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U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICY:
A TALK WITH
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

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PROCEDINGS

MR. PIFER: Good morning and welcome to The Brookings Institution. I’m Steven Pifer. I’m a senior fellow here where I direct the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative. And it is my pleasure today to introduce Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, who’s going to talk to us about American arms control policy.

Before I continue with my introduction I would like to express the gratitude of Brookings to the Ploughshares Fund and to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, whose generous support makes programs like today’s possible.

When President Obama took office in 2009, he set out a very ambitious agenda for arms control, which he laid out in a speech in April of 2009 in Prague. And over the course of that first year, the administration recorded significant achievements.

In April of 2010, it signed the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, it issued a Nuclear Posture Review which set the objective of reducing the role and the number of nuclear weapons in American policy, and it launched the Nuclear Security Summit process. And the President almost immediately laid out even more ambitious goals, so on signing the New START Treaty he talked about a negotiation to further reduce U.S. and Russian strategic forces, but also to expand that negotiation to include both tactical nuclear weapons and also reserve strategic weapons in a way for the first time would have had the United States and Russia negotiating on their entire nuclear arsenals. The administration also talked about the possibility of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and there was a brief period when NATO and Russia discussed the possibility of cooperation on missile defense.

Things, unfortunately, have slowed since then. Certainly over the last year you have the crisis over Ukraine, but even before that crisis it was clear that on major questions of arms control the Russians had stalemated the process on strategic
forces, on tactical nuclear weapons, and on missile defense. But the Obama administration, nevertheless, has two years left to go and we’re delighted to have Under Secretary Gottemoeller here to talk about what to expect in that period.

She has a long and distinguished career with the U.S. Government. We actually first met in 1990, when we were on the Soviet desk at the State Department, and she went to her first START negotiation. She’s also served at the National Security Council, senior positions at the Department of Energy, and, in 2009, became the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, where, among other things, she led the negotiation of the New START Treaty. And she now holds the position of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

I should also say that in addition to being the U.S. Government’s top expert on arms control and security questions, she’s also the organizer of most excellent adventures. In 1994, she was at the National Security Council staff and I was working with her on Russian-Ukraine questions at the State Department. And one day in May, she calls me and says, Steve, Strategic Command has offered to take me down to Kings Bay, Georgia, to visit the Trident Ballistic Missile Submarine Base and then to go down to Port Canaveral and spend a day on a Trident submarine. Would you like to come along?

Rose, is this a trick question? (Laughter)

We then had 2-1/2 days seeing both how Kings Bay was preparing to conduct the inspections that it was going to require -- it was required to accommodate under the New START Treaty and then spent 8 hours on the USS Maryland at sea, where we visited every compartment, looked through the periscope, drove the submarine, and, at one point, got to climb inside a Trident missile. For an arms control wonk, this was the dream date.

Rose, we look forward to your conversation. And after your opening
remarks, we’ll be happy to open up the questions to the audience and have a discussion. Please.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: What Steve didn’t mention about that day was that the fondest memory I have is of actually getting a driver’s license for driving the Maryland. Now, that, of course, was totally ridiculous, but, nevertheless, it is something that I treasure at home. You got a driver’s license, too, it seems to me. Yes.

MR. PIFER: Yes, it’s in my office.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Exactly, exactly. You know, this time of year is a really special time. I’m delighted to be here and see so many colleagues and friends, experts around the audience. And thank you, Steve, very much for the invitation. We’ve been trying to organize this for some time, but this is actually a very, very good moment to come to you and to speak about our plans for the arms control agenda over the coming years.

First of all, this holiday time is a very special time for this administration because so much in the disarmament arena was accomplished right at this time. I remember, for example, in 2009, right after the Copenhagen Summit, where President Obama with then President Medvedev had a critical kind of waypost meeting in the negotiation of the New START Treaty. And we came back to Washington to wrestle with some very important issues here, which resulted in another very important waypost meeting in January, when Admiral Mullen went to Moscow with a team from across the interagency to again press forward the progress in the negotiations. So this period in the negotiations was very, very important.

And then, of course, on December 22nd of 2010, the New START Treaty was ratified. The Senate gave its advice and consent to the New START Treaty. So I always feel pretty special about this time of year for a number of reasons in our arena in
addition to the normal good fun that ensues.

As all of you might know, I’ve been traveling quite a bit lately and just got back, actually, from a trip to the Hague to visit the OPCW, continue our work on Syria chemical weapons issues; Prague to do a speech on, again, our disarmament agenda going forward, and I’ll replay some of those points today, but also expand on them. This laid the groundwork for our attendance in the following two days at the Vienna Conference on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons Use. So all of that will be woven into what I have to say today.

But the third stop on this most recent trip of mine was in Ukraine and I had the opportunity to go to Kiev. Actually the anniversary was the anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum entering into force on December 4th of 1994, so I had an opportunity to speak to a Ukrainian audience. And as you can imagine, there were sharp questions about the import of the Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine. I’ll be glad to talk about that during our question-and-answer period, but it’s yet another reason why this season of the year is a very important one.

And what I would like to say about Ukraine in beginning my remarks today is, first of all, that there we see a government that is focused on problem-solving and intent on moving strongly forward with the reform agenda that they have I think failed to fulfill over so many years now. So I’m actually very hopeful after this trip to Ukraine and hopeful for -- and also not only hopeful, but convinced of their continuing partnership in the non-proliferation treaty regime with strong commitments voiced to their non-nuclear weapons status under the NPT. So it’s a very, very good visit in many, many ways. So I come back to you here in Washington with many recent and important impressions and look forward to sharing them with you in addition to hearing your thoughts and your questions this morning.
I will say here to begin with what I said in Prague. First of all, there should be no doubt, the U.S. commitment to achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons is unassailable. We continue to pursue nuclear disarmament and we will keep faith with our Non-Proliferation Treaty Article VI commitments.

Our responsible approach to disarmament has borne fruit in the form of major reductions in nuclear weapons, fissile material, and nuclear infrastructure. These efforts have led us to reduce our nuclear arsenal by approximately 85 percent from its Cold War era highs. In real numbers that means we have gone from 31,255 nuclear weapons in our active stockpile in 1967 to 4,804 in 2013. We know, however, that we still have work to do; 4,804 nuclear weapons is still a lot of weapons.

As we consider future reductions, our focus must be on achievable and verifiable measures that all interested parties, nuclear states and non-nuclear states alike, can trust. Our past experience, both successes and disappointments, will inform how and when we proceed, each step building upon the last.

When we take stock of the last 30 years, it is clear that our path has been the right one. We have accomplished so much and if we had all been gathered together in this room for a nuclear policy event at Brookings in 1985, I don’t think anyone in the room could have imagined or predicted how much we were able to accomplish. I was right down the road in 1985 at 21st and M Street at the RAND Corporation, and I know that I would not have predicted how much we have accomplished.

By the way, my next-door neighbor at RAND Corporation was Ted Warner, a very good expert in our field who has passed on recently. And I know there are others among this group who miss him as much as I do, but his legacy is truly a great one and I did want to say a word in tribute to Ted Warner this morning because he was a great colleague and a great friend.
Within that decade of 1985, Washington and Moscow would conclude the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START; the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; and the HEU Purchase Agreement. These various bilateral and parallel unilateral initiatives led to an array of impressive and long-reaching efforts, banning an entire class of missiles carrying nuclear weapons; reducing the deployed nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia by over 11,000 weapons; drastically reducing and eliminating whole categories of tactical nuclear weapons, while removing others from routine deployment; and converting Russian nuclear material equivalent to an astounding 20,000 nuclear weapons into fuel for nuclear power plants.

These efforts were followed by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT, sometimes called the Moscow Treaty, which further reduced U.S.- and Russian-deployed strategic forces. And, of course, in 2010, the United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty. When it is fully implemented, New START will limit deployed strategic nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s.

New START is enhancing strategic and security stability between the United States and Russia. Both nations are faithfully implementing the treaty’s inspection regime. And I note, even during this severe crisis with the Russian Federation, the Russians are continuing in a business-like way to implement the New START Treaty. Current tensions with the Russian Federation highlight the durability of the verification regime and the important confidence that it’s provided by data exchanges and notifications, onsite inspections under the treaty, as well as the security and predictability provided by mutual limits on central strategic forces that are verifiable in nature.

None of these achievements could have been predicted back in 1985 nor laid out in a long-term, time-bound process. On the contrary, it was the faithful
implementation of each individual initiative the provided trust and confidence, and the strategic opportunity to move ahead to the next phase.

Underpinning all of our efforts, stretching back decades, has been our clear understanding and recognition of the humanitarian consequences of the use of these weapons. That is the message that the United States delivered in Vienna last week at the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. We appreciated hearing the testimonies and statements of the participants there, including many victims of nuclear radiation contamination. While we acknowledge the views of those who call for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons ban treaty, the United States cannot and will not support efforts to pursue such a ban. We believe the practical path that we have so successfully followed in the past remains the only realistic route to our shared goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. Again, it should be remembered that we share the same goal; we just have different ideas about how to process to that goal.

The international community cannot ignore or wish away the obstacles confronting us that slow the pace of progress on arms control and non-proliferation efforts. We must all acknowledge that not every nation is ready or willing to pursue serious arms control and non-proliferation efforts. We are seeing new and enduring pressures on the non-proliferation treaty, pressures that threaten global stability. We are seeing nations turn away from cooperation, turn away from the common good of non-proliferation efforts, and clinging more tightly to their nuclear arsenals.

As we push those nations to accept their global and ethical responsibilities, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal for the defense of our nation and our allies. This is not a stance that is mutually exclusive of U.S. disarmament goals by no means. It simply recognizes that the international security environment in which we find ourselves is one in which we must take account of and
pursue further progress in a very difficult, overarching situation.

We are conscious of our current obligations and responsibilities and we are meeting them. The United States also knows that it has a responsibility to lead efforts toward disarmament, and I can affirm to you that we will never, never relent in this pursuit.

There are people here in Washington and people around the world who see the landscape and say that we cannot control the spread of weapons of mass destruction or further limit nuclear stockpiles. They are wrong. It was in Prague that President Obama reminded us that such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some ways we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable. Again, the United States cannot and will not accept this.

When we fail to pursue peace, the President also said, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. To denounce or shrug off a call for cooperation is easy, but also a cowardly thing to do.

The United States will press ahead even in the face of many obstacles. While we have accomplished much over the past five years, we will continue to push forward. We have no intention of diverting from our active efforts to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, increase confidence and transparency, strengthen non-proliferation, and address compliance challenges. We will do so pursuing all available and practical avenues.

For instance, the United States earlier this month contributed resources and experts to the successful onsite inspection exercise held by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty organization in Jordan, the so-called IFE14, Integrated Field Exercise 14. Such practical efforts help to ensure that the international community will have an
effective verification regime in place for the day when the CTBT enters into force.

The United States has made clear that we are prepared to engage with Russia on the full range of issues affecting strategic stability and that there are real and meaningful steps we should be taking that can contribute to a more predictable, safer security environment. Given that the United States and Russia continue to possess over 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world this is an important and worthy goal.

In June of 2013, in Berlin, President Obama stated U.S. willingness to negotiate a reduction of up to one-third of our deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New START Treaty. Progress requires a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment, but this offer is still on the table.

On the broader world stage, progress toward disarmament requires that states take greater responsibility to resolve the conflicts that give rise to proliferation dangers. It requires ending the nuclear buildup in Asia, that Iran join an agreement restoring full confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, and that North Korea return to compliance with its international obligations. And it requires that we make progress elsewhere when we can. This, importantly, includes in the Middle East, where we will spare no effort to convene an historic conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and systems of their delivery. And our Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman is fully engaged in this project, as well as our envoy for the non-proliferation treaty, Ambassador Adam Scheinman.

Further, as the United States considers arms control and non-proliferation priorities we will continue to consult closely with our allies and partners every step of the way. Our security and defense and theirs is simply non-negotiable.

We are in a difficult crisis period with the Russian Federation. I began with that. The matters include not only Ukraine, but also Russia’s violations of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF Treaty. Addressing both situations is an ongoing process.

With specific regard to the Russian INF violation we will continue engaging the Russian government to resolve U.S. concerns. Our objective is for Russia to return verifiable compliance with its INF Treaty obligations as the treaty is in our mutual security interests and that of all countries around the globe. Indeed, we need cooperation with Russia and other nations to address new threats, first and foremost the threat of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon or nuclear material. They need this cooperation for their own security, as well as for the security of other countries around the globe.

As I've outlined here this morning, there's no way to skip to the end and forego the hard work of solving the truly daunting technical and political non-proliferation and disarmament challenges that lie ahead. It is not enough to have the political will to pursue this agenda. We have to have a practical way to pursue this agenda.

We can all acknowledge that verification will become increasingly complex as lower numbers of nuclear weapons -- as we lower the numbers of nuclear weapons while requirements for accurately determining compliance will dramatically increase. Everyone who shares the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons should be devoting a lot of time and energy nowadays to address this challenge.

With that idea in mind, I announced in Prague a new initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. The United States proposes to work with both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states to better understand the technical problems of verifying nuclear disarmament and to develop solutions. The United Kingdom and Norway have already pioneered this type of work.
This new initiative will build on the spirit of that experiment to create a non-traditional partnership that draws on the expertise of talented individuals around the world, both in government and out of government. And in that regard, I’m simply delighted that the Nuclear Threat Initiative will be a prime partner, providing intellectual energy and resources to this project. We are excited to be working with them on it and we hope to work with more of you on this initiative, as well. So I do hope that we’ll have opportunities to develop an ongoing discourse as we roll out the agenda for the initiative further, and hope to hear good ideas from you, whether it’s on the process side, procedural side, or actually on the technology side, as well. We truly do want a wide-ranging partnership with the nongovernmental community.

Beyond this effort we will continue to work with the P5 on transparency and verification. I’m very pleased that the United Kingdom will host the 6th Annual P5 Conference in early February in London. The regular interactions, cooperation, and trust-building that are happening now in this P5 forum is the foundation on which future P5 disarmament negotiations will stand.

In closing, I’d like to make it clear that the United States has plans and we intend to see them through. Again, at the core of our efforts is our deep understanding of the human impacts of nuclear weapons. That is why I traveled this year to Marshall Islands, to Hiroshima, and two times to Utah to talk with those who have suffered at the use of nuclear weapons, radiation contamination, and economic problems, as well.

That is why the United States sent a delegation last week to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons Use. The United States understands that nuclear weapons are not a theoretical tool. They are real and any use of nuclear weapons would exact a terrible toll. No one in this country or any country
should ever forget that.

Thank you very much for you attention and I look forward to our discussion period. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. PIFER: Okay, Rose, well, first of all, thank you very much for the overview. Let me take the moderator's prerogative and pose a couple of questions, then we'll open it up the audience. And we have about an hour to grill you now.

The first question would be a general question. I mean, when you're looking at the overall U.S.-Russia relationship over the past year, obviously there is this crisis over Ukraine that's been a big shadow. And you did mention that despite that, the Russians have worked in a cooperative way, in a business-like way in terms of implementation of New START. But you've also had a series of other exchanges: you've been to Moscow, you met with Deputy Minister Yakov. How has that affected those exchanges? Do you see an impact on those?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I think, quite honestly, and there are a lot of, you know, speculations out there that things have gone severely worse since the crisis in Ukraine, and I would say that some of the hesitation we saw from the Russian Federation about the disarmament agenda had emerged well before the crisis over Ukraine. There were concerns about -- and many of you remember, there were a series of issues they said were of concern to them before they wanted to engage in further strategic arms reduction negotiations, including missile defenses, including the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, including a conventional global strike, a number of issues were out there, which I saw essentially as serving a blocking function to any further discussion of nuclear disarmament measures in the period immediately after New START entered into force.

And, oh, by the way, another key Russian talking point throughout that
period in the run-up to the Ukraine crisis was that essentially New START would have to be fully implemented before they would agree to proceed with any further negotiations. So New START will be fully implemented on February 5th of 2018, so we don’t really have that far to go. But, nevertheless, I’ve been arguing regularly to my Russian colleagues that not only is the Berlin proposal in their security interest as well as ours -- and no country enters into an arms control treaty, including our own, unless it’s in their national security interest -- but, furthermore, it’s the kind of proposal that could be implemented seriatim: that we could implement New START and then immediately build out from that in implementing the Berlin proposal.

So I just wanted to make people aware that we had, I would say, hesitations and barriers in the way even before the Ukraine crisis emerged. Since the Ukraine crisis emerged, the situation has been complicated by the severity of that terrible crisis. However, I would also say that I think there are some interesting continuing signs out there of pragmatism and a business-like attitude.

I mentioned the New START Treaty implementation, but in addition to that we had tremendous success with implementation of the Syria chemical weapons project, getting 1,300 tons of chemical weapons out of Syria in the period between September of 2013 and September of 2014. So at the very height of this Ukraine crisis we continued to work very successfully with Moscow, as well as with the U.N. Task Force that was assigned with implementing this project to get those chemical weapons out of the country. There’s still more work to do. We’re dealing with our concerns about the capabilities the Syrians may not have declared to the OPCW, but, nevertheless, that’s a good sign, I think, of a continuing business-like attitude in Moscow.

And the third area has been one for my colleague, Wendy Sherman, the Under Secretary of Policy, and that is the so-called P5+1 talks concerning Iran, where,
again, there’s been a very business-like attitude by the Russians and they continue to help to move that agenda forward. So it’s an interesting mixed picture, I would say.

And people have asked me why I continue to be optimistic despite the negative trend lines. Part of it is associated with this business-like attitude that I’ve seen when the Russians have clearly decided that it is in their national security interest to continue to cooperation.

MR. PIFER: Let me ask a second question, which is you mentioned the Russian violation of the INF Treaty. And shortly after the formal judgment was announced publicly the Russians came out and said, well, we have three concerns where we believe the United States has violated the treaty in terms of use of drones, target missiles for the SM-3 interceptor, and a question about the vertical launch box planned for the SM-3 deployments in Romania and Poland. How do you respond to those charges?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: First and foremost, with a clear statement that the United States remains fully in compliance with the INF Treaty. And furthermore, I talk about the very careful compliance assessment process that we carry out. The Defense Department has the lead for those assessments, but, nevertheless, it is with close consultation with other agencies of our government. And so we say that we have a process in place and we come to a careful determination and we say to the Russians don’t you have such a process, as well? I mean, essentially that’s part of my discourse with them, to talk about the necessity of compliance being considered as a whole of government-type of issue, I’ll put it that way.

I will say also for this group, I know there’s been a lot of interest in this. And taking from the interest we’ve heard from the nongovernment community, we are putting together a factsheet that will provide you some unclassified information about why
we clearly believe that these three systems are in compliance with the INF Treaty. I wish I had it to hand out to you today. It’s still being worked among our interagency team, but we will have it on the street shortly and it’ll be available on our website. So we’ll make sure that that’s available for everybody. But it is -- I’m completely confident that we are in compliance with our INF Treaty obligations based, again, on a very solid interagency process.

MR. PIFER: Okay. Well, let me go ahead and open up the floor to questions from the audience. If you could please state your name and affiliation. And keep it short and there should be something resembling a question mark at the end.

So here in the front?

MR. KIRSANOV: Good morning, Madam Secretary. Dmitry Kirsanov of Tass, the Russian newswire service. Since you were speaking about the dangers of nuclear weapons, I wanted to ask you about the U.S. modernization program. And specifically, I wanted you to comment on a news article by Professor Theodore Postol which is about to be published in the latest issue of the Nation magazine. So I don’t distort his views, I just wanted to read you two brief passages, with your permission, and I would like you to comment on those.

“Close analysis reveals a technically sophisticated effort to ready U.S. nuclear forces for a direct confrontation with Russia.” That’s point number one.

And the point number two, “the modernization drive as a disturbing indication that the U.S. military believes in nuclear war against Russia can be fought and won.”

Any thoughts on that?

MS. GOTTEMÖLLER: I disagree profoundly with both of those points. And one point that I have made repeatedly to my interlocutors in Moscow is that we’ve
been down this road before of an action-reaction cycle. The last thing we need now is to repeat the mistakes of the Cold War, pouring resources and our national intellect and will into programs of this kind that, of course, if necessary they would be in our national security interest, but we don’t see them as necessary at this time.

What is necessary is some judicious modernization of our nuclear forces. And it’s interesting that there is, I would say, at the moment a disconnect. Russia, after the period of the 1990s, where a lot of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal was essentially going out of its guaranteed period of service, the big Cold War era missiles, such as the SS-18s, so-called SS-19s. These are NATO terminology, obviously. They passed out of their service life and so Russia’s had a mass obsolescence to deal with. So in this first decade of the 21st century, Russia has been focusing on modernization of its strategic forces and putting resources into that.

The second decade of the 20th century now underway, the United States is putting some resources into judicious modernization of our strategic forces. So there’s a bit of a lag time here, but I would say both Moscow and Washington has been making some decisions about, again, what I consider to be judicious modernization following some, you know, Cold War era systems going out of their service life.

MR. DUNKERLEE: Thanks. Craig Dunkerlee. Rose, thank you for a wide-ranging brief.

One of the challenges out there that you mentioned is the growth of nuclear arsenals in Asia. And I was wondering if you could expand a little bit on that particular problem and how your part of the administration is thinking about dealing with that long-term problem. And more specifically, if you can give a sense of the quality of our discussions with the Chinese on these particular issues, not just in the P5 context, but bilaterally on the question of strategic stability.
MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, first of all, I will say a word in support of the P5 process because I remember the very first meeting in London in September of 2009, which I consider it a proto meeting. It was one of those meetings if you’ve been in government you recognize some people kind of exchanged their talking point scripts and, you know, it’s kind of stilted, to be honest. But in the five years since, there has been a steady increase in the amount of true interaction in these meetings and a maturation and new sophistication, I would say, in the interactions among all of the P5.

So I very much welcome -- again, the U.K. hosted the first proto meeting and now returning at the end of the first cycle to a meeting in London, I know that the discussion will be very rich and very interactive. And actually, we are, I think, putting a lot of issues on the table with regard to strategic stability and having a chance to air them and exchange views on them at P5, which has not happened historically. So I do think it’s quite an historic venue and one that I very much welcome.

But in terms of our bilateral interaction with the Chinese I want to talk about several levels. First of all, I want to give due credit to the nongovernment community for the Track 2 and Track 1.5 discussions that have been going on with regard with China. And a lot of the organizations around this room have been carrying them out in one way or another. There’s a lot of interesting new developments, I would say, in those settings with the Chinese being willing to talk about details of verification regimes and that type of thing where they have not been willing historically to really touch on those topics or have been simply in a listening mode and not willing to really come out and discuss or participate in projects.

And these kinds of second track activities are reflected, also, on the government side in some particular practical, I would say, developments. I mentioned the IFE-14 in Jordan. A couple of weeks ago, I was there for the VIP day and got to see
a number of the various sensor systems and so forth that had been brought. One of the most impressive sensors was a mobile gas detector, an argon detection system, that the Chinese technical teams had worked on and brought. And they had it there and they were showing how it would operate, you know, for us VIPs, many of us not knowing anything technically, but, nevertheless, it was good to see an entire Chinese technical team there and the respect and the kind of regard for the technology that they had brought b the rest of the IFE team. So that was good to see on an international basis.

And it was good, also, for those of you who know Ambassador Sha Zukang, he was there, as well, representing China as their VIP. And he was one of the negotiators of the CTBT. So to see him there again, he was interacting with all of us, of course, but interacting with the technical team that was there was very fun, very gratifying actually.

So I would say I’m seeing with China a kind of willingness to engage that I did not see before I came into government this time. In the last five years, I think that there has been a real intensification in their efforts to engage both unofficially and officially with some true practical results.

MR. MAUCIONE: Good morning. Scott Maucione with Inside the Pentagon. I was just a little curious about the international partnership. I was wondering if that’s something that needs funding and would that go in the FY ’16 budget? I was also wondering when we might see results from the partnership and what kind of reception you’ve heard from our international partners on the partnership.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Are you talking about the global partnership?

MR. MAUCIONE: The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament and Verification.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: The verification partnership, I beg your pardon.
We are starting small with this. We have some particular early projects that we are engaging. We are working very, very closely with the UK and Norway, who had the early project, as I mentioned, on warhead verification. And we want to emphasize and focus on warhead verification because it is something, honestly, we have never tackled as a true international matter.

And part of the rationale here is to convey to non-nuclear weapons states the complexity of this upcoming stage of the nuclear disarmament agenda. That is, monitoring and verifying the reduction and elimination of warheads and monitoring holdings of warheads, full stop. That’s a very, very complicated matter because of the huge sensitivity, obviously, of warhead arsenals and it has to be handled in a way that does not allow sensitive information to get out and contribute to any proliferation threat. So as a first order of business we’ll be concentrating on building on the UK-Norway experience and building out from that.

I should give full credit, by the way, to some bilateral work that was done during the 1990s under the so-called Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement between the United States and Russia. At that time, there was some really decent work that was done on information barriers and that type of thing. So, again, there are other foundation stones that we can build on, but I don’t want to limit it to WSSX because that’s a set of projects that were successful at the time, but they’re now over a decade old. So I think we want to also look at more recent experience, such as the UK-Norway project.

MR. BRADLEY: Good morning, Madam Secretary. Brian Bradley, Nuclear Security and Deterrence Monitor. I was wondering if there had been a date set for the next discussion with Russia about INF and what that engagement would entail on the U.S. side. Thanks.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, I would never, ever talk about our quiet
diplomatic scheduling in any detail, but I can assure you that the interactions are ongoing.

SPEAKER: (inaudible) SBS, South Korean news media, Seoul Broadcasting System. I have two questions on Korea, the Korean Peninsula first, and North Korea.

Do you see any -- how is the prospect next year, in 2015, the North Korean nuclear issue? They're a still significant threat in the region and also globally. Do you see there will be any development of progress in that direction next year?

And the second question is you refer to Ambassador Thomas Countryman. And in South Korea, the ABC (inaudible) Agreement is also an important issue. How do you see the prospects?

MS. GOTTEMÖLLER: First of all, with regard to North Korea, we are very interested, of course, in returning to the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but that process can only take place if North Korea reestablishes its bona fides before the international community. We need to really see some concrete indicators that they are serious about negotiations, they are serious about the process of denuclearization. So we will continue to press them on that matter. Our ambassador, Glyn Davies, is still our full-time envoy focused on that matter and serious about -- we're serious about trying to continue to make progress in that area. But Pyongyang is going to have to take some steps to convey that they are serious about moving forward.

The other comment I would like to make about that is that I think that if we have a successful negotiation in the P5+1 context and we are all hopeful that that negotiation will produce good results in the next coming months, and I certainly hope that we'll see some good results toward the time of the NPT Review Conference in April/May, that I hope that will have a salutary effect on the North Korea situation and that it will be a kind of signal that it's time to move forward with some problem-solving, also, on the
Korean Peninsula with regard to North Korea’s nuclear weapons. So we will see how that works, but I hope that there will be some momentum that results perhaps from a number of different directions in the coming months. But that is one I think that is worth watching.

On your second question are you referring to the 1-2-3 --

SPEAKER: (inaudible)

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Yes, exactly, the 123 Agreement, agreement for nuclear cooperation with the ROK. Again, I don’t want to comment on confidential diplomacy that is going on right now, but I will say that we’ve made excellent progress, in my view, in the negotiations and I don’t see any reason why we should not be able to complete it in short order. But, again, I don’t want to talk about any details of meetings and so forth.


First, we’re very pleased to see the United States participating in that meeting. As you know, one of the motivations for that meeting and that gathering has been the disappointment about the progress on the disarmament action steps agreed to in 2010. And one of the issues that was raised at the meeting was concern about the incompatibility of the potential use of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law and the laws of war.

Are you thinking about or planning on engaging with some of the non-nuclear weapon states through the P5 process to discuss how the United States and other nuclear arms states have reduced the role of nuclear weapons? And is the United
States willing to--thinking about providing its rationale for how the U.S. nuclear war plans are compatible with the laws of war as the 2010--or I should say the 2012 Nuclear Posture Review report suggests?

MS. GOTTEMÖLLER: First of all, the guiding principle here is a policy that I have oft repeated, but has oft been repeated by our President all the way down to my level and on, and that is that the legacy of the practically over 70--nearly 70-year non-use of nuclear weapons must be extended forever; that we must continue to do everything we can to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again. And that is at the heart of U.S. policy in this regard and certainly is at the heart of the de-emphasis on nuclear weapons in our own national arsenal and in our own national doctrine that was put forward in the Nuclear Posture Review and in the implementation study that ensued from the Nuclear Posture Review.

So we will continue to be definitely willing to broach the points that were made in the NPR and in the follow-on to it, the implementation study, and to talk about it, not only in official circles, such as at the P5, but also talk about it publicly, as well. And that's actually a good reminder, Daryl, to continue to remind the international community of the very significant, in my view, policy steps and initiatives that the administration has undertaken since it came into office to really put in place the structure for de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in our doctrine and policy and in our overarching military arsenal.

So good reminder and I think definitely that'll be something we're ready to do.

MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you. Leandra Bernstein, RIA Novosti, Russian press. Specifically on the INF Treaty, in a hearing with Congress last week you were pressed to make the statement that, yes, it is the United States' stance that Russia is noncompliant in the treaty. So very specifically, what exactly is the reasoning for its
noncompliance? Is it the Iskander missiles? Is it the X-101 cruise missiles? And where exactly, location-wise, is it noncompliant? Is it Crimea, is it Kaliningrad, or some other place? So just to get a little specific.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Okay. First of all, I wasn’t really pressed in the hearing last week on that matter. We’ve been very open and public since July when we published our compliance report that Russia, in our view, is not in compliance with the INF Treaty. And the reason is a ground-launched cruise missile that has been tested, that is in development in the Russian Federation.

I should be clear for this audience if you’re not familiar with INF, it’s a total ban on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and non-nuclear missiles for that matter. A total ban on missiles, full stop, between the ranges of 500 and 5,500 kilometers. And so it doesn’t matter whether they’re deployed or not, just if they’re seen being tested. If they are in development, then they are not compliant with the INF Treaty.

And it is that concern that we raised in the compliance report in July of 2014, and have been continuing to raise with the Russian Federation. It is a ground-launched cruise missile. It is neither of the systems that you raised. It’s not the Iskander. It’s not the other one, X-100. Is that what it is? Yeah, I’ve seen some of those reflections in the press and it’s not that one.

So I think it’s really, really important to focus down on, you know, a good discussion of this matter. That’s my basic point.

The Russians have made certain allegations against the United States. Steve already raised that this morning. We believe that we are in complete compliance with the INF Treaty and we’re willing to talk about that with the Russian Federation, but we need to hear from the Russian side, as well. That’s the most important thing from our perspective. This can’t be a one-sided conversation.
MR. FLECK: Thank you. Madam Under Secretary, I’m Martin Fleck. I’m with Physicians for Social Responsibility. And one point I want to totally emphasize is that we’ve asked you to send a delegation to the Vienna Conference and thank you, thank you on behalf of our members all over the country, our allied organizations who were also asking you to do so. Thanks to you, thanks to Secretary Kerry, thanks to President Obama for making the decision. I know it wasn’t easy.

Another thing is about the non-proliferation treaty. I think that United States policy may be out of step with the urgency of the situation, which was expressed at the Vienna Conference, especially by people like Eric Schlosser, author of Command and Control, who essentially is telling us that we’re living on borrowed time. And, therefore, since it’s been 44 years since the United States promised to pursue disarmament in the NPT, there’s some impatience and a sense that we’re not moving fast enough.

So with regards to that, I know that you feel that we’re engaging in judicious modernization, but I think that at the NPT you may find that other nations and people here in the United States also sense that a $355 billion expenditure over the next 10 years, a trillion dollars over the next 30 years, is not judicious and it is not indicative of a nation that’s moving to live up to its Article VI.

So my question, what’s my question? It’s really a favor. Would you ask the President to put the brakes on the modernization program in order to improve the optics as we go into the NPT review?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, let me say a few things. First of all, about our decision to attend the Vienna Conference, we really saw it as an excellent opportunity to make the case that I’ve made to you this morning and to have a really good discourse and debate with the entire community with a broad spectrum of views, and I welcome the
opportunity to hear other views in this room this morning. But these will be a continuing source of discussion and debate, there’s no question about it. But our core rationale for going to Vienna was to make sure that our story was out there, too, because I do want to make sure that from our perspective an 85 percent reduction in the U.S. arsenal of strategic -- of nuclear weapons, full stop, since 1967 is a significant step on the road to disarmament. And we are continuing further elimination and disarmament efforts every single day.

So the notion -- I just don’t accept the notion that things have stalled. And I want that message to be very clear for this audience. We will continue to press that message forward and we can debate it. And this matter of whether our modernization is judicious or not I’m sure will also be strongly debated. I welcome the debate, but our reason for going to the conference was a practical one, and that is we felt it very important to get our side of the story out there. And I hope that we’ll have an opportunity to continue, you know, with open-mindedness among the community to hear what we have to say, as well. And so I think that’s how I’ll answer your questions, so thank you.

MS. GIBBONS: Hi. My name is Rebecca Gibbons and I provide contractor support for the Air Force’s arms control shop. And with that in mind, I wanted to ask you about the Partnership for Verification and if it’s been determined what other states are going to be involved in that effort and if it’s going to be an interagency effort.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: It will certainly be an interagency effort and it’s been an interagency effort to get to this point because, clearly, we couldn’t make a big international announcement of this kind unless we had broached it and discussed it and thoroughly aired it among the interagency. For those of you who have served in government you know how delicious that activity is, but it’s necessary. It’s very necessary. So it’s definitely been an interagency effort to get to this point.
And we are welcoming -- I said in my remarks we want to work with non-nuclear weapons states as well as nuclear weapons states, and so we’re, at this point, open-minded about who will be participating.

I also want to say, however, that we hope to invigorate the work on verification matters among the P5 because we also think that it’s very important that the nuclear weapons states develop some sophisticated understanding of these matters. In the last year, we have had success in establishing a P5 working group that meets in Vienna at the same time that Working Group B meets. Working Group B is the verification working group that deals with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and looks at technical verification issues in that context.

I think it’s fine for the P5 to begin work focusing on CTBT verification because that provides a lot of very good technical information that can then, in the future, be broadened out in other directions, as well.

So the verification initiative is a great new approach, I think, but I don’t want you to say or anybody to say that we’re abandoning our efforts to discuss these matters among the P5, as well. It’s one of the most important rationales for the P5 process, as we see it.

MR. PIFER: I have to say that I think that’s the first time I’ve heard the interagency process described as “delicious.” (Laughter) Right?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: With a hint of irony.

MR. PIFER: Many other adjectives, but.


One is, is there anything you can share about efforts in South Asia to share best practices, confidence-building measures with countries outside the P5?
And second, types as well as numbers obviously matter to civility. And I wonder more broadly if you have any thoughts on prospects for constraining or discouraging land-based MRVs in the longer term.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, and that’s one point I wanted to make about our own stabilizing activity over the last generation really has been our move to de-MRV the ICBM force, and we see that as one of the core steps in the direction of a more stabilized strategic relationship among countries. So, yes, as a general matter, we constantly focus on the necessity of avoiding multiple warheads on missiles because they create -- speaking of delicious -- they create highly valuable targets. And that is what you want to avoid if you want to have a stable strategic relationship. So that is a constant of our discourse on these matters internationally and will continue to be so.

With regard specifically to South Asia, I want to say again that we’ve had some, I think, really good Track 2, Track 1.5 activities going on recently with both India and Pakistan. I commend those of you around the room who have been involved in them. They have been very, I think, interesting and sometimes productive from what I’ve been able to see when people have briefed or told me about them or sent me trip reports and so forth. I think there have been some really, really solid discussions, bringing up exactly the issues you talk about, the kind of classical issues of strategic stability.

We do have discussions of these matters on an official level, as well. We have a strategic dialogue with India. We also have the so-called SNAP Talks, with Pakistan. I always forget what SNAP stands for: Security, Non-Proliferation, and Strategic Stability Talks, which take place, as well, with Pakistan. So we have opportunities to raise these issues officially as well.

I will tell you one of my goals in the coming year is to broaden this discussion from any kind of regional ghetto, to be honest. These issues, such as
conventional global strike, they affect the whole Eurasian community, they affect the whole international community. I think we need to be talking about them in a broader community of countries who are either deploying to tempted to deploy these kinds of capabilities. It’s the same with any of the other systems you might name, including something like MRV’ed system.

So I think having an opportunity to broaden these discussions and, you know, bump them up from any particular regional setting is very, very important as a direction for policy, and I hope we can accomplish it.

MR. SHELAND: Good morning, Madam Secretary. Mark Sheland, formerly with the State Department and the IAEA Secretariat. I’m interested in your statement on convening Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone conference and would ask you to elaborate on practical goal-setting. I mean, how prepared is Israel to engage and be transparent in some measure? How prepared is Egypt in terms of its current government structure to engage? And how much of a hindrance to all of this is the Iran issue?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: That’s an interesting -- you know, frankly, I think there’s been quite -- we’ve had a preparatory process going on in the past six months. I don’t want to, again, get in details of diplomatic exchanges, but it’s been quite positive preparatory process that has, I think, dealt with some of the initial tensions and anxieties over this Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone Conference that emerged from the NPT review conference in 2010.

We have brought the core actors together. The Arabs, the Israelis, and the Iranians have participated. So in terms of the P5+1 talks, I don’t see that as being a big kind of negative influence on this. The necessity now is on all states interested in this matter to get together and agree on an agenda. Our view is if the states can get together
and agree on an agenda, there is no reason why we shouldn’t be able to convene this
closeup on the cusp of moving to convene this conference. We
hope that the parties can act together in everybody’s interest to agree on an agenda. So
that’s where it stands at the moment.

MR. VODDER: Hi. Jake Vodder with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun.

Thanks for your time this morning.

You mentioned that the Russians have been unwilling to discuss further
reductions until New START is implemented. What are the prospects for the Berlin
proposal of last year pitting its mark between now and 2018?

MS. GOTTEMÖLLER: Well, again, I think a lot depends on in this case
broader political issues. I did take note that President Putin, when he made his speech at
Valdai, which was very critical of the United States in many, many ways, but there was
one key paragraph where he said that it is necessary to continue nuclear arms reduction
negotiations. So I hope, you know, that this is indicative of some Russian flexibility in this
regard. Of course, we have to make the case in our own political environment that it is a
good thing to do to continue to pursue strategic arms reduction with the Russian
Federation at a time of profound crisis over Ukraine and other significant issues.

My view of this matter is that, historically, throughout the ups and downs
of the U.S.-Soviet relationship through the Cold War, continuing to pursue strategic arms
reductions was in our interest, in the interest of the USSR at that time, and in the interest
of the entire global community in the context of the non-proliferation treaty and our
responsibilities to pursue disarmament under the Article VI commitments. So I believe
that there is both a solid historical rationale for proceeding, despite the severe crisis
bilaterally and I believe that there is a strategic interest requirement, as well, or a strategic interest rationale, I would say, that these further reductions would not only be in the U.S. interest, but in the Russian interest, as well.

SPEAKER: Thanks. I just wondered could you address the impact on economic and financial conditions in Russia and in United States (inaudible) and then nuclear talks or negotiations?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Yes, I believe that you were talking about the cost of the modernization programs over time?

SPEAKER: (audio drop; inaudible)

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Okay, I understand now. The question is with regard to whether the economic crisis in the Russian Federation may affect their further modernization efforts, as I understand, and what the impact might be.

Again, this is a little bit out of my job jar, but I was reading with interest this morning the Financial Times has an interesting array of commentary on what’s happening with the Russian economy right now. One of the points that was made is that Putin, several weeks ago, signed out the Russian Federation’s national budget for FY ’15 and ’16 with the assumption underpinning it that oil would be at $96 a barrel. And today, as we know, oil is -- well, it’s going up and down some, but I think the trend is pretty much down, heading below $60 a barrel. So it’s an assumption that is not going to be viable for supporting the Russian economy.

So, again, it’s not up to me and certainly I’m not in our own Treasury Department or Finance Ministry. But I do think that there’s bound to be some impacts on the goals that the Russian Federation has laid out for strategic force modernization. I just cannot tell you what those impacts will be, but, historically, it has meant selecting priorities.
There's been a lot of talk about different kinds of weapon systems on the Russian side in the press. I can't comment as to whether any of those are officially endorsed or not, but I think it's inevitable that there will be some honing of the program to modernize Russian strategic forces due to the economic difficulties. So that's really all I can say on that matter.

MR. BIRCH: Yes, hi. Doug Birch, Center for Public Integrity. Hi, Rose.

My question is, as the clock is ticking down the administration and Moscow is showing very little interest in pursuing further negotiated cuts in arsenals, at some point will the administration reconsider linking its own -- the size of the U.S. stockpile with the size of Russia's stockpile and just accept the Nuclear Posture Review's recommended judgment that the U.S. can get by with a smaller arsenal and still be secure?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: I believe the question is a question about unilateral reductions, and I will say, as I've said repeatedly, including in public testimony, that unilateral reductions are not on the table. Not on the table is all I can say.

MR. PIFER: Right behind you.

MR. JENT: Yes, good morning. Tim Jent from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, New START Onsite Inspection Branch. First off, Madam Secretary, thank you for all your hard work. As a member of DTRA and as a treaty implementer, we often sit back and look at some of the things that might affect a treaty (inaudible) and all the way out to 2018. And as we see the likelihood of new sanctions being announced as early as Friday, I do believe that the administration is willing to sacrifice all the hard work that your office has done over the years in arms control to include the treaty to continue with sanctions? Or do you think that the topics can remain separate and continue on separate paths so that the treaty as well as your efforts in the future may continue?
Thank you.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. And let me express my appreciation for DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the entire team of inspectors who go out, and also on our side the Air Force, the Navy people, who accept the inspection teams coming from the Russian Federation. Eighteen times a year the Russians are coming here to our bomber bases, our naval bases, looking at submarines, looking at our ICBM force. It takes a lot of work, as you can imagine, to prepare for those inspections, so that's on the Air Force/Navy side. DTRA, of course, involved as well, accompanying the Russian teams.

But then when we go 18 times a year to Russia to look at the strategic rocket forces, bases, their nuclear Navy, the LRA -- long-range aviation -- bases, it's the DTRA inspectors who are at the forefront. You guys are really on the cold face here implementing the treaty, so thank you and my appreciation for your continuing work.

I will say the signs so far -- I think the crisis was at the moment that the Ukraine crisis was bursting on the scene. As some of you may recall, it was actually March 8th, which is International Women's Day. That's a big Russian holiday, so I was astonished to see when I woke up in the morning a reference in the newspaper that Russia was considering pulling the plug on the implementation of the New START Treaty. Well, as you can imagine, I got on the phone immediately with my counterparts in Moscow. It was -- that report was linked to an unnamed source in the Ministry of Defense.

So I got on the phone immediately. I said what's going on? And I was told, you know, we'll look into this, get back to you. So within five days I had a callback and, again, not just to me, but an official announcement of the Russian Federation that they would be continuing to implement the New START Treaty despite the crisis that has
been going on in Ukraine.

So I hope that that position will hold. It’s consistent with the history that I spoke about a moment ago, that despite some very rough patches during the Cold War, some very serious ups and downs in our relationship that we, nevertheless, continued to implement arms control treaties and agreements throughout that period. Some of you with long memories will remember that when the Soviets marched into Afghanistan in 1979, we pulled the plug on the so-called SALT II Agreement. At the time we did not move forward to ratify and implement that agreement. But, nevertheless, at some point, the then Republican administration and the Kremlin agreed to proceed with implementing the SALT II limitations. And that went forward kind of in a parallel agreement informally, even during the years when the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan.

So that’s just an example historically of what I’m talking about, that, again, despite serious differences, serious problems, bilaterally we have continued to see implementation of arms control treaties and agreements affecting the nuclear forces to be in our mutual interest. And I hope that that will be the case here, as well.

MR. KRAMER: Good morning, Madam Secretary. I’m Jay Kramer. I’m a lawyer who worked in nuclear export control and non-proliferation hearings.

You spoke this morning about work to be done at the P5 and the partnership with respect to the verification. And I wonder if that work anticipates a multilateral organization to eventually implement verification as disarmament moves, as it ultimately must, into the multilateral area rather than just bilateral or whether the anticipation is that these efforts will develop techniques that can then be used by the IAEA in the course of verification of disarmament.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. That’s a very interesting question.

First of all, I will say that from the perspective of U.S. policy, we see this
verification monitoring of arms control treaties and agreements as essentially a national function for the foreseeable future, although -- and here’s my second point -- we do obviously cooperate with international organizations. I mentioned being at the CTBT onsite inspection exercise in Jordan. We put a lot of resources and a lot of people into the implementation of that onsite inspection experiment for the CTBT, so we worked very closely with international organizations. IAEA, as you know, worked very, very closely with the IAEA, as well. But I see it for the foreseeable future as essentially a national responsibility.

However, and here’s something I wanted to note that I think there’s been some really interesting work done historically on what will happen when we get close to zero. This is not a matter for national policymakers right at the moment, but I would welcome continuing work on what would be required institutionally, procedurally, technologically when we get very close to zero.

I think, again, historically there have been some good studies in this area and it’s worth the academic community, the scientific community continuing to consider these issues because I think it backs up -- again, our emphasis is on the practicality of getting to zero. How can we practically get to zero? And to do that, we’re going to have to do some very hard thinking about what it will take, again, whether it’s institutionally, procedurally, technologically, and certainly in the realm of regional security, as well. That’s a whole different topic we could spend a morning session on. But, nevertheless, just talking about the nuts and bolts of an arms control regime, I think there could be some good work done on that topic again.

MR. McKENZIE: Good morning. Matthew McKenzie from the Natural Resources Defense Council. Thank you so much for doing this event today. Yesterday, the Moscow Times reported that Russia is considering deploying rail-mobile nuclear
missile systems, and I wondered if you had any comment on that reporting. Thank you.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, talk about back to the future, that's where we were in the '80s and we've really been urging the Russians to, again, consider, you know, what's going to be stabilizing and what's not going to be stabilizing going forward. I did mention that I see their modernization thus far as being judicious.

For example, there are New START numbers for delivery vehicles -- well below -- the 700 central limit. The central limit of New START when it's fully implemented in 2018 will be 700 operationally deployed delivery vehicles. The Russians are well below those levels now and we don't see them, you know, surging up. And I'm delighted we have that kind of central limit to provide a ceiling for how far they can modernize.

But I think the rail-mobile system is a good example of one where there's some questions about its economic feasibility as well as its strategic stability rationale at the moment, so we'll see. It's not up to me to make those decisions, but we would certainly, I think, urge consideration of the strategic stability impacts of such a system, especially if it's to deliver an MRV'ed missile.

MR. PIFER: Briefly on that, there was a question during the New START ratification debate whether rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles would be covered by the New START Treaty. They would, in fact, be covered?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, if it's an intercontinental strategic system it would have be, you know, brought under the treaty essentially.

MR. DUNN: Madam Secretary, good morning. I'd like to -- John Dunn. I'm an inspection team chief at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I'd like to cobble a couple questions together here based on some of the discussions we've heard.

You mentioned that 90 percent of the world's nuclear armaments are in the hands of the United States and Russia, that unilateral disarmament's not on the table.
from the United States’ perspective, a recent statement from Putin that he values future disarmament, but there’s also been statements from Russian officials that they’re not really interested in any further bilateral disarmament steps with the United States beyond the New START Treaty and that any future disarmament needs to be in a multilateral form.

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you for raising that. That’s one of the conditions that they had laid out in this earlier phase I was talking about.

MR. DUNN: So my question is given that 90 percent are in U.S.-Russia hands, first of all, I guess you just confirmed one of the questions is, that a multilateral prerequisite does, in fact, exist based on your discussions with your interlocutors in Moscow. Have you had any discussions with other nuclear states that kind of indicate what their threshold is below which the United States and Russia needs to attain for their participation in any multilateral efforts?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, historically, there have been, again, I wouldn’t say official positions out there, but there have been a lot of expert comments that, oh, when the U.S. and Russia get, you know, around 1,000 deployed warheads, then maybe it gets more interesting. But I’m not saying that these are official positions of Beijing, Paris, or London by any means. I would just note that that number of 1,000 in U.S. and Russian arsenals has been out there as something that countries have, in their NGO communities and their expert communities, have commented on.

One thing about this multilateral point, I have always stressed that I don’t even see how you would structure such a negotiation because there is such a disbalance that the United States and Russia do have over 90 percent still of the nuclear weapons in the world. So how do you structure a negotiation between, you know, two parties with very high numbers and three parties with rather low numbers? It doesn’t make practical
sense to me. And I have yet to hear from the Russians how they would structure such a negotiation, so I don’t know what they mean when they say they want to move to multilateral negotiations now. And actually, that’d be an interesting topic for discussion. Thanks.

MS. PERLMAN: Thank you. Diane Perlman of School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason, and I regularly go to the NPT meetings. And just in response to your comment about what we need to get to zero, one of the things that we need to do more of is dealing with the underlying conflicts and the causes and the fear and the desire for nuclear weapons that perceive irrational beliefs in what nuclear weapons provide.

And I’ve been going to -- I went to the U.N. Conference on Climate Change with Mediators Beyond Borders. And one of the things we have been doing is getting language into the treaty about dealing with the conflicts, mechanisms for dealing with the conflicts first. So I think that that -- like what are your thoughts about, you know, if we could deal -- we have many ways of dealing with the conflicts and we usually deal with the symptom of getting rid of the weapons rather than the need or the conflicts that lead people to feel like they need these. So could you comment?

MS. GOTTMOELLER: Well, thank you, Diane, and I know a lot about your work. We’ve had a chance to talk about it before in this setting and others.

One thing I will say is that we recognize the necessity of working on the regional security matters as intensively as possible. My boss, Secretary Kerry, has been out on the road, you know, nonstop and in recent weeks very much focused on Middle East and the hopes for rejuvenating the Middle East peace process. So we have the regional security piece of it very, very much in mind and constantly work it as a matter of national policy.
But my comment is we need to do both. Again, I would not argue and it would play into the hands of those who say you’re not doing enough on disarmament if we somehow backed off or sat on our hands and didn’t try to continue to make practical progress in every way we can, whether it’s generating the conditions for more sophisticated and difficult verification regimes in the future, like monitoring warheads -- that’s the whole meaning of our verification initiative -- and also, as I mentioned, getting non-nuclear weapons states involved so that they recognize what some of the difficulties are in that regard. But you have to do both at once, I think.

MR. PIFER: I give myself the opportunity to take the last question and that is, Rose, you’ve talked about the Russians being serious in terms of implementation of New START and obviously because they calculate that that’s in their interest. But you also mentioned that, you know, the Russians haven’t been prepared to go beyond that and I think you used the term, some of the issues that they raised, as blocking functions from further reductions.

Is there sense within the U.S. Government why the Russians aren’t prepared to go further? Because when you look at the unclassified numbers, you know, the Russians are up comparably with us and 4,500, 4,800 weapons, usually above any third country at 300. Is there a sense for why the Russians at this point in time are reluctant to engage in discussion on going lower?

MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Prior to Ukraine crisis I think it was a complex mix of interagency factors on their side and perhaps, I’m speculating here, but perhaps some sense that they hadn’t quite decided where they wanted to go with their own modernization program, so not wishing to engage in a nuclear reduction negotiation in that context.

Since the Ukraine crisis emerged I think there is an additional political
layer of complexity here in that I think there’s a different attitude, slightly a different attitude in Moscow in this area of further reductions to the point that I made a few moments ago. That is that despite the ups and downs in the relationship, we believe that we should continue in a responsible way to pursue further arms reductions with Russia. It’s the best way, as we see it, in the end, to deal with the threat of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons. That’s what President Obama said in his Prague speech, that the only way to deal with terrorists wielding nuclear weapons in the end is to get rid of nuclear weapons and get rid of fissile material.

By the way, we haven’t talked about the Nuclear Security Summit at all this morning, but I’m really proud of the fact that we’ve gotten rid of the equivalent of 3 metric tons of fissile material from countries around the world over the last 5 years since the Nuclear Security Summit started, and the Russians have been great partners in that effort. That’s another area where we’ve had a great partnership with the Russians despite, again, the ups and downs in the relationship.

So it’s a very mixed picture and I think it’s a bit more complicated now by, you know, their political stance in the context of this bilateral crisis, which is not exactly the same as ours. That is, despite this bad period, this bad patch, this very serious crisis, we should, nevertheless, continue pressing forward. But the hesitation was there beforehand and I guess I would say hesitation beforehand was more institutional, interagency, and perhaps budget-driven on their side. And since the crisis has emerged it’s taken on some political aspects to it, as well.

MR. PIFER: Well, Rose, you’ve covered a lot of ground. We’re grateful that you took the time in your schedule. And please join me in thanking her. (Applause)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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