acute conflict by resorting to violence. These are quotes. Or as well as statements like, "Islamic doctrines and traditions embodied an inherent resistance to change." So occupied these ideas an important role, putting in a simplistic way, the religion of Islam, the prevalence of militaristic culture among the Turks, or expansionist ideologies like pan-turanism and pan-Islamism, were put forth as root causes of the genocide.

I'm ready to accept these types of method of explanation which can be called essentialist actually in nature, can provide us with some important clues that might help us to understand the behavior of just one of the actors in the process, main perpetrator group. However, I would like to state that these studies that describe the period by putting the intention and the motivation of one actor who performs the act, it's called ahistorical, it is not really a historical analysis of the period. What I'm proposing is an explanation of these three massacres which doesn't rely on only the intention of motivation of a single actor, namely the Turks, but rather that one puts the Armenian
reform question front and center, connects all these massacres together, and includes two other actors in the process in addition to the Ottoman rulers, Armenian reform movement, several branches of it, and the great powers. So they too were active in this process. We would need to add here of course the dynamic relations in the locals, Circassians, Kurds, and so on in order to extend the scope. But all these three massacres, 1984, 1909, and 1915-18, came about as a result of the common denominator of the dynamic relations of these actors. Throughout the entire process the one thing that distinguished the relations between the actors was their different position that they took on the Armenian reform question. Despite certain differences in ideology ideological preferences or social class roots the massacre occurred as the common response of Ottoman-Turkish rulers, both Sultans and the CUP Party Leaders.

And one additional important issue -- I don't have time to discuss, but the Armenian reform movement were not passive receivers in that process. They were also active participants in that process, and this gives it a dynamic process. The critical case here is the Adana massacre of 1909 and whether or not really we should put the Adana massacre within that context. There are debates and discussion, but my argument is we have to put Adana as a bridge between 1894-96 and 1915. And this is the continuity on the reform question. Why Adana is so important on the reform question, maybe this is a revelation for the historians, nobody knew until recently that there were indeed another reform package in Ottoman parliament 1909 before Adana massacre. So this is an interesting other topic that must be discussed.

So the third context, this is the -- I mean to unite all these three massacres on the axis of Armenian reform question is something that has to be done and researched thoroughly. The third context interprets the Armenian genocide as part of the history of the collapse of the four large empires of Europe. By this process which started
in the middle of the 19th century, which came to a head in 1918, the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empire collapsed. The struggle for nation states within each of these empires has fanned by French Revolution played an important role in this collapse. Each of these empires tried to suppress the nationalist movement within their own territories, nevertheless fanned the flames of the similar movement in rival empires. And the nationalist movement in each empire turned into the direct subject of power struggle between different empires. Among these empires the Ottomans ended up being the most vulnerable and were exposed and defenseless to foreign meddling due to their weakness. The largest scale power struggles between empires devastated the equilibrium of the Ottomans. The most visible reason behind the meddling was to ameliorate the conditions of the Ottoman Christians. The most common expression that was used during the frequent meeting -- I’m quoting from the diplomatic reports -- “to give security and content to the Christians by obtaining for them a fair share in the Ottoman administration.” This is from the diplomatic report that they used. It was because of the Islamic institutional make-up of the state as well as the affect of the Islamic culture whereby Muslim did not see Christians as equal to themselves, the Ottoman’s could not formulate a way to bring Christians into equal status with Muslims. The actual framework that determined the foreign intervention was less about humanitarian concern and more about calculated based upon realpolitik by the great powers. And I have a new theory, you know, so -- not a theory but a new approach. The European great powers viewed the problems of Ottoman state with its Christian as a part of European security. This is, again if you read the diplomatic correspondence very carefully you will see that they consider Ottoman’s problems with Christians as a part of European security. So they believed if the Ottomans did not find a solution to their problems with its Christians it could turn into an internal conflict within Europe within short order. Security concerns in
Europe were one of the biggest justifications for intervention.

What happened was at the beginning of the Greek uprising 1821 we have a new concept in Europe. This is what we use today, humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention as a term in international diplomacy entered in the arena with the Greek uprising. And throughout the 19th century great powers justified their intervention with the term of humanitarian intervention. And this is what is considered by Christians as the liberation from Ottoman (inaudible) yokes and by the Ottomans it was considered a threat to their own national security.

So my central argument is there was an accumulated knowledge -- this is the term that I'm using -- accumulated knowledge that really shaped the mindset of the Ottomans, which based on the four prong, namely these are the four pronged pattern, reform, demands, massacre, intervention, and succession. This is the history of the 19th century. Christians asked reforms, Ottoman suppressed organized massacres, great powers humanitarian intervention, ended with succession of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and so on. So this is the accumulated knowledge which has based on these four pronged pattern. And then Ottoman Christians demand for the reforms become caught between the screws of European internal security and the Ottoman perception of being under threat. Then 1913, after the Balkan War, Armenians asked the reforms, negotiations started 1913 summer months. And for these negotiations, Armenian reform negotiations, they took 1895 May reform proposal as their basis. When they signed 1914 February the reform agreement, it was clear for Ottomans it is the beginning of the end for them. This is four prong, reforms, massacre, intervention, succession. They thought it is the beginning of an independent Armenian state. What I'm here going to tell you and to finalize my talk is actually Talaat Pasha's telegram or letter. So what I propose here has nothing to do with my own ideas. These are actually summary of letters written by
Talaat as Interior Minister to Ottoman government dated May 26, 1915. In this statement Talaat describes the reason for the Armenian deportations of 1915. According to him -- again it's not my quote -- "Armenian reform question" he says "open the way for the intervention by great powers which would inevitably result in the partition of Ottoman territory. And the purpose of the deportation was to prevent the intervention of great powers." So quoting Talaat, "So as the question of reform, which is completely internal matter of the Ottoman state, has now became an international question as a result of the intervention of the foreign countries, and with some of the Ottoman provinces now passing under foreign influence it is demanded that certain concession be granted and that a special administrative organization be created." Nevertheless, Talaat continues, "Since it has been seen through a bitter experience 19th century that reforms and organizations that are created under foreign influence and pressure have led to the dividing and partition of the Ottoman homeland." Talaat leads in that long letter another revelation for us. He says that before the start of the war, underline, before start of the First World War, quote from Talaat, "Deliberations were underway as to how to prepare and implement the means for eliminating this trouble, Armenian reform question, which represent an important section in the list of vital questions of the Ottoman state in a manner that is both comprehensive and absolute." According to Talaat, since the war had broken out they had had to make do with certain provisional measures, but now in May 1915 the time comes to give the problem, "An orderly manner of arrangement in accordance with appropriate procedures and principles." As can be seen the decisions driving the Armenian genocide were not directly related to the exigencies of the First World War, rather they were directly the result of seeking a solution to the Armenian reform question which was considered a huge thorn in the side of the Ottomans that had gone on for the better part of the 19th century up to that point. To the aim was to prevent
the intervention of the great powers and perceive the inevitable succession of yet more
territory from the Empire.

For this reason what I am saying is that the only way to understand
Armenian genocide if we examine it not as a single event, as a process and as an
Armenian reform question, and on these three different levels that I described above.
Thank you very much for your time. (Applause)

MS. EKMEKÇIOĞLU: Hi. Thank you for being here. Thank you, organizers for the invitation, and thank you for the introduction. I would like to speak today about an aspect of the Armenian genocide that has been attracting a different kind of attention lately, the gender then age conscious dimensions of what happened to Armenians and other Ottoman Christian communities during World War I, especially the ways in which many Armenian women and children found themselves in Muslim households and found themselves Islamized. In the last few years this issue came to the larger public’s attention in Turkey especially thanks to the coming out of the grandchildren of Islamized Armenians. As many of you might know, many Turks today admit that one of their grandparents or great grandparents used to be an Armenian who had been absorbed into a Muslim household during the war years or before the war years during the previous waves of massacres.

In my talk today -- can you hear me? Is it okay? Okay. In my talk today which is titled, "Making People by Making them Up, Abduction during the Armenian Genocide", I'll discuss the historical conditions that enabled such a transfer of population from one group to the other. And I organized it in three parts. First I'll present a brief overview of how abduction worked during Armenian genocide. Second, I'll discuss the Ottoman and Islamic repertoires and practices that enabled the young Turks to create what I termed as a climate of abduction during the great war. In the last part if I have
time I'll talk about the Ottoman and Turkish archives vis a vis this issue.

Part one, similar to the transfer of property from Armenians to -- I'm saying Armenians simply because I did most of my work on Armenians so usually it's Ottoman Christians also including the Austrians about which we'll hear more -- similar to the transfer of property from Armenians to Muslims and Muslim institutions, including the state, transfer of women and children from Armenians to Muslims and Muslim institutions such as the orphanages was an integral part of the whole process and not a byproduct of war as such. Many times when you talk about wars, any war, we talk about a rape as a weapon of war, or rape and abduction as unavoidable consequences of mass violence. There is of course that component during the Armenian genocide as well, but what is more interesting and analytically eye opening I find is that abduction and its byproduct, sexual violence, were integral non little aspects of the event that began 100 years ago about these days. What did World War I mean to a typical Ottoman Armenian woman or child? End of life, if not loss of family members, loss of community, loss of control over body and mobility, suppression of native language, new religion, new everyday language, new place definitely -- not definitely, but overwhelming majority, a new community if they are absorbed into a Muslim context, new household, and new family, new children, new husband, new fathers. And how did this happen? This integration of the Armenian family and the community was one of the ways in which the ruling Young Turk government intended to unmake the Armenian people which we have in the title of our panel today. The Ottoman archives are full of documents detailing what to do with Armenian orphans and widows. I'll read one document which is going to show how the government encouraged, ordered, and orchestrated the transfer of women and young children from Armenian milieus to Muslim households and institutions. The date of this document is April 30, 1916. This is definitely not the first of its kind, but it's a quite
comprehensive one and it's a typical one. It's been used by other historians, Taner Akçam used it, Ordimit Unger used it, in their works. So this one particular document is sent from Minister of Interior Talaat Pasha's office to the various provinces.

Geographically it's everywhere really, such as Adana, Erzurum, Aydın, Edirne, Aleppo, Hudavendigar, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Mamre, Tulasi, Elazig, Konya, Kastamona, Trabzon, and the sanj-aks of Izmit, Canik, Eskisehir, Karahisar-i Sahib, Marash, Urfa, Kaysaki, and Nigde. It includes five orders. First one says those families, that means women and children, who had been rendered, kimsesiz (speaking foreign languages in Turkish), that are who are left without anyone, without a guardian or father because their men -- the document says "because their men have been deported or currently serve in the Ottoman Army are to be separately distributed to villages and towns that are without any foreigners or Armenians. Their living expenses are to be paid from the refugee's fund and they are to be trained and accustomed to the local customs. Second, young and widowed women are to be married off. Third, children up to the age of 12 are to be distributed to our orphanages." "Our" here meaning Muslim. "Fourth, if orphanages are insufficient for this job they shall be given to prominent well to do Muslims to be assimilated to local manners and ways of life." And, five, "If a sufficient number of such prominent Muslims cannot be found efforts should be made to distribute them to peasants with the assurance that every month 30 kurushes will be paid by the refugee's fund." And there's another of course very common expression in the document saying that regular report of the numbers and figures of who has been transferred to where or taken in or married off are to be sent to the Center periodically.

The document is pretty self explanatory. I would like to direct your attention to the fact that the Interior Ministry cares about the futures of the transferred people. They are to be transformed. It is not just a transfer operation, it's a
transformation operation. They are to be absorbed in and become one of us and discontinue to stand out. This is not a temporary measure, but a permanent one which was the same case with the Armenian properties. We see that emphasis is not just on taking in Armenian women and children and helping them survive, but on de-Armenianizing them by way of Islamizing them, or by assimilating them into a variety of Muslim communities, Kurds, Arabs, and Turks being the main ones, but also Caucasians definitely.

Similar to the -Armenian historical homeland, and remember the whole issue revolves around territory, right, the Armenian female body and the vulnerable and assimilable child that is the cornerstone of the Armenian future were to be emptied out of their content, culture, religion, ways of being, and replaced by the right kind of content, the one that belonged to the groups that were on the perpetrating side of this conflict. It is in fact striking that the perpetrating group came up with strategies to unmake the target group by making a significant portion of the target group a part of the perpetrating group. At the end of the process of abduction, Islamization, forcible name change, and isolation from the native community, these women and children would cease to be part of the problem, but would become part of the solution. They would discontinue populating and reproducing the target group. And it's also all about demographics and human breeding and reproduction. And they would begin populating and reproducing the preferred group, in this case Muslims.

Part two, why women and children and how come women and children? What type of a historical repertoire rendered this transfer policy thinkable for the Ottoman state, and what was it that made it feasible and successful on the ground? First we should pay attention to how these groups understood the difference that separated each other. The Ottoman-Turkish authorities who created this wartime climate of abduction
were Ottomans after all. Therefore they conceived difference on religious terms rather than for instance race and blood. This does not mean that Committee of Union and Progress leaders had not become increasingly radical or that they did not use racist vocabulary. On the contrary, they did refer to Anatolian Armenians as tumors requiring an operation for instance, or leeches feeding on Muslims, or "microbes within the organism of the father land that had to be eliminated for good". Yet such terminology did not preclude conception and implementation of policies based on the assumption that the difference between groups were not innate and indelible, but rather than changeable. During the Armenian genocide the Ottoman government's goal did not necessitate the killing or deporting of every human being considered Armenian. Those who were considered lacking the capacity to transmit group identity could be spared death and deportation for simply they did not matter. Given the patrineal logic shared by both Christians and Muslims in this geography and endorsed by law of both groups, it's easily deduced that it was females who did not matter to group identity. Women reproduced groups socially and had huge symbolic importance, but they did not define the group. Any child a woman borne automatically belonged to the father's family and his community, his religion, for the shared logic in paternity in Islam and Christianity dictates that the father is the sole creator. Women do contribute physiologically to the child, but in no way are they taught to engender it. By not attributing the mother any role in procreation this monogenetic mentality reduces the womb to an empty vessel, or a field, that takes the shape and form of whatever fluid fills it in, the seed.

In order to clarify this point let's think of it comparatively. Holocaust presents a good opportunity because it's very different. According to Nazis Jewishness was a fixed identity. It was something Jews, regardless of their sex or age, carried in their dirty blood. And mixing of that with the clear Aryan blood was a crime. During the
holocaust rape was officially forbidden, and when it did happen, and it did happen, Jewish victims were usually killed in order to prevent racial pollution or defilement. Therefore abduction for extinction was unthinkable during the holocaust. On the other hand the blood of Armenian women was seen to be devoid of the capacity to pollute the Muslim nation because it had no agency or consequence. Therefore abduction for extinction was possible. It was not only possible, however, it was also preferable. By the time that World War I reached the Ottoman lands many politicians and bureaucrats had already internalized the idea, the Ottoman ruling elite, they internalized the idea that given a country’s demographic profile was proof of its strength. We have new studies coming and showing that even from early (inaudible Tanzimat) on, from 1840s on they had this anxiety, this demographic anxiety. They were anxious about the dangers of depopulation. This is also common in many other contexts of course. That an operation such as the wholesale deportation of Armenians could pose, especially at the time of such high scale mobilization, in this framework then it made more sense to recycle Armenian women and children then to discard them. Moreover like the temptations provided by property and real estate, easy access to an Armenian or other Christian woman or child could prompt more people to kill their neighbors, remain bystanders to their disappearance, or refuse to provide help.

Another important factor that enabled this transfer policy was the fact that women and children were seen as incapable of organizing resistance. Once they changed their religion, name, and language their loyalties were sure to change. Of course so this is what makes the current grandchildren’s movement kind of interesting because clearly not all of them have acted as they were supposed to act despite the fact that they did become Muslims and ceased to be a security threat to the Turkish state, Ottoman state. And the CUP knew -- the Ottoman countries must have known that this
transfer of loyalties would not happen overnight. This is one of the reasons why the documents ordering women and children mention that they should be sheltered in towns and villages without Armenians, or that efforts should be made to acculturate them to their new surroundings. Isolation from the native group was considered necessary for successful assimilation. Moreover even if they did not immediately and sincerely change their alliances, because basically they are forced to change sides, it was believed that these formerly Armenian women and children would not pose a significant challenge to the project of getting rid of Armenians given their biological and social inabilities. The same was true about children, even boys. Boys under 12 or 10 were usually seen as incapable of organizing resistance, therefore they did not pose a challenge.

In my larger work I've also looked at the previous Ottoman practices that enabled such a conception of transfers. I'll just mention them in passing, such as for the children the institution of (speaking foreign language) I think plays. It's there, right, non Muslim boys turning into Muslim men basically through some of the policies that the state implements. Abduction into bondagery has been practiced in the Ottoman lands for the longest time. (Speaking foreign-Turkish language) foster children is also a very common Ottoman practice, both Muslims and non Muslims do it. In terms of abduction, what is abduction? It's always been practiced in Anatolia, even before Turks arrived there like Greek mythologies full of abduction. It means power and mass community abduction. This honors the victim and the whole enemy group, especially their men because they failed to protect. Asserts victory over other men in that regard, and Sultans too abducted -- Ottoman Sultans did reproduce actually if you think about how -- most wives of Ottoman Sultans were originally non Muslim, mostly Christian women who had been converted and included into the Ottoman royal family, but no one who would question the Muslims of the royal family despite the fact that originally half of what we
would now call -- half of the matter came from an original non Muslim partner. There are also material benefits to this. Free labor, sexually available females and children, wives without bride price requirements or natal family to intervene. Might be considered charitable. I think many people did consider this charitable. They are basically including someone who would have been otherwise killed or dead or would perish. So it increases the household heads charisma among the group and the prestige really.

In the last few minutes that I have I'll talk about what has been very interesting for me to observe, which is the fact that these documents -- I think, Taner, you have also mentioned it in your previous talk -- these documents, including the one that I read to you, are readily available in the sense that they are not -- I did do this research without going to the Ottoman archives, Turkish archives, simply because the Turkish government, the Turkish Republic Prime Minister General Directorate of the State Archives published them. They have volumes titled Armenians in Ottoman Documents in which they select and translated Ottoman state documents to modern Turkish and English and published them. Their main goal in doing this is of course to negate the genocide thesis. And even if you just randomly Google genocide and you look at the definition of genocide, at least two of the five things that qualify something for genocide, two of them are related to these documents. So I was puzzled really that how come they were -- what happened, what went wrong that they made these documents available because they clearly indicated the Ottoman state's intent to do exactly what the genocide convention mentions. There can be a number of explanations. First, that they really did not do their homework and study what exactly it was that they were rejecting. Second, this is an indication of a larger process I thought. In the 1980s and '90s, even in the early 2000s, Turkish official narrative relied on the argument that the Armenian case was no holocaust and that applying the term genocide to the wartime deportation of Armenians
would threaten both the concept of genocide and the legacy of the holocaust. Indeed, Turkish officials’ argumentation was in line with and inspired by the emerging field of genocide studies which emphasize the holocaust's uniqueness, that it could not and should not be compared with other cases. And it's true as I mentioned, when you look at the experiences of women and children holocaust and Armenian genocide are different. (inaudiblepoles). Holocaust is a major rape avoidance case despite the fact that they both qualify for the same kind of crime. Also there is another tendency which I think is shared by the people who compiled these collections, as well as many Turkish national scholars who work on this issue. The first person who wrote -- there are only two books actually about -- two book length studies of women and children, Armenian and other Christian groups during the genocide and its immediate aftermath. And the first person -- I'm done -- 20 minutes. In the last 30 seconds, the person who did this, Ebrime Esham Artner, but others also, they present all these documents to who that there was no genocide. That in fact there was a humanitarian way of taking care of the women and children of the deported Armenian males. They simply missed the point that, I think, the fact that they had to go through the Armenianization doesn't mean that they -- it means that there was another point there. They simply missed the point that physical wholesale annihilation is not necessary for an event to qualify for the crime of genocide. Thank you.

MR. GAUNT: Thank you for the invitation to speak today. I am going to talk about the non-Armenian Christians who were affected by the First World War. There is now a realization that there has what has been called the Armenian genocide is much more complicated and involves more target groups than the Armenians. This includes, then, secondary targets like the Assyrians, the Greeks, and I would also throw into the equation the Yazidis. And it has a lot of consequences for how we are thinking about
what was going on in Turkey or the Ottoman Empire at that time. The Assyrians that I will be talking about are also the ancestors of those Assyrians in Syria and Iraq that are the target of ISIS during this year and the past year.

Now thinking about the other target groups actually expands the territory of the history of the genocide to the extremity of southeastern Anatolia and to northern Mesopotamia, and it even spills into parts of northwestern Iran.

On the second it expands the chronology to include many genocidal acts both before the 24th of April 1915, which is usually taken as the starting point of the genocide, but it also pushes the end date into the mid-1920s and perhaps even further. And that is during the time of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. It also removes Kemal Ataturk of his clean reputation that exists from World War I. If we include the Yazidis, we may be talking about a process of elimination or mass forced conversions going back to the 1840s. Including Assyrians and Greeks into the narrative, also as Taner was indicating earlier, reduces the importance of the political and nationalistic aspect of the political life of the Young Turks as these groups had a very weak expression of will to have autonomy. They did not have a revolutionary feeling.

At the same time it increases the religious and ethnic aspect in that they were all non-Muslim populations. It also increases the number of victims of the genocide in a way that we have not even begun to calculate. It means also, and I am in agreement with Taner, that we can see a continuity and violent demographic displacement sponsored by the government and going on since the 1800s. And it is coupled, if you look at it from a sociological point of view, with a persistent regional genocidal violence among the population with beliefs that are based on their interpretation of Islam that allows them to attack their local non-Muslim neighbors.

Since the 1970s, Sweden, where I work, has received wave after wave
of refugees from the Middle East and a large portion of them are Christian minorities from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, but above all from Turkey. And most of these refugees go under the international umbrella term of Assyrians, though the group itself doesn’t agree on this term, it being a cover for about four different religious groups who have a history of being rivals to each other.

Now, as far as the Assyrians in general go, there is a difference between them and the Armenians. For the first, they speak a Semitic language, which is close to Arabic and Hebrew. They are in a territory that is sort of squeezed below that of an Armenian settlement in the middle of Kurdish and Arab territory. In all probability, and this is based on anecdotes, the Assyrians got along much better with the Kurds than the Armenians did, so they had more friends that would protect them.

Inside Europe and Assyria, diaspora has established itself since the 1970s in Holland and Germany and particularly in Sweden where the city of Sodertalje plays the same role for the Assyrians that Glendale, California, plays for the Armenians with an intellectual base there -- radio, TV, and the like. My university is placed right in the middle of this -- it’s a new university and I have to build it up -- and I had many students who pushed me and supported me to investigate this genocide, which they had heard from their parents and grandparents. They call it the Year of the Sword, the Year of Seyfo, and they modeled their memory work and the commemoration and also a drive for political recognition of genocide on the Armenians. They even took the same date, the 24th of April, for commemoration and then complained to me that gee, we’re being obscured by the Armenians. They still have not found their own date for this.

Early estimates of the number of Assyrian victims were presented at the Versailles Peace Treaty. They range from 180,000 to 250,000 victims, and this was calculated guess-wise as 50 percent of the original population. Most of the survivors
have been pushed out of their home territories and found themselves far from home in Syria or Iraq. In both cases they were being used by the mandate powers, France and Britain, as mercenaries, or in what became the Soviet Union, also a bad place to be in.

At first there was very little to go on besides the memories of the families. There was one book, an oral history of survivors made in Syria, and a chronicle written by a monk outside of Mardin, a Syrian-Armenian town, and none of it was in any major language save Arabic.

Documents began coming out of the woodwork from my students and their families, restaurant owners, wholesalers in fruits and vegetables, owners of furniture stores, and the like. All of this began to look like a genocide that I knew from my studies of the Baltic countries. Much of it corroborated what the Assyrian memory had asserted. And this was very important for diaspora since there was a conflict between them and some high school students and teachers who had gotten their information from our friendly, local, Turkish Embassy that it just had not happened.

But the Assyrian documentation had the additional and unexpected benefit of giving us a new perspective on what was happening to the Armenians. In towns like Mardin, which were mixed with Armenians and Assyrians, the Armenians were taken first and the Assyrians later and they were able to chronicle what was going on. So we have a mountain of detail about what happened to the Armenians that you usually do not have.

Now, I have added to the memory work, documents from the Ottoman archives, which I was able to get to already in 2005. I had some help in that with an unnamed professor who now works at a college, a university, in Massachusetts. I won’t name him at all because I promised I never would. I have been working with two cases in which the paper trail of Assyrian places leads up to the government in Constantinople,
and it shows that they knew that the people that were talking about were not Armenians, but were Assyrians. It was not a case of mistaken identity covered by collateral damage.

The first case is that of a large village close to the border with Syria that resisted attempts and a siege for such a long time, three or four months, that the army was diverted in order to deal with this. The Ottoman Empire was a bureaucratic empire, so there were a lot of telegrams sent back and forth to Constantinople and to Diyarbakir and other places in order to motivate this and also explain it. Telegrams were sent to the Third Army in order to divert the military expedition on its way to Iran. The Third Army command also had to contact Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, in order to implement this. Also, because military advisors from Germany were in place in this expedition, telegrams were sent to von der Goltz Pasha, the senior military advisor from the German side. Also the German Diplomatic Corps was involved going up to the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, and back and forth. So around a little village of no strategic importance at all for the war, there was about 30 secret telegrams sent back and forth about the suppression of this place. There was a pretense in the beginning that they were Armenians in this village. It turned out to be some refugees had fled from the deportation tram. What this shows is that for one village, 40 telegrams and other documents both in Turkish and in German archives exist. In the end this village was spared because it resisted, Enver promising to come back at a more opportune time and suppress it. But it shows if we have one Assyrian village with 40 telegrams involved, how much more is there for the Armenian resistance? We just don't know, but it promises that the military archives are going to be a very rich mine.

Two, in dealing with the Assyrian tribes of the Hakkari Mountains, the Ottoman government was suspicious of their loyalty already even before the war began and there was a deportation order for them at the end of October 1914, which did not get
implemented because the war broke out. This was an order from Talaat Pasha to remove the Assyrians from the border to Iran to Konya and other places in central Anatolia.

Now, Talaat's suspicion that the Assyrians were disloyal was probably correct. When the city of Van was besieged by its governor, Djevdet Bey, on the 20th of April 1915, a Russian relief column was sent to relieve the Armenians, and the Assyrians of Hakkari joined in stopping a relief column coming from the Turkish Army side. For this, the Assyrians were pushed out of the Hakkari Mountains into Iran, but that's another story. What this also shows is the extreme involvement of the Minister of the Interior again and the Minister of War in pushing the Assyrians out. They were to be punished. They were never to be allowed to come back, and this was a very violent campaign involving the military.

So what kind of conclusions can be drawn by looking at the Assyrian case? Well, one has to do with how we look at genocide. Genocide is usually conceived as to have been perpetrated by very evil people against completely innocent victims. And we can't say it in the Assyrian case that they were completely innocent of contacts with foreign governments, of being disloyal to the state, but still they were massacred and dispersed and ethnically cleansed in a way that is nothing but genocide. So we have to rethink our thought about what actually is a victim.

Now, also there is a degree in which the Assyrian genocide has been in the shadow of the Armenians. I already mentioned that this was sort of natural if you take the 24th of April as the starting point of the Assyrian genocide. Most people explain this well, we thought we would get support from the Armenians if we joined in, but the Armenians actually had problems of their own in this.

A third thing -- and I mentioned the Yazidis in the very beginning,
especially the Yazidis of the Sinjar Mountains. In Assyrian documents they are the saviors. They were going out into the desert, collecting both Armenians and Assyrians who were being pushed into the desert in the deportations, built up a colony with houses, school, church, an Assyrian priest, and for this they were also punished later on as they are today.

I'll stop there. I've sort of given you a potpourri of things that you can see if you look wider than just to the Armenian target group. I thank you.

MR. de WAAL: We've got three distinguished historians here. You can already tell that. They've been talking about their research, about the archives. I'd like this Q&A session to focus on historical aspects. We do have two other panels to talk about more contemporary aspects.

And let me go first and take the benefit of having three historians here who've done years and years of research and ask you each whether there's -- if each of you has one big unanswered question that you'd like to see answered about this whole period of the Armenian genocide, one sort of research question that you think deserves -- a big question that deserves more attention. We have a very full picture, but obviously we don't have a complete picture. Who'd like to --

MR. AKCAM: I mean I have a very specific issue, two issues, I would like to raise. The first issue you may never have thought about, the Andonian documents. I think it is worthwhile to have really research on the authenticity of the Andonian documents.

MR. de WAAL: You should probably explain to those who don't know.

MR. AKCAM: What is the Andonian documents? Aram Andonian was an Armenian intellectual. He was also deported April 24 and survived the deportation, and then in Aleppo he compiled a series of memoirs from the surviving Armenians.
During that period in Aleppo he got from an Ottoman official whose name was Naim Bey a couple of telegrams from Naim Bey. They are deciphered telegrams.

Aram Andonian published these materials without knowing English and French. It was published in English and French and then in the Armenian language. The complete was in the Armenian language, which was used also as evidence in Talaat Pasha process 1921 March in Berlin. We don’t know where the originals of these materials are today. They have vanished. And in 1983 two Turkish historians wrote a book. It’s approximately 200-300 pages book. They claim that these materials are not authentic. They are forgeries.

So my desire now is really to work on it and to show that they are actually authentic documents because the importance of the Andonian documents is -- there are two sets of materials there. One is what we call the smoking guns. These are the telegrams from Istanbul sent by Talaat saying to kill all Armenians, nobody should be alive to answer for it. And there are other set of documents basically related to deportation. And I can give you the good news. This second category of materials that Andonian published basically related to deportation, I have found the similar and the same documents in Ottoman archives. So this is the first. On the second one, I’m not going to talk in details, but this is worthwhile to research.

And the second important question for me is really to analyze the Armenian reform question. This is another interesting discovery that I made. It amazed me that nobody mentioned it. It was 1909 February, sadrazam, the Prime Minister Pasha, along with the British Embassy Ambassador in Istanbul, proposed a mayday reform proposal to Ottoman Parliament and then during another massacre, this was deeply heatedly debated in Ottoman Parliament and rejected 1909 June. You cannot find one single reference to this reform debate in 1909. So this I got from the German
Embassy Ambassador in a his report of 1909 and it opened my eyes. This is where I am now, working on that topic, 1894, 1909, 1915.

MS. EKMEKCIÖGLU: For me I am very curious about the wartime Istanbul. We talk about the 24th of April being the date that the intellectuals were deported. We know who have been deported, their background, how the list was prepared, and what happened to them. But we don’t know how Istanbul -- Istanbul is a very different case. It didn’t experience en masse massacres or deportation. So how the Istanbul-Armenian community experienced this for years I think is going to be very interesting to know more about.

One aspect that also I think deserves more attention is the gendered consequence of the fact that more than 99 percent of the people who have been deported -- intellectuals, professionals -- the leadership, the Armenian brain team from Istanbul, they’re all men except for two of them and 12 of them were in the list. So how does it change the intelligence, the Armenian intelligence, in Istanbul both during the war years, but also in its immediate aftermath?

MR. GAUNT: If we are looking at the Armenian genocide as a general anti-non-Muslim campaign with religious aspects to it, there is a great wide, white, blank field and that is what the religious leaders were actually doing and thinking. We can get into the Ottoman archives these days. We can get into Russian, German, other archives. The only religious archive that is open to us is the Vatican, and they were very, very knowledgeable about what was going on, but they were interested in the Catholics, of course.

No historian has been able to look at the Syrian Orthodox Church or the Assyrian Church of the East documentation. We know that a lot of hanky-panky -- do you use that word? -- was going on between their leaders and the Ottomans about this.
Bribes were being paid in order for some people to be saved and others not. There was infighting between the various Assyrian denominations that has sores that exist even today. We really need to develop that religious side of what is going on before we can say that it's more than just a speculation that the religious aspect is important.

MR. de WAAL: Great, thank you very much. I'm going to take a few questions. Please wait for the microphone, introduce yourself, and, again, a plea to try and sort of keep this to an historical discussion and not stray too much into the issues that we'll discuss in later panels. Let's start at the back, you, sir.

QUESTIONER: My name is David Loudon. I'm a policy analyst. I'm very interested in hearing from Taner regarding the military tribunal and its shortcomings or failings or just insights you might have.

MR. de WAAL: Of 1919 you're referring to, yes?

QUESTIONER: Yes, 1919 to 1922.

MR. de WAAL: Okay, we'll take a few. A few rows in front of you there was someone. Yes, you, sir.

QUESTIONER: My name is Innis Penar. I'm a Turkish-American, and I had a question. Of concern to me is -- to me my perception is a double standard when it comes to the accusation of genocide. We're talking about the Ottomans. Why do we never hear about Armenian genocide, for example, when the Armenian volunteers and head of the Russian Army entered the city of Van in 1915? There were approximately anywhere from 40,000 to 80,000 Muslims massacred, every woman, man, and child. Doesn't that constitute genocide? I noticed in the past Professor Akcam referred to it as "war crimes." But in Srebrenica when the Serbs did it to 8,000 people, they were hauled before The Hague on charges of genocide. So why do we not hear about the Armenian genocide?
MR. de WAAL: Thank you. And Omer, wait for the microphone and introduce yourself.

QUESTIONER: Omer Taspinar with National Defense University and Brookings. Perhaps in continuity with the last question, one of the reasons why there is genocide denial in Turkey is the sense that Turks are singled out and that what happened to Muslims in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, is not called genocide. So my first question would be should we be more liberal in our terminology and the use of the term “genocide” in the way that it’s part of nation building, ethnic nation building, in the context of the Balkans or Caucasus? There seems to be a kind of Turkish allergy to the term genocide because Turks are often projected as perpetrators, but, obviously, there have been genocides. And if we use the term at a kind of micro level and look at communities, what happened in the Balkans and the Caucasus, should we be more open to accepting these events of the 19th century and events perpetrated against Muslims as genocides as well?

My second question would be since in the panel we don’t have an historian who would basically deny that what happened was genocide -- the name of Justin McCarthy comes to mind -- as historians, how would you deal with the arguments of reputable historians who basically dispute that this was clearly genocide? Is it on historical grounds that you would dispute their claims? Is it on the terminology of genocide and the technical definition of genocide? In other words, if we had someone representing the so-called Turkish view, how would you deal with such viewpoints?

Thank you.

MR. de WAAL: Thank you. Let’s stop there. Although, of course, the so-called Turkish view, we do have two people from Turkey on the panel.

MR. AKCAM: No, it’s a perfect point, actually, what is Turkish-Armenian view as if there were ethnically oriented views on social problems. I don’t want to go on
these denials as an aspect. Personally, I respect the denialists with their political point of view, but it has no merit. I don’t want to spend one second on that topic. So for me, it is very clear and I’m ready to debate and discuss on the grounds of my own publication and other publications on genocide research. And we are very ahead of these two-sides of the story discourse. I don’t take them seriously, and I only want -- with Guenter Lewy’s book, you might know about it. Guenter Lewy’s book was distributed by Turkish councilors and embassies as one of the serious books, and I took this book apart. The problem with denialism, Omer, is if you deal with it, you cannot really proceed with genocide research per se. The best way for me, and that’s after I took apart Guenter Lewy’s book, I am looking for my own -- all the genocide scholars -- we are looking for our own research.

I have to add maybe to the first question. What is developing in our field is the look of histories. There are now young scholars really developing microcosm studies for each city, which really we are missing in our genocide research.

So the question of Muslims and the Balkans, yes, of course, we have to deal with it like we deal with the German expulsion from Czech Republic or German expulsion from Poland. The problem in the debate is these other mass atrocities involving in Balkans or the Caucasus are always counterpart and used as an excuse against the Armenian genocide argument. I’m all in favor of debating the Balkan expulsion of the Muslims and incorporate it in a broader perspective. We don’t have any problem. But the problem is if you start using these as an argument against the genocide, then it becomes a political issue. This is exactly true for, let’s say, the Armenian volunteers’ massacres in Van or in the Caucasus area. Never refrain not mentioning -- we mention these massacres and in Caucasus in 1914 it started August and then continued all the way. And it is, of course, important to incorporate all kinds of
mass atrocities in the broader process.

The major argument is these massacres or, let's say, the wide range of Armenian uprisings, these were used as an argument against the genocide. But, as you know, in the Rwanda case, there was the Rwanda Liberation Front marching with its army in Rwanda and genocide occurred during that period. So the important problem is not not mentioning the mass atrocities in small scales during the war; the problem is why we use these as an argument against the genocide period. This is the important part.

Military tribunals, the basic knowledge is I think we published in English, the trials and the verdicts and the indictment of the tribunals. There were afterward three major attempts: At the Paris Peace Conference they wanted to establish an international criminal court; never successful, and it was established in 2000. Second attempt, the British government tried the perpetrators on Malta. It never came to a trial. Then the third attempt was taken by Ottoman government in Istanbul. They established a military tribunal 1918 November and they started 1919 February all the way to 1922. There were two major reasons for this trial: Number one, to get positive results from the Paris Peace Conference because it was always a reminder to the Turks, if you want to get a positive result from Paris, you have to try the perpetrators. And this is what they did, but they didn’t get what they expected. And there were altogether 63 trials in Istanbul, not only two or three that you know, 63 trials. And there were approximately around 200 defendants, and at the end there were around 16, 17 death penalties and three were hanged, one in 1919 April and two in 1920 summer, July. Why the trials ended? This is a wonderful letter I call it. It’s an incredible letter of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk that he formulated August 8, 1920, when the conditions of siege were clear that the Ottoman Empire was partitioned among Kurds, Turks, Greeks, and the Armenians and Mustafa Kemal wrote a letter to Istanbul government and said this trial or hanging of the
fatherland’s children he called it is nonsense because it didn’t bring what they expected. It is very interesting question.

This is my last important information for you. Had Great Britain accepted the nationalist demand, namely trial as a price for the national boundary of Turkey today, what they were asking actually, what would have been the history seen today? If Great Britain had accepted the nationalist’s demand, trial as a price for national boundaries of Turkey, we would have talked today a total different history.

And my example for those Holocaust experts is compare this with the Morgenthau Plan 1945. When the Morgenthau Plan was considered to separate Germany in six small states to weaken it, the American Defense Secretary said stop this because then you will salute the Nazis as national liberator. Concentrate only on Nuremberg trials and this is the reason when we discuss today the Holocaust, we remember the Nuremberg trials. But when we discuss the Armenian genocide, we mostly discuss national security issues. I think this is the frame that I would put the trials.

MR. GAUNT: As far as genocide, you said that well, genocide seemed to be rather common. And from the point of view of a genocide scholar, the problem is that genocides are not very common at all. I think we have about 12, 13 in modern history to compare with each other, all in very different places and all discontinuity overtime. But one of the essential elements of determining if it is genocide is the involvement of governments in it over a long time. That’s why I was talking so much about the paper trail leading all the way from a small village up to the top.

I also mentioned that Assyrians -- the people I study -- they were killing Turkish military and Turkish civilians in revenge. They were also part of Atatürk’s Armenian volunteers in Van, and so maybe some of the 40,000 to 80,000 Muslims were killed by that. What I did then was to turn it around. Maybe our definition of genocide
needs to be adjusted as far as how to see a victim. A victim cannot be simply assumed to be an innocent victim. But I am like Taner. I don’t care what it is called, what it is categorized as. My sympathy is with the victims, and they were being killed for other reasons than it was genocide. It wasn’t called genocide then, of course. That’s my point of view, but I absolutely will admit that innocent Turkish Muslims and Kurdish Muslims were being killed, yes, but they did not have a government behind them.

MR. de WAAL: Right, thank you. Who’s going to go next? We’ll start with the back. It’s Erik and Emile.

QUESTIONER: Erik Larson, American University. I wonder if someone could just comment on the recent arguments of Ugur Umit Ungor and the way in which he puts the centrality of property, of the transfer of property, from Armenians to others as the key to the process as it unfolded. Thank you.

MR. de WAAL: Emile.

QUESTIONER: Thanks for the presentations. I enjoyed listening. Two questions, probably for Professor Akcam and Lerna regarding first, the Turkish decision in entering World War I. Of course, it was a decision borne out of considerable diplomacy as well as local decision making. In the past genocide would be connected, would be seen as a byproduct of World War I, Turkish participation in World War I. Now it seems to me the understanding is shifting to the Turkish participation in World War I being the byproduct of these longer term demographic policies of the government. If you could comment on that relationship and the decision making, whether the decision to enter the war had to do with the demographic program as well?

For Lerna, regarding the groups that were excluded from the genocide. How did those decisions go? Obviously they varied from area to area, Istanbul a specific case, some of the other places in the west of Asia Minor. But how were those excluded
groups defined, if you could talk a little bit about that, and what the size of them was compared to the affected groups, as far as Armenians say.

And Professor Gaunt perhaps could talk about the Assyrians as well in that sense. Were there groups that were excluded from the deportations and massacres?

MR. de WAAL: And we’ll take one more in this round from Kemal.

QUESTIONER: Kemal Kirisci. I’m the moderator for the next panel. I know Omer is a very grown up person and can stand up for himself, but Taner, I’d like to go back to the question that Omer raised. What I liked about your framework and your choice of the term “process” relates to the question that I think Omer has raised. In the third leg of your framework you talk about the collapse of empires and the impact of nation state building on the Armenian genocide that we’re talking about.

Now, what I would be very interested in is the role of -- Tom, in his book, refers to Eric Zurcher, a Dutch historian, and the way in which in the last ten years of the Ottoman Empire 2.5 million Muslims and Turks died and there were large numbers of dislocation. I’d be very interested to read an article or hear the way in which that phenomenon impacts on the process. I know that some of the people that worked in the Ottoman bureaucracy that got involved in the Armenian genocide, there were people who were part of that deportation from the Balkans or related to the experience itself. I’m very curious. I’d like to learn more about how that impacts on the decision to go ahead with what you described to us in such amazing detail. Thank you.

MS. EKMEKCIOGLU: I can go first? If I understand you correctly, you are talking about -- so when you mentioned groups were excluded from genocide, do you mean the women and children who had been abducted? No?

MR. de WAAL: Geographically as well.
MS. Ekmekcioglu: Geographically also. I don’t know the percentage. I mean we know if you consider Istanbul as one of the places that has been excluded, Istanbul is one case, is made as one case. I guess if you’re talking about --

MR. AKCAM: It’s not excluded. It’s a debate for research. There were deportations from Istanbul and the number of deportees, it’s a small group of people beginning 1915 April and more than 10,000 Armenians were deported from the city of Istanbul. They developed certain criteria, which should be deported from Istanbul: Those who were born outside of Istanbul, unemployed, and a member of a political organization. Based on these three categories at the beginning, they started deporting Armenians from April all the way through November and then the German government intervened and deportations stopped in Istanbul. There were deportations from Assyria Smyrna, Izmir, also and it was also stopped by the intervention by the man, von Sanders. He officially threatened the Governor of Smyrna. So the overall plan was actually to deport all.

MS. EKMEKCIOGLU: Then I guess there’s no exclusion.

MR. AKCAM: Of course, in official order there were some exclusions. For example, according to central government’s decision and this was continuous friction between Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry, the soldiers’ families should be deported. It was a government decision, but we know from the experience and from all of the examples, soldiers’ families were not exempt. They were also deported. But in certain areas -- this is the importance of the local history -- we have to look in which area really the soldiers’ families were not deported.

And the second important category is the Catholic and Protestant Armenians and there is a fluctuation on that also until 1915 August, all Protestant and Catholic army Armenians deported. But with the intervention of German government
again, there were certain exemptions and these were all regulated on the statistic populations. The central government based its deportation policy on the demography and what I call 5 to 10 percent regulation. They basically didn’t deport Armenians, for example, in certain areas in western part if they were less than 5 percent. And in eastern historic Armenia, they deported all Armenians without any exceptions. And their policy for the settlement area was 10 percent.

It’s very interesting to know that the entire deportation process was controlled by the Office of Statistics within the Interior Ministry, so they were getting regular, almost on a daily basis, numbers, numbers, and numbers about the Armenians and their percentages to each other. So it was a calculated demographic policy and within that policy there were certain exemptions, but local authorities really used their power in that regard because bribery played an important role. So we don’t know exactly what really happened in each local area.

MR. GAUNT: If I should say something from the Assyrian point of view, the border between the Province of Diyarbakir and the Province of Mosul was the marking of the safe area. If you came into the Province of Mosul, you were saved. We even have a case in which an Assyrian village, Faysh Khabur, it’s a rather large town now, was attacked by a Kurdish tribe and the Governor of Mosul punished the Kurds for doing that. So we don’t know the decision behind that and we’re still looking for it.

Now, getting to the question that Omer makes that the property is the central thing, I don’t think the question of Armenian and Assyrian property can be held separate from the demographic engineering. Why do you want to get rid of people? Well, it's because they have property that you want to get hold of. The two things go hand in hand. What we’re seeing is an idea of a total change of the social and economic structure of this coming state, a total change, and that means new people in new
positions. Thank you.

MR. de WAAL: And the question of the Balkans?

MR. AKCAM: The question of properties and the Balkan issues, properties I think in these days -- my book is in English and available on the confiscation of Armenian properties. I don’t think that the economic belt of Armenia played an important role in the decision making process. We don’t have any evidence for it. But we know as soon as they started the deportations, they also developed laws and regulations how to regulate the remaining properties, first in the middle of 1915, and then 1 May, 10 July, 26 September. And there were several laws and regulations, and last one is 1923 by the Turkish government in Ankara, which is the basis of the properties.

These laws are very interesting to analyze because the state consciously used the Armenian belt for certain purposes. I published all these documents. Number one, Armenian properties were used to settle Muslim immigrants. Number two, Armenian properties were used to finance the war; for example, the crops and so on were sold and then these revenues were given to the military. And number three, Armenian properties were used to create a new Muslim bourgeoisie. This is not my term. They used it. A new entrepreneurship, this is the third purpose. And the fourth, an important number of Armenian properties were used as schools, hospitals, or prisons.

And if you’d like to discuss the denialism: If you read the denialists’ arguments, they will say that during genocide there were trials. Those Ottoman officials who misused their power and mistreated the Armenians, they were tried. This is one of the central arguments. It is true. There were more than a thousand trials. Against whom? Against those Ottoman officials who had stolen the Armenian properties for their own purposes. There was no one single case against one Ottoman official who participated in killing operations, but there were hundreds of court cases against those
Ottoman officials who misused the Armenian properties for their own purposes. And this is the importance of how really the Ottoman government was keen to use these Armenian properties.

Today it is one of the central questions in recognition of the Armenian genocide. I think the reparation question is the elephant in the room. Nobody really touches it in detail. This is one of the major problems.

Related to the Balkans, two anecdotes because we don’t have much time, 1918 in Ottoman Parliament the Greek deportees were complaining and criticizing the Ottoman genocide for the massacres and killing. One of the -- I think Issan Sab Labay, one of the participants of the genocide -- was arrested later by British authorities. He stood up and said we learned this from you. It is true that really the progress nationalism kind of took the Balkan nationalism as an example for themselves. And then, indeed, those Muslim immigrants who came and settled in certain areas they became perpetrators during the Armenian genocide. They were used, and we published all these telegrams, Ottoman authorities from the central government sent telegrams, find us the immigrants because they are ready to participate in that process and they built -- one of the important sources of the special organization, was these Muslim immigrants came from Balkan and Caucasus.

Later to the Muslim debt, my second anecdote, it is the governor who told the American missionaries -- because there were a lot of Muslims also dying during that period -- and he said to the American missionaries, this is God’s punishment to us because they couldn’t bury Armenian bodies and it created disease in that area. And as a result of this disease, there were a lot of Muslim casualties also. So the governor called this God’s punishment of the crimes.

In every war people perish, it’s true, and the Muslim perished during the
First World War also. But like the Germans in the Second World War, the number of German casualties is more than actually the Holocaust victims. But this doesn’t prevent us to discuss the Holocaust as a state policy.

MR. de WAAL: Thank you. Well, I think we’ve got time for one more round maybe. You sir, but I also wanted to mention Lerna gave her presentation, suppression of the Assyrian women and children, and I don’t want to reproduce the suppression of women and children by no one asking her any questions. So if anyone has a question to Lerna, I will take that first. These two ladies and this gentleman here, yes.

QUESTIONER: Lerna, can you tell me the census of the number of women that tried to be Islamized and were they successful?

MR. de WAAL: And behind you?

QUESTIONER: Actually, the same question.

MR. de WAAL: Okay. You, sir?

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. It’s a little small reference and a question. The reference is that the first Britisher who was given access to the Mogul Empire in India was Mr. Hawkins. And he went to the emperor, and he like him so much that he started staying there. And Mr. Hawkins -- the emperor arranged his marriage with an Armenian girl. So he lived happily with the Armenian girl in India. This was just a small reference.

My question is that the best thing is that generally we discuss current affairs. But in this case you are talking about history, which is very important because history is our teacher and we learn so much from history lessons for the future as well. And my question is that since we are debating this case and even though there have been many other ones, does it mean the case is still open and how can it be brought
forward if it is open? Thank you.

MR. de WAAL: There was another lady here with her arm -- did you have a question?

QUESTIONER: I was wondering about the motivation for the Assyrian genocide or program or whatever term you want to apply and what period?

MR. de WAAL: Motivation?

QUESTIONER: Please.

MR. de WAAL: I’m afraid you’ve already had one, so I’m going to not take you for the time being. Steven and next to you.

QUESTIONER: Steven Keat, former Foreign Service officer. First of all I want to thank all of you for an excellent series of presentations. I’ve learned a lot. One of the things I found very interesting was the difference in how women and victims of rape were treated by the Nazis and how this was handled in the Armenian case. For all three of you, would there be other examples that you’d want to give of things that are particularly different between these two cases and things that you consider to be critically similar? Thank you.

MR. de WAAL: The lady next to you.

QUESTIONER: Diane Compelian, clinical psychologist. First a comment. My aunt who was raised in Istanbul told me that what happened there was a lot of targeted burnings, burnings of particular houses, particular streets, just a fact to toss in.

I interviewed a number of people for various studies and I heard and I have since read the same kind of story over and over. This involves sort of the culture I guess of the Turks; that before the genocide it was something that simply happened every now and then. There would be a loud sound, a trumpet or a drum, in a normal day
and Turks would just start killing all the Christians there. And then that same sound would come again some hours later and boom, everything would stop so suddenly that even someone who had been injured by someone trying to kill them that person would then help them up. I don’t get it. Is there anyone that can explain that, that this is such a normal thing over hundreds of years that there’s an etiquette of how to do it?

MR. de WAAL: And then here?

QUESTIONER: It has to do with a quick question on identity and, Taner, if I understood your presentation, which I’d like to hear more of, it’s how did this early part of the 20th -- late 19th, early 20th -- century progression from an Islamization demographic approach change into one that became increasingly ethno-nationalist. So you move from a process of Islamization of non-Muslim populations in the empire to one of a Turkification, which also had the religious element that took place. How did that come about and when?

MR. de WAAL: Why don’t we start with you, David?

MR. GAUNT: Goodness, let me see. The motivation for Assyrian program in genocide, you mean why is it possible to categorize it as a genocide? Well, I do this in similarity to the Armenians. Were the Assyrians targeted on the grounds of disloyalty? Yes, just like the Armenians. Were they massacred? Yes. Were the massacres continual throughout the summer of 1915? Yes. Were their homelands emptied by the time the massacres were over? Yes, they were in other places. Was the killing organized with special task forces of local people dedicated just to removal and killing of the villagers? Yes. Was this done with the help of the local governor? Yes. Did the central government know about this? Yes. Did they encourage it? Yes, the Governor of Diyarbakir was promoted to become the Governor of Ankara after he had done these things. So it seems like we have a case of very, very concerted, but secret --
and that's one of the reasons why it's not so known as the Armenian because it just happened and quickly -- which is the case with many genocides.

As to the difference between Nazis and Ottomans: In the Ottoman Empire the bodies were laying all over the place. The Nazis certainly must have learned that you shouldn't do things so openly would be one thing.

MS. EKMEKCIÔGLU: Just to continue with this, in terms of the experiences of female victims and children victims, it’s different -- the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide. But in terms of the attention to reproduction, they are very similar. That’s why both of them qualify for genocide. And this is how Raphael Lemkin talked about them in the same breath, the person who coined the term “genocide.”

The sexual violence that Jewish women experienced during the Holocaust was sterilization, for instance. The births among the target group were forcibly stopped. A lot of sterilizations and also forced abortions, for instance, or in camps reproduction was forbidden. While the preferred Aryan races were not only encouraged, but sometimes forced to reproduce a lot of children. So to change the balance, again the demographic concerns, are at the center of both cases.

Another question about the success of the whole transfer policy: In the aftermath of the war, after the Armistice of Mudros, October 1918, with which the Ottomans accepted defeat, Armenians and other western organizations mostly were allowed to collect -- locate first and then collect -- and retrieve and reintegrate these kidnapped women and children back into the Armenian community. So there’s a process of -- that’s how I started the whole project actually. I was more interested to see what the Armenian Patriarchate, which is the main center that organizes these collection efforts or risks the efforts you can say, what they did with them because who are you going to consider an Armenian? In the aftermath of this trauma, who is going to be an Armenian?
Would you accept a child born of rape who is fathered by a Muslim, but is coming to life through an Armenian woman’s body? Would you accept it as Armenian or not?

So I looked at these administrative policies. The operations to bring the kidnapped Armenians back to the Armenian fold in contemporary Turkey’s borders continued until 1922, '23. And during that time, we don’t have one single number as to how many of them returned, but it’s not -- I mean I’ve heard 50,000, for example. They are very random. No one has collected -- please correct me if --

MR. AKCAM: 1921, League of Nations has certain numbers on it.

MS. EKMEKCIIOGLU: Yes, they have certain numbers, but at the end, for instance, it also continued in mandate Arab countries, Syria being one of the major ones, up until early '30s. Still from Bedouin households Christian women were collected and brought back to their original communities. So I don’t have one big number.

In terms of what we talk about today, the Turks who have one Islamized Armenian ancestor, the number that I see usually is 2 to 3 million people. Correct me. It’s a major operation.

MR. AKCAM: I mean the number is always a problem for these orphanages and those women and girls who are taken into Muslim households. We have estimates from 1921. This is the number of Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul and the League of Nations. They established a special committee for it and their estimate is around -- I mean they took out of the Muslim households around 100,000 children and women and girls. Then their estimate was around 70,000 or 80,000 still in Muslim households. We don’t know whether these -- these are really weak estimates.

The question of the similarities and differences with the Holocaust and what are the particular characteristics of the Armenian genocide, it depends on how you define the Holocaust, of course. If you define the Holocaust as a Jewish genocide, then
there are a lot of differences. But if you approach the Holocaust as a creation of a racial empire in Europe, as a process of a racial empire, then the similarities increase. For example, the assimilation, the forcible taking out of the children from households. These were German policies based on their racial policies against the Slavic people. They have the certain criteria developed.

But if you compare with the Jewish case, the Holocaust in the narrow term, there are four important differences. Number one, forced conversion. It was a structural element of Armenian Genocide and was used throughout the genocidal process. The fluctuation I’m not going into detail, but we have to also know all those Armenians who converted to the Muslim religion, they survived. So forced conversion. There was an up and down. I don’t want to go into detail, but forced conversion was a structural element. Number two, collection of the Armenian children and putting them in orphanages or distributing them in Muslim households. This is what Lerna spoke about. And the third, forcible marriage of Armenian girls with Muslim men. This was also structurally planned and organized. And fourth, to your surprise maybe, there was a limited settlement policy. They, indeed, survived to resettle Armenians in Syria and Iraq for a certain period of time. But, again, numbers, numbers, numbers.

Beginning 1915 May all the way 1915 end of November there was a settlement policy. Armenians were resettled in Rasul, Radka, Resoline, and Aleppo. And they also established special concentration camps throughout. This policy was given up at the beginning of 1916 and a second wave of genocide was organized in the summer of 1916. Approximately 250,000 Armenians were massacred in the second wave. Why? They settled Armenians first and then organized a second wave of killings. This is a strong argument for the genocide case because the Turkish government or any denialist would argue that the Ottoman authorities could not control
the Kurdish mountains in Kurdistan and this was the locals. But you cannot explain the
mass atrocities and massacres and killing of more than 200,000 Armenians in Aleppo,
Resoline, Radka, and Rasul. These are the flat areas under the control of Djemal Pasha,
the Third Army.

Why? Numbers, numbers, numbers. They were getting regularly on a weekly basis numbers of Armenians. My theory is at the beginning they thought that really only 10 percent Armenians could survive and they could be resettled in Syrian area. When they notice as a result of their demographic policy that the numbers of Armenians increased more than they expected, we know the Ottoman numbers, 1916 January it is 500,000. It was too much. And then the second wave of cleansing and killing started.

Do you know how many Armenians survived at the end? Approximately 150,000. Do you know the number of Muslims in the so-called resettled areas? It’s approximately 1.8 million. They really mathematically implemented a policy that at the end 10 percent survived and these 10 percent were Muslims. They only survived because they forcibly assimilated. Otherwise they could have been sent to Rasul.

So these Muslimized Armenians 1918 October reconverted to Christianity again. So for the Armenian friends, I have to tell them if their parents survived the genocide, they were Muslims at least for two and a half years. They couldn’t have survived otherwise. The options were given to them. Either Rasul or Islam and they chose Islam. So these are settlement policies, another important particularity of Armenian genocide. And because of the dominance of the Holocaust in our genocide field, we mostly ignore these particularities because in all cases, everybody who worked on their cases tried to push their cases as close as possible to Holocaust so that they could make their cases. But today I think we don’t care much whether it resembles the
Holocaust or not.

MR. de WAAL: Thank you so much. Before we thank our brilliant panel, Fiona has a couple of words.

MS. HILL: I’ve got a very quick announcement. We’ve had also food for thought here, but we’re actually going to have real food in between. I know that this is somewhat trivial in the context of some of the very heavy, weighty, issues we’ve been discussing, but I do want to make sure that you all know that the next session will actually begin at 12:45.

So before we thank our panel, I would just like to let you know that there will be food served outside in the corridor here. My colleagues will show you where that is and we look forward to seeing you all back here again. You can come in here and sit and eat if you’d like to. Obviously, we encourage people to have discussions. But we’ll start the next session again promptly at 12:45. But I’d like to hand over back to Tom to thank everybody for being here.

MR. de WAAL: It’s been a great discussion, and I think we should all thank our panelists.

(Applause)

MS. KIRISCHI HILL: I just want to again just say a couple of words at the beginning. ISIS is a very controversial and obviously very sensitive topic. I know there are a lot of people who have very different views and different feelings about how we might have done this. People were not here as we’ve heard from the questions to give different perspectives. Just to say again that this is not intended to be a definitive statement on this very as we’ve already said very sensitive topic and we understand that there are a lot other people who would like different perspective to be raised here. Some people who don’ like the wording of things. I’ve actually received a couple nasty grams
on my email in the break and I would like to actually encourage everybody who does feel unhappy in some way to come and talk to me. One of my emails was a bit anonymous, but I think I can probably figure out who it was from.

But, anyway I would very much encourage people in the spirit of the debate that we are here today. But, if you have an issue that you would like to raise please do come and raise it with me directly. I’m not a fearsome person so I think you can tell here and we’ll have a very polite because I’m British, civil response outside. I know the British makes my accent sometimes a little difficult to contend with, but in any case in the break or at the end of the meeting I would be really very interested to hear your perspectives and some of the thoughts on more things that we might be able to do in terms of furthering the debate, so feel free to send me an email but please also come and talk to me if you would like to afterwards. I’m now going to hand over to, um, another distinguished panel and to my colleague Kemal Kirisci who will frame this next panel and thank you all of you for staying with us and again we hope you enjoyed the lunch.

Thank you so much.

Mr. Kirisci: Well thanks, Fiona. Thanks to you all for being with us today. Fiona, on a number of occasions has underlined the sensitive nature of the topic but I just got around to checking my email and I must say there are no nasty emails as far as I go. And I have to say that I have greatly enjoyed the first panel and learned extensively from it and I thought the questions were very good and did not have any element of anger in them. In any event I’m Kemal Kirisci, the senior director of the Turkey project at the center. By now you have found out Fiona is my boss and I greatly enjoy working under her and if anything goes wrong you can blame her rather than me. Welcome to the panel that will focus on contemporary times as opposed to history but look at the way in which the events from
1915 have shaped modern Turkeyish Armenian relations and how they have also played a role in other conflicts in the Caucasus. One critical aspect of this topic is normalization of Armenian Turkish relations, that's relations between Armenia and Turkey and hence the opening of the border between the two countries. A border that was closed by Turkey in response to Armenia's military actions during another conflict in the Caucasus over Nagorno-Karabakh.

I thought the best way to appreciate the significance of the border especially for us Turkish citizens is to visit Armenia, but not by air, by land. It's a physically beautiful but otherwise a treacherous ride. Thanks to funding from the Genesis group I was able to take this ride via Georgia on two occasions last year as a part of a project looking at the regional security in the south Caucasus. It is a treacherous ride because the road and the traffic on the way to Yerevan is a dangerous one. It reminded me of the windy and mountainous sections of the two land highway between Ankara and Istanbul in the late 60's, early 70's as I road it in the back of a 1966 Impala with my father. The ride requires breathtaking skills and diligence to navigate in and out of columns of cars and heavy load trucks on a road full of blind spots. To make it worse in my case we were sitting in a Japanese car with a right hand drive. You can't imagine how it felt overtaking trucks in a band. It is a treacherous ride because it also focuses you to take note of the socioeconomic consequences of the collapse of the Soviet economy and the closed border between Armenia and Turkey.

Inevitably you ask yourselves the question how would this drive had felt like if the border between Armenia and Turkey was not closed and what would this mean in terms of regional economics and politics. We have now a panel composed of names that have worked on these questions and related aspects of it for many years if not a
lifetime. Tom you already know him and I’m a very slow book reader. I did read half of
the book on my way to Baku last week and the other half on my way back and I
have nothing but praise to say about the book. I highly recommend to everyone to give it
a try. Gerard Libarian is a name that we have long been familiar with and all I can say
that every single encounter with Gerard for me has been a very enriching experience.

Gerard served as a professor of history at Michigan University where I
too had a chance back in the late 90’s as a Fulbright Scholar teacher, but I think what
makes Gerard very special that he’s someone from the field who has for all those years
tried to open that border. And back in the early 1990’s when he served with Levon
Patrician Ter-Petrosyan, the president of the first Armenian Republic of the end of the
Cold War he shuttled between Turkey and Armenia and got to spend time and almost,
almost settled the issue if it was not for what happened over in Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories surrounding it. We also have two very good friends and
colleagues of mine Mitat Celikpala whose a professor at Kadir Has University and Nigar
Goksel who is from civil society and both of them really know South Caucasus.

I’m a very late comer to it. A comer on that ride between Tbilisi and Erevan. I was always very impressed with the knowledge and the
experience they have from the south Caucasus: Armenia, Ascha
Bakanzerbaijan, as well as Georgia. Nigar also has recently been appointed as the
senior analyst in Istanbul of the International Crisis Group. But if you allow me before I
turn the floor to the panel I’d like to pay homage to Huran Ding for whom we have put this
conference together. He was someone who worked to help to find a constructive answer
to the very question I have raised. I belong to a large group of people in Turkey and
beyond it who have so much to say about him. But let me just recall the code from
Fiona’s opening remarks that personally it touched me deeply and I think impacted me as
I listened to him at that infamous conference in 2005 at Bilgi University. Come let us first understand each other and come let us first respect each other’s pain. I think it was those lines that set me and many of my friends and colleagues on that journey to do what fell upon the Armenians in 1915.

As far as the question at hand goes I’d like to draw your attention to a very short book by him, I’m not a very good translator but the Turkish goes (speaking in Turkish). Like two neighbors so close yet so distance and the picture on the cover is the river that separates Turkey and Armenia which runs in a very deep valley with Huran looking onto it. I hope that this conference and this panel will contribute towards the journey that he helps us to set out. Tom let’s start with you. My instructions from my boss is that we are supposed to do this in 15 minutes, but I know you are prepared for 20 minutes. You know, somewhere along there we’ll meet.

Mr. de WALL: Thank you very much I’m going to continue with the theme of history, but the politics of the theme of history and I’ve given my presentation a title which is called navigating an unpredictable past- the history and politics of Armenia and Turkey. In the USSR official history used to change so often. The joke was told the Soviet Union is a country with an unpredictable past. We’ve seen that phenomenon played out last week, again, Victory Day which has been reframed in a new way with every passing year in Moscow. And I think the same phenomenon can be used to describe the histories – national histories – the politicized histories of Armenia which along with Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union and of Turkey. Soviet Union was founded in 1922. Turkey in 1923. And both with the notion that this is year zero. That we are starting history anew with setting the clock anew. And two countries very much founded on the principle of forgetting. Hal Burke tied the historian as the phrase that this equals in the Turkish case the myth of the immaculate conception of the Turkish
In Turkey the history of the Armenians has changed several times over the past century. As we know, Mustafa Kemal later to be called Attaturk played no role in deportations of the Armenians in 1915. Attaturk actually had common cause with the Armenian revolutionaries who were assassinating the Young Turk leaders of the committee of union progress. He also wanted to see the predecessor regime decapitated. But historians including Turner-Adjumaner Akcam, Eric Zohe have shown us that there was also, as well as this decapitation there was also a continuity between the committee of union and progress and the new Turkish Republic if only because the Turkish Republic usually saw the expiration of Armenian properties as a fete accompli as has been already mentioned as a foundation for the formation of a new ethnic Turkish bourgeoisie.

As we know the Armenian question mostly disappeared from public consciousness from about 1930. Only one history book, that of Esset Urash was published in Turkey in about 40 years in the Armenian question. And when the Armenian question returned to public discourse in Turkey it was as a result in a direct response to the wave of Armenian terrorism sponsored by two Beirut – Beirut Armenian terrorist groups – Asala and Augustus commandos in the 1970’s targeting Turkish diplomats for assassination. Often the newly self-appointed historians of the Armenian question in response to that were actually diplomats, were actually the colleagues of people whose colleagues have been assassinated.

Older Turks who had lived, actually lived through the apocalypse of Anatolia in World War I could put their own spin on the slaughter of the Armenians. But they never denied that it had actually happened. Read the memoirs of General Pasha to get a flavor of how he puts a spin on the massacres but does not deny...
that they happened. But as Jennifer Dixon and others have documented a new narrative forged in the 1970’s and 80’s treated the Armenians unequivocally as enemies, fifth colonists and threats to the state new exceptionally low casualty figures were produced for the first time. There was the suggestion again for the first time that Armenians had been the objects of allegedly benign relocations of violent deportations. In this way the Ottoman Empire of 1915 and Turkey of 1980 an embattled state on the frontline of the cold war were conflated with the threat to state security still issuing from Russia in alliance with the Armenians. Since the AKP government was first elected in 2002 Turkey has changed a great deal. It’s unpredictable past has become more nuanced.

When Turkish leaders Regit Tith Urdawan Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Acdmet Davutalo Davutooglu expressed condolences to the grandchildren of Armenians talk of inhuman deportations or even crimes against humanity they are replacing and supplanting that old narrative, the Armenians as traitors. You can’t express condolences to traitors. Instead we now have a Turkish leadership under Edwan Erdogan that sees itself as the heir of the multicultural Ottoman Empire seen in the rosy light with benevolent Sunni Islam as the governing principle. In that spirit last week Davutalo Davutoglu actually went to Syria, crossed into a war zone to pay homage to Solemen Suleyma Shaw Shah, grandfather of the Ottoman Empire. In this telling there is still an unconvincing equivalent between those both muslims and Christians who died in warfare and the peaceful Armenians who in 1915 were targeted for destruction and deported from their homes by this state when war was still far away, from towns as far away from the front as Ismet from the sea of Marmoran Marmara. This new AKP multicultural narrative charts a path to reconciliation too easily. If we are being flippant we might call it from a shared pain to champagne as it still underestimates the gravity of what happened to the Armenians and the Syrians. But it is a big step forward to what came before. Ron Dink
whose name has been mentioned many times and I’d like to mention again was the author of many wonderful aphorisms. In a phrase that pleased neither nationalist Turks nor Armenians he observed that for Armenians Turkey is both the poison and the antidote. This is true in so many ways. But I want to focus now on how his poison antidote metaphor is true for the writing of Armenian history. There is a need for much more honest and bleaker history of modern Armenia and Armenians to be written that relates among other things the cruelties Russian Armenians often dealt out to Muslims in the years 1916 to ’20. At the same time it should be obvious that it’s much harder for Armenians to write that history so long as Turkey has not owned up fully to the much greater atrocities in the form of the mass destruction of the Ottoman Armenian population, the genocide that was committed in 1915 and 1916. Clearly one reason that the word genocide itself is so toxic and the major reason why Armenian official history of it is so one dimensional is the continued painful slowness of official Turkey to acknowledge what happened. To put it another way years of Turkish denial have helped to stunt the growth of Armenian history which has not matured to full adulthood.

Instead of analytical history some Armenian scholars still engage in a seemingly endless process of proof nor does confront Turkish denials amassing documentary evidence of the crime which they then display in pamphlets outside the Turkish Embassy accompanied by often gruesome photographs of the dead. Others especially in the Republic of Armenia engage in the mythologization of heroes and martyrs without leaving any place for the human beings who actually lived or died in 1915. In this story Turks are essentialized and the Armenian history in the Ottoman Empire is taken to be one long prelude to the 1915 genocide. There are of course dissenters to these narratives. In 1963 Hannah Aarons won equal parts admiration and hatred from fellow Jews when she published her book Eichmann in Jerusalem which
sought to analyze the thought processes of the Nazi mass murderer Adolf Eichmann and the role certain Jews had played in the holocaust by subjecting the mass murder of people to historical analysis she broke too many taboos. Three years later in 1966 the Armenian novelist Gogan Majari/Gurgen Mahari attempted something similar in his novel Burning Orchards. Majari-Mahari was personally acquainted with some of the worst that the 20th century had to offer. Born in 1903 in the city of Van he was a child when the battle over his home city turned into an inferno. After fleeing with his family to Soviet Armenia he was arrested and spent more than a decade in Stalin’s Gulag. His novel, Burning Orchards about the siege of Van is both an elegy for the lost city of his birth and a savage satire on the clumsy Armenian Revolutionaries who put their fellow Armenians at risk by embarking on dangerous adventures against the Ottoman government. Majari's-Mahari's timing could not have been worse. In 1965 Soviet Armenia had finally shed his silence about the genocide with mass demonstrations in Eurovan/Yerevan. His anti-heroic narrative was greeted as a betrayal. Copies of the book were burned and Majari-Mahari was forced to withdraw the manuscript from the publisher and resubmit self-censored version. Fifty years on Majari's-Mahari's novel – it's still not a mainstream work in Armenia. Nowadays it is possible to read proper nuanced analytical history about 1915 written by both Armenians and Turks and some of the historians who are with us today, I’m happy to say. In the academic literature we can now read about the multi-faceted lives of Armenians and the Ottoman Empire, the interactions with their Lisbon-Muslim neighbors. Scholars at the University of Michigan are recreating the story of AmenoArmeno-Turkish – the extraordinary Ottoman language written in the Armenian script which the first Ottoman novel was written in the 1860's. Most of that history is sponsored by American or European academic institutions. Too little of this unfortunately has entered the public discourse of Armenia
itself. For reasons that are both understandable and unfortunate we hear too little about how the Republic of Armenia in 1915, thereafter, Soviet Armenia was forged basically in ethnic cleansing of its Muslim, mainly Shiite population. People who were known at the time as Tartars with whom we now call Azerbaijanis. Again the story is too little known of how Azerbaijanis again bore the brunts of the Armenian National Project being deported from Armenia to Azerbaijan in 1948 and 1988 to ’90. Of course it was not one way traffic, Azerbaijan in a different way also targeted its Armenian population. In 1988 to ’90 Armenians were violently and expelled from Baku, Karabakh—Celilabad and Somqayit.

Nowadays a much more extreme anti-Armenian ideology is to be found in Azerbaijan than in Turkey. The Azerbaijan side of the story is a whole separate tail which I don’t have the time for today. But I do think we could trace a direct line between 1915 and the current date deadlocked Armenian—Azerbaijani conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. In his history of the first war in the Ottoman Empire shattering empires, Michael Reynolds writes of how the young turks brought destruction on themselves and others through a vein pursuit of absolute security. Although of course there can be no absolute security in this world. The main victims of this vein pursuit were the Ottoman Armenians. But we can also see the cascading effect of this mentality through the decades. In a strange and terrible way the Armenian fate seems to have absorbed and internalized this false lesson too in the way it fought the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And Armenian victory in the conflict in the occupation and destruction of seven Aza ArbaniAzerbaijani territories characters around Caraba Karabakh. In turn displaced the victim complex onto Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan in turn has now made the trauma of defeat and especially the 1992 massacre outside the village of Khajaliy into a central part of its national narrative.
In recent years the killing of Khojaly, the worst crime of the Karabakh conflict have been given greater and greater prominence in the Azerbaijan national calendar and elevated into the Hojeili-Khojaly genocide in evidence competition with the Armenians. I’m not a historian, I’m a consumer of history. But as a consumer what is my demand of the historians to make better history? What would I like to see emerging from the past to challenge the comfortable orthodoxies of the present. Well I would say that when it comes to the telling of the main narrative in 1915 in Turkey I think the job is already half done, the elements already in place. A loss of good analytical history has been written over the last 15 years. If Turkish society can only read and absorb the books of Tann, Taner Aksham, Akcam, Normal Blocsum, Fatat Dundar, David Gunt, Ramin, Raymond Keavorkian, Ronald Suny, Eric Zerki, Eric Zerka to name just seven authors I think the job is mostly done. As for the Armenian side I’ve already mentioned one unwritten history. This is the history of Armenia as a land that was also home to non-Armenians. To be crystal clear I’m not talking about another mythological land. The modern Azerbaijan invention of Yerevan Khaneate that had no Armenians in it. I mean Armenia as a country which for several centuries was home to a mixed and shifting population of Muslims along side Armenians.

A few physical traces of that culture remain, but the historical records are there and they deserve to be retold in the history books. The other history that I have yet to see told properly and maybe I was speaking too soon because we discussed it in the first session is the one Coming Alive in Turkey and that’s the story of the Islamized Armenians. Lana Lerna has written about it and others and I think when this story gets told I think this does reconfigure how we understand the Armenian genocide. Um, it seems that the stigma of rape and sexual violence and the close nature of the topic at the time has ruled that out of history and it’s only just beginning to reemerge. But if the
figures are correct and one hundred thousand – Eric Zerka also uses this phrase 100,000 Armenian women and children were left behind and that could be indeed a conservative estimate then there must be 2,500,000 Turkish citizens who have a least one Armenian grandparent. This is not an easy story to tell. It breaks taboos about sexual violence. It disturbs the calm surface of Turkish identity. Scratch the Russian you say and you find the Tartar. What happens when you scratch a Turk? The story of the Islamized Armenians also asks Armenians difficult question to accept as their kin people who grow up as Turks or Kurds and do not speak the Armenian language. So, in conclusion I dare to say that this is the kind of difficult history that both Turks and Armenians need if they are to engage in real dialogue rather than engage in the politicized shadow boxing without actually ever changing an always allusive past. Thank you.

Mr. Kirisci: Many thanks Tom. That was really a nice tour d'horizon but also it reminded me and hopefully you that the border is not just about the actual physical border there. Gerard?

Mr. Libaridian: I'll use up the rest of this time. Constantly negotiating what can I say? Before I present my paper I'd like to join others in paying homage to Aram Huren Dink and there’s no need to say more about him. But I would like to pay homage to a colleague and a friend who passed away just a week or ten days ago. Raff Arul Izada who had a major input in transforming a Sheikh cease fire into a permanent one in the war of Garabagh. That story has not been written. I hope it will be part of my next book. My presentation will approach the themes we have been discussing from a different angle. That is from inside out. The impact of genocide on Armenian political thinking and a wait up is in the foreign policy of independent Armenia and its strategic implications. In other words the instrumentizational genocide. I will lead
a side discussion of the diaspora. The Ottoman Empire in Turkey has been at the core of Armenian attitudes for a long time but especially since World War I with or without recognition, with or without direct references, affairs of state, public opinion and scholarship has been formulated with reference to what is one to think of the Turk and that has a lot to do with Armenia’s independence or the impossibility thereof. In simple terms though I hope not simplistically here’s the question. Are the Turk and Turkey genocidal in their essence? Or is what happened in 1915 explained by historical circumstances as a historical event or process? If the answer to this question in substance is yes that the Turk and Turkey are genocidal then Armenia cannot be an independent state. It must always rely on Russia for its protection and Russia is more than happy to indulge and extract a price. The price for security in this case would be the loss of sovereignty and the imposition of whatever regime is convenient to Moscow in Armenia. In this case if the Turks and Turkey are genocidal in essence Armenians – Armenia cannot have and does not need a foreign security policy. They are not actors in the making of their own future. They just need to make sure that Russians love them.

Armenia and Armenians therefore cannot have a history. At best they will have a materialology. If the answer to the first question is negative, that we are dealing with history and historical processes then if we do not proceed as if Turkey was a genocidal state then Armenia has a chance for independence – independent statehood and then what Armenians say and do do matter.

In 19- just as a quick background in 1980 there had evolved a consensus. In the diaspora despite battles before that Soviet Armenia is okay. It is secure, we’re not independent – well there are issues with political rights but it’s okay because we are secure. The diaspora came basically to agree with the regime in Armenia of the Soviet statehood and historiography even in the diaspora but certainly in...
Soviet Armenia emphasized the Russian orientation as a natural thing for Armenian’s to follow because it provides for security. And I think this was also a way for the communist regime that had lost it’s legitimacy to legitimize itself by following the nationalist line or national history line emphasizing genocide and indirectly saying that you guys shouldn’t think about independence. The Guttapa-Karabakh movement although it started on the question of Guttapa-Karabakh at the time evolved very quickly because of Soviet behavior and because of other pressures it evolved into a major program, a movement for national revival and eventually independence. In this debate and this issue was debated in the supreme Soviet of yet to be independent Armenia and these two issues were presented. There were even diaspora representatives who were invited to address and some parties and communist party argued that Armenia cannot be independent because there is Turkey. And we need to stay within the Soviet Union otherwise if we are independent we are not part of Russia or the Soviet Union they will come and exterminate us -- the rest of us.

By some miracle it is the second policy that won in Armenia in 1990-91. That is we can be independent and we can deal with Turkey state to state and have normalized relations. Incidentally I should say here that the border between the two countries was not closed in 1993. It was closed during the Soviet period. It was the Iron Curtain remember? There was only one train for decades that came from Moscow to what is Gymbria-Gyumri now, used to Leninakan, across the Turkish border and then was there. Two cars, I took that in 1975, once a week, Wednesday news. That was it. It came, dropped people off, didn’t take anyone and came back. The border had been closed, it never opened to be closed in 1993. Now at our request in ’92 Turkey opened the border to bring in European donated wheat which couldn’t come by trains from because of the Abkhaz conflict. So I’ll talk about that earlier to later. But also they
opened it for special individuals. I crossed that border three times to go to *Ankara* for negotiations. Now we’ve had three administrations, three different presidents in Armenia, three administrations, the first was the *Debadross-Ter-Petrosyan* administration. In terms of relations with Turkey it was a very simple proposition. That is we normalize relations and opened the border without any preconditions. The genocide issue was not a matter of state policy, it was a matter of commemoration, it was a matter of history, it was a matter of museum and dignified processions but it did not constitute the basis of Armenia’s foreign policy or certainly for the bilateral relations. The issue was not discussed at least not on our part, it was raised sometimes informally when we had too much with the Turkish colleagues they might raise aren’t you going to talk about this thing called genocide? And I’d say that there’s no such thing as being called genocide. There is a genocide but I’m not talking about it. You want to talk about it, go ahead. Not I. Uh, so anyway the, um, it was a simple proposition and as *Gamal Kemal* indicated in 1993 February we were very close to having a protocol to normalize and open the border.

But the operations on the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, became too much of an issue and Turkey stopped these negotiations. We continued talking, we since then bilateral relations have been linked to the *Garapa Issue-Karabakh issue*. The genocide issue was not there as far as a matter of bilateral negotiations. In the second administration under *Cochair-Young-Kocharyan* it became part of public discourse by the president himself and by others in the Armenian government. And this was not because there was too much significance given to genocide in and by itself, not on the part of *Cocharyun-Kocharyan* although the argument had been continuing against the first administration that the denial or nonrecognition of genocide by Turkey is a matter of national security that means Turkey will do it again.

So it was perceived not only as a matter of what had happened in the
past but as current imminent danger and possible future policy on the part of Turkey. Cocharyun-Kocharyan didn’t care about that argument, Cocharyun-Kocharyan wanted the border open. What he cared about was look Turkey has linked Garapao Karabakh as a peak precondition, progress or resolution of the Garapao Karabakh conflict precondition for bilateral. Why don’t we raise the genocide issue? We’ll scare them, we’ll get the Turks to be scared and then they will withdraw. If Armenia goes behind the campaign for recognition then Turks, Turkey will be scared and they will withdraw their linkage to Garapao Karabakh – precondition. Of course, none of that happened, so the genocide became a bargaining chip with Turkey. The third administration – today’s administration has been the most unpredictable. We know that the protocols were signed I think Nigar will talk more about that. I will not go into it and here in these protocols there were two issues that were ostensibly resolved without being resolved. One is do you talk since Cocharyun-Kocharyan and Syachsun-Sargsyan had talked about genocide the Turks said well there must be something about that in the protocol. There was nothing about that in the protocol we had drafted. But in – because it became part of public discourse state level continuation insistence I’m talking about genocide. Although not still as a precondition then the protocols in 2009 had a sub-committee created or it would be created to study – to find the truth about history and everyone assumed we are talking about genocide.

And the Garapao Karabakh issue was not mentioned although the principle that the signatories to the protocols do not intervene in the affairs of other states, would have been an indirect reference. Now it’s interesting that having talked to both Armenian and Turkish officials at the time, neither Armenia or Turkey had any plans for the subcommittee. They had no visualization of what a subcommittee would look like. Mandate, budget, duration what questions to be asked, et cetera. Now and
then since then when Armenia thought Turkey was – had already dealing bilateral. Then Prime Minister Goan Erdogan said, you know, these will not be implemented until the Garapao Karabakh issue is resolved or there is progress in that. And then since then things have gotten not so – not in the right direction, there was football diplomacy, I will not go into that and then suddenly in September – on September 3 last year President Sachsun Sargsyan of Armenia in Moscow basically declared that Armenia would join the Eurasian Economic Union which means scrapping four years of negotiations with Europe as an associated state.

Then came last month or two months ago, the pan Armenian, so called pan Armenian declaration of the Armenian commission for the 100th Anniversary commemoration of the genocide which referred to something like historic justice, the Several Treaty, Usonian borders and then, you know, that’s already a very different ball game than just recognition of the genocide. And then because that created some problems says Sachsun Sargsyan the President of Armenia said Armenia has never had territorial claims. Although for many of the signatories they declared – they considered that commission statement chaired by same President as the basis for demands? And more recently the Parliament of Armenia referred to that positively, to that same Pan-Armenian declaration.

Then Sachsun Sargsyan said, you know, we can do without that border. It’s not essential to us. The opening of the border. We can survive. Now there are items in the past 20 years that have and before that have complicated this situation. One is the Sumgait issue in 1998, end of February the programs against Armenians in the city of Sumgy Sumgait near and that is significant for a couple of reasons.

One Armenia especially in Garapao Karabakh refers to it as Turks. There is an equation there that these two are not that different and there are many statements
on both sides that indicate that they are at least cousins if not brothers. So the Turk did it. And I know that the reaction from the government in Armenia was not again, never again. We can’t allow this thing to happen. And so this was— that is not the government but the opposition, and this was very important in the evolution of the national movement from strictly a Garapa-Karabakh matter to a national agenda matter. That is if we were part of the Soviet Union for security where was the Soviet Union when our people were being killed in Sumgait. The connection became a very important thing and it’s become worse since then and that makes it a very difficult, it makes it more difficult to resolve the Garapa-Karabakh problem because if you see it as a Turkish problem then it’s a different sort of animal.

Azerbaijan has joined in with Turkey on the denial process. You know, despite early resistance to that eventually I assume that (inaudible) Turkey demanded that Azerbaijan join the campaign for denial. Now then there is the rhetoric, the Turkish rhetoric of power, and then there’s the other side. That is what other things that have happened to facilitate that may be considered and that is 1992, ‘93 Turkey opened it’s rail lines to supply wheat from Europe but to supply the wheat—to transport the wheat to Armenia without which Armenia in the worst winter of the whole period might have starved. So this indicated something that the Turks are not there to kill you. If they wanted to kill you all they needed to say is no, we’re not giving our rail lines. But this despite the fact that I repeated has never come into Armenian political discourse. Because it counters the other narrative. The Turkey has opened the rail lines which it closed because of Garapa-Karabakh. Turkey opened the charter flights between Istanbul and Yaver-Yerevan. That is very important. It has facilitated visa issues. Um, it has not prohibited in direct trade through Georgia, usually.

And the large number of Armenians through-from Armenia who work in
Turkey are still okay. Turkey no longer prosecutes people who use the term genocide, there’s a significant number of – still a minority but a significant number of historians, Turkish and from Turkey and students who study this issue and books that are published. There are some churches that have been renovated, there is a different attitude and Tom referred to some of them. The statements by the prime minister and president on April 23, April 24 are certainly not satisfactory, but the fact that they did make a statement I think is significant. Now, where are we now? Putin was in Yerevan on April 24 and it made the Turks upset. And, but then the next day he called Turkey a strategic partner. So that complicates things, but, you know, we will – if we want to we can disregard all of that. Putin is still our man. What Putin is saying is look- it’s a good thing you have the April 24th. Don’t ever forget the genocide. Don’t ever forget the character of the Turk although they are our strategic partners, but for you they are a threat. And so don’t think about resisting our attempts in the South Caucuses and, you know, we will provide you the security, security regarding Turkey as long as you give up whatever we want you to give up. And that process is continuing. That is there has been – the more importance given to genocide on the state level in Armenia the more sovereignty we’ve given to Moscow.

Let me then cut it short. Getting to the interesting part, in 1996 April I think I did my last official visit to Oncara. Mr. Delmazo was the Prime Minister. And I had a long meeting with him. And I presented him with the following issue. Armenia is no longer at the stage where we don’t have energy, we don’t have wheat, we are now thinking of the next 10, 20 years. And we are thinking about long term security. And we are wondering whether Turkey will be part of the problem of Armenia’s security or part of its solution.

Because the security – if the threat is from Turkey then we need Russia,
the more threat we create or we imagine the more we will give in to Russia. But if Turkey is not a security threat or a minor one, then we have more independence. He understood that. But then he was sabotaged by Baku because he wanted to open the border. The next week he went to Baku to say he wanted to open the border, to inform President Aliyev and that was several times in Baku. Now where are we now? We don’t – the centennial has aggravated dispositions in Ankara on the part of the government. The Armenian discourse has gone mainly on genocide as so many interviews now on the Turkish threat in Yerevan.

And we have at the same time this issue kind of hiding what is happening in terms of Armenia’s sovereignty. Complicating two things – one the genocide centennial has been used to then ignore what’s happening to avoid a serious discussion on relations with Russia and sovereignty and secondly it has been used to legitimize a government that is seen largely as illegitimate. If I’m talking about genocide then I’m a good government. That has nothing to do with democracy, has nothing to do with human rights, and this is a very dangerous thing. On the Turkish side there has been a retrenchment, the terms that Tom used are not used in writing in human treatment, they haven’t come out. It was (inaudible) on a plane that mentioned it but it is not in their statement in human treatment or whatever. And they have elections too. My conclusion is that we are in the worst situation that we have been in in a long time in terms of this issue. And maybe we should stop for a moment, get back and once the dust settles on the centennial and the elections and part of the future and then maybe there should be a serious study of what are the points of conjunction, what has happened? Are their things done which we agree? What are the things in which we disagree and what can be the possible solutions not by government representatives but by (inaudible) intellectual groups, scholars who know this issue and to kind of lay the
ground work for the future which we hope will come. Thank you.

MR. KIRISCI: Thanks, Gerard. I really wish there was more time for you to develop your ideas and go into greater detail but as I listen to you I couldn’t help but think of Winston Churchill when he gets up at the House of Commons, takes out his watch before he starts talking and people start yelling at him, you need a calendar, you need a calendar. I hope that calendar will last for long, Gerard, and there will be many other occasions where we can listen to you publically as well as privately. Mitat it’s your turn, Mitat has a lot of first hand experience in the area and I’m not privy to the details of his talk but I hope you’ll have a chance to respond maybe to the very last questions that Gerard raised.

Mr. Celikpala: Thank you, thank you very much indeed. I will also like to start with thanks to the organizers. Great chance to be here and to discuss this issue especially after almost a month of centennial and it’s an issue in Turkey as well and we are discussing. My title is Turkey and Armenia or Turks and Armenians partners in a case of arrested development.

You know arrested development is a medical term for physical or mental development. This developmental disorder for mental retardation that develops in some children after they have progressed normally for the first three or four years life. How about Turks and Armenians? Or Turkish-Armenian relations for a century or Armenia-Turkey relations for more than 20 years with an independent Armenian state emerged around Turkey. Is this a case of arrested development? How can we change our mindset and develop further hosted kind of relationship between Turks and Armenians. Turkey and Armenia this is the issue. And it’s a very clear fact that we are discussing since the beginning of this conference the most Armenians and Turks have been separated by trauma, geography and politics for a century. Clashing natives have
defined separate collective memories in both parties and (inaudible) relatives interviewing narratives of political violence that bound together.

And there is a feel-full-fledged semantic debate going on. And there is a feeling among the international commentator that Turkey seems to be losing this debate in terms of genocide. As a response especially for the members of this mentioned community the Turkish overreaction is getting fierce, supported of the century of policy of denial with various versions or silence.

And this Turkish silence and denial fuels Armenian anger, and of course creates little sign of reconciliation. And this Armenian anger regenerates new Turkish narrative against the Armenian narrative of genocide and refresh conservatism and nationalism among Turks. A vicious circle, a cycle, how can you break this cycle – Turks and Armenians. For Armenians the narrative is centered on the genocide and the genocide became a central marker of their identity. The psychic wants pass through generation. For Turks or you may say Turkish government the atrocities were committed but they happened in war time when plenty of other people who are dying. Just-Officials heavily denied there was ever any plan to systematically wipe out the Armenian population. The commonly accepted definition of genocide. The deaths were the results of either killings or starvation or simple the realities of war.

For example, Bryan Cullen the deputy undersecretary general in Turkish presidential administration currently in his article says what happened is relocating large number of Armenians as measure of counterinsurgency. This decision combined with war time politicking, lack of resources and organizational ineptitude led to an unfortunate bit of callous-chaos, unwillingness and death. Turks, (inaudible)Kurds, Armenians killed each other in the thousands, portraying betraying their remarkable history of coexistence in Anatolia. Or President ErdoganAdwon reiterates Turkish position as Armenian
diaspora is trying to instill (inaudible) against Turkey through a worldwide campaign or genocide claims. For Armenians genocide is effect and veracity of genocide cannot be questioned under any circumstances. For Turks genocide is not just simply an (inaudible) academic term, it is a legal framework to UN and carries tremendous implications, international course and tribunals. Moreover it’s an historical issue and we need to leave the issue to the historians.

For many of course if not all Armenians that is (inaudible) Khachaturyan says in New Yorker the desire for revenge was not always easy to separate from the desire of for justice. The idea of reconciliation was unimaginable. And then how do you go forward and to play within the political environment? For Turks the attitude is a reflection of (inaudible). The issue is a matter of honor for Turks as must all Turkish officers testify stress out. Simply Armenians were traitors and Turks too necessary measures to counter Armenian (inaudible) separatism, also end violence in the 1970's and 80's were the proof of the negative attitude.

Why Armenians are expecting the recommission of genocide and increasingly focused on reparations or compensations for that Turks offering condolences to Armenians as well as other victims of early 20th century events and calls that in court quote "attempts to create hierarchies of pain and so seed sos of animosity are wrong and inhuman". Turks are expecting form the international community all citizens including Turks and other Muslim populations altogether. Then all these two uncompromising narratives turn out the issue as a heavily challenging political issue.

How the reconciliation is possible under those circumstances and how can the parties face up with contemporary or history and contemporary political realities and will create win-win situation or normalized particularizations political relations for all parties. For many analysts on this issue the genie (inaudible) was out of the bottle and
the Turks begun discussing the Armenian genocide. The wall of denial began to collapse and of course this is not the condition recognition of genocide, but it is a progress and a couple of developments last I get decade like joint commissions, second anter and third track and even multi track diplomatic initiatives.

Ron Dink’s murder the statements by Adwon Erdogan and the Ayatollah Davutoğlu offer a broader space in which to discuss what happened in 1915 within the Turkish society. This is a fact. As a recommendation Turkish academician I can see a change in hearts and minds among the Turks and there has been a shift in Turkey. This is the case. We have just started to discuss the issue. And another thing the narrative has changed. From the so called genocide or Armenian allegations to the 1915 events just memory or the common pain. There are complete political steps by the presidents – Adwon Gul and Erdogan and of course the Prime Minister, the Ayatollah Davutoğlu there are some letters, visits and diplomacy and it seems that this became- it’s turning a sort of tradition in Turkish politics. These are good signs. And there are some return of confiscated properties, restoring and opening some churches, holding a ceremony at the party, conference and recommendations, all those published books and there are a couple of Armenian candidates for the DD upcoming elections as well. These are the steps that we have to mention.

Are these steps historic concession by and for our Turkish leaders is the question. Or are these steps for making reality obscure or since these steps taken to look forward in order to construct more bright future to all parties. This is a discussion. It depends on the parties and they take the issue and make some comments. For example, for Armenians Adon Erdogan is letter to Arkinevich (inaudible) Armenian suffering under the Ottoman empire when he offered condolences in April 2, 2014 did not
an apology. He offered a perplexing statement sympatic in tone but it is in substance still consist of shielding denial.

He has spoken of his sorrow for the Armenians while continuing to deny them genocide. Is that true? And most of the time we are discussing how Armenians feel before and after each and every – for two decades, but no Turks are told-Turkish public opinion and this is the case. And it effects such public opinion. And as an official you just try those commendations, opening letters and you get your not sincere. This is not an official position and then how the political Turks can play and this is the question last couple of years, we are asking to each other and the government as well and for Turks from that point Armenians are stuck with that history and losing the chance to overcome-looking at their future and through internationalizing the genocide issue alienating Turkey.

This internationalization policy supports genocide bills by different parliaments and the statements by several villages and political leaders forcing Turkey to be more defensive. This political support for the resolutions have come straight out the propaganda formation kit has only aggravated relations between the Armenians and Turks and their respective governments. The papal statement or the ES resolution, last resolution were hostile acts for the Turkish official circles and for example Davutoglu the Ayatollah said the pope was part of an international conspiracy against her. As for EU resolution whatever the decision the European parliament takes on Armenian genocide claims it will go in one ear and out of the other.

Adwon-Erdogan told news conference you remember most probably and he continues with that it is out of the question for that to be a stain issue of genocide on Turkey. And you know these are the issues–Pushing Turkish decision makers making some controversial steps and some speeches. On the one hand you are issuing very
positive and responsive letters to share the – all this pain whatsoever but on the other hand you are shifting from all those issues.

In this situation our Armenian issue plays a sort of role as a Swiss army knife. And it is to be used for domestic reasons to generate a nation of for regenerate conservatism on the one hand and on the other hand we are planning playing with an international community with this idea. But it is worse for the population, for Armenia and Armenians and of course for the Turks.

What is the But there is one I think concrete result political result – hope which is alienating to resolve I think Russia and Turkey,a Turkey and Turkey responds with the same way trying to get internationalized or regionalized issue. And there is a good experience. And we help Armenian there. Borders are closed and Turkey has some good relationship with other nations. And then afterwards for example 6/2010 after the protocols collapsed and failed Turkey started to establish its own caucuses Caucasus with declaration most for working on the region and Turkey is establishing a new line and you’ve got to remember in 1990’s we were discussing that there are two competing lines in the caucuses Caucasus. One is Russia, Armenia and Iran. And the other one is Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan to get the rest of the actors.

But it was a sort of slang or a wording but now it’s very concrete. It’s Since 2010, Turkey, Azerbaijan, sign an international and regional agreement, strategic partnership agreement. Then afterwards they declared jobs on Trabzon declaration and since then we have very concrete results.

And there is a new kind of region and in this region Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia cooperating on different aspects from communication, transportation, and energy links and try to link them to the rest, to the EU. And this is a political process. And in front of us we have another line and the I’ve mentioned Russia is so active, we are not
discussing the role of Russian, now Armenia is getting more close and moving towards Russia as a Eurasian partner country. And it works and this leaves Armenia’s side and Armenia is excluded from all those projects. If we continue with this attitude five most probably within 5 to 10 years time, you will be faced with indifferent Caucasus. And this is the end result of internationalizing the issue. If the parties do not get together and discuss and try to develop a new perspective for them it’s going to be the end result and we are in a worse situation in the region just because of all those developments and how can we move forward? For example, Sargsyan in his interview published in Turkish Daily – I read it maybe two weeks ago, he said that in 2015 our struggle does not end it will just enter a more major phase.

Our struggle has just started and it will be more coordinated and purposeful in the upcoming years. And to be sure politically this is so for Turkey. And this is the reason why Turkey is establishing a new political environment in the Caucasus and I’m going to talk about and other issues when the public opinion in Turkey read those kind of statements, they remember other stories. If you remember a couple of years ago Sargsyan Armenians we achieved our mission and this is the new generations responsibility to achieve the other purposes to have the rest of Armenia and this is creating a relative environment and atmosphere and people getting distant from each other.

Now this is the worst situation ever because we mixed each and every issue and all those issues are interrelated—Are Mixed mixed now. Many parties are involving for example recognition of genocide, Nagorno-Karabakh issue, opening borders or the organization and integrity of all those countries or to respect those borders. These are all interlinked and it’s almost impossible and now it’s not only Turkey and Armenia now we have Azerbaijan, we have Georgia, we have U.S., we have Russia
and all those actors are involved in this issue. That makes everything more complicated most of all because this is for this reason that it’s not easy to solve it. And now issue turned out to be zero sum game 100 percent again for one party means a loss for the others. We lost a gray area, therefore I don’t see sort of progress from this point on and all those maximalist events make it – makes everything more complicated.

Now all those parties we need to give some insight and we have to listen to all of them. Diaspora, Armenia, and Turkey, what about Azerbaijan or the U.S. and the EU, what draw role for Russia. These are issues that I am leaving aside and most probably questions and answers I will try to clarify my position and try to understand the issue. I think I am on time, let me stop here and thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. KIRISCI: Thanks, Mitat, for reminding us about the complexities that are facing us. I’m hoping that Nigar, now with the International Crisis Group, will be able to offer us some -- a way out of this difficult situation.

MS. GOKSEL: Thank you very much. I actually just joined the International Crisis Group the 15th of April, so I’m going to be speaking more on the basis of the work that I did before that, starting from the late 1990s.

I find myself in an interesting position because so much ground has already been covered, and so I try to fill in the gaps and maybe look to the future a little bit more, not go back into history too much. And, in fact, the way I’d like to frame the problem, the part of the problem that I’m thinking of is the Armenian-Turkey normalization in the sense of opening the border. In that sense, I think it’s much more linked to Nagorno-Karabakh than it is to the history of disputes. And it’s also more linked to Russia in that the whole reason, the primary reason, that the Armenia-Turkey border being opened has been desired by Washington and the Euro-Atlantic, more generally, is
to weaken Russia’s hold on the region, to have more competition from Turkey and from Europe. In fact, to the extent that I mentioned history it’s going to be, in a sense, to try to take it out.

I think Turkey embarked on the protocols of 2009 with two wrong assumptions. One of them was that having a historical commission or sub-commission would reduce the pressure on Turkey of the genocide recognition campaigns, and somehow that would be neutralized. I think it became obvious throughout the debate among Armenians, became obvious to Turkey as well, that that was not going to happen, that that was going to continue alongside any kind of exploration of history that might be going on.

A second wrong assumption that I think Turkey went into this process with was an assumption that the Karabakh resolution process was on the brink of being finalized, and that if Turkey could time the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border alongside the solution on the Karabakh front, in a way Turkey would reap the benefits. Turkey would be the fixer and get credit for that.

Of course, I mean, I think it’s the wrong assumption because it totally backfired, and that to the extent that Armenia Azerbaijan may have been close I think it’s made it more difficult for the two to come to an agreement. At least Azerbaijani perspective is that Armenia’s position hardened, to some extent. And I would also add that I think it made it much harder for President Sargsyan to both shoulder history commission that was very unpopular among the Armenian diaspora and Armenia. And to also be expected to make a compromise, a so called compromise on the Karabakh front.

So bunching these all together, I think, was a mistake in the sense that I don’t think the history commission needed to be part of the equation. It wasn’t going to serve Turkey’s interest, and it actually wasn’t even very popular in Turkey, so, you know,
pushing it that far was probably not useful because the Turkish nationalists already saw it as raising the question of whether it might be genocide. So actually, it didn’t really calm the Turkish hardliners opposition either.

I agree with the previous speakers that we find ourselves in a worse situation now than we were previously, and I think the protocol process, the 2009 - 2010 period actually made the knot between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey deeper and tighter. All three countries are worse off in terms of their ground in the region, for numerous reasons that I think I’ll try to cover. But I would have hoped that the protocol process in its failure could have put a nail into the coffin of some of the wishful thinkings that existed among these three actors, and I don’t see that as having happened in that the hardliners of all three countries felt vindicated at the end of what happened that they were right.

What the others, the rest, the pro-normalization people, the pro-Europeanization people didn’t really sit back and recalibrate. They didn’t really have a more sober assessment, and this actually goes back to what Gerard Libaridian was saying that there really hasn’t been a reflection to build on what we know is no longer possible, so what is possible. We haven’t seen that happen and I think it’s fundamentally important.

Essentially, I mean, the wishful thinkings that could have been, that have been I think have proven not to be viable are numerous. One of them is that, well, like I mentioned, having a history commission is not going to convince all sides about the same narrative of history. You can’t negotiation and expect results with regard to collective memories or whatnot. And Ankara’s effort to do so, which has been continuing, just last week there was a meeting between Erdogan and historians about how 1915 should be framed. That doesn’t look like it’s going to lead anywhere useful with regards to this
problem.

Secondly, I think the assumption that Armenia would trade territory around Karabakh for an open border with Turkey is one that, on numerous occasions, has proven not to be very sound assumption. Armenia’s wishful thoughts, as well. It is an assumption that Turkey will delink Karabakh from the opening of the border with Armenia, I think, is one that is not sound in that it doesn’t look like it’s going to happen. I can go into lots of details about that, but the leverage that Azerbaijan has over Turkey, at least for the time being, is such that I would not expect Azerbaijan’s position to be disregarded by Ankara. This relates to domestic constituencies, to votes, to business contracts, to numerous investments Azerbaijan has made in the country, to geo-strategic calculations about the worry of pushing Azerbaijan into Moscow’s lap. You know, once upon a time, and it still is, I mean, there’s a solidarity element to it as well, but there’s much more than just solidarity involved. It’s a calculation and it doesn’t add up.

I think another wishful thinking on the Armenian side, on April 24 the passage of the centenary, I think, has made it clear that coercing the international genocide campaigns are not enough leverage to force Turkey to open the border with Armenia without conditions. It didn’t happen this year. It’s probably not going to happen in that way any time soon, and neither is Turkey going to recognize genocide on the basis of pressure from other international capitals. So that is also not working.

Another thing I think that we recently have realized, all of us, so that’s everybody’s wishful thinking, perhaps, might have started in 2008 with Georgia’s awakening that if there is a conflict on the ground Russia is the only country that’s going to go in with hard power. And so I think that’s something that we all have to think about with regard to the caucuses as well.

So whenever an idea about a way to solve the Karabakh conflict comes
to the agenda almost all sides say that status quo is more convenient than trying to take a risk and trying to make a difference. But I would argue that we should rethink that because everybody is losing ground at the time being. I think Turkey-Armenia relations, it’s already been said, it’s deteriorated. There’s more mistrust. The last week statement by President Erdogan, more or less to summarize it, was that the efforts to try to soften the climate has actually -- the efforts to find a middle way and soften the climate did not work. That's not the way that we should go from now on. That's more or less what I understood from his statement.

I definitely recognize and agree with everybody’s points about the Turkish society opening up in many ways. There’s an expanding segment of society that questions official narratives. No doubt it’s significant. It’s important. I wouldn’t pin too much hope on that tipping balances anytime soon. I think it’s a gradual process and I don’t think that’s going to change the political calculus in the near future.

To the extent that the political leaders in Turkey were geared at expanding the space for a more free debate on history with Armenians, it’s still there, but this whole framing of the debate about the hostility issue that was mentioned. The reframing of everybody who contradicts Erdogan’s line as co-conspirators with foreign agents that are trying to weaken Turkey in the world, it makes it very difficult to have a free debate if, at the end of it, you feel like you’re being framed as a part of great powers that are trying to weaken Turkey.

It goes back to Taner Akcam’s point and then history as well in that the, sort of, great powers notion and seeing the critics as pawns of other powers is more or less still there. So I think we have domestic democratic issues as well that are weakening the hand of the liberal intellectuals, let’s say, that were forging a more open debate on Armenia.
It’s been mentioned that Armenia’s more entrenched under Russia’s grip. I would also argue that another thing that’s weakening -- just to talk about Armenia’s -- I’m going to through all three countries and how their hands are getting weaker. From Armenia’s point of view, I think Azerbaijan, what Mitat mentioned as Turkey’s joining the three, the Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan integration with infrastructure, I think that’s just as much Azerbaijan driven as Turkey driven, and it’s actually been very successful in that the geo-political imperative of opening the Turkey-Armenia border is less now because there are soon to be, at least the railway, there are pipelines. The integration in the region, sort of Europe to Central Asia integrational route, is being forged without the Turkey-Armenia border.

So it’s becoming primarily only important for Armenia’s sake that the border be opened, and that Turkey is able to reach the Caspian Sea now, a few hundred kilometers longer, but there are other routes that are already being established. A couple of hundred extra kilometers doesn’t make a huge difference when you consider that most of the things that are traveling are traveling from the west of Turkey, so it’s already 2,000 kilometers to the border.

The pressure is less. I think Azerbaijan’s hand is also getting weaker in many ways. There’s almost a broken relationship between Baku and Washington, Azerbaijan and the eastern partnership program of Europe, very tense, very negative, sour tone. Azerbaijan doesn’t attend most of the meetings. The focus on democracy being as strong as it is, as much as there’s grounds for it, it also shows a lack of significance to Azerbaijan’s geo-strategic importance in that the caucus seems a little bit more dispensable than it used to be for the west which, of course, means that Georgia’s more vulnerable as well. And that you don’t see a lot of Western effort to ensure that this region doesn’t slip into the hands of others.
I don’t think Azerbaijan can fully truck Ankara. Once the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline has been built if Turkey can make leeway towards its ultimate goal of being an energy hog and has enough energy, natural gas, coming in from Russia, Turkish Stream, Iraq is an option. Once you have this excess gas that Turkey aims for the leverage of Azerbaijan goes down. Azerbaijan’s ability to keep delivering contracts to Turkish businesses has a timeframe. It’s not endless. And, I think, you know, Azerbaijan has to deal with Russia on many issues that Turkey can’t solve. And to the extent that Ankara gets closer to Moscow, the value of Ankara for Azerbaijan also goes down because Azerbaijan can just deal directly with Russia. It doesn’t have to go through Turkey for that. Many regional initiatives with the Turkish diplomats talking more to Russian diplomats than they are to Azeri diplomats. That’s sort of unsettling, I would say, for Azerbaijan as well.

Turkey’s relations with the West, obviously, have been deteriorating. Turkey’s credibility as a democracy, as an ally to the West I think has gone down. The West there is much complaint in the EU that Turkey doesn’t align with European policy when it comes to the caucuses. It doesn’t use its assets in the caucuses be its Azerbaijan relationship or other towards Europeans in. True, Turkey has very little incentive to though. When you think about it, Turkey’s excluded from the decision making process of European foreign policy making. It also doesn’t think that Europe is very successful in what it’s doing, so when we combine these two things there’s not a lot of reason for Turkey to try and join forces with Europe to that end.

I think Turkey’s also losing ground in Baku, in some ways. The pro-Russia factions in Baku seem to be getting stronger. The purging of the Gulen movement. Representative, so called representatives in Baku, left a gap in Turkey’s soft power that I don’t think has been filled yet. And ultimately, Turkey’s not able to solve or
aid Azerbaijan very much on the Karabakh front. All Turkey can really do is stand still, not open its border, from Azerbaijan’s perspective all Turkey can do. Another thing it can do is talk in the international arena about how Azerbaijan has been wronged, as Turkey has been doing this, but it hasn’t been leading to results, so ultimately, Azerbaijan would be more likely to turn to Russia than to Turkey.

I’ll try to wrap up. Confidence building measures, I was going to talk about, but I’ll keep it very short. People to people contacts are important, reducing the hostility and discourse is important, having more meaningful ways to get to know each other and understand each other important. There are a lot of limitations to it though with Turkey’s border with Armenia closed.

Azerbaijan having very little incentive to try to reduce the tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia so that it doesn’t look like it’s a legitimate status quo is still there. Azerbaijan is very keen on having Karabakh Azerbaijanis included in the people to people contact. Armenia’s against that. Whatever you look at, even as benign as it looks, one side feels like its losing ground. Therefore, most of the steps on the agenda are not being pursued.

Should America try to be more involved? On the one hand, yes, in that you speak to many people from the region and they say that having no effort even coming from America is leading to a recalibration and leaning on Russia more. On the other hand, if the U.S. does get involved this could also provoke Russia to counter, assert itself, so I think that’s also risky. You see more communication between Turkey and Russia when it comes to Karabakh.

The problem is when you look at even -- we never really talked about the Minsk Group. So, yeah, I wouldn’t even get into that at all. But to the extent that there are formulas on the table, for example, Armenia’s withdraw from a couple of regions
outside on the periphery of Karabakh, and then international security guarantees the return of Azerbaijani IDPs and whatnot. There are some, sort of, partial or full resolution idea on the table. The probably is for Russia to be on board on most of those it has conditions, conditions that include Russian peacekeepers.

If the countries can’t work with each other to try to find a solution they’re going to end up having to settle for a solution that is more Russia imposed or that involves Russia as well. The West may be more willing to let this happen now than it did in the past. Whereas, as we talked about yesterday, it would be ideal for the two countries, Azerbaijan and Armenia, or three countries, Turkey, to come to a deal with their own resources communicating with themselves as opposed to being forced to almost have, as much as they would otherwise, but with also a Russian presence and a Russian imposition that might not be short term.

MR. KIRISCI: I'll follow Tom’s practice from the previous panel and start leading us into the Q&A session for this panel. Maybe while we wait for the microphones to be put in place I’d, nevertheless, like to inject a positive spin to the rather macabre picture that has emerged.

I, personally, having visited the area twice last year and being back from Baku very recently, I still remain quite impressed that the Turkish and Armenian governments, so far, continue to allow civil society to interact with each other quite energetically. There is trade that continues, and in a very ironic way, while Turkey doesn’t have official relations with Armenia, Turkey remains to be one of the major trading partners of Armenia. It’s an ironic, but also a very important detail there. Through the grapevine I also continue to hear both from the Turkish side, Armenian side, but also from the Georgian side that unofficial official relations continue between the two sides, meaning, Armenia and Turkey.
I think the critical element here is the position that the Armenian and Turkish governments will take on the future of these relationships. I think as long as they remain in place, these relationships, there is room for improvement there.

What I took back with me from our trip to Baku is this silk route project. If that silk route project, without going into the details, really materializes I may be naïve and too rational, and maybe not making enough allowance for the role of domestic politics and interest groups, but when I look at the 10, 15 years ahead of us, with the caveat that that silk route does materialize, I cannot see how players in the region are not going to be drawn into this exercise. The cost of sabotaging it would seem to be just too high. This applies to Azerbaijan itself.

Azerbaijan I was impressed, is channeling really significant funds into realizing this project. Somewhere along the line there’s a contradiction in terms between the amount of funds that is going into there and the effort to create when they call a non-oil sector in the economy or non-energy sector in the economy and the hard position that persists towards Armenia and on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh.

I would like to conclude these remarks by referring to the questions that Gerard raised at the very end of his presentation where he called for an exercise to address some of the lessons that ought to be learned from the protocols. I read into it the need, maybe of a broader dialogue, even if it’s a second track dialogue, with all the parties, and particularly Russia as well. I’ve already seen a couple of hands that went up and then got discouraged because I opened up my mouth maybe too long.

We’ll do this. We’ll take three questions and then, maybe hopefully, we’ll make another round. I’d like to give priority to people belonging to the other gender there. The two people, you and the lady in front of you, and then I will take two from here. Let’s make it four questions. Please try to be brief and do please mention who you
are.

MS. BOURBON: Hi. My name is Contessa Bourbon from the New York Times. I’d like to ask how has demand for reparation has progress? And I’d like to ask Mr. Mitat and Mr. Gerard on the reparation demand.

MS. KIRISCI: Could you pass the microphone to the lady in front of you?

Yes.

MS. COPIAN: Hi. My name is Yelena CopianKopyan. I’m a graduate student at the George Washington University. I’m glad that Tom brought up the issue of Azerbaijani involvement in non-recognition of the genocide, and the, sort of, elevation of the Khojaly massacre, and to the status of genocide, and sort of this competition.

I mean, I agree, my experience I found that Azerbaijanis tend to be the most fervent and enthusiastic opponents of genocide recognition. I was just hoping that anyone on the panel could sort of, you know, extrapolate on this and help me, maybe, better understand where it comes from, and what their stake in this genocide debate is and how we can possible respond to this polarizing influence in a productive way? Thank you.

MS. KIRISCI: Thanks. Let me take two more from this side and then we’ll go to the other side.

MR. SMALLOW: I’ll try to be brief. Thank you very much. My name is Farqardi Smallow. I’m from Azerbaijan. Earlier, Dr. Fiona Hill invited everybody to come to her and complain about the event. If she allows me, I will complain publicly to say that to my dismay these two panels seem to be unbalanced. Because in first panel we had a chorus of the three experts bashing Turkey without telling any Turkish perspective being voiced here. And then labeling the important part of the Turkish nation as denialists, I don’t think that it’s a correct definition or the right way to adjust the brush of any kind of
the diverging (inaudible) views.

And on the second panel, maybe I have less complaints, but still, Azerbaijan was mentioned several times, but I believe that Brookings could also invite somebody from Azerbaijan to also share the Azerbaijan perspective on this matter. But on a larger point of view, I have a problem with the Armenian narrative, and it comes to the linkage between events of 1915 and the Karabakh conflict.

When Turkey tries to raise this issue, the Armenians, for instance, say there’s nothing calling them. Turkey has nothing to do with Karabakh issue because it’s two different issues. But whenever our Armenia friends try to talk about 1915, each time they insert some references to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Just take a look at from the pan-Armenian declaration of on the events of 1915. You will see the declaration glorifies the, so called, art of war, which means that its occupation won (inaudibleone-fifth of) Azerbaijan, and the ethnic cleansing against 700,000 people. Not just the (inaudible) Dr. Libaridian again, nations (inaudible) mentions Sumgait and short-circuited the event without saying that it happened in the Soviet Union and that it happened also with (inaudible), so another involvement of other forces that we’re not interested have a peaceful coexistence between two minorities on the Soviet period.

And another point is saying that one point Armenians claim to be the descendant of the atrocities in Turkey and on the other way they shy away to talk about the same ethnic cleansing that were committed against, against Azerbaijan in Karabakh. Okay. I will stop here and ask my question. Brookings was quite vocal about bringing to the table this idea of opening the border, and this clearly failed back in 2009 and ‘10, and sometimes, I don’t know why, but people hurriedly jump on the blame and put on the blame on Azerbaijan for fail of this protocol, but down the road there was no guarantee that those protocols were will be implemented.
Because Azerbaijan was there the issue was the opening of the border. The reason for the closure of the border wasn’t, kind of, Armenian military action, as mentioned by Dr. Krishiba Kirisci. It was a clear occupation and aggression against Azerbaijan. Whenever you talk about the opening of the border Azerbaijan’s reason, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh should be dully taken into account. The (inaudible) coupling with those of these two issues is probably out of reality at this point. The question, has anything changed on the ground that near attempts of opening the border would be more successful than those back in 2010?

MR. KIRISCI: Thanks, Farqardi, and I hope this way we have made up for some of the unbalance nature of the conference, Farqardi. But I can’t help but squeeze in also that if the opening of the border was a failure, closing the border, so far, looks like it has been a failure too. Yes, and then we’ll turn to the floor please.

QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot. I appreciated all the presentations. I just wanted to make a comment on what Tom said about 1948. There was --

MR. KIRISCI: Not too long though.

QUESTIONER: No, no. It’s very short. Actually, there was a lot of Azerbaijani populations from Southern Armenia. They were forced to leave to Azerbaijan, but it was not a part of the Armenian national project. It was a decision of Joseph Stalin. And the first secretary of the communist party for Armenia, Grigor Harutyunyan, he flew to Moscow and met Anistate Anistas Nicolae Mikoyan and personally came to stop this because it can create problems between Armenians and Azeris. So I was part of the Soviet policy, not an Armenian one.

I have a short question for the speakers from Turkey. There was, for example, a massacre of Bahris in the Iranian 80s. There are a lot of Iranians now in Iran who are recognizing this as a massacre, but you cannot find among them anyone who is
not in opposition to the government. So from this point of view, respecting the victims is not a part of an internal Iranian staff, so can you say there are any Turks, intellectuals in Turkey, who recognize the genocide who are not in opposition to the Turkish government? So I want to find out whether it has anything to do with Armenians or it is a part of the internal Turkish political process?

MR. KIRISCI: I think you're secretly trying to find out which way they're going to vote at the elections in June. Let's start with Negar-Nigar and then we'll follow. So pick up whichever question you feel as been directed to you now.

MS. GOKSEL: I'll touch on all three of them, but I won't answer either three very substantially. I think Azerbaijan being instrumentalized in 1915 is not doing Azerbaijan a favor. I was against it for Azerbaijan's own sake in that I think it's something that Turkey would like to see happen to strengthen its own joint forces, in a sense, because Turkey made sacrifice for Azerbaijan, in quotation, sacrifices, by keeping the border closed. And, you know, this is something that Azerbaijan can do in return.

It also, of course, it's the same as the Armenian lobby, as was mentioned by Farqardi that both focused on genocide recognition and also talks about Karabakh. So there's also sort of a natural partnership that Turkey and Azerbaijan would have against the Armenian organized, Armenia Diaspora. But I think it weakens Azerbaijan's hand in a sense that, you know, you can be a victim in Karabakh. I think Azerbaijan has a stronger case when it talks about its own issues as opposed to when it takes on Turkey's burdens.

Decoupling the two, I agree it's not possible. That's partially what my speech was based on. I don't think it's possible now, and I think trying to create the hope that that's going to happen has been counterproductive in a way. It's led to a lot of disappointments and grievances, and so I think we should be sober about it, you know,
whether we like it or not. Whomever likes it or not, saying it doesn’t exist, there’s no such linkage is not reflective of the reality on the ground. It might not be on a piece of paper, but it is connected in Turkey’s politics, so it’s connected.

Essentially, I think it started off, the genocide recognition, communities in Turkey started off as anti-establishment. They were anti-Kemalist, anti-military, so from the roots of it in the 1980s, I would say I can think about the 1980s, the 1980s I don’t know of very many people who were countering the official narratives who were not anti-Turkish state. But now it’s gotten a little bit more complicated because the people in power are also not the traditional Turkish state establishment, producers of the Kemalist ideology. So I think you have more intermixing now between people who vote for the government or support the government and still have a very different view on republican history.

QUESTIONER: (off mic)

MS. GOKSEL: Etienne Mar.(Inaudible) I was going to mention him, but then because of his Armenian origin it wasn’t a very good example.

QUESTIONER: He’s a government man.

MS. GOKSEL: Yes, I know, but it just -- I felt like it went within my --

MS. KIRISCI: It was briefly.

MR. CELIKPALA: A couple of points. First, before the protocols, you are right, Azerbaijan, we failed in protocols. Azerbaijan may be a part of these processes, but it is not only the Azerbaijan. This is a big mistake to blame Azerbaijan on this failure of the protocols. We have to take, and we have to look at the historical processes, and in 2000 and 2009 it was just after Russia-Georgian war. This war ruined everything that Turkey invested in Georgia. It just stopped Turkey’s passage to Azerbaijan and Central Asia. No one knows in Turkey what the Russia move forward.
It's a vengeance dangerous issue.

Then afterwards most probably there are some signs from the western countries or partners of Turkey that those parties are going to offer some solution to Nagorno-Karabakh issue. If some sort of solution or goodwill emerged among those parties, and if it is a possibility to reach out then it will be nice or wise to sign a protocol and normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia, which is a spillover effect of the normalization of Azerbaijan and Armenia as well.

But in a couple of months we fail, and most probably protocols are very well designed documents, but it was most probably studied by all those previous leaders, politicians of Armenia and Turkey in 1993, 1994. It is a sort of collection of memories and experiences, but there was no public opinion in Turkey. The public opinion has never prepared for such a kind of step. There was no public opinion studies in Azerbaijan, as well. And there are some big issues, and I don't know whether it was a possibility between the Armenian community as well.

Therefore, without making any preparation it was bound to fail, and it failed. The documents are still on the agenda, political agenda, but I don’t know how the parties can move forward. And it’s a big question mark. And then it’s almost an impossibility.

For Turks, as you said, I’m just separating Azerbaijanis from the Turks of Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh is precondition now. For normalization, the president himself, mentioned a couple of times Armenian side needs to take some steps to make Azerbaijan a little bit comfortable. This is end quote, I don't know how and why, but this is the precondition, and that makes everything more complicated, but this it Turkish approach as well.

For your question, I read an article a couple of days ago, I think, because
I’m reading all those articles. I’m trying to read, at least, in English, partly in Russian, and in Turkish on this centennial issue, published in different places. For a poll in Turkey, around 8% to 9% of the population is recognizing themselves as a person, genocide, and this is a huge amount of population. But, you know, Armenian issue or this genocide discussion is a stance issue, and it’s really in Turkey, with an exception of some small groups, nationalists or national nationalists or Osage (inaudible) group. I don’t know how can we translate it, because there’s a political difference between it, conservative groups and other groups are thinking that there are some massacres. We have some common pain or collective memories, but the genocide, as a word, is not acceptable. More than 90% of the population and -- but this 90% easily discuss what happened in 1915, and they are ready to discuss. Of course, there are some strong groups opposed of it.

Last word, demands for reparations progress has not progressed because it’s unacceptable for the moment. There are many expectations, some billions and in some diaspora groups or lobby groups working in D.C. or the U.S., and they are making some calculations up to $2 billion whatsoever expecting Turkey to pay some $1 billion. I read some articles that they’re expecting Turkey as a gesture to leave Mount Ararat to Armenians, many discussions. If you put all those discussions you go not very far from the Turkish perspective. I don’t see any progress because there’s no start yet in Turkey.

MR. KIRISCI: Yes, please, Gerard.

MR. LIBARIDIAN: Beginning with the end there, with regard to the reparations. Were they justified or not? The Armenians demands come from institutions, organizations. They haven’t come from the government of Armenia, as I mentioned. Sargsyan stated that no president, no government of Armenia has ever presented any claims, certainly not territorial ones. That would be the most radical. There are political
parties that have. And as I mentioned, the Pan-Armenian declaration has references to such possibilities.

But there’s a contradiction which existed since the genocide recognition issue became the primary item on the agenda of the diaspora beginning in the late 60s, 70s. And the contradiction is this, and this is done by the three Armenian political parties. The recognition of the genocide is the first state on the basis of which we will make territorial and other demands. This is a self-defeating proposition.

Again, it may be just. It may be fair to demand something, but the question is there’s no way Turkey will recognize the genocide if the consequence of that is now fighting for territory and it’s territorial issue. This is very simple, and this I said in 1992 and people didn’t like it, when I started working in Armenia. But then many people don’t like a lot of what I say, so that’s the reparations.

Now, on the issue of the balance of this conference. I think the conference has a specific core issue, and this core issue’s related to a number of issues. There’s no obligation to invite everyone about whom we speak. We should be inviting the Russians, maybe, the Iranians.

SPEAKER: The Syrians.

MR. LIBARIDIAN: The Syrians. I mean, if they’re not related directly you don’t invite them. You are most welcome to organize a conference on Khojaly, and I’ll be there to support your thesis. I’ve done it publicly. That there were atrocities committed by Armenians. I have no problem with that, so organize a conference and invite me, as long as I can go by train or go there with a derailment.

Anyway, on the border issue, the border has a number of dimensions, but keeping the border closed was very much part of the Azerbaijan strategy in its negotiations with the Armenian side. That is the strangling of the Armenia economy.
Because Armenia was able to overcome the blockade that Azerbaijan put in by bypassing Azerbaijan and bringing in its natural gas. But what the border with Turkey could lose much more. And for Azerbaijan it became a matter of negotiating strategy. If Turkey opened the border Armenia’s economy would have a different future. And that Azerbaijan did not want.

With regard to its role in the protocols, I’m not 100% sure as to what the forces were, but it’s very obvious that Azerbaijani officials themselves claimed to have had that influence on Turkey. So it’s not my word or yours that matter.

Now, on the Sungayat Sungait issue, of course it was the USSR that was there in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and Karabakh. But no Azerbaijani official, since independence, has said there was something wrong that happened there. Though if, and I have asked them, Armenians forget Ojala Khojaly, Azerbaijani forget Sungayat Sungait, and Azerbaijani have said this is a USSR business, but then is anyone criticizing? No one has done it. So if you don’t criticize it you are, in a way, taking responsibility. Not directly, but certainly indirectly.

The connection between Garapar Karabakh and the linkage, Turkey’s linkage. I do not care much for the Turkish demand. I think the Garapar Karabakh issue should be resolved because it’s good for the Armenians, in and by itself, regardless of whether it’s a precondition or not. I think the bilateral relations, in and by themselves, are important for the two countries, but certainly for Armenia because your normalization lessens the perception of the threat that comes from Turkey. That would be a very healthy attitude.

The final point I want to make is that if you talk to Turkish officials today they say it was a mistake on their part to create that linkage. That their influence on Armenia and in the region, and their ability to visualize something bigger would have
been much better if they had not only recognized the independence of Armenia, but also established relations. They will often make that statement, diplomats of that time, to say we made a mistake.

MR. KIRISCI: We’d like to go for another round, so bear that in mind, please.

MR. WAAL: I’ll bear that in mind. On reparations, I think I’ve said this before. I think it’s incredibly difficult to re-litigate the first World War a hundred years later. I think this is a political issue and it’s bound up in recognition, and the recognition will entail some symbolic or even more than symbolic steps by Turkey, but I think it’s a symbolic issue more than it’s a legal issue.

On the protocols, I’d like to mention immodestly that I have a whole chapter in my book on the protocols based on interviews with all the people involved. It actually started before 2007. The Armenians and the Turks approached the Swiss in 2007 before the Georgia War. The failure of the protocols, I’d also like to put some blame on Washington not for -- mainly for naivety that I think it was up to Washington to anticipate Azerbaijan had a problem that needed addressing, and to think of something -- to require some kind of deniable non-linkage linkage with the Karabakh issue in which would probably get a bit less than Baku wanted and bit more than Garaban wanted in order to get Azerbaijan something out of that process and move it forward. And I absolutely agree with Gerard, if Turkey’s on the inside then Armenia has more leverage, and that’s actually ultimately better for Azerbaijan and for everybody.

Finally, on Farqardi I’ll also happily come to an event that you organize. I’ve also written about this. That links to the other question which is, you know, ask a Palestinian about the phenomenon that a victim of a trauma often inflicts trauma on someone else and it goes down the line, and Azerbaijanis, in that sense, are a bit, kind
of, displaced victims of 1915. But I’d also say on Gadjali Khojaly, the Armenians, often when they’re denying it, often use very similar arguments, I’ve written this as well, to the ones they accuse Turks of denying, 1915. Well, it was a peaceful relocation in the name of security and, you know, we didn’t mean to hurt anyone. It was all collateral. It’s incredibly similar arguments used when Armenians are denying Gadjali Khojaly to when Turks are denying 1915.

MR. KIRISCI: Thanks, Tom. I don’t mean to hurt anybody, but my boss is signaling that we have to push things along. I’ll take, as I promised, three questions, quick questions, please, and then we’ll turn to the panel for one last time. Yes, please.

MR. KOUSHAKJIAN: Thank you. My name is Taniel Koushakjian and I’m the communications director for the Armenian Assembly of America. First, I’d like to thank Brookings, Fiona Hill, and for all the panelists for your remarks. I have a quick statement and then a brief question.

First of all, my organization was supportive of the protocols, so was the five major Armenian American organizations. There was one fringe element that did not support it, but the majority of Armenian-Americans, at least from our organization, from the Armenian-American perspective supported the protocols, the opening of the border, and peace between Turks and Armenians. So I wanted to make that point.

But going back to the beginning of the protocol which I think is rooted in the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation commission of 2000, and I’d like to hear, specifically Mr. Libaridian’s comments on that. I know you were involved in another workshop in a similar track, but I’d like to hear your comments on TARC, as well as Mitat’s comments from a different view. Your perspective on, at the time if you were following it, if you were familiar with it, what you thought. Because as we all know, it produced a result, the International Court Transitional Justice found that the events of 1915 were genocide, and
that was a result of TARC, and that was the foundation of the protocol. So I wanted to get your analysis on not only TARC, but maybe some similarities or dissimilarities of the growth of the TARC process in 2000 to the protocols and where we are today. Thank you.

MR. KIRISCI: Thanks. Yes, ma'am.

MS. NAGARIAN: Hi. Good afternoon. My name’s Nancy Nagarian and I have a question on the role that you folks think civil society might have in some of these issues of closed and open borders. Briefly, I was asked by a nonprofit that was working through Baku University with students from the University who were working on futuristic scenarios for Azerbaijan and the world. There was a grant offered by the government of Azerbaijan and this organization applied for it and asked for my help to write the side of the Armenian history of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

I saw some of the things that students from Azerbaijan wrote about how they saw the conflict, and it was the precursor to how we could write some peace scenarios. Unfortunately, the entire grant application was thrown out despite the fact that this organization was already hired by the University of Baku. But my question is if we’re looking at how can civil society help move along some of this issues, such as we’re seeing the opinions change in Turkey, and perhaps the opinions could change in Azerbaijan, as well as, perhaps, Armenia. How can we see civil society become part of the solutions if we’re having these reactions from governments?

MR. KIRISCI: All right. Yes, please, sir.

QUESTIONER: Practically speaking, is any agreement with Turkey worth the paper it’s written on? In 1995 Turkey signed an agreement with the European Union to be admitted into the Custom’s Union, and then after it was admitted it said it wasn’t going to abide by any of the provisions, agreement on the Cyprus issue, renounce
its claim to the Aegean Islands, renounce its claim to Western Thrace, and settle the Kurdish issue. When it signed the Ankara protocols, it said we are not going to abide by Provision 9, we won’t recognize the Republic of Cyprus, and then made all these we won’t do this, we won’t do that with Cyprus.

Then, more recently, it made other agreements which it said, yes, but. It always come up with a yes, but we will not do this afterward. The protocols is a good example. After it signed the protocols or agreed to the protocols it said we will not sign this until you get out of Karabakh, but that was not discussed in the protocols.

MR. KIRISCI: And the question?

QUESTIONER: So any agreement with a yes but possibility is no agreement.

MR. KIRISCI: On 1995 I’d like to let you know that on Monday the European Union and Turkey agreed that they’re going to upgrade the Custom’s Union, so I suspect that suggests that both sides are not holding any grievances to each other. As far as EU Turkish relations and Cyprus goes, let me remind you that the Turkish side on Cyprus did vote in support of the UN plan that was going.

Tom, let’s start with you and then just go down.

MR. WAAL: I’m only going to answer one question. It’s great that you asked about civil society. I do think this is a bright spot that Armenia and Turkish civil society are very strong, they form links, and they’re kind of pioneers. When the window of opportunity opens, hopefully sooner rather than later, but it could be several years, civil society will have made a much more beneficial environment. I think that’s very positive for Armenia and Turkey, and it’s a lesson for Azerbaijan where there isn’t that kind of benevolent background. And that’s one reason why the political leaders are kind of hostage to much more hardline positions.
MR. KIRISCI: Gerard.
MR. LIBARIDIAN: The TARC, Mr. Koushakjian, I was not involved in that. And I think it was a good thing they didn’t ask me to get involved because I didn’t think it was the right way to proceed. It was both government representatives who denied that they had representatives. So that uncertainty, I think, was a problem.

Whether it did some good or not, I don’t know yet. There was a legal opinion. They asked whether this was genocide or not from an independent outfit and they said yes, but Turkey has not current responsibility. Maybe that was a step forward, but as an experiment maybe it was good. I was more involved in the Workshop for Armenia-Turkey studies which was a major effort from the year 2000 until two years ago. Well, it’s still continuing in a different form. To bring scholars together regardless of their nationality, and we certainly have Turks, and Armenians, and Americans, and Europeans to see if, with some intellectual integrity, we can create the context in which things happen.

That Workshop meeting, almost once a year, was, I think, instrumental in creating a clientele in Turkey that would look at these, and it produced a conference later on. So I was involved with that for about 10 years. Other than that I don’t know much about TARC. I think people have written about it.

The Armenian side, Nancy talked about Armenian side of Garaparkarabakh, I think we have to be careful. We are beyond the idea of writing two sides. We need to get to write one narrative that may recognize differences. I tried to do that at the University of Michigan by inviting Zufagaraf to come and to work with me for a semester to see if we could write that. The idea that there’s an Armenian history and a Turkish history, it’s the same land, the history of the same land we’re talking about. There has to be a single narrative, but it takes time to develop that, and it takes
intellectual maturity and honesty, and we are not there yet.

Civil society, and this is my third comment, there’s the problem of Turkey-Armenian relations, which are easier to define, to follow, to negotiate, because these are governments. Whether legitimate or not, whether you like them or not, these are the people who run, so when they say something it’s the position of the country. But the Turkey diaspora issue is a very symmetric warfare. There is no diaspora. There’s no single diaspora that has a representative, right? Who can speak on behalf of the diaspora. We don’t have it. So there is various political parties, the churches, all kinds of organizations, and every one claims to speak on behalf of the diaspora.

That makes is very difficult to negotiate. I think the process is that civil society continues. We’ve made great progress in terms of Armenians of the Diaspora, and the Turkish people, and journalists, and whatever, on so many fronts, and we have to continue that. Then Turkey, as a government, should not imagine a diaspora and negotiate in their mind with that diaspora when, in fact, they’re negotiating with themselves, when they’re making statements, and they expect the diaspora to respond in a certain way.

I’ve told officials this. You cannot negotiate with yourself and claim you’re talking to Armenians. Do what is right. All right? You do what is right and that means opening up the history, the freedom to explore, to explain, and then civil society, on both sides, should work with each other to understand each other (inaudible) in the spirit mentioned.

QUESTIONER: And Azerbaijan?

MR. LIBARIDIAN: As well as Azerbaijan. Except that has been closed. There used to be a lot of contacts. There are fewer contacts now sometimes in Tbilisi, but the Azerbaijani government has blocked these contacts, so that is a more difficult
issue at the present time.

MR. KIRISCI: One concrete, positive outcome that has come out of TARC is that Turkish and Armenian nationals can travel to each other’s countries practically without visas. Mitat?

MR. CELIKPALA: Yes, very shortly. Nigar is more qualified than I in this civil society role because she is very active for a couple of years and travels a lot. But I have to say that though civil society organizations doing much, they contributed positively between Turks and Armenians. For example, Rounding Foundation is very active the last couple of years and they are just arranging all those flights easily, and they are giving money for any kind of issue.

This is very important, not only political, but humanitarian, and in economic, academic, whatever. This is very important, but it takes time. We need to talk to each other, and the civil society plays this role, and we are trying to understand each other. I have many experiences in Armenia and Yerevan, and we were discussing it, and it takes time, but it’s very good. But we have to think the Azerbaijani aspect as well, because Azerbaijanis have said many concerns and they are tangible. We have to think in a broader perspective, comprehensively, very important. This is the reason why we are expecting some role.

And I agree with Gerard. I teach my students two issues, one is Turkish-Armenian, and the other one is Turkey-Armenia. Dealing with Turkey-Armenia is a little bit easier, but Turkish-Armenian is more complex. It takes time. We have to think and we have to be careful on that. Therefore, it takes time.

For TARC stuff, there are some positive aspects of it. TARC was really famous in Turkey for a while during the processes. Maybe it opened some window of opportunity for the other kind of interaction between those different groups. But, for the
court case, it’s an aspect of positive stuff for Turkey as well. It says genocide maybe, but under some conditions, it's a little bit complicated, and there are a couple of other international court decisions, and they refused in all those international courts that this is not genocide, but we have to think and we have to work on. Therefore, we have time to understand these legal and international aspects of the discussion.

MR. KIRISCI: Nigar?

MS. GOKSEL: I don’t have anything.

MR. KIRISCI: I’m so grateful. I’ll be able to keep my job. Thank you to the panel, and thank you to you all. And I turn the panel to the next one. Thanks.

MS. FELDMAN: I would like to get started. It’s late in the afternoon. I would like to give the panelists as much of an opportunity as possible and also the audience for discussion. Thank you for staying.

My name is Lily Gardner Feldman. I direct the Program in Society Culture and Politics at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

I was asked to chair this panel I think in part because I work on international reconciliation, a term that has come up several times today.

I would like to say that a number of the questions that have been raised throughout the day are questions that have come up in my work over the past 40 years, the same kinds of questions, but obviously the answers in the German case are quite different, and it may be we will come to that later because Germany has been referenced a number of times since early this morning.

This panel is a continuation of the second panel, and it is entitled “2015 and Its Horrors: A Century After 1915.” We are trying to connect the distant past to the present by undertaking three challenges. First, to identify what has changed and what
has remained the same. Secondly, to address the deep seated nature of conflict, and the faint hope of reconciliation, and third, to consider the place that horrific historical acts have in contemporary relations.

We have assembled an illustrative panel of experts who have a variety of perspectives on the subject matter in terms of professional training, in terms of places of origin.

The first two presentations will deal with the Turkey-/Armenia question directly, whereas the last two presentations will broaden our scope to other conflicts and responses to mass murder, but still suggesting a connection with the Turkey-/Armenia topic.

Let me briefly introduce our speakers and their topics. The first speaker is Arman Grigoryan, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, resulting in a wide variety of publications, including “Ethnofederalism, Separatism and Conflict: What Have We Learned from the Soviet and Yugoslav Experiences,” and also “Third-Party Intervention and the Escalation of State-Minority Conflicts,” and finally, “Hate Narratives and Ethnic Conflict,” all of these very relevant to what we have been discussing so far.

The presentation title is between understanding and justification why we should not fear explaining genocides. Arman will address recent advances in the study of genocide and the controversies inherent in the tension between positivistic and normative approaches to the problem, and then he will apply some of those general reflections to the debate surrounding the causes and the consequences of the Armenian genocide.

Our second speaker, although he’s sitting first, is Omer Taspinar. He’s an expert on Turkey, the European Union, Muslims in Europe, political Islam, the Middle East, and Kurdish nationalism.
He is a Professor at the National War College and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

His extensive publications include two books, “Political Islam and Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey,” and “Fighting Radicalism With Human Development, Freedom, Education, and Growth in the Islamic World.”

His presentation is entitled “2015 As a Lost Opportunity,” in which he will try to explain why the AKP has squandered a crucial opportunity in relations with Armenia as well as in the approach to 1915 and the larger context of Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

Our third speaker will be Hisham Melhem. He is the Bureau Chief of Al-Arabiya News Channel here in Washington, D.C. He speaks regularly at college campuses, think tanks, and interest groups on a variety of topics, including U.S./Arab relations, political Islam, and intra-Arab relations. He’s also the correspondent for An-Nahar, the leading Lebanese daily.

For four years, he hosted Across the Ocean, a weekly current affairs program on U.S./Arab relations.

The presentation’s title is the “Persistence of Collective Memories,” in which he will look at the treatment of minorities in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon in the context of ethnic and religious conflict.

Finally, we have Catherine Guisan. She is currently on the faculty of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. She has also taught in the Netherlands, Austria, France, and Russia.

She has published widely on the EU, on reconciliation, including most recently a book on ethical foundations of European integration and its interface with
thinking theorists, and her piece entitled “Truth Telling and Right Speaking in European Integration Politics” will be appearing soon.

Let me just apologize. In terms of over representation, we are rich. I think we represent 20 percent of all the panelists. I apologize for that.

Let me turn to Arman Grigoryan. Thank you all for staying and for listening. (Applause)

MR. GRIGORYAN: I was going to say that after hearing my own abstract for my presentation, I realized that I certainly over committed and I was not going to be able to deliver that much in 20 minutes, and now it turns out I have to deliver that much in 15 minutes. That, definitely, I’m not going to do, but hopefully some of the issues I want to talk about will come up in the question and answer session.

What I want to talk about today is the recent or relatively recent advances in the study of genocide with a particular focus, and that is the relationship of the academic study of genocide, the social scientific, or to use a more jargony word, the positivistic studies of genocide with kind of old conventional wisdom when we talk about genocide in political terms or in generalist discussions, and also in some parts of academia, actually. Academia is not necessarily a place where old conventional wisdom is denied or rejected.

The conventional wisdom, let me begin with characterizing it because that is going to be my target, hopefully not my straw man.

I think you would agree with me that when we hear any public conversation or journalistic narrative about the issue of genocide, there are probably two implied or sometimes explicit theories as to what causes genocidal violence in general.

The first one is it is hatred, and when we talk about hatred, when I say “we,” when journalists talk about hatred, they discuss it as some kind of an utterly
pathological and apolitical phenomenon. It is a cause itself. It is not a consequence of anything. The starting point of analysis, point zero of analysis is hatred itself. It is a cause. That is probably the most common implied theoretical argument about genocide.

There is an important corollary in hatred arguments about genocide which has to do with the portrayal of victims as non-agents. They are pure victims. They are objects of violence. They have no agency whatsoever when it comes to genocidal violence.

This is very important because there is again an implicit concern that assigning any agency to victims or talking about victims as political actors in conflicts that result in genocide is going to amount to blaming the victims or diluting the issue of responsibility, et cetera.

The second very popular and related argument when it comes to explaining genocide in the conventional wisdom is theories that focus on exclusionary ethnic nationalism, kind of broad-based ideas of what constitutes the political community, the polity, and whoever is excluded from that definition is slated for mass murder and violence, and these ideas were particularly popular in the 1990s when we were reading a lot of reports about what was happening in Yugoslavia and the conventional narrative about conflicts in Yugoslavia was this explosion of exclusionary sort of nationalism.

Again, it’s a self contained causal argument, a certain way an idea is defined about the political community and whoever is excluded sometimes get targeted for mass murder, genocide, and ethnic cleansing.

Now, the conventional wisdom actually was the earlier academic wisdom as well. If you look at the first generation of genocide studies, particularly in the post-Holocaust period and particularly focused on the Holocaust, there was a special
emphasis on hatred, on pathological ideas that characterized not the ideology, and not the ideology was considered to be a self contained cause of the mass murder of the Jews, and Nazism, of course, was also considered a form of exclusionary nationalism. It excluded outsiders which were slated for mass murder.

I think there is something interesting about the exclusionary nationalism argument, but not the way the conventional wisdom describes it. I’m going to return to it but first let’s talk about the hatred argument and what recent studies and the recent findings, relatively recent, they’re not all very recent, but some of the interesting social scientific arguments against the hatred hypothesis.

First, I want to paraphrase Steven Crowder, who is a political economist, and in one of his articles he was talking about international trade. He’s discussing economists who argue that international trade is obviously the beneficial policy to have, yet a lot of states have trade barriers. The implied argument there is that some states are stupid to have trade barriers. Crowder said stupidity is not an interesting analytical category.

I want to argue that hatred also is not an interesting analytical category. It’s not just the kind of category that can be easily used in social science, it begs for questions, where does hatred come from, right, can we really separate hatred from a political interaction, can we separate any emotion, any politically consequential emotion from political interaction.

There are a series of questions one might also ask about this theory, why hatred affects some groups and not others. Is it really true -- I want to make a special comment here about the German case.

Is it really true that the German hatred or German anti-Semitism was the most intense form of hatred or anti-Semitism in the beginning of the 19th Century.
If you were asked in 1910 where is the Holocaust most likely to happen in Europe, Russia probably would be a much better candidate than Germany. If you were asked that during another period, you would probably rule out a Holocaust in Germany, right. Yet, it is precisely in Germany where it happened, which was at the time of perhaps the most liberal of European societies, but it went to the other extreme in very quick order.

You obviously need other things to explain this sort of political violence. Hatred by itself is not going to give you much analytical leverage to understand it.

Why does it happen in some historical periods and not others? Think about the Armenian case. You go to the mid-19th Century, I know the Turkish propaganda makes too much out of this, but there is an element of truth to the claim, that in the mid-19th Century, and this is after the Greeks and Serbs had rebuilt and the Armenians still hadn’t.

The Armenians are referred to by the Turkish elites as the faithful minority. They are referred to in such a form with a considerable degree of affection. In a matter of a few decades, Armenians become the most feared threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

There are other arguments about the hatred hypothesis. “Eichmann in Jerusalem” was mentioned, one of my favorite books. There are five books that have changed me profoundly, “Eichmann in Jerusalem” is one of them, and it’s not just that one book, there are other books that have made the same argument after Hannah Arendt and some even before her.

The argument there is that when you look at the actual perpetrators, they don’t have horns, they don’t have fangs. Most perpetrators are ordinary human beings like you and me. Hatred and ideological distortions and pathologies are not necessary
for understanding it. We are all capable of murder. This is a very uncomfortable thought, but it has been demonstrated again and again by a lot of very good social science.

One relatively recent book I would highly recommend reading is the book by Scott Straus called “The Order of Genocide,” about the Rwanda case, and he does a very careful statistical analysis of the different motives of the perpetrators. Hatred does not rank very high there.

Finally, I want to point out that genocides are not committed by peoples. Genocides are committed by states, which also is in an uncomfortable relationship, this evidence is in an uncomfortable relationship with the hatred hypothesis.

What about the exclusionary nationalism argument? It is true as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go too far, or it doesn’t go far enough either. First of all, we had cases of mass murder committed by societies that subscribed to civic notions of nationalism. This society included -- this is the society that has mass murder in its past. The same can be said about Australians.

There are cases of exclusionary ethnic broad-based nationalisms that in some periods of their history are quite violent and barbaric, like the Germans, and you realize that the German concept is a nation who has not changed from the Nazi period, right, it is the same concept of what constitutes a German now as it used to be at the time, but it would be nearly blasphemous to compare modern Germany to the Nazi period. They couldn’t be more different, yet there are ideas of nations who are based on the same concept.

What is it that links nationalism to genocidal violence? Most studies of genocide point to the rise of mass politics, so it’s not the ideology itself, but it’s the rise of mass politics with modernization, and the rise of mass politics in states with intermingled
populations and the unsettled issue of power, who controls the state and who controls what territory.

When you look at Europe, you have these multi-ethnic empires with intermingled populations, and you have the mass politics displacing old government, and they had to settle the issue of power. A lot of the conflicts and a lot of the ethnic cleansing and a lot of the violence happened exactly to settle those issues.

Of course, not all intermingled populations produce genocide. There are a number of other hypotheses that help us understand which cases are most prone to genocidal violence and which cases are less prone.

The issue of power is particularly complicated. I'll get to make maybe 25 percent of my talk. (Laughter)

The most dangerous situations are not the ones when a group is completely and utterly powerless. This is another myth in the conventional wisdom. Groups that have a lot of power are not endangered in being massacred or subjected to mass murder. It is the in between cases where groups have some power, some influence, and yet they are vulnerable as well.

What is also very important to understand, and this is what is clearly demonstrated by the evidence, is when these power relationships change. If you look at a lot of cases of mass murder, these are committed by states, not all of them, but quite a few of them, including the Armenian case, they are committed by states in decline and in fear of losing, in fear of these minorities forming alliances with others and rebelling against them, so states in decline are a lot more vulnerable to these kind of policies and a lot more prone to these kinds of policies.

Let me just make one point which I really care about, and I'm going to stop after that. One of the most common arguments, one of the most common
prescriptions as to how to deal with ethnic cleansing, mass murder, ethnic conflicts, is make states more democratic, democracy is seen as the panacea, democracy, of course, is the secular religion of the West, and everybody loves democracy as everybody loves motherhood and apple pie.

When we compare what is happening in the modern Middle East, we think the problem is lack of democracy there or at least in some parts of the Middle East, where these sort of conflicts are happening today at a very, very high intensity, and we are comparing them with peaceful Europe, where minorities are respected, where minority rights are guaranteed, where there are constitutions, checks and balances, et cetera.

A lot of the recent social science raises questions about this sort of static correlation. You take democracies and you take non-democracies, compare their treatment of minorities. Clearly, democracies treat their minorities better. Case closed.

Some people have raised the issue that a lot of modern democracies have gone through a similar process, they have already gone through their ethnic cleansings, they have already gone through their simulations and defeating their minorities, and now they are democratic because they can afford to be democratic.

I'm going to conclude by an anecdote which you might find maybe funny, although this is not a funny subject. There is a wonderful book by Michael Mann, who is a political sociologist at UCLA. The book is called "The Dark Side of Democracy."

In it, he makes this point exactly. Once he was at a panel and people challenged him on that, and they made the observation that actually if you're talking about static correlations, democracies are better when it comes to the treatment of minorities.
Michael Mann hesitated how to answer this, and he didn’t have a good answer, and I knew what his answer should be, so I raised my hand and I was like okay, Michael Mann’s argument is correct, it’s the title of his book that is wrong, it should have been “The Bright Side of Ethnic Cleansing.”  (Laughter)

I did have other things about the moral implications of the positivistic theories of genocidal violence.  Actually, that was supposed to be the most important thing I was going to talk about, but I don’t have time.  I hopefully will return to it in the Q&A.  Thank you very much.  (Applause)

MS. FELDMAN:  Thank you, Arman.  Omer?

MR. TASPINAR:  Thank you all for staying.  I know it’s getting late, so I’ll try to be very brief and hopefully try to answer questions if you decide to stay even longer.

What I’ll try to explain, what I’ll try to talk about is why there is a disconnect between what we are discussing here in terms of the genocide and the debate in Turkey.

There is indeed a main disconnect.  I would like to underline this because if genocide recognition is the first step towards reconciliation, we have indeed a major disconnect in what we are discussing here and what is happening in Turkey.

We can basically find some optimism and believe there is movement in the right direction because 10 percent of Turkey is talking about what happened to Armenians.  There is a growing recognition among some civil society groups that what happened was tragic, even the term “genocide” is no longer exactly a taboo.

Make no mistake, in the mainstream of Turkey, you don’t have really a sense of collective guilt.  What you need to have in my opinion, and I’ll try to be deliberately provocative here in comparing with the Holocaust, without a sense of
collective guilt, there will never be a sense of genuine recognition and a genuine apology for what came to be called “genocide.”

I would even argue that instead of collective guilt in Turkey, what we have is a collective sense of victimhood. In Turkey, in fact, the debate is not about what happened to Armenians but often when Armenians are being told, immediately the sense of victimhood in Turkey kicks in, and it can be summarized in the form of who remembers the Turks, who remembers the Armenians who were killed. Who remembers what happened in the Balkans and the Caucasus. We are talking about all the atrocities, all the deportations, all the ethnic cleansings that happened against Muslim communities, and we are focusing on Armenians.

That is the sense of collective victimhood that you have in Turkey, and if don’t find a solution to this sense of collective victimhood, I think we will not get really ahead in our attempts to push Turkey towards genocide recognition.

We may find English speaking Turks, progressive Turks, liberal Turks, democratic Turks, who will apologize for what happened, who will feel a sense of guilt, but if what we are looking after is an apology from the government, a sense of recognition from the government, a sense of guilt from mainstream Turkey’s society, we’re definitely not there yet.

We’re not there yet because the main narrative in Turkey is primarily about a sense of victimhood and a sense of resentment towards the West. Increasingly, my worry is that we have a government in Turkey which portrays these attempts by foreign governments to genocide recognition and their parliaments in the framework of Islamophobia. They don’t like us because we’re Muslim, in the framework of Turkophobia. In the framework of orientalism, Muslims have committed atrocities against Christians.
There is a perception of injustice done to Turks, injustice done to Muslims. That’s the main narrative, I think, which resonates with still the majority of Turkey.

In terms of reconciliation, if reconciliation on the Turkey side would take people to acknowledge that what happened was genocide, we have to think about what would reconciliation on the Armenian side entail.

In other words, if the Turks have to move forward a little bit by saying okay, what happened was a disaster, it was a tragedy. In many ways, Armenian communities were annihilated. That’s movement in the right direction.

However, acknowledging the genocide because of the toxic nature of the term, is still very difficult, because whether we like it or not, genocide comes with baggage.

It’s very difficult for officials or civil society groups or the Armenian government to say genocide recognition will not entail some form of compensation, some form of reparations.

There will always be a perception in Turkey, and perception is reality, that acknowledging the genocide will come with consequences. It will come with consequences related to compensation, territorial or financial.

Therefore, you may have a Turkish government which one day may decide to apologize for the decimation, annihilation, destruction of Armenian communities, but the term “genocide” itself, what we are discussing today, is very difficult for the Turkish Government or the Turkish mainstream to accept.

Historians may agree. Historians may come to terms with what happened, but for a government and for mainstream society to recognize what happened as genocide to have occurred, I think that’s the main obstacle.
What about the debates in Armenia? What can the Armenian communities do in terms of helping Turkey to come to terms with history? Here in this conference I heard a couple of times terms like “Turks are not genocidal,” “It’s not in their DNA to commit genocide,” or the fact that Turks basically are not predisposed genetically to kill, although that’s a good start.

In terms of today, that is not going to really move forward the debate in terms of Turkey’s sense of empathy with Armenia or Armenians. Of course, Turks are not genocidal. Of course, Turks are not genetically predisposed to killing. It’s not in their DNA.

There is a context to this, but the minute you try to bring the context dimension, then you are labeled as a denialist. This is why I think we have to be more liberal in the context and use of the term “genocide.” The term “genocide” is a very toxic term. If we could talk about what happened to Turks in the Balkans, what happened to the Muslims in the Balkans as genocide as well, if we could talk about what happened to the Muslims in the Caucasus as genocide as well, maybe there would be more asymmetry to this.

We’re not there yet because the term “genocide” technically defined, as we heard this morning, is one state is engaged, although I’m not sure whether this is how it should be defined, but there is a sense that if a state commits violence against a minority, that’s more prone to be a genocide, when there is an intercommunal fight and when there is basically a civil war context and two ethnic groups are fighting and there is mass killings, we are reluctant to call it a genocide.

In other words, when Serbian nationalists or Greek nationalists or Bulgarian nationalists or Russian nationalists kill Muslim minorities, if it is in the absence
of a Serbian state, in the absence of a Bulgarian state or a Russian state committing these killings, we can’t call it a genocide.

That is the kind of technical difficulty in terms of what is a genocide. Turks feel singled out that they have committed genocide, but what happened to them is somehow not genocide and it is mass killings.

I’m saying this in order to project the debate in Turkey, because in the mainstream, these are the kinds of arguments you are likely to get.

The term “genocide” is a very toxic term, and there is a reason why the Turkish government or Turks are okay with the term “ethnic cleansing” or “tragedy” or “decimation,” “annihilation.” The minute you use the term “genocide,” it turns into a different debate. That is why genocide itself is a concept that is turning into a toxic obstacle for progress in terms of reconciliation.

Finally, why 2015 is a lost opportunity. Well, I had high hopes when the AKP came to power almost 13 years ago that we could move forward in terms of democratization in Turkey, in terms of coming to terms with history, in terms of liberalization.

Indeed, the AKP government has done more than previous Turkish governments in terms of changing the political vocabulary, “condolences.” That’s an important step to talk about shared pain. My favorite sound byte of this conference was “From shared pain to champagne.” Although you would never have really AKP officials toasting champagne, but there was an attempt to say look, let’s talk about the collective sense of agony, the collective tragedy. That was at the heart of the clumsy attempt to put Gallipoli at the heart of the centennial, to say look, we should not be talking only about the Armenian tragedy, but let’s talk about all the sufferings.
Of course, this did not work because the Armenians rightly would say yes, you have suffered, a lot of Muslims have suffered, but how can you use this as an excuse for the genocide, how can you use this as basically an attempt to alleviate the agony of the genocide.

This is as much tolerance you would get from the Turkish government in terms of trying to change the vocabulary. This was a first step, but it did not go too far. It did not really achieve what it was intended to achieve, which was dialogue with Armenia, opening the border with Armenia, establishing diplomatic relations.

As if coming to terms with 1915 difficult enough, you have, as we discussed in the previous panel, all the geostrategic issues surrounding Turkish-Syria relations, Russia, the geostrategic dimension of Turkish-American relations, you have a number of complicating factors which have transformed 2015 into a loss, unfortunately, in terms of Turkey coming to terms.

Finally, I would like to say also that when you look at the Turkish political agenda, we can spend a day on the Armenian genocide here, talking about why Turkey is unable to come to terms, but when you look at the Turkish political agenda, the issue of 1915, the issue of genocide, is simply not in the top five or six or seven items that is being discussed in the country.

The political agenda of Turkey is so loaded from the urgent situation of what’s going to happen with the Kurdish question to the question of Islam, secularism, the fight between AKP and the Gallant community, the question of Syria, what’s going to happen to basically Turkish relations with the region, Israeli relations, Cyprus, EU, that Armenian has a hard time, the issue of 1915 has a hard time entering the loaded Turkish political agenda.
We’re not discussing this issue in Turkey. The only time this issue is being discussed in Turkey is in the context of foreign governments basically passing resolutions. You wouldn’t have a debate in Turkish t.v. and Turkish parliament and Turkish academic circles without April 24, without the pressure coming from external dynamics, simply because there is a political agenda in Turkey, there is a loaded political agenda, domestic agenda, which dominates the urgent issues, which basically leaves no room for Turkish intellectuals, Turkish politicians, Turkish civil society to really go to the heart of the matter and discuss what happened 100 years ago.

There is no sense of urgency to this debate. This is why I believe 2015 was a lost opportunity. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. MELHEM: I’m not a historian. I’m not a historian of Turkey or Armenia. I was recruited to come here because of my experience and because of an article I had written, the title of which was “The Twilight of Middle Eastern Christianity.”

I’m a journalist. I’m one of the those people who write the first draft of history that later on professional historians botch and rewrite. (Laughter)

I’m here essentially to talk about my own experience and what I call the persistence of collective memories. Let me start with a couple of caveats. I come from a region where in the last 100 years, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, since the birth of this crazy architecture which is collapsing right now, because what we see today is the fraying of the political order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of western colonial powers.

What we see today or what we are going through today in the Middle East is similar in many ways to what happened in 1915 in the sense we are going through a huge, hellish transition.
When I watch the situation in the Middle East, I'm always reminded of what Antonio Gramsci said about the nature of transition. I'm a former Leftist, so I feel compelled once in a while to quote my old fellow travelers at that time. Gramsci says the crisis consists in the fact that the old is dying, the new cannot be born yet, and in the interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

What we see today in the Arab world and the Middle East in general is these morbid symptoms. They are going to stay with us for a long time.

Let me start with a couple of caveats, as I said. One is because I come from that part of the world and because I meet victims and because many of us wallow in victimhood and many of us elevated their pain into the level of mythology, I hear a lot of talk about -- they may not phrase it as eloquently as I do -- the hierarchy of pain, there is some sort of a hierarchy of pain, that my pain is more genuine than yours.

I don't believe in the aristocracy of pain. There is no such thing as aristocracy of pain, even for those that have been at the receiving ends of horrific violence. We know many of them in the Middle East. Let's make that clear.

The other one is guilt. Growing up Catholic in Beirut, I know something about guilt. I believe in moral responsibility. I don't necessarily believe in inherited collective guilt. Those Germans during the Nazi Holocaust and the Nazi horrors are responsible morally because they did not do enough, those "ordinary Germans" that Taner spoke about and other historians spoke about.

I do believe society should own the history just as individuals own their previous past. We cannot escape it. Own it. That's the problem I think the Turks today are still struggling with. We can talk a lot about what "genocide" means and whether it is annihilation or ethnic cleansing, mass murder, but essentially are they owning their history?
Even if it was before Ottoman, and that is really one of the questions. We really do not have to go back to 1915, to the horrors of 1915, to talk about denial. Most individuals don’t do introspection well. Most people don’t engage in self criticism. What goes for individuals goes for societies and cultures and states, just as individuals seek refuge in denial when they are faced with unpleasant realities, things they have done and committed, states resort to refuge in denial.

That is what we have in the Middle East. I don’t have to go back to 1915 to what the Turks did to the Armenians and Syrians and others, or what other people did to Turks and other groups. Horrendous things happened to everybody.

In my lifetime, there were those accused of committing mass murder or crimes against humanity. I struggled with fellow Arabs, because I used to be one of the few who dared go on CNN and talk about the genocidal war that was being waged against the Kurds by the Iraqi regime. It was a state that was doing this. I was vilified.

There was no outcry in the late 1980s. Most of us were around in the late 1980s when Sudan was committing these mass murders, uprooting tens of thousands of Kurds, demolishing their culture and their history and their heritage, and killing them physically with gas. There was no outcry in the Arab world.

With the Turks at least today, there are many Turkish intellectuals and scholars and great journalists, including my friend, Omer. We talk openly. We try to say we should own, we should own this thing and talk about it.

I have yet to see many Arab intellectuals talk about what happened to the Kurds or what happened to the people in that war, or the atrocities that are taking place in Syria today, especially on the part of the left. Incredibly shameful. I don’t have to go back to 1915 to talk about this.
When I wrote that article -- let me back track and say a few things about my personal relationship with the Armenians. I grew up in an Armenian neighborhood. I went to school with Armenian kids. I heard the stories. Actually, on April 24, the whole city, Beirut, was closed down because we had so many successful small business, Armenian owned businesses.

I became familiar with the Armenian tragedy when I was 10-11, 13-14, and at that age, I used to converse in Armenian, and I even learned a few Turkish words from the elder Armenians who used to converse among themselves in Turkish, and I still remember some of the beautiful cuss words, although we take no second place to anybody when it comes to curses in Arabic. It's very rich.

I grew up with Armenians and I heard the horrors of 1915. The interesting thing is I had my own horror story. My father died when I was 11. My father was a lone child, his mother survived him. Her name was Martha Succinic. She had one of the most beautiful old faces you could ever see. I worshiped that woman. She used to put me next to her, comb my long hair. I always had long hair, believe me. I used to have long hair. (Laughter) I grew up and I mellowed and I lost it.

She would comb my hair and tell me what happened to my grandfather, my paternal grandfather, her husband. I still can't talk about it. The Turkish Army collected all able bodied Christian men in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine during the so-called (speaking in Turkish), which is mobilization; right?

They took them, and one of them was my grandfather, to do slave labor. Many of them perished. Many of them died. Some managed to flee and went through the Syrian desert and ended up going back -- my family is from Northern Lebanon. I was born in Beirut but my family is from the mountainous part of Northern Lebanon.
He arrives, diseased, he told they collect dead bodies on trains, it was horrible. He survived for two or three months and then he died.

I grew up listening to my grandmother who I worshiped telling me what those Turkish monsters, those are her words, did to my grandfather. She would cry and I would cry hysterically. I worshiped that woman. Talk about hatred and talk about demonization. I had never met a Turk in my life, I was still a little kid.

I brought these memories with me, and that is why I want to talk about the persistence of collective memories, and then I came to the United States in 1972. With the passage of time, learned history, learned about the history of the Ottoman Empire, met wonderful Turks, fell in love with Istanbul when I went there. It took me a long, long, long painful time to get over my personal demons when it comes to Turks.

Today, I am proud of my friendship with a lot of Turks, including this man here. I am lucky because I got out of that trap, and yet intellectually, I made my peace, and yet it is still in my gut, it is still under the skin because I learned the tragic family history from a woman I worshiped as a little boy.

When I look now to what is happening in the Middle East, again you see flashes from 1915 and 2015. Death marches in the deserts in 1915, the Armenians. Death marches in the deserts in 2015, the Syrians and other Christians. In 1915, you had the famine in Lebanon, which was mostly manmade, Lebanon and Syria, but mostly in Lebanon. You have seen the grainy black and white pictures and photos of emaciated kids and women mostly.

A few weeks ago a Lebanese paper published a number of new apparently pictures, and it brought tears to my eyes. It was so reminiscent of what is taking place in Syria today where Bashar al-Assad is using medieval tactics of siege and
famine, starvation, and you have seen pictures of emaciated women mostly. It is always pictures of emaciated kids and women, children and women.

There were horror stories about people eating grass, taking religious edicts to allow them to kill cats and dogs. Again, the only difference is these photos are in color and they are clear, unlike the grainy black and white photos of 1915 of Armenians, of Christians, those who were victimized by that mostly manmade famine.

Again, the same violence and the same denial. It is good to have collective memories if we use them as a cathartic thing, to honor the memory of those who died, but not to use them politically for revenge, not to commercialize them, not to make political careers out of exploiting them, as politicians do, as intellectuals do, because they want to perpetuate that aristocracy of pain.

This is what we have today in the Middle East, what really makes it so tragic today is there is an old woman today, a Syrian woman or Yazidi woman, who will be telling her 10 year old boy what happened to his father or there is a father who will be telling his daughter that her mother was killed, probably raped and then killed.

We are going to go to another cycle, another century, where these collective memories will be told and retold, passed on from one generation to another, and many of those people may not be as lucky as I am to get out of that cycle, to liberate myself or themselves from that burdensome collective memory of pain and victimhood, because there are people who are going to perpetuate the victimhood. There are people who are going to exploit it for political reasons or for cultural reasons or whatever.

The problem with collective memories is they don’t die easy. I come from a region where they commemorate the death, it happened yesterday, I see Turk men who would kill you in a battle, kids weeping and crying when somebody sings a story
about those killed. These tough men become little kids. It happened yesterday. You talk about it on and on and on, at home, at the mosque.

You do reenactment. I’m a Virginian by choice. I worship Abraham Lincoln. I call him my secular saint. Jefferson is my man. On the 4th of July, I read the Declaration of Independence every year, and I drive on the hilly roads of Virginia and blast the radio, listen to the blues, and say thank God I ended up in America.

Being a southerner by choice, I have a funny affinity to Robert E. Lee because of victimhood. Defeated people have long, long memories. Victims have long, long memories and they perpetuate them, and they do reenactment.

I read about a theater, and the reenactment of the killing of Imam Hussein, where he was killed along with 70 of his supporters. The writer was beautiful, describing a situation. He said the closer we get to Ashura, where we do the commemoration, you have a group of people who represents Imam Hussein on horses or whatever, and these people are attacked by another group.

They stage it the way we do Civil War reenactment. I’m a Civil War history buff, I know what I’m talking about. I am probably the only one that writes about the Civil War. I’ve done work in television. I even thought about -- I ride horses. (Laughter) I have a Palomino. They said look, they will shoot you, a Palomino, usually generals don’t ride a Palomino. Anyway. (Laughter)

The interesting thing is you have these people live together and the closer you get to Ashura, to the day of commemorating this tragedy, tension begins to build up, then you have this tension between these people who lived with each okay throughout the year. Emotional build up to the day they stage the event, the killing, the ambush and the killing of this great man, Imam Hussein. Those who played the role of the killers of Hussein, when people get into a frenzy, they stoned them, their neighbors.
Now we are celebrating, commemorating the 150th anniversary of the American Civil War, the bloodiest conflict in American history. We are still living in the shadow of the American Civil War, 150 years ago.

I have elder friends, people my age or older than me from Virginia, and I give them a lecture about Antietam, believe me. I know so much. They still feel in their gut that we have been wronged in the south. Victims don’t forget easy.

During the killing of the 1990s in Kosovo and Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic invoked that dark day, when was it, 1380 something, when Ottoman Turks annihilated essentially the Serb Army. It was a horrendous event, it became the stuff of folklore and mythology and songs, and it happened yesterday.

American Civil War, Sunni’s in Ashura, Slobodan and the Serbs, you name it. Perpetuating victimhood, not dealing correctly with collective memories.

My fear is that we are creating a new generation of Sunni’s and Shiites and Yazidi’s and Christians and Syrians, who are going to pass these horror stories of pain and victimhood and create another cycle of collective memory that will stay with us for another 100 years, and unless we deal critically with the whole concept of collective memory as something we can use effectively to cleanse our history.

You know, the Germans did a wonderful job, sometimes they may have gone to far in self flagellation, South Africa did something very interesting and very commendable, the people I grew up with in Lebanon still refuse to do, and until this moment, the Lebanese never owned their civil war, never owned their massacres. They still say well, depending on your view, it’s the Syrians, it’s the Israeli’s, it’s the Palestinians, you know, we were caught in the middle. They made me do it in a way, like the devil made me do it.
They don’t want to own it. That is a shame. We have the same thing in Syria now, and we are going to have the same thing in Iraq and the same thing in Sudan, and we never learned.

Collective memory, persistence with collective memory is good, only if you know how to use it. It can really suffocate you, and I’m glad personally I escaped that. Thank you. (Applause)

MS. GUISAN: Well, you are all a very hard act to follow, and here I have the privilege of the last word. My presentation is entitled “For the Sake of Survivors, What Kind of Justice and Reconciliation.”

I would like to draw from transitional justice in the early years of European integration as a reconciliatory process, to examine the Turkish—Armenian relation in a comparative manner rather than as a single and exceptional case.

Why transitional justice in the early years of European integration? Because these policies both started as responses to genocide as mass massacres of World War II. I hope this approach will stimulate the work of imagination, which is so needed in the case of frozen conflicts.

Hannah Arendt called imagination “Neither mere reflection nor mere feelings, but the gift of the understanding heart.” King Solomon was one example she cited, with two mothers fighting over the same baby. Imagination, she wrote, “Makes it bearable for us to live with other people, strangers forever in the same world, and makes it possible for them to bear with us.”

Let me start with a few remarks about transitional justice. Its theory and practice should probe Turks, civil society and the states to feel less defensive as their country has joined a rather large club of countries being held accountable for past misdeeds.
In my country of origin, Switzerland, it was challenged by external pressure to reopen bank accounts of Jews it had closed after the war and to return money to the descendants, but the Swiss policies changed.

A comparative perspective might help alleviate the sense that Turkey is singled out for prosecution. Moreover, history experience teaches us that truth seeking and atonement must be pursued for their own sake, not to gain international support. International recognition of German efforts came long after the whole process had started.

Transitional justice rests on four pillars. I suggest that we can consider these four pillars as four analytical categories from which to assess the Armenian-Turkish relationship.

The first pillar consists of domestic and international trials. The second of truth and reconciliation commissions. The third is psychological healing of victims and perpetrators, and the fourth consists of reparation.

For instance, we might examine systematically the whole process of meeting our justice by reviewing trials of what stood in for trials from the Ottoman trials of 1919 to the attempts by Armenians to take justice in their own hands in the 1920s, in 1973 and 1983. When are terrorist acts justified we might ask.

We might examine in light of similar processes as well the process of truth seeking and atonement which started in the last decade in Turkey. What is the role of literature in the processes of healing? Should Fethiya Cetin’s best seller “My Grandmother: An Armenian-Turkish Memoir” be considered in this light?

Coming to reparation, Taner has also suggested a comparative approach. Is there a statute of limitations on reparations? Obviously, people disagree.
about this. Certain gestures have been described as reparation can stand in for reparations, and if I may make one practical suggestion.

There are presently perhaps as many as 100,000 workers from the Republic of Armenia in Istanbul. This number took place seasonally. Since 2011, their children have been allowed to attend Armenian schools, but they cannot receive a diploma because they are not Turkish citizens. Could this policy change as a form if not of reparation at least a recognition that these children have a special link with Turkey. I simply raise this question as a possibility.

I turn now to the early years of European integration as a reconciliatory project. What are relevant features to our case? I do not suggest in any way that this process is a perfect process of reconciliation, rather we should look at it to stimulate the imagination, a bit like we might study the South African process. My definition of “reconciliation” comes from our chair, Lily Gardner Feldman. Reconciliation and peace do not mean the final elimination of conflicts but rather the transformation into productive convention in a shared and cooperative framework.

There are enormous differences, of course, between the Western Europe of the early 1950s and Turkey and Armenian today. I would like to argue, however, that recollection of past atrocities and even reparations may not hold by themselves the best promise to follow in politics. Rather, the work of identification with the other materially and psychologically is more effective and lasting.

Let me discuss briefly how this worked out in the early years of European integration. First of all, the victim took the initiative. Second, shared policies were to establish balance and even equality among the partners. Third, small countries to decisive leadership at moments of crisis.
First, the victim took the initiative. France had been occupied three times by German troops in 70 years. The French initiated -- France had failed in its efforts to create peace. There was no finger pointed. Europe was called to overcome its division.

The main concern was forward looking, to establish peace, democracy and prosperity. The French initiators understood something Hager had theorized 150 years earlier -- which provoked the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire.

In his famous metaphor of a master and slave, Hager argued that in a conflicting relationship, both parties gain from changing their relationship, because it defines not just a material interest but also their respective identities. Who wants to be defined forever as a slave master.

Because the victim has the most interest in changing the relationship, it takes initiative. Liberation takes place in the world of work and economics. The slave fights its master over the fruit of its labor and if the fight is successful, the master is liberated from the status of mere consumer. Liberation also takes place in the minds of the enemies, as a slave comes to see a master as a human being for the first time, it becomes a human being to the master.

Although the French/German relationship was not exactly that of a master/slave, some French people managed to shift from victimhood to agency, both in civil society and the elite level, which came to a great surprise to international observers then.

In the mind of European founders, like the American founders, the right kind of institution would train people into new behaviors. They would hold in check over winning nationalism. This was a very tall order when you think of Luxemburg in comparison with West Germany or France.
It took years of negotiation, between 1950 and 1957, to craft the free founding treaties and to imagine what would become known as the community method of decision making.

Primacy and applicability of law decided by European institutions, leadership among partner nations by alphabetical order, and I will leave it at that.

A certain economic equality must also be maintained between France and Germany, and Germany already in 1950 was taking over France in steel production. Coal and steel being the backbone of the weapon industry, they would also be the backbone of a new agreement.

I do not have time to say what worked and what did not. What remained is that the European coal and steel community was considered like a laboratory experiment in cooperation by actors, lacked the marshal plans of OEC in earlier years.

Coming back to Armenia and Turkey, obviously, a process of regional integration does not seem a realistic option today, given that Turkey continues its process to the EU and Armenia has decided to join the Eurasian Economic Union. However, could Turkey and Armenia offer a joint project on water to the region, a much needed resource and perhaps not as heatedly disputed as oil or gas.

Could there be a meaningful agreement over the fate of the controversial Metsamor nuclear power plant or on how to meet Armenia’s energy needs. Folks who are specialists of this region will know much better than I.

In retrospect, it is useful to remember that the coal and steel treaty was signed and ratified while France was still occupying Versailles with no sign of letting go. France and Germany bracketed this issue in a letter attached to the treaty. Three years later, the relationship had changed enough for a referendum to be held in West Germany
and Versailles returned in West Germany. Actually, the referendum was held in Versailles.

Can the situation of Versailles be compared to that -- the latter is even more difficult. It involves four countries, not to mention Russia -- three countries and one is a dictatorship. Could Turkey and Armenia agree to bracket this issue and obtain some cooperation on other issues first.

A referendum has been proposed. Displaced should be allowed to vote in that case. The Armenian state has chosen the policy of aspersion, which shows how right Hager was. The work of self reflection is as important for the former slave as for the former master, although the former slave might be tempted to aid the former master.

If the Republic of Turkey and Armenia could get their act together on some imaginative joint and practical project backed by a egalitarian institution, they could play an important bridging role also between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, which have failed to engage some collaboration. I might say to the cost of the Ukraine. I won't say more on that.

The last feature of the early years of the communities I wish to mention is that historically small countries have rescued the Union from difficult dilemmas. I think of 1954, of Kosovo -- excuse me -- Slovenia, when Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, which divided the UDP.

What initiative could Armenians take today? This is not for me to say, of course. I will formulate a wish only. Just as the division of Europe struck all Europeans, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire struck a whole region, politically, economically, and psychologically. Not just Turkey and Armenia.
Could some Armenians invite Turks, Syrians, Iraqi’s and Lebanese to an ongoing dialogue about disintegration, but also about how to imagine a new ethnic/religious space in the region. This could be healing.

In conclusion, I believe the practical experiences of transitional justice could help both parties move beyond a sense of victimhood toward a sense of empowerment because of the realization that truth telling and atonement and reparations are also -- albeit in different ways, and there is much to learn from others’ experience and is much to contribute.

As for Europe integration, a victim initiated process, an intricate web was established between behavior, institution, and economic programs. Finally, the small took the initiative.

One question stands today for me. What collective identities do Armenians and Turks wish to choose and to project to the world singly and in connection with each other. (Applause)

MS. FELDMAN: You all have been very patient, so if we can collect some questions or comments, if I could ask you to identify who you are, to be brief, because -- Fiona, how much time do we have?

MS. HILL: About half an hour.

MS. FELDMAN: The gentleman in the back.

QUESTIONER: My name is David London. I’m a policy analyst. I would like to know from any of the speakers, and thank you so much for your comments, who you might see as serving the essential role of facilitating such a discussion between Armenia, and Armenians and Turkey and the Turkish people?
I think that the role that facilitator will have to play will require such a delicate touch and a sensitivity so as to create an atmosphere that really produces some results.

MS. FELDMAN: Another gentleman in the back.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm a journalist from Armenia. I would like to ask about what should Armenians do in terms of dialogue with Turks? This is a topic we have spoken about today a lot. It looks like there are two main things, two main perspectives that Armenians can pursue. One is sort of to put aside history and extend a hand to Turks, not to politicize the Armenian genocide recognition but rather try to engage in so-called constructive dialogue with Turkey.

The second one is to have the Armenian genocide recognition as part of Armenia's political agenda and to pursue this perspective.

I think Armenia tried both. During the first period of history, it was not politicizing the Armenian genocide, and not having sort of Armenian government supporting the recognition of the Armenian genocide internationally, and then the situation changed.

Which one was more effective and which one you consider -- I think Omer Taspinar referred to this in his speech -- which one would you consider more practical, if Armenia puts aside the Armenian genocide topic, would Turkey be interested in talking to Armenians and reconciling with the Armenian people.

If I could make a brief comment about the fact that “genocide” as a term is sort of a toxic term, and for Turkish society, it is kind of harder to swallow, to take this. While I understand it may be a toxic term, I think what scholars and journalists should try to do particularly in Turkey is not trying to avoid this term because it’s toxic, but maybe
trying to show to the Turkish society that Armenians killed by Turks and Turks killed by Armenians, it is a very different dimension.

Armenians lost settlements, but this is not the same for Turkey. Armenians lost their homeland in 1915. I think maybe we should try to pursue this direction, of explaining this history to millions of Turks who may not really be aware of the details about this. Thank you.

MS. FELDMAN: Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Following up on that, my comment is also to Omer. I understand and completely agree with you, and as someone who is from Turkey, I understand what you are saying about the toxicity of the term itself and importance of context, and definitely I relate to the victimhood.

It has been created from the very moment of the establishment of the Republic. I think it is purposely constructed like that. There is a legacy of Kemalism in that victimhood idea, but now I think the AKP government, it has been capitalized in a different way, more religious, with an accent to religion.

In context, yes. I think there are more and more historians who are paying attention to context and starting the narrative of what happened to Armenians.

We have heard already but many people will start with these stories from 1912, for instance, the importance of the Balkan wars and the feelings that it naturally created among the Muslims who had been expelled from their homelands basically.

This has been my challenge, I do pay a lot of attention to context, because I think it is the solution really, and bringing in different actors.

I don't agree and I don't see your point when you make the claim to use the term "genocide" more liberally in relationship to other events that I think are more like ethnic cleansing than genocide, in fact, when you think about the Balkans specifically.
Not just the fact that they don’t fit the definition of genocide, but I also don’t see it as a solution to the problem of making the term less toxic in Turkey, if nothing else, only because as you point out, and I agree, the Turkish government will not use the term, so it might change the mainstream perception or it happened to them, it happened to us, what’s the big deal about it type of attitude, but if the government is afraid of the consequences of naming it genocide rather than annihilation or ethnic cleansing, it’s not going to change.

MS. FELDMAN: We have one more here, and then we will have some responses and then do another round.

QUESTIONER: I wonder if there could be a commission rather than having more studies done on the genocide. The Turkish textbooks, the misinformation, disinformation is really a sore spot, and if we could weed out some of that, we might have a better chance at the 80 percent really understanding and not having the wrong impression.

For example, we talk about the Civil War. The Civil War has to have a government in and of itself, like Jefferson Davis was in Richmond, he directed Robert E. Lee. The Armenians didn’t have a commander-in-chief.

That sort of thing, I think, would be extremely important. We can’t keep talking about intercommunal warfare when there wasn’t intercommunal warfare. We need to have the correct terms. We need to train our young people with the proper history. We can’t be victims and we can’t have heads in the clouds.

MS. FELDMAN: Let’s start with Catherine and then come back this way.

MS. GUISAN: Well, I couldn’t agree more with you. Actually, does someone know whether there is a historian commission on this very issue?
MS. FELDMAN: I would just say this has been a fundamental element of Germany’s dealing with its past and its foreign policy. It has had bilateral textbook commissions with most of the victim countries. There is another role that Germany has played which may be more relevant here, which is to facilitate the analysis of textbooks, for example, between Israel and Palestine. It was Germany that facilitated that and paid for it.

In East Asia, it has been doing work in the Balkans. There is this institute for textbook research, which has been around since the 1950s.

If the parties can’t necessarily have the impulse to do this themselves, there are international organizations and institutions that have done this in other cases quite successfully. Again, the idea is not to come up with a common history necessarily, and the process is as important as the outcome, in fact.

MR. TASPINAR: On the question of asymmetry, Turkish victimhood versus Armenian victimhood, what can be done to convey to the Turkish public that there isn’t much asymmetry, that the Armenians have lost their ancestral homeland, they lost basically places that they considered Armenian and the Turks at the end of the day established a successful nation state, and there shouldn’t be much victimhood given the fact that at the end of the day without the Turk, a new republic was born and Turks managed to take their place in history without the sense of victimhood.

I think on the one hand the Turkish education system tries to imbue that sense of confidence in national building. On the other hand, Turks always had a love and hate relationship with the West. They believe there is a lack of respect, a lack of empathy, coming from the West towards the Turks, demonization of the Turks, the fact that the Turks are not treated with respect, the fact that the EU has double standards for
Turkey, the fact that there is growing Islamophobia in the West, creates a sense of resentment.

This is, I think, magnified when you have western governments who call basically what happened to Armenians genocide but you would not have really a debate about what happened in Algeria and the killing of one million Algerians, a debate about that, which basically would call it a genocide as well, or attempts by the U.S. Congress to talk about what happened to Native Americans or in Australia.

The fact that the West is not really looking at its own history of nation building, all the things that have happened from the 16th Century to the 20th, and they are blaming the Ottomans, the Turks, they are singling them out. That’s the perception you get.

That creates a sense of victimhood, I think, a sense of double standard, and it is magnified by the fact that there is in the West a sense of Islamophobia, and there is always a sense that Turks are portrayed as barbarians, et cetera. This government, the AKP government, does a good job in terms of projecting this as they don’t like us, they don’t like the fact that we’re a Muslim country, and the reason we are not a member of the EU is because we’re Muslim, and this emphasis on the Armenians and genocide is part of that narrative.

Now, would it help if you would recognize what happened in the West, killings of Muslims in the Balkans as genocide? Would it help, for instance, if there would be more asymmetry?

We have a tangible example in front of us. Does it help to recognize what happened in Srebrenica, it says genocide, the Turkish government calls it a genocide, the West calls it a genocide. I think it helps in the sense that you have someone like Etyen Mahcupyan who was until recently an advisor to the Prime Minister,
who would say well, isn’t it strange that the Turkish government is calling it-what happened in Srebrenica a genocide but we are not calling what happened to the Armenians a genocide.

Forget 1915. Let’s take Taner Akcam’s analysis of proceses. What happened in Adana in 1909, 20,000 Armenians being killed in a few days. That in itself is a genocide. Why should we not call it a genocide? If we call what happened in Srebrenica a genocide, Let’s compare it with Adana in 1909.

I think it would demystify the term “genocide” in the eyes of Turkish public opinion. The Turkish public considers genocide as something -- when they hear “genocide,” they see the finger pointed at them by the West, but the West is reluctant to call what it has done to Muslims a genocide.

In the context of Germany, of course, it’s different. We cannot deny what happened to the Jews in the Holocaust. That is also a kind of difficult asymmetry for Turks because when we compare the Holocaust with the Armenian genocide, the Turks immediately say well, how can you think the CUP was basically engaged in this kind of racist policy or the Ottomans had the equivalent of anti-Semitism presence in the Third Reich.

You can’t compare what happened to the Jews and the systemic annihilation, basically the plan to kill all Jews to what happened to the Armenians. Immediately, it triggers this reaction that these two things are not comparable.

The Holocaust, when it is compared with the Armenian genocide, it does a disfavor to those who want to talk about the Armenian genocide without the context of the Holocaust, because the Holocaust issue basically poisons the whole Turkish attitude towards it because it brings it to the floor, the question of okay, if we accept like Germany, what is going to happen.
There will be reparations. There will be consequences. How can we get away with recognition of the genocide. We talked about a sense of collective guilt, a sense there has to be consequences, there will be territorial and financial consequences, so in that sense, I think the whole comparison with the Holocaust is unfortunate, and it blocks the debate in Turkey about what happened in 1915.

MS. FELDMAN: Arman?

MR. GRIGORYAN: A couple of remarks. I think there are two ways a state is going to have a critical look at its past. One is the method that was exercised against Germany, and that was a total defeat and a complete remodeling of its society from the top down, essentially a situation where its institutions are controlled by outsiders and are doing something, recruitment of a de-Nazification campaign.

By the way, when we are talking about Turkey state’s attitudes towards the Armenian genocide, I think Turkey is not unique in denying its past. Actually, if anything is unique, it is Germany that is unique.

The Turkish example is much more common in terms of states’ attitudes with regard to their own pasts, including the democracies that you mentioned with considerably bloody hands and bloody histories.

That’s one method. The second method, I think, is for Turkey to liberalize, the process of Turkish modernization to continue, and for things that are impediments to that modernization and liberalization to be minimized.

This brings me to the question of what Armenians can do. Well, at the very least, Armenians should not do things that make that modernization process more painful, that make the liberalization process in Turkey more difficult.

Recently, I had an article in the Washington Post where actually this was my counsel to my fellow Armenians, there are a lot of things in the Armenian discourse
about Turkey that makes it more difficult for Turkey to come to terms with its history, including things like anti-Turkism racism in some Armenian corners, including things like territorial demands.

I would also add this wasn’t part of the article, but this is in line with what Omer was saying. I don’t think it is very helpful for us to at least as third parties to pressure Turkey to come to terms with its history.

I know that a lot of Armenian organizations and individual Armenians celebrate every time there is some American state or city or Italian county or Italian township that recognizes the Armenian genocide, I think it does harm. I know this is not a popular view, especially among a lot of Armenians, but I don’t see that necessarily helping the cause of the Turkish society moving closer to genocide recognition.

If anything, it helps the Turkish nationalists who argue that this is just a continuation of the old story and we are being singled out, and look, if we come to terms with this, there are going to be consequences of all sorts.

At the very least, the Armenians should avoid doing these things that create impediments on the process or create obstacles against the process in Turkey, which is slow, which is underway. I don’t know how it will end. Nobody can be terribly optimistic about that quite yet. There is a process, and I think there are right and wrong things one could do with respect to that process.

As to who could facilitate a dialogue with Armenians, between Armenians and Turks, that was the first question that was raised, I don’t know what the role of a facilitator would be. What is it? Armenians and Turks cannot talk to each other and they need facilitators? I really don’t understand the meaning of “facilitators.”

I think there are enough rational Armenians and rational Turks that can sit down and talk and they don’t need anybody to hold their hands. If there are
Armenians and Turks that don’t want to talk to each other, like perhaps our current governments or some organizations, no facilitator is going to be able to do anything.

I’m a bit skeptical about the role of facilitators. There isn’t anything that they know, facilitators know, that Armenians and Turks don’t.

MS. FELDMAN: Hisham?

MR. MELHEM: Quickly. I agree with Arman about facilitators. I think the Turks have to come to grips with what happened and the Armenians should show the kind of understanding of what your article in the Washington Post reflected.

I think people do divisionism history when they are secure enough to do divisionism history, when they have self confidence to do it. It is like individuals. People joke about themselves. Those who do self-deprecating jokes are secure people. Those who engage in self-criticism are secure people. Those who rewrite history and try to write it correctly usually are secure enough to do it.

In this country, we didn’t do this 50 years ago. Look at the movies. Look at the popular culture when it comes to the Native Americans or the African Americans or the minorities. Now, we are owning what happened. I speak as an American. With what we did to the people.

Look at how we write today about slavery. It is again wrenching, it’s painful, it’s not pleasant. Nobody wants to exercise their own demons. I’m very conscious of this because I come from a region where nobody wants to dig up the skulls and the ugly history and the mythology and to admit that. Everybody wants to live in denial and perpetrate all these mythologies.

You have seen in the last few decades these courageous Turkish men of letters and women of letters and scholars and journalists talk about what happened in 1915 openly and honestly. That is a sign of maturity. That is a sign of self-confidence.
That’s a sign of being secure. I think we should encourage these tendencies because it has to come voluntarily.

I think the German case is so unique that it really is not easy to use as a model. The Germans are the Germans. I studied German philosophy, I know one thing or two about those people.

I always look at South Africa, and again, I’m not sure -- we can have a technical discussion about if a community did mass killings, does that amount to genocide because that community does not constitute a “state.” What do you do when communities are being encouraged by states or used by states to do mass killings?

That is an interesting question, too, but I think also communities should engage in self criticism and introspection.

The American Civil War was unique, so we cannot really compare again, like Germany, you cannot compare it with other communities that engaged in civil wars.

MS. FELDMAN: A question here.

QUESTIONER: Germany lost the war and the Nuremberg trials were forced on them, so they really didn’t have a whole lot of choice in what they acknowledged or didn’t acknowledge.

South Africa was under tremendous economic pressure from the whole world that was boycotting them, and they had two incredible leaders there, Nelson Mandela and de Klerk. That could have blown up horribly.

You have pressure from the outside saying this is true, you can’t ignore it, and then you also had in that case incredible leaders.

I don’t see anyone in Turkey just sort of automatically wanting to come up with this. We have already been told that this issue is way down the list. I think that pressure from outside, in my opinion, is probably the only reason it has come up as a big
issue now, so if you don’t think facilitators are a good idea and you don’t think any kind of outside pressure is a good idea, and you think Turks and Armenians should just talk to each other, how are we really going to make any progress?

The people who hold all the power and who will press the others don’t usually just give it up because they are such nice guys.

QUESTIONER: I’m going to ask you a question about identity and how the differing definitions, the evolving definitions of identity in Turkey might assist in this process of examining coming in terms with shared history.

Specifically in terms of the political evolution within Turkey addressing the Kurdish question might provide one route of also addressing the Armenian question, and this has to do with much broader questions of democratic evolution, the upcoming June elections, and whether there is a Kurdish party, Kurdish based party that comes into parliament, that provides the space for addressing first and foremost the Kurdish question, which frankly bolts much larger than the Armenian question in Turkey domestically, and as a way to get at that.

Do you see that as a possible way to encourage this broader societal conversation that gets at the question of a new Turkish identity arising?

QUESTIONER: Mr. Taspinar and other apologists for Turkey keep referring to the losses, the Muslim losses, the Turkish losses in the Balkans. What happened in the Balkans was a war, w-a-r. The first Balkan war, the Turkish lost most of its European holdings. The second Balkan war of 1913 was negligible.

What happened in 1915 and the years following was not a war, w-a-r. It was outright cleansing, genocide, whatever you want to call it, but there was no war. I wish you would stop referring to the lack of sympathy for the Turkish losses in the Balkans, which was a war.
QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Vidia Idleman, I'm a Turkish Jew, and I would like to go back to the Holocaust/Armenian genocide comparison. The Germans perfected genocides, and the Holocaust is very unique, as you all mentioned.

My question is are the Turks simply afraid of being compared to the Germans and the Holocaust because they are simply ignorant about the definition of "genocide" as a legal term, and that is very general and many different kinds of acts could fall under the legal term "genocide." It doesn't have to be as systematic as what the Nazi's did. It doesn't have to be an entire population. It doesn't even have to kill part of a population. It just simply needs to be an act that leads to destruction in any way.

Are the Turks just ignorant about the definition of "genocide," or is it just too convenient to compare themselves to the Nazi's and get away with recognizing the actions as genocide? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: My question is to Professor Catherine -Guisan. You made some very nice examples such as industrial cooperation and what have you, but you also mentioned something about conducting a referendum, about Nagorno-Karabakh, and may I suggest to you that there is only one ethnic group left there, that every Muslim was expelled.

MS. GUISAN: I said that.

QUESTIONER: Yes, correct. What do you think the results of such a referendum are going to be in Nagorno-Karabakh? As far as the gentleman from the audience who made the point about there was no war, maybe the Russian Army advancing during World War I was an altruistic excursion.

MR. TASPINAR: I think you get a sense of why we would have a polarized debate when you basically try to impose on Turkey that what happened in 1915
is genocide and the ethnic cleaning of Muslims in the Balkans would not be genocide.

You would get that kind of reaction, there has to be asymmetry.

I empathize with the Armenian viewpoint that the scale, the tension, the end result of what happened in 1915 is in a different category than ethnic cleaning of Muslims in the Balkans and Caucasus.

However, it is unavoidable the minute we talk about genocide, this comparison with the Holocaust. We keep coming back to this, and it is unfortunate, but to put a final note on this in terms of explaining exactly what I mean by the uniqueness of the Holocaust and how comparing the Holocaust with the genocide does a disfavor.

In the Holocaust, you don’t have really a gray zone. It’s black and white. You don’t have really a context of basically Jews taking arms against Germany and trying to establish a state or a Jewish nationalism but wants to establish basically an Zionist project in the middle of Germany.

The perception of Turkey, and again, I can understand why you are angry with this argument, but the perception in Turkey is --

MR. MELHEM: What is that?

MR. TASPINAR: The argument that the Armenian rebellions caused this Turkish policy, that the context of 1915 is different than the Holocaust because there is a gray area there. The perception in Turkey is it’s the process.

MR. MELHEM: The perception there was an organized Armenian uprising (inaudible) was an important goal in extermination of Armenians.

MR. TASPINAR: As far as I know, the way Hitler justified the genocide was not because there was a Jewish uprising, but basically Jewish blood, Jewish DNA, was toxic, and the Germans should not -- not that?
My sense is that there wasn’t really a black and white in the context of the Holocaust. Relativism has ended with the Holocaust. There is no relativism. In the Armenian context, the Armenian issue, Turks would immediately give you the context and alleviating circumstances, including war with Russia, including Armenian nationalism and that would change the debate.

In terms of the other question about whether external dynamics help, if they don't help, and the fact that Turkey is not able to discuss this on its own, how would Turkey come to terms with this. What is the mechanism for Turkey to come to terms.

If the mechanism we are looking at is recognition of what happened as genocide, if this is the first step towards reconciliation, if there will be no reconciliation without Turkey acknowledging what happened as genocide, I think we are waiting for one or two generations. It’s not going to happen. It may not happen in my lifetime.

What may happen, however, is basically a Turkish government which apologizes for massacres, with the argument there won’t be compensation, there won’t be any financial or territorial compensation, but there will be a formal apology for the events of 1915.

This is what I can hope for, to see a apology in my lifetime. It will happen exactly as Hisham described, when there is a government that is secure enough to talk about this, that doesn’t have really this populous instinct of catering to Turkish nationalists, doesn’t have this instinct of basically we’re under siege, there is so much pressure on is that if we do this, if we give them an inch, they will ask for a mile.

We’re not there yet. The Turkish government, the Turkish people, the Turkish psyche is not healthy enough yet to come to terms with what happened because we’re not secure.
The Kurdish question, in my opinion, it exacerbates the Armenian issue because you basically insult Abdullah for having Armenian blood. That is how you treat some of the Kurds for this kind of racist policy. You have an attempt to portray basically the Kurds as subservient to western interests, and they are there to divide the country, just like the Armenians did it in the past.

Now you have people like Selahattin Demirtas, now the leader of the Kurdish political party, and I think he will be the only politician within the Turkish context that will come close to acknowledging what happened as genocide, and it is not a coincidence. He’s very liberal, he’s very democratic, but he’s the leader of the Kurdish party, and we are debating whether he will pass the 10 percent threshold.

Any Turkish politician who would go to the ballot box by saying I accept what happened in 1915 as genocide and I want to solve the Kurdish problem, this person would probably not have more than five or six percent of the votes. We are not there yet. The maturity of the Turkish political debate about 1915 is not there yet to recognize what happened as genocide. Maybe massacre, but not genocide.

MS. FELDMAN: Catherine?

MS. GUisan: I just want to make a very quick point about the process of Germany confronting its past, but for Europe integration and context, it would never have happened. There was a whole context by a resistance movement reaching out actually to announce if Germany reformed itself, there would be an united Europe.

I don’t have time to say more. I agree with you as the situation is now. I was talking about if the two states manage to get their act together on some concrete project, there might be a time where they trust each other enough to have a referendum which could take into account the voice of Israeli’s.

MS. FELDMAN: How much time do we have?
MS. HILL: Let's take one more.

QUESTIONER: I'm going to make a couple of comments but short ones.

In Nazi ideology, the Jews were responsible for Germany’s loss in the First World War, and they were responsible for socialism, they are responsible for bolshevism, they are responsible for capitalism.

There is a very strong thing there. Now, the to Omer’s point about how Turks perceive, well, just because Turks perceive, it doesn’t mean it’s true, number one. Number two, if reconciliation is the most important thing, so because the Turks perceive and they have resistance, then it’s the victim that must travel the rest of the way in order to achieve that reconciliation.

There must be responsibility for actions that have been taken, and that reconciliation cannot be the ultimate goal if the means to achieve it is for the victim to forget its past, to be blamed for things for which they are not responsible, and the gray area in the Armenian genocide doesn’t exist because we know what happened, number one.

Number two, the difference between the Holocaust and the genocide is the Armenian genocide was strictly rational political calculation. The Holocaust, that is a very different reason. The Armenian one is more typical because it has the Turkish leadership resolving a real problem.

The German leadership did not resolve a real problem. That’s the big difference, but it doesn’t make it less of a genocide.

MS. FELDMAN: This is the last question/comment.

QUESTIONER: Arman, you began your presentation by saying that genocide has its roots in hatred. I suspect as long as there has been human society, there have been hatreds.
We tend to think of the Armenian genocide as the first genocide, but given what you have said, I suspect that throughout history there have been genocides but they are just not recorded as such.

Why do we think of the Armenian genocide as the first genocide? Is that just a misnomer, a historical misnomer?

MR. GRIGORYAN: Two things. First of all, I wasn’t arguing that the Armenian genocide or genocides in general are caused by hatred. I was critical of the series of literature that ascribe genocides to pure hatred, and nothing else, that hatred itself is not the consequence of political interaction and political engagement.

When the Holocaust is singled out as the case where it was pure ideology, pure hatred, and there was no political or socioeconomic interaction, no conflict in German society that could have explained anti-Semitism, et cetera, that is not true either.

If you look at the literature on the Holocaust, not the popular literature on the Holocaust, this is disputed very heavily. The latest book that I’ve read that I would recommend everybody to read is by Menderman, it is a marvelous book and I think everybody should read it.

I forgot the other part of your question.

QUESTIONER: The first genocide.

MR. GRIGORYAN: I never called the Armenian genocide the first genocide in history.

QUESTIONER: (off mic)

MR. GRIGORYAN: Yes, I know. In fact, I’m annoyed when that is done. If there is a first genocide of the 20th Century, it was the genocide of the Herero’s in Namibia by Germans. Even if it wasn’t the case, I kind of don’t understand the
compulsion to call something the first genocide as if it adds something to its horror or its value. I find it objectionable, in fact.

I hope Armenians would stop calling it the first genocide. I think if the whole aristocracy of pain argument, that attitude towards the horrible mass murders in history would stop, and I think we gain nothing intellectually or politically from creating such hierarchies and I agree it should not be called the first genocide. It wasn’t the first genocide in the 20th Century.

As far as earlier genocides, I think there is some consensus in the academic literature that genocide is a modern phenomenon, because it is related to mass politics and mass nationalism and ethnic cleansing.

Genocide is not unique in another sense, that genocide sometimes is the culmination when other efforts to solve the ethnic problem have failed. If a simulation of policies have failed somehow, it has escalated to that, but it’s not unique as an occurrence, it is related to ethnic politics. It is related to mass politics.

There are others who dispute these genocide arguments and you do have cases in pre-modern history where groups were targeted as such for extermination, the mass murder of 80,000 Roman citizens.

There are some cases you can recall in pre-modern history where that has happened, but I still think there is something different about modern genocides, and it is related to mass politics and who controls the state. There is a different way we think about the state and a different way we relate to the state today than we did in pre-modern times.

MS. FELDMAN: We do have to end. Fiona has asked me to say a few words, and I’d like to do that because a number of things have been said about Germany and to some extent the record needs to be set straight.
I do believe the Holocaust was an unique event, but Germany perpetrated not just a Holocaust but also occupied countries, it also pursued an aggressive war against other peoples. I'm just saying it's very important to say the Holocaust is unique but there are other behaviors resulting in the massacre of millions of people.

I think one can learn from that even though it is unique, one still can draw lessons from unique events. Secondly, I think it is very important to draw some lessons from what Germany did after the Holocaust, and I think there are some universal lessons.

Because we say the Holocaust is unique, we then shy away from everything Germany did thereafter and say we have nothing to learn about it. I don't think that's correct. I think there are many lessons.

There was a reference to collective guilt. You said there has to be collective guilt, otherwise there is no movement towards reconciliation. In fact, Godunov refused to use the term “collective guilt.” The statement he made in 1951 that began the negotiations over reparations with Israel, the Israeli’s wanted a statement of collective guilt, and the statement was important because there was a back and forth between the two parties, it always have to be mutual, he refused to use the term “collective guilt.”

You can imagine the Israeli’s would have said okay, you can make whatever statement you want, we’re not going to listen to you and we’re not going to respond. They didn’t do that, and they didn’t do that for several reasons.

One was a highly pragmatic reason, the Israeli economy was on the basis of disaster, and after a major effort to look for funds all over the world, there was a recognition that the only place they could go for economic assistance was Germany, and they ultimately negotiated with Germany, even though there wasn’t a statement of collective guilt. Can you imagine, seven years after the Holocaust, Israel did this.
The other reason is I think there will never be the notion of forgiveness on the part of Israel, there has to be mutuality, what is it the other side has to give. I guess this is directed toward Armenians.

If Turkey does make a statement, it doesn’t have to be a formal apology. Godonow’s statement in 1951 was not actually a formal apology, but what did Israel offer. It was magnanimous, it accepted a step had been made and this could lead to other steps. The calculation that was made, when we talk about reparations, it is extremely important, the only country that has received reparations from Germany is Israel.

There is a very clear reason for this because the 1953 London Debt Agreement said there would be no reparations from Germany until there were a peace treaty. Germany still hasn’t concluded the peace treaty. The unification process was a two plus four process, and that was quite deliberate, because it didn’t want to deal with all these reparation claims.

The exception was Israel because the negotiations with Israel had started before the London debt conference. Germany had no legal obligation to pay reparations to Israel, no legal obligation because the victims, the state of Israel did not exist at the time the crimes were committed. It did it for moral reasons. It did it for political reasons.

I think this notion of legal issues, we need to think about this very carefully, and the Israeli claim was not for what had been lost, they said they could never ever calculate what had been lost, the calculation was done on the basis of the number of refugees that ended up in Israel after the Holocaust and how much it cost to absorb each refugee, education, health, and so on.

Even on the Israeli side, there was a creative way, and Catherine and several people referred to Hannah Arendt and imagination, and I think imagination, we
have a paucity of imagination, and that is why the German case is interesting because even though Germans can be very legalistic on a number of issues, they can also be very, very creative, and often I have to say it comes internally from internal sources, but it also comes from outside pressure.

I wouldn’t get away completely from the notion of outside pressure, and you know, the whole question of the European Union that Catherine referred to and Franco-German relations, that is true, but remember at the same time Franco-German relations were being pursued, the relationship with Israel was being pursued. Initially, at least, it had nothing to do with the European community. It did later.

What I’m saying in the end, I guess, is that if you look at how Germany dealt with its past, don’t talk about the comparison of the event that led to it having to deal with its past, but if you look at how it actually dealt with its past after 1949, it might be context is different, histories are different, but the mechanisms that have allowed some forward movement might be useful.

It’s a very, very complicated long non-linear process, and I think people tend to put Germany out there as a perfect case, and it isn’t.

That’s what I would like to leave you with today. I don’t just say this about Germany because I’ve studied it for so long, but what other cases do we have where a country has fairly successfully dealt with a past of major atrocity. We don’t really have anything else.

At least we can look at it, even if we say that doesn’t work, it might make us think a little differently because we are in a gridlock now. How do we get forward movement, and a number of people have asked that, and I think that is the next step, and that was Gerard’s point, we have to say where are we, how can we move forward.
When we do that, we need to think very, very concretely, and there are some examples internationally that might be helpful.

CLOSING REMARKS

MS. HILL: I want to actually thank Lily particularly for this at the end, and I regret we don’t have more time to talk to Lily and have her perspective on this.

I just want to make just a couple of observations as we wrap up here. Actually, perhaps it’s not by chance that there are so many Brits. We Brits actually have a lot of atrocities to account for. One of the reasons I personally came to this is through Ireland, which is often called the “first colony,” and if there were some Irish people here today, they might actually give you some choice words about genocide in the form of colonization.

I was sitting here talking to Lerna and actually showing her -- I went on Google to actually get the actual date of this -- in 2011, when Queen Elizabeth went to Dublin to the Castle, the headquarters of British presence, an island. Remember, the island was colonized over centuries and there are massacres and massacres and massacres, often reenacted.

I have very similar stories to Hisham. My father and his brother didn’t talk for 30 years, and they never talked. My father died without knowing his brother was still alive, and we had no contact, all because of the island, the long and unpleasant family history that’s related to this.

I spent a lot of time -- from age 13 after seeing my father and his brother almost come to blows over various things, deciding one has to get out of this.

It took Queen Elizabeth almost 100 years, in 2011, to go to Ireland and to sort of apologize. We were looking at the title of this. They said she gave half apologies, she expressed sympathy and sadness for the atrocities that had been brought
upon the Irish people, and it would be very hard to apologize for all of the tragedies of Ireland, the famine, the slaughters, the massacres, the invasions, for over centuries, but the Queen did a fairly good job at it.

Gerry Adams, one of the leaders of the IRA accepted that apology for what it was. It was a step. We know that also came from outside pressure from the involvement of the United States and Senator Mitchell, which people are very grateful for, and it’s not over yet.

There is still the risk of violence, there is a great deal of concern that with the potential unraveling of the United Kingdom, that could happen now, in the wake of the recent election, and nationalistic English perspective that is kind of broadened to British politics, that we could see an unraveling of those accords. They came about in the context of a constitutional arrangement within the United Kingdom that kept Northern Ireland there and sort of a shared perspective on economy, history, and politics. It is extremely difficult.

The reason we had this meeting today, and a lot of people have asked us why is there not a representation of official Armenia or official Turkey or anything else, because for the most part everybody here is a scholar, and as Hisham said, even if you are a journalist, you are the writer, the first drafter of history, so all of us who are historians, like myself, you start off by going back to the journalists of the period who were writing the eyewitness accounts and bearing witness to the events that lead up to what then becomes history.

Even if it is people chronicling things a millennium ago, maybe as an early journalist, like Tom started off, and then moved off into books. This is how history starts.
Many historians play a very important role, people like Taner, opening up documents and getting people to think about things. There are two historians that I studied with at different parts in my career. One, Dirk Moses in my undergraduate, who wrote about the genocide of the Aborigines in Australia. Dirk’s book was on the basis of the Australian government making a formal apology to the Aborigines, a very long time later.

The British government also apologized many times for deportation of children and other relatives to Australia, and to other atrocities that were carried out against the Aborigines, taking their children away from them and putting them in orphanages and families, very similar to some of the things we hear about.

The Aborigines didn’t have a lot of political power. That came from actually soul searching inside of Australia and people like Dirk Moses, my fellow historian, writing books.

Another person I studied with at Harvard in graduate school when I did my Ph.D. in history was Caroline Elkins, an American, who wrote a book about Britain’s colonial treatment in Kenya, in the Mau Mau rebellion, and the dreadful things that were done to Kenyans. That actually led to some reparations for the Kenyans, and that was after World War II.

One of my other personal experiences when I was a kid in Cyprus was being taken by a Greek boy that I had been playing with along with my sister to a hillside where he showed me where his grandfather had been incinerated by the British forces during an uprising against the British. That didn’t make me feel too good. This was prior to 1974. I was still a little kid. I didn’t understand this. I asked my parents, and my parents knew nothing about it.
Britain’s colonial history was pretty nasty, and that went on right until after World War II and went up until the 1960s and 1970s. I remember as a kid with my dad watching all of these movies about these brave handful of British soldiers showing down the Zulu’s and massacring thousands of Zulu’s coming towards them.

A bit later I realized these Zulu’s were actually people, fathers, brothers, sons. We were just watching them all be slaughtered.

Actually, as Brits, there is actually a lot to come to terms with, and when Lily says we don’t have something on the scale of the Holocaust, we actually have an accumulation in many settings, and as Hisham said, when you become an American, like I have and you have and Lily, you also take on this recognition of all the things that happened here as well that we still haven’t actually come to terms with.

My daughter is learning about the Native Americans at the moment and is a bit shocked there aren’t so many Native Americans around. Native Americans got reparations to casinos, so all kinds of very strange forms of the American government coming to terms with things that were done, the obligation of treaties and the deceit and betrayal of many agreements that were made. Casinos we see today are a strange kind of reparation. I’m not going to suggest that as a model.

I am going to say these come in strange forms, and we haven’t had a full apology, because they don’t have political power and a presence in Congress. They don’t have the lobbyists other groups have.

I think there are an awful lot of things we should take on board. It is why we deliberately picked not political representatives but scholars, historians, journalists, to start to tell a story.

This is only the beginning, we hope. We do hope we will be able to continue as Lily does in her work at AICGS, and that Catherine is doing in her research.
about Europe, and all of here and here in the audience will find ways in which we can keep pursuing this very important topic.

I think all of us should step back because everyone has sat here and just take a sober reflection on this issue. We hope some of you have taken something away from this today.

I do want to thank all of you for participating. I commend Tom’s book and the book of everybody else that has been recommended to you. Tom has actually taken on all of these very difficult issues in his book. He’s going to have another series of seminars that many people will be participating in.

We couldn’t have really had a better chair for this than Lily. I hope, Lily, we will have you back again at Brookings to talk a bit more about this example, which is very pertinent.

I just want to thank everybody for participating and all of you for staying to the end. Thank you. (Applause) Thank you also to the friends of Hrant Dink for making this possible for everyone to come together. Thank you.
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