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BRAZIL AND THE SHAPING OF A
COOPERATIVE MULTIPOLAR ORDER

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PARTICIPANTS:

Featured Speaker:

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Permanent Representative of Brazil to the
United Nations

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: Welcome everybody. Thank you for joining us here today. On behalf on International Order and Strategy and the Latin America Initiative, it's a tremendous pleasure to welcome Ambassador Antonio Patriota to Brookings. Antonio is both a hugely distinguished representative of Brazil's foreign policy and a long-time friend and I'm delighted that he can join us here today.

Ambassador Patriota is a native of Rio de Janeiro, which tell you a lot, graduated from Brazil's prestigious Diplomatic Academy in 1979. I've known Antonio for a very long time and he has never told me this which is striking, but a colleague of his told me that he graduated with the highest marks ever recorded at the Diplomatic Academy. He is shaking his head in modesty. Served in the embassies of Curacaos, Beijing, and Geneva in the 1980s, and then in the Office of the Presidency and was a member of Brazil's delegation to the UN and to the international organizations in Geneva in the 1990s, became Brazilian Ambassador to Washington in 2007. A lot of you know him from that time. He became a major player in the American diplomatic scene and made many, many friends in Washington, at the same time playing a critical role in the global trade talks that were happening at that juncture, and in the response to the G20 to the global financial crisis. In 2011 President Rousseff appointed him to the position of Foreign Minister, Minister of General Relations, which he served until August of 2013. And during that tenure oversaw what was known as the Rio+20 negotiations which resulted in a global deal to generate the sustainable development goals to replace the millennium development goals in 2015. And he now serves as permanent representative of Brazil to the United Nations.

So it would be pretty hard to come up with somebody with a similar level of experience and expertise to talk to us about the issue he's going to talk to us about

today, about the evolving international order and Brazil's role within it. Antonio will speak for about 20 minutes and then I'll join him on stage together with Harold Trinkunas, the Director of our Latin America Initiative for a conversation about the evolving multilateral order and Brazil's role, and then we'll open it up to question and answer.

So please join me in welcoming on stage Antonio Patriota. (Applause)

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Thank you very much, Bruce; and I was just remembering as I came into this building that I was here speaking on a panel about Brazil not so long ago, maybe four or five years ago, and at the time the now-deceased Eduardo Campos who was Minister of Science and Technology was also a keynote speaker. Very sad to think of that, but very happy to be back in Washington and to be able to share a little bit of what we're trying to accomplish at the United Nations.

So the first part of my presentation will be a little bit of a commercial, Brazil at the UN; but I'd also like to elaborate a bit on how we see today's geopolitical situation as an opportunity for shaping a more cooperative world order. When people speak of multipolarity in some people's minds this is automatically associated with more balanced better world order, but you can have multi polarities of confrontation, of breakdown in communication, and more problematic even than a unipolar world so we have to ensure that it will be a cooperative order. And finally, during the debate if it turns out to be an opportunity to correct some misperceptions or to clarify some aspects of Brazilian foreign policy I'll be very happy to do that.

Starting with the commercial, what we do at the UN. Well, as many of you know Brazil is a founding member of the United Nations. It's going to celebrate its 70th birthday this year, San Francisco charter, and we are one of the few countries, UN members, who actually have diplomatic relations with every other single UN member. So 193 UN members, we have relations with the other 192 plus the Vatican and Palestine,

the two observer states. There are only three or four countries in this category, the others being India and Sweden. I've been told there's a fourth one, but I have yet to discover if that is accurate or not. In any case it is a reflection of Brazil's interest in universal diplomatic relations, and also a desire to play a strong role multilaterally at multilateral institutions. We have been very active since the UN's inception, but I think more recently in more visible ways including through our contribution to the UN regular budget. We became the tenth biggest contributor, that's ahead of at least one permanent member of the Security Council. We've also elected the Director General to FAO, the Food and Agriculture Organizations, the WTO. We were a significant contributor and have participated in many peace keeping operations. Not the largest troop contributor from Latin America, that distinction goes to a small country, Uruguay, that is very active on that front, but still one that has made an impact I think in various different scenarios and more recently in Haiti as you're aware where we have the largest contingent of troops in the United Nations Stabilization Mission, and the Force Commander position since this mission was established. That is a very unusual practice for the United Nations because usually there is rotation among different regions for commanding peace keeping operations. But in the case of Haiti the consensus is that Brazilians have demonstrated a special capacity to mingle with the population, to be effective in that kind of scenario, and this explains the consistency with which the Force Commander has remained in the hands of a Brazilian General. Also significantly today the peace keeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo is headed by a Brazilian General. It's an interesting position to be in because it's the first time that a Chapter 7 -- in UN jargon that means a peace enforcement operation -- is being attempted in Africa with a full approval and encouragement of the Africans themselves, but a little bit of a novel experience. And again I think the overall or the predominant view or even the consensus view is that

General Santos Cruz is doing a very good job, a very professional job, and has actually taken advantage of the mandate that was given to him to use force in certain situations in the Eastern Congo to great effectiveness, to the point where the conflict seems to be finally subsiding after many, many years of UN presence and this kind of stagnation in this problematic conflict in Africa.

Along with Japan, Brazil has been the country that has sat the longest in the Security Council as a non permanent member, the 20 years for 10 mandates. So that's about a little less than a third of the Council's existence. And if you look at the agenda today and how it's being shaped for the 21st century I think you have very strong, solid arguments to demonstrate that Brazil is at the center of many of the most strategic debates.

And starting with something that Bruce mentioned, Rio+20 and sustainable development, 2015 will be the year of the Sustainable Development Summit in September. The Millennium Development Goals will reach their 15th year and that will signal their end and the beginning of the Sustainable Development Goals. Now these are very different goals from the MDGs as they are know, because they will be applicable universally, differently from the Millennium Development Goals that were essentially an agenda to promote development in the poor countries. Now we have an agenda that is essentially universal because it introduces the environmental dimension into thinking about economic and social development. Sounds like a very simple idea, but it actually took a major conference to promote this kind of new thinking. And the document that came out of Rio+20 in 2012, it didn't seem to be at all a foregone conclusion that we would reach consensus. When the draft arrived in Rio 40 percent of this very long text was still open, and I think to some extent one can credit Brazilian diplomacy for having helped to bridge the gaps in what many view as a substitute for what the Washington

consensus represented for a long time. In a very simple way you could describe the Washington consensus as placing all the emphasis on economic growth and on the idea that through economic growth social development would be an automatic consequence through the trickle-down effect. So there was a view that governments should not necessarily become involved in social projects in assisting the most vulnerable segments of society in overcoming poverty and vulnerability. Well, this thinking did not prove to be very effective, especially in Latin America, and conversely through governments such as that of President Lula, a different approach, a different model was put into practice with very successful results when it comes to bringing people out of poverty and promoting social progress. So Brazil was well positioned in many ways to advance a new consensus, a sustainable development consensus which is precisely what came out of Rio with focus on poverty eradication, reduction of inequality, and a harmonization of economic, social, and environmental policy. I think the surprise of many, this was such a complex agenda, but the follow up to the Rio conference has actually proceeded in a very constructive and productive way. So this year, 2015, we're on track for finalizing 17 goals and 169 targets that will compose the Sustainable Development Agenda for the post-2015 world. This is not a project that has already completed, but most people in New York are confident that by September we will have reached an agreement. And again this is a very complex, wide ranging agenda that includes issues such as energy, health, education, gender; I mentioned inequality, in ways that has never been done before multilaterally. So one issue where Brazil was clearly as the center of the debates.

There's another very important process taking place this year, and Bruce Jones will be involved directly in this, which is the peace operations review. Now that has been mandated by the Secretary General, by Ban Ki-moon, as an effort to look at the many challenges around the world in terms of peacekeeping and whether the current

tools are appropriate. You are probably familiar with the Brahimi Report that came out 20 years ago and they represented a similar effort, but the consensus is that the situation has changed quite considerably in many scenarios. There are new experiments under way, including the intervention brigade that I had mentioned in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Is this a feature that has come to stay, is this a model that should be attempted elsewhere. I think there is a need also for looking seriously at strategies to combat terrorism around the world. Many of the strategies that have been employed in the early 21st century have not necessarily produced satisfactory results and I would say that the moment is more than ripe for some new thinking on this and thinking multilaterally how can countries come together in combating terrorism in a variety of scenarios.

I am particularly interested in another review that will take place this year which is the Peacebuilding Architecture. Having chaired the Peacebuilding Commission for the past year I think the easiest way to contrast peacebuilding with peace keeping, or what the Security Council does with what the Peacebuilding Commission does is maybe comparing the Security Council with an intensive care unit at a hospital where you take people in very dire situations that need emergency treatment, whereas a peacebuilding commission would be more of a rehabilitation center. Countries coming out of conflict where you have to make sure that they don't relapse into conflict again, but that need sustained attention if they are going to be capable of walking with their own two feet. And currently there are six small African countries that are the focus of particular attention in the Peacebuilding Commission, three of them in West Africa, Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone -- actually four, three of them being afflicted by Ebola, and two others, the Central African Republic and Burundi in Central Africa. Unfortunately there have been cases of relapse, as we know as the Central African Republic illustrates,

South Sudan as well. But some of these other countries actually provide some positive lessons that should be mainstreamed into the thinking at the United Nations so that they can be used in similar scenarios. One of the challenges here will be to ensure that the Peace Operations Review and the Peacebuilding Architecture Review mutually strengthen each other and that the communication between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission improves.

There are many other areas that I could give examples where Brazil has been particularly active. The protection of civilians' debate. I know quite a bit of interest was generated by our response to the RtoP Initiative that comes from 2005, the Responsibility to Protect -- RtoP is short for that, where Brazil proposed at the time of the Libya crisis a responsibility while protecting document. More recently in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations Brazil has been at the forefront along with Germany of an initiative to protect the right to privacy in the digital age. This has been also a pioneering kind of initiative that initially was met with, as it is understandable, some resistance, but that ultimately succeeded in achieving a minimum degree of consensus that allows the UN system to work on some parameters that countries should follow in observing the right to privacy in situations where terrorism is a threat, where you must confront major threats such as those posed by ISIS and others. So this year there will probably be an interesting discussion in Geneva at the United Nations Human Rights Council on the appointment of a special rapporteur on the right to privacy in the digital age. And I think it's fair to say that had it not been for Brazil and Germany in this case we would not have reached this position.

Internet governance is another area where we've been working I think in innovative ways including through a multi stakeholder conference that was held in San Paulo recently. Upcoming this year will be also the Non Proliferation Treaty review and

here we will have to take stock of unfortunately the absence of progress as regards vertical proliferation, or another way to mention stockpiling of nuclear weapons. But when it comes to horizontal non proliferation, I think again Brazil and Argentina, Latin America, many other regions of the world, provide an example by having established nuclear weapon free zones. And in the case of the Southern Cone through a bilateral agreement that has been considered by many as a model to be followed by other threshold countries that have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons but decide not to and negotiate guarantees that are considered acceptable safeguards, including by the International Agency for Atomic Energy in Vienna.

Well, this is a kind of quick oversight of some of the issues where I believe Brazil is having an impact at the United Nations and they are not minor issues. There are many issues that are shaping debates for the 21st century. However, I will now transition into an area where we have yet to see satisfactory progress and that is the area of governance in the peace and security domain. As you know there's been a debate in New York on the reform of the Security Council for more than 20 years now, but that debate has been characterized by paralysis and gridlock due to what I would describe the work of a rather effective minority in preventing a two-thirds majority or a near consensus from being formed for reasons that are perfectly understandable and that have to do with the geopolitical changes that the world is undergoing. However, and here I'll refer to an article that I've just published in this magazine, *Horizons*, where -- actually I was inspired by a seminar that the Austrian government organized in Salzburg recently to celebrate 200 years of the Vienna Congress, 100 years since the onslaught of the First World War, and to try to look at lessons both from the Congress of Vienna and the kind of diplomacy that that represented. I think a first experience in transitioning from unipolarity to multipolarity that could be useful in today's world because one of the challenges

precisely today has to do with the same phenomenon. Very different circumstances obviously. The United States cannot be compared to Napoleon's France, but to some degree structurally a similar exercise, even made more difficult because there's no experience, previous historic experience in transitioning from unipolarity to multipolarity in times of peace, relative peace at least such as the ones that we live in today.

But while I argue that there are factors that actually should contribute to some fresh thinking and constructive or productive initiatives regarding global governance for the 21st century -- and I'll mention a few of them, I'd say climate change. The whole climate agenda is a unifying factor because never before in history or never before at times when the international community thinks about world order, let's say after the Napoleonic Wars or after World War I or World War II was there a situation that called for so eloquently and so dramatically for international cooperation. With respect to climate there is no salvation without cooperation. Either everyone cooperates and works around a common goal or everyone is doomed. And this is actually an extraordinarily powerful unifying factor that exists in today's world. Another potentially unifying factor at least is the fight against terrorism. The nations of the world, whether you look at the permanent members of the Security Council or smaller nations, nations in Latin America that are relatively untouched by terrorism, but they all agree that this is a scourge that is unacceptable and that the international community needs to find more effective strategies to deal with.

Another advantage with respect to other situations in history is that well, we actually already have an international body such as United Nations that was founded 70 years ago around a charter, that is more or less respected around the world, or at least considered a defining parameter for international relations by everyone. And this is not something that existed again in 1945 or in 1918 or in 1814. So there is no reason

why we shouldn't be able to sit around a table, recognize that the world has changed, and look for improved cooperation, improved cooperative mechanisms.

Another important aspect to take into consideration is the following that in other areas of governance the international community has demonstrated that it is capable of transitioning into a more multipolar framework. Look at the G7 and how it was superseded by the G20 after the 2008 financial crisis. I remember when I was ambassador here in Washington hosting a dinner one for former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson where he said it doesn't make sense anymore to sit around the table with people who have more or less the same opinion, we need to speak to the Chinese, we need to speak to the Russians, we need to speak to the Brazilians. And so this formation, this format has run its course and -- well, in contrast with what happens with a more formal organ such as the Security Council of the United Nations that the G7 it could be enlarged by a collective decision. It didn't have to go through Congressional approval or ratification or anything of that sort. So it was very easily done and quickly done and nobody today argues against its existence. In fact if anything I think what we need is better communication between the G20 and what I sometimes call the G173, all the others who don't participate. But there seems to be general acceptance that this was an improvement. So likewise in other areas there have been small adjustments. The United Nations environment program used to have an executive board that was relatively small and now it's become universal. The international financial institutions are going through some changes of their own which we find still insufficient, but that reflect relative changes in economic power around the world. So that is recognized as a necessary moment for change. So again there's no reason why we shouldn't be able to do this when it comes to the governance of peace and security.

But finally the argument I also like to make is that for the first time in our

history, in Brazilian history, I believe that we have a major role to play in shaping a new order also when it comes to peace and security, not only because we are a good example of a peaceful region, in fact a country with 10 neighbors and very friendly cooperative relations with all neighbors in South America. Beyond that a very strong commitment to multilateralism and what for us is the first time in our own evolution where we have global outreach -- I can't think of any other expression. Global outreach in the sense that we have close to 140 embassies around the world, the Brazilian private sector is very present in all parts of the world, as I was mentioning diplomatic relations with every single UN member. This has only come about in the past 10-15 years. It hasn't always been like that. We've always had a very strong Latin American presence, strong presence in the developed world, strong commitment to multilateralism, but frankly relatively marginal understanding or superficial understanding of the dynamics in the Middle East and Africa, not to mention to Asia or the South Pacific.

So given this new situation for Brazil, and not all that many countries are in this position if we look around the world, there's an opportunity, and I find there's also a responsibility to participate actively and to contribute to what ideally would be a cooperative multilateral and multipolar world order. However, and this is an interesting topic actually that I was discussing over lunch with Bruce, there are several challenges for Brazil in this respect. First of all we need to find ways for our voice to be better heard since we are not a permanent member of the Security Council, since we only participate occasionally in its deliberations and we are observing from the outside -- well, it's not a given that our voice will be heard. But even domestically also in my experience I find that whereas there is a national consensus when it comes to Brazil playing a more active role or having a higher profile with respect to economic, financial, trade issues, or attracting investment. For example, participation in the G20 or assuming the position of Director

General of the WTO, this doesn't generate any controversy nationally. But when it comes to mediating the Iranian nuclear file or taking a more active position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- to give two examples -- public opinion becomes more divided. And there are those who say oh, let's leave this to other countries; you know, we are comparatively far removed from these problems, why should we get entangled. Well, the whole point is that in a multipolar world you need to get entangled, you cannot actually hide behind your relative position of stability. And if you don't do that at an early stage well it's difficult to come in later and by the time other mechanisms crystallize perhaps you will be left without a voice.

So these were the thoughts that I thought of sharing with you today and but referring also to what I think are the very special responsibilities of the United States and China in shaping a new world order for the 21st century. It's clear that they will be the first and second economic powers, the first and second military powers for most of this century. I would argue that it's very clearly in the interest of both Beijing and Washington to have predictable mechanisms for ironing out difficulties. You can't do this only talking to the like-minded, you have to speak to constituencies that have different world views and you need participants that are capable of helping to bridge the communication gap. This is something that very often Brazil is called to do, something that we did at the Rio+20 conference effectively for example. So I really hope -- I was reading today in the *New York Times* that President Xi Jin Ping is visiting Washington this year. I think it would be a fantastic opportunity for these two great powers who happen to be the first and second trading partner for Brazil at this moment, sit around a table and try to look seriously at how to improve the world order when it comes to peace and security and ensuring it's a cooperative one.

Thank you very much.

MR. JONES: Antonio, thank you very much for that; that was terrific.

And by the way you were very gentle to your largely American audience when you refer to the United States and China being number one and number two. You didn't specify in which order and that was very gracious. (Laughter)

Let me ask you a couple of questions about two different aspects of your talk, one on great powers and one on the UN. Then I'll turn to Harold.

I very much liked your emphasis on shaping the order. I hear a lot of pessimism, a kind of automaticity of history, the repeat of 1914, and I hear a lot of I would say unrealistic optimism as well. And I think the emphasis on shaping is extremely important, but there are three countries who are likely at some level to -- or could be a challenge in shaping the order you described. Russia for reasons that need no explanation, China if an emerging order doesn't give it enough room to expand its power in Asia, and the United States of the United States doesn't feel like the evolution is ceding it enough space for leadership that it's used to. That's an undiplomatically put question and you'll have to answer diplomatically, but where are you concerned about great power relations and where do you see optimism? I mean you mentioned climate and Middle East, but in those relationships what's the balance of your view between optimism and pessimism?

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Your question reminds me of a similar question that was put to me when I went to the Munich conference two years ago. And it was the first time that a Brazilian participated in that conference. It was also about a new world order, and the way the question was put then is what do the emerging powers wish to change the established rules as they emerge and rise let's say to positions of greater influence or participating more actively in debates and in decision making on peace and security. Well, my answer at the time was one of the things Brazil expects is people to

follow rules, governments and countries to follow rules. So in that sense it's less about changing the rules and about ensuring that the rules are observed. And unfortunately this is not happening necessarily at this moment. So I think greater respect for international law is something that doesn't come automatically. I think it also needs to be discussed and I would argue that in many respects this is something that China is very committed to. Russia seems to be very interested in that. They defend international law as the basis for international cooperation and there's no reason why the United States shouldn't be since the United States is at the origin of the UN charter and of many of the commitments that countries have undertaken.

But there seems to be a revival of the debate on world order and recently Henry Kissinger put out a book that is very interesting, and some of the chapters I really like, others I like a little less. I don't like the fact for example that it hardly mentions the United Nations at all which I find is more than oversight, it's probably an attitude of a certain disdain for what it represents which I find to be regretted. But he does mention two aspects of a world order. One is a common set of rules that everyone agrees to. And I think we already have this with us. We have the UN charter, we have all the entire body of international law that evolved over the past more than half century, and that continues to evolve in areas such as climate change for example. The other element is a kind of understanding regarding the balance of power. And I think this is where we really need the kind of discussion I was referring to, sitting around a table looking at how to ensure that the rules are observed and that if someone deviates what are the consequences, what are the possibilities for enhanced cooperation.

That's the most diplomatic way I can answer.

MR. JONES: Let me then ask you something you mentioned in your UN experience, but actually straddles both issues which is around the Rio+20 agenda, which

by the way from here on out I'm going to refer to as the Rio Consensus.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Okay.

MR. JONES: We hear a lot about the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus, so now we have the Rio Consensus.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Good idea.

MR. JONES: Except the question is, is it actually a consensus? A number of diplomats negotiated that text in Rio, but I suspect if you polled even the foreign policy crowd in Washington about whether they understood that the Sustainable Development Goals were supposed to apply to the United States you'd find that very few people were aware of that putative obligation. So I'm curious as to your judgment about whether or not you think that the west is actually sort of conceptually and politically ready to take on those kinds of obligations which is emblematic of a very different role in international order.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Well, I certainly think that the government officials who signed on to the Rio Consensus are aware. The goals and the targets are voluntarily, so this is not like a legally binding agreement that you will pay a price for disobeying. In fact it's a consensus of something desirable for the international community to enter into and take into account the high price that countries individually will pay and the community collectively as well if this awareness of the environmental dimension of development for example is not duly taken into account. So what I would say the bigger challenge is perhaps is to change the behavior of society in general, you know, patterns of production and consumption, energy consumption patterns, the private sector, how it deals with its own priorities and methods of production. Anything that involves change in behavior is difficult, you know, for individuals or for societies, for countries, for governments. But again what I think the almost miracle of the Rio

Consensus is that everyone agreed that this was important and that we need to establish a constructive dialogue about these objectives. Now I think we've gone further than what I would have imagined in 2012. We are on track, there is an awareness of where we have to work. This includes education, educating people for sustainable development because in many quarters people are not sufficiently aware of the implications. So I'm relatively positive about the fact that for the first time we will have universally applicable goals and the highly developed countries will be participating. To give you an example, I was recently at a retreat I guess you would call it near New York on one of the goals, goal 16; quite a bit of ink was spent over goal 16 which is about promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. And there were participants from all parts of the world, countries of all levels of development. It was a fascinating discussion because differently from what you see at the UN very often there wasn't this automatic north-south kind of polarization. You had the American participants saying that they were learning from practices in some countries in the developing world. In fact the Justice Department revealed something that I thought was fascinating, that the indigenous communities in the United States are being studied for conflict resolution involving families or neighbors in order to reduce the level of litigation in society. So this was like a best practice that was being shared with everyone else, and it kind of illustrated the advantages and the new territory into which we will be entering once we had these Sustainable Development Goals applicable to all.

MR. JONES: Harold, I turn the floor to you.

MR. TRINKUNAS: Sure. Mr. Ambassador, thank you again for a fascinating talk. I do want to draw you out on one of the points you made which was that Brazilian society has by and large reached a consensus on the global economic and trade role Brazil should play, but not so much on the peace and security side. Do you see any movement on that? And also if there is movement what more would Brazil be

able to do on this front? What more would you like to see Brazil do when it comes to international peace and security that maybe it isn't doing right now?

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Yes. Well, I do see movement, especially with the younger generation. In my experience these past years in Brasilia I traveled a lot around Brazil and I spoke to students. You know, there's a mushrooming of international relations departments all over the country which is quite a new phenomenon because when I was studying to become a diplomat there were maybe four or five institutions where you could study. I don't even think international relations as a discipline or as a course existed at that time, but you would study law or political science or geography or history. So now there is a whole new generation of young Brazilians who are studying international relations, and not only the economic part, geopolitics, where does Brazil stand. It takes an interest in what goes on in the United Nations. We have a lot of interns at the UN coming and participating. There's actually a young professor here in the audience who has been following our work in New York. But the truth is for even a not very specialized observer in Brazil if you go and look at the press when there are situations like the Brazil-Turkey initiative on Iran, or even an initiative like the Responsibility While Protecting idea when it came out, there's a kind of school of thought that tends to argue that well we don't really have so much political capital to invest, you know, in these big geopolitical questions. Let's concentrate on raising the standard of living of the population, which of course remains a priority. But I think what President Lula represented here and Celso Amorim his Foreign Minister whom I replaced in 2011, was the sense that these are not mutually exclusive. In fact you gain leverage to negotiate trade agreements and attract investment and basically participate in economic and financial discussions if you have a more active political agenda as well. So you can play on all chessboards at the same time and the inhibition is only a psychological one.

It's not something that we've done before all that much. There is also -- let's say the international environment is not very welcoming. When we got involved with the Iranian nuclear file it was very clear that not only -- actually you make this point in your book -- that it wasn't only let's say the United States or the so-called Western powers who had some misgivings, Russia and China who initially had said yeah, why don't you go ahead and try to negotiate an agreement, but ultimately they went along with the sanctions and they didn't support the Tehran declaration.

So it takes some work domestically I do think, but that is evolving quickly, especially with the younger generation, but also takes a lot of work internationally.

MR. JONES: By the way the book Antonio is referring to is the global blockbuster (laughter), Still Ours to Lead, by yours truly.

Harold, do you want to continue or should we go to the floor?

MR. TRINKUNAS: Let's go to the floor.

MR. JONES: Okay, we'll go to the floor and we may come back on some other issues. It's hard from this seat to see the back so please put your hands up high and we'll get to you, but we'll start at the front with these two.

If you don't mind we'll take a couple of questions and let you respond or avoid responding.

MR. TRINKUNAS: If you could just please identify yourself when you.

MS. BRIMMER: Good afternoon, Esther Brimmer now at George Washington University. Mr. Ambassador, it's a pleasure to see you again. And thank you to Brookings for hosting this particular event. May I ask three questions related to peace and security?

The first is to say we have a current crisis. You referred to the Munich Security Conference which just occurred this weekend. Of course Ukraine is on the

agenda. And I'd like to get you to draw your thoughts out on the role of our multilateral tools with dealing with this crisis. It will of course never be on the agenda of the Security Council, but it was on the agenda of the General Assembly. There was a resolution last year brought by Ukraine because it was the victim of aggression of a neighbor. Brazil did not vote for that resolution. Would you talk a bit about the thinking about the approach there? Of course the G7 is the G7 and no longer the G8 because of reaction to Ukraine, yet the BRIC Summit did not highlight that point.

The second is actually on nuclear non proliferation. And I again commend Brazil's long distinguished service on another part of the UN party, the International Atomic Energy Agency, where of course Brazil has served on the Board of Governors and has been very deeply involved in the importance of rules in this area. Yet, both Brazil with its partnership with Argentina and India to take two examples, have in a sense special relationships with the global nuclear non proliferation regime recognized by countries. Well, my one question is what's the long-term prognosis for the regime when important countries have various relationships to it? And there are many complicated elements to that.

And finally, this summer India, Brazil, and South Africa will meet in the IBSA Summit. And indeed many here in Washington are very interested in this aspect of multilateral diplomacy at IBSA. What might we expect?

Again, thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

MR. JONES: I call it to respond to all of those. (Laughter)

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: I could spend several hours responding.

MR. JONES: And by the way Esther gets special privileges by realm of sort of her experience at this, but I'm not going to be as tolerant on multiple questions of the rest of you, but go ahead.

SPEAKER: Hi, I'm just going to make one question. I'm Mariana from Rio De Janeiro Federal University. While, Ambassador, you mentioned that we face psychological hindrances to play a larger role in the peace and security agenda, and it would be within and without Brazil obviously as you mentioned. And what I was wondering is that how does Brazil perceive its own capabilities in terms of hard power and soft power because Brazil seems to have kind of an interest scare whenever someone mentions that Brazil carries interests in terms of foreign policy, it tries to say no, we're not that interested in terms of being selfish or we don't want to create or engage in any situations that will make us sound like a selfish nation that was to engage in situations where it's going to withdraw benefits to itself only. However interest are (inaudible) to foreign policy or to any kind of social relations, so how would you perceive the way Brazil assesses its own capabilities in terms of hard power and soft power mentioning the fact that interests matter.

MR. JONES: I always thought of you as the living embodiment of soft power, but now you do speak up for hard power too. So over to you.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Okay. Well, on Ukraine it's not that Brazil didn't participate, Brazil abstained, but 100 countries abstained, close to 100 countries abstained. So this was not a consensus initiative at all. I did make a statement that day right before the resolution was voted and I said that, you know, the UN charter has to be upheld and honored in every single situation. So abstention is not taking a position on the annexation itself, it was more a position on the text of the resolution because this was more of an example of something that we find objectionable at the UN which is a text being precooked by a group of nations and put to a vote where you don't have the opportunity to amend or to introduce other ideas that might have made it possible for you to join in voting in favor. It's a kind of a take it or leave it pronouncement that we found

was not entirely acceptable because it came from countries that had also challenged the UN charter recently. And, you know, this is not something I have to be too diplomatic about because President Obama I think was elected in part due to his position on the Iraq War and one that was very critical of this War. So it's clear to everyone today that the Iraq intervention of 2003 was a violation of the UN Charter, and yet people who support that initiative were here promoting a similar condemnation in another situation. So it seemed to us like it wasn't the ideal kind of setting for us to have an honest, sincere, constructive discussion, one that would produce good results on the situation in Ukraine which is one that is of course of great concern and I would express hope and expectation that the current efforts by Chancellor Angela Merkel who is here in Washington I believe and will be going to Minsk soon are fruitful.

You also asked about the IAEA, and the position of Brazil, Argentina, and India are very different in this respect. India is a country with nuclear military capability. Brazil and Argentina, we're threshold states that unilaterally decided to forego the use of nuclear power for military purposes through agreements that are bilateral, but that also involve the IAEA as you rightly pointed out. And this doesn't really impact on our position vis a vis the Non Proliferation treaty. I think there is a discussion as regards the signing of the additional protocol to the NPT which is not obligatory. Countries can choose to sign or not to sign. And what I think Brazilian and Argentinean diplomacy succeeded in doing -- which was significant and I think also interesting from the point of view of other threshold countries; maybe in the future Iran will find this an interesting example or model -- was to negotiate safeguards that are subsequently considered equivalent to the additional protocols. So this is maybe an inspiration for others, other parts of the world.

There is also let's say the expectation that was signed into the last NPT

review conference that there would be a conference on creating a denuclearized zone in the Middle East, a conference that has yet to take place. But some people who participate in that kind of debate consider that the Brazil-Argentina model might be a model for some countries in the Middle East to enter into in the future.

And finally you mentioned IBSA. IBSA is an initiative that was created on the day of the inauguration of the first Lula presidency on 1 January 2003 when high level delegations from South Africa and India came to Brazil and it was felt that the three large multi ethnic democracies of the south should establish closer cooperative understandings. And I think today IBSA can be considered not only very effective and inspiring, but also very result oriented triangle. IBSA has created a fund in particular; it's modest. Each country contributes with \$1 million a year, but it accumulates and it has been responsible for some very significant small projects in least developed countries around the world, in Haiti, in Sri Lanka, and Laos, and Guinea-Bissau, in Gaza, and the West Bank. I visited some IBSA-funding projects in Palestine myself and certainly a way for the three countries to demonstrate increasing engagement in cooperating with least developed countries around the world.

There was a question about hard power, soft power, self interest. Well, every diplomacy has to be oriented to upholding its national interest. I don't think there's any doubt about that. How you define national interest sometimes is subject to political equations that vary from country to country in democracies such as Brazil or the United States. There are sometimes differing views on where the national interest lies and this is healthy and necessary. And of course politics and diplomacy not being an exact science it gravitates a little bit around ideology and priorities that can vary from groups of individuals to groups of individuals. But one thing that I think characterizes Brazil maybe more than other players in the same league, let's put it that way, but it's not necessarily

an exclusive Brazilian characteristic, is a very strong commitment to a functional international system. So Brazil is a country that defines as part of its self interest or its diplomatic objectives working towards an international system -- I describe in this article as a cooperative multipolarity for example as something fundamental for us, among other things, to be able to concentrate on raising standards of living, improving the conditions of Brazilian society, or increasing productivity, a whole set of other domestic goals. If you sought of that I would venture to say I think we would probably make some progress in establishing the kind of international environment conducive to peace and development. But that is yet for us to see.

MR. JONES: Go back to the room. So I'll take a cluster in the middle here.

SPEAKER: Thank you, Ambassador. My name is Kumar from (inaudible) and we have got business interests in Latin America, including Brazil. My question is related to the BRICS and the BRICS bank. And my question is that with the current downslide in economy both in Russia as well as in China, how do you see the future of BRIC as an organization as well as a development bank? Thank you.

MS. TREVISAN: Hi, Claudia Trevisan from the Brazilian newspaper, *O Estado de Sao Paulo*. You mentioned the outreach of Brazilian foreign policy and you mentioned the opening of embassies in a lot of countries. Was there a withdrawal of this policy during the President Dilma Rousseff's government? Thank you.

MR. JONES: The gentleman right behind. And, Harold, feel free to respond on the questions you asked.

MR. RIDOUT: Hi, Tim Ridout from the German Marshall Fund. I was wondering if you could speak a little bit about ZOPACAS in the Atlantic. On the security front, do you see its capacity growing, do you see it becoming a little more important

organization itself, and if so what are ZOPACAS-NATO relations likely to look like? Is there room for transparency and confidence building measures and things like that?
Thanks.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: On the BRICS on the bank I think you're correct in associating the BRICS first and foremost with cooperation on the economic financial front because that's how the acronym came into existence to begin with as it was invested by a Wall Street banker or analyst. And I would venture to say this is where the strongest or most effective coordination is taking place and where the interests overlap more visibly. So at every G20 Summit there is a BRICS coordination meeting among the heads of state and government. Here at the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings the BRICS coordinate, the Governors at the IMD coordinate on a regular basis, and the BRICS bank and the contingency facility that was negotiated also through these BRICS Summits are the produce of this very strong coordination. So whereas the economic outlook has changed a bit, at first when the economic crisis hit the developed world very hard in 2008 and the years immediately thereafter, it's still hitting Europe very hard, the BRICS continued growing and seemed to be like the engine of world growth. And nowadays that has subsided somewhat and rates of growth have diminished very considerably, including in Latin America and Brazil among other places. So that situation has changed, but I think the commonality, the strong collective interest among the BRICS in continuing to coordinate on financial matters, and in providing alternatives for other developing countries in terms of loans and support for their infrastructure projects, for example, which is something the BRICS bank will be concentrating in, has not diminished. So it's here to stay, it's going to continue irrespective of the fluctuations of economic growth or let's say the geographic distribution of economic growth.

There was another question on the number of embassies. Well, what I

often say is that the Lula period was marked by many initiatives that represented opening avenues for Brazil around the world, but you can't be in permanent revolution in that respect. I mean there are only 193 countries around the world, you can't open 40 new embassies every 10 years. And I think with 138 embassies and about something like 60 consulates and other missions to international organizations we're pretty much at the level that I would consider a desirable level for a country, even a country of global outreach. This is more or less a situation of other countries with a global presence. In fact if you look at certain regions there are some surprising statistics. Brazil today has more embassies in Africa than the United Kingdom. Well, actually one embassy more than the United Kingdom (laughter), but I can still say that statement and not be saying anything false. So it's more or less where we should be.

Another interesting phenomenon is the number of embassies that are opening in Brasilia that have increased very significantly. And this process continues. Surprising because Brasilia is a very young city, its 50-something years old -- 55 years old. Those who served in Rio were very reluctant to move to Brasilia at first for understandable reasons. Coming from Rio I can understand them very well. (Laughter) But the truth is that Brasilia in these past 10-15 years has become a capital with close to 40 African embassies. It used to be that in Latin America Havana was the capital with the largest number of African embassies. They had something like -- I think they still do - - around 30, but now Brasilia has more. So the movement in the other direction has been continuing. Even recently Fiji and Burundi have opened embassies in Brazil. I think there's an expectation of enhanced cooperation; it places a lot of responsibility on our shoulders and our resources are unfortunately rather modest when it comes to cooperating with developing countries. But very often this can also translate into programs that are not costly, mere training programs where you can also use funds and

agencies of the United Nations to finance studies in Brazil or internships in Brazil in a variety of areas such as agricultural development and others. So there is what may seem as a freezing of opening embassies, it is actually, you know, coming to a level that is adequate and where there's still movement, especially in the other direction.

ZOPACAS is an initiative that I would like to see gaining a little more traction. Unfortunately after it was -- for those who don't know it's a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. Again referring to the Munich Conference, people in Munich were very surprised because they were speaking a lot about the Atlantic community and, you know, without specifying that they were speaking about the North Atlantic. At one point -- I know Ann Marie Slaughter was there and I said well, most of you here don't seem to realize that there's a South Atlantic community and a zone of peace and cooperation that is actually oriented by quite different objectives than the North Atlantic community. And among other traits, Africa and South America, or Latin America as a whole, and in this Mexico took a very important leadership role, established denuclearized zones, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Pelindaba, which was not at all the situation in the North Atlantic. So ZOPACAS is a platform for enhanced cooperation between the South Atlantic countries of South American and Africa in particular. There are projects that are taking place. Unfortunately I think a little bit at a lower level of ambition than I'd like to see, but the good news is that there will be another ministerial meeting of ZOPACAS in Cape Verde in two months where this whole agenda will be revisited and hopefully new areas of cooperation will be looked at an enhanced.

MR. JONES: In fact, Mr. Ambassador, would you expand a little bit more on what do you see as Brazil's role in West Africa and sort of the countries that border there and what would you like to see Brazil doing, do more of? Where do you see this going?

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Well, Africa in general is clearly a priority for Brazil. An indication of this is for example President Dilma Rousseff's participation in the 50th anniversary of the African Union in Addis Ababa. There is a forum that was created that meets every three years, a South American-African Summit, also known as ASA, and the President has hosted. Brazil has hosted such summits and participated also in Africa. The number of embassies, the private sectors, strong presence, area all indications of a long-term commitment to Africa. West Africa deserves special attention because it's a kind of border. Now many people say that sometimes seas or rivers they bring people more together than -- mountain chains separate people more than the sea or a river will do. And there is a very obvious affinity between Brazil and Africa given the fundamental role that Africans have had in shaping Brazilian identity. Nowadays more than 50 percent of Brazilians identify them as being African descendents. You know, this is not a small proportion of the population in the Americas. There's 100 million people who may have a minor contribution from Africa but they still prefer to identify themselves as African descendents than as -- I don't know Iberian descendents or Indigenous or some other group.

So for all these reasons there is an obvious interest in strengthening the ties. If you look at the African Atlantic coast there's only one country where Brazil doesn't have an embassy today. It's the country of Gambia, a relatively small country. And yet we do have cooperation with Gambia. In fact the Gambian ambassador at the United Nations in New York was accredited to -- the Brazilian government is right now importing cattle from Brazil to develop a meat production facility in his country. So I think that in itself reveals a very strong commitment. There are few countries that have such a governmental presence in the region. But of course the governmental presence generates expectations. So the big challenge I think for Brazil in diplomacy, not in larger

BRAZIL-2015/02/09

countries where we've been involved with for longer period of time like Angola or South Africa where we have IBSA, or Nigeria is an important provider of oil for Brazil, but in some of the smaller countries is to give substance to the relationship through cooperation, through capacity building sometimes. As Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission in New York I have been visiting Guinea-Bissau very frequently and the degree of expectation there is very, very high. We are doing -- there are some programs that are under way including in the security sector reform that hold promise, but probably not enough, not to the extent of what the countries would like to see. And here's an area for Brazilian diplomacy really I think to demonstrate that it can match its governmental presence with substance.

MR. JONES; I'm going to go back to the audience and then we'll take a last round and then I'm going to ask you a little bit more about the Security Council.

Right at the back; blue shirt. And we'll come up to the front.

MR. SANCHEZ: Hi, my name is Alec Sanchez; I'm a Senior Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. In a new study the UN mission to Haiti has been renewed for one more year until October of 2015. And I wonder what do you think is going to be the future? The mission definitely did plenty of good after the 2010 quake, but then it did introduce cholera into Haiti, (inaudible) peacekeepers raped a Haitian teenager in 2011, last month the Uruguayan government announced that it was going to withdraw its troops because of frustrations over the President Martelly's government. I wonder what you think is the future of this mission? Thank you.

MR. JONES: Gentleman right in the front.

MR. VALDERRAMA: Thanks. Rodrigo Valderrama, Plantation International. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, and thank you Brookings.

I was reading that there's a commission at the UN working on the

alleviation of debt for some of the developing countries and also there seems to be increased activity of United Nations operations in, you know, small construction infrastructure and social programs. Is there going to be a greater role? Do you see that and how would it be funded at the UN? Thank you.

MR. JONES: The young lady right here.

SPEAKER: Hi, my name is Stella; I work for the Institute of Governance and Sustainable Development. I was very inspired by what you said that we have no cooperation, there is no salvation on climate change issue. And I would like to hear a little bit of your opinion how we can broaden Brazil's role as a leadership because we have involved in this issue from one of the country's that had the biggest (inaudible) way to improve this issue with governance in our internal problems, but then it seems like we have stagnated and we are not developing this leadership role anymore. Having 2015 as an important year for this issue I would like to hear from you what can expect?

MR. JONES: All right. Antonio.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Okay. So first question was on MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Well, I think you're correct in pointing out some of the problems, challenges that MINUSTAH has faced in Haiti, including the introduction of Cholera and some misbehavior by troops that has been investigated and the soldiers -- well, they had to account for their acts and I think -- let's put it this way there has not been any impunity in this regard. At the same time MINUSTAH has performed relatively well I would say in helping to create a more stable environment in a country that was, you know, subject to chronic situations of instability and, let's face it, you know, dictatorial government, very bad governance, and today faces a promising, more promising, comparatively promising future. Two successive democratically elected presidents, an economy that's growing at around four and half

percent a year. That's, you know, a relatively high rate for the Americas nowadays. Of course it's coming from a very low base. I visited Haiti very regularly over the past years and something that I can ascertain through my experience is that the devastating impact of the earthquake would have been much worse had it not been for MINUSTAH. Now MINUSTAH was not created to deal with the natural disaster, but let's say that within the tragedy that the earthquake represented the presence of MINUSTAH was an asset and it really helped to keep things under control at a time when there could have been mass looting and violence and all sorts of other manifestations of a destructive kind.

That being said Haiti is today not a scenario of a grave conflict. It's not at war with any neighbor, it's a struggling democracy. Let's put it this way, the institutions are not as strong as they have to become, but it's in a comparatively better place than it has been, and it's in a comparatively better place than many of the other situations that are brought to the Security Council are. So it's natural that countries should think about a drawdown of the troop presence, and this is precisely what the latest decision was about in October. It seems now that due to the manifestations in the streets some troop contributors and some Security Council members are thinking of freezing the drawdown. This is not Brazil's position. In fact this is an interesting topic where Brazil and the United States have the exact same position, Uruguay as well, and Britain and France. But we have yet to receive an updated report to see what we do in the coming months.

In any event I think the idea is that you need to transform what was one of stabilization mission into a support effort by the international community to keep Haiti in a trajectory of institutional, economic, and social progress. Actually Haiti would be a very good candidate for the Peacebuilding Commission that I have described as a kind of rehabilitation center. But this is of course for the Haitian authorities themselves to decide. It's a voluntary initiative to be inscribed into the agenda or not.

There was a question about debt alleviation. I think you may be referring to an Argentinean initiative on debt restructuring, and this has to do with the Vulture Funds issue, the holdouts, and the problems that Argentina has been facing with some investors here in the United States that did not abide by or feel that they should join in the renegotiation of the debt that included about 95 percent I think of the creditors. So what Argentina did is bring to the United Nations the idea of a discussion on a legal framework to prevent situations such as this from arising. In fact these are situations that could affect any country around the world, developed or developing. And indeed a working group has been created for discussions that might produce some results that will be taken into consideration by the international financial institutions here. There's a good dialogue going on between IMF and the UN in this regard. We invited our own IMF Governor to make a presentation in New York on this matter and it seems like some basic understandings might be reached. But there are misgivings by some developed countries, creditor countries with respect to this initiative.

I don't think the UN -- well, you mentioned the private sector and infrastructure. There is a discussion on the establishment of partnerships with the private sector as part of the agenda for what is called the means of implementation of the sustainable development agenda, because as I was saying before the sustainable development agenda cannot only involve governments, it needs to involve societies at large and the private sector very significantly. So the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, is interested in creating a unit in the Secretariat to precisely enlist the support of private sector representatives who would like to let's say contribute to accelerating this agenda. Now the discussions here involve some administrative questions that are very complicated and where we have yet to reach a consensus. Much of the debate hinges around the degree of transparency and accountability that the private sector would have

towards member states and ensuring that there is intergovernmental oversight of what the private sector does while using the UN logo so to speak. You must be sure and ensure that the companies who are working under this umbrella are fully aligned with the principles and objectives and let's say the spirit of the work of the United Nations which could not necessarily be the case. So that is where the debate is at this point.

On climate, yes, I'm firmly convinced that there is no salvation with cooperation and it's a challenge but also an opportunity for all of us to work more closely together. And now what I may not agree completely is that Brazil exercised leadership in the past, is not exercising leadership today. If you look at countries of similar size, comparable economy, I think Brazil is actually in a almost unique position where it has unilaterally assumed goals to restrict greenhouse gas emissions, even though it is not obliged to do that by the Kyoto Protocol, but it has. And not only that it transformed these commitments into domestic legislation. That is one thing. I mean when you witness how difficult it is to even have a debate about this in Congress as in other countries, I think that is no small accomplishment.

On the deforestation front, it's true that sometimes there's a degree of oscillation or going up and down in the statistics, but the results have been very impressive compared to past practices and the commitment of the government today is it cannot be compared to the attitude that prevailed let's say until 10-15 years ago, which is one of essentially benign neglect. The advantage for Brazil of course is that it can contribute to the climate equation by reducing deforestation. This is not something that is at the disposal for example of China or even India, because we have such a huge tropical rainforest. So here I think leadership is being demonstrated. Environmental policy and restrictions placed on the economy, on industry, or obligations placed in agriculture and other sectors of society is not an easy task for any society, for any country. It generates

difficult political debates in whatever country this is taking place today. But the positive thing about Brazil, I would say even revolutionary, is that complete change with respect to the debate today compared to where it was I would say -- wouldn't know how to put a date on this but the past 15 years or so very fundamental change has taken place. In fact the first conference on the environment and development which was Rio-20 in 1992 made have represented an inflection point because up to that date the prevailing attitude was one very much on the defensive in the Brazil, you know. We cannot sacrifice our development goals because of some idealistic environmental agenda that is essentially defended by the developed world. This was the kind of narrative that prevailed at that time. This is a completely different world that we are living in today where we have become leaders in for example negotiating a sustainable development agenda for the United Nations where climate and the environment play such an important role.

MR. JONES: I'm going to give Harold the last question, but before I do let me bring you back and draw you out on the issue you ended on in your talk, namely the Security Council. We spend a lot of time thinking about the Security Council in terms of peacekeeping operations, and the management of civil wars, and the constant of things it's done for the last 25 years, but it seems to me if we look ahead it's got two great challenges in front of it. It's got what's been referred to as the great unraveling in the Middle East, and the kind of the tensions and terrorism, interstate conflict that is present and will be developing. And it's got the return of geopolitical tension and proxy war. And so I'm just curious if you've begun thinking about it, if Brasilia has begun thinking about what kinds of roles Brazil and India, and sort of the new power would play in the Security Council confronting those kinds of challenges and how optimistic are you about seeing a reformed Security Council?

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Well, I think Brazil is already playing a role

that demonstrates I would say at least two things. One is a commitment to working multilaterally and within international law and respect for the UN Charter, to confront whatever challenge is placed before the international community, whether it's terrorism, whether it's geopolitical tension between big players. The other one is a certain independence, independence which is a rather rare quantity in today's world because one thing that troubles me when I listen to debates in the Security Council -- open debates obviously because we don't participate in the closed door debates, it reminds me of the Cold War. I mean it really is very reminiscent of the bipolar world order because it's a contest between those who support the U.S., British, French position, so-called western position, and those who will either associate themselves directly or support in some way the Russian-Chinese -- much more frequently the Russians take the more vocal position. I mean there are many shades of gray in between and there are many ideas that could be proposed, but that don't find the light of day because no space is created for that. And this has to do with the composition of the Security Council. I am convinced that unless you change the permanent member composition it will be very difficult to change these dynamics. I know that Mexico thinks differently. The former ambassador of Mexico to the United States is sitting here and we respect different views, but from a systemic point of view -- and I'm not talking here about Brazilian policy objectives necessarily, I could be talking theoretically about some other country participating as a permanent member, I don't see how you will modify these outdated dynamics that prevent the Council from taking innovative approaches that maybe will prove to be better strategies than the current ones that let's face it are not working all that well.

Now there are ways in which Brazil has demonstrated this independence that are not necessarily well received by the current P5. I just mentioned the Iran

Initiative. It's important to remember that the Brazil-Turkey Initiative happened when Brazil and Turkey were sitting in the Security Council as non permanent members. So what these two countries did, you know, countries with relatively large diplomatic services and some experience of multilateral relations. In the case of Turkey a neighboring country with very well historic experience and deep knowledge of Iranian reality. In our case, at least a country with a presence in Tehran, because let's face it, very often -- there's one country that I know you are very close to who presents a resolution on human rights every year at the General Assembly that doesn't have an embassy in Tehran. So how can they measure progress or absence thereof without a physical presence? But what I was alluding to was that these two countries tried to fulfill their responsibility, their sense of, you know, if we're sitting here in this Council and an important challenge in terms of peace and security is being discussed where we don't see a way forward, well we'd like to try something ourselves. And yet this was not necessarily well received, although today when you look at the P5+1 negotiations what is happening is that very much the same approach that was taken by Brazil and Turkey in 2010 is being attempted again, except that meanwhile Iran has developed its nuclear peaceful -- according to the Iranian authorities -- capacity much further than what it was, the number of centrifuges, the quantity of enriched uranium, et cetera, than had been the case in 2010. So very clearly I think here -- and I know that you argue this is your book as well -- a missed opportunity. Someone who cannot be suspected of having an ideological predisposition to support what Brazil did, the former Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, wrote an article saying that the Brazil-Turkey Initiative had been a missed opportunity. But this is already an example of something that was attempted, can produce let's say a measure of concrete result. It wasn't a comprehensive solution, it was more of a confidence building measure, but that could have let's say spared some degree of heightening tension in the

Middle East but did not.

Another example is the RWP, the Responsibility While Protecting. I frankly sometimes -- in face in one of your articles you were saying oh, this was rejected by the P5 and so it didn't gain traction. The expectation was not that it would meet with an automatic approval from the P5. Quite the contrary, it was a little bit of a provocation in that sense, and the fact that it did not meet with approval I think doesn't disqualify it. In fact a very interesting phenomenon is happening right now in face of developments in Libya where everyone agrees that the situation has gotten extremely problematic and much worse perhaps, but very clearly it's impossible to disassociate the NATO intervention in Libya from the current situation of affairs in Libya. There is renewed interest in RWP and all the -- I keep getting letters, papers, that are written around the world. There will be a seminar at Columbia University organized by a professor called Michael Doyle I believe on Libya and where he will showcase RWP. I could give many other examples.

So this was another I think good example of a non permanent member of the Security Council not only criticizing an approach that it considers unsatisfactory or weighing too much on the use of military force, not thinking enough about the consequences that military intervention will have for the country and the region, and proposing some alternatives. Basically, you know, some self restraint and some political oversight. And again -- this is the third time I quote your book today -- I know that you agree with the idea that in the case of Libya after the authorization was given for the protection of civilians through a NATO force, well if the NATO force intended to topple Gaddafi it should have obtained an additional resolution from the Security Council. This is what essentially RWP was also arguing in favor.

So I think there are demonstrations to answer your question that already

indicate that Brazil tries to think independently in ways that strengthen multilateralism and cooperation, but it's very difficult to do that as I say without looking at the governance mechanism itself.

Now how optimistic I am about reform, frankly I'm not optimistic about the IGN, which was the Intergovernmental Negotiating forum in the United Nations, and the prospects for them to reach any agreement anytime soon because there are divisions and there are delaying tactics. And very often the Chairman of the group feels a little bit intimidated and actually resorting to procedures that are resorted in every other negotiating environment at the United Nations, such as for example presenting a text for negotiation. But there are many who question his authority to do that. So I think we will still be struggling with procedure, with delaying tactics and this is at a very high risk for the international community because as we sit and contemplate this gridlock and this paralysis the international situation evolves and maybe opportunities are missed.

So maybe what is necessary is a parallel track. Some country or group of countries to start discussing this among themselves in a very serious manner and then making the process more inclusive at a later stage. I don't know if there will be any volunteers to do this, but I honestly believe, and in again looking at history, looking at the example of how the world sleepwalked according to a famous book, Into World War I, because there were not satisfactory mechanisms for coordinating on peace and security matters, or the mechanisms that had existed had worn out, the Vienna Consensus, the Vienna Congress, is an illustration of the dangers that we could be running into. I don't see how this would serve anybody's interests. You know, there are problems of relatively loss of influence if you're not included in a future Council with permanent members. But we have dealt with this in the G20 for example, and I think what we need to do is always ensure that you don't enclose yourself within a rarified atmosphere and that you always

keep the communication going with a larger membership. But the original design of the United Nations was that you would have smaller Security Council and the General Assembly.

So I think what we have to work at is also improved procedures, reporting, more transparency, more interaction, with the general membership at large, but not using arguments such as the creation of new centers of privilege, et cetera, to block progress because frankly in the G20 you could argue that maybe some new centers of privilege were created, but no one is saying that this was a bad idea, that we should go to pre G20 days.

MR. JONES: Except for the 21st and 22nd countries who are really annoyed.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Spain and the Netherlands, yeah.

MR. JONES: We're past time, but with your indulgence I'm going ask Harold to ask the final question in lieu of a final (inaudible), so.

MR. TRINKUNAS: No, I just was going to make a final comment. Just I thought your point on RtoP, RWP is very well taken because I think there's something else that's very important about Brazil's proposal which is to point to the issue of sustaining the legitimacy of these kinds of efforts under the UN auspices. It's important to consider all these other effects that was embodied or captured by this RWP proposal. And so I think more broadly going forward I think that issue of the legitimacy of the institutions and the kind of proposal you're making is going to be one of the areas for discussion and debate I'm sure as we go forward.

But again, thank you very much for.

MR. JONES: When I first met Antonio it was in 2004 and Kofi Annan had launched his initiative on the reform of the UN, and you'll remember that you said to

me at the time that any country that wanted to play a serious role on the international stage had to be willing to take up international security issues beyond what was in its narrowly defined national interests. And I think you see in the person of Antonio the experience that Brazil has taken on and begun to develop in precisely those terms. And so my thanks to you for that and my thanks to you for being here with us today.

AMBASSADOR PATRIOTA: Thank you, Bruce. Thank you.

MR. TRINKUNAS: Thank you.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016