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AN OVERLOOKED CRISIS: HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT IN LIBYA

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Brookings. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a senior fellow in foreign policy, and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

For the past 22 years, we've been working and doing research on internal displacement in a variety of context. I think this is the first time we've ever organized an event focusing specifically on Libya, and certainly, this research that was carried out and our concern with the issue predates the current attention being paid to Libya in the context of the micro Asian crisis, although we will be focusing on that, as well.

We have a good panel for you today. We're going to begin with Megan Bradley sitting at my far left. Megan teaches development studies and political science at McGill University in Montreal. She's done a lot of work on transitional justice, displacement, reconciliation in variety of contexts. But from our perspective, she's almost coming home.

She worked with us for a couple of years as a fellow in the Project on Internal Displacement. We still miss you a lot, Megan, and it's really nice to see you here with us.

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: So, Megan's going to talk about some of the research that we've carried out in collaboration with colleagues based in Doha, and then, we're going to the Charge d'Affaires from the Embassy of Tunisia, Kais Darragi, who is a career diplomat, has worked in a variety of settings throughout the Middle East, most recently, London, Tokyo, before coming to Washington in 2012. Some of the consequences for

Tunisia of displacement in Libya are something to be considered.

We'll then turn to Shelly Pitterman, who is the representative here in Washington, D.C., of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; has worked with UNHCR for many, many years in very different settings, from headquarters to the Middle East, and now in Washington, where he also focuses on some of the issues in the Caribbean. But UNHCR has been quite visible in the past week or two, with respect to what's happening in the Mediterranean off the coast of Libya, and I hope, Shelly, that you can put this into the broader perspective.

We often see that internal displacement within a country has consequences far beyond the borders of those countries, and I think we'll be saying that we hear our panelists discuss today. Each of them will talk for a short amount of time, and then we'll open it up for questions. And I hope you are busily thinking about your questions, and we'll look forward to hearing from you. And we'll begin with Megan. Megan, welcome, and tell us about your research.

MS. BRADLEY: All right, well, thank you so much, Beth. It's always nice to come home, especially when the weather here is much better than it is in Montreal (Laughs), however cold a spring it might have been here.

I'm particularly happy to have the chance to share with you today some of the results of a recent study on the displacement crisis within Libya and across the Libyan borders, particularly into Tunisia. This is a forthcoming report that I've been working with two colleagues, Ibrahim Sharqieh, who is with Brookings Doha Center, and Chudam Zyogetz, who is a Tunisian researcher and journalist. Chudam and Ibrahim took the lead on the field work in Tunisia and Libya that informed the study, so, I'd like to start out by acknowledging their key contributions to the project.

The report is focused not just on the flow migrants and the silent

seekers across the Mediterranean. Rather, it's focused in particular on the displacement crises that have been affecting with the (Inaudible) citizens themselves, although these are clearly interrelated dynamics, and I'm looking forward to speaking about those in the Q&A session.

So, just to start with the numbers and an overview of some of the displacement dynamics that we look at in the report, a Bolivian population, as I'm sure many of you would know is 6.2 million; so a small country. After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, some 550,000 Libyans were uprooted within the borders of Libya itself, and in addition, an estimated 660,000 Libyans sought shelter in neighboring countries, particularly Tunisia and Egypt.

So, this is clearly a sizeable proportion of the population of a relatively small country. The majority of IDPs who were uprooted in the context of the violence that accompanied the revolution were, for the most part, able to draw on their own resources to return to their homes relatively promptly after the violence concluded.

There was, however, a smaller group of about 50,000 people who have ended up in a situation of so-called protracted displacement. So, these are individuals who, even today, have still not been able to return to their homes. The greatest proportion of this population is a group of about 40,000 people from the town of Tawergha near Misrata.

Perhaps some of you have followed the details of this case, but this is a situation in which the residents of this town, who belong to a particular ethnic group, were accused of loyalty to Gaddafi and involvement in a series of war crimes that were committed against the residents of the city of Misrata. In retaliation, Misrata militia attacked the town; virtually destroyed it and arbitrarily displaced the entire population. So, the UN Commission of Inquiry has referred to this situation as a war crime and in and

of itself, and as a crime against humanity.

So, the majority of these IDPs who are a relatively cohesive and vocal group are living in IDP camps, principally in Tripoli and Benghazi. With the upsurge of violence that we've seen since the summer 2014, there's been in addition to this core group of protracted IDPs, a whole new wave of people who have been forced from their homes. So, the best estimates that we have are that there are some 400,000 Libyans who are now uprooted within the country.

It's important to stress, though, that because the majority of international actors pulled out of Libya in the summer of 2014, there have been really no regular updated assessments of the size and characteristics of this population. So, 400,000 is very much a rough estimate. What we do know for sure, is that many of those who are currently uprooted in Libya have been subject to multiple displacements, so, they've been forced from the communities in which they sought shelter, and still, unable to return to their homes. And it's also clear that the almost complete lack of international assistance for IDPs in Libya at the moment has pushed many of these people into situations of deep impoverishment and extreme vulnerability to the ongoing violence.

In terms of those who sought shelter outside of Libya, we also saw relatively prompt return movements after the conclusion of the revolution in 2011. However, we do see, and I think Mr. Darragi will speak to this -- we did see a significant proportion of the population remain in exile primarily in Tunisia.

Now, many of these individuals are assumed to have some degree of affiliation with or loyalty to the Gaddafi regime, and this has made them unable to return to the country because of fears associated with retaliatory violence. So, in thinking about this population, it's important to stress that the vast majority of these people have never been actively involved in any kind of violence or abuses associated with the Gaddafi

regime.

Instead, this is more a case of guilt by association; people being labeled as loyalists by virtue of family associations or having that label applied to them in the context of local power struggles. So, it's a very complicated case, but it's important to recognize that this is not a group that is uniformly in any way, responsible for violence or human rights violations.

So, in addition to this group, which has stayed in exile for a longer period of time, there has been again, a major surge of movement into Tunisia, and also, into Egypt, since the summer of 2014. We don't have good numbers on this population. In the summer, the foreign minister of Tunisia suggested that there are as many as 1.5 million Libyans in Tunisia. A smaller group is understood to have more or less, established residency in Tunisia, but again, it's very difficult to assess the scope of the population, because Libyans don't actually require a visa to enter Tunisia.

So, Tunisia has very generously kept their borders open throughout the duration of the crisis. So, what we have is a situation of people using their own resources to travel into Tunisia, and they have not, for the most part, actually registered as refugees, although sizable proportion of the population would presumably qualify for refugee status.

So in effect, Tunisia has really become a major host state in the region, although strikingly, they receive very little international support, which is something that I hope we will discuss further. So, if we think about the Libyan crisis in relation to the displacement that's taking place across the Middle East in North Africa at the moment, it's striking how little attention the situation has received, particularly when we're thinking about the displacement of Libyans themselves, and not just the issue of migrants and asylum seekers trying to escape to Europe from Libyan shores.

I think that this lack of attention to the Libyan situation is significantly due to the fact that Libya is a relatively well resourced country, and there's an assumption that Libyans have their own resources to draw on in order to respond to their needs for housing, food, et cetera. Now, this has meant that until now, there's been relatively low costs of the displacement crisis for European states, and also, for the U.S.

But what I want to stress is that in the longer term, this reliance on the displaced person's own resources is just not tenable. What we saw in our research and interviews with affected populations is that yes, some people are receiving, for example, regular pension payments from the government, despite the ongoing payoffs, which is quite remarkable, but many don't.

And so, they're eating into their own resources, approaching situations of increasing impoverishment, and in addition to this, many of the IDPs and exiles have protection concerns that money alone can't resolve. So, this means that the kind of neglect that the situation has received is not, I think, something that can continue into the future.

What we saw in our research is that many Libyans in Tunisia are effectively trying to live under the radar. So, the Tunisian government has been remarkably generous in terms of keeping its borders open and enabling this kind of informal protection that Libyans have accessed to date. The government has pledged not to return Libyans while the violence is ongoing, and has enabled Libyan children, for example, to go to school. Some are able to access medical care, as well.

But we see in countries around the world is that this kind of hospitality does come at a cost, when we're talking about displacement situations that are expected to be protracted, and that's certainly the case here. So for example, we see rents significantly increasing in many Tunisian cities, which is leading to tensions between

Tunisians and the Libyan exiles.

Many of the Libyan exiles who we interviewed for this study reported that they live basically, in perpetual fear of a policy change that would see them be forcibly returned to Libya where they fear for their lives. I think this suggests that there is a need to consider how the international community, including UNHCR, can better support Tunisia to develop its policies and capacities as a host state and to provide secure and reliable protection to those within their borders.

So, just to conclude, in terms of responding to and ultimately looking towards the resolution of this displacement situation, I think it's important to recognize the obvious, and this is that it's just impossible to talk about aiding IDPs and resolving a crisis in a sustainable manner without looking at the broader question of conflict resolution and peace building in Libya.

So, increased security is obviously the essential precondition to stopping displacement and to resolving the predicament of those who have been forced from their homes within Libya and across borders. What we saw in our research is that from the perspective of many uprooted Libyans, return is their preferred solution to displacement, and this is, presumably also the preference of the many states and international organizations who are involved.

What we see in other cases, though, is that as displacement becomes more protracted, people's preferences and plans can change. And so as the situation continues, it will be important to continue to have open dialogue with the displaced about their preferences, and to make sure that their opinions are closely taken into account.

So, while returns aren't presently possible, I want to close by just highlighting three quick points that will need to be kept in mind moving forward, and moving towards an eventually resolution of the situation. First, it's absolutely imperative,

it goes without saying that returns must be voluntary and take place in conditions of safety and dignity, as is required under international law.

The flipside of this is that while the trends can't be forced, they also can't be banned. So, it's important to think about how to overcome, for example, the obstacles that have prevented the people from Tawergha from returning to their homes.

Second, we need to think about the relationship between transitional justice, reconciliation and the ongoing displacement situation in Libya. Transitional justice processes in Libya have been effectively suspension with the violence, but there are, I think, many lessons to be learned from the past failures of the processes that were initiated in 2011.

So for example, the political isolation law that was instituted in Libya was problematic, particularly because of its highly punitive nature. This is an opportunity to try to take stock of some of those shortcomings, and ideally, have a clearer sense of the way to move forward in the future.

And last, it's essential to think about how immediate support can be delivered to IDPs, and also, to exiles in ways that eventually lay the groundwork for durable solutions. So, even though return is not an immediate possibility, there are ways in which the populations can be assisted now in ways that will help people to come out from the shadows and not experience a situation of entrenched marginalization, which is the risk that many people, particularly exiles, face at the moment.

So this entails, for example, ensuring that Libyan children take up the opportunity that's been presented to them to go to school. Many are still not actually enrolled in schools. This is just one small step that I think is an important part of making sure that this population is not locked into a situation of protracted displacement in the longer term. So, thank you very much.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, Megan. A complex picture of protracted displacements, new displacements within the country to surrounding countries and further abroad. We turn now to Tunisia and welcome Mr. Kais Darragi to talk about the experience of your country in dealing with Libyan displacement and the crisis.

MR. DARRAGI: Thank you very much.

We'd like to think of Libya as an opportunity for Tunisia. Unfortunately at the moment, it is a problem for the whole region, but it is -- we consider it as an internal problem for Tunisia, because of the interconnection between the two countries, the two peoples and the very close relations, historical, cultural and economic.

After the revolution in Tunisia in the revolution in -- the start of the revolution in Libya, we have received over one million Libyans in Tunisia. Most of them relied on their own means in cities, but we have had around 90,000 Libyans who were in refugee camps in Tunisia. Then, the success of the Libyan revolution was good news to Tunisia, because many of the Libyans, particularly the refugees that went back home -- and we all hope that it will be stability and opportunity for everybody.

Unfortunately, things did not turn out to be very easy for everybody. For the Tunisian process, too, which was quite long and painful, but for the Libyans, they are going through a more complex and more painful process. Right now, we have -- it's not easy to give figures -- precise figures, but we have an estimation of more than one million Libyans living in Tunisia.

Most of them are middle class refugees, we could call them. Most of them are relying on their own means, on their savings, and more or less, they are living in very good conditions. The Tunisia law -- there is the Tunisian Libyan convention of 1973, which allows Libyans free circulation in Tunisia, freedom to establish businesses and to be in Tunisia like any ordinary Tunisian citizen.

So in this stance, this is quite a positive picture. In terms of repercussions in Tunisia, I would start with the good news, with the positives. I mean, the Libyans in Tunisia, they come with capital influx, and they help the economy, in a sense. I mean, there is an estimation of something around one billion euro injected into the Tunisian economy.

But unfortunately, this positive picture does not -- could not hide the negative impact that we have and the pressure that we have on the Tunisian economy and in other aspects. You know, over one million -- that is more than 10 percent of the Tunisian population, are in Tunisia. And a population increase -- a 10 percent increase of the population with non productive citizens, that would have inflationary pressure on the Tunisian economy, and Tunisians are feeling that.

Obviously, there are other considerations, but it's not -- the blame is not to be put on this demographic increase, but there are other considerations. But this has contributed to inflation in Tunisia. It has contributed to, as Megan has just said, to rise of crimes, to strains on public services, hospitals, schools, transportation systems.

But most importantly, and this is being fair to Tunisia, is that they put more pressure on the subsidy system in Tunisia -- food subsidies, energy subsidies, and that is something that is being fed. Other negative aspects are related to security. The situation in Libya -- the proliferation of weapons and the situation in Libya has created some concerns about the possibility of smuggling weapons, and it has taking place -- of training Tunisians in Libya.

So, it creates some kind of precautions about the influx of Libyans to Tunisia, which are quite legitimate in the context of serious security threats, because we have our homegrown security threats and terrorists, too. And there are -- there is an interconnection between all terrorist organizations throughout the region.

The situation is more complex, because the beginning of the Libyan revolution, when there was a surge of Libyan refugees, the Tunisian Army did not have many assignments. It could deal with the situation, whether in terms of security, whether in terms of organizing refugee camps and facilitating access of Libyans. But now, the Tunisian Army is quite small, and it has so many missions, and it is -- you know, followed then a war against terrorism within Tunisia, and it has the task of protecting borders. It does not have the capacity to play the same role that it played in 2011.

So, these are some of the aspects we have, but apart from these moneyed or urbanite and middle class refugees in Tunisia, we have the problem of third nationalists. It started in 2011, and we have around 200,000 Eritreans, Sub-Saharan Africans, who came for refugee stages in Tunisia. Most of them have -- went back home or have been adopted in other host countries in Europe. Some of them, not a great many, are still in Tunisia.

The concern is that we hope that the situation in Libya will improve; that the national dialogue, in a way, will come to a positive conclusion. But Tunisia and the whole region has to prepare themselves for the worst. We hope that the experience in August, 2014, when the fighting intensified in Egypt after the killing of 21 cops -- Egyptian cops -- there was a surge of new refugees or of border crossing towards Tunisia.

That obviously, alerted the Tunisian authorities that gave us a signal that we have to be prepared for any new surge. The Tunisian economy is not in the same shape as it was in 2011. The Army is not in the same readiness as it was in 2011, and to be honest, too, there is, in Tunisia, a sense of humanitarian fatigue. There was a huge stance of solidarity in 2011 with the Libyan, but with other refugees, there was a sense of willingness to contribute from all citizens to help and to also, project the picture of generosity and solidarity.

But there is some kind of fatigue, even within Tunisia itself. There were so many complaints of people moving from Tunis to inland regions, offering support, offering donations. Now, people, with the economic situation, are not in the same kind of attitude. So, these are some of the challenges that we are facing and that, as Megan has said, that we are facing alone without any international support. But I think the minimum is to try to work emergency plans to provide the logistical support, but also, to provide support in terms of management, crisis management and procedures to deal with an event -- a possible new influx of refugees.

So, will I stop here, and then maybe we can deal with questions later on.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. And let's turn now to Shelly Pitterman, United Nations, high commissioner for refugees.

MR. PITTERMAN: Thank you very much, Beth. It's really a pleasure to be here.

My conversation will start with three perspectives. One, the Libya specific, and then -- which I'll speak to briefly, and then, as we must, with any refugee situation, look at the neighborhood and then the region, almost by definition.

But in the case of Libya, given the security situation, our physical presence in Libya is naturally quite constrained, which gets to some of the points Megan mentioned about the level of assistance that can be offered to the displaced persons, and in fact, to some 40,000 refugees, as well, who are, according to our last count, in Libya, mostly in the Tripoli area.

So, we've had to withdraw our international staff. We've got about 30 to 40 national staff in both Benghazi, principally in Tripoli, as well, and we work to the extent that anything can be accomplished in support of the displaced populations that are concentrated in various neighborhoods, because as you said, they're very dependent on

family connections, and they've basically been obliged to go it alone in the Libyan mess.

We work through some international NGOs, like International Medical Corps. We're working with the Danish Refugee Council, as well as the Libyan Red Crescent and some few national NGOs that are able to get things accomplished. So, we continue to try to keep a presence, to provide some minimum, you know, material support, to work with the individuals and respond to individual protection needs.

But you know, there's no illusion here that anything significant on our part is effectively changing their situation in a big way, which I daresay is very often the case with displaced populations, because of the nature of the conflicts that they regrettably find themselves in. And Libya is a more extreme example of that, I guess, in the current map of conflict and internal strife.

So, we watch carefully and optimistically the work of the special representative of the secretary-general to find political solution. Apparently, this is a slow and complicated process. It's happening in multiple countries, dealing with multiple actors. And so here again, I think patience is the key. And in that rather sad landscape, Tunisia is a pearl of reception of asylum, of understanding. And so naturally, UNHCR in particular, but I think all who care are very grateful for the excellent support that's been provided by Tunisia.

When you think of the Tunisian case, I, in my background, think as well of Lebanon and other countries that have been impacted by the surge of instability and insecurity in North Africa, as well as in the center of the Middle East around the Syrian refugee problem, because there are relations -- there are relationships here.

And there's been a lot of focus on how Lebanon has been impacted by the -- in particular, Lebanon, by the incredible number of Syrian refugees. And I guess we also have to think about Tunisia in a significant way. And we can provide as an

international community, direct support for relief to refugees, but you know, as you've said, they are part of the community in many ways. They are being integrated through municipal services, health education. They are living in rented buildings, and they're working on the savings that they've had, the resources that they were able to bring.

But as far as this is a protracted displacement, those resources will run dry. And when that happens, we'll find ourselves -- and it's happened sooner in Lebanon, because of the dramatic quality war in Syria. When that happens, those people will suffer more clearly and it will have a more dramatic impact on Tunisia.

So we have to, I think, already anticipate -- we have to anticipate the problems that will come with marginalization, with exclusion, with poverty, and with the fact that they are not Tunisian. And as you said, Tunisia had already, quite an experience after the revolution, receiving tens of thousands of foreigners, including refugees, in its territory, and dealing with them in a most hospitable way.

So, the high commissioner has been looking at this question and advocating for a more proactive approach to development. This is not a relief situation. Tunisia is a middle income country, just as Egypt, on the other side. Therefore, not necessarily eligible for the types of grants that would normally come from development agencies and international financial institutions like the World Bank. It simply doesn't qualify.

But we're trying to make the case, and I guess this is a very effective platform for doing so, as well, that it's in the collective interest of the global north and of the people of Tunisia, and of the Libyans, as well, who are impacted by this, that we should think about creative ways to help affected countries to engage in structural, bilateral and multilateral development support; that we shouldn't have to wait until the crisis becomes -- well, until the problem becomes a crisis, but engage more proactively

from the get go.

Tunisia is a case in point, precisely because of the economic hardships that you mentioned that are facing the country in terms of GDP and so on, but there are other examples around the Nigerian situation -- Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Lebanon and Jordan are other important examples, as well as Turkey, to a lesser extent, where development -- institutions and development resources -- that's the key -- can be leveraged to provide more support, not only to help the countries of asylum, but to give more space and to hopefully address this problem, which is, I think, critical of hospitality fatigue -- of humanitarian fatigue, so that there is a more concrete and short-term benefit beyond the cooking pots and the blankets and the very punctual support to a school here or a medical center there.

So, this is something that we've been pressing for and looking for creative ways to make that happen. There are some opportunities in the months to come through you know, the G7 conversations or the next annual meeting of the World Bank, with whom we've been working very closely on this, and we hope that there will be advocates in this room and elsewhere, to help find the key to a more creative and flexible approach to concessional loans that recognize in a context like Tunisia, the openness that you've shown as a country and as a nation to refugees from Libya and from elsewhere.

The third piece that I'd like to very quickly mention, of course, is that the havoc in Libya, the vacuum of authority, the insecurity and the instability creates a pathway, however risky it may be, for Syrians and Eritreans and others to transit to make their way to safer shores in the north, on the one hand. And also, for the -- some of the 40,000 or so refugees themselves to exit.

And so, we have seen from Libya, over recent months and years, an

increase in the outflow of both people, and also, the -- I call them both people not to conjure up images of years ago, but that's what they are. And we've seen in the tragedy on the Mediterranean last week, that they run a terrific risk in doing what they do.

It's not a choice. It's not a poll. They're not economic migrants, most of them. They are forced to flee because of the circumstances in their home countries. It's a tragedy within a tragedy, in effect, that they've had to leave Syria or Eritrea or other countries from which they've fled to seek asylum in Libya, or to transit through such an insecure environment, and be at the behest of traffickers that are also able to flourish in such an environment, in order to make their way, or to try to make their way to Europe and elsewhere, in order to find safety.

So, I hope we can talk more about that, but I just also don't want to abuse my opening time, to draw the link between Libya, the neighborhood in North Africa -- I didn't speak about Egypt, but the same principles exist in general. But Tunisia's open border policy is clearly something that UNHCR is very, very appreciative of, and also, to make the link that it's the broader region and it has a global impact. Thank you very much.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you, and thanks to all of you.

Before we open it up for discussion, I thought we might just have a little conversation amongst ourselves, and maybe start with you, Megan. We know from other experiences that the longer people are displaced, the more protracted the situation, the less likely they are to go home. I mean, are there steps that could be taken now, even given the situation inside Libya that might facilitate eventual return of Libyans from Tunisia and elsewhere?

MS. BRADLEY: I think there are steps. One issue, for example, that certainly will need to be considered is a question of restitution. This is going to be a very

complex process. It always is, when there have been large scale displacements through which people have lost their homes.

In Libya, it's going to all the more complicated, because the restitution claims are also intertwined with the practices of the Gaddafi regime over decades. The Gaddafi regime would use land conflict -- I mean, allocation of land resources as a way of playing different groups off of one another, and this, of course, results in very complex overlapping claims to the same properties.

So, in terms of thinking into the future, when we can hope to see this situation sorted out, the restitution piece is going to be a big part of that. I think that there's work that can be done in terms of forward planning for strategies to address that situation. That's just one example. I think that there is a range in which there can be effective forward planning.

You know, it might seem sort of idealistic at this moment, because the security concerns are obviously paramount, but I think it behooves us to do what we can in the situation we're in at the moment.

MS. FERRIS: I'm going to turn to this issue of hospitality or compassion fatigue. You know, when you step back, even from this region, we're just overwhelmed with humanitarian simultaneous mega-crises. Everybody I know in the humanitarian sector is exhausted, you know, running from one crisis to another, and trying to raise money, and I mean it just --

And you know, in this situation, Tunisia gets very little international attention. And here, I'm struck by the fact that you know, you've had this generous, hospitable reaction to refugees from a neighboring country for several years now. And I mean, is there anything that the international community could do to recognize the tremendous efforts you've done to address that compassion fatigue?

MR. DARRAGI: Yeah. I mean, this question of hospitality fatigue is a common feature all over the world. But I think really, it's complicated further by a stance of disillusionment. Disillusionment with people who thought -- were euphoric about the revolution and thought that overnight, the situation will change. They will have economic opportunity, employment for everybody and have very high standards of living overnight.

Of course, the development part in Tunisia -- the process there was very, very slow and was very painful. The economic growths are not there yet. So, there is a sense of disillusionment -- economic disillusionment, at least. I mean, there is now a sense of political pride in what Tunisia has achieved, but economically, there is some disillusionment.

To be honest, too, there is some disillusionment about the international community, and sometimes, about our neighbors, because Tunisians thought that they were generous above their means, and that they made sacrifices. But the hospitality was not returned. When there were possibilities in these countries, Tunisians were not considered as -- were not considered immediately to have some job opportunities or whatever. So, there is this sense of general fatigue that is both because of the effort that is being made, and the long time that this effort is being made, but also, because there is a sense of disillusionment.

In terms of what can be done, I mean, the international community could have the Libyan authorities, whichever -- could also have -- because one of the issues that Tunisian authorities have discussed before is that we have Libyans living here, but they are benefiting from subsidies. We cannot limit subsidies to Tunisians only, so they are welcome in our countries and to benefit from them.

But we are asking in return maybe some kind of preferential for oil, to cover that kind of subsidies, particularly in the energy sector. It did not work, but now

(Inaudible) is even worse with the infighting between governments or authorities in Libya, itself.

In the international community, I mean, it's -- I mean, we always hear about these complaints in Italy, in France, about the number of refugees and economic migrants, but as you have just mentioned, it does not compare with what Lebanon is doing without complaining, with what Tunisia is doing.

They receive 5,000 or something, and all the press, all the country and everything is about that issue. We are receiving millions of -- 10 percent for population refugees. So, in a sense, there should be more international responsibility; a sharing of costs, sharing of sacrifices. That is not taking place, but I hope that things will prove that these -- even in the interest of let's say, of the not -- of the majority, because if you help with these countries, maybe you can reduce the influx of migrants to these countries, too.

MS. FERRIS: (off mic).

MS. BRADLEY: Just to jump in on this question of compassion fatigue; there was a really interesting piece of public opinion research that was done in March, by a French and Tunisian firm working in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. And this research found, interestingly, that when Tunisians were asked to identify their top two ways in which their government could help to respond to the Libyan crisis, 72 percent of respondents picked accepting refugees from Libya as one of the 2 key ways to respond.

So, I think on the one hand, this is a great testimony to how people do continue to maintain a very generous spirit, despite this kind of compassion fatigue. And yet, the population was split almost down the line on the question of whether Libyan families should actually be allowed to integrate into Tunisian society.

So there was, you know, a lot more resistance to the notion of hospitality

going forward than just keeping the border open, which I think, comes back to this question of hospitality fatigue and how hard it is to sustain these kinds of open policies in the longer term.

MR. PITTERMAN: And if I may?

MR. DARRAGI: Yeah, please.

MR. PITTERMAN: And regrettably, if you look at the world map today, the situation is only going to get worse.

MS. FERRIS: Oh yea.

MR. PITTERMAN: And so, I think that you know, the conflicts are proliferating. There are more conflicts. Every month, there's a new emergency. We've just declared -- moving away from this particular region, we've just declared a level one emergency in Rwanda, because of the outflow of some 8,000 Burundian refugees. Who would have thought after having engaged in a major repatriation program to Burundi?

So, only to suggest that the nature of things these times reflects increased conflict, more violent conflict. You spoke of the beheading of the -- just more unpredictability, more impunity in -- and less management of existing conflicts. They become more protracted. So, we have protracted emergencies in ways that we didn't have before.

And Beth, you know, from your long experience in refugees -- that an emergency lasted six months, not five years, like in the Middle East now. And so, that's why we think that it's really important to think in bigger terms, because the humanitarian financial system is broken. It cannot sustain this kind of commitment, and already, we're satisfied with a -- you know, with what we can do when we're 50 percent funded, and we've had to make some very serious choices.

But when it gets to structural support and issues relating to services and

host countries, we can't wait to engage the international community in that reflection. And it's not just a question of being nice, of being compassionate. There are security issues for states that are in -- that are next to some of these failed states, where if there's a risk, it needs to be addressed in a very proactive way, in a big way, and that requires more than just a few projects. It requires a more systemic and sustained structural approach.

MR. DARRAGI: And to comment on this idea of (Inaudible), I don't like to be selective and accept the first part and reject the second, but I think for the second question, if you asked me the same question, I would respond the same way.

We think that it's -- the idea of integration is not good. But it's not because of rejection. I think it's a rationale kind of behavior. It's not rejection. Because if you say we would like to have them integrated, there is a recognition of failure that is a total despair of the frustration of Libya. I think it is more rational, in a sense, that we wish them success and they are welcome here, but we hope that they will have a positive solution in the near future.

I, personally, would think this way if you asked me this question, rather than rejection of integration. But even before the revolution, I mean, now we have, let's say one million refugees. But even before the revolution, at all times during (Inaudible), we have always found one million Libyans in Tunisia coming for two years and coming for medical care. So, they are part of society. The 10 percent number is already there -- is always there. In better conditions, for good purposes for good reasons, but in this case now, it is not a matter of choice.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. And one question more, and then, we'll open it for discussion to you, Shelly. Are European governments doing enough in responding to the exodus of votes from Libya? I mean, many of us thought that Mare Nostrum was a

wonderful Italian initiative that ended. Is something like that needed?

MR. PITTERMAN: The --

MS. FERRIS: Not to put you on the spot.

MR. PITTERMAN: So, that's why I'm here (Laughter).

The Mare Nostrum was perceived by Europe to be a pull factor, and without too much controversy, it's pretty clear now that in the year that's followed, the numbers have increased. The numbers of deaths have increased on the high sea. So, Mare Nostrum was a good initiative by Italy, and it should have benefited from more support from Europe generally.

But that's that. It is what it is, one could say. And now, there's the Triton alternative appropriate, which is focused more on border patrol, border management. Yesterday, the European Council decided to triple the investment in the Triton operation, which is, I guess a -- you know, fair reaction to what has been happening in the month of April, especially with the last tragedy.

Most of you know should know by now that 900 people or more died in one single accident -- 1,200 people have died already on the sea -- on the high sea since -- 1,276, since the beginning of this year. So, it's not a problem that's going to go away, and now, certainly, with the season being as it is, there will be more boat traffic, and hopefully, there will be more rescue.

But, it can be said that Germany and Sweden, in particular, have been remarkably generous in their approaches, particularly for Syrian refugees coming to Sweden and to Germany as asylum seekers directly, or through programs of resettlement or humanitarian admissions. We've been calling for a more generous approach, using flexible visa family reunification, resettlement, anything that would allow for more access, legal, safe, secure, predictable access by Syrian refugees in particular, to European

states on a more generalized and equitable basis.

That, unfortunately, did not come out of the European Council decision yesterday, although there is more -- there is movement in that direction, but no firm decision in that respect. There is still, for very good reason, a focus on trafficking and on smuggling and that's important in and of itself, because it represents risks, of course, to migrants and to refugees. But it doesn't provide a safe alternative to those people who are forced to flee to find security and safety.

MS. FERRIS: All right, thanks. We'll open it up now for questions, and maybe take several at a time. If you could introduce yourself and -- we'll start over here, please.

MR. LAWRENCE: I'd like to -- Bill Lawrence. I'd like to press a little bit further on that last point and on the economic piece of this. I agree with you, that conflict is the main problem here, not just regular rolled economic deprivation.

But if you look at the fact that most Tunisians work in the informal economic sector, Libyans are being pushed into -- to work now in the informal sector; that this is informal flows of labor across the Med. You know, that large numbers of these flows are coming from West Africa -- not just Mali, but Senegal, Gambia. If you look at the numbers, we have a lot of informal economic sector activity here.

So, my question for you is, when the United Nations looks at livelihoods and crises and how to deal with refugees, how do they deal with this whole informal economic sector piece and constructing economies that will work? And then for Megan, just a very -- much quicker question.

You alluded to the Tunisian high figures of 1.5 or even 1.9 million they talk about, and the Egyptians often say they have even more Libyans. And you aptly pointed out that it's tied to the whole Gaddafi -- you know, those tied to the regime. But

my question for you is, what precedent is there, what models are there for external reconciliation? Right?

There are a lot of Libyans who aren't going to go back until they feel there's a safety in going back. So, how do we deal with international dialogue with the exiled population that fears to return? It's like the Tawergha industry -- you know, the Tawergha problem inside. But you know, what are the models for that, because they won't come back until there is some sort of -- you know

MS. FERRIS: Okay, let's take a couple more. And if you could stand up more, please, I think it helps people to hear better. This gentleman right here. Yes.

MR. BOYCE: Thank you. Michael Boyce from Refugees International. Thank you all very much for your presentations.

A question regarding the IDP response. Of course, we see in other settings where IDP populations are you know, less than accessible, like Somalia or Syria, that humanitarian organizations often used remote control mechanisms, working from a neighboring country, and then using, particularly local actors, civil society, local NGOs to distribute the aid within the country.

Of course, that's never a perfect solution, especially when it comes to insuring proper protection for IDPs. But I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the extent to which this is already being used or being considered for the Libyan context.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And we'll take the gentleman in the very back there.

SPEAKER: Jeff (Inaudible), independent consultant on humanitarian issues. A comment and a question.

First, as someone who has often pointed to flaws of UNHCR, I think it's only fair to give UNHCR a lot of credit for the reporting that you have done in your -- in

UNHCR's annual reports over the last several years. UNHCR has consistently reported on the number of debts at sea of people trying to flee the Horn of Africa and Northern Africa to Europe and other parts of the Middle East.

And on an annual basis, the estimates had been in 2 or 3,000 per year perish at sea. So, this is not new. The only difference in this latest incidence last week is that they were all on one ship. If those 900 people had been on four different ships and had died, 200 apiece, it would not have been in the media, and we would not be hearing about it.

But this is not new, and UNHCR has had this in the reporting for several years, which leads me to my question, primarily to Shelly, but also, if the other panelists have views on this.

On this migration, asylum seeking fling by boat, in Libya, does UNHCR and its implementing partners have any leverage to influence the most dangerous and abusive practices of the traffickers? And similar to that, does UNHCR and its partners have any -- have you had any success in raising awareness among would be asylum seekers and migrants before they depart Libya, about safer alternatives to reach their destination? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Okay, we've got some complex questions here, and I invite anybody to jump in and answer. A question on the relationship of informal migrants of concern with asylum seekers, external reconciliation, the question of UNHCR and others doing remote management to work industry Libya? And does UNHCR have any influence with the trafficking element inside the country? Who would like to begin?

MR. PITTERMAN: Maybe I should give some of it a go.

So, perhaps in direct response to the question about the labor sector, it's not so much in the countries of origin, so to speak, that we would engage. I mean, we

are directly -- but certainly, in the countries of asylum, we're trying to get more involved in hear the buzzword, the key word, the official words is resilience.

So for example, in the context of the Syrian refugee response for the first time, and in a very collaborative way, and hopefully, it will be effective in terms of generating new resources, we've talked not only about responding to the refugee piece of our work in the countries of asylum, but also, resilience for the host community in putting into place certain activities through UNDP, through other development oriented organizations, to respond to the impact of large numbers of refugees on the services in the host countries, and livelihoods and helping refugees and people in the host community to keep up income generation.

What we're already seeing very quickly though, and this gets back to the earlier point I made, is that these are inadequate responses, because of just the availability of funds, even if we begin to tap into the development pool of funding. They're inadequate responses to the kinds of issues that were mentioned with respect to Tunisia and Lebanon, where you have real structural challenges in a big way, that impact on national security in the short or medium term.

And in these areas, what we're going for is important. It's essential, but it's insufficient, I think in terms of really keeping asylum space preserved, and also, keeping countries that do provide asylum, secure. And so that's, I think, the first piece.

The second, I will very quickly mention is that we've never denied that -- the movements by sea are mixed, whether it's in the Caribbean or the Red Sea or in the East Pacific or for that matter, in the Mediterranean. So, there need to be mechanisms which lack -- which are lacking in all four examples, for identifying people who are, indeed, in need of international protection, and dealing with that according to international and national law on the one hand, and those who are migrants addressing their

concerns, however that's done, by IOM and by the host countries, and if it's according to law, then returning them safely to their point of departure or to their country of origin.

Those mechanisms are just not in place anywhere, frankly, in a systematic, coherent and predictable way. So, that's why the high commissioner took the initiative last December to have a dialogue -- an international dialogue on protection at sea, which was prescient, which was well time, in order to begin to have all states think about, well, what are the mechanisms that need to be introduced in order to provide those protections, on the one hand, and protect state interests, on the other, not that they're mutually exclusive, by any means.

And just in very quick reply on the remote management for IDPs, it's a very modest, as I indicated -- but Megan may have more to say about this -- like I said, we have our international presence out of Tunis. We have national staff in Tripoli and Benghazi. We work with NGOs, both international and national to do what we can.

The program is underfunded. Access is very limited, and so there's no pretense that what we're doing is anything on the order of the cross line operations, or for that matter, the cross border operations as well, in the Syrian context, or other IDP emergency situations. And with respect to Jeff, thank you very much for your observation. In fact, we have always, together with IOM, spoken about deaths, to the extent that we can count them.

We get this information from Coast Guards, so they're not, you know, our numbers, but we publish them because they're part of the movements of people of concern, or potentially of concern. And I misquoted the number of deaths on the Mediterranean. Since January, it's 1,776. So, that's a number that I should have more easily remembered.

1,296 in April, of which 900 or so -- but the numbers are also not as

precise as we pretend. Several dozens in the Caribbean already this year, that we get from the U.S. Coast Guard from the Bahamian and the Turks and Caicos Coast Guards, as well.

So, as far as -- I have to say that my short answer to your question is, I don't know, but I don't think so. I don't imagine that we have relationships as such with traffickers in order to be able to give them some guidance or training on best practice. (Laughter) I just don't -- I don't think that that's likely.

And similarly, the whole nature of this being as -- as secretive as that -- it's very hard, I'm sure, for us to give good advice to refugees or asylum seekers about the best way to manage this travel. That's why -- and then I'll stop, we have focused on the need for states to introduce structures; transparent, predictable structures that address the needs of asylum seekers, and to give them legal alternatives through creative and flexible visa arrangements, resettlement programs, humanitarian admission programs in order to be able in order to -- or safe points of departure, in order to be able to address their protection needs.

MS. FERRIS: Megan, external reconciliation?

MS. BRADLEY: Thank you for a really interesting question. You know, it's certainly true that historically, reconciliation processes, transitional justice processes have tended to be very nationally bound, so they haven't taken into account the regional and cross border dynamics of refugee flows, and the ways in which refugees can be, as we would say in political science, spoilers in the context of peace processes -- which is to say that they, if their needs are not met, they can potentially undercut those processes and jeopardize their success.

That said, there have been some interesting developments on this front. One of the report co-authors, Ibrahim Sharqieh, has actually done extensive research on

reconciliation and dialogue processes in the Arab Spring countries which in some cases, have had an international dimension to them.

In Libya, in the Libyan case particularly, there have been some individually efforts to try to have reconciliation with and dialogue with Libyans with in the Diaspora. These processes have often really been severely criticized by people within Libya who are opposed to the notion of reconciliation. There's still, I think, as we saw in our research, strong relevance of this divide between perceived loyalists and revolutionaries. Some have suggested that in the context of the upsurge of violence since 2014, the salience of those divides has reduced. What we've seen is that that's not so much the case, which is not surprising. I mean, the regime was longstanding, and the kinds of divides about those are going to run deep.

The other things that I would say on this question of external reconciliation process is, is that we often tend to focus on reconciliation in terms of formal political processes of dialogue and you know, actually having people sit down together around a table in a political process.

What I've seen in some of my research is that reconciliation can often be significantly promoted in more informal ways, particularly through re-establishing economic ties. For example, supporting families to reconnect across borders, communities to reconnect across borders, and these kinds of economically rooted and informal processes can be just as significant if not more significant than the formal political processes.

And just on the question of remote border -- remote management and cross border operations, I think it's just important to recognize the Libyan Red Crescent has really been carrying so much of the weight in terms of the response that is happening to the IDP situation, and that moving forward, perhaps, it will be important to think more

seriously about the role of cross border relief; thinking about the experiences that have taken place in Syria, you know, troubled as they have been, but could perhaps, have some important insights for the Libyan case.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much.

(Simultaneous discussion)

MR. DARRAGI: -- capital of commands -- on the idea of the remote border management, that reminds me that we have another category of refugees in Tunisia, and that's diplomatic refugees, including UNHCR (Laughter), the U.S. embassy, the Canadian embassies and so many embassies.

MR. PITTERMAN: Thank you for your protection (Laughter).

MR. DARRAGI: You're welcome. But that's -- to move to a more serious picture, it's about this mixed picture between economic asylum seekers and human (Inaudible) asylum seekers. I think the major flow that we are seeing now -- the major problem that we are seeing now is this concentration on the pull factors, and you forget about the push factors.

I mean, obviously, the push factor -- it is a catastrophe out of proportion. It is something we have not seen for so many years. We are speaking about 14 to 15 million IDPs in the region. Your people would take this opportunity, take this wave to try to smuggle themselves into this wave into Europe as economic asylum seekers. But if we deal with the catastrophe as it is and try to find solutions to it, political solutions are sometimes the -- security solutions and other possibilities to offer asylum, then we can really separate between the genuine human (Inaudible) asylum seekers and the economic seekers.

But let's concentrate on the real issue on this real catastrophe before looking into the pull factors or into some people who are opportunistic, people who will

take this opportunity to travel illegally to Europe or somewhere else. And I think that yesterday, I was listening to the NPR, to the special reporter of the United Nations secretary general on refugee issues, and he cited the example in the 1970s, where countries like Canada, the U.S., Europe had formally welcomed thousands of people from Burma, from many other countries in the Asia region, and it was a successful model, and they are now good citizens in these countries. They have their children in universities and they are totally integrated, and they contributed to the economies of these countries.

MS. FERRIS: All right. Let's open it up for another round of questions. Yes, please, ma'am.

If you could introduce yourself.

SPEAKER: Hello. Kirsten Cherdla from the World Bank. Thank you very much for this very interesting discussion and for taking up the topic, because we've also been feeling that Tunisia and the Libyan context have been a bit overshadowed by other developments.

I was having two questions. First question, we are reading very different numbers in the news on the number of people waiting in Libya to cross the Mediterranean. We know that there are migrants there that were -- I mean, most of them who were working in Libya had already fled in 2011, but I guess some returned and some are still there.

Then, there are asylum seekers there. There were some recognized refugees that the UNHCR mentions. So, I was wondering if anybody had a clear picture of what is actually happening in there, because we read a lot of anecdotal evidence about what's happening in detention centers, what's happening in smuggler's houses.

Do we know? Because I've read numbers from 1.5 million, 2 million

people waiting, 500,000 waiting to cross. And what is their situation? The other question I would have, we heard a little bit about Libyan refugees in Tunisia, and I was wondering if we have a little bit more information about the different groups that are there and what their economic status and their wellbeing is like, because I guess that this information would be very important, also, for the Tunisian authorities to have, to then have a targeted approach to how to react to these refugees, and how to react seeing also, the state of the Tunisian economy. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. Good questions. The gentleman back there.

MR. WELCH: Hello. Matt Welch from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. And my question is about durable solutions in this situation, and especially in Libya and in Tunisia for the refugees and IDPs in those situations.

And you had, of course, mentioned that the great hope for the majority of -- vast majority is to return when there's peace, and certainly, Tunisia is very overloaded in terms of integration for people -- local integration. So, my question is about resettlement and what role you think it has in this situation, both in terms of protecting people, and also, giving alternatives to that dangerous flight.

MS. FERRIS: Dr. Diab from the Libyan embassy, do you want to speak?

SPEAKER: Yeah, okay. Yes, please?

MS. FERRIS: Uh-huh.

SPEAKER: Hi. (Inaudible), National Endowment for Democracy. Thank you very much. This is a highly timely panel, maybe even overdue. I have two questions. First, understanding the constraints and the limitations of working with IDPs inside Libya, specifically those that are coming out of the city of Benghazi, which has been under heavy bombardment for almost the past year.

What kind of services are being provided to the IDPs, be it shouldered by Libyan Red Crescent or other international organizations? And then secondly, a lot of the discussion is about Tunisia, and that's great. What about the situation of Libyan outflow -- you know, the refugees that are in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, other host countries. If you guys have a little bit more context about that, that would be good to know, as well.

MS. FERRIS: We'll take one last question in the back here.

SPEAKER: My name is (Inaudible). I am second secretary of embassy of Egypt here. I'm familiar a little bit with the situation in Tunisia. I have posted before to Libya from 2009 till 2012, and I have participated in the evacuation of hundreds and thousands from the refugees in the south of Tunisia from Egyptians and from certain nationalities.

So, I'm going to -- actually, I don't have a question. I have a comment to shed some light on the situation in Egypt about the Libyans that are there. The number of Libyans who are only Libyans -- they are not Libyan Egyptians, you are talking about 700,000 Libyans only. Before the revolution that we used to have a half million Libyans there living in Egypt.

Also now, there are no camps in Egypt for refugees, so all of these people, they are living -- they have houses and they have services for their son in their universities and schools. There's not any problem for them, and they are used to (Inaudible) like Egyptians in some situations, and then some services.

We have similar problems like Tunisia that are in relation the subsidies, that we couldn't limit those subsidies to only Egyptians. And at the same time that Egypt used to really receive really big numbers of Arab refugees from other countries, not only Libya, that we received after the war in Iraq -- that's around a quarter of a million Iraqis that are living in Egypt.

And now, we have 350,000 Syrians with a number of Libyans, and we used to have one million Sudanese. All of these as Egypt is suffering internally from economic problems, and we are still suffering with increasing intensity of the problem of the refugees from Arab countries like Tunisia. That's (Laughs) a little bit similar situation.

But the problem for us, actually, we have humanitarian and economic problems, and (Inaudible) I mentioned is very important for us, that's the security. After the revolution, directly, again, it's Gaddafi does many Libyans, some of them supporters of Gaddafi and some of them supporters of the revolution. Again, it's Gaddafi came to Egypt, and they have sometimes represented like a security threat in Egypt, because they are used to fighting and shopping malls and sometimes in the streets using (Inaudible).

Not only is this a very big number of weapons -- amounts of weapons that they've smuggled from Libya to Egypt after directly the revolution. Till now, that's -- don't forget that's a very big number of the extremist groups. They are concentrated in millions in the eastern part of Libya, and (Inaudible) and now served. Also, this is very big challenging (sic) for Egypt. Maybe you heard about the incident that happened last year -- end of last year for the Egyptian border guards when there -- a group of them, they were assassinated by terroristic groups that are coming mainly from Libya.

So, those are some complicated -- highly complicated for us, not only in Egypt, not only human (Inaudible) in the economy and the security and terrorism. As I mentioned, it's very important for us. That's all. I have tried only to shed light on the situation in Egypt. Thank you very much.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. I think it illustrates how complex these patterns of displacement are, and over time with different groups and different countries and economic and security and humanitarian concerns -- certainly not an easy

issue.

Now for the panelists, we've got some difficult questions. How many are waiting to cross, different groups of Libyan refugees? Where are we with durable solutions, resettlement integration and so forth? What kind of services are being provided to IDPs in Benghazi and elsewhere? And I think we just had some response on the Egypt question. So, who would like -- the first person who answers gets to choose which questions to ask (Laughter). Yes, please.

MR. DARRAGI: I'll try to answer the first question about the different groups and categories in Tunisia. Well, I think we cannot come, really, with a precise number first. Maybe the margins are quite narrow, from 1,000,000 to 1,800,000. So the margin is really very, very, very wide. We do not have any precise figures and no clear answers.

And this is one, since you are from the World Bank -- this is one of the issues that Tunisia has discussed quite recently with the World Bank, and we are going to undertake a comprehensive study about the impact on the economy of the Libyans in Tunisia. But let me try to say something about these groups.

I think most of them, most of the Libyans in Tunisia are from the middle class. They do not, for the moment, have any financial problems. There is some kind of gap in wealth, but you could maybe detect by the town of residence of Libyans. The more you move north, the richer you are. So, those who are not well off will stay near the borders in Medenine, Tataouine.

A little bit more rich, I will go to Gabes. Those who are rich enough will opt for Suez, Hammamet or Tunis in particular. But that does not mean that there are some who have financial difficulties and who have problems have schooling, problems of getting access to the health system. The other thing about political affiliation, if you like,

there is no money that you see -- the conscience of people in Tunisia, but we have seen some minor tension between different Libyans and Tunisians.

Fortunately, it was contained, and I think -- but there are from every side. Maybe most of them are pro Gaddafi citizens, but we do not have any kind of idea about that.

MS. FERRIS: Mm-hmm.

MR. DARRAGI: But we have seen some kind of tension that was contained, and maybe that gives ideas to the possibilities of external reconciliation, but I don't know if it works or if it is taking place. But we managed to contain the tension between Libyans, and I don't think there are any problems. Sometimes, it's very minor incidents, but totally under control.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks.

MR. DARRAGI: Thanks to the Libyans themselves, because they are behaving properly.

MR. PITTERMAN: I can -- my answers here will be short. I don't know and I don't know (Laughter). I don't know the answer. Maybe somebody else does, even in the room, about how many potential folks there are that will leave by boat. I just don't know. There may be some estimates out there, but I just don't happen to know them.

As far as the level of assistance, I think I intimated that it's inadequate. It's focused on some non food items to those who can get access, some -- I mean, we always try to provide protection, support for children who are impacted or women, specific groups that might have their stories and need counseling. But you know, I can't pretend that it's more than it is.

Partly, that's a function of access. Partly, it's a function of resources. It's certainly not a function of will, and Megan correctly said I intimated before, that we rely on

national NGOs, as well, and that's first and foremost the Libyan Red Crescent. We also have support for folks who have been returned or intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard or Navy and brought back, who are then brought to detention centers where the conditions are not good, and we have provided some individual support to them in collaboration with the International Medical Corps.

So, these are you know, what we can do. And I think the bottom line is that in fact, it's true that this situation has not benefited from the level of media, public and donor attention as much as it should, which relates to my point about just bandwidth and financial resources. And so, to the extent that the World Bank and Tunisia are in communication, you may want to think about what flexible and creative options there might be.

I draw attention here, as well, to the fact that when we did go for the Syrian refugee appeal, I had mentioned that we had in our refugee response plan, an element on resilience to support the host community, and there were chapters in that appeal that were crafted by both Jordan and Lebanon to speak to their needs, as far as services and infrastructure support in a bigger way. And that might be a useful reference, as well, for Tunisia.

Matt's question with respect to resettlement I think is quite timely, and frankly, here too, I must admit that I don't know the answer. I don't know what the realistic prospects are -- would be for processing out. But it would fall within the framework of giving, especially for Europe, an organized legal alternative to receive refugees who are now in trouble in Libya.

And we have nationalities, we have Syrian refugees of course, that are about half, as far as we would -- as we're able to estimate and be in contact with them of the 40,000 or so refugees, but they're also, as I mentioned, Eritrean refugees -- let me

just mention some of the other nationalities that we've got. There are Palestinian refugees from Eritrea, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, among other nationalities on an individual basis.

MS. FERRIS: Anything else on solutions, Megan?

MS. BRADLEY: Well, on the question of resettlement, I think when we reflect on the relevance of this opportunity for Libyans, we have to recognize that well, globally, 1 percent of refugees acts as resettlement, so the numbers are already very low.

The vast majority of exiled Libyans are not registered as refugees, so for them to even begin to contemplate access to resettlement, there would have to be a real shift in the approach to start with a much more comprehensive registration process that could identify who is most in need of resettlement, given that it's now widely understood that resettlement opportunities should be provided as a protection tool.

It's also important to recognize that resettlement would be a very limited -- there would be very limited access, if any, to IDPs, so sometimes, we tend to focus on resettlement, and it can detract attention from the larger numbers of people who are trapped within their own countries, and who will never have an opportunity to participate in that process.

On the durable solutions question, I would also just stress that it's important to recognize in a case like this, that so-called durable solutions are not going to mean an end to mobility. So, as the participant from the Egyptian embassy pointed out, and also, Mr. Darragi indicated in his comments, there are longstanding Libyan communities in Egypt and Tunisia.

People have historically moved very freely and fluidly across the borders, and that kind of movement will be a part of what a durable solution to this situation looks like. So, we shouldn't expect that all of the sudden, we'll have a more sedentary dynamic

in the region. People will continue to engage in mobility as part of their livelihood strategies and their way of life.

In terms of the question on the economic status and wellbeing of Libyans in Tunisia, it's great to hear that a study is being contemplated that would look at those issues from a quantitative perspective. The qualitative research that we did for this study certainly can't be generalized to the whole population, but did underline that while the majority of exiled Libyans are indeed, middle class, there are people who are facing real impoverishment, and who are being pushed to engage in what we might euphemistically call negative coping strategies to deal with that reality. And so, it's important that we not lose sight of that population and the particular protection concerns that they have.

(Simultaneous discussion)

MS. FERRIS: I want to thank all the panelists. These are complex issues, and you know, beyond the statistics and the descriptions and the terminology are real live human beings, you know, who are caught up in conflict, who are fleeing for their lives, who are scared, who are poor. And I think these discussions have to remember that these are people that we're talking about, and that they have serious needs.

Thanks to our panelists. Megan Bradley, Shelly and Mr. Darragi. Join me in thanking them. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016