THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

HISTORY, POLITICS, AND POLICY IN THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE

Washington, D.C.

Monday, November 17, 2014

Welcome and Introduction:

KATHARINE H.S. MOON
SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Keynote Address:

ROBERT GALLUCCI
Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

Roundtable 1 - History and Policy: Issues, Process, Implementation:

SUE MI TERRY, Moderator
Senior Research Scholar, Weatherhead East Asia Institute
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CHARLES ARMSTRONG
Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies in The Social Sciences, Department of History, Columbia University

VICTOR CHA
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JOHNA OHTAGAKI
Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of Defense

TAE-GYUN PARK
Professor of Modern Korean History, Graduate School of International Studies
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KATHARINE H.S. MOON, Moderator
SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution
VAN JACKSON  
Visiting Fellow, Center for a New American Security  

MICHAEL SHULMAN  
ROK, Political-Military Affairs Officer, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  

ANDREW YEO  
Associate Professor of Politics, Department of Politics, Catholic University  

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KHALED ELGINDY, Moderator  
Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution  

HENRI BARKEY  
Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor Department of International Relations  
Lehigh University  

STACIE GODDARD  
Associate Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College  

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Korea Chair Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Associate Fellow, School of Advanced International Studies  
Johns Hopkins University  

ALEXIS DUDDEN  
Professor, Department of History, University of Connecticut  

STEVEN GOLDSTEIN  
Director, Taiwan Studies, Harvard University  
Sophia Smith Professor of Government,  
Department of Government, Smith College  

STEVEN H. LEE  
Associate Professor, Department of History, University of British Columbia  

JONATHAN POLLACK  
Senior Fellow, Center for East Asia Policy Studies and John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution  

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GREG SCARLATOIU, Moderator  
Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea  

RICHARD C. BUSH, III  
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies  
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NAMHEE LEE  
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Singapore Management University  

Closing Remarks:  

KATHARINE H.S. MOON  
SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and Senior Fellow  
The Brookings Institution  

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PROCEEDINGS

MS. MOON: My name is Kathy Moon. I am the SK-Korea Foundation Chair of Korean Studies and Senior Scholar. One of the four in our ever growing Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. And we have several scholars from the program who will be part of the conference today, so I'm very grateful for this collective effort.

I want to welcome you to Brookings on this gorgeous, beautiful rainy day. We should celebrate it instead of bemoan the fact that it's dripping all over us, and we will have some people who are late, both participants as well as audience because of the rain. We have one person who is stuck in New York because he can't get a flight out, and we're hoping that he will come in time for the panel on the U.S. Korean alliance. So we have a little bit of time, so we're going to hope he makes it.

We're getting a slightly late start because we also had a little bit of AV, audio visual problems. I don't know if it's related to weather. I blame everything on weather when my computer doesn't work, so I'll try it with AV. I've been told to let you know that the screen behind us, this multi, probably, I don't know how much, but we've had it renovated, this multi, whatever is costs, screen is having some technical difficulties, so it may flicker, I was told, while people are speaking, so don't worry. Nothing will blow up. They're just testing it, and it will all be fine.

At any rate, thank you so much for coming. The participants as well as the audience members. To let you know, we have had an overwhelming number of RSVPers. Well over 200 for a room that accommodates 140 people, and we will just squeeze them in if they make it in the rain.

It is one of the most diverse audiences for a Korea/U.S. seminar that I have ever seen. If you were to read the last names and the institutional affiliations so diverse, and so it is fulfilling one of my goals here which is to diversify the interest in
Korea studies as well as those who have something to say that we can learn from those of us who are in the business of studying Korea.

This conference is my, what I would call, maiden conference, you know, new ships go on their maiden voyage, and as the new chair of Korea studies I thought hard, even before I started my job officially, about what the first substantive conference of my own making would be. And I discussed this with my colleagues, and I decided to focus on both the gap as well as the friendly alliance. I won't go so far as to say marriage. I don't like all these very personal, intimate metaphors we use in politics.

But at any rate, to study both the gap and how to bridge the gap, and to bring the communities of scholars and policymakers closer together so that both communities can benefit from each other's work, and help each other push the research, policy, analysis agendas in their respective fields. It is in line with the very foundational purpose of Brookings.

The Brookings Institution traces its beginning to 1916 when a group of leading reformers founded the Institute for Government Research. They already had one of these abbreviates, IGR. The first private organization devoted to analyzing public policy issues at the national level.

Brookings makes its mark by focusing on academic studies, and there is a reason why Brookings does this. I think you would agree that all of us who care about effective and efficient public service, whether you are in government, civil society organizations, the private sector, the academy and other fields would agree that the world needs leaders who can think boldly and creatively, and apply independent and objective scientific analysis to understand and resolve many challenges and crisis around the world. Today we celebrate the global scope of Brookings in studying pressing issues and contributing constructive ideas to address those issues.

The Korean Peninsula has its share of challenges. Though other parts
of the world face what seem like insurmountable afflictions on individuals and communities, obstacles to economic resources, and law and order for basic daily survival. I point this out here because today's conference also focuses on the Koreas in a larger context of regional and global realities.

Sometimes specialists of Korea tend to be what Americans call naval gazers. We study our belly buttons, you know, we just look only at Koreas in our very small area. And I think it's well above -- past time, I would say, for those of us who study Korea to reach out into other issue areas, and to link up what's important about the Koreas with other issues in other parts of the world, and to learn from the experiences and lessons from other parts of the world, and see how they apply to the Koreas.

Studying the Koreas and their relations with those outside their border effectively requires context, historical, cultural, and the contemporary changes that transform both history and culture. Here with us today we have a truly brilliant diversity of esteemed guests whose expertise ranges from the politics and foreign policy of the Koreas, the United States, Canada, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan. I tried so hard to get a Russia specialist, but they were not available because of scheduling conflicts. The Middle East, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland, the Mediterranean island of Cyprus, Turkey, and Germany, a country that offers many lessons for the past, present, and future of the Koreas.

I thank all of the guests for the time and commitment they are pouring into today, and the preparation for today. A special thanks to those who traveled a very long distance to be here for a very short time. From South Korea, Singapore, Vancouver, Canada, California. We have a brilliant diversity of speakers in addition to a diversity of expertise and professional experience. With diversity comes broader perspectives and disagreement, which I highly encourage today.

At Brookings we encourage constructive and creative disagreement. So
just remember, constructive and creative. We invite the audience to join in in that spirit.

Each round table has been tasked with discussion and debate. No formal presentations, no papers, talk, thoughtful talk.

To facilitate that process I sent out questionnaires for each round table to consider and invited each member to offer one question of his or her own that would add to the valuable pool of questions. The goal of the conference is to exchange information and interpretations of scholarship and policy in order to benefit mutually both the researcher and practitioner, and, of course, you our larger public.

If you take a look at the list of questions that's available to all in the audience as well as the participants. I realize after compiling it together with my research associate, Paul Park, that we have a list of so many research questions to keep people busy for the next ten years. So anyone looking for a research topic, a dissertation topic, or simply a policy paper there are plenty of questions.

I think what’s more important is that often think-tanks and institutions focus on the deliverables. I think what’s important is the questions we ask, and that we document the questions we ask. We have that today embodied in these sheets of paper.

I want to thank the Brooking staff at the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, and especially Paul Park, my research associate for whom this is his first conference that he managed pretty much on his own, and he has done such a meticulous, superb job. He’s there in the back. If we could give him a hand I’d appreciate it.

Ambassador Gallucci, are you ready? We are very lucky to have some very prominent guests with us today starting with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, otherwise known as Bob. Most of you know him and have worked with him or at least have read about him in various places, doing various types of work.

Ambassador Gallucci also embodies scholarship, the think-tank world,
foundation world, and, of course, government through his pioneering work on working on one of the most difficult crisis situations of the 1990s for the United States and for Asia. He has served as a very long-term dean of Georgetown School of Foreign Service effectively, and that's the key. A lot of people stay around, but they're not always effective. Dr. Gallucci has been very effective in all of these capacities.

I believe you started out teaching at Swarthmore, right? Yes. So he knows the whole gamut of the kinds of backgrounds we are featuring today. So without much delay, further delay, Ambassador Gallucci.

MR. GALLUCCI: Good morning everyone, and thank you Kathy. Thank you for the conference too. Usually when I have an audience with so many people I know and have enjoyed worked on Asia I'm talking about North Korea and I'm not this morning. This is not about policy prescription. I'm not going to be telling you why I think it's not a terrific idea to capture future policy towards North Korea by asking the question why would we want to buy this horse again. I never thought that was a very good question, but I shan't go there.

Instead, I am, to follow Kathy's direction, to briefly talk about the -- what has generally been called the gap between the work of scholars and academia, and the work of practitioners, very often in government.

I want to make three points in this connection. The first is that there is a substantial amount of evidence of a dysfunctional gap. Second, that there are fairly understandable reasons why there should be a gap. The third is that we should deal with this gap both buy trying to find ways to usefully bridge it, but also we should be aware of those times when that gap should be preserved.

So evidence, three points. First, academia, for those of you not currently in academia let me tell you is still organized into disciplines. We talk a lot about interdisciplinary work on campus in the academy, but walking the walk is a lot harder than
just talking the talk. Disciplines, I would say, still rule.

Like, however, is not organized in disciplines. So that when we look at what's rewarded in academia and we say disciplines rule we mean that the journals are disciplinary journals, by and large, the ones that count most in academia for the reward system in academia. Namely, who get promoted and who gets tenured, and the criteria depends very much on disciplinary-based journals.

While that's true for the years that I was in government service, and particularly those years as an Assistant Secretary of State, I can't actually remember anybody coming into my office and saying in an excited voice, we have a history problem in South Asia or we have a political science problem in Northeast Asia. People in government don't talk that way. As a matter of fact, anybody outside of academia doesn't talk that way.

Academia still resists interdisciplinary work. It doesn't reward what practitioners need. It doesn't reward, I would submit to you, what their students need. Little vignette, and I was encouraged by Kathy to use vignette, so I might now otherwise.

So I was new as a dean 18 years ago at Georgetown and there was a program that was already started called Science, Technology, and International Affairs, and we wanted to make it a major for undergraduates. A true interdisciplinary major. We hired someone, we had a regular search, we hired someone tenured track position. We all know what that means here, wonderful.

Person comes in very experienced, had done some very useful work with the undergraduate program in Science, Technology, International Affairs at Princeton. All fine, charged the tenure committee. They go off. Two weeks later they're back in my office saying, well, has a problem here, you know, he hasn't published in biochemistry in a very long time. I said, well, yes. He hasn't been doing biochemistry for a very long time. He's been working in the areas of science policy. That's what we want him to --
this is a school of Foreign Service. That's what we want him to do here. But how do you expect to tenure him? What's his discipline?

This is the school of Foreign Service. This isn't even the political science department. This is a school whose identity is wrapped around interdisciplinary work. What's his discipline? So I tell you that was very instructive to me, and was useful, and guided me for my remaining years. Not to fix it, but to just be aware of it because the dean is not about to fix such a thing.

Why is this like this? A second point here. Because, IR theory, international relations theory remains, I think, the dominant field or sub-field, Victor can tell us which it is, I'm not sure, in political science and politics, and regional studies that which many of you in this room commit. Regional studies are generally disparaged.

For IR theorists theory building is undercut by geographical limits. However, the policymaker doesn't think in terms of the IR system. He or she in policymaking thinks in terms of, you'll be shocked to hear, countries or regions. This is where stuff happens. It doesn't happen in a system. It happens in Latin America or Brazil, and the IR system isn't something that the government practitioner works with every day or doesn't think about in those terms.

Indeed, in my over 20 years of government service I never once heard a policymaker, Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State say, geez, this is tough. Get me an IR theorist. What I have heard is get me someone who knows the history of this problem. Get me someone who can describe to me the importance of the geography. Get me an economist who knows the dynamics in that region, the economic dynamics. Maybe it's petroleum. Maybe it's something else. Get me someone who's intimately familiar with the domestic politics in that country and I want to know the importance of religion here in a religious conflict. I want to know how culture plays. That's what the policymaker generally asks for.
He or she generally thinks of international relations theory as irrelevant to his work. That the word was irrelevant to his work government. But IR scholars, in my experience in the academy, value research; their work that builds system theory that transcends geography, place, and time. That converts information, and by the way now, you all know we have lots more information than we did ten years ago, converts information into data that then manipulates that data with actually pretty sophisticated methodologies.

All in the service of the production of analytical propositions about big things like war. The IR theorists generally reject regional politics or economics the same way they would reject regional physics or regional chemistry. What they want to deal with is science of that kind that is not bound by geography, by the world the rest of us live in. So for policymakers, the academics, from their perspective, value and pursue that which they really cannot have while they disparage what the real world desperately needs.

A third point which is temporizing, a bit, is that there is such a thing, from the policymakers perspective, and from mine looking at this, as good theory, useful theory. Practitioners understand that, I think. They, the practitioners, simply a complex world with generalizations all the time. These generalizations go to propositions about culture, about religion, about institutions, about personalities, about human nature. But they are often put forth by the policymaker without evidence of any kind. They seem more like prejudices, more ideological often. There's no rigor to them. They are generalizations that are simple and often wrong, and for that, dangerous.

So we are in a funny place here, I'm arguing to you. There is a need for generalizations for theory, for conceptualization. The folks who can do that are delivering a kind of generalization and theory that isn't useful. So gap is what I'm arguing. Good theory, in foreign policy or international relations, helps us conceptualize some very
complicated situations. Helps us conceptualize the flow is history. Helps us understand current events.

It does build on good and accurate and solid description, but it goes beyond description. It yields explanations of why things happened. It is self-conscious about identifying the assumptions on which the explanation is based, and the important factors of elements or, if you must, the important variables, and how these variables are related. There can be good theory.

So why is there this gap? I think it's obvious, but I'm not above stating the obvious. Scholars and practitioners live in different worlds. Different worlds that have different missions. For me, the two worlds are the world of the actors and the world of the observers. Each one, the world of the actors has three casts, for me, and the observers have three casts.

The actors, these are all practitioners, are policymakers. They are the senior political appointees and the careers at the senior level. They are the implementers who, very often, are diplomats or military people. Then there are the analysts in this world who are typically in the intelligence community. All three of these groups in the foreign policy world of practitioners have a mission, and it is to shape events for a national purpose, generally.

The other world is a world of observers, and this world includes scholars. Their mission is to explain events, but exactly who they're explaining them to differs. Their audiences, obviously, differ. Scholars are in academia. Research analysts are in places like Brookings. Journalists, it seems to me, are out in now a multiple of media venues.

But scholars really principally have an audience of other scholars and their students. Research analysts at a place like Brookings, serve in a declaratory way, serve practitioners, serve scholars, and serve the public. Journalists principally, it's not
exclusive, obviously, are aimed at the public, serving the public.

So when you take this all apart the world of the actors and observers this way and see different missions and different audiences it's no wonder that there are gaps in terms of what people value. So what do we do about that? What makes the most sense?

Obviously, as Kathy said, there's some of this -- we need bridging activity in these gaps. In other areas we specifically need to preserve the gap. Let me say a little bit more about that.

The bridging activity for scholars I've already given this away, but it's huge for me in the international relations field. I think scholars need to promote and to value regional studies. The world of the actors, the practitioners, as I've said, want this. What I would say to academia is if you build it they will come. They are interested in this.

Second, promote and value history. Right now I put a special emphasis on diplomatic and military history because it is particularly disparaged among historians. History is the basis for good theory. It is the evidence. Great quotes are out there. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it, Santa Anna.

If you substitute in that quote the world history for past you get Churchill's those who cannot remember history are condemned to repeat it. Of course, Mark Twain's history doesn't repeat, but it does rhyme. My all-time favorite, which is a warning, past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. That comes from my Vanguard investment advisor.

Like Mark Twain's cat who will not sit on a cold stove or a hot stove, and therefore, learned the wrong lesson, we must, when we look at history, be careful about the wrong lessons and the misuse of history. A really wonderful treatment of that for those of you who haven't seen it go, please, to Ernie May and Dick Neustadt's Thinking in Time.
For practitioners I would say a lot of things. People in academia would ask me very often whether my colleagues in government actually read anything. I would say, well, it's funny cause they've always asked me whether you have written anything of use worth reading, so there's a kind of mutual disrespect going on here. But if I were going to pick something out for those practitioners to pay particular attention to in scholarship I would say something you tend to ignore, practitioners, is work that's done on the policymaking process and the impact of process on substance.

I mean here when you go, in fact, produce an explanation of why the United States of America did something at a particular time you can operate at any number of levels of analysis. You can cut this lots of different ways, but one of the things in the real world I found to be depressingly of importance is bureaucratic competition and organizational pathology.

If you want more about that theoretical bit is, for me, Graham Allison's work of 40 years ago which still stands up pretty well. Members of both worlds, of all three casts in both, would do well to cross a bridge between their worlds, and then go back to their own world again. This sometimes happens, and there are institutionalized mechanisms for this.

The Council on Foreign Relations has run this fellow's program for -- since I was a graduate student, for a long, long time, but others do it as well. People actually learn. Individuals from that experience are spending some time in the other world, and I really mean go back and go forth. Come back to where you came from.

So the gap needs to be bridged. It also needs to be preserved. This is clear when you think of the gap inside the world of the practitioner between the practitioners in the intelligence community, and the practitioners in the policymaking part. Whether they are implementers at one level or more senior, the real policy decision makers. There is a literature out there about how the intelligence analysts should
perceive him or herself in that world, and what the relationship should be to the policymaker.

Ideally, I think, this is an oversimplification that that policy analyst within government should be very sensitive to the questions that the policymaker has, but should not be sensitive to what the policymaker wants for answers. I mean, that's the intelligence to please that's often shorthanded as.

If you cross over to the gap between the two worlds in terms that I've been talking the research analysts, I think, at a place like Brookings, again, should be driven by the questions that the actors, those three groups, the three casts of actors, the policymakers, the policy implementer, and the policy analyst that research analyst, in a place like Brookings, should be very interested in what it is they want to know. They should be very interested in the course of policy and what the policymaker needs, and what they think the policymaker needs.

Obviously, again, like the intelligence community they should not be terribly interested in the answer the policymaker wants, but they should be interested in addressing the issues that they're interested in.

The journalist, it seems to me, is in a different world, and is in a world of informing the public. Then we have this links to the role of the press in a free society and I think that's to be preserved. It's not that the press isn't of use or the journalists' work isn't of use to policymakers, but the policymaker is not the principle audience.

Now we come to the key part and my closing comments. That is that I think there is certainly a place in academia for scholars who are completely disinterested in what the policymakers wants to know and what they'd like to hear as an answer to their questions. I think there's a good argument to be made that true scholarship should not be sensitive to this all the time. That there's got to be a place for those who are pushing at the boundaries of theory in the academy completely uninterested in the current policy
problems or what a policymaker wants. There's got to be a place for those scholars.

What I'm arguing for here in bridging this gap is that there should be room in the academy for scholars who do want their rigorous scholarship to be of use to the policymaker. In other words, they want to be relevant to the work government should be doing to improve the human condition. There should be a place for students, undergraduates, graduate students, young academics, even before they get tenure, to work in the academy, and make a contribution to improving the human condition.

My argument here is for tolerance in the academy. It's not for exclusivity. I'm not saying that this should be the only measure. I'm saying that we should have an academy that will tolerate this and reward work even if it is relevant to improving the human condition. Thank you all very much.

Do you want me to stay there? Any discussion questions, attacks, whatever? Right there, saw that hand first.

MR. NICKS: I'm Larry Nicks from CSIS. Ambassador Gallucci, I want to ask you a question going back to some of your comments about history. I want to use Putin as an example for my question.

If you look at his speeches that justify what he has done with Crimea, what he is doing in Eastern Ukraine, his speeches overflow with history. He talks incessantly about Catherine the Great and how she liberated these so called Novo Rhesus regions from the Turks and settled Russians peacefully in these areas.

He never mentioned Stalin at all in any of his speeches, but what strikes me, and this is what my question is about, is that in the U.S. government from the President on down into the State Department you see no challenge at all to his version of history that he presents when we talk about dealing with him on these particular issues.

His view of history is one of the reasons he enjoys 80 percentage plus ratings with the Russian people who are very steeped in their own version of their history.
But in the U.S. government you seem to have what seems to me to be a kind of dead zone. In terms of recognizing the importance of history in these kinds of issues and dealing with it.

I think I could apply this to the Middle East, certainly also to the Japan history issue. But how do you -- do you have any thoughts from your experience in terms of how do you account for this kind of dead zone within the government with regard to the importance of history?

MR. GALLUCCI: So I will say briefly to that, I mean, I think that you’re -- the question and observation's a good one. I think there's a stylistic thing going on here at least. Dare I say it, a cultural thing.

I think it's far more likely a European, and this is European Putin doing this, for him to do that than it is for Americans to do that. Not that we never do. So the first thing is I think as a character of a piece of rhetoric I don't think it's that common. There may be a reference to the Founding Fathers or something, but we generally, I don't think, proceed in quite the same way as I've seen others in other countries proceed, particularly in Europe.

Second, as far as letting him get away with this crap, that's a question of what's the most effective way of taking him on on this. Perhaps a debate over what's accurate and useful use of evidence from history would be a good one, but I want to make sure I had a very well-armed person engaging in that.

MS. MOON: Can I just interpret for one minute. If you would please tell us your name, your institution, but also keep your questions, questions very, very brief so many can participate. Thank you.

MR. GALLUCCI: Question over here. Right here.

QUESTIONER: Thanks for your presentation and your cautious warning. I do think history is very important and just like a child to learn and make
mistake and you learn how to improve. History's the same way back to centuries ago. I think we are repeating the same mistake. So I was just wondering, as a professional, as an advocate could you really ask people to admit everything they want to analyze to make it useful? A lot of analysis now is really almost useless or misleading because their data sources and agency providers that are wrong, basically, not only inaccurate but also wrong.

I just wonder if you can really use this kind of proactive to encourage all analysis to not do the same mistake and mislead the public and policymakers.

MR. GALLUCCI: If I take your meaning I certainly wouldn't disagree with the proposition that it would be nice if the data we had was accurate. It would be nice if the analysis was good and based on good data.

The thing I would be most on about is the purposeful misuse of history. I mean, I thought that was what the first question, I think, was getting at, and that's what my reference to the Thinking in Time book by Neustadt and May. You can commit a lot of purposeful errors by the use of history, and I think being careful about -- and this happens not even when -- it happens in government, in my experience, if you look at a case for intervention, for example, in a particular instance.

You say, well Syria's just like. The thing about it is it's never just like anything. It's not that there aren't conceptualizations, there aren't generalizations that won't be of help to you. Yes, there will, but the differences in the cases are what have to be teased out. That's one of the points that Neustadt and May make.

Right there.

MR. NOSAN: Chris Nosan with the Nosan Report. Thanks so much for a really thoughtful, organized presentation. Turned out you did know what you were going to talk about.

For the purposes of the discussion, I disagree with your characterization
of journalists are writing for the public. Maybe it's just, you know, very self-serving to what I do, because, you know, but if you look at coverage in the Times and the Post and the Wall Street Journal, you know, the major papers of record. Yeah, they're informing the public, but they're really writing because they know that's the only thing somebody at the NIC is going to have time to read. The only thing somebody at INR is going to have time to read.

They're not going to read the paper. They're not going to have time to come to the conference, but they're going to see, you know, David Sanger on something or something that I've scribbled on something. It does inform how you write about it.

So for that, but especially the history thing, next year's the 70th of the end of World War II, especially the Pacific War, and history's going to play a really important part of that dialogue. I would argue how journalists choose to write about the debates, especially Abu and the deniers versus Park and the you've got to show sincerity, you know, journalists are going to play a big role in that.

It's talking to the public, but it's really talking about decision makers to what you just said. What do American decision makers have to say about history's going to really influence how that comes out.

MR. GALLUCCI: All right. So here's my view because I disagree with you on this. So I really do believe that when I ask myself the question I was thinking about what I want to say to that. I said, okay, what should journalists be doing. I think of what the free press ought to be doing in a democracy, and I think informing the public. I think that's their mission.

But don't mistake that observation, that claim I'm making with a proposition that in government, government is not a consumer. Look, the very first thing you look at when you get up in the morning if you're an Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs that's the one thing I'm sure I know what happens because I did
that is not the intelligence that comes in, the hot intelligence from the community. Not the
cable traffic from last night. I mean, these are all important, but they're not as important
as the newspapers, in those days.

The first thing you look at is what the press is saying. With all respect to
David Sanger, we love David Sanger, right? But we have a lot of smart people in
government too, but the American public isn't reading these people in government.
They're reading David Sanger. We care about this so, so much, more than the
intelligence and more than the cable traffic because the American people are getting their
information, and what they should think, from these people.

So the first thing you worry about is what are the American people
learning about the world last night. Not about the world last. You need to get that first
because you've got 12:00 follies to deal with. You know, they're going to push somebody
out there in front of a podium like this, you know, and answer questions about this, and
it's all on the press. So the press is incredibly important to the government, but I would
like to think, in my ideal world, the press isn't writing for the government. The press is
writing to inform the American people, and the government is very interested in how the
American people are getting informed.

Yes, here?

MR. KIM: Hugo Kim, previously internship International Journal of
Korean Studies. Now I'm teaching some courses as the grad school. My question is
generally speaking, creating the gap between theorists and practitioner comes from the
country educational system.

The reason why I'm saying that is usually policy makers in the
government are selected from the academic world. They are educated in a specific
certain area. For example, take an example in economics. Even in economics there are
a lot of areas, international economics and finance, and economic theories. A lot of other
stuff.

So nowadays, specialists are specialized too much in that old area, political science. So generally speaking, policy makers coordinated all of the factors, economics, politics, everything. But they don't know much about -- even if you consist of consort ing with different specialists, but it's very hard. Economists say, we know we consider -- I mean, the political scientists say we considered the economics in policy making, but they don't know economics really.

If the economist is the head of the team he doesn't know. He say he consider politics. He doesn't know much about the political science. I don't know if it's correct or not, but that's my opinion. Thanks.

MR. GALLUCCI: So let me just, the issues of the interdisciplinary work on campus is to me always interesting because there is a declaratory policy at most places that favors interdisciplinary work. What I was saying to you is that my experience though is when we got to things that are most valued, the most important stuff; the value is placed on the work that was done in the inference pattern of a particular discipline with a particular set of journals that are associated with that discipline.

It is a little bizarre. It's not only that State Department isn't broken into, you know, the departments of the university into disciplines. It's not only that. It's that students, you know, have to go home after their political science class, and after their economics class, and after their history class, and after their sociology class and they're supposed to put this all together. The faculty don't do that for them. When does this happen?

This might happen. I mean, I give and have for decades now only oral final examinations for a variety of reasons, but one of them is because I want to see if they've been able to put any stuff together, and answer the kinds of questions that you all answered. You know, someone asks you and you go to your next dinner party, so what
the hell is happening with North Korea?

Well, it would be good if you knew something about North Korea when you went to answer that question, and not just IR theory. I mean, it would be good if you knew something about, you know, north is the one on the top. But, you know, you bring something to that. So I have sympathy for the fact that whoever -- and we do this. I've had students come to me and say after we put together this interdisciplinary course in political economy, and I had the students come to me. They were the seniors in the class. They felt they could do this, and say, you know, it's not interdisciplinary if you have a political scientist and an economist in the class, and one talks for one class and the other talks for the other class. That's not interdisciplinary. They're right. You know, it requires more work than that. I do believe that.

Right here?

MR. MOSSETIG: Mike Mossetig, PBS Online Newshour. Following upon what you're talking about, more need for studying process. It seems, but based on your experience over the years, is foreign policymaking getting more centralized in almost every country, Number 10 Downing Street in Britain, but here in the National Security Council, and the National Security Council is headed by a person who was elected and is probably thinking about their reelection, so the extent of the polarization of the foreign policy process if it gets more centralized in the NSC?

MR. GALLUCCI: Interesting. I hadn't looked at it that way because I hadn't thought of the NSC as being headed by the President. I understand the sense in which those who work in the White House may be particularly sensitive to the political vulnerabilities of a president. I'm not disagreeing with the proposition. I'm just confessing I hadn't been thinking about that.

To me, as an outsider looking in, and that's all I've been for a long time now, this administration both the first Obama Administration and the second seems to be
more centralized than administrations I had known from Clinton back to Ford. I hate to admit. So it seems that it is more centralized.

The next step in your proposition though was that because it’s more centralized it would reflect domestic political needs more than were it not so centralized, and I’m not sure that’s true. It may be, but, A, I have never thought about it that way, and, B, off the top of my head I’d say be careful with that one.

It might be, but you can certainly have an NSC that has managed a classic management of the NSC is the Scowcroft Model. You have different models and the Scowcroft Model is one in which you had fairly powerful secretaries of the Departments of Defense, State, and the Intelligence Committee, etcetera. But with an NSC that was witting and capable of bringing together these pieces for a coherent decision by, A, the principles, and then recommendation to a president.

That could be politicized too, so I’m not sure I want to go there with the conclusion. That it is more centralized it seems that way to me, but again, as an outsider.

One more question, and I’m looking at him, right here.

MR. BAGA: Henri Baga from Lehigh University. Bob, as a member of academia I think I should defend a little bit academia, but I--

MR. GALLUCCI: Please.

MR. BAGA: Look, I belong to the school of the tolerant. I mean, I got into government and art, and I believe in influencing government action, etcetera. But I think your characterization of theory is a little bit unfair. Because there is between the regional studies and the theoretician is a conceptual thinker. People who can bridge the two. You need the theory in order to be able to bridge and talk about the region. Because you don't want just regional specialists who only know the region. As Catherine said earlier, I mean, just naval gazers, because you need to be able to do that.

But I would also submit to you that those working the government, not
people like you who came from the outside, are not exactly very ready to understand -- to conceptualize. The more people, especially like we’ve seen in this Administration who bring in Congressional Aides as policy makers, they have no idea of what conceptualization is. They have no idea how to bridge the gap themselves, and they know the minutia of the day. So if there is a gap it's also that gap. We also need to raise the level of the people who are also working the government.

MR. GALLUCCI: I want to -- I mean, yes, sure. But, again, I really feel quite schizophrenic right in front of you, you know, 13 years of the Dean of Georgetown and over 20 years in government service. But I feel at this podium more like defending those in government because when I went into government for so long I listened to my former colleagues in academia who had so little respect for the capability and interest of people in government for their work which they translated into for conceptual thinking.

My point today is that, and it was point number three, right? It was that there is good theory, and there's an audience for it in government. But it's got to be something which they can understand, and it's got to be, indeed, what they can regard as relevant to what they're doing. I think insisting that they read the APSR or that they read -- I mean, world politics, I go on these things. They're written for a different audience, and that was my point about audiences.

I will defend the right of the policy maker to say after he or she reads, you know, a paragraph this is not for me, right? You may or others in academia may say, what is he going to pick up instead? He's going to pick up foreign affairs, oh my god. Well, you know, the people writing in foreign affairs are writing the influence people other than scholars, right? That's where they want to have their impact, and they organize their writing this way.

Look, you have in this room; I was standing in the back of the room before with Victor. I don't know where he is now, Victor Cha, that's an example of, you
know, I could pick all kinds. I don't mean to pick on Victor, I do, but, you know, this is a guy who does really good political science, and he does good policy relevant stuff, and you want to see how it's done read his stuff. This can be done, and it is done by lots of people.

But I don't think we make the -- my plea at that end of this talk was for tolerance. Right now I see the intolerance in academia. I see departments that are not willing to acknowledge the value, the worth of pretty rigorous thinking and argument almost because of its relevant and its assess ability.

I have a great quote, and I will not attribute it because I like this person, but as he told his colleague that he had gotten tenure at one of the top three departments in this country his one critique after the tenure meeting was that many of us thought your work was too accessible. I rest my case. Thank you all very much.

MS. MOON: Thank you very much, Ambassador Gallucci. I think it was a perfect way to start the conference. Just as background, he had written a piece in the Chronical of Higher Education on just this kind of question. This relationship between international relations, scholarship, and policy. So that was partly a stimulus for thinking about the conference.

We are going to move on the first round table. Our opening round table. We have someone from AV who will help with the microphones, etcetera.

MS. TERRY: Good morning. What a fascinating discussion so far. Thank you, and thank you to Kathy Moon and Brookings. My name is Sue Mi Terry. I used to be with the U.S. government on the other side of the river primarily and now with Columbia University. I'll be serving as your moderator for the first session today. And today our first session's discussion is on History and Policy: Issues, Process, and Implementation. And I believe our assigned task is to discuss dilemmas and challenges of the relationship between history and scholarship, and then policymaking and
implementation.

And to do that we have a very distinguished panel here today, most excellent actors and observers -- scholars, historians, political scientists, academics, practitioners -- Victor who’s done both. I know they need no introduction, but I’m going to ask them to introduce themselves anyway, just a name, title, and affiliation. And if you could also each ask the question that you want to add to our discussion. Can we start with you?

MR. ARMSTRONG: All right. My name is Charles Armstrong. I am professor of history. My full title is the Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies in the Social Sciences at Columbia University. And I just want to mention that the department, in which I reside, the History Department, was originally when it was founded in 1857 called the Department of History and Political Science. So I wanted to, hope we can, add to the discussion how is it that history and political science became divorced and how we might bring them together as history as not being just a source of data, but actually itself an academic discipline with its own questions and problems that can interact creatively with political science and policymakers.

So my question is a very simple one that I think is particularly relevant in our examination and observation of Korea today, which is what do we learn from 25 years of failed predictions of North Korea’s collapse. We have just seen the 25th anniversary of the Berlin Wall falling, which was the beginning of these confident predictions that the end was imminent for North Korea. Have we learned anything, should we learn anything, from the fact that these predictions have been wrong? They may be true in the future, but they’ve been wrong so far.

And more generally I think the policy question is do we learn something from these speculations about the future whether they’re right or wrong, or are they simply something that we spin out and then forget about?
MS. TERRY: Victor?

MR. CHA: Victor Cha. I'm the D.S. Song-KF Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown and Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, D.C. I've been teaching at Georgetown now for 19 years, with the exception of three years from 2004 to 2007 where I worked on the National Security Council as Director of Asian Affairs and as the Deputy for the U.S. government at the six-party talks.

My question was not a question; it's more of a statement. So I decided because we had two academics already on the panel that I would take the identity of someone on the policy side so that Johnna would not be all by herself. And so I had -- I guess I can reframe it as a question. So my questions were -- I had two -- and the first was why do academics -- and it may not be what's in the paper -- why do academics consistently underestimate the level of expertise among policymakers? That was the first question.

And the second is why do academics consistently overestimate the view that policy is made in a vacuum, i.e., that policy on a particular issue like North Korea or the alliance is made simply in a vacuum? It's only about Korea.

MR. PARK: I'm Tae-Gyun Park from the Seoul National University and I'm in charge of the Korean Studies Program at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. I was a former advisor for the Ministry of Unification probably in 2011 and '12 on history actually.

And my question is why does misunderstanding happen between South Korea and the U.S. in spite of a very long history of an alliance, not only on the level of government, but also at the civil society level?

I'd like to say something about the hot issues, in particular about the transfer of the pressure control about the South Korea forces from U.S., the first
commander to the South Korean government. And, if possible, also I’d like to mention about the policy toward North Korea.

MS. OHTAGAKI: Hello. Johnna Ohtagaki. I am a senior advisor in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Asian & Pacific Affairs. Kathy said that we could ask either a policy or a process question. And so since I’m a policymaker, I thought I would ask a policy question. And especially since I think there are so many of you with a lot of historical expertise in the room, I thought this would be interesting and given that you’re going to be looking at unification questions later.

So my question is what happens after unification when North Koreans can vote to ROC politics, in particular the U.S.-ROC relationship?

MS. TERRY: Great questions, but I’m going to add yet more questions to the mix before we get started because we got a couple more questions from Brookings. And the questions are first on whether or not when it comes down to policymaking, domestic politics is the real driver. For example, regardless of historical legacies, the geopolitical importance of resolving conflicts. For example with North Korea, does political polarization among political elites and interest groups determine what’s possible or not?

And the second question is about personalities. So among the various factors that go into policymaking, is the personality or personal relationship between leaders and negotiators a primary driver in policy decisions?

So those two additional questions on domestic politics and personality/personal leadership and personal relationships. So if I’ve done my math right, which is not always good, we have about seven to eight excellent questions to think about. So let’s get started.

I’d like to kick the discussion off with yet one more question, which is my question, but I have that prerogative as moderator. So in your assessment, what’s the
most egregious example of lack of historical understanding by policymakers on both sides of the U.S.-Korea relationship? Maybe we’ll start with the historian, Charles?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, thank you. Let me go back to the beginning of the U.S. relationship with Korea after liberation. I think that the fundamental problem with the U.S. policymakers had was, of course, a general ignorance of Korea’s situation, but also more specifically a lack of understanding of Korea’s understanding of their history, by which I mean their relationship with the region and their view of the great powers around them.

I remember Dean Rusk, who was one of the two men who decided on the 38th parallel, the dividing line between the two zones of occupation in 1945, said years later they didn’t know, nobody in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee knew the history of previous discussions about dividing Korea and the fact that in 1896 the Russians and the Japanese had discussed the possibility of dividing Korea between Northern and Southern zones of occupation around the 59th parallel. And Rusk said if he had known that, they would have looked for some other solution for the joint occupation of Korea, not dividing it into North and South.

The Koreans remembered this previous attempt to divide their country, but the Americans did not know that. And they also, the Americans, had no knowledge of the Taft-Katsura Agreement at the time and most Americans still don’t know that. And many Koreans probably don’t know it anymore, but enough do that there is a kind of view of outside forces impinging on Korea that I think Americans need to look at.

On the other side I think Koreans in general have a tendency to not look at the history of America’s involvement in the world, to think that the Americans care so much about Korea, which is not to say that Americans don’t care about Korea, but the policy toward Korea is in this global context, which Americans often do not appreciate. And there’s a very large gap and misunderstanding on both sides.
MR. CHA: Well, one example and it’s amusing, but at the same time it says a lot about how ignorance can become a policy problem, was we once had, when I was in government, we once had some senior level officials from the Korean government visiting and were holding in the Roosevelt Room. And so I worked for a public administration. So the Roosevelt Room is the Teddy Roosevelt Room and so there was a big delay and we were stalling. And the Protocol Officer who was with us was showing them around the room and then showed them the Nobel Peace Prize, which Teddy Roosevelt got for negotiating the peace between them and Russia. She then went about to explain this whole thing. And I was standing behind her going no, no, don’t talk about that. And, of course, the senior South Korean official was very nice about it and just listened carefully. But then the next day in the Korean press there was a story that said that the United States didn’t have the Nobel Peace Prize, but actually had a document that celebrated the secret agreement between the United States and Japan with regard to Korea and that then spread like wildfire throughout the Korean press.

So instead of dealing with what we needed to deal with, we spent like the next day trying to beat back that story and explain that it wasn’t some secret agreement that had been posted in the White House, but it was simply the Nobel Peace Prize.

MS. TERRY: Since you’re talking about Teddy Roosevelt and the Taft-Katsura Agreement, oftentimes when our alliance is at a low point where there’s some sort of anti-America sentiment that flows in South Korea, I feel like our American policymakers have no real understanding -- sometimes we’re caught off guard, right? Why is this 2002 like a schoolgirl’s accident that paved the way with no man’s election, or the beef protest that grows out of hand? And we don’t really understand the origin of it, like maybe it starts from the Taft-Katsura Agreement where Koreans felt betrayed because he paved the way for Japanese colonization and the division of the Korean Peninsula and so on. So it’s kind of interesting that we don’t really have that
understanding.

Another question then is where are scholarship or history because that came up earlier in the morning. Is there a time when that’s irrelevant to or even an obstacle to policymaking? Where history is irrelevant to policymaking because we’re talking about the relevance of history, right? Are there examples of history when it’s irrelevant to policymaking or even poses an obstacle?

MS. OHTAGAKI: Well, I mean I -- let me start out -- I actually forgot to say this earlier, but I'm here in my personal capacity. So whatever I say today does not reflect any U.S. government views.

I mean I wanted -- and actually this is somewhat going back to your original question -- I mean I think -- and I'm previewing a question that I saw on tap for later. But I do think that this question of sort of -- I think the question of whether the U.S. or how the U.S. sort of analyzes its policy, whether or not it bases it on history, like, for instance, I think one of the questions that's coming up is whether the U.S. prefers Japan over South Korea -- I don't know, it's actually on tap for us -- is that's a slight misperception of sort of how Americans approach policy in the sense that we have this very strong history of being -- of it not mattering where you come from, but basically what you believe in matters. And I think that disguises a lot of our policy.

We have an affinity for democracies and countries that share our values that extends beyond history. We have a tendency I think in general to focus on sort of those values and sort of our future prosperity over questions of history. So to go back to I think your slight diversion of the question of when history doesn’t matter, I think that Americans tend to not focus on history as much. And I do think for other cultures, that’s not the -- it’s a little bit of a misunderstanding.

MR. CHA: I think what Charles said was right. I mean the United States was ignorant about Korea at the end of the Second World War. But at the same time I
think for U.S. policy and policymakers and strategic planners, and I don’t mean to say this to offend a Korea audience, but we know our history when we care about the issue. So if we care about the issue, we know the history.

I’m right now finishing a book that’s looking at the U.S. creation of the alliances in Korea and Japan. And, in fact, this weekend I was going through the Dulles Papers. And if you go back and look at John Foster Dulles and his trips to Japan and all that he wrote, I mean he was really learning about Japan. He was learning from the experiences of Germany. I mean he was really trying to learn the history.

So if we care about the issue, we learn about it, right? We know the history and we’re sensitive to it. Unfortunately, the reality was whether you’re talking about Dulles or Kennan or Truman or Eisenhower, we didn’t care about Korea until the North Koreans invaded.

MR. PARK: Actually I found a very interesting letter from Former Ambassador Habib to the Secretary of State in 1972. Actually Ambassador Habib, he faced severe difficulties in 1972. On the one hand, he tried to approach North Korea. On the other hand, the consolidation of a regime was going on. So he sent a letter to the Secretary of State probably not in 1972, it’s before and he pointed to three important issues in South Korea. The first one is the 1953 anti-Communist POWs, really adjoining the Armistice Agreement. The second is the serious conflict with President Kennedy in 1963. It’s about the transfer of the regime from the military junta to a civilian government. The last one in 1968 is the secretive questions. Actually in ’68 had a secret crisis between South and North Korea, but at the same time there was really another serious crisis between the South Korean government and the U.S. Actually President Johnson, he assigned a Special Envoy, Cyrus Vance, to persuade him not to attack North Korea. It’s kind of the retaliation so the North Korea infiltrators who attacked the Blue House.

So my idea as to the history and the rest some kind of documents
produced by the Foreign Service, I think that the policymakers they seem to very
seriously consider the history co-experience between two countries.

MS. TERRY: Can I go back to Johan’s comment and your question
about is U.S. being more favorable to Japan because I think this is sort of a
misperception or is it a reality? But I think it’s a misperception that’s out there and then
we can sort of talk about Korea, go back to Korea, because you made that comment. So
I would like to ask the panelists, is that a misperception because I’m thinking it’s a
misperception or is it a reality?

MR. PARK: Actually, the problem is that --

MS. TERRY: Koreans believe that, I think.

MR. PARK: Yes, I think that sometimes a misperception, but sometimes
not a misperception from the Korean side is because --

MS. TERRY: Well, I think there’s a difference between the Korean
perspective and the U.S. perception.

MR. PARK: Yes, there are so many troublesome issues between Korea
and Japan even nowadays. The Koreans believe that the U.S. is responsible for that
kind of controlling issues. First of all think about the year 1951, the San Francisco Pact.
Actually, the Koreans were not invited in the San Francisco Conference. And also in
1965, normalize relationship with Japan. We have so many issues, but some of that is
closely connected with U.S. policy after 1945. First of all is the Dokdo Island issue. And
also --

MS. TERRY: So we are interested in the Korean perspective, so I’m
asking whether that perception is a right one, the Korean perception. There’s a pro-
Japan bias from U.S. government’s perceptive. If we can hear from the American side.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Victor’s the real expert on this, but I just wanted to
throw out that it seems the Japanese are thinking that actually U.S. is taking the Korean
side on certain issues these days. So it's not only a Korean perception of their getting
the short end of the stick --

MS. TERRY: I think we understand the Korean perception and Japan's -
-
MR. PARK: Yes. What I want to say is that actually the reason why
Koreans have that kind of idea is that not only is the government asking the U.S.
government to say something to clarify what is true and fact, but at the time not only the
Eisenhower government, but the Johnson organization, they didn't say anything to --

MS. TERRY: So, Victor, maybe you can defend the U.S. government
position or explain --

MR. CHA: Oh, yes. I'll defend the U.S. government position as it was in
1950. But I will say that in answer to your question, Sue, did the United States prefer
Japan over Korea, in 1950, 1945 to -- absolutely. I mean it was very clear. If you go
back and look at what George Kennan was writing about, it was very clear that Korea and
Taiwan for that matter were not part of the Maritime Defense Perimeter that the U.S. was
creating. So it goes back to -- and so for that reason we knew nothing about the history
of Korea and we were withdrawing from Korea, but we were trying to learn as much as
we could about Japan, about the role of the emperor in society as they tried to fashion an
occupation policy, all these sorts of things.

So you have to ask where do those preferences come from. Why is it
that the United States preferred Japan over Korea? And I think the -- and this, even
though I didn't plan to be up here to knock IR theory, this is where IR theory is useless
because it's largely because our preferences derived from our concern about great
power. Japan was the only great power in Asia. Even though it was a defeated power at
the end of World War II, Kennan and Atchison and others knew: That would be the only
great power in the region for the foreseeable future. That's why the United States
focused on it.

Now, on this issue of -- you know, a lot of the issues today -- and I don’t disagree. I think a lot of historical issues today do derive from the Peace Settlement in San Francisco and Korea wasn’t invited to that. But the other thing we have to remember is that the United States for centuries prior to the end of World War II had really a great deal of strategic ambivalence when it came to Asia. It was just we’re not interested in it; for missionary activity, for commercial reasons, but no strategic reasons whatsoever. And so with the end of the Second World War and then with the invasion of North Korea, the United States all of a sudden was put in this position where it decided that it was going to build on sort of - advertising my book now -- they decided that they were going to build an empire in Asia, right? And so when you don’t know a lot about a region and you decide to build an empire in it, you make mistakes, right? And so there were mistakes that were made in the past, but it’s not like we can go back and reopen the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

MS. TERRY: But I just wonder if you’d confirm or disconfirm --

MS. OHTAGAKI: So let me jump in there. So I think as far as our current position on historical issues, we’ve made it clear that we want to see some sort of resolution between Japan and Korea that’s mutually agreeable for both sides. And I’ll jump in with a little bit of analysis on that. I mean for the U.S. it’s greatly to our strategic interest that our two most important allies in the region get along. So I think that’s basically the -- I don’t think there’s a preference. But I will also say anecdotally having worked on both the Korea desk, which by the way just so you know, geographically within the State Department is actually in the same area as the Japan desk. It’s all sort of one flow-through. There’s no discernable preference at all. And certainly now we also have our new desk for Japan-Korea’s former ambassador to Seoul. So perhaps historically, but I think at this point, no preference.
MS. TERRY: So let’s move to Korea questions just because we have some time for that. To start with Charles’ question, you said about the collapse theory that we’ve been wrong by 20 years, right?

MR. ARMSTRONG: 25 years.

MS. TERRY: Can I just add to that a little bit because I think who has not been wrong when we’re talking about North Korea? So it’s not only collapse school of thought that was wrong. And we thought when Kim Jong-il died, oh, it’s going to collapse. Or every time we jumped up and down thinking that North Korea was going to collapse for one reason or another.

You can argue, one can argue, maybe before this school of thought was also -- because those people like to look at every sign of reform and say oh, North Korea is transforming and really changing. We said that in 2002, said it in 2009. I mean so that school of thought was wrong, too. And then there’s the nuclearization school of thought that if we do this, if we take them out or if take them off the state-sponsored list of terrorism, maybe then they will denuclearize. So I’m just saying -- I will just add that it’s not only the collapse school of thought that has been wrong in terms of North Korea for 25 years.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Right. Well, I’ve never been to any of those schools so I’ve never been wrong.

Of course, it’s easy to try to call it’s accountable for making wrong predictions and that’s not really my point. My point is what kind of traps do we find ourselves in when we spin out the likelihood of certain future scenarios happening and not prepare for others?

So I mean this is -- we talk here about history. I’m an historian, talking as an historian, but, of course, policy isn’t about history. Policy is about the present and the future. So how do we build upon not just the history of what we are studying, but the
history of what we’ve done in policy, right or wrong, to try to inform our actions in the present and the future?

And if I might advertise my book -- I’ve just produced a book. It’s based - - I think really the first time to try to synthesize all this information from the former Eastern Bloc about North Korea from East Germany, Soviet Union, China, so forth. As policymakers to pay attention to that, does our new knowledge and all this -- everybody says we don’t know anything about North Korea. Actually we know a lot about North Korea. We know an astonishing amount of information on North Korea, but mostly its history. Does that change our policy toward North Korea if we understand it better? And this is a question. I’m not a policymaker. It certainly changes my view of North Korea, but does it affect the policy we have toward it?

MS. TERRY: Does it, Victor?

MR. CHA: Oh, here’s the answer to the question from the policymaker’s perspective, which is okay, then give me five ways it specifically should change our policy. And so I think this is where the gap between academia and policy falls because I think -- and I can say this because I’m an academic, so I’m not offending just the academics in the room, I’m offending myself when I say this. But academics have a tendency to say here is how complex the problem is and here is why you’re doing it all wrong because you’re not looking at this and you’re not looking at that. And as a policymaker you have to sit there and go okay, tell me based on that specifically what I should be doing differently today.

And so I think this is where there’s a big gap. One of the biggest transitions for me as an academic going into policy was I was very good at criticizing policy. I was very good at saying what we were missing, what variables we weren’t considering, all that. And then in the first meeting they said, okay, so what should we do tomorrow? What’s the three things that we should be deciding on at the next sub-PCCC
meeting? And initially I was just -- I had no answer because I had been so good at criticizing and explaining how difficult the problem was and what was wrong with the policy, I'd never actually thought about how I'm supposed to operationalize things.

And so I think that's a big gap. And it's one of the things that we try to train students to do, to be able to close that gap, to understand the critical thinking on the academic side, but to also be able to operationalize that in specific policy recommendations.

MS. TERRY: I would agree with that, so I wonder if there's an academic defense for it because I found it to be true having gone to academia since leaving the government and I have to change my policy options paper. Because everybody loved to criticize, right? And we say Obama's Administration as a whole, you know, this policy's not working. Except when you ask for specific recommendations, no one really has a recommendation, right? Victor, you've been always saying it's the land of lousy options. When you say, okay, what should we do? There's no clear answer to that. I don't know if there's academics who'd like to defend academia, but that's the criticism that you don't have any recommendation. You just only like to criticize. No response?

MS. MOON: Can I just throw in that (audio skips) collapse of North Korea --

MR. CHA: For weeks or months, yes.

MS. MOON: So we're not just talking (audio skips) --

MR. CHA: Yes, that's what I mean.

MS. TERRY: I don't know if there's a policy that was based on that assumption, though.

MR. CHA: So I don't think U.S. policy is based on assumption in the past, in the present, or in the future.

And this is another thing that I wanted to get off my chest about
academics and policy and that is -- I said that my question was why do academics always underestimate the level of expertise that policymakers have? And so on that point I would say that they do, they underestimate. I mean if you look at people on the policy side, the people who are working in the State Department on the Korea desk or in the Pentagon who have been working on Korea for a long time, there's a tremendous amount of expertise there or in the IC, right? There's a tremendous amount of expertise there. And it's not that they just know what's going on the policy side. They read stuff outside the policy side. During the week they're sitting there taking in the cables and the cable traffic and the IC dump every day, but on the weekends these people go and they read like what's in the field. They read what's coming out in the journals. They read the latest books. So these people, at least in my interaction with them, they truly have the expertise of scholars. And so I think that's a terrible misperception on the part of academics.

The second is that academics overestimate how much they know about policy. They basically -- you know, policy is not just reading the newspaper and all of a sudden I'm an expert on policy and I can say this, that, and the other thing. Doing policy is hard. It's a lot of work. It's daily intake of information. So it's not just saying well, the strategic patience policy, it's not going anywhere. It's because they don't know what to do or that sort -- but it's like really understanding the specifics, knowing what a missile reentry heat shield is and why that's important, knowing what rules of origin mean for the FTA and why that's important, knowing what NATO plus 3 status is, knowing like all these sorts of things as part of the mechanics of policy that matter that I think academics miss because they just take the top line based on the headline in the New York Times and they go yeah, I agree with Sanger, this is right -- if David's there, sorry -- but I agree with Sanger and, therefore, U.S. policy is all messed up.

So I think to help close the gap at least academics have to understand
that policymakers have much more expertise than you think they do and to really engage
in policy, you have to really dig into the mechanics. It’s not just sort of the top line
criticism.

MS. TERRY: Johnna, did you want to jump in?

MS. OHTAGAKI: So I’m really glad Victor just said all that because I
don’t have to now say that, but to Charles’ question, I actually have a counter example for
you, at least in the past. There was a point and your question was on unification -- oh,
I’m sorry -- was on --

MS. TERRY: Collapse.

MS. OHTAGAKI: Collapse. There was a point at which Secretary
Clinton -- I think it was in 2009 -- said something like we have to deal with -- in North
Korea we have to deal with the government that exists, not as we would wish it to be. So
I do think that there is a lot of thinking about that question of is the policy -- what kind of
assumptions are we making when we’re making these kinds of policies, and it’s a
constant conversation.

I’d also say to Victor’s point that as academics point out to us, North
Korea policy is incredibly complex. And for sort of the functioning policymaking process,
there are at any given time probably a couple hundred people in the U.S. government
working on North Korea policy and they all have various kinds of expertise, whether it’s
like the history. I mean there may be Intel analysts and some of our analysts specialize
more on the history, some on the propaganda, some in the situation as it’s evolving.
Whether they’re the policymakers and they may have a political background, so they
understand the political situation within the U.S., and/or maybe they have a regional
focus and so they’re focused on the political situations in any of the given five-party
countries, six-party countries, or whether they understand the bureaucracy and
understand how to get a policy moving. Even having the greatest policy in the world is
not going to get you anywhere within the government system unless you understand how
to get people to buy into that policy within the system. Whether it’s being sort of in the
managing role, trying to make all of those various parts work, whether it’s -- a lot of
people come from the outside. We have people from the think tanks working on these
issues come into government, and they have great connections to the think tanks. And
so they might act in sort of a liaison role to the think tanks, bringing more of that thinking
in. So I think there’s a lot of -- at least for our system, it’s the diversity, and I think this
goes back to the original opening keynote address that really for us to try to capture the
complicated nature of the problem.

MS. TERRY: So I think academics -- I think just the coordination
process of the policymaking I don’t know if they understand. So even if there is a sort of
a solution they’d like to recommend, it’s so out of the realm of reality in terms of just -- of
course, we didn’t get to talk about domestic politics, which was one of the questions that
you have to consider the situation now, domestic politics. Who’s the current leadership?
What’s going on with Congress and the two parties and just the coordination process
that’s involved.

We only have a few more minutes before we can turn to Q&A. Professor
Park, would you like to sort of -- do you have any comments or --

MR. PARK: With regard to the kind of perception in person that I think is
one of the reasons is actually the voice if the policy’s not clear. I know actually it’s not
difficult to say something clearly. Policy is very -- even in one administration there’s very
diverse policies. But from the Korean side and outside the U.S. actually the people
always pay attention to what the U.S. government says and what are their policies? I
always feel that it’s not clear. And we can very easily experience so many
misinterpretations not only by the mass media, but also even the government officials.
And sometimes there’s some very -- kind of a conference at Brookings Institute and that
was reported in the Korean mass media. And the pundits they said it is the Obama Administration’s policy. It’s not the presenter’s opinion. So always because of that the civil society in not only Korea, but also in Japan, always they have some kind of misunderstanding and misinterpretation.

What I want to say is that I think that there is a more clear voice should be needed and in particular about the controversial issues. We say about North Korea and also the Korea-Japan relation. Not only the beginning of the Korea-U.S. relation after 1953, but also these days so many Koreans they believe that there’s so many pro-Japanese in American government. That’s the reason why they ask the American politicians and leaders the bias with Japan. But I think that’s a misunderstanding, a misinterpretation. We need some kind of more clear voice as communication.

MS. TERRY: More clear because it’s not clear is what you’re saying from U.S. policy perspective, okay.

We have a few more minutes before we turn to Q&A. Is there anything else that you want to get off your chest before we turn to Q&A?

MR. CHA: Well, can I just go back to the point about the process?

MS. TERRY: Victor has a lot of stuff that he just needs to release.

MR. CHA: The process I think is important, and Bob mentioned it in the keynote as well. I think one thing that is often underestimated is the degree to which process can really -- sometimes outcomes don’t look rational and that’s because there’s a process. With anything there’s a process. And sometimes it may not be the best solution that rises to the top, or more likely it’s that it’s greatly watered down. Whatever that solution is, it’s greatly watered down because there’s a bureaucratic process and other sorts of things that are going on, personalities, there are other sorts of things that are going on. And I think in academia to the extent that we’re interested in policy, we often think that Solution A makes the most sense because based on a rational analysis
that should be the right policy. And this is what I meant about policy being made in a vacuum. It's not made in a vacuum. What we do or say on North Korea has implications for what we do or say on Iran, or what we do or say on North Korea may be constrained by what the Undersecretary wants to do on Iran. So there's all sorts of different pieces to policy that don't necessarily make it so simple, that this is oh, the government's so stupid, that's the obvious outcome. Why don't they follow it? If it were that simple, then that would be the course that would be it.

MS. OHTAGAKI: And as a follow-up to that, I mean I would also that there's -- to your point about sort of message consistency -- I would say that there's sort of two parts to that. One is message discipline, right? So is the official U.S. government policy consistent? And I hope we do a good job with that. I don't know. You tell me how we do. But the second part is why does the Congress say something different on North Korea policy versus the Executive Branch? Or why do think tanks say something different than both? This is something that's unique to democracy and extremely strong and sort of a robust tradition here in the United States that all of these bodies can have different opinions, but our Constitution kind of dictates which bodies have precedence in representing us to foreign governments.

And then also to Victor's point, I think that a little bit of this democracy kind of plays out within our institutions as well. So there's a lot of -- and because of that the end product does, as Victor was saying, represent the collection of a lot of different equities. But there's also prioritization to that, obviously the NSC being the ultimate arbiter. But within let's say the State Department, if you have a given policy the bureau who is charged with our diplomatic relationships is going to have a view, the Democracy, Rights, and Labor Bureau who is charged with promoting human rights globally are going to have a view, the Nonproliferation Bureau is going, et cetera. And there is during the policymaking a discussion between all of these groups to make a recommendation to the
senior people who then discuss it sort of with the Defense Department, with the Treasury, with Commerce. Everyone gets together. And what comes out is something that is some prioritization and mix of all of those different equities.

MS. TERRY: I think we'll open it up for Q&A. We'll take three questions at a time and just if you could, just state your name and affiliation and succinctly ask your question.

QUESTIONER: Hi, how are you? My name's Kristen Kim. I'm a National Security reporter and graduate student at Northwestern. I was wondering what the looming possibility of reunification? Many South Koreans, especially in the younger generation, remain ambivalent or rather indifferent about this issue as a whole. So I was wondering the extent to which you think their understanding of history or sort of the lack thereof is influencing these attitudes?

QUESTIONER: It's my comment, not question. Fundamentally here is the theorist and the practitioner. Theorists do not have any responsibility. Their theories are only based on the generalization of numerous particulars, making theories. So whatever theorists make is not responsible, but policies or practitioners belong to the organization. The organization has objectives. Objectives -- I mean the goals and values and missions, objectives, and strategies based on those fundamentals policies are formulated. So because of the objectives, policies could be different from theories. Of course, they use the theories. An ambassador said that the history is the basis of theories. It's a very important sentence. But the objective, their mission objectives, strategies provide the policy. It's the basis of the policy.

So the difference is very clear. Since I'm teaching currently the strategy planning, this is from that field of study.

MS. TERRY: Great, thank you. Question, please?

QUESTIONER: My name's Baiyong. I think the question is can we
really identify and resolve the problem of the variation between the theories or academic or basic research and the policymaking? One thing I can think of is an academic forecast on series, but forget about the data they get is really from the different sources. The sources give you the wrong data or not the real economic data or really factual data, but there is a hidden agenda also in political side. So if we can say as spokesman and identify their type of hidden agenda and fix it and really open it to the public, just will resolve the things. Thank you.

MS. TERRY: Name, affiliation, and a short question, please.

QUESTIONER: Sergei Castif, Financial News in Moscow, Russia. So my question is to what extent American policy toward Korea is influenced by let's say Korean lobby, Korean business lobby and the free trade agreement, so there is some Korean business lobby. So my question is does Korean lobby have any influence on --

MS. TERRY: Korean lobby.

QUESTIONER: Yes, thanks.

MS. TERRY: Okay, we have three questions. We're going to answer three questions and we'll get back to you. Unification and young people, theory and policymaking, and the Korean lobby impacting. Who wants to --

MR. ARMSTRONG: Unification, right?

MS. TERRY: Well, her question was about unification and if North Koreans could vote, right?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Are you saying that North Koreans can only vote after unification? What if they can vote before unification?

MS. OHTAGAKI: That would be interesting, too.

MS. TERRY: Do you want to talk about unification and young people? I can just address unification and young people. I do think that the younger generation in South Korea is less interested in unification, and I think that is one of the reasons that it's
driving the government right now into this huge unification and it has to do with lack of historical and cultural or any kind of ties. Even when I was growing up, my entire paternal side of the family came from North Korea and I was indoctrinated into thinking unification is our goal, unification is our dream and so on. And I think they have less of that kind of ties and there’s no concept of Korean War or even the three or six generation or the democratization movement and so on. And so I do think there is something to that.

MR. PARK: I think that the big impact from the German unification. Shortly after that the Korean government really eagerly they set about the unification costs. And that is I think one thing. And the other thing is that the 1997 financial crisis. After that the young generation they really feel the job insecurity. So if South Korean government should pay the unification costs means that there is reduced job opportunity. So that’s I think is the basic idea and the thinking of the young generation in South Korea.

MS. TERRY: Korean policymaking, I think we discussed a lot about that, including lobby.

MR. CHA: Well, let me talk -- can I say something about theory and policy?

MS. TERRY: Unification, of course.

MR. CHA: So now I’m going to use the other side of my brain.

MS. TERRY: Very schizophrenic today.

MR. CHA: There is a lot that is appealing about theory. I mean the notion that you can look at a mass of data, a number of cases, and to be able to kind of draw out a single causal tendency. This I think is intellectually very appealing and it’s very useful. And so the problem I have is I think it’s -- I mean Bob and I share the same, which is the lack of tolerance, right? I mean that yes, that sort of work is good. It can be useful at times. But the two worlds should be tolerant of one another, should not simply be disparaging of the other world. And if you’re trying to operate in both worlds, it’s very
difficult. I think it’s just as hard, it’s even harder I think, to get published in foreign affairs than it is to get published in a disciplinary journal -- world politics, international organization, or something. But as a young academic, I did not even try to publish in foreign affairs until I got tenure because I knew that it would basically be a waste of time. I mean it actually works against you. You tend to track academic -- it works against you to publish in policy journals. You write an op-ed for the New York Times, that’s probably even harder than getting into foreign affairs, which is harder than getting into the disciplinary journals and it would work against you in a tenure committee because you’re not paying attention to the right stuff. So there’s that aspect of it.

Having said that I think there are elements of theorizing that are quite useful for policy, especially when they reach conclusions that are counterintuitive to what we normally think. So if there’s work out there, large and statistical analysis that basically tells us within a minimal margin of error that Democratic-controlled congresses tend to be more protectionist than Republican-controlled congresses, that’s not very interesting to me because I think for the most part we know that. But if -- and this is a real example -- if you have somebody that can, an academic who can tell you that politicians’ votes on free trade agreements are not rewarded or punished in their next election. That is a counterintuitive finding. That is interesting. So I think that’s the basic difference.

And the last thing I’ll say on theory and policy is that we’ve been quite critical of the gap here, but we should acknowledge that probably in the United States we’re one of the few societies where we do have academics that revolve into policy, the so-called revolving door. People like Bob Gallucci or Tom Christensen or Charlie Kupchan, or people like this. We do have people that revolve in and out and that I think is a good and useful thing. I mean Korea from I would say about 15 years ago, we see more of that in Korea, too, where you have academics that rotate into -- Hans will speak later and others who rotate into government. We don’t see as much in Japan, for
example. We don’t see it in China and other countries in Asia, but I think relatively speaking, the United States, although there is a gap, it may not be as wide as it is in Asia.

MS. OHTAGAKI: Can I jump back in on the unification question? Actually I just had a thought. I also think that to some degree that maybe partly because of the youth part of that equation in the sense that I think American kids in general tend to be the argument that you’re focused on sort of the future and less on history. And so I think if you made the argument to an American young person that you’re going to have to make sacrifices in your future because of your history, I think that’d be a pretty tough pill to swallow for a young person, too. I think as you get older you start to think more about history. That is not to say or to minimize I think the thinking of young people. I think there are some statistics about sort of when people have their Nobel Prize-winning ideas, but mostly they’re sort of like in your youth, but again I think emphasizes the importance of sort of a diversity of opinions in thinking about the whole question. I mean it’s a big decision.

MS. TERRY: I’d like to take just a few more questions, but do you want to give a one-sentence answer to the Korean lobby question that that gentleman asked?

MR. CHA: I didn’t know there was a Korean lobby.

MS. TERRY: The third question was about whether Korean lobbies are impacting the U.S. policymaking. Victor worked at the NSC for some time, but he doesn’t really get that, so that shows you the impact of Korean lobby. I think that just kind of answers the question.

MR. ARMSTRONG: There was once a very notorious Korean lobby back in the seventies --

MS. TERRY: With the whole Korea-gate, right.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Korea-gate, right, and all of that, but they’re much more settled down.
MS. TERRY: I was not aware of it. He’s not aware of it. He said what?
So I think that kind of answers that question. Okay, next set of questions. Name, affiliation, short question, please.

QUESTIONER: Mike Bosetti, *PBS Online Newshour*. Maybe I’m missing something or maybe you’re compartmentalizing it for a future -- for one of the afternoon panels -- but in the Korean historical study and imagination, I’ve heard a lot of triangle -- Korea, Japan, U.S. What about China? I’ve barely heard China mentioned in this panel.

QUESTIONER: Hello, I’m Dennis Halpin from the U.S.-Korea Institute. I had a question for Professor Armstrong and the panel about the lack of a collapse over the last 20 years. I’d just like to point out in 1970 a young Soviet dissident, Amalrik, wrote a paper called "Will the Soviet Union Survive Till 1984?" Now, he died in a mysterious car crash in 1980. We got to 1984. You had Andropov in Moscow, a KGB guy like Putin. You had Star Wars, Pershing missile deployment, evil empire. It looked like the Soviet Union wasn’t going anywhere. But then you go to 1992 you have Yeltsin on the tank and bye-bye Soviet Union.

So even though in 1970 no one could perceive of the disappearance of the East-West paradigm in their lifetime, it happened. So my question is okay, predictions of North Korean collapse might be dangerous, but denial of the possibility of a North Korean collapse in our lifetime might be equally dangerous. I mean is that what you’re saying? You’re predicting that there would not be a collapse in our lifetime and that counter-planning on collapse scenarios is, therefore, not necessary?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I’m not saying we should deny the possibility. I think the possibility is there. I’m just saying we should not build a consensus around the expectation that it’s going to happen anytime soon. There were a few people who did predict the Soviet Union collapse. Some actually were quite accurate. What is her
name? Herlinda Kaus in France. She actually wrote a very perceptive book in the eighties about how the Soviet Union would break up into various ethnic and national constituencies. I’m just a little concerned about a kind of group think that might develop around this very specific expectation, and we have to look back and see how things did not always turn out in the past the way a prediction expected.

The one thing I can say about history, and this gets back to the unification question as well, the only thing I learned from history is that we can always expect the unexpected. And we can do all the planning we want for all the contingencies, but we don’t know what’s going to happen. And the fact that fewer and fewer young South Koreans want unification does not mean in and of itself that unification isn’t going to happen. Unification could happen despite the opposition of a majority of Koreans, and we have to be prepared for that as well. Most Germans did not expect and many did not want unification at the time that the Wall fell, but it happened anyway. So that’s all I’m saying. I’m not putting myself – I’m an agnostic actually about whether or not North Korea is going to collapse. But I’m certainly not jumping on the bandwagon with saying it’s imminent.

MR. CHA: Two points and one of them I’ll try to draw together Mike’s question with Dennis, which is okay, so if the United States, South Korea, and China start to have trilateral dialogue about potential contingencies on the Peninsula, would that be considered a policy that is based on the presumption that North Korea will collapse? Is it considered policy that it’s designed to try to make North Korea collapse? Or is it just good policy in the sense that you have to prepare. You have to prepare for all sorts of contingencies. And that’s where I think there is a gap between what academics and policymakers think.

MS. TERRY: Do you want to comment on the U.S-Korea-China relationship?
MR. PARK: Yes, about in particular the China issue. And before that I’ll go back and say about what you say -- what I want to say is not about the consistency. It’s about the principles and clearest decisions or that now the U.S. government has the best policy. But if not decided then in that case I think also it is not possible to be clear. But one thing about now is that the system, let’s say the missile defense, these days more and more experts and scholars they’re giving warning to South Korean government and civil society. The system in South Korea has kind of crossed over the line and that kind of thing could really destroy the very good relationship between South Korea and China to control the issues. So China is now very important to think about the U.S.-Korean relationship.

MS. TERRY: We do have a panel later on China, so we’re discussing more in depth. We have time for one more question.

QUESTIONER: Hi, Mike Billington. I’m with Executive Intelligence Review. Since the discussion has sort of turned to unification or reunification, let me extend the question about China to what I think is more fundamental, which is that South Korea has made it very clear that their relationship to China and Russia is absolutely crucial to them; that the only hope for peace in the North is not lecturing them and demanding this and that about their nuclear program and human rights, but providing them an actual stake in development, the long-term development that’s already going on around South Korean firms openly working towards a consortium with the North and Russia. I think that’s the question that U.S. policy is just completely outside of that whole concept, which is what’s dominating and I think correctly all of Eurasia with the new Silk Road perspective, great development projects working together, and the U.S. is completely outside of that process to our detriment.

MR. TERRY: Sir, did you have one question?

QUESTIONER: Loren Hershey. I’m a semi-retired attorney. I worked in
the Justice Department many years ago. I’ve been a student of Asia for about 48 years, so I’m knowledgeable, but not an expert. Are there any North Koreans present? That’s a question. Number two; is there any Track II that goes on between North Korea and South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Russia, or China?

MR. PARK: Do you mean present in the panel?

MS. TERRY: No, I don’t think there are North Koreans here, right?

QUESTIONER: Well, you get the point of the question?

MS. TERRY: Yes, Track II. I think there is Track II.

MR. CHA: Sure, yes. There is Track II dialogue that takes place between the United States and North Korea. There are a number of groups that organize it, some in New York, some in California. I would say again, a common misperception is that the United States and North Korea don’t talk to each other. Why don’t they just talk to each other? That’s why Track II is important. But again, that’s not the reality. The reality is that there’s an open channel of communication that takes place through New York between the United States and the North Korean official channel of unification, even though there are no diplomatic relations between the two countries where they’re very easily able to communicate and convey pro forma messages, but also to convey very frank and candid messages.

Where Track II is useful is when in periods of time when that so-called New York channel is cut off for whatever reason. That’s when Track II dialogue can be useful because it facilitates contact between officials when they might be instructed otherwise in formal diplomatic channels not to be having contact.

MS. TERRY: Any other final comment? I think that concludes the first panel. We’ll have a coffee break until 11:30. Thank you.

(Recess)
MS MOON: Okay folks. We're going to be getting on to the next roundtable. This is the roundtable on Alliance Management: Basis, Weapons and Command. At first, when I was coming up with a title, it just went on and on, and I decided, you know, this will encapsulate, and people are free to talk about everything under the sun regarding the alliance. I'm Kathy Moon, and I will be serving as moderator and participant.

I just want to make a quick informational announcement that Mike Shulman, from the Department of State, is stuck in New York. He's actually on a plane. He called me from the plane to say he managed to get on the next available flight, but he will not be able to get here in time for now. Therefore, we will include him in one of the afternoon panels, since he's been good enough to prepare and come. And we were very lucky because we have Mike Squarey here, who, out of the audience, just happens to be also a career expert, having served as the director of the Korea Office, the Korea desk in the Department of Defense, and he very nicely, kindly, generously offered to step in and serve as another discussant. So we are at full range here, full power.

I just want to make a couple of observations. One is that those of you who have been in government or are in government, would you please avoid abbreviations until you spell out what those abbreviations stand for, for those of us who are not familiar with the USG? USG and ROK abbreviations. And then Andrew Yeo and I have been discussing that when we looked at the list of questions, and you know, this is the document that any dissertation student or master student or anyone who wants to do research can follow and pick up on, that we noticed, and I noticed, in the e-mails that got sent to me before we edited, almost every academic--pure academic--those who have not served in government, and especially the historians, the questions were very long and wordy compared to those in government, or having been in government, who had, you know, very brief questions.
The one exception to the academic pattern was, my former professor from Smith College, Steven Goldstein, who is right here, who gave the shortest question, which was identity and unification. And I scratched my head and I figured, I know him. I'm not going to go back and ask him what he meant. So I added a few words on, but it is quite amazing at the different cultures of even the wording.

Okay, so we’re going to move on to discussion on the alliance and it’s varied facets, and I will just offer you my questions since I’ve given you my name, and my question has to do with my own emphasis in research, especially in the past, the first half of my academic career focused on many of these socio-political issues regarding the U.S. Military bases in South Korea, and -- I’m looking for one of my many question sheets here -- thank you.

So my questions have to do with the status of forces agreement in particular, because between the U.S. and South Korea, this has been a regular issue that emerges and is often highly politicized, especially by the South Korean public. So how should policy makers address the issues concerning the statues of forces agreement or the abbreviation SOFA, specifically, the increased complexity of (inaudible) in South Korea especially, in alliance politics, the institutionalization of new procedures and protocols over time -- do they help reduce some of the politicization and increase better coordination between the USFK -- the U.S. Forces Korea, and the South Korean actors?

And also the impact on the politicization of U.S. bases, sovereignty, unequal relations, troop conduct, civilian rights -- these are all issues that have come in in the U.S. South Korea alliance. Also in the U.S. Japan alliance and so -- the U.S. Philippines alliance when we had active military bases there. So they are pretty worldwide, these issues get raised. I’ll turn to Van to introduce himself and his question.

MR. JACKSON: So, I'm Van Jackson. I'm a visiting fellow at the Center for New American Security, and counsel a Foreign Relations International Affairs fellow. I
also adjunct in the school of Foreign Service at Georgetown, and up until a month ago, I had been in the Pentagon the last five years in the office of the Secretary of Defense, as the (inaudible) desk director, (inaudible) strategist and policy advisor focused on Asia.

Ah, my question. The alliance was born out of convergence of threat perceptions in 1950, but how does that perception affect alliance management today? So, are there differences in how South Korea and the U.S. see the threat posed by North Korea? And threats in the region more broadly? Does the threat perception convergence or divergence within the alliance trickle down to alliance strategy, weapons investments, basing decision and the like, or is it all just politics?

MR. YEO: Good morning. My name is Andre Yeo, I'm an associate professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America, here in Washington, DC, and as Kathy pointed out, being at this conference on policy history and policy has made me self aware of how verbose I was in my question, so I’ll translate it into non-academic speak. But, now my question for us is, does the past success of the U.S. ROK alliance create biases, making it more difficult for policy makers to see the alliance from a more critical perspective, such as the number of troop deployment on the peninsula, and north south relations which are on questions, such as the transfer of operational control.

MR. SQUAREY: I'm Matt Squarey. I'm currently unencumbered by affiliation, but as Kathy mentioned, I (inaudible) just recently as one of the country directors and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I -- immediately following Van actually. In that role, I was fortunate to be exposed to the many ways in which the United States and the Republic of Korea both share in the investments required for the combined defense of the Korean Peninsula, and I worked most closely on negotiating the new special measures agreement, and also handling issues related to (inaudible) missile capabilities, particularly, missile defense, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, and a (inaudible) capabilities.
In those experiences, I was struck by how significant the investments both sides are making, and the question that I was pose to the panel and to the audience is, how can the two countries share in the investments required in the (inaudible) defense. What are the appropriate roles and missions for each country to take up and what could we be doing differently to share in the investments (inaudible) for the combined defense.

MS. MOON: Okay. Thank you very much, and now they’ve been very, very kind to OSD -- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Special Measures Agreement, SMA. Any others that we should -- THAD.

MR. SQUAREY: Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense.

MS. MOON: Yes, Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense. So you’ll hear THAD -- I was at the meeting in -- sponsored by one of the think tanks. It was a closed group meeting. I don’t remember if Victor was here, but it was Koreans and Americans, and I heard THAD, SAD and TAD. And I kept thinking are these three different acronyms or one? And I realized it was just a matter of pronunciation. Some people wanted to call it THAD, TAD or SAD, depending on how they’re tongue turned. So I thought that was a very interesting linguistic, political experience.

At any rate, I’d like us to start with Van’s question. I think it bridges the history and the policy and brings us from the past, present, to the future. So Van posed a question of the fact that the alliance was born out of convergent threat perceptions on the 50s, and now the -- we have possible divergence in threat perceptions, and that would depend on, I guess, who you ask in both countries as well. And does threat perception convergence divergence trickle down to alliance strategy, to weapons investments and basing agreements. And then of course, this is a question we could ask at every round table -- or is it just politics? Mostly domestic in both societies. So I open this up to our roundtable. Would Van like to take a jab at your own question?
MR. JACKSON: Yes. So the first thing I’d say is that this was a brilliant question, and highly consequential, very interesting. So yes, obviously I’m kidding, but I’m also serious. So the -- ideally, I’d like to think that threat perception drives the formation of strategy, drives the formation of policy, and the policy drives the everything else, so basing decisions, how much, what does that look like? And then, but we know in the real world, it clearly doesn’t work that way. And we know domestic politics plays this gigantic role in things like OPCON and base disagreements, the special measures agreement, but to dismiss everything as politics is not very helpful, right? And so, can we at least say when threat perceptions are driving some of these specific decision? Are there specific decisions that we can identify in the alliance that we can tie back to threat perceptions? With convergence or divergence.

And I thought that missile defense, historically, is an area where the alliance has had a disagreement. South Korea has been reluctant to join what it perceives as like a regional missile defense architecture. The U.S. has been promoting something it would describe as a regional missile defense architecture, and the threat imperative from the U.S. side is pretty clear -- North Korean ballistic missiles, right?

But from the South Korean prospective, historically, the threat of ballistic missiles is more aimed at Japan or at the U.S., and not so much at South Korea, and so it makes it -- the lack of an apparent threat, in this respect, makes it easier to politicize that issue. And so in the normal here and there, the issue did get politicized, and we’re still living with this missile defense taboo hangover today.

But the threat of missiles is sort of changing a little bit, right? It’s like, I’m just reading the news now since I’m out of government, but North Korean short range missiles that used to be able to range Japan -- it’s not that they can’t anymore, but North Korea is changing the angle, right? So it can shoot straight up and down to hit South Korea. So the threat, or the perception of the threat is changing, and I’m sensing like, a
modest shift within South Korea and Government (inaudible) at least, about the missile defense issue.

No drastic C-change, but it kind of seems like South Korea may be more (inaudible) to missile defense something. Maybe not THAD, maybe, I don't know. But in response to this change in the reality about how we see the threat from North Korea -- I don't know if I went on too long.

MS. MOON: (inaudible), could I ask you for a comment on it?

MR. SQUAREY: Sure. I think that in terms of threat perceptions -- both the United States and South Korea take the treat posed by North Korea very seriously, and broadly have similar views of some of the challenges posed by North Korea, and have an impressive unity of purpose and effort regarding the threat. But I think that there are divergences in terms of the areas in which the two countries prioritized. Things to work on -- missile defense is an interesting one that Van mentions.

From the Us perspective, there’s long been a sense that there is no single solution to addressing intensifying North Korean nuclear weapon and (inaudible) threats, and therefore there needs to be investments, in the holistic set of capabilities to address the threat, whether it’s missile defense or intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, or (inaudible) capabilities or kinetic control capabilities that allow us to unify efforts across those capabilities, and I think that in South Korea, there has often been a preference for very visible investments and in high end technology and high end systems that send a very clear, symbolic message to North Korea and to other countries, and I think that there’s often been a challenge in the alliance of bridging the U.S. view of kind of spreading out investments across a holistic range of solutions and the South Korean view of focusing on some very prominent, symbolic investments.

But I think as Van alluded to with missile defense, there is an increasing commonality in the way that our countries view the need to invest in these capabilities.
You see South Korean leaders often talking about not only the kill chain concept, but also the Korean air and missile defense concept. And I think that there is a -- I actually think it’s very clever branding, the KAMD concept, because it situates this idea of investments and missile defense in a way that it is clear that it is an indigenous, independent Korean system. It’s not a system that is controlled or directed by the United States, and it also is very clear that this is for the defense of Korea, which I think is very important to Korean, and it’s a (inaudible) that I think Americans can be more sensitive to in advocating for enhanced missile defense, that having better kill chain and KAMD capabilities in South Korea is very important for the defense of Korea.

MS. MOON: I find this very interesting, because your mention of KAMD, Korean Air Missile Defense, that’s another commonly -- it comes with the THAD territory, THAD KAMD. There is a political aspect to the KAMD, which you’re alluding to, and I think that also has to do with history. The history of the U.S. Korea alliance, and this issue about sovereignty, independence, Korean autonomy and the lack of equality -- perceived equality among many Koreans, historically, in the relationship -- in the alliance relationship.

And what’s interesting about KAMD is that this is a very, very ambition project. Technologically, militarily, in terms of coordination of various organizations in South Korea, and also coordination with the United States, and it is an incredibly costly, very, very costly endeavor. But it is a very symbolic, as well as strategic and political project, and so for South Koreans, the KAMD is a very important sign that it is and becoming indeed more independent and autonomous vis-a-vis the alliance, and that it can help lead the alliance and not just follow the U.S. lead. So it is a difficult situation, where you need to have the -- for the protection of South Korea from potential North Korean missiles, various kind, you -- THAD can be helpful. But then the cost of
incorporating THAD into the Korean Air Missile Defense System, or adapting the two together is extremely, technologically and militarily -- technologically and financially a high stakes game.

So I think it’s important to keep that in the historical context, because it does have an impact on the public, and on the government. I’ve talked to some military folks in the ROK military who are very proud of KAMD, and who would like to see this succeed and not get it distracted by THAD.

MR. YEO: And I use these military acronyms to teach my one year old the alphabet. But I wanted to address Van’s question directly about differences in threat perceptions between the North and South, and it’s interesting that those on the policy, (inaudible) have addressed threat perception largely through material capabilities, but there are other factors. History, ideology, you know, differences in ideas, which shape how threat perceptions are formed.

And so, if you remember, for South Koreans, North Korea, of course it’s - - the nuclear program is a direct threat, but you have to remember that for South Koreans, the North Korean issue is more than just a military or -- it’s more than just -- it’s beyond just the nuclear issue. There’s also the issue of reunification, which, for South Koreans -- excuse me, for the United States, for the longest period, the North Korea threat -- the North Korea issue was really observed as primarily an issue of nuclear proliferation. So the way South Koreans and the way Americans approach North Korea, (inaudible), so that’s where you begin to see differences in approaches to the North Korea threat.

And more broadly, in terms of the alliance, and this is where I think academic theory may be useful, but there are these power asymmetries between South Korea and the United States. This is just fact, but we know that for Koreans, the U.S. ROK alliance matters much more than for -- how -- I don’t mean to denigrate Koreans by
stating this, but from the point of view of the Americans, because United States is considered a great power, the relevance of the ROK alliance is not going to be at the same level. So when Washington looks at -- when Washington looks at the alliance and they (inaudible) threat, it's from a much more global threat, whereas Koreans -- it's really about the peninsula, it's more within the region. Where I do think we're beginning to see convergence is because South Korea has begun to step up and play more of a regional role. And so that's where I think we can begin seeing more of a convergence about threat perceptions for the region. It's obviously good for the U.S. ROK alliance.

MR. SQUAREY: Can I two finger that, or whatever it's?

MS. MOON: Sure.

MR. SQUAREY: Sorry. So, the -- my concern actually is that as we look out beyond North Korea that threat perceptions are going to diverge greatly. So it's way premature, but there's a lot of Korean concern about Japanese militarism, and the U.S., as a matter of policy, supports the normalization process for Japan's military, and has for a long time. And on the flip side, South Korea has expressed a lot of concern, especially in the missile defense context about China. Like fear of being on the wrong side of China, let's say.

But as you know, the Department of Defense plans for everything and there is a lot of preparation and relation to sort of high end strategic competitors like China. And so, depending on what happens in the region, it's completely plausible in an alternative future that we and South Korea are on completely different pages about who is the friend and who is the threat. It's early to make these kinds of calls, and it's going to depend on regional behavior, but -- found somebody, alright.

MS. MOON: Are you done?

MR. SQUAREY: Yes, I'm finished.
MS. MOON: I wanted to -- first of all, we have Mike Shulman who valiantly has made it from New York, so thank you very much.

MR. SHULMAN: Thank you, and apologies to everyone for it.

MS. MOON: No, no. Please, you can't control the weather. We can try to control many things, but not the weather. Take your time and take a few breaths, and in the meantime, we'll fill in. I wanted to get at some of the direct answers to Van's question. I was thinking that in terms of some examples of threat perceptions, we've already had Andrew talk about, yes. There are divergent perceptions, partly because of the proximity -- North Korea, South Korea and the political ties.

The emotional, psychological ties in addition to the military issues, but also that the U.S., being a great power, versus South Korea, a middle power and a regional power, of course you have differences in threat perception and strategic capabilities -- response and capabilities, partly based on history but just based on today's reality. Where history, I think, is important is that more than threat perception divergence and commonality, I think that from a South Korean perspective, U.S. unilateralism is something that is very worrisome, and what a colleague of mine at Wellesley calls nervous making, to South Korean policy makers and the South Korean public?

And we do have evidence, historically, for such unilateralism. The Nixon doctrine and the pull out of two divisions suddenly, because of the U.S.'s role in Vietnam and the need to extricate itself financially, and in terms of our troops, and that, through the South Korean military, (inaudible) military, the government, the public, into a frenzy of fear that the U.S. was abandoning South Korea. And it is a time when actually, the U.S. decision brought -- the unilateral decision brought the South Korean opposition and ruling parties, the left and the right together, to oppose together the actions the U.S. was taking.

The global posture review was a more recent example where many South Koreans felt
that it was a relatively unilateral decision on the part of the Bush Administration under the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.

And so, these incidents historical incidents, I think add to the problem of perception, both on terms of divergence and convergence. It complicates the perception convergence. Michael.

MR. SHULMAN: Yes?

MS. MOON: Now that you’ve caught your breath, if you would introduce yourself and give us the question that you’d like to share with the audience and the roundtable and say a few remarks, I’d appreciate it.

MR. SHULMAN: First off, happy to be here. I’m Michael Shulman, and I cover political military affairs on the Korea desk at the State Department. I’ve had that assignment for about a year and I’ve worked with some great people at State and at DoD, including the gentleman sitting next to me, who I was happy to see when I walked in. So the question that I had prepared was, given what we accomplished as an alliance in 2014, we wrapped up some big things, one of which was the Special Measures Agreement, which covers the raw contribution to stationing cost to the United States forces, Korea. We finished that in January of this past year, and also our new framework for (inaudible) transfer. We just wrapped that up not too long ago. And I was going to ask the panelists thoughts on what we think the alliance will accomplish in 2015.

MS. MOON: Well, can I ask you what you think we need to accomplish in 2015?

MR. SHULMAN: Well, now that we have some -- those big things out of the way, what I foresee in 2015 is enhancing continuing our global partnership, which is such a big part of the alliance now. It’s reflective of how far the republic of Korea has come, how far the alliance has come. Now we can work together on some really major issues, like (inaudible) with ISIL, with Afghanistan, counter-piracy. It’s quite a long list of
things. For the full scope of that, rather than list everything, you can -- I would refer you to the joint (inaudible) from the recent security consultant meeting, SCM, that's online. And our joint statement from our two plus two meeting, which happened the next day.

It really illustrates how broad the scope of our alliance is. And that's what I foresee us focusing on, at least in the first half of 2015. Working together to address the security challenges, not just in Northeast Asia, but around the world.

MR. YEO: Just to jump in there, I think for 2015, I mean, so we have some of the big issues. The OPCON, I think, transferred from that. I don't think it's completely resolved, because there's just no (inaudible) deadline for it. But thinking about regional and global priorities, one issue that I think the alliance could address is, you know, again getting back to this discussion with Japan and trying to bring more coordination among those partners to strengthen regional -- our regional partnership. Also, I -- we've -- this is something that Kathy and I have both worked on, but in terms of thinking about the alliance ahead -- if, you know, we -- it's a question that I posed about the past success.

So we've had this alliance, you know, for 60 years. What's in store for the next 60 years, and from time to time, we see opposition. We see pro-anti based protests. We see civil society raising issues about inequalities within the alliance, and I think these are more alliance management issues, but even though these aren't (inaudible) and big issue items, I think those are some things that I think can be addressed further.

I know one issue that's on the plate right now is with environmental cleanup. One of the bases of -- this is something that (inaudible) society has really latched on to. So I think those things need to be worked over so that you don't have something just pop out in the midst of a crisis like you did in 2002 when you had the two schoolgirls run over in that accident.
MS. MOON: Thank you. One way that the U.S. and the Korean governments have been able to improve the management of the alliance along the civil military relationship (inaudible), is by making some effort, I would say, relatively modest, and again, relative to, let's say, the U.S. Japan alliance and the kind of institutional structures in place in Japan to deal with some of the civil military relation problems. So South Korea and the U.S., since the two girl's deaths in 2002, and the huge outpouring of South Koreans cries and demands and grief over that loss, and both governments handling of that crisis, the USFK has developed mechanisms, measures, programs to help educate the troops about conduct, to conduct within the U.S. -- within South Korea, and also both governments have improved channels of communication, hotlines and such, at different levels of the relationship, the USFK and the South Korean MND, the Ministry of National Defense.

And I think those measures will help. When I look at the U.S. South Korea, USFK relationship and compare it to the U.S. Japan alliance, it's still lacking. The former is still lacking in terms of well institutionalized procedures, and this partly is the fault of the South Korean government. The South Korean government has never established a structure in agency or in office that deals with civilian complaints or problems that could be managed so that it doesn't spill -- they don't spill over onto the street and into bigger alliance management territory.

In Okinawa, for example, the prefectural government in Okinawa has offices that regularly, daily deal with citizens' complaints, grievances, petitions, issues. So that the prefectural government can work with the commanders in Okinawa, U.S. commanders in Okinawa, and try to manage them before they develop into more critical problems in the larger alliance. I think that's one area where we have room for improvement in the U.S. ROK alliance management territory.
I want to get to some of the tough questions. In terms of the discussions, negotiations over OPCON. For the U.S. side, it was very rational to emphasize that we come up with preparation first, preparation and readiness, and then have a date that meets that. But for the South Koreans, it was a bit confusing that no particular date was set. And so there were questions in South Korea -- does this mean that this OPCON transfer will actually occur, is Washington thinking something else, what else might be going on. These are natural questions that might occur when people don’t actually are in the know. And so I thought, what are some of our panelist’s through on this question.

MR. SHULMAN: Well, I can jump in, but first Kathy, just to address the points you were raising before, which were very interesting. I -- not being so familiar with the Us Japan alliance structures, I can’t comment on all of those things you mentioned and make a comparison, but I think it’s important once you look at the alliance to note that it is evolving and it learns from its mistakes, which you mentioned. Procedures have been improved for the civil military relations and so on. Uh, what you saw -- what you’d see ten years ago is not what you see today, and a large part that has to do with the evolving nature of the security situation on the -- in the region, we evolve, we adapt to it, and most importantly, we collaborate with the Republic of Korea really more than ever before, and we are constantly looking for ways to even increase collaboration.

One of the things we worked on this year that I mentioned, the Special Measures Agreement, that includes new consultative mechanisms within that, as far as how funding is allocated. That’s just one example. We’re always looking for ways to improve that, and I think that trajectory will continue going forward. And I also want to note that right now, while we don’t take the alliance for granted, we are constantly looking to improve it. It is at an all time high in popularity. And again, I think that has to do with the fact that both countries recognized the nature of the threat, and that it has to be
deterred, and we have to prepare for that threat. And I think that’s why the alliance enjoys such strong support, not just from the militaries of both countries, but also at the political level.

The dynamic is not quite what it was ten years ago. You know, I don’t have a crystal ball and I can’t see how that’s going to continue (inaudible) into many, many years from now, but that’s how we see it going for the foreseeable future, and it’s worth putting that in perspective.

As far as OPCON goes, as you mentioned, we did have a timeline to hand over in December 2015, and -- but the Republic of Korea came to us last year requesting us to re-evaluate the timeline and look at a conditions based framework, and as allies -- when our ally comes to us with an idea, we consider it. We talked about it at great length and we had a lot of discussions, and we came up with a framework that we thought was best for the alliance. And I would want to dispel any idea that the United States is against OPCON transfer. It’s not. We see OPCON transfer as the next logical step in the evolution of the alliance, but at the same time, in our bilateral assessment of the security situation, we decided that this framework is a better way to approach it right now. That certain conditions need to be met before we transfer, and the security situation on the peninsula has to be conducive to a transfer. This is agreed on both sides after again, a lot of discussion and a lot of collaboration. So that’s really OPCON in a nutshell.

MS. MOON: Van or Andrew, do you have any comments to what’s been said, or do you want to.

MR. JACKSON: Add a quick (inaudible) for OPCON. What’s funny about OPCON transition with South Korea is that obviously, in Asia, and in Korea in particular, sovereignty is very important, right? It’s very strong norm. It’s not immutable. It’s not some inviolable principle, and so when sovereignty is very important, until it
doesn’t support your interests as a nation. And OPCON is an example of that, you know. It’s the South Koreans who came to the U.S. and requested a delay in OPCON transition. The U.S. government’s been clear about that. This is a request from the ally. So I think we -- it’d be just as likely that the U.S. would be the bad guy in the newspapers is South Korea requested a delay and we said no way, take OPCON.

And so I feel like the U.S. can’t win on OPCON, frankly. I think the outcome that we’ve got now is as good as it gets.

MR. YEO: One point on Kathy’s question about different perceptions on there being a date or just being exclusively conditions based -- I think that it’s important to consider the factor of credibility here. With this now being the second delay of OPCON transition, both the ROK and the U.S. were very cognoscente of the fact that if you were to set a specific date and the political dynamic on either side changed in the future administration, or if the security situation in North Korea was such that either country was uncomfortable with OPCON transition based on a date certain, then you would face a very real credibility problems of kind of shifting -- to use an American football metaphor, to -- of shifting, of changing the -- shifting the goal posts. So I think that when you’re dealing with an adversary as serious as North Korea and the very serious common threats that the U.S. and South Korea face, you have to be very careful about your credibility. And I think that the agreement that Mike discussed is about as good as it gets, like Van said, in terms of preserving alliance credibility.

MS. MOON: Thank you very much. I want to throw in a question here that we had not entertained when we were e-mailing one another, which has to do with the U.S. Japan (inaudible) guidelines. The entering report came out. Many of you have read it, and there is the expectation that both governments -- that Prime Minister Abe and President Obama would sign it by the end -- at the end of December or by the end of December of the year. It is not a finished document. The question I have for the panel
here is, to what extent, and how do you envision, if at all, different impacts from the U.S.
Japan defense guidelines on the U.S. ROK alliance.

M. SHULMAN: I'll take a first shot at it. I mean, as far as the
guidelines go, again, I'm the Korea guy, but for Japan, they were revised really in large
part because of, again, the changing security situation. For the same reason why we
revisit certain agreements and mechanisms that we have with the U.S. ROK alliance.
And you know, as far as trilateral coordination among the U.S., ROK and Japan goes,
that's very important to us, and it's something we're constantly talking about. We believe
that it's really crucial for regional peace and stability. To the extent we can further that,
yes we'd like that to happen, and we hope that with transparency and just explaining that
the revised guidelines of what it is, just so there's -- a trust can be -- I guess trust can be
developed by both sides about what it is. That's really the first step, I think, in making
sure that's not an obstacle to achieving trilateral cooperation.

So we, you know, in short, we want to see -- we believe good relations
between Japan and the ROK are in the best interest of both countries as well as in the
region, and we're going to keep saying that.

M. YEO: I haven't read the New Japan defense guidelines, but you
know, it would be interesting to see -- and maybe there is something in the works, a
similar one for the U.S. ROK alliance, but if you were to create it to have something in
there about regional partnerships and a more, further cooperative defense -- security
cooperation with, and that's (inaudible).

M. JACKSON: Two just quick points on that issue. One, I think Mike
mentioned earlier the keyword here which is transparency. I think that, from my
perspective, it would matter a great deal to South Korea to continue to see open dialogue
and transparency on what the defense guidelines review means for South Korea, and so
-- I haven't been in government a few months, but I know that there is communication
between the U.S. and ROK and Japan trilaterally on these issues. There is -- I think we should encourage bilateral dialogue between Japan and South Korea on how Japanese evolving views of their own foreign policy and defense policy affects South Korea. I think that's all very good and transparency and dialogue is very important.

A second point I would make -- I just, on trilateral cooperation, obviously it's very important to the United States that Japan, South Korea and the United States have trilateral communication, that there is robust information sharing between the countries, but a point that I would like to emphasize is that this is not only important for the defense of the United States, or for the defense of Japan or for our regional security objectives. It's actually very important for the defense of South Korea. Japan plays a critical role on any contingency on the Korean Peninsula. United Nations command rear would operate based out of Japan. And similarly, for any nuclear or ballistic missile threats affecting the United States or any of its allies. Robust, trilateral information sharing is very important for enhancing our readiness, and so I think it's important to note that trilateral cooperation is important for the United States, and it's important for the United States defense, but it's also important for the defense of South Korea.

MS. MOON: Thank you very much. I think we will close up our portion here and open it up for Q and A to discuss further. I'm going to take a question from the back there. I'll take three. There are two and then (inaudible).

MS. KIM: Hi. My name is Christina Kim. I'm from Georgetown University, graduate student. My question is related to missile defense and the divergence of threat perception. So like Dr. Jackson mentioned, South Korea is more interested in (inaudible) defense phase because of the short range ballistic missile system, but that would signify that it's -- since it's a midcourse missile defense system that it would be defended against U.S. and Japan, the North Korean ballistic ICPMs targeted towards U.S. and Japan. So my question is, the consequence of not joining the
U.S. Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense, does that outweigh the benefits of South Korea joining this integrated missile defense? Thank you.

MALE SPEAKER: (Inaudible) fellow Brookings. My question is about the credibility of the U.S. security commitments to South Korean and other Asian partners. You know, recently many (inaudible) in Asia is closely looking at what happened to Washington DC, and (inaudible) trend is obviously the difference, with spending cuts and depolarization, making politics, and how the (inaudible) effect with passing the budget for the defense budget on time. So the increasing number of the (inaudible) the (inaudible) analysts in the senior (inaudible) of Tokyo, not to mention Beijing, starting to discuss the possibility of the collapse of strong U.S. centered secured architecture. And (inaudible) lead to come up with a plan B. You know, don’t encourage, do not place all the eggs in one basket. So given that this trend, how does Washington -- what can Washington do to re-ensure the partners about the reliability of U.S. -- the (inaudible), given the domestic politics.

MS. MOON: Thank you. We’re recording all this, so for eternity, posterity.

MALE SPEAKER: (inaudible).

MS. MOON: (Inaudible) introduction.

MALE SPEAKER: And also at Georgetown starting in the spring. The point about the evolving alliance is a good one, but what bugs me, whenever this discussion of the alliance comes up is that nobody refers to history. And there was an edited volume but Bruce Cummings many, many years ago, which had a chapter in it about something called operation Eveready, which was a U.S. military plan to overthrow - - to stage a coup de tat against Sigman Ray. So rather than doing that, which was regarded as a high risk option, we decided to go with an alliance, and look how far we’ve come. So that point is certainly well taken. But no one ever mentions the origins. They
talk about the duration, 60 years. My question is this -- what happens to extended
deterrents, when North Korea develops the capability to hit the United States with nuclear
missiles. And that day is rapidly coming, because we’re not doing anything about it.
We’re kicking the can down the road. I’d be very curious to get any reaction from the
panel on that one.

MS. MOON: Thank you very much. These are tough questions. I think
we should start with the last one, since that.

MR. JACKSON: Yes, it’s a great question.

MS. MOON: Yes, let’s start with that one. Go ahead, Van.

MR. JACKSON: So, in the alliance, in all of these many consultation
mechanisms that we have, high level meetings among policy officials, both side always
focus on the next big meeting, the next deliverable, the next crisis, how do we get out of
the current crisis? There’s very little in the way of institutional capacity to deal with long
term planning, long term strategic issues. This is actually something that’s missing from
the alliance as compared to japan and Australia and the UK. And as a result, we have
little like, tolerance for these bigger, longer term questions that get worse over time.

SO it’s like the alliance doesn’t think time is a variable that matters,
almost. And so, North Korea’s missile program and its nuclear program is proceeding
apace. They’re on track to have a nuclear triad, which would be like a secure second
strike capability. IN 2010, North Korea engages in small scale violence against South
Korea. Us policy makers were panicked and frenzied about the possibility of escalation
with a nascent nuclear North Korea. What happens when North Korea’s got a nuclear
triad and a secure second strike capability, when it’s got a robust ability to attack with
nuclear weapons? Is that not check mate? Like, what U.S. policy maker is going to have
the risk propensity to engage in you know, Cuban missile crisis resolve, standing firm,
right?
Our future circumstances, our future policy options are going to be vastly constrained by our allowing this issue to continue to evolve the way it has. John is totally right. So this is a huge strategic problem, because it’s getting worse and it’s narrowing options for future policy makers because we’re not willing to resolve it today. I don’t have a solution for how you do that, but it is -- the time is making this problem worse, and we could be put on the horns of a dilemma in the future. So I’m being critical with that (inaudible).

MR. SHULMAN: Without getting too deep into deterrents, (inaudible) deterrents theory, I’ll just add though that we -- it is on our radar, for both of our countries, (inaudible). It’s a big part of our dialogues, of our defense dialogues that we have twice a year, and just last year, we signed -- we endorsed our secretary of defenses, and ministry of defense from both countries and endorsed a tailored deterrent strategy, specifically to basically craft our extended deterrents approach for the foreseeable future. I’ll also note, as many of you may know, that the U.S. -- the extended deterrents that we provide are committed to provide to the Republic of Korea also, includes the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It’s a full range of military capabilities. Nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, missile defense capabilities. We reaffirmed that two SEM’s ago, but obviously it’s an extremely difficult situation, the North Korea threat and their evolving capabilities.

But we do have mechanisms to address it and discuss it and find solutions.

MS. MOON: I’d like us to move on to some of the other questions and we can always revisit some of these and I welcome the audience to have some of your rebuttals or whatever ready. There was a question about. Andrew?

MR. YEO: I was going to respond to the -- DR. Son’s question about the regional architecture and U.S. commitment. It was funny, because yesterday evening, I was having, in our dinner discussion, another participant was -- we were talking about the
future presence of the U.S. in Asia, and that person, who won’t be named, thought that it would take a while, but we will eventually been out the door. My research has been focused on, you know, from the origins of the bilateral security architecture to multi laterals of today. Looking at this from a long term perspective, and from my reading of it, I do think that the U.S. is committed to this region, and if you look at -- I mean, if you look at U.S. policy towards Asia even a decade ago, you had -- so it wasn’t just about -- it was primarily about bilateral alliances, but there was -- starting from about five, six, seven years ago, we’ve seen the U.S. begin shifting towards, you know, different multi-lateral -- they’ve been thinking more about multi-lateralism.

So if you take, for example, the east Asia summit or the ARF, we now have -- you know, we take those -- I think we take those multi-lateral venues much more seriously than we did in the past. If you look at new partnerships that we’re building in Southeast Asia, or even the strengthening of U.S. (inaudible) relations from 2009, there’s a lot of sings that indicate that we are committed to this region. I don’t know how that translates though into, you know, boots on the ground for that part of the world. But we do have to think beyond the bilateral alliances. I think that’s the core of our security framework for the region. Our meaning the United States, which the U.S. South Korea alliance plays an integral part. But we’ve seen the building of these other institutional mechanisms in place, so it’s a combination of the bilateral (inaudible) that we’re seeing, and I think that’s the direction that the U.S. has moved.

MR. SHULMAN: So their rebounds policy.

MR. YEO: Right.

MR. SHULMAN: It’s a major part of this presidents -- president Obama’s foreign policy. He’s the first pacific president we’ve had that -- the United States has been in the republic of Korea longer -- for 60 plus years now, committed to its defense. But yes, Asia is more important to us. We’re more involved in Asia than ever before.
And as Professor Yeo said, we are committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea, and we say that all the time. Whenever our dignitaries visit it’s always something we never forget to say, and we assure the Republic of Korea people. So I can say it again here but I think it’s pretty well known. And the North Korea threat still exists, and that’s why, you know, that’s the primary reason why we have this alliance and it’s going to continue.

MR. YEO: One way to look at it though -- because the question is, well what about what’s happening in Russia or the Middle East, that we keep getting moved into different contingencies, and I've -- you know, I've put it in the analogy of investments, because now that I have kids I have to think about these things. But those are the crisis -- those are the (inaudible) that you have to put out. There are going to be crises that come up all the time, but if you look at Asia, it’s more -- I mean, we don’t see any -- there could be crisis potentials but we don’t see all out wars taking place at the moment, but it’s like a long term bet -- or a long term investment.

I think, from interviewing many U.S. officials that past couple of years, I get the same story that they are committed to this region even if you have threat perception put out these fires (inaudible) in the Middle East so you can -- you should think about it as more of a long term investment for the future.

MR. JACKSON: Bridging the question of the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the region and to South Korea specifically, with Dr. Meryl’s point about dealing with the challenges of an evolving alliance, I think one of the critical issues that the alliance needs to take on in coming years and decades is defining a post North Korea logic for the alliance. For the last 60 years, we’ve been animated by the imperative of deterring, and if necessary, defeating North Korean aggression, and I think that is entirely appropriate, and it is what the alliance should be focused on in principally. But whether collapse and potential reunification is in five years or in 40 years, or who knows when, the
alliance will have to deal with this issue of what you do after North Korea in its current state, and I think that drawn out, that logic will go a long way with clarifying for South Korea the enduring security interests that the United States has with this alliance, and that will, I think, hopefully reinforce the assurance of the credibility of the US commitment.

MS. MOON: Thank you very much. I’d like us to move to the other question, which had to do with the ROK’s relationship to the U.S. Defense system. That architecture. Van, do you want to take a shot at it?

MR. JACKSON: I don’t remember the question exactly, but I’ll answer the question that I wish I had been asked. So we talk about -- the U.S. talks about a sort of regional missile defense architecture only sort of sparingly or inconsistently. There is a set of U.S. investments in missile defense, so radars, queuing systems, interceptors, and you have Japanese investments in missile defense, and over the last few years, you’ve had us working in co-development on missile defense. And so, and then increasingly, Australia is becoming part of this as well. So there’s some U.S. officials, especially in the missile defense (inaudible) who talk in terms of a regional architecture, but there isn’t a -- the regional architecture that exists today is patchwork. It’s stitching together our national capabilities. And so the fear of some sort of, you know, like region wide architecture that constrains China or something is illusory. That’s not real.

And so what we’re trying to get to is the ability to have - okay, everybody has their own national capability. Call it what you want, but we need to be able to plug and play with each other. And so, the effectiveness of missile defense increases not by sums, but by multiple factors whenever you can add capability -- when you get more angles from different radars, and you have redundance. So missile defense is not a perfect science. It’s actually like, quite flawed, and we’re just getting better over time. And so it’s useful -- it’s valuable for everybody. It grows the pie to be able to participate and have high degrees of inner operability.
We can call it regional architecture or we can call it something else. Korea is trying to call it something else, but at the end of the day, it hurts the U.S. and Japan and to some degree, Australia, and even South Korea, if it’s not a part of a larger whole.

MR. YEO: I think that the.

MS. MOON: Oh, go ahead.

MR. YEO: Personally, I think that the phrase regional defense architecture is overblown for all of the reason that Van just mentioned. What’s important is to have an effective system, and one of the key ingredients to that is the interoperability between U.S. systems and other capable systems as they come online, whether in Japan or in South Korea. And I think often times, people over use the word integration. To address the question about the various layers of missile defense and the various phases at which capabilities can address threats -- putting aside specific systems like that or others, I think the important thing to remember is that given intensifying North Korean missile threats, we need to be able to have an approach that can address threats from various types of missiles, and missile in various phases of flight.

And the way to do that, based on all of the analysis of missile defense architectures, is to have a layered system comprised of various capabilities. And so, whether that’s THAD, or whether that is some indigenous Korean solution or whether it is sea-based intercept capability that Korea obtains, what is important to have an effective missile defense is to be able to address different types of missile threats at different phases of flight. And so I think that we can kind of get wrapped around the axel talking about an integrated missile defense or talking about THAD and what Chinese perceptions of that are, and we need to keep returning back to what makes missile defense effective, and it’s a lot of the things that Van highlighted.
MS. MOON: Thank you very much. I'll take two more questions, and then we will break for lunch. One of our participants, Chi Yong Soong, all the way from Singapore. Do you want to stand and tell us who you are?

MS. SONG: Chi Yong Song from Singapore Management University. Since Dr. Jackson is talking about threat perception, let me take a slightly different approach to threat perception. I think you seem to take defensive realists take on threat perception and probably try to constructivist's approach to this issue. This is where IR theory becomes useful. I'm a student of IR theory. We talk about the U.S. and South Korea and perception of the North Korean threat. Let's just turn the table completely around from the other side.

(Inaudible) North Korean perception of threat is South Korea, Japan, China or Us, who's more threatening from, you know, the other end of this spectrum. Because threat perception is mutual, and if we want to have our own perception of North Korean threat, we need to think about which country North Korea would hit first. Would it be the weakest link in this alliance management? Would it be the strongest one?

MS. MOON: yes, the gentleman over here.

MR. BILLINGTON: Hi, thanks. It's Mike Billington from EIR. I brought up a similar question in the first panel but it wasn't addressed, and I think it needs to be addressed. It's -- you say that the idea that there's a fear of encirclement of China is absurd. I don't think it's absurd at all. The U.S. is carrying out exercises for its air sea battle. We're putting missile defense around China and Russia in Europe, and the South Koreans recognize this. They're not just concerned not to have bad relations with China. They perceive, and (inaudible) said this in her meeting with Xi Jinping, and in the meetings with Russia, which is that they perceive the Eurasian development, this idea of Eurasian development of the Russian Far East, of China, of North Korea, as their only hope for long term peace in North Korea. Not threats and sanctions and either you do
what we say or else. They’re concerned about nuclear weapons, of course. But they are in fact making joint development projects around Rajim. They’re talking about building railroads through North Korea. These are development projects as a basis for peace, rather than just this threat from an economically broken Europe American system. I think they’re looking at development for themselves and for all of Eurasia, and I think you have to address that.

MS. MOON: Thank you. I need to wrap up the question period so that we could just have -- we’re running five minutes late but that’s okay. We’ll give five minutes to our roundtable folks to offer some thoughts in return. So two questions on the table regarding the constructivist IR theory. The constructivist view of the truly constructing threats and their perception of threats, in this case, North Korea’s perception vis-à-vis the other powers. And then this question from the gentleman. Any takers here?

MR. JACKSON: I would just point out that I studied under Andrew, and it was steeped in critical theory and social constructivism, and I don’t wear labels, but to the extent that I do, I would actually say I take a constructivist approach to IR. The challenges that there are limits, and there are sort of different logics that prevail as different times, and the logic that seems to prevail with North Korea regardless of the approach that we take is -- it fits a defensive realist frame, I think. The question is fair though. You know, what would North Korea do based on its threat perception, and I don’t have an answer. But it’s not obvious that it would be based on its identity. A military attack is usually based on something -- identify forms a context for a military action, but the decision is motivated by something a little more approximate. So.

MS. MOON: We can discuss is at lunch. Anyone on the second question?

MR. SHULMAN: Well, I can kind of build on what Van said, or just bring it down to a simple point. I mean, when North Korea is developing and upgrading and
improving its military capabilities, it’s -- the alliance can’t sit still. It has to adapt to that, and it has to make sure that it has what’s necessary to deter those capabilities. So yes, obviously trust becomes a big issue between both sides, and that’s definitely not solved, I guess, when both countries improve their military capabilities. But the United States and the ROK cannot sit still as an alliance when a TPRK is becoming increasingly a nuclear state.

**MS. MOON:** I think unlike the first panel, which had the luxury of critiquing the critiques and critiquing the policies and critiquing the critiques of the policies, our panel has had a tougher job because we actually have to think about specific answers to specific problems, to which we can’t possibly have all the answers. That’s part of the problem. So, we will continue these discussion, these questions discussions throughout the conference. You’re welcome to do so at lunch time and what I ask is that members of the audience, you are welcome to partake in lunch right outside on the other side here, of the wall, and the participants, the official participants of the conference, we are going to go to a different room. We’ll be led by Paul and some others, and we must return here by 1:10 because Ambassadors Hun Sung Jiu will be giving his keynote at that time. Oh, I’m sorry -- we will be having -- we’ll be starting the next panel, the roundtable and keynote and remarks, and that is a whole package that goes together on division and reconciliation in other lands and in the Koreas. Thank you very much.

(Recess)

**MS. MOON:** (in progress) going to have several cuts at this issue of division and reconciliation attempts -- and, in some cases, actually, unification -- looking at different countries, a comparative conversation. So, we’ll be including other countries, in addition to the two Koreas.

And I’ve asked several colleagues who are experts on Northern Ireland,
the U.K., on the Palestinian issues, Cyprus, Turkey -- and then we will have a keynote by Dr. Han Sung-joo, who served as the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Advisor to Cyprus in the 1990s, and then remarks by the former German Ambassador to South Korea, who happens to be in town, who will deliver remarks after Dr. Han. So, it’s a wonderful gathering of expertise and backgrounds, in geography and in terms of issues.

I just want to introduce Khaled Elgindy, my colleague at Brookings. He’s part of the Saban Center for Middle East Studies. It will soon change its name, right?

MR. ELGINDY: It has already.

MS. MOON: Oh, it has already -- to --

MR. ELGINDY: Center for Middle East Policy.

MS. MOON: Center for Middle East Policy. And this is one of our longstanding and very celebrated programs -- Middle East Program at Brookings.

So, I don’t think Koreans have usually had folks on the Middle East - Middle East experts -- at Korea-related conferences, so I hope you will realize how lucky you are, and I hope that Khaled, and Stacie, and Henri also will benefit from discussions regarding Korea, and make it useful to their own work.

So, Khaled.

MR. ELGINDY: Thank you, Kathy. It’s a pleasure to be here. And thank you to our two panelists.

Just by way of housekeeping, just to let everyone know that, as Kathy said, we’ll be ending this discussion around 1:45 or so, to be followed by an address by Dr. Han. And then the Q&A for this particular session will happen afterwards.

So, again, my name is Khaled Elgindy. I’m a Fellow here with the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. And, as Kathy pointed out, my particular area of expertise and experience is in the area of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. And I was a participant in previous rounds of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.
We have, also, I think, other relevant experiences, which ultimately may have more in common with one another than with the Koreas per se, but I think there are certain lessons that can be drawn, certain dynamics that relate to conflict and conflict resolution, as well as, from a policy standpoint, the U.S. role in both of those.

So, we have experiences -- in addition to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we also have the Northern Ireland conflict, which Stacie will address, and Henri will talk a little bit about Cyprus.

One thing that strikes me initially is, how do we define peace, and how do we define conflict resolution? There is, obviously, in the case of Syria, a longstanding internal conflict between the two parts of Korea that has resulted in division.

Yet in some cases -- in particular, the case that I'm more familiar with -- division is actually the desired outcome. And that is, you have two groups who, in one way or another, cannot live together, and so the consensus resolution to that conflict is essentially to divide the land into two separate states -- I think a very different dynamic than what you have in Korea, but one of the many differences, I think, that are important to be mindful of.

In addition, we also, I think, want to tackle the idea of reconciliation as an extension of peacemaking -- and whether -- and, please, I would ask both of you to weigh in on both of these issues -- partition, division, on the one hand, versus unification as very different forms of conflict resolution, on the one hand -- and on the other hand, the idea of conflict resolution versus reconciliation as such.

How essential is reconciliation, really, as a more advanced, I'd say, stage of, you know, not simply resolving conflict, outstanding issues between two conflicting sides, but actually reconciling? Is it necessary to have reconciliation, or is it simply enough to resolve these outstanding issues from a technical or political standpoint?

So, I'd ask both of you if you could weigh in on one or both of those
questions, however you see fit.

MS. GODDARD: Thank you. So, I'm Stacie Goddard. I am the Jane Bishop Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, and really happy to be here today -- talking about Northern Ireland, and hopefully relating it to something that I know very little about -- the situation and issues of reconciliation and division in Korea.

The question that I posed -- and I will definitely take up your question -- was the question of, is it right for policymakers to suppress or ignore historical truth about a conflict in order to avoid reigniting the conflict itself at a moment of conflict resolution?

So, obviously, this plays into the question that you're asking. Now you're going to have to forgive me for a couple moments. Kathy actually asked both of us to give you three to four minutes of overview, given that a lot of people here are not specialists on Northern Ireland. I find it funny Kathy asked me to give you four minutes of overview on a conflict that goes back 800 years.

But instead, I'm just going to really focus on this issue of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, and give you a little bit of background, in particular of the conflict resolution movement in the 1990s, with particular focus on 1998 Good Friday Agreement. And the reason I want to focus on this is that this is a peace that has been far from perfect. There have been a lot of stops and starts, a lot of contestation.

But in some ways, it's been extraordinarily robust. Obviously, this is a peace that has gone on for 15 years. It has created the working power sharing agreement between two parties -- Nationalist Republicans on the one hand; Unionist Loyalists on the other -- that very simply kind of denied the legitimacy of existence for much of the 20th century. So, the fact that these two groups are sharing power is absolutely remarkable, at least in my eyes.

And, while violence hasn't completely ceased, it really has brought the end to organized violence that went on from 1972 -- some people would say 1969 -- until
a ceasefire in 1994. So, I really see this as a remarkable peace, but a lot of other people who study conflict disagree. They see it as a really problematic peace, in part because it looked less like a massive social transformation than it does to some people like an armed truce, right?

There are still lots of groups out there, Loyalist and Republicans, who are not comfortable with the peace, that believe that they haven’t achieved their full goals -- either of complete unification for Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland; that partition still exists -- or some Unionist Loyalists who still believe that the primary goal needs to be complete unification within the United Kingdom. So, people say, until you have moments of real historical transformation and unification, this is a really problematic peace.

And I actually come at this a little bit differently. I think, in some ways, the robustness of this peace has been based, in part, on the ability to let these contradictions and divisions persist -- not to say that they’re going to persist for 100 more years or indefinitely, but not to try to force them to resolve and create unification through a top-down national reconciliation process.

And instead, a lot of ambiguity over the historical conflict has allowed, I think -- left room for real organic transformation in the future. And let me just very briefly point out a couple of ways in which I think this has been done. Some are, I think, particularly relevant to the issue of the Koreas.

The first is that the peace itself actually recognizes contradictory historical claims as legitimate. Try to wrap your head around that for a minute -- contradictory historical claims as legitimate. So, on the one hand, many Unionists and Loyalists -- people who support continued union with the U.K. -- have walked away from the negotiating table saying, the union is more secure than it has been in its history -- and it is, because the Republic of Ireland has actually renounced its claims to Northern Ireland. It no longer makes sovereign claims over that territory -- and because Northern
Ireland is not going to become a part of the Republic of Ireland unless the majority says it will -- and that would be a very long time coming.

On the other hand, the Republican Nationalists, who have, for a long time, pursued the unification historically with Ireland, say they, too, have their claims met. Why? Because they say they are working towards unification, they’re building cross-border institutions, and they’re also creating Northern Ireland into a space where their historical identity has a place. If you walk around Northern Ireland today, you see signs, for example, in Irish. There’s a rejuvenation of an Irish national identity. So, both sides are saying their historical identities have place in this new Northern Ireland.

Now there are some that say, well, great; politicians lied to the people. Everybody’s saying they got what they want. But I actually think it’s allowed, in some ways, many of these groups -- not necessarily the extremes, but many of these groups can move forward and say, well, we’ve dealt with that. Our identities are actually secure, and now we can work together on these other issues of governance. So, I actually tend to be a little more optimistic.

I think a second issue that this brings up -- and I think this one is maybe particularly relevant to the Koreas -- is the way in which questions that were once one of the political contestation have moved into the realm of symbolic politics. And I want to be clear -- I’m not saying, in some ways, that’s a diminution of these issues. I’m not saying that they’re less significant, right? But they’re not being subjected to the type of violent contestation as they once were, right?

So, certainly, there is still a lot of sectarian contestation. Visit Belfast in July, and you’ll see what I mean. Whether or not it’s marches for the Orange Order, huge bonfires commemorating William of Orange’s defeat of James II, to create a Protestant kingdom, these politics are still there. But they’re being played out in the symbolic realm, instead of necessarily this kind of violent contestation.
And, likewise, to have the issue of unification of Ireland -- that is to say, the elimination of the territorial division between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which happened in 1921 -- that, too, is becoming more of a symbolic issue -- less about, we must remove this type of governing structure, this actual partition, and more about, can we build these type of cross-border institutions and cultural identities?

And, again, I think, in some ways, that begins to address that question of, can you create reunification symbolically, without creating actual reunification of two systems -- which may not actually want to be reunified. And I can take that up in the Q&A.

Final question I'll pose about this is, all of this is being done with a lack of a national truth and reconciliation commission. There has been some push for it, but I think there are a lot of dangers, actually, to forcing the truth and reconciliation commission. Whose truth, obviously, is kind of an obvious academic question. What's the purpose for? Unionists who do support it -- and there are very few -- would want to see this actually being a punitive regime, which Nationalists do not want.

So, this could actually risk bringing up a lot of continued contestation, and putting this, I think, back in the realm of politics and violence, whereas waiting time, allowing this stuff to actually proceed at the local level, might be the more productive solution.

So, I think that kept within my four minutes, and I'll let it go at that.

DR. BARKEY: I'd like to follow after Stacie. I'm Henri Barkey. I'm the current Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. And for the record, we've been trying to recruit her for a while, but ain't no way.

Okay, Cyprus - now completely different situation. Here, you have an island -- wonderful little island -- actually, it's not that little; it's a sizeable island in the Mediterranean, but not very populated -- about a million people. And it has become a
major sore point -- and has been a major sore point between two of the United States’s most important allies in the region -- Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies. And both of these countries almost came to blows a number of times, sometimes because of Cyprus; sometimes because of Cyprus plus other related issues.

But what is the question? Here, you have two communities -- a Greek-Cypriote community and a Turkish-Cypriote community. And the question I pose is whether or not, when you have two different ethnicities that actually do not have a common language, do not see necessarily a common future together -- now more so than ever before -- and essentially don’t even see the past as the same -- can you have (inaudible)? Let me give you a few historical facts.

Cyprus became independent in 1960. You had an agreement. The Turks and the Greeks -- and the London Agreements with the British, as a party to this -- agreed essentially to have some kind of, shall we say, communal-based political system -- which never worked very well, because the Greeks are actually 20 percent of the population, and the Turks are about 20 percent. And the two together are less than a million, by the way. So, we’re not talking about this huge, large population to begin with.

Nonetheless, in 1964, the Turks almost invaded. And because of a communal alliance between the two sides with the Turks, Turkish-Cypriote community being on the defensive. And the Greek-Cypriotes actually never accepted the fact that that island -- which to them was always Greek -- had Turkish-Cypriotes in it. And, in fact, that goes back to 1570. In 1570, the Ottomans took -- 1570 was the (inaudible) war that the Ottomans lost the navy to a combined European navy, but they won the island of Cyprus, and then, of course, populated that island until they lost the island to the British in the 19th century.

But the issue here is that, for the Greek-Cypriotes, fundamentally, the Turkish-Cypriotes who came -- the Turkish-Cypriotes, who are the product of, essentially,
Ottoman occupation -- are illegitimate; they should not be there in the first place, because this island is Greek.

So, for the Greeks, it's been very difficult to accept that there is a Turkish minority there. And for the Turks, too -- I mean, for many Turks, the island really should be Turkish. After all, it was under the Ottoman Empire for 300 years, and if the Ottoman owned it, they own it for the rest of eternity. I'm kidding, but, in a sense, it gives you a sense of where the positions are.

So, Cyprus became independent, went through a very hard time, and the two communities -- even after 1964, even when the Turks were convinced not to invade Cyprus -- the communities never integrated -- although I should say that some Turkish-Cypriotes did integrate themselves into Greek society, spoke very good Greek -- but, fundamentally, at the root of this is not just the fact that you have two different ethnic groups -- different religions, different languages, et cetera -- but you also have two powers, Greece and Turkey, that interfere, intervene, and use Cyprus for their own interests -- for their own domestic politics, as well as for their own international politics.

So, in a way -- and this is also the interesting comparisons of Korea, you see -- is that the Turks see the Turk-Cypriotes as being their brethren, just as the Greeks see the Greek-Cypriotes as their brethren. So, the attachment is imaginary, maybe, if you want to become constructivist. But that attachment has been created, fostered, and is now very, very real.

And Turks celebrate when the Turkish-Cypriote republic that is not recognized by anybody except for the Turks -- just, I think, a couple days ago was the 31st anniversary of their independence, and Turkish organizations everywhere around the world sent messages out saying what great success that was.

But, fundamentally, the Greeks and the Turks -- and the governments of Greece and Turkey -- intervened and made things a great deal worse.
One of these cases was in 1974, when the junta in Athens, in its
desperate attempt to stay in power, because (inaudible) engineered a coup against a
legitimate Greek-Cypriote President of Cyprus. And because the coup makers were
perceived by Turks as being real right-wing fascists, the Turks intervened in 1974, and
occupied 37 percent of the island.

And that’s where we’ve been since then; since July of 1974, 37 percent
of the island is occupied by Turkish troops. There’s about 40,000 Turkish troops, and 18
percent of that island is not -- it controls 37 percent.

This, obviously, has been unacceptable to everybody. Everybody sees
the Turkish invasion as being illegitimate. And things really did not -- there’s been a lot of
(inaudible) diplomacy, all kinds of efforts. The United States, in part because of domestic
political interests in this country, always had, until recently -- I think until the Bush
administration -- a Cypriote coordinator who was in charge of resolving the Cyprus
problem. And there are also U.N. troops that separate the two communities.

And when you think about the amount of money that has been spent by
the United Nations to separate essentially 200,000 people on one hand, and 800,000 on
the other, and there’s been, really, no violence, it’s crazy.

However, the influence of the two powers -- Greece and Turkey -- can
also be seen in the one time when there was a real chance of success. And that was
2004. The Greek government, starting in the late 1990s, had decided that, well, Turkey’s
an enemy, but it’s not that bad, right, and, therefore, we should not block Turkey’s entry
into the European Union. So, the Greeks, to their credit, changed their policy. I’m talking
about the Greek government.

The Turks in 2002 elected an Islamist government that was very, very
anxious to demonstrate its bona fides to the West -- that it was not this crazy Islamist,
and that people should not be afraid of them. And the way they did it was to make
certain important concessions in foreign policy.

The other thing that became very evident some years later is that the Turkish government was petrified that the military was attempting to overthrow them -- this Islamist government. They happened to be right. The military was trying to overthrow them. And they decided that the way to consolidate their own domestic position was by making concessions on Cyprus; therefore, getting European and American support for the government.

And what came out was, in 2004, the Annan Plan, which essentially was an agreement between the Greek-Cypriotes and the Turkey-Cypriotes that they would create, would join in some kind of a bi-communal (inaudible) arrangement that would enter European Union together, because in 2004, Cyprus -- Greek Cyprus, which is officially the recognized Cyprus. When you talk about the Cyprus government, there’s only one, and it’s a Greek government -- was going to European Union. The question was, how do you bring the Turks in with you?

So, an agreement was signed, and the Annan Plan was a great success. Everybody agreed. The Turkish government pushed the Turkish-Cypriotes to agree to this -- except there was a referendum. And the Greek-Cypriotes voted against the Annan Plan, and, therefore, the Greek part of Cyprus joined Europe, and the Turkish-Cypriotes did not. And now the conflict has been frozen.

In the meantime, the Turkish government feels much more secure, has consolidated its position, doesn’t feel it needs to make any concessions on Cyprus. So, in a way, we have moved much, much, much, much, much further away.

That’s where I’ll stop.

MR. ELGINDY: Thank you both. If I might maybe add a little bit of discussion on the conflict that I’ve worked on, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- it is a longstanding conflict -- not quite 800 years; more like 100 years, although I think most
people have the perception that it goes back to Biblical times. But it is, in fact, a 100-year conflict; essentially began after World War I, when the British, who had colonial designs on most of the region, along with the French, issued what is known as the Balfour Declaration, essentially saying that Jews ought to have a national home in Palestine.

The problem was that Palestine was already inhabited, and many of the people -- in fact, the vast majority of the Arabs of Palestine -- wanted either to be their own independent state, or to be part of a larger Arab state in what was then known as Greater Syria.

Since then, since the British controlled Palestine, there have been a number of attempts -- as the Jewish population has grown, there's been a number of attempts to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. In 1936, it was proposed. The Arabs have consistently rejected any notion of partition, insisting that they are the majority -- or were the majority at that time.

And, again, in 1947, it was essentially decided by the relatively brand-new United Nations to effectively partition Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. That partition never actually happened, in the sense that the Palestinian-Arab state never actually came into being, but it did serve as the basis for the creation of the state of Israel, the Jewish state.

Since then, the whole idea of partition in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was essentially -- I would say not since then, but for most of the half-century afterwards -- the idea of partition disappeared. The idea of an independent Palestinian state only reappeared, really, as a matter of international consensus and U.S. policy in the late 1990s with the Oslo Process, the Oslo Peace Process.

And since then, since the late 1990s, there've been this attempt to reach a resolution based on the so-called two-state solution. For probably the last quarter-century or so, those efforts have failed -- not because people don't know where the
border ought to be -- there is consensus on that issue -- but for a host of other reasons.

And I think one of the differences, really -- I guess, in some ways, it's also a similarly, but -- with these other two conflicts is, you know, in terms of similarities -- on the one hand, you have, of course, issues of -- you have a binational reality. You have two communities who are competing over the same area of land, who have historical claims to all of it. And, essentially, the extremes in both communities refuse to share.

And so, essentially, the conflict comes down to one of power dynamics. Whoever has the most power can impose their will on the other.

So, you have competing claims. It's very different from, again, either of these conflicts, in the sense that even the same piece of territory doesn't have the same name. Palestinians refer to all of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea as historical Palestine; part of their historical patrimony. And for Israeli Jews and for many Jews outside of Israel, all of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean is the land of Israel, the Biblical land of Israel -- very different historical narratives, very different competing identities.

Some other similarities include the presence of settler colonialism, which -- certainly an issue in Northern Ireland, and in Cyprus, as well. But I think probably to a much greater extent, through settler colonialism, actually created a Jewish majority in historical Palestine that had not yet existed. And there are also issues of international ongoing military occupation, at least as in the case of Cyprus.

One thing that has really -- I mentioned that the two-state solution has been the dominant paradigm as far as resolving the conflict -- up until today. And I believe that is starting to change. A lot of Palestinians -- and Israelis, frankly -- are giving up on the idea that the land can be divided, and, in their own ways, are insisting that Israel/Palestine remain a single, indivisible political unit -- obviously very different ways of
how they conceptualize those two entities -- the so-called one-states on both sides.

But one thing that I was struck by Stacie’s presentation is this notion that reconciliation might actually be a way to sort of leapfrog over issues that have complicated peacemaking, essentially -- whether, you know, the idea that there needs to be a hard border separating the two sides, or, in other cases, maybe it’s to eliminate that border, and somehow reintegrate the two broken halves.

In fact, maybe it’s not a simple either/or situation. Maybe it’s possible to blur the lines a little bit, as was the case that you pointed out in Northern Ireland, through some combination of addressing, you know, historical issues of the conflict, and attempting to reconcile -- or at least legitimize competing narratives.

And I wonder whether that may also be true in the case of the Koreas. I think that’s obviously -- for those of you who are Korea experts -- and not for me in particular -- but I think it is something that, at least in the Palestinian and Israeli cases, is -- a lot of people are starting to think that maybe it’s time not to necessarily either have a one-state solution or a two-state solution, but perhaps some combination of the two -- through a federation, or a confederation, or some hybrid type of resolution that would allow for competing identities, competing narratives to be legitimized, to have their own space, while not threatening, certainly -- or at least not triggering the existential fears of the other side.

And I wonder, too, if maybe either of you could elaborate on the possibility of these types of hybrid solutions in your respective conflicts.

DR. BARKEY: Can I just -- I mean, the funny thing is that the Cypriotes, at least -- or at least the people who have been thinking about the Cyprus solution already have created a name for it. It’s called this bi-communal federal state, right? So, it recognizes that the two communities are ethnically, religiously -- in every way -- very, very different, but it is also federal arrangement, whereby in the Annan Plan, there was a
very specific way in which the President would be chosen, and the way the two governing
houses would be selected.

So, yes, there are clearly in the Cypriote case -- but I’m not actually
convinced that the Cypriote case is ever going to be solved now -- at least until conditions
in Turkey change again, because I think Greece is less important -- because of the crisis
Greece is going through -- less relevant.

So, it all depends on what happens in -- if you’re one of the mother
countries and specifically in one mother country now. So, in that sense, it’s not
analogous to Palestine.

MS. GODDARD: You know, I think there are a lot of different layers on
which people have actually tried to blur the lines, right?

So, you get the formal institutional part of it. You create a consociational
government, and you make sure that consociational government has a First Minister from
one sectarian group, and a Deputy First Minister from another that can continue to appeal
to their own constituencies. And this has created just mindboggling partnerships
between, you know, former Loyalists strongly, like Ian Paisley, and former IRA members,
like Martin McGuinness. It’s really just remarkable.

But I think beyond that, you have the blurred lines of trying to create a
notional idea of a united Ireland, like there’s this space called Ireland which includes both
North and South, without eliminating that formal boundary, right? So, the Republic of
Ireland government can be involved in affairs of Northern Ireland -- with, by the way, the
U.K. also participating, as well -- but only on a basis of consultation, right? So, it wasn’t
given any sort of actual executive powers, right?

So, there are these formal ways, as well as these kind of cultural,
ongoing negotiation ways that they try to blur these lines of sovereignty. We’ve gotten so
used to, I think, the modern state of thinking of sovereignty as an indivisible thing. And,
really, it’s only something that one can have. But trying to parse through how it can be divided is really fascinating.

And I actually do think there were more creative attempts at doing this -- and you can correct me if I’m wrong. In Jerusalem -- in some ways before the peace process started, right, because you had a very active mayor that was interested in bringing in various Palestinian groups in order to try to create some sort of local government space and participation. A lot of that got pushed aside as things become hardened into a two-state solution in the 1990s.

MR. ELGINDY: That’s true, yeah. I think in the Palestinian-Israeli case, that is true. That’s, I think, a subject for a whole other discussion.

But, you know, the idea that you can blur the lines, I think, is one that is intriguing -- although, I think, you know, a key difference, as far as the Koreas are concerned, is, you know, in all three of our cases, you’ve got historical animosities between two different groups. In the case of the Koreas, you’ve got essentially -- it’s very different at the political versus the popular level. You don’t have historical animosity for the most part, as I understand it. Others can correct me if I’m wrong, but you have essentially one people who have been divided for a host of reasons, and have been in a state of conflict. There are, of course, grievances on both sides.

And so the idea of reconciliation, I think, is much more logical in the case of the Koreas, or the Germanys, or Vietnam than necessarily in the case where you have clear reinforcing along the lines of sect, and religion, and history, and culture, and language, and ethnicity, and so on. But I think that’s something, also, that, you know -- in terms of how we look at reconciliation, and the sequence by which we look at reconciliation -- and whether reconciliation is even desirable or possible.

MS. GODDARD: If I can jump in on this -- one thing that really stood out from the first panel of the day was the talk about the way in which young people in South
Korea don’t really think about reconciliation.

And this is something that struck me on one of my first trips to the Republic of Ireland in 1995. So, this is before the peace process was off and running, before everything had been consolidated -- and not really realizing, as an American, how much Northern Ireland was a place that was out there. You did not go, normally, as a tourist -- become a tourist and go to Northern Ireland, if you were in the Republic of Ireland. Republic of Ireland was going through a huge financial doom.

They would talk about the fact that this is one Ireland, but this was something that, because of this division, had developed a really unique historical trajectory and identity. So, while there’s still this idea that there is an Ireland, there are really two separate groups here, with some idea of reconciliation, but very different identities -- even among people who nominally share a religion, share political commitments, and all this.

MR. ELGINDY: Talking about reconciliation between Northern Ireland and --

MS. GODDARD: Between the Republic and Northern Ireland itself, the idea that there is just one Ireland. I don’t think that actually exists.

MR. ELGINDY: Another layer to the idea of reconciliation.

MS. GODDARD: Yeah.

DR. BARKEY: But, look, I mean, in terms of comparing the case of Korea with these cases, one has to also ponder the role of the outside powers, in the sense that, how much influence do these outside powers have? During the Cold War, of course, the behavior of China and Russia was different than it is today; similarly, you can (inaudible) the United States, as well. So, context makes a big difference.

In the case of Cyprus, at least, you had a very big, enticing factor there, and that was the European Union, both for the Turks and the Turkish-Cypriotes. I mean,
the Turkish-Cypriotes who are now outcasts, essentially, because they belong to this country called TRNC, and if you work in U.S. government like I did, we always put quotation marks around TRNC, because even the word TRNC was not legit in cables.

But Turkey-Cypriotes very much wanted to join the European Union; voted in that 2004 referendum. They voted en masse in favor of the Annan Plan, whereas the Greek-Cypriotes voted against, because they were going to get European passports. And European passports meant that you were not stuck on that island, where the only place you could go to was Turkey. And you can go anywhere, essentially, in the world.

And because the British controlled the island until 1960, there are still very strong links between Britain and both Greek-Cypriotes and Turkish-Cypriotes communities. If you go to London, you have, you know, little ghettos of both, even.

So, there was a very important factor there that enticed the Turkish-Cypriotes. The Greek-Cypriotes were guaranteed to go into the European Union, no matter what the outcome of the referendum was. So, they had the, shall we say, the luxury of saying no to the Turks, which is what they did.

In the case of the Greek-Cypriotes, it was about the fact that they didn’t want to reconcile themselves with the Turkish-Cypriotes on the terms of the Annan Plan, which they thought gave too much to the Turkish-Cypriotes. And the Turkish-Cypriotes, on the other hand, because they’re a minority, and because they also wanted to put a distance between themselves and Turkey -- at least the population of the government of Turkish Cyprus -- did vote in favor.

But, again, external factors play a very, very big role in terms of determining how things work out.

MR. ELGINDY: Stacie, you mentioned the idea of transitional justice, and that, in some cases, it may not actually be desirable; it may actually inflame the
conflict. Why do you think that's the case in Northern Ireland?

And specifically, to both of you, what role does transitional justice play in mediation attempts in general -- external mediation attempts, whether it's by the U.N., or the United States, or some other third-party actor? To what extent is transitional justice a relevant policy initiative in your specific cases -- in addition to, how desirable is it on the ground?

MS. GODDARD: Yeah, this is something I've been (inaudible) a lot -- and most notably because, over the summer -- many of you might have been following this -- Gerry Adams was brought in for questioning because of a murder that was (inaudible) by the IRA. He was brought in for questioning based on some documents that were, up until recently, (inaudible).

And this raised a lot of questions and a few op-eds about the need for transitional justice -- that is to say, to go ahead and address the fact that the level of violence, the crimes that were committed during this time, and whether or not to hold people accountable, or to (inaudible) get at the truth; this kind of became on the front burner again.

And I'm skeptical, both at a general level and at a local level. And let me explain why.

At a general level, truth and reconciliation -- they've become, in some ways, kind of part-and-parcel of conflict resolution, right? I mean, obviously, one of the more famous -- I wouldn't get into South Africa, but looking at Indonesia (inaudible) all of these different areas in which they're having truth and reconciliation commission.

And as a social scientist -- and, indeed, perhaps, on occasion, an IR theorist, if I can (inaudible) -- we don't actually have good empirical data that tells us that these are effective mechanisms, right? Sometimes, there are questions of whether or not they become mechanisms, actually, of a government story. In other words, are they
producing a local history? Are they producing a winner's history? Do they solve conflict? Do they open old wounds?

All of these questions are still in flux, so I get a little nervous about the fact that they're becoming part of a normative package. Oh, we're solving a conflict; we need social transformation, and here's your technique for doing it. And I don't think we have the type of information that tells us that this is the road to lasting peace and social transformation.

And I am, by the way, speaking very specifically of national truth and reconciliation committees here -- things that are done at broader levels. There are lots of efforts in Northern Ireland, at local level, grassroots type of truth and reconciliation. There are moments where Sinn Féin has actually gone around (inaudible) just apologized to people for violence, as well, so there are these type of areas. I'm speaking at a much broader level.

At a local level, I am worried because of -- I don't think there's agreed-upon meaning of truth and reconciliation -- whether or not it's punitive or fact-finding, and I'm also worried about the repercussions for, to be honest, some of the leadership that I think has been critical to maintaining this peace process.

And Gerry Adams was brought in, and without speaking at all about Gerry Adams as a normative figure, I was a little terrified, because I think part of selling this peace and legitimating this peace has been about the leadership. It's not just about the peace process itself; it's the fact that people like Gerry Adams, and Martin McGuinness, and Ian Paisley, and David Trimble, and all these people who are leaders in these very contentious communities came onboard.

And a truth and reconciliation commission is necessarily going to delve into these individual histories. And I worry that this would come at great cost. These are people who are hardliners who are willing to negotiate, and if you de-legitimate them, and
take them out of the peace process -- well, obviously, Ian Paisley is now gone, because he passed away in September -- but if we take them out, I want to make sure that there’s a leadership there that’s capable of coming onboard.

    So, that would be one of many concerns I have out of it.

    MR. ELGINDY: Right. It’s interesting, because, you know, you talked about the difficulties -- or sort of the kneejerk reaction to truth and reconciliation as an inherent part of conflict resolution. That may have been the case in Northern Ireland and in other examples, but it certainly hasn’t been true in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where there is no attempt at all, either by third-party mediators or by the parties themselves in any meaningful sense, at reconciliation or truth-finding. And I think a lot of that has to do with the enormous imbalance in power.

    And so those who are advocating truth and reconciliation -- or some form of accountability for past grievances -- are essentially those who are the least empowered -- and, in this case, the Palestinians.

    DR. BARKEY: Look, I disagree. I mean, I disagree because I think truth and reconciliation actually is maybe needed, and works best when the communities are supposed to live together. If they’re going to go on their own separate states -- and, as you said, the dominant paradigm until now was essentially the two-state solution in Israel-Palestine -- it doesn’t matter what the truth and reconciliation process does, because the two states will always create their own narrative about history and about everything else. And there’s no necessarily incentive in making this work.

    For example, in the case of Cyprus, the Turks, for example, are not interested at all in truth and reconciliation -- although, in another conflict they’re engaged in with their own domestic Kurdish problem -- which is 20 percent of their population -- and now that there’s a peace process starting -- or in process, I should say -- there is more talk of truth and reconciliation.
I mean, again, the weaker party’s pushing for truth and reconciliation, but the idea is that the Kurds are not supposed to separate from Turkey, whereas Israel and Palestine are supposed to have two states. In the minds of the Turks now, they’re supposed to be two states in Cyprus. I mean, the Turks want two states. So, there’s no point in truth and reconciliation. It doesn’t really come up.

So, I generally agree with Stacie’s general concerns about truth and reconciliation. I also think it has a lot to do with how people perceive the future, and how they will build a future.

MR. ELGINDDY: I think that just about does it for our time on this particular discussion. As I said, we’ll be coming back to a Q&A session after our address from Dr. Han.

Thank you.

MS. MOON: The roundtable members are welcome to stay up here, because you’ll be joining with the other two gentlemen to come in the Q&A.

I am very moved, because I’ve learned so much, and this has been an incredibly rich, intellectual, historical, analytical roundtable. And the fact that the three of you dealing with such difficult issues -- and long-lived -- God forbid -- 800 years of division, and crisis, and war, and violence -- that you’ve been able to encapsulate all this in such a truly -- a nutshell, each of you. I’m very, very grateful.

We will have time to talk together about this, but I’d like to, right now, move on to introduce our afternoon keynote speaker. Many of you know him. And Dr. Han Sung-joo is a beloved figure in Washington. He’s a beloved figure in many parts of the world, and I’ve had the fortune and joy -- pleasure -- of knowing him since I was 21 years old. And I would say in the Korean tradition, you don’t refer to your elders of such status as your soul mate, but, in some ways, he’s my novel-reading soul mate.

I love looking at novels, and thinking of him, and thinking, would he like
to read this? And then I send them to him, or pass it along as a gift. And I love the fact that he reads -- not only international relations theory, and political science, and area studies, but also novels.

Dr. Han Sung-joo, everybody knows, is a historic figure in South Korean politics, the Academy, and in U.S.-Korea relations. I think there are no other Dr. Han Sung-joos as a type in South Korea, and I will hope that, one day, one evolves, but, truly, it requires evolution, because he has developed into the kind of diplomat and reconciler -- true reconciler -- of multiple issues and peoples over many decades. So, I respect him immensely.

Many of us know him through his work on U.S.-Korea relations and as the former Foreign Minister of the ROK, the former ROK Ambassador to the United States, and, also, as Professor Emeritus at Korea (inaudible) Korea University.

And as I was listening to this panel, and looking over the bio, I thought, Dr. Han, you are a personal reconciler of divisions in South Korea. Why? Because he’s a graduate of Seoul National University. And in his generation, you were never supposed to go to another territory such as Korea University, and devote your adult life to the growth of that institution, the other institution, and even become Acting President of that university.

So, he has accomplished things in his personal-professional life, as well as in his diplomatic, worldly life.

I asked Dr. Han to come again to Washington, after just having been here on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the agreed framework decisions agreement. And I felt very guilty, because it’s a long trip, and, you know, going back and forth takes a huge toll. But he graciously, generously accepted.

And the reason I asked him is, again, not to talk so much about the Koreas and U.S. in Korea, but because he has other expertise. He served as the U.N.
Secretary-General’s Special Advisor to Cyprus, the very island that Dr. Barkey has been
talking about, and the crisis there over division and conflict.

So, Dr. Han brings many different insights from many parts of the world,
and I will leave it to him to educate us all.

Dr. Han Sung-joo.

DR. HAN: Thank you very much. It’s very nice to be back in

Washington and at Brookings, to talk about something that is different than usual -- the
usual being security and policy, now and later. We talk about history, and the meaning of
it, and what it portends for the future, as well.

I was asked to talk about the division and reconciliation in Korea, in
comparative perspective. I think I was also asked to participate partly because of my
Cyprus background. I was going to start by saying that there are some peculiar
similarities between Cyprus and Korea -- that, historically, Korea was the only country
colonized by another Asian country -- Japan. Cyprus was the only European country
colonized by another European country, Britain. But I’m not going to say that, because
I’m going to get questions like, what about Taiwan? What about Ireland? What about the
Chinese empire? What about the Soviet Empire? And so on.

But in simplicity, that, I think, holds some truth. In fact, there are still two
fairly large tracts of land known as sovereign bases that Britain uses for military
purposes. As such, there are mixed sentiments; sometimes positive, but mostly negative
-- in both Korea and Cyprus, toward their respective former colonial countries.

Korea and Cyprus both have formal armistice lines dividing their territory
known as the military demarcation line -- or MDL -- in Korea, and the green line in
Cyprus. But the Korean MDL is longer, wider, more closed, and much more heavily
fortified. There’s also a large economic development gap between the two divided parts.

What makes the two cases quite distinct is the sociological and historical
background of the division. Cyprus was divided as a result of ethnic conflict between the Greek-Cypriotes and Turkish-Cypriotes; Korea was divided by the geopolitics of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was in connection with the situation in Cyprus. Some Cypriotes of both sides claim that the expression “ethnic cleansing” started to be used first.

Today, many -- that is, more than half of some 200,000 residents in the Northern Turkish Cyprus -- are not even original Cypriotes, but are settlers who came to Cyprus from Turkey’s Anatolia after the division of Cyprus in 1974.

There’s much less commonality between the Southern and Northern Cypriote people that bring them together, as we heard, and more grievances and animosity that separate them. By contrast, one still hears North and South Koreans chanting, “We are one people.” And, for the most part, there is no sign of animosity between them on the people’s level.

The division has been so long and so complete in Korea -- and the people of the South and North have had such little direct contact -- that if grievances or animosity still existed as a result of the Korean War, it would be among and between South Koreans themselves, as much of the mutual assault took place in localities in the South.

So, what reconciliation and justice do we need to seek between the North and South in the case of reunification? On this question, perhaps we should look to other cases of divided countries, such as Germany and Vietnam, for comparison with Korea. And today, I will only talk about Germany.

Of the four countries divided after World War II -- Germany, Korea, China, and Vietnam -- Korea and China remain divided, and Germany and Vietnam have been reunified -- Germany by incorporation, and Vietnam by force.

The main difference between Germany and Korea and their division was
that while Germany was the precipitator of the Second World War, Korea was merely the victim of an arbitrary decision made by the victors -- the U.S. and USSR. Thus, Koreans feel that while Germany may have itself to blame for the division, Korea was the innocent and helpless victim.

In the divided Germany, there was no animosity or hostility between the people of the West and of the East. Germans in the West felt sympathy towards their brethren in the East, and wanted to help them to improve the economic situation, regain political freedom, and free them from the Soviet yoke. Germans in the East envied the freedom and prosperity their Western brethren enjoyed.

And after reunification, problems arose from three sources: One, the issue of dealing with properties in the Eastern part of Germany that used to be owned by those who were now living in West Germany. Two, what to do with those responsible for the political oppression of East Germans, especially those related with or to the Stasi organization. And three, the second of second-class citizenship felt by the East Germans known as Ossis toward those supposedly high-handed West Germans known as Wessis.

But these were manageable problems that were, in fact, managed and ameliorated in reasonable ways in the post-unification period. Even on the question of complicated property issue, Germany settled for monetary compensation for property lost during 1945, ’49, and Soviet occupation period; lost after 1949 by DDR, by return of the property to the original owners -- or monetary compensation -- and property lost during the Nazi period by both methods.

I may be misinformed on this, and we might have the benefit of knowing more about the situation by Ambassador (inaudible).

In the Korean case, although there was an international war, South Koreans feel no animosity toward the North Korean people. Instead, they feel sympathy for the North Koreans, for their dire economic situation and lack of freedom. Similarly as
the East Germans, North Koreans feel envious of South Koreans, who enjoy relative economic prosperity and political freedom. Some may feel South Korea should be doing more to help them economically, and to improve their political predicament.

In the case of Korea, the conflict and cleavage that needs to be reconciled exists not so much between North and South Korea as between the South Korean left and the South Korean right -- a phenomenon known as the South-South Conflict.

To be sure, some of the left or right are moderate, and some are radical or extreme. The conflict is based on opposing interpretations and understandings of a whole range of historical issues, such as the division of the country, origin of the Korean War, Jeju Uprising of 1945 to ’48, known as the April 3rd Incident, Gwangju Massacre in 1980, and Kim Dae Jung-Kim Jong Ill Summit of 2000.

The left is critical of the United States for being mainly responsible for the division of the country, for supporting and encouraging successive military and authoritarian governments in South Korea, and for presumably fostering tension on the Korean peninsula.

The right accuses the left of toeing and supporting the North Korean line, undermining South Korean alliance with the United States, and trying to weaken the legitimacy of the South Korean government.

The left regards South Korea’s successive rightist regimes, starting from Syng-man Rhee, to Park Chung-hee, onto Lee Myung-bak as having been insufficiently nationalistic, meaning not anti-Japan enough and too dependent on the United States. In this regard, they would view North Korean government as having stronger credentials on nationalism issues.

The right responds by emphasizing the contribution made by their leaders to the cause of independence and subsequent economic development.
They -- both the left and the right -- have been fighting over history, textbooks, what to teach and not to teach in schools, and whom to revere and whom to despise.

Until the German reunification -- I’m using the term “reunification” for Germany, and “unification” for Korea, as you might have noticed, because that’s the way both Germans and Koreans use the term -- while the right, which feared -- it was the South Korean left which clamored for unification before, while the right, which feared that it would mean unification under North Koreans auspices, took the defensive position.

However, the tables were turned after German reunification, in that the left began to fear that any unification, following the German example, would come as an result of South Korean absorption of the North. It was now the right which became more vociferous about the need for unification of Korea.

As it happens, the moderate left, currently represented by the opposition party, is in favor of providing massive and unconditional economic aid to North Korea, reducing tension and arms competition with North Korea, and expanding cooperation with it.

The right is in favor of strengthening the alliance with the United States more actively, and aggressively promoting human rights in North Korea, and promoting unification at an earlier date. They’re against providing large-scale economic assistance to North Korea while it devotes resources to development of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons and missiles.

In this context, it is interesting to speculate on what role the South Korean left will play if and when unification comes. Given that, after 10 years of controlling the government during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun presidencies, the left has difficulty expanding its electoral support base in the South. The progressive parties will try to expand their electoral support base in the Northern part of Korea after
unification by promising more economic benefits, social welfare, and greater political autonomy for North Korea; promises that the right will find hard to match.

The left may well succeed in their effort to expand support in the North, provided that, somehow, they succeed in finding coherence and unity among their various factions and individuals.

No matter what happens in the balance of political forces after unification, it is not clear what will happen to the degree and intensity of the conflict and bad blood between the political left and political right in Korea, particularly between the extreme or radical left and right. It is a conflict that will not disappear with unification, and that will continue to hamper the unity and harmony of the nation as a whole.

In the North, there would be, after unification, the serious but inevitable issue of settling a score with and taking punitive measures against those involved in the oppressive state and party apparatus. The success of this task will depend very much on how limited the scope of the rectification, how judiciously the punishment is meted how, and how fairly the operation is conducted.

On the property issue, the Korean case is expected to be much less burdensome than that of Germany. One, the number of claims will be smaller. Germany had more than two million claims in the legal process. In Korea, so far, there have been only several thousand registrations, even though the number of properties confiscated reach 420,000 cases.

Secondly, the records, including deeds, land, registry, are very scanty, because of the war, because of the erasure of the records in the course of change of skies between North and South Korea.

Three, there is less public support for returning the lost properties in Korea. And, as you know, there’s an expression in Korea: “Sentiments always trumps legality in Korea.”
There are three basic solutions. One is symbolic compensation. Second is leaving it to the current owner. The third is, return to the original owner -- and an overwhelming sentiment is in favor of giving very symbolic compensation to whoever has the documentation and proper inheritance has been taken care of.

And, finally, there's another reason -- and that is, the Korean division has lasted much longer, the original owners all having expired physically.

I would like to add just a couple of footnotes to what I have said so far. One distinguishing aspect of Korean division, compared with that of Germany and Vietnam, is that it has lasted longer -- nearly 70 years or over two generations -- than that of the other two countries, which were divided for 35 and 25 years, respectively. A long period of division resulted in a demographic change, particularly involving the generational change, which has been extensive and significant.

Increasingly, fewer numbers of individuals with the memory of living together with family members, friends, and colleagues, separated since division, are surviving today. Their descendants and other Koreans of younger generations would naturally have more muted feelings toward Korea and Koreans of the other side, whether they are positive or negative feelings.

In South Korea, until the late 1980s, it was the younger generation and political forces of the left, as I said, which showed strongest interest in national unification. They denounced the older generations and foreign powers which supposedly stood in the way of national unification.

Since the early 1990s, however, they became more globalized and utilitarian, and focused more on mundane matters as jobs and careers. Members of the younger generation who shared the progressive views of their seniors also shied away from the unification cause for reasons that their older ideological compatriots did.

What these generational and demographic changes indicate is that time
matters in how necessary, feasible, and attainable reconciliation will be in any divided
country, unless the conflict is of what is known as primordial nature, such as ethnicity and
religion, as in Cyprus or Northern Ireland. With the passage of time, negative feelings
and the need for reconciliation would matter less when division is felt still fresh in
everyone’s memory and living experience.

I would also like to add one more footnote about restoring commonality
between North and South Koreans. In this connection, I would also like to speak about
the critical role of those known as North Korean defectors -- talbukja in South Korea. A
phenomenon that is worrisome about the long period of division between the North and
the South is not so much antagonism between the residents of the two Koreas as their
losing commonality -- in Korean, known as (inaudible), becoming different -- as one
people in such key areas as language, at least in vocabulary and expressions, ways of
thinking and living, interpersonal relations, and abilities and skills.

Upon unification, they will have the serious task of enlarging and
restoring areas of commonality -- in Korean, (inaudible), or becoming the same. Meeting
this challenge will require effective policies of the government, an active role of the civic
groups -- but the group of people who will play a key role will be those who are known as
North Korean defectors in the South, the number of whom has grown to nearly 30,000 by
the end of 2014.

To be sure, they have more grievances toward the North Korean regime
than the South Koreans; however, they have more connections with people in the North,
they have the experience of living in both parts of Korea, they understand the ways of
thinking and living in both North and South Korea, and they have more ability to create a
bridge between the Koreans of the North and the South. Whether and how well they can
play the role of bringing the two peoples that will have lived apart for so long will depend
much upon how they are treated in the South, and how smoothly and well they integrate
into the South Korean society.

So, what conclusions or words of wisdom can I draw from the remarks so far? One, more often than not, division is not the result of hostility and animosity between the peoples of a divided country, but that of geopolitics, historical circumstances, and government policies. Certainly, this is the case in Korea.

As such, reconciliation is more often the result rather than the cause of unification or reunification. In the case of Korea, reconciliation within each of the divided parts -- South-South, North-South -- remains at least as formidable a task as reconciliation between the peoples of the respective parts. I guess this is the point that Stacie Goddard mentioned earlier.

Three, history and interpretations thereof influences history in Korea. The left and the right often have opposite views on what happened in history, and adopt different policies when they assume power. In South Korea, the left thinks the U.S. has kept Korea from reunifying. The right thinks the United States saved South Korea from extinction. They differ most distinctly on how to deal with North Korea, and how to handle alliance with the United States.

Four, policy statements and decisions affect the interpretation and politicization of history. Characterization of the other side as warmongering only results in accelerated arms race and greater insecurity. Furthermore, the policy statements and decisions made can often result in self-fulfilling prophecies, especially in the area of mutual distrust and insecurity.

Finally, even the cases are never identical in all respects; it is useful to engage in comparative analysis of Korea-related issues and the role of the United States through other country cases of political division and reconciliation. What happened and happens in other cases can provide lessons to follow or anti-lessons to avoid in the case at hand, which is Korea.
Thank you very much.

MS. MOON: Wow. Thank you very, very much.

Dr. Han often sends me speeches he’s written, and I read them, and always think they’re wonderful. But this is -- I think this is one of your best. And we are going to be putting it up on our website soon after our conference ends. So, you can all read it more carefully. And the whole event will be podcast. It’ll probably be available by tomorrow or so.

So, Dr. Han, thank you very much -- very thought-provoking and moving, philosophical, as well as dealing with policy.

We’re blessed with richness today, and we have Dr. -- Ambassador Hans-Ulrich Seidt of Germany, United Germany. He is currently the Inspector General of the entire German Foreign Ministry, and it so happens that he served as the German Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2009 to 2012. He spoke a little Korean to me last night at dinner. I was very charmed. And what’s also interesting is that Dr. Seidt, like Dr. Han, they’re both Ph.D.s, diplomats, so the whole bridging of academia, scholarship, and policy come together in these two gentlemen as well.

And in the case of Ambassador Seidt, he is very familiar with division and unification and attempts at unification, not only because of what his own country went through but also because he served as Germany’s Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2006 to 2008, critical years of war, division of multiple types, and he also served as the Deputy Director of the Special Task Force on Bosnia for the German government from 1994 to 1997, another critical period dealing with other situations of division, bloodshed, reconciliation, peace process.

So, thank you very much for joining us, for making the time and for being very prompt with sending us your comments, and we look forward to listening to you.

Thank you. (Applause)
MR. SEIDT: (Speaking in foreign language.) Excellency, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honor and pleasure to be here for this very important event, and it's a particular honor to speak after such a distinguished statesman and scholar like Ambassador Han Sung-joo. Thank you very much for inviting me and to make some very personal remarks on the German view on Korea.

This year when President Park Geun-Hye visited Germany she was received by a German State President who was born and raised in East Germany, and she was also received by a Federal Chancellor who is a lady and who also was born and raised in East Germany, so my two bosses at the top are from East Germany and I must confess as a West German or somebody from the southern part of Germany, I do not feel as a second-class citizen.

President Park Geun-Hye also visited the city of Dresden where she gave a speech at a technical university and this was also very meaningful to Germans because the city as Dresden, as some of you might know, was seriously destroyed during the Second World War, and in the late ‘40s and particularly in the 50s, after the Korean War many technical engineers from the technical university of Dresden went to North Korea and helped there in the north-eastern part of the country to rebuild some of the cities and factories that were destroyed during the bombing of the Korean War. So, many people in Dresden, East Germans, had in one way or another personal relationship with Korea; in this case with North Korea. So, the visit of her Excellency, the President of Dresden, was also a kind of a contribution to show to the people of East Germany, to the people in Dresden who helped North Korea, that this was also appreciated by the Korean people as a whole.

Division, reconciliation -- I think Ambassador Han Sung-joo gave us a very profound analysis of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and I would agree in every point with his analysis, in particular, when he refers to the still continuing division in
South Korea among the political forces is South Korea; also, the regional differences in South Korea that are still felt today.

However, I would like to add two additional elements from a German point of view. First, in visiting North Korea I was astonished to see how much North Korean’s have in common with the South Korean compatriots on the other side of the border.

In Germany if we analyze the mentality of a people, the culture of a people, we distinguish between the so-called oberflesching couture, the culture at the surface, and the tee fin couture, the deep culture, and what a difference there is at the culture at the surface between North and South. I cannot imagine any other society today that is more globalized than the South Korean society. Wherever you travel in the world you’ll meet a Korean. You’ll meet Sumsong. You’ll see SK, (inaudible) wherever you go. After all, the Secretary General of the United Nations is a Korean.

Then in the North, this is definitely no globalized society. It’s isolated. No information, whereas in the South, you know, everybody has his iPhone in the hand. But on the other hand, this is the surface culture.

If you look to the deep culture of the Korean people, they are very, very similar. They have humor. They are hard working. Also the people in the North; very hardworking and very difficult, their conditions. They have a strong sense of family bonds; staying together, working together, (speaking in foreign language). Very important in the South and in the North.

And then, of course, you have the language. There are slight differences certainly, but also have the differences in the South between the different dialects. There’s a difference whether you come from Dago or from Guanjo, so there is a very, very solid basis for a -- still a common future of North and South due to the deeply rooted culture and tradition that is unique to the Korean people.
And then if you look to the economic reunification of the country, there is an additional element in the case of Korea that did not exist in the case of Germany, and this has to do with the globalization of the South Korean economy; the whole economic structure of the South.

Korea today is one of the strongest economic countries in the world, high industrious, very modern with the typical Korean (inaudible) structure. A Korean chabel can make investments in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, can make investments in Latin American countries and those investments work.

In the case of a Korean unification, what would happen if you knew Samsung, SK, LG, and those other conglomerates would take over some parts of North Korea and invest there? My feeling is this would go much faster than the re-industrialization of East German after reunification with all the problems that were mentioned by Ambassador Han Sung-joo.

Enormous strength in (inaudible) power and the structure of the Korean (inaudible) system in the South could change the landscape of the North much faster than the landscape of East Germany was changed after reunification.

And in a way since North Koreans are not only hardworking, humorous, they're also intelligent. Perhaps they might elect today the skills and abilities necessary for a country in the 21st Century, but given the right training, the right education, they will pick up very quickly. After all, if you look to the success of the North Koreans in some very sensitive technological areas, they might also be able to do very good things in other less sensitive technological areas.

So, unification, reconstigation are not dreams. They might become reality in the case of Korea. Country has changed, particularly in the South, but the country has changed for the better, and if there will be change on the Korean Peninsula, my feeling as a German is that the positive changes in the North will be much faster than
in the case of Germany. It took us about 25 years. In Korea I would say after 15 or 20 years, and you would not recognize the economic and also the natural landscape of North Korea, so I am personally very optimistic that in the moment change will come to the Korean Peninsula. The Koreans will be able to come again together their divisions and to work together saying (speaking a foreign language). “Let’s do it and you will succeed.” Thank you very much. (Applause)

MS. MOON: Thank you very much, Ambassador Seidt, for your comparative insights and great optimism. We appreciate, especially the optimism because I think dealing with the Koreas, we need it, and we appreciate the insights because God knows, in addition to all the insights that the round-table folks have shared, we now have many to choose from and to benefit from.

So, in that context I’d like to open up for Q&A, and do we have a full panel here. It’s getting a little crowded on this stage, but we’ll manage, and so I ask you to tell us who you are and also to keep your questions very brief so that we can maximize the time together. We are running a little bit behind schedule, and we will try to make it up as we go. Andrew?

MR. YEO: Thank you for your remarks. I have a question for Ambassador Seidt. I know Germany has a lot to offer to Korea with its own experience with unification, but I also know that Germany also has an embassy in North Korea, so what role do you think the Germans could play in facilitating dialogue between the North and South?

And for Ambassador Han, with the divisions between the political left and right in South Korea, if you take away the extremes, the far right and the far left, do you think there is some ability for consensus within at least what we would consider reasonable moderates on North Korea policy? Thank you.

MS. MOON: Let’s take another question here. I’m going to take it from
someone who hasn’t spoken before. Charles?

QUESTIONER: (off mic)

MS. MOON: But from the audience.

QUESTIONER: Thank you all very much. I have a general -- actually, I want to get back to the academic side of things. Years ago a very good scholar who was also a practitioner of Gregory Henderson edited a book called *Divided Nations in a Divided World*, and I was wondering if very briefly you could say if there is any utility in sort of theorizing national division, if we could sort of look at Korea in this broader context of understanding these national divisions as a whole, or are they all so very different from each other that they really have to be looked at separately?

Maybe that’s beyond the scope, but I wanted to ask Dr. Seidt but perhaps Dr. Han as well, we talk a lot about unification. I actually had a very interesting day in Potsdam with the last East German Ambassador to North Korea, Dr. Huntsman (inaudible). He had a lot of time on his hands. There were a lot of officials in the former East Germany there and he said very something. He said, “You know, we talk about reconciliation, reconciliation, but sometimes two systems cannot be reconciled. What we have to focus on is co-existence.” So, should we be talking about co-existence between the two Koreas, North and South, before we put our energies into unification?

MS. MOON: I think we’re going to start with those two right now because these are loaded questions that could invite a lot of comment from folks, so Andrew Yeo’s question about the role of the -- well, Germany has diplomatic relations with North Korea, and what role might Germany play in the future unification of Koreas.

Shall we start with that one? Mr. Seidt?

MR. SEIDT: Yes, thank you for the question concerning our embassy in Pyongyang in North Korea. For me as Inspector General of our service, it’s a very positive question because, in fact, our embassy in Pyongyang is worldwide the only
embassy where we earn money. (Laughter) So, why? When German reunification arrived 25 years ago we inherited from East Germany a large compound of the GDR Embassy in North Korea. We closed this embassy down, but we didn’t break up diplomatic relations with North Korea. They existed but we closed the embassy. At the same time the North Koreans kept their embassy in East building, which is still there. In the year 2000 (inaudible) Sunshine Policy we were asked by the South Korean government to re-open again our embassy in Pyongyang, and we did that, but we did send a verbal note to the North Korea government laying down the three principles that govern German policy vis-a-vis the Korean Peninsula.

First, we will re-open the German embassy in Pyongyang, but secondly under the three conditions. First, we contribute to the decrease of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and to a better understanding between North and South. Secondly, we will try to promote human rights also in North Korea, and thirdly, in the end we are committed to the unity of the Korean people and peace and freedom. To this were sent they did not reply, kind of acquiescence, so they agreed, and then we re-opened our embassy in this big compound. Later on we were able to rent it out, and we have now the British and the Swedes as top contractors, and they have to pay a small amount of money. Well, not so small, by anyway, the embassy is making money.

At the same time as a kind of reciprocity in diplomatic relations, also the North Korean embassy in Berlin is allowed to make money. They are also renting out a part of their large building in the center of Berlin, and they are having there a cheap hostel where young people who want to come to Berlin and they can stay in one of the buildings of the North Korea embassy, so it’s quite an experience to go there. Unfortunately they do not offer kimchi there, but they get some money out of renting out this part of their embassy.

What road does our embassy in North Korea play today? First, we are,
of course, very carefully selecting the Ambassadors there. Currently, our Ambassador Thomas Shafer is there already for the second time. He was already Ambassador to North Korea before. He’s back now together with his wife. She’s from Guatemala, but she’s a scholar in Chinese history focusing primarily on the Manchu dynasty and the area around Pyongyang and this part of China, so he knows the country well, and he is visiting at least once a year Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. sharing his knowledge with our Korean, Japanese, and American friends. And in the case of his visits to the United States, I know that he is also coming to Massachusetts Avenue to talk to the people here in the Carnegie Endowment Brookings Center, so this is what we are trying to do, trying to follow the three principals.

We try to contribute to be a better understanding between North and South with a promotion of human rights in North Korea which is very difficult, and thirdly, we remain committed to the unity of the Korean people in peace and freedom.

MS. MOON: Does anyone else on the panel have a comment to Andrew’s question? Maybe we could expand this a little bit. We often, when we talk about unification -- we will have a panel on unification, so I don’t want to pre-empt that discussion, but we usually look at the immediate environs of the meaning and the impact of unification and the role of the neighbors; China, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Russia, but while we have a diplomat from the EU here, maybe it’s a good opportunity to ask what might the EU’s role in -- you can name your scenario of unification, but hopefully peaceful. What might you be able to contribute to a unification process of the Koreas?

MR. SEIDT: Well, in Germany we are a bit reluctant from our own German experience in East Asia to see an active political role for different reasons. As far as Germany’s concerned, our geopolitical experience with the Korean Peninsula in East Asia is that beginning in the very first years of the 20th Century Korea played a
crucial role in the big power politics at that time, and in one way or another the situation on the Korean Peninsula is not only the result of the outcome of the Second World War but also still the direct consequence of events that happened about 110 years ago in the area including the definition of spheres of influence between different great foreign powers in the area.

By the way, at that time Germany still had an East Asia flotilla in a place called Qing Dao, so the family of Queen Min, they fled from Seoul to Qing Dao when the Japanese took over, and Germany at that time avoided to become involved, so we see our role only as a kind of facilitator, and I think Germany would very much favor an inclusion of North Korea in the free trade agreement with South Korea and the European Union, so the moment North Korea and South Korea will be re-united, of course the free trade agreement with South Korea should apply to the whole of Korea, but no other active political involvement in this highly sensitive political area.

MS. MOON: Your last statement. That’s pretty radical. An ROK, DPRK, EU free-trade agreement seems quite a dramatic shift from the way most people think about it as an idea.

MR. SEIDT: The FTA between the Republic of Korea and the European Union is reality. It’s very successful, and of course the moment there is a -- there will be a united Korea, this treaty will, of course, apply also as far as Germany’s concerned to the United Korea. Like all the other treaties that we have concluded with West Germany, also did apply for United Germany after re-unification.

MS. MOON: Under an absorption-type scenario, I (inaudible).

MR. SEIDT: Well, quite frankly, the German reunification was not an absorption. If you look to the Reunification Treaty, the treaty was signed by percentages of the GDR and representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, and at least for an historical second, maybe the moment when this treaty was signed by West Germany, we
recognized the East German and the GDR as equals, so this was not an absorption but this was a treaty concluded by two partners who recognized themselves as equals. This is something different as an (inaudible) or an absorption.

MS. MOON: And something to keep in mind for the Koreas. I’d like us to move on to Charles’s question. We have this feast of experts here on different types of division, reconciliation, unification, non-unification, so can we theorize, Charles Armstrong is asking, is it possible for us to look at these different cases and theorize about the politics of division, unification, reconciliation, et cetera? Charles, am I encapsulating that correctly? Okay. Stacie? Take a shot?

MS. GODDARD: The easy question. I think the question for me is less can or should because in some ways my answer to that is of course we can and of course we should. But it’s a question of how, and I was thinking a lot about this with (inaudible) Gallucci’s comments this morning because he talked about the need to have this type of regional-area specialty, but how do we actually square this with the ability to think and create generalizable theory? In other words, how do we marry that kind of very deep, regional, and even state-specific knowledge with comparative study? And it’s something that I wrestle with my own work realizing (inaudible) asymmetry of knowledge being an expert in one and really kind of wading into another.

And I honestly think in some ways this points to -- maybe this gets us a little off topic -- for the role of group work and not to pat Kathy’s back too much but the role these types of workshops precisely because I don’t think you can necessarily have this all done by one person or you’re going to end up stepping over some of the really important historical contingencies and spatial particularities of a particular case, right.

Ireland, to be clear, is not Korea, even though I’m trying to pull out generalizations there, but I think having somebody who does know Ireland and somebody who knows Korea coming from a thematic perspective, we can pull out those
generalizabilities without completely stepping on the uniqueness of the cases.

QUESTIONER: The good news here is that there’s not an enormous number of cases, so you’re not going to have statistical models being developed about this stuff, which actually is a great relief, so the comparative method that Stacie’s talking is a way to do. And look, we always learn from other cases. It may not necessarily be grand theory, but it is a better understanding. I mean I think this is what we should aim for.

I mean a better understanding because when you look at different cases you realize that -- example I gave in terms of the role of outside powers and the case of Cypress (inaudible), two powers, there’s something to be learned even if they don’t exist in another case, all right, because you do see the, for arguments sake, the positive or negative influences in different cases. So, there is a lot to be learned from doing comparative work, but whether or not we can come up with a grand theory, no, I’m very suspicious of that and we shouldn’t even try. Just understanding -- improving understanding is all we can strive for.

QUESTIONER: I agree with everything that’s been said. I think it is possible to glean certain lessons from other experiences, but there are obvious constraints. Each conflict I think is very idiosyncratic, but in addition I would say that both the policy and the politics also matter a great deal.

In the case of the conflict in Northern Ireland, the United States -- and if we take Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S. played a key role in mediating both of those, but it’s been a very different type of mediation I think largely due to domestic politics in both instances.

Northern Ireland is not just a case of regional stability and conflict between the U.K. and the Irish, an historical conflict. It’s also a domestic-political issue, and that’s equally, if not more true, I think, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where
domestic politics has a very often disproportionate effect on how mediation and how the conflict is perceived.

MS. MOON: We can take a few more questions, and again I’m looking for people I haven’t -- over there in the green? I think it’d be better to wait for the mic.

QUESTIONER: Thank you for letting me ask my question. If it sounds off-track or whatever, I don’t mind if you don’t answer. Yeah, in terms of -- my question is related to more peace and harmony in the world, kind of effort towards this topic. I know that right now Korea, especially South Korea’s really considered very modern and advanced, a developed country just like Japan and all that, and I heard you guys talking a lot about Germany, and I know that Germany has a lot of interaction in terms of business and otherwise also I bet, so in terms of looking at -- you know, because of our history and all that, I’m almost quite old now, so I’ve been seeing this over and over again, and I have some knowledge in journalism and all that, so that’s why I thought I’d bring this out so others will think about these issues and solve quicker or make better efforts or faster pace.

MS. MOON: I’m sorry. Could you just give your name and your question?

QUESTIONER: Yeah, so is there any knowledge about how -- in other words, in history, because of all that, how you look at it and how they target and make a misery, problems and losses and all that. So, yes, so any thoughts about that and any efforts, or is it being addressed in your EU and all that, I guess, or with other countries so that others will learn, you know, because I’m a Tibetan from India and Tibet is fighting for their country from China and all that. I know it’s considered together now, so in order to solve that in the future.

MS. MOON: Okay, thank you very much. Joe? There’s a mic right there. If you would just tell us your name.
MR. WINTER: I'm Joe Winter. Nice to have Ambassador Han back again here in Washington. I want to address a question to Ambassador Han, and that has to do with this point that Dr. Goddard raised about accepting each other's historical narratives. That would be a difficult process, no doubt, between North and South Korea, but is that -- is any effort underway, not necessarily in the government-to-government level but perhaps more track-two basis for attempting to construct national narratives that would be legitimized and acceptable to both sides, or is that just too difficult at this point?

MS. MOON: Thank you. We'll take one more question. Yes, back there.

MS. STEVENSON: Thanks for taking my question. I'm Diane Stevenson. I'm a student at George Washington, and I think this relates to the previous question, but if you guys could speak a little more directly on the role of, like, propaganda and indoctrination in this process. I know in some of these cases that you've discussed that would have been a serious issue, and I know in North Korea that's definitely going to be an issue in the future, so if you could kind of target in more on how you would address this sort of history and narrative that's been changed and intentionally taught to the people.

MS. MOON: To maintain the division?

MS. STEVENSON: To improve the indoctrination or to change that process because people in North Korea and I'm sure in some of the other areas as well have been taught a certain thing a certain way.

MS. MOON: In South Korea as well.

MS. STEVENSON: Yes.

MS. MOON: Okay, so we now have our history, national narrative, division linkage here, so I'd like to throw it open to our speakers. Dr. Han, would you like to start?
MR. HAN: I’m going to start with Andrew’s question. I think there are more, even as we say, currently the government party which tends to be on the conservative side -- by side and the opposition party which is on the left side, not talking about coherent (inaudible) each party is divided within itself, and back on the opposition side the moderates are in the majority although in terms of intensity and the (inaudible) radical ones tend to be stronger, and the opposite may be the case on the right side.

There is certainly liberal minority, so there are sometimes effort to have crossed alignment in voting or in expression of use, so as the time goes on there will be some re-mixing of these political configurations I think, so it is not as if we have two very solid, coherent, whole opposing each other.

Regarding the question of coexistence that Charles raised, the German constitution -- basic law before unification had two provisions as I understand. Please correct me if I am wrong. One is to reunify by way of East Germany accepting the current federal constitution. The other way was to adopt a new constitution, and the East Germans voted to accept the current federal constitution; therefore, they are calling it not reunification by absorption but by, I think, admission -- I don’t know what the German word is -- by joining.

But I think the fact whether you like that word or not is basically East Germany being out of West Germany system, and there are two elements there. One is how much of the political identity is left to say that it is coexistence. The other is what kind of institutional arrangement there is, and I think the East German identity did not survive that much to the extent that we can call it coexistence in any way possible.

In terms of institutional arrangement, you can have a two-state solution. You can have a conflagration. You can have a federation. You can have a unitary system. Since Germany already had a federation, they settle for federation, which is not really closer to coexistence than, I think, even though each state has its own identity, and
East Germany joined as -- not as one state but five states, six -- including Berlin, so, it is not certainly a unification with coexistence as such.

So, there is an effort to devise a system in South Korea when and if unified to maintain some degree of autonomy, some degree of identity for North Korea, but in this case things are a little difficult, more difficult than the German case because Germany, again -- East Germany is not one entity but several entities, so it’s easier to incorporate if not absorb, so we have difficult situation.

The other question about accepting a historical interpretation of the other side, I don’t think there will be a time, any time when the opposing sides will accept the other side’s narrative, as you call it, but the best solution would be we can let it go, gloss over rather than constantly arguing about it and trying to -- as some governments trying to do regarding past history with Japan to correctly re-erect history, for example. (Speaking foreign language.) If we continue to do that, we’ll never resolve the issue. It was easier in South Korea to re-erect history with regard to Japan, but it will be very difficult to re-erect history with regard to the division, the war, about South Korea relations, about our relations with United States, and so on. So, somewhere the idea of not probing into everything in detail would be helpful.

It’s difficult enough -- to the last question about history. It’s difficult enough to have countries like Japan to see history in jib away, very difficult to have a country like North Korea, from North Korea point of view, South Korea to see history in the same light by the two sides.

MS. MOON: It’s a -- you give a very practical response, especially because these issues are so divisive in both North Korean and South Korean society, but I think it’s an issue that is going to be up for grabs because North Korea, people talk about -- we have a panel on human rights. I’m just trying to keep you attentive so that you’ll stick around for all of the goodies ahead. But people talk about human rights, and
there are different advocates for different aspects of human rights in North Korea.

Having visited, I was with Steven Lee. We went on an academic trip together. I was supposed to go with Charles, but I couldn’t make it that summer. I found the -- I can’t even put this into regular words. The severe distortion of history in North Korea and the daily manipulation of history in North Korea, the moment by moment, constant contortion of history in North Korea; deeply, deeply offensive, offensive and oppressive, and I would say I, myself, as a visitor felt a certain form of my rights as a thinker violated by the constant assault on history, and it is something that is a particularly prominent aspect of North Korean society.

They live history every day, but they live their version of history every single day, and the intention is to re-create it, re-shape it according to the regime’s wishes every day. It’s a daily project; this reproduction of history. So, I was very struck when Stacie commented that in Northern Ireland the two sides in a way to disagree. I thought how might that ever be possible in the two Koreas.

MS. GODDARD: Not all agreed to disagree, to be clear.

MS. MOON: Okay, all right. Maybe not that far, but also I’m curious in some of these cases, how do these countries or societies through reconciliation write textbooks? What do you teach? What kind of a history do you teach a people? Stacie, do you have -- do you know, in Northern Ireland, how after the peace agreement?

MS. GODDARD: This is not my specialty, but it’s a fascinating question, right? So, I mean obviously, with Northern Ireland you’d be looking at probably something that is still standardized throughout U.K., but interesting question.

MS. MOON: I think it’s fascinating.

QUESTIONER: Look, I think -- look, old states create their own history. It’s called socialization. The moment you go into primary school you are taught a certain history, but what develops -- important factors here. There are two factors that influence
how that history eventually is changed, altered, and interpreted. One, I think, is the intensity of the conflict. The more intense the conflict is, the more diametrically opposed will be the narratives, you know, justifying (inaudible).

But second is democratization. The more democratic you become, the more voices come out, and I will give you one example. In Turkey, for instance, in 2004, 2005, 2006 when Turkey was really democratizing suddenly, people saw Turkey (inaudible) genocide, right? A (inaudible) taboo subject. As now Turkey becomes less and less more democratic and the government is essentially cracking down on dissent, you see the space for this closing down.

The country example with respect to Israel, the same thing. There was a period in Israel where you had these new historians who emerged essentially questioning the narrative of the War of Independence and what happened there, et cetera. And as the conflict has become more intense, now you see this closing down again, but in democratic societies I think you have the option, which, of course, North Korea is not.

Now, what I don't know how to explain is Japan because Japan is the odds -- you know, far away from the conflict. There is no conflict, and it's democratic society, yet they cannot (inaudible). That I don't know how to explain Japan, but I mean in these other societies you can see that.

MS. MOON: That's very helpful. Two key factors are the intensity of conflict and democratization. We will keep that in mind.

We're going to close up this session and move directly onto the next one, and we have adjusted the time, so Dr. John Merrill who will moderate the next roundtable will lead us in terms of the time. So, we'll move to unification and regional powers perspective, take a coffee break later, and then our last panel on human rights. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. MERRILL: Well thank you, all, for sticking it out. We have one
more Panel after this. But, yes, I see a lot of familiar faces in the audience. How are you all, if I don’t have time to go around and say hello individually.

This is a type of format that I’m not too familiar with. I’m used to these long, boring papers, and then Q&As on the papers but --

QUESTIONER: Long, boring speeches, now instead.

MR. MERRILL: Is that what -- Is that how it goes?

QUESTIONER: Yeah.

MR. MERRILL: Okay. We’ll do our best. And I’ve got my instructions on when we should do the Q&A. I guess maybe the best thing is to go through the Panel, and ask everyone to introduce themselves, and say a word about the -- we were all asked to submit questions by the boss, and so I was a little late, but I did submit my question.

My name is John Merrill, and I stepped down from my job at the State Department, as the Japanese might say, descended from heaven, or a foggy bottom in this case. And so I’m now right next door at SAIS. And starting in the spring I’ll have an affiliation with Victor at Georgetown as well; and really enjoying retirement.

My question was; why is Seoul so hypersensitive to the U.S. reaction to anything that they might want to do with North Korea? And why has a mid-range power not been able to get its shit together in terms of unification policy? Is the place really that divided that they can’t reach some kind of minimal consensus about how to deal with North Korea? So that’s the question that I’d like you guys to maybe talk about.

MS. DUDDEN: Yeah. Great. I mean, it sounds as if we have taken our gloves off.

MR. MERRILL: What’s your question?

MS. DUDDEN: My name is Alexis Dudden, I am a Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, and I think I was invited to be Japan today. And so
that's another -- if you want to really get the audience going, obviously we can do that.

MR. MERRILL: I would really be curious to hear that because I keep hearing strange things about Japan. The rightwing in Japan, I really would like to enlist North Korea in some grand coalition to keep China in check.

MS. DUDDEN: I think it would -- Yes. I actually think there is truth to that, but what I was going to focus on before we get to what I could call the aberration, that is Japan right now under the current iteration of Abe, is a longer view of the Japan and North Korea and South Korea relationship, especially since 1945. Insofar as, you know, if we think about the information we have, especially about North Korea, a lot of the websites are based in Japan. And so these are very significant details to our knowledge of the situation.

So I wanted to focus on the question of the resumption of the ex parte talks. Should Japan be part of this? Should Japan be excluded as some are suggesting? Which then leads into your -- you are really going to throw things down today, aren't you? Your question of, is Abe doing an end run, and these are questions that are (inaudible).

MR. MERRILL: I wouldn't say end run necessarily, but --

MS. DUDDEN: With a big bag of $10 billion, it's pretty cool.

MR. MERRILL: You've got the number right. Yes. That's the number that's rooted about, that's what Japan might be willing to pay for a settlement. We'll go to our next Panelists now; if you could introduce yourself and perhaps --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yeah. Steve Goldstein, I teach --

MR. MERRILL: -- Steve, can take a question.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I teach at Smith College, and I'm at the Fairbank Center at Harvard. I'm the Taiwan person, and I guess if I were speaking frankly for Taiwan, I would say that it's not clear that we are talking about a divided nation in the first
place. We are talking about relations between Taiwan and the Mainland, and I think one question which I gave as my question is the question of identity. What is Taiwan, what is the Mainland? The ambassador spoke about the issue of recovering community; in the case of Taiwan, you have to create it. So it starts from a much more difficult position.

There isn't even the assumption of a unification or reunification. By the way, each side uses different terms. The Mainland speaks of unification, Taiwan speaks of -- The Mainland speaks of reunification, Taiwan speaks of unification, and that tells you all you have to know about the issue.

MR. MERRILL: Steven?

MR. LEE: Yes. I'm Steven Lee. I teach in the Department of History at the University of British Columbia, in Vancouver Canada, and my question for our Panel was -- I'm representing the United States -- and my question, everybody has a nationality which is different from the country which they are representing. So I'm a Canadian who is representing the United States in this case.

From the point of view of the United States, one of the big obstacles to a peaceful settlement on the Korean Peninsula is the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. North Korea, meanwhile, opposes the American military presence in South Korea and joint military exercises with that country. So might Korean reunification include the DPRK giving up its nuclear weapons program, and the United States removing its troops from South Korea, how would Taiwan, Japan and China view this scenario?

MR. MERRILL: I'd like to comment on that from a historical point of view in a few minutes.

MR. LEE: Okay. Fine.

MR. POLLACK: You are just the moderator. (Laughter)

MS. DUDDEN: I don't think so.

MR. MERRILL: Jonathan?
MR. POLLACK: Yeah. I'm Jonathan Pollack, and I'm a Senior Fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center here at Brookings, and also Senior Fellow in Center for East Asia Policy Studies. So I'm here wearing a China hat, supposedly, although we were -- we weren't given instructions by Fearless Leader on exactly what domain we could or could not cover but -- yeah, no, and that's exactly what I did.

MR. MERRILL: That won't be a problem with you, Jonathan.

MR. POLLACK: Yeah. That's right. But I just sort of -- you know, Korean unification is obviously something that is much talked about, much discussed, but seems remarkably distant for all the kinds of reasons I think that we've highlighted here today. My question is to try to ask ourselves, if you look at those that I will call the surrounding powers, setting aside the two Koreas for the moment; but can we offer any judgments, or can any of my fellow panelists offer any judgments on, at the end of the day, what are the deep underlying attitudes or perspectives on unification, and what it would entail?

I'm not specifying the kind of unification, or the timing of unification, but analytically thinking, or strategically thinking, maybe that's a better way of putting it; if we look at the perspectives of China, Russia, Japan and the United States, can we say that there's any real differentiation in their attitudes and preferences?

Or, alternatively, are some more disposed and prepared to base -- pay some kind of a significant, political -- account (inaudible) expenditure of capital, political and otherwise, in order to sustain a divided Peninsula? So that's my modest question for the Panel.

MR. MERRILL: Yeah. Steve?

MR. LEE: Maybe I'd like to start, to that part of the question.


MR. LEE: And as an historian, I'd like to also start with a historical
example. And actually something which struck me in one of our panels this morning, where several people were saying that the roots of the U.S.-South Korean relationship went back into the 1950s and was formed in relationship to a common perceived threat, vis-à-vis North Korea.

Well actually, it’s not the case. It’s the opposite. In fact, because at the time in the 1950s when the United States and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, the perception in the United States and the reality was that it was South Korea who wanted a military reunification of the North. And it was the United States that did not want the South Koreans to unify the North unilaterally, and the reason for the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty was actually to try to prevent Syngman Rhee from moving his forces unilaterally northwards.

So in some sense, there was more of a commonality between the (inaudible) and the North Koreans, and so the Americans thought it was South Korea at the time of the creation of their Mutual Defense Treaty. And I think that’s a really important starting point. Because if we think that the roots of the U.S.-South Korean relationship goes back to a sense of shared purpose against North Korea, that’s actually wrong.

MR. MERRILL: That’s right. I alluded to Operation Ever-Ready.

MR. LEE: Mm-hmm. Yeah. And you mentioned the operation, but the treaty itself, the Defense Treaty which was signed in -- well negotiated and signed in 1953-1954, was explicitly designed to try to prevent South Korea from military reunification, and that’s the loss.

MR. MERRILL: While everyone was staging a coup we decided to give Syngman Rhee a bribe.

MR. LEE: Yes.

MR. POLLACK: But you know, treaties can serve a variety of purposes
and there can be, if you will, real meaning, hidden meaning, what have you, I don’t dispute what you are saying, that a large part of this was in fact to inhibit and to control Syngman Rhee, but treaties also evolve.

MR. LEE: Yes.

MR. POLLACK: And I think it is fair to say that over the longer stretch of time, the underlying purpose that has sustained the alliance has, in fact, been an essentially shared view of the -- of a Northern threat; as distinct from -- because after all Syngman Rhee has been gone a long time.

MR. LEE: Yes.

MR. POLLACK: All right.

MR. LEE: I would say from the early ’60s onwards, and things changed.

MR. POLLACK: Yeah. Mm-hmm.

MR. LEE: But the roots are important.

MR. POLLACK: Yes. That's an important point. Thank you.

MS. DUDDEN: If I could jump in with Japan. We have a variety of situations as we do in each of our countries. In so far as there is the very significant feature of Koreans -- excuse me, Japanese of Korean ethnicity in Japan, and their view of unification is so at odds with the current state of state-to-state relations between Japan and South Korea, and Japan and (inaudible), that again, when I say aberration Abe, since the really -- we are at probably the worst time since, what, 1945, in his particular relations.

And that is really seriously due to the refusal or the desire, not simply to erase the history, the shared history, i.e. colonization and war, but now to have a litmus test of how Japanese you are, in terms of where you stand on various specific issues; such as sexual slavery. Mindy Cutler is here, everybody must read her New York Times Essay from two days ago.
But these are things that happened, these are things that, because of the
tireless work of Koreans in Japan, Japanese in Japan, knowledge was discovered,
history was established. There were apologies made, we moved on, that someone is
using this as a political weapon to reposition a leadership in Japan is at odds with, I think,
all the other countries trying to come up with a solution. So we have all this going on, but
the Koreans in Japan celebrated the 30th Anniversary of the One Korea Festival.

And, you know, this takes place in Downtown Tokyo, this was in
September, so there's 30 years of active desire and activism for unification that goes on
in the open, in Japan, on the one hand. And then this really, sort of studied attempt to
denigrate all things Korean to the extent we are back at the state of affairs, in which
even the word for Korean is the most derogatory slur you can use in Japanese. And
that's not just North Koreans, that applies to the category of Koreans when you use the
word "cockroach".

And that's just -- it's such a rub from hoping to work together regionally
that I do think we need to step back and say, if you look at the famous picture of Koizumi
in Pyeongyang, hearing the news that; yes we have, we have your kidnap victims here.
The background has two gentlemen, it has Abe (inaudible), and so we know he's
positioning himself on the abductee issue from the get-go in 2002.

But the other man, (inaudible) Satoshi, whom I'm sure many of you know
well, had his house firebombed; or he was in the foreign ministry, he had his firebombed
by extremists in Japan and the foreign ministry let him go because he was causing a
disturbance. And this is what -- this is the view, the firebombing view is now emerging as
state policy. And so these are really precarious times in that (inaudible). History
definitely is on the surface, I think is my point.

MR. MERRILL: Steve?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I suppose, looking at Taiwan and Taiwan's attitude
towards Japan, if that's what you want me to talk about. I think that one of the issues that is probably the most recent, is the Free Trade Agreement between China and South Korea, which is viewed in Taiwan as threatening. My guess would be that reunification and what the impact on Taiwan would be is -- would be an investment opportunity.

MR. MERRILL: Is Taiwan and its relationship with the Mainland a type of reunification or something that can be put in that category?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: No.

MR. MERRILL: A very thin --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, I think that the ironic part about Taiwan's relationship with the Mainland is that -- I was sitting today listening to people talking about the North and the South, is that Taiwan and the Mainland have proceeded so much further than North and South have towards some kind of neutral relationship. And yet at the moment they are almost equally as far from any kind of resolution.

And that's the paradox of Taiwan and the Mainland. And I guess if I can be critical of what's gone on today, it's been at such a high level of abstraction with assumptions, and certain statements made about what might be in terms of North and South, or what is possible what is not possible, that what strikes me is how -- how thin the relationship is, and if the relationship is as thin as it sounded today, I don't know how you talk about the future. Because if it's as thin as it is today, contingent -- any kind of contingent possibility of occasion, can totally change the situation.

MR. POLLACK: Steve, could I ask you a question. One of our colleagues who is not here today, has made an interesting argument, that the last thing that an entity called Beijing would want right now, would be unification. That if you look, for example, the sobering effects of what is going on in Hong Kong as seen from the Mainland, would you really want Taiwan formerly incorporated under the People's Republic of China?
I mean, in theory then, it gives -- it would give anyone from Taiwan the right to go hither and thither and do whatever on the Mainland, subject of course to the kind of political process that it has. But, you know, this is where unification as a slogan, and I'd like the fact that you'd talked about identify, and unification or reunification, there's the slogan, but the slogan may be there for reasons of political legitimation that has very, very little to do with the -- either reality, the on-the-ground realities.

And I couldn't agree with you more about how powerless, almost nonexistent, any meaningful relationship is between the North and South, of Korea, as distinct from what we see between Taiwan and the Mainland. But it's -- but it serves multiple purposes that -- I don't know -- and that's politics, that's not theory.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well I would say that it isn't that Xi JingPing doesn't want to --

QUESTIONER: Want to incorporate, yeah.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Right. It's just at the moment; the last thing he needs is a conflict with Taiwan. If you look at recent Chinese policy, Taiwan -- they have left Taiwan alone. And he doesn't need that. So I think that China now is being unusually patient with Taiwan for two reasons. One, there are elections coming up. And two, it's just an additional headache for a leader who has some other more serious headaches.

QUESTIONER: Very good.

MS. DUDDEN: Could we return to your investment opportunity observation?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yeah.

MS. DUDDEN: Because I think that that -- there have been so many -- the question of the Asian Gaijin Development Scheme was raised earlier, but there have been so many development proposals based in Japan for -- that require a unified Korea, or at least required an openly coexisting state of affairs, including actually finishing the
railroad to begin so you can move things. But maybe this is the way I could ask you to comment on the elephant that is the United States in the room to all of that, insofar as when the countries we are talking about get together and talk about a unified Korea, it does seem that that circles back to the legacy of the 1965 Treaty, recognizing only the South moving forward.

And some my favorite documents are right before the signing of that -- of the Normalization Treaty. The Japanese Chamber of Commerce representatives went to Chongyang essentially to apologize that they were unable to convince their government to have normalized ties with both North and South, and essentially this is; we'll be back.

And I don't think, obviously, in 1965, expected the protraction -- this protracted situation, but in terms of Japanese investment -- and I'm using -- I don't mean to sound like a rightwing Japanese politician, but the way that the Japanese infrastructure in what is now North Korea that was left behind in 1945, as the owners of these businesses fled South, is something that was really actively, you know, part of diplomatic exchange and politics between all parties; Northern representatives, Southern representatives and Japanese diplomats until 1965.

And the United States, you know, under no circumstances are we going to let there be a relationship between Chongyang and Tokyo, and that kind of froze things.

MR. MERRILL: Well, that's changing now, isn't it?

MS. DUDDEN: Yeah. So they must --

MR. MERRILL: Because, I mean this is -- Abe's redeeming characteristic, as far as I can see, is that he's willing to flip the finger at the United States and do what he damn well pleases with North Korea, if he thinks it's in Japan's national interest.

MS. DUDDEN: I think he thinks it's in his interest.
MR. MERRILL: Well, yeah. Well, of course, because there's also the question, I don't know if he's made his announcements yet about the elections or not but --

QUESTIONER: Tomorrow.

MR. MERRILL: Is it tomorrow that it's going to come? But (inaudible), North Korea is enmeshed in Japanese domestic politics to an extent that most American policymakers I don't think fully appreciate. And there is this idea, which is pretty deep and pretty broad in Japan, that North Korea is the last unfinished business of the Pacific War episode, and that they want to reach a settlement.

And as you've said, they are prepared, if they get what they want, to pay big time in terms of something that's anathema to the U.S. Government which is development assistance.

MR. POLLACK: John, if you are right, the U.S.-Japan relationship is in far deeper trouble than any of us would be inclined to imagine.

MR. MERRILL: I'm not saying it's going to happen, but I'm saying there is that current there.

MR. POLLACK: That's a current but, you know, relative to -- Look, what does North Korea want from Japan? North Korea wants money from Japan. It's really quite simple. Presumably in some equivalence to whatever the South (inaudible), you know, allow for --

MR. MERRILL: Sure.

MR. POLLACK: -- for inflation and God knows what. I understand that sentiment perfectly. I mean the North Koreans are trying to get out of the vice grip that they find themselves in, vis-à-vis, the extraordinary extent of their dependence on China, not to say that North Korea then behaves as China would wish; but the whole idea, as North Korea has done in the past, is seek other outlets.
You know, beg, borrow and steal from whoever is willing to do business with you, but I don’t think -- Does Abe really -- you know, we are all making the distinction between a leader and a country. And I think we have to be sort of clear about that. Your point about Abe as a particular person who represents particular interests in Japan, it doesn’t mean that those are widespread across the system, and you know, like any system it’s -- it exhibits a lot of different tendencies, though I would say in Japan, the collapse of the political left in Japan, over the last several decades, explains part of his ability to move and to act.

Now whether he can sustain this or not, I don’t know. I mean, Japan is now -- again officially in a recession. Abe already is having to dial back on his -- on what his original plan had been to impose even bigger increases in the consumption tax. You know, you can begin to hear noises about others who may want to move him out of the way, I’m not trying -- although in theory he still in a relatively strong political position.

But I think it’s just a reminder that all politicians, in whatever system they are in, have complex motivations, and in some cases they have obsessions. And in Abe’s case, he’s revisiting a lot of history. It’s kind of -- to a degree it’s kind of, grandpa, this one is for you. And that troubles me, frankly, a lot. But it’s those kinds of things that require an absolutely candid discussion between all involved parties, and I would put the United States at the top of that list.

MR. MERRILL: Hmm? Steve, did you have something that you wanted to contribute?

MR. LEE: Yeah. Something that Alexis said in her question about the legacy of the colonial error for understanding the post-colonial history of North and South Korea. And I think that’s very important, and normally from the perspective of the United States or South Korea, we think of Japanese colonialism as the evil era in many ways. But that’s not true for North Korea, and one thing that we sometimes forget is the impact
of the Korean War on North Korean thinking.

So that in some ways, the United States replaced Japan in the North Korean views of that -- what was evil, because of the terrible experience with the bombing that North Korea experienced. So we -- I think based on some of the comments that people made this morning, I think it is important to try to at least understand the world view of North Korea.

MR. POLLACK: Oh, yeah.

MR. LEE: And the history of that, and why they see things in certain ways. One other thing is that, also comparing different ways, of different models of unification; right? The German model, for example, which was talked about earlier this afternoon, which is very valuable and understanding what are the possible things that South Korea and North Korea might do. But there is a big -- we also have to understand historical differences in these models, and I think a very critical element difference between North and South Korea and East and West Germany, is that North and South Korea experienced a devastating civil war. The two Germanys never went to war with each other, okay?

MR. MERRILL: Right.

MR. LEE: Now in the case of China, of course, Nationalist and Communist China, there was a civil war, so there's a similarity there with the two Koreas. But there's a huge power imbalance between, you know, Continental China and PRC, and Taiwan that makes it quite different, again from the North and South Korean case.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Don't overdo the impact of the civil war on Taiwan, because it was a civil war not between Taiwan and the Mainland.

MR. LEE: Yes. Yes. I understand. Yes.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: But between the Kuomintang and the Communist.

MR. LEE: Yes. Right; the flight to Taiwan --
MR. GOLDSTEIN: And then the very strong, almost mainstream of
Taiwan politics has a very ambiguous view of the war.

MR. LEE: Yes. Right.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: And a very ambiguous view of the Japanese. Even
though President Ma Ying-Jeou tries to present Taiwan as having been a part of the
Second World War --

MR. LEE: Right. I think that’s very --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: It was not.

MR. LEE: That highlights the differences again. Yes.

MR. MERRILL: I would pose a question to you and to the rest of the
Panel. How does North Korea in its hearts of hearts, the North Korean elite, see the
United States? This talk about constructivist approach goes way over my head. I can
maybe put my arms around, Hans Morgenthau talked about a very realistic, real politic
view of the world, but if North Korea is trying to survive these days. If it scaled back its
ambitions from upsetting the whole applecart and taking over the Peninsula like it tried to
do in 1950, would it want a better relationship with the United States, which is also a
status quo power?

MR. LEE: Well, I think we have to think historically about that as well.
And I think the recent change in the leadership can generally -- indicates a change in
policy vis-à-vis the U.S. in the terms of the -- either their willingness or their hopes for
some kind of normalization. I mean I don't -- I mean, it's hard to say for sure, but that's
my gut impression.

MR. POLLACK: I mean, I think of one level -- for sake of argument, I'm
not saying that we are at this point, but a relationship with the United States would be
very, very validating. We know from the experiences in some Track 2 context, or Track
1.5 that, you know, North Korean diplomats were earnestly soliciting the involvement of
Henry Kissinger, believing that, well, if Kissinger did what he did with China why can't --
why can't he do the same for us. And there are lots of reasons why he can't and won't.

But the fundamental reality here gets to the character of the system as we understand it, that nuclear weapons capabilities are written into their Constitution. The essential argument that Obama makes, and whether you agree or disagree, whatever, but he's basically saying, North Korea has to make a choice between it's -- some measure of economic recovery, or the extent to which it will operate outside the international system, because of its nuclear weapon status.

And Kim Jong-un says, great, I take both. So the question is, even if he does value this relationship, is the allure of that, if I could call it that, sufficient for him to, dare I say, endure the unendurable, which would be yielding these kinds of capabilities.

I mean, Obama -- let me emphasize -- does not, I don't think he operates from a fundamental antagonism towards the North, but he has deep beliefs, both about the character of the nonproliferation regime, and the implications if North Korea manages, over time, to sustain and enhance some measurable nuclear weapons capability, because even though a lot of this will be long after he is no longer President, that creates the seeds, it seems to me, of a fundamental breakdown of whatever degree of stability and normalcy we could imagine.

MR. MERRILL: (Inaudible) a big strategic patience.

MR. POLLACK: Well actually, I am a fan of strategic --

MR. MERRILL: Oh. I see.

MR. POLLACK: Yeah. I am. And so are the Chinese, they just don’t admit it.

MS. DUDDEN: Your comment about the legality of the nuclear capability -- excuse me -- the nuclear capability being written into the Northern Constitution, it makes me ask the question what kind of -- you know, does Japan want a unified Korea
under Abe right now. And I think even more than Beijing, Tokyo does not.

MR. MERRILL: Yeah.

MS. DUDDEN: Because -- and that is what's kind of being irrelevant when you ask, you know, so what are they doing? Abe is hoping to intensify the division because under his view of the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, he needs to be as militarized as possible. Which, for a long time, was certainly not the worldview of those in Japan, arguing in favor of the unified Koreas; and you think about, again, the -- not just the voices on the now defunct left, but arguably far more (inaudible), LDPRs.

Even that, for the health and the future and prosperity of North East Asia a unified Korea is our goal. They, of course, were always did the jokes in Japan, that the unified Korea filled most Japanese with terror, because they would all come marching for vengeance. But in fact that didn’t seem to be the policy, nor was it what Japan did at the six-party talks. And so under the current worldview being expressed as Japanese policy, it’s not only a divided Peninsula that’s desired, but a deeply divided one way into the future that requires a nuclear armed Japan, which always, for the record, Japan has the legal capability, and always has, it just has chosen not to go that option.

MR. POLLACK: Well, I think can get a little far ahead of ourselves too. There are impulses that have long been there in various corners of opinion, both in Japan and in South Korea, along these lines. And of course, we know that in the ’70s Park Chung-hee, in fact, had a covert program, which the United States stopped dead in its tracks. Whether this could materialize on a larger scale again, I don’t know.

I’m not -- I mean, it’s related in part to the desire for more autonomy or freedom of action that, maybe, all states have to a degree. But the question is, whether or not, either Japan, or for that matter they are okay, can achieve more freedom of action, but within the framework of existing alliance relationships, or redefined alliance relationships. I’m not -- you know, again, I can’t see so far -- I mean, to me, it would take
a fundamental breakdown in East Asian security and East Asian order for us to be in the domain of where both -- in effect both Japan and South Korea would with withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty, because it was the end of the U.S. based-line system.

MR. MERRILL: So who wants unification? I mean, I'm sitting here, and the South Koreans don't want it, the Americans, don't want it, Chinese don't want it, the Japanese don't want, why are we here?

MS. DUDDEN: No. We are missing -- because we are talking -- but that's the rub here. We are talking at such a state-to-state level. And as was raised in the previous Panel, what actually matters is the human beings involved. And so I always -- I know, but I'm an historian, so that I do it.

QUESTIONER: (off mic) human beings do it.

MS. DUDDEN: I deal in human beings and the lives they live, and the lives that ones I know best to answer are those of Korean descent in Japan, who, at fifth still are stateless, for all intents and purposes. And that is surreal in the world system. 600,000 people before the Korean War was up and running, were forced to pick a side. And they weren't from either side, because they had been born in colonized, that there was no divided Korea, and they were forced first to make a decision in their lives in Japan.

And those who acted in, sort of their geopolitical outlook, which was, why is this American decision impacting my already difficult life, to picked Northern affiliation? Those who picked southern affiliation had better material benefits at the beginning, including their kids could go to a school, that would be recognized and they could go to college.

But this decision that was drawn very starkly, began, first among that community in Japan, both sides were allowed to travel to the North as well. Somehow or other, the Southerners especially when they would do so, then would get arrested in
South Korea as spies. The most famous case being Professor (inaudible), whose prison memoirs are definitely worth everyone’s attention.

But it’s a very deep community that has formed, not just how Japanese and Koreans get along, but really how much a lot of us know about lives lived, first under the Japanese Colonial era, but then lives lived as those just outside the state process, that are vital to the state process in North East Asia.

MR. POLLACK: Steve, the answer I would -- you know, if you look I’ll give a slightly contrarian view of, you know, does anyone really want unification? I think if there are realists about the ultimate logic of unification, they are in China more than anywhere else. They are there heavily for both the media geographic reasons, commercial reasons; to some extent, for ethnic affiliation by the border.

But the reality is, today the only country among all the powers that has a meaningful, or semi-meaningful relationship with both Koreas, is China. And in China the gravitational pull over time, is increasingly towards the south, we all know the dimensions in terms of (inaudible), and the like. It’s really extraordinary. If political tensions return of a significant sort, I mean, actually they have subsided slightly between China and Japan, but maybe only momentarily for APAC purposes.

But if the decline in the Japan-China relationship is sustained, within another two, three, four years, China will do more trade with South Korea than it will with Japan. That’s -- if you consider the differential size in the two economies, how long Japan has been involved. I mean, it’s speaks -- to me it speaks volumes. Now, again, by comparison, the relationship with the North is a very, very complex one that the Chinese have.

They are a little frustrated. They don’t have any easy inroads or avenues, or they are the dominant economic force, and still there is a prevailing belief in China, what I call the hope springs eternal concept. That ultimately, North Korea will
have no alternative but, in some measure to, join the world around it. And that -- I mean, and this is a long-running, it's a record of failure; I wrote about this in *The New York Times* about a years ago after Jang Song Thaek was executed.

China's record with North Korea is one of policy failure since -- at least since the time of (inaudible).

MR. MERRILL: But let me interject here. That was also the view of the Regan administration, that was certainly Gaston Sigur's view as he laid out -- I'm sorry, but it was, the so-called modest initiative, which was to encourage North Korea to get with the program, focus on the economy, enter into the mainstream of the region, and now we've completely changed our approach.

MR. POLLACK: Well Gaston was never President of the United States.

MR. MERRILL: Well that's right, but he got away with that, and we were actually implementing it, and the Seoul Olympics were not disrupted, and there was a brief flowering of academic exchanges, cultural contacts, it might even have led to some improvement temporarily in Anti-Korean relations. But all I'm saying is, painting North Korea as the bad boy, and totaling refusing to reflect on what role we might have played in this, who first used nuclear weapons? Who introduced nuclear weapons onto the peninsula? Who started it? Which Korea started it? You said it yourself, and nuclear weapons program, and --

MR. POLLACK: North Korea had an interest in nuclear weapons going back (inaudible) --

MR. MERRILL: I understand that.

MR. POLLACK: Right. Right.

MR. MERRILL: But there is this action/reaction dynamic and it seems to me that going forward one thing people can try to do is to deescalate tensions and move things downwards, rather than constantly hitting them up, that's all.
MR. POLLACK: Yeah. Right. I think we won't do too well on the original
sin arguments. I know it's an easy -- I mean if we could -- we can't revisit history. History
is history, if we understand incorrectly, and I'm --

MR. MERRILL: We've got some historians here.

MS. DUDDEN: (Inaudible)the two are related. All right, so something an
historian asks her students is, think about the Korean War as the world's first nuclear
conflict, insofar as this is the war fought immediately following the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. The war immediately following, really, the invitation to everybody in the
world till (inaudible) would blow the following summer.

And so if you are a leader born at that moment, and have your own
country you are going to recognize that is the definition of sovereignty, and arguably that,
so there is -- it's not an original sin in that's where (inaudible).

MR. MERRILL: Steve, you had something?

MR. LEE: Just to support what you said, that I think there can be a
constructive role for the United States in the Korean dialogue. There's no easy solution
especially in periods of great intensity in conflict, sense of conflict between North Korea
and the (inaudible). But I think that in some ways there may not be any choice, the best
way will be to try to engage North Korea in dialogue, in policy, which may lead eventually
to some normalization agreement.

And it might very well be that a weakened in North Korea and the
imbalance in economic power on the peninsula exist, is not the best situation to think
about unification. You know, if I think back to the Korean War period, and I think back --
there was actually in the Korean Armistice Agreement, there was a section for, which
called for a political conference for the peaceful -- actually what was essentially about the
peaceful unification of the two Koreas; the Geneva Conference of 1954.

If you look back to that and, you know, at that point, the South Korea
were very worried that they were so far economically behind, and the North Koreans were experiencing some of the economic reconstruction. The North Korean policy for reunification was very much one that we think of today, vis-à-vis South Korea, that the North Koreans, that we have the capital, we can provide the economic, you know, context in which we can reunify and absorb the South.

And I think that in cases where the imbalance of power on the peninsula is perceived as being so different, that it's very hard to negotiate reunification. And so it might very well be that, if there is some economic improvement in the context as the North Korea economy and society, where there's more stability and that might create a context in which, you know, the kind of German might be a lot more easier to deal with, the kind of (inaudible) Hospolitic with the (inaudible). I don't know.

MR. MERRILL: Whatever happened to trust-politic?

MS. DUDDEN: Do you want to take it?

MR. POLLACK: Well, it's a slogan. I mean every Korean President, South Korean President has to bring forward a slogan of one kind or another. You know, it obviously hasn't borne a lot of fruit to say the least but, you know, again, leaders of all kinds, it's not just -- not just in South Korea, they have to come up with bumper stickers that they can sell. But it is interesting because it's the extent to which, is there a serious discussion and debate in the ROK about unification?

If she's serious in her statements of intent, if you will. You know, people can have different kinds of judgments, but it's also to some -- in some measure it is based on a belief, not unlike what, I think, going back to Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have believed that under some circumstances, you know, the imperatives of becoming a credible -- of economic recovery simply require this over time.

Now, maybe that's not the case, but I think that the underlying logic of it is, there's a sufficient allure, but very frankly, I think that from the point of view of the
North, I think that, if you had, for sake of argument, a measurably increased South Korean presence in the North, that’s potentially a very, very big danger to the system. That would be my own views.

MR. MERRILL: Well, I think we have to move according to our schedule into the Q&A section of our discussion this afternoon. Maybe we’ll go first with one of our participants and then to Rob. And yeah, okay, fine. Let's go here first, and then -- And please, identify yourself, and ask a question, if you can.

MR. PARK: I'm Tae-Gyun Park, from the first section.

MR. MERRILL: Many declarations up here.

MR. PARK: And I really enjoy the session, and then also I'd like to express my totally, my agreement with Stevens, the position, in particular, I'd like more attention to the armistice -- an armistice on the Korean Peninsula. As far as I remember, in 2006 President Bush, he proposed that the -- you know, not only probably that, he proposed that if North Korea ///hit all of the nuclear program, the U.S. Government is will to end the Korean War completely, means that rather than the unification he mentioned about the replacement of our missed agreement into the peace regime.

But these I cannot hear about that kind of the -- the policy from the outside of the Korean Peninsula, even I think that South Korea totally ignore the kind of the -- the process; so before thinking about the unification, how about the discussion about the establishment of new regime on the Korean Peninsula, instead of the very unstable, this armistice system.

So think about Armistice Agreement in -- actually in 1957, a very important article, that a certain day was nullified, it's about the -- to span the introduction of new weapon happen on the Korean Peninsula. And then in 1958 the U.S. introduced the nuclear weapons in the U.S. forces. So I think that's the certain point of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. If we think about that kind of unstable situation, we
should think about it on our system on the Korean Peninsula before the unification.

MR. MERRILL: Why don't you take it?

MR. POLLACK: Yeah. Two points; I'm not convinced that the Armistice system, such as it is, is as unstable as you argue. For one very simple reason, although there have been some hideous developments at different times, over the last 60 years, there has been no nude large scale war on the Peninsula. That's no mean feat if we think at the level of armament in North and South. So in some sense there has been deterrence. I mean, I know that the North Koreans are always arguing that the United States is plotting nuclear war against them.

I hate to disappoint them, but they are not. I mean, even the U.S. forces, every time a commander of U.S. forces has war-gamed a conflict on the Peninsula they -- the same conclusion is reached time and again, that, you know, at the end of the day South Korea would “win the war” but the cause -- the degree of devastation, and the consequences, will be so profound, that the game is not worth the candle.

And I don't see -- I have never encountered, in my experience, any serious discussion in U.S. policy circles, of taking the war to the North. Everything presumes, if there is another war. If the North were to initiate another conflict, that’s when you activate your military plans. On the nuclear weapons, although it is true that certainly there is still an element in contingency planning, I suppose, but President Bush withdrew -- President George H.W. Bush, withdrew all the residual tactical nuclear weapons on the Peninsula unilaterally.

In 1991 they were -- all nuclear weapons on -- stationed on ships, like carriers, are not there anymore. So there has been a diminished reliance on nuclear weapons. In fact that's part of what Obama's own thinking is. He would like far less of these weapons, not more of them. So the question is, how do you do it under these circumstances, particularly when you have one country, and one country only that has
ever withdrawn from the Nonproliferation Treaty. And one country, and one country only, that has ever tested nuclear weapons in the 21st Century.

And it’s those, kinds of precedence that I think sustain his belief that there’s got to be a different way, but the argument I supposed is over, what does that require in terms of interaction and discussion not only between the United States and North Korea, but with other parties as well. And that’s where we can argue and quibble till the cows come home.

MR. MERRILL: Any of the other?

MR. LEE: No. I was just going to say that the Armistice is a good place to start.

MR. MERRILL: Yes.

MR. LEE: And again, if we stop talking about unification, and talk more about the stable division, I think we are closer to the reality of, you know, where things are most likely, and you know --

MR. MERRILL: One of the -- one of the problems with that, of course, is that the geometry of any set of talks would depend on the subject.

MR. LEE: Right.

MR. MERRILL: So, Russia was never formerly a party to the Korea War, so they would be out. Japan was never formerly a party, except for some coastguard units, so they would be out; so I --

MR. LEE: I would build beyond the Armistice. I mean that’s a first step. It’s certainly a better first step, than no first steps that I’ve heard today, to be honest.

MR. MERRILL: Okay. Steve?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yeah. I think both the Armistice Agreement, really, in some ways the dismantling of the Armistice Agreement occurred in the ’50s, ’60s and ’70s, and then North Korea said that’s no longer willing to adhere to it. I think that it is
time to seriously think about a peace treaty which would replace the Armistice.

MR. POLLACK: But even before, a treat -- what Steve is advocating I think is something else; it's just -- you know there are very practical operational things that could be done here; and in which, very frankly, the United States from time to time has engaged with North Korea and counterparts.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: On that point I would, you know, just throw something out, and that is some kind of arms limitations agreement; if it's possible. I mean nobody ever talks about it, everybody is talking about nuclear weapons. But maybe a starting point would be some reduction on tensions through some kind arms limitation agreement, why not. I don't know.

MR. MERRILL: The problem with that, again, I think it's a great idea, but the problem is the asymmetries between the two sides, this came home to me a few years ago when I was reading a newspaper article, about a new class of South Korean, fast patrol boats. Patrol killer experimental. And that time they planning to build about 3 dozen of these damn things.

These patrol crafts had everything -- they had everything. They were stealthy, they were powered by gas turbans, they had cooperative engagement capability, so everything would be hooked in with everything else. With airplanes, with Sure batteries and, you know, looking at the South Korea Air Force, it far outclasses anything the North can put up.

So North Korea has to rely on SOFs as the Special Forces, and nuclear missile systems to match the power of South Korea and the U.S.-ROK Alliance, in their own minds.

MR. POLLACK: Mm-hmm. In their own minds --

MR. MERRILL: So it becomes extremely difficult, I agree, this is something that is very worthwhile and maybe should tried, but it's tough. Let's go to Rob,
because he has something on a more positive note, I'm sure.

QUESTIONER: On the economy.

MR. WARREN: Rob Warren, I'm from (inaudible). I wanted to come back to your initial question that you asked John, and that is, what are the strategic interstitial involved. I think personally, that we have a situation where we've had almost seven years now of strategic patience. During that seven-year period North Korea has continued to develop their nuclear capability and their missile capability. I think that's a threat to both South Korea and the United States.

And I would like to ask you, maybe to address, Mr. Clapper's trip to North Korea, just last week. It seemed to me, coming out of that, was an indication that North Korea wants to sit down and have a dialogue. And also our response was, we are not going to buy that horse another time. I'd like to have your comments.

MR. MERRILL: I'm not sure that Mr. Clapper said that. What I heard was from his Meet the Press Interview, was that he thought it was an illuminating visit, and he wouldn't mind going back again. That's what I got. I think that not buying the same horse twice is something that other people have said in the past. I don't believe that Mr. Clapper has said it.

QUESTIONER: No. I agree.

MR. MERRILL: I think that was a very, very good meeting, and I don't know why he was chosen. Maybe it was because he wasn't a diplomat, but as it worked out; I think he was a very good person to listen to what the North Koreans had to say.

MR. POLLACK: It's interesting also that his counterparts were -- in essence, those within the North Korean --

MR. MERRILL: Same type of function.

MR. POLLACK: Same functions, yeah. But, you know, General Clapper discloses, but he's not a big talker, shall we say, maybe given the line of work that he's in.
But I still haven’t read the transcript from the Face the Nation.

MR. MERRILL: I just read the news stories, yeah.

MR. POLLACK: The news story. But, no, no, no, it was interesting at least by his characterization, it was anticipated by those North Koreans that he was meeting with, that he was going to come, dare I say, bearing gifts, or bearing proposals, but that’s not the basis on which he went North. It’s not the basis on which Bill Clinton went north, and so forth.

And you know, again, you can either agree or disagree, but I think the fundamental reality was, you had incarcerated Americans, and there was an opportunity to get them out. Whether that provides the basis for something more sustained, I guess we’ll all find out.

MS. DUDDEN: What’s also -- it’s interesting -- I’ll be really fast -- where it’s interesting to read the papers in Japan that are dealing with kidnap issues as well. And so, the fact, yes it was reported, but it was reported so fast, and in such a -- you know, this is irrelevant to what’s actually happening in the real world of our relations with North Korea. That it does make me really hope that, at least Japan is involved in policy moving forward, insofar as to have it be -- to have it be so separated from US’s actions leads to, I think, increased mistrust.

MR. MERRILL: Let’s go; if you’d identify yourself for the group, and ask your question.

MR. KIM: Hugo Kim from (inaudible). My question is forwarded to Jonathan. Now South Korea has economic interest with China, and also strategic alliance with the United States. Sometimes environments have changed, make a difficult relationship either with China or the United States. Of both countries know the South Korea situations, but sometimes uncomfortable. So if you’re advisor of the Korean Government, what would be right advice? Thank you.
MR. POLLACK: Now that I'm playing China --

MR. MERRILL: No. No. I want to save you from something Jonathan.

MR. POLLACK: No. I know. Yeah, right.

MR. MERRILL: Because we were having dinner last night, and we had a discourse on the Foreign Agents Registration Act. So I don't think you can advise --

MR. POLLACK: Thank you.

MR. MERRILL: -- any government, but you can your own opinions.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you. Thank you, John. Thank you. Look, I think that the reality of the President, is that, China -- South Korea's evolving relationship with China has been at no cost whatsoever to its relationship with the United States. South Korea occupies a very, very distinctive position. A close ally of the United States, they don't want to undermine that kind of alliance at the same time as there is a belief that there are inroads that could be made with -- and into China, and vice versa.

You could argue it's a wager, but what I'm saying is, it's not a zero sum situation, and frankly in this case, so I can tell you from my own discussions with people, and policymaking in the Obama Administration contraction between those two dynamics going on at the same time.

MR. MERRILL: You've been very patient, waiting for quite a long time. And then after -- Can we get the mic down here?

QUESTIONER: Seregey Gustav, Financial News to Moscow, Russia. So as this Panel is on regional power, so could anyone elaborate on putting Russia at all into Korea dialogue? Thanks. This is a question.

MS. DUDDEN: I think his $10 billion loan forgiveness is another interest. I mean, there -- I mean, these are two very large sums of money, that Japan and Russia, both the country is seemingly increasingly excluded from international approaches of engagement. So I can't comment on Russia, I can comment on what it looks like from
the outside.

It's that they are being sidelined, and then we did talk about the rest of the Japanese War earlier in the day, and for that reason, I think especially Russia and Japan need to be part of this conversation, because if we are talking about historical actors' involvement, and if you are a Korean you start there, right, because --

MR. POLLACK: This is Mr. Putin's second effort at an initiative towards the North. He traveled to the North in 2000, the only Russian/Soviet leader ever to travel to North Korea, top person. He was still trying to collect on some of the debt. He basically gave up on that. I would say, however, that young Mr. Kim, is looking for a place to fly his plane, and I think the most likely location, it would fly first to Russia.

MR. MERRILL: And we'll know more in a few days, because there's a North Korean high-level personal emissary of Kim Jong-un's on his way to Russia --

MR. POLLACK: Way to Moscow, right.

MR. MERRILL: -- right now. I think Russia is back. I think they were sidelined for a while, but I think they are back in the picture. And they seem to be very interested in big infrastructure projects and there are others in the region who also want to play, sort of thing.

MR. POLLACK: But now if they could only find somebody to pony up the money, so that these could be achieved.

MR. MERRILL: That's why we need better Korean relations in (inaudible). Cathy? I'm sorry.

QUESTIONER: One more question.

MR. MERRILL: Oh. I'm told we can have one more question, so who would be -- who would like to -- Do you want to go down there?

MR. POLLACK: Right.

MR. MERRILL: Okay. You choose.
MR. POLLACK: No. No. I'll follow (inaudible).

MR. MERRILL: Okay. We'll go down there. Go ahead, sir, if you'd just identify yourself.

MR. KAROTKIN: Hi.

MR. MERRILL: I'm sorry or those --

MR. KAROTKIN: Thanks for making time for last question. I'm Jesse Karotkin; I'm the Deputy National Intelligence Manager for East Asia. My question relates to a couple trends that we've been seeing in recent years that have been mentioned briefly today. One is the deterioration in relations between Kim Jong-un and the Chinese Government. And separately, concurrently and I think a related development, of course, is the improvement in relations between China and South Korea, that's been mentioned several times; improving political and economic relationship.

Assuming that these trends are sustained, to what extent do the Panelists think this will change China's willingness to think about the idea of unification in ways that I guess, historically, the Chinese have always been reluctant to do?

MR. POLLACK: It's an excellent question. I do think that the center of gravity in Chinese policymaking under Xi JingPing, in particular, has shifted. I don't want to overstate it, but there are a variety of ways in which number one, he has dealt now five times that he has now met with President Park. So if we are keeping score, it's five to zero and, you know, at the moment I don't see any signals coming out of China, that Young Kim is going to be welcomed any time soon in China; whether he wished to go or not, is a different matter.

I do think over time, if you think in evolutionary terms, not in terms of giant leaps, that's something that I believe China's leaders are comfortable with. They are not comfortable with kind of big jumps into the unknown here, but are thinking seriously about, as I look at their relative position with the two Koreas, how do they
position themselves in a way that accords with their political and economic, and maybe even ultimately security interest. It really is something that warrants very careful --

MR. MERRILL: I'd like to get the two Steves into this, and you as well. What do you think?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I mean, it depends on the terms of the unification. I mean, thinking historically, for example, Victor Cha referred to John Foster Dulles this morning. In 1954 when he negotiated the Joint Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea, he thought it might be possible to have a neutralized Korean Peninsula which was unified, and that the Chinese might be willing to see that, if the South Korean forces left. I mean, as a historical reference.

MR. LEE: If South Korean forces left?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: No. Sorry. American forces, American forces left South Korea.

MR. LEE: I suppose, I'm just going to come back to the drum that I've been beating for the last hour, and that is, I think the Chinese, for the moment, are very happy to have their cake and eat it too. To have a divided Korea, and a good relationship with the South and that they are not thinking about how they can facilitate the unification. It's of no interest.

MS. DUDDEN: Under Abe, everybody but Japan is to blame for everything.

MR. MERRILL: Well, one of the things we were supposed to talk about but I don't think we have time-to-market, is who is responsibility for the -- that was one of the questions for the division of the Peninsula. But you know, we are Americans and we don't self-reflect and then talk about, but some very fascinating historical questions.

I remember one meeting I went to and there were North Koreans present, and Bruce Cummings present. Bruce was beating up on the United States, and
on U.S. policy, and I was shocked, I really rocked back on my heels because the North Koreans attacked Bruce. They said, well, before the country could be divided, it had to be colonized and lost.

And then they segued into a beautiful class analysis of the young (inaudible) riding around on their donkeys reading books while the country went to pot. So, I mean, you can go level after level if you approach this from a historical point of view, and peel it back a little bit, but we don't have time this afternoon, so we'll have to save it for another occasion.

MR. POLLACK: That's the onion theory of history, right? Yeah.

MR. MERRILL: Yeah. (Applause)

QUESTIONER: (off mic) to this group, very, very much. And the afternoon, it really perked us up. So I appreciate it, and some heavy-duty questions, and answers. We are going to move right on to the next Roundtable, Human Rights, because we are running late. So those of you who need coffee, please get it and just come back. But we are setting up, and we are going to start right away.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Well, I guess we are ready to proceed. I have my new marching orders from Professor Kathy Moon. We were running a little bit late so we're going to proceed with our panel discussion until 5:30 and then from 5:30 to 5:55 we're going to open it up to questions from the audience.

I would like to congratulate Professor Moon on the timing of this panel. Tomorrow the U.N. General Assembly will be casting a vote on a resolution addressing the human rights situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea. As it stands right now the draft of the resolution includes language, I would say strong language on crimes against humanity that may have been committed in North Korea and the resolution also contains language on the issue of accountability.
In preparation for this panel presentation, I think that the article by Professor Moon and (inaudible) was an excellent way to prepare for this discussion. And the point that is made in that article seems to be that, well, especially during the Cold War; the United States dealt and engaged countries that did not exactly have a stellar human rights record. I thought it was interesting that you mentioned the visit by former South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan, the first head of state to visit the Reagan White House.

There is a little bit more to that story, actually. That was part of a negotiated deal between Richard V. Allen who was National Security Advisor at the time to President Reagan, it was part of a negotiated deal to actually save the life of Kim Dae-jung. I also think that before I ask the distinguished panelists to introduce themselves, I think that a great way to set the tone for today’s discussion would be to quote Justice Michael Kirby who spoke here at Brookings in April of this year.

As you know Justice Kirby is an Australian judge, 38 years of experience as a judge, who together with Marzuki Darusman, U.N. Special Rapporteur on North Korea and also Ms. Sonja Biserko, a Serbian human rights activist, were the three investigators at the U.N. Commission of Inquiry that produced a report that reframed the approach to North Korean human rights.

If North Korean human rights was somehow seen as a remnant of the Cold War and continued to be seen through Cold War lens, what this report did was to truly reframe this issue. Justice Kirby says that the Commission of Inquiry has found systematic widespread and grave human rights’ violations occurring in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It has also found a disturbing array of crimes against humanity.

These crimes are committed against inmates of political and other prison camps, against starving populations, against religious believers, against persons who try
to flee the country including those forcibly repatriated by China. These crimes arise from policies established at the highest level of the state. They have been committed and continue to take place in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because the policies, institutions and patterns of impunity that lie at the heart remain in place.

The gravity, scale, duration and nature of the unspeakable atrocities committed in the country reveal a totalitarian state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world. That said, I would like to ask that the distinguished panelists introduce themselves very briefly and I'm going to begin with Dr. Bush.

MR. BUSH: I'm Richard Bush. I'm the Director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings. And I've been asked to talk about the implications of reform in China and Taiwan for prospects for greater protection of human rights in North Korea.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Professor Song?

MS. SONG: Thank you very much. I'm Jiyoung Song from Singapore Management University. I live in Singapore but I'm originally from South Korea. I got my education in the U.K. so I have this dodgy accent. If you don't understand me just frown on your face so that I can repeat myself. I worked on my initial interest in North Korea was human rights. I did human rights (inaudible) analysis which turned into a book in 2009. Recently, my research focus is on irregular migration in East Asia. So I follow, I basically follow the footsteps of North Korea for the past 15 years.

So I just interview North Koreans in China, Thailand, Lao, Myanmar, South Korea, now in the U.K., London, Toronto. There is a big Korean community where a lot of North Koreans go there and seek help from South Koreans and also seek refugee status from (audio skip).

My question I have two questions I'm not sure whether I can ask two. One of the ICC. Even if Kim Jong-un is brought before the ICC which is highly unlikely
due to China or Russia's veto power at the U.N. Security Council. There is no alternative human rights friendly candidate in the North Korean leadership to replace him.

If Kim Jong-un is taken to the ICC, what would be the human rights gains for the people of North Korea? What would be the consequences for the people living in that country when there is no alternative?

South Korea also face some rollback in democracy and human rights. And the U.S. is not really a big fan of the ICC or any of the international organizations. And has lost a big of more leadership on human rights especially after 9/11 and (audio skip), you know, torture cases. What would be the U.S. and (inaudible) roles in stopping human rights violation and crimes against humanity in the Korean Peninsula as a whole.

I have another question that's based on my understanding of North Korean thinking of human rights which is different from the Western sort of liberal thinking of human rights. China and North Korea have developed their own politics of human rights to counterattack mainly the U.S. but Western criticism against the grave systematic violation of human rights.

They criticized double standard, selectivity and the politicization of human rights on the U.S. foreign policy while prioritizing a right to survival, subsistence and development. So they focus on what they say, Seng Jung hwan, Seng haw hwan, Seng mug hwan which is mainly right to survival not necessarily of the people but probably what they mean is right of the nation or the country to survive in this anarchic international environment.

(Audio skip) many developing and non-align movement especially in Asia and Africa, they join and welcome this kind of move and can this right to survival or development be considered as a permissible limitations under exercise of individuals rights and they reconcile these two concepts.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Thank you very much, Professor Song and we'll go
next to our next panelist.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I'm mark Schneider. I'm currently the Senior Vice-President of the International Crisis Group. However, I've been invited here to look back at a different period in U.S.-South Korea relations during the period of the Carter Administration when I was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. And to some degree it was quite interesting because I have the opportunity now to see what WikiLeaks had put out on cables coming from South Korea when I traveled there and also cables coming from the embassy there after I traveled there.

And it's interesting because it does reflect, I think, on what the difference was in terms of the U.S. human rights policy that was begun, to some degree with the Carter Administration and how it's shifted over time perhaps. Become more institutionalized within the U.S. Government today in different ways. But at that time, I think that there was a -- the charge of selectivity and the charge of double standards was very much a criticism that we faced.

The response was that even in a country where we had very significant security relations as South Korea was at the time that we nevertheless conveyed in a very clear way our identification with those basic rights, civil and political rights. So that when I traveled there I visited Kim Dae-jung in house arrest. I visited Kim Young-Sam while he was under house arrest. I spoke to people who had undergone torture by the South Korea police at the time.

And subsequently, the U.S. Government halted export licenses to the South Korean police, abstained or voted against loans, certain kinds of loans to the government basically to reflect the concern that the government of South Korea had not moved adequately at that time. It's obviously changed much differently today but at that time in a direction of respect for basic human rights.

And I think it's important particularly now as one looks around the world
at a different kind, not a Cold War, but a different kind of strategic threat that is faced by the U.S., others in the West to look at whether or not there is a sufficient focus on conveying our continuing concern about respect for human rights in the world at large. And we could raise different issues that exist today in the U.S. foreign policy where that's an issue.

But I must say that it was interesting to look at the way in which South Koreans viewed the Carter administration and human rights policy at that time and how the U.S. Government attempted in various ways to balance the issues of security, issues of security interest as well as human rights concerns.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Thank you, Mr. Schneider and I'm Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Ms. Lee?

MS. LEE: My name is Namhee Lee. I teach at UCLA and I think that my job today is as a historian to remind the audience about particular issues that has to do with human rights discourse. But I understand that I've been here all morning, all day long and you are such a learned audience that I don't think there is any need for reminder.

But I just wanted to revisit the one episode that you mentioned which was mentioned by Kathy Moon which is the President Ronald Reagan's invitation of Chun Dooh-hwan in 1981 so soon after the brutal suppression of Gwangju in 1980 which was seen by and large by the South Korean public as A) a typical case of double standard held by the United States government. And that is while it publicly espoused democratic ideals, it always had this contradictory claims and actions which also became a source of anti-Americanism that was part of parcel of the 1980 South Korean democratization movement.

And so, as for someone who's studied about the South Korean democratization movement and about the activist who had devoted their lives to, again,
to talk about the human rights violations in South Korea, my question then has to do with why there seems to be this conspicuous absence on the part of the politically progressives in South Korea and also to a certain degree in the United States about human rights violations in North Korea.

And I think that question has to do with, again, my own sort of role or limited role in the South Korean democratization movement and my own self-reflection as an academic and as a former political activist. And that, I think, this might not necessarily be a venue through which to ask this kind of question but I thought I might just raise this issue about how to engage with the concerns expressed by the progressives in South Korea and the United States that much of the criticism about North Korean human rights is politically harnessed to a regime change agenda.

And many of us know, particularly, those of us in this room that U.S. government has had certainly history of regime change through either covert means or limited military operations. Another related question is that why do human rights activists in the United States and also in South Korea overlook the violence that international sanctions generate on North Korean people as humanitarian and development aids are withheld?

And I was very heartened to hear John Merrill's comment earlier in the panel about the danger or the limitation in exclusively focusing on North Korean state as a source of all problems that there are certainly third parties. Here we can talk about the international organizations such as IMF or International Bank or transnational organizations and the role of the United States for that matter. So those are the reasons why I raise these questions.

MR. SCARLATOIU: I understand. Dr. Bush, I--

MR. BUSH: I took your word briefly very seriously. So looking first at Taiwan, the United States government over a number of decades did very little, actually
did nothing to promote human rights in Taiwan before the 1980s. Taiwan was strategically important and Chiang Kai-shek was our son of a bitch.

We did promote economic growth and this was actually very important for the long term because it had the impact of creating a middle class that then made certain demands on the Kuomintang Regime. The other thing that happened was that liberals in the Congress, a small minority, began to focus on human rights abuses and the absence of democracy in Taiwan.

They did this at a time when Taiwan's president Chiang Ching-kuo was already aiming to open up the Taiwan political system. Those liberals made the appeal to Chiang that a United States that -- or a Taiwan that was democratic would have a greater claim on U.S. support than heretofore. And this was at a time when Taiwan strategic importance had disappeared.

So Chiang Ching-kuo picked up on that offer and it was one of the reasons that he moved forward. So what are the direct takeaways? The U.S. impact was mainly indirect. Chiang Ching-kuo's decisions are very important and for purposes of the discussion, improvement of human rights accompanied and followed democratization. Democratization really came first.

Now, looking at China. From the 1970s on U.S. executive branch focused on China as strategically important to the United States. There was only one instance where we tried to use the leverage of our economic relationship to extract human rights improvements. That was surrounding the continuation of MFN. The Clinton Administration tried this most aggressively. The effort failed mainly because there was not strong enough support in the United States for a sustained application of that policy.

But what we did do was enable China to enter the world economy through opening our markets, opening our universities, making possible the transfer of
technology and a granting of finance and capital. This has led to, I think, not improvement of human rights but an expansion in personal freedom in other ways and also the creation of a middle class.

Will this lead ultimately to democratization and the improvement of human rights? I hope so. I don’t know when it will happen but again, it was Deng Xiaoping’s decisions in 1978, ’79 then again 1992 that initiated and then reconfirmed this policy approach that has transformed Chinese society and, you know, I would say politics to this day.

So what are the implications for North Korea? First question you have to ask is North Korea strategically important to the United States in ways that Taiwan was before 1971 and China has usually been? The answer is no. And it probably won’t be.

Second, do we expect leadership decisions in North Korea that will lead to a radical improvement in relations with the United States and the rest of the international community such that the process of economic modernization based on markets and leading to the formation of a middle class and whatever follows that, do we have reason to expect that? Right now it doesn’t seem so.

I hope that those policy changes will come. Nuclear weapons have to be in the mix. But through a prism of what happened in Taiwan, through a prism of what happened in China, those leadership decisions seem to be necessary to get that process going. All right, it would be a long term process and I wouldn’t expect to see sort of a really big outcomes in my lifetime and I intend to live a long time.

The alternative here if one is worried about an increase in personal freedom for North Korean citizens, the emergence of a middle class and all of that is unification. If we have to wait for a long time for North Korean leaders to make the decisions that would allow North Korea to follow in a Taiwan or China direction, maybe unification through absorption or through collapse and then the integration of the South
and the North socially, economically, politically and culturally will bring about the sort of fundamental changes that would result in a true respect for human rights in North Korea.

Thanks.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Thank you, Dr. Bush. And I will use my privilege (audio skip) to direct a question to all panelists. Basically, after the holocaust, after the Cambodian genocide, after the Rwandan genocide 20 years ago, each and every time we have said never again. And now, we have an investigation commissioned by the United Nations that has found that crimes against humanity may have been committed in North Korea.

It has reminded us that there are at least four fully operational political prison camps in that country and that 120,000 political prisoners are still being held in these facilities. What is it going to take to persuade the government of the DBRK to comply with its international obligations and to comply with its own constitution as well because on paper many of the human rights that we talk about are actually, believe it or not guaranteed in the constitution of the DBRK.

Mr. Schneider, would you like to take the lead on this one?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, I go back for a second. It does seem to me that at different points in time it's easier to argue to a regime that stopping the clear violations of the integrity of the person, stopping torture, stopping cruel and inhuman punishment seems basic. And the fact is that when that happened then other things follow in the sense that if individual dissidents are no longer afraid of being tortured or imprisoned and brutally treated, that that begins to open up their willingness to, in fact, to engage in opposition actions.

There are different situations because I think, in fact, in places where you've had military regimes but previously you've had democratic institutions, it's a lot easier to see the transition back to democracy, put pressure on the regime. It's a lot
harder in the case of North Korea which I agree. Assuming that you did relaxation in the way that the government treats its people, inevitable and hopefully, as you indicated, change might be a change in the regime to permit a Korean democratic society to operate.

It, unfortunately, it's likely to take a long time. I think you do have to continue to maintain pressure. This is the goal. The goal is respect for human rights, integrity for the person, civil and political rights and economic and social.

Right now I think it would be hard to argue that you have equitable treatment of all of the people in North Korea in terms of receiving government services, in terms of access to economic benefits at all. And so, I think you continue to put pressure on with respect to that.

MR. SCARLATOIU: I think this is a great point and what we have seen for the past few weeks has been the North Korean government actually responding to efforts to push for a U.N. General Assembly resolution. The Foreign Minister spoke before the General Assembly for the first time in 15 years mentioning human rights. The U.N. mission held a press briefings. Of course, human rights were again mentioned and at a meeting that our organization actually co-sponsored in the main chamber of the ECOSOC, Justice Michael Kirby was the keynote speaker. The North Korean government dispatched eight diplomats from the U.N. mission, from the Geneva mission and also from Pyongyang.

MR. SCHNEIDER: In some instances it would be interesting to see but when that kind of pressure happens in the past, what the reaction of repressive governments has been, has been to release a certain number of political prisoners. It would be interesting to see if that happens.

MR. SCARLATOIU: The very serious issue that we have in North Korea is that we do not have those lists. Some NGOs have compiled lists of political prisoners
based on the memories of former prisoners and guards but this is a tremendous difficulty compared even to other extraordinarily oppressive environments.

MR. SCHNEIDER: When I went to South Korea, I did bring with me lists of political prisoners that NGOs and church groups had put together. And, in fact, and that was one of the things after the visit that one of the cables informed me that many of the people on that list had been released. So I think it's something to continue to press for.

MS. SONG: Pyongyang just responded by closing down one of the biggest political prison camps. It was caught in the satellite images. They closed down one of the political prison camps. I was going to say something. Risse, Ropp, Sikkink wrote a book about power of human rights and they laid out this five stage of spiral model of human rights known violating countries behavioral change.

So first stage was repression and second stage was denial/transnational advocacy role and the third one is a tactical concession. I think this is probably considered as a tactical concession, release of the American prisoners, also closing down one of the political prison camps and try to engage with the U.S. American diplomats and other international human rights community. And the fourth stage is a prescriptive behavior.

So they try to change, enact new laws that it's compliance with international human rights standard. And the final stage is the rule consistent behavior. But this is a non-linear model. This is a spiral model so when there is not enough transnational network or public awareness, the tactical concession might go back to denial or even further to repression stage. We need to bear in mind that there should be a constant pressure by the civil society, individuals or prominent figures like Kirby pressing on these issues of crimes against humanity, not just human rights violations.

MR. SCARLATOIU: That is certainly a great suggestion. The point you
made about your, if indeed in response to a national pressure North Korea is doing away with political prison camps, of course that would be a positive development. But we are not absolute -- all I'm saying is that we need more research on Yodok. It's just one section of Yodok called sol in chun that apparently has ceased to function as a detention facility.

We need better and more satellite imagery analysis and we also need to corroborate the satellite imagery analysis with the testimony of former North Koreans which might even have contacts inside the country and are closer to those facilities. We saw this happen a few years ago, Camp 22 close to the border with China in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province was shut down.

It ceased to function as a detention facility and unfortunately in the process, up to 8,000 people went missing. So our greatest concern here is that the North Korean government will engage in attempts to erase evidence and eliminate the witnesses. And that is why we're experiencing this great sense of urgency as we address truly the heart of darkness of the human rights violations that we discuss.

MS. LEE: May I just --

MR. SCARLATOIU: Yes, Professor Lee.

MS. LEE: I'm afraid I'm on this (audio skip) but I just -- and I might be characterized as one of those pure academics who has not served (inaudible) but not because I have any disdain for academics who work in governance but I just simply don't have that kind of capacity. But I do have a great respect for academics who work in policy issues.

But as an academic I might have to sort of pose this question about what happens when we push the regime, which feels that it really doesn't have any choice other than the choice of extinction or transparency? What was his name? I think in 2009, for example, Sam Brownback who basically said holocaust now about the situation
put this in a very stark choice again between extinction or transparency.

And my fear again as someone who don't have a solution, concrete solution, for this problem but who can only sort of come up with the abstract ideas is that it really does not leave any room for any alternative solution. I mean, I wonder if the panel members have any --

MR. BUSH: (audio skip) couple of responses. I think between extinction and transparency there's the option of muddling through which I think North Korea feels it's doing okay. Part of muddling through is the sorts of tactical move that we're seeing now. I'm glad they have to work harder to keep international opinion from their door and I'm glad Judge Kirby did the work that he did.

I am a bit cynical though. I think that this -- all of these things are tactical. None of them are irreversible to the extent that they're happening at all. And I fear that the systematic violation of human rights including the violations against the integrity of the person are so integral to the regime and how it believes it has to survive that the pressure will -- that, you know, in the end be unavailing.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Great point. And once again an attempt to counter these efforts to push for a General Assembly resolution, North Korea has actually offered a visit by the U.S. Special Rapporteur. This is something that human rights groups had asked for a long time. In response Mr. Darusman spoke strongly in favor of a two-track approach.

Of course, we welcome a visit by the Special Rapporteur but these visits must be executed on the terms of the Special Rapporteur according to his terms of reference not the terms of the recipient government and there is simply not enough time between then, just a couple of weeks ago and tomorrow, the day when a vote will be cast on the resolution. That said, as part of this dual approach, Special Rapporteur Darusman has also spoken in favor of technical assistance. So seeking accountability is one part of
the story.

On the other hand, of course, the international community and why not U.N. agencies and human rights groups may actually be in a position to provide technical assistance. I know that human rights groups are generally accused of being in the business of regime change. I can tell you for sure that our organization is not in the business of regime change. But certainly most experts and those with an interest in the Korean Peninsula would agree that some change, significant change, is likely to result in the improvement of the human rights situation.

Well, as stated earlier, certainly the reunification of the two Koreas as the Republic of Korea on South Korean terms is the most likely scenario that will be conducive to the clear improvement of the human rights situation and economic development on the entire Korean Peninsula.

I thought that one of the questions asked by Mr. Schneider was very interesting because it addressed the very difficulties that the human rights groups have faced over the years. Do security interests always trump human rights objectives? What does history tell us? And this has truly been our challenge because nukes and missiles have always been on the agenda but it has been really difficult to maintain North Korean human rights in focus.

Human rights was always outclassed by the other very important issues. I think that we're in a better place right now especially given the reframing of the issue by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry but I was wondering what the panelists would think about this topic. Is it realistic to expect that human rights will be added to the agenda and human rights will be made part of any future contact under -- with North Korea using available vehicles or other new vehicles that might be made available?

MR. BUSH: Well, I think the default answer is security always trumps values. But if the President of the United States decided that human rights should be
elevated in importance and salience in our diplomacy in North Korea and sort of made sure that the departments of the U.S. Government did so, then that would be a different story. You know, you do come back to how integral human rights abuses are to what the regime views at its survival necessity.

And it may be that both what we call security and their internal control mechanisms are together so important that we get traction on neither.

MR. SCARLATOIU: (audio skip) Lee.

MS. LEE: Can I also say something? Here I'm again and again reminded how abstract all of the things that I say are but I can't help but to say something about the concept of security. We need to expand sort of the notion of security to include the security that comes with the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. So that the human rights discourse and the policy also has to go hand-in-hand with the kind of security or peace and stability that the Korean people are longing for. And so, again and again, I think we need to be very careful in talking about security as being somewhat a separate issue from the human rights discourse.

I don't know if that makes necessary sense but I think many of the Koreans would fear, for example, that this sort of push to do something about the North Korea, and this is not at all to suggest that the problems are not dire enough. Usually, this is a very serious problem but at the same time, we need to be concerned about the concern of the Korean people as a whole.

So that the security issue would have to be -- the notion of security would have to be expanded to include the security of peace and (audio skip).

MS. SONG: Can I add onto that? I think there has been already changes in the public discourse in international politics. You know, security here, I think what Dr. Schneider meant was a state security or national security or defense military kind of security. But since 1994, UNDP already laid out the definition of a human security
which is more people centered. And it was -- it has very specific meanings of personal
security, community security, political economy security, food, environment and health
security.

But when you sort of compare this seven (sic) dimension of human
security with international human rights standard, they are very parallel meanings. So it's
more individual, people-centered approach to human rights not just about the military
spending or, you know, having weapons to protect your country.

But now, the whole entire discourse and (inaudible) is moving toward
security (audio skip) human security.

MR. SCARLATOIU: And certainly, if one were to look at North Korea
and the people of North Korea from a human security perspective, most likely the
conclusion would be that the main reason for the very precarious state of all seven
components of human security in North Korea is the dire human rights situation.

MR. SCHNEIDER: If I could? I really threw the question out to some
degree to spark this kind of discussion because I do think that your point is very important
which is that security has to be viewed in a broader sense. And that, in fact, peace and
stability on the Peninsula is a very important element of both security for the two Koreas
and for the international community.

And that -- and so, therefore, the efforts, for example, to pursue nuclear
negotiations in some agreement as well as to find the kind of political transition over time
that leads to, in fact, a unified Peninsula is desirable in terms. Not just of peace but also
of human rights, respect for human rights. And the other is that it's not an either or.

And I think that I would argue that, in fact, even in the narrow sense of
national security viewed in terms of the dangers to, in this case let's say the United
States, that it's never simply looking at just the one issue, one interest and nothing else
on our agenda, that you can chew gum and walk at the same time. And so, you can
raise issues with countries which are your significant military allies as South Korea was for many years. And at the same time raise human rights concerns because there was not sufficient respect for human rights within South Korea.

And that was the same with respect to most of the military dictatorships in Latin America that you could, in fact, and needed to press for human rights, respect for human rights in those instances. And I suspect that now one would have to raise the issue with respect to some other security relationships in other parts of the world facing the problems of Islamic extremism that, nevertheless, you have to be concerned about respect for human rights by countries with whom or governments with whom we currently are in some kind of allied relationship.

MR. SCARLATOIU: All right, Professor Lee raised the issue of sanctions, international sanctions. Now certainly the perception might be that North Korea is a heavily sanctioned country pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions. However, that might not be the case compared to other countries that are the subject of similar sanctions and moreover, the current sanctions regime has absolutely nothing to do with North Korea’s human rights violations or the crimes against humanity that may have been committed in Korea.

It is also my understand that the international sanctions based on those U.N. Security Council resolutions that basically two main goals in mind, one is to prevent the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology by North Korea and the other one is to punish the elites that are in charge of such activities. Your question is addressed to human rights activists and that’s why I feel compelled to address it.

Why do human rights activists overlook the violence that international sanctions generate on the North Korean people? What precisely do you have in mind? What kind of violence?

MS. LEE: Well, it is true that we don’t any sustained analysis of what
actually happened with the sanction. The sanction went into effect three days in to the Korean War and if you look at the studies that are done by the effect of sanctions in countries such as Iraq and, for example, Cuba what the mortality of the children, for example, in Iraq in the nineties has two-folded. In Cuba, mortality has gone up something like by 57 percent because of the inability to control pneumonia and influenza.

So sanctions do play in a big role in the inability of the North Korean government to provide the kind of security that, you know, health security, for example, that we're talking about. So again and again I agree that there isn't a specific study done about the impact of North Korea but we can infer from the studies done in other countries that have been subjected to sanctions for a long period of time, what possible impact this would have on North Korean population, the population that we care so deeply about.

And the human rights activists, you know, as a former activist obviously I do have a great respect but I do so that there is that kind of loophole that when we emphasize so much about the action of state we tend to overlook some other actions that might play a role in contributing to the worsening condition of the welfare of the North Koreans. That's all I'm pointing out.

MR. SCARLATOIU: I understand. But wouldn't the same government of North Korea hold the key to improving the lot of its own people by first and foremost putting an end to these egregious human rights violations, then seeking technical assistance to address the other human rights issues? A few very simply issues, Dr. Schneider, in order to qualify, for example, for World Bank assistance wouldn't military expenditure have to be reduced drastically? Wouldn't they have to collect their national statistical data and submit the national statistical data? A high degree of transparency reform?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, no question but I think underlying that question though is the way in which North Korea -- government of North Korea uses the available
revenues that it has. And it appears that a significant part of that goes to military expenditures as opposed to responding to basic human needs within the country.

The other is that the -- at least as I understand it, there continues to be a significant amount of food aid provided by international donors including the U.S. and the -- and believe me if you used the Cuban embargo which has been let's say not successful and had negative consequences over the course of the past 50 years, but that isn't the reason for the -- what the changes that occurred in terms of access to resources for health facilities and that goes through the change in Soviet support for Cuba and other factors. And their medicines are not, even in terms of the U.S. embargo, medicines are not covered by the embargo.

But in general, you try and have sanctions that are targeted on individuals and that have less impact on the population but at least, in the case of North Korea, I think I would argue that their government decisions are much more responsible for the misallocation of resources in terms of benefit to the population.

MR. SCARLATIOUI: Professor Song, any comments?

MS. SONG: Sanctions don't work. Sanctions only, you know, isolate the country further and further. Well, I mean, if there is an international sanction against the DPRK regime and they can still operate with probably more elicit activities doing all this smuggling and traffic issues and also, countries like Singapore where I live, they do trade with North Korea.

I bump into North Koreans now and then just on the street. I even bump into the first son of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-nam used to live in Singapore. Tried to buy some houses, very expensive one, we don’t mention that failed. But this kind of information I just -- one of my students, Singaporean students was telling me that my sister has a client. He seems to be from North Korea. I said, who? And then Kim Jong-nam. I said, what? No way.
But these and they also -- Singapore has some, a couple of North Korean shipping companies. So they do ship through -- most of the European goods through Singapore. It was sold in Pyongyang departments stores so the sanctions don't work.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Right. Before we move on to the Q and A, Professor Song, I thought I would try to respond to your -- the points you make pertaining to the ICC. Even if Kim Jong-un is brought before the ICC, there is no alternative human rights friendly candidate. There is only one way to find out, allowing the people of North Korea the right to freely choose their own representatives. They might do a better job picking leaders who might be in a better position to improve the overall situation.

Regarding the ICC, you make another very important point that since China is a P5, a permanent member, of the U.N. Security Council, even if the referral to the international criminal court were to be brought up in the Security Council, China would likely veto such attempts and that is a valid point. But at the same time, by persisting in this effort to push Security Council referral to the international criminal court, I think that the price, the political price, of unconditionally supporting a regime that is committing crimes against humanity will be high and only getting higher.

If China wants to veto such attempts, so be it. Let them do it over and over and over again. That said, Professor Moon? Yes, I guess we are ready for the Q and A. We will go to Mr. Robert Warren and then to Mr. John Merrill. And then third question?

MS. MOON: Thank you very much. This is -- I appreciate everybody staying and it's been a long day especially for those who flew out from far away and are trying to stay awake. I have three points for a two-finger and this is Washington speak for comments versus questions even though I do have questions. I want to talk about what's -- to add a little bit to supplement some of the comments but also to address what has not
been mentioned as part of the human rights problem concerning North Koreans.

The first in terms of just supplementing what Professor Lee, Namhee Lee has written a prodigious book, a prodigious book on South Korea's, yeah, she's going first rate, South Korean democracy movement but also historical assessment of authoritarianism as well as documentation of torture and human rights abuses. And when I was reading parts of your book, I did a double take because it's as if we're reading about North Korea today.

And so, again, we need to remember history. It took South Korea a long time even as an ally to get out of the kind of mindset about in terms of how state relations with people should be. And so, it will take North Korea a longer time I would assume.

Regarding your comment about sanctions and food aid, et cetera, there is a direct correlation between international sanctions that, as Greg points out, that are poised or opposed against the nuclear tests and rocket launches and the lack of the international community and World Health -- World Food Organization and other U.N. affiliated and non-affiliated NGOs to provide food, medicine, et cetera. Why?

One, because the sanctions mechanisms make it difficult for governments to actually donate. Two, it makes the delivery of funds nearly impossible because the banking system, the bank that the foreign trade bank that North Korea uses which has a link with the Chinese bank and that's where the money gets funneled through China into North Korea. The Chinese have become more cautious about it.

So it's difficult to get even funds that have been already pledged to North Korea and the World Food Organization is due to basically close up shop come this January because they don't have the funds to run. The aspect of human rights that's not being mentioned, there are multiple ways to look at human rights and we're looking at state violations, right?

That is the traditional way but Amnesty International and other human
rights organizations in the post-Cold War period defined and expanded their definition of human rights to include non-state actors' violations of people's human rights. And here human trafficking, in my view, is a critical reality that hasn't been addressed. And human trafficking, especially women from North Korea to China as forced brides, as prostitutes, children being brought in to do indentured servitude, labor, pornography, these are realities that are happening regularly. It's been happening for years.

And there, the North Korean is not as directly involved. They may condone it like many other governments but you have private actors, North Korean private actors, Chinese private actors, South Korean private actors, Russian private actors, who are -- Japanese private actors, who are part of this illicit system institutionalized that allows these human rights violations to occur. So I wanted to expand our conversation in those ways, thank you.

QUESTIONER: It's a very interesting panel. I just wanted to react to a couple of things. First on this question of DJ and Ronald Reagan, Richard Allen has made a very detailed account of what happened. And the deal was that we'd have a South Korean presidential visit in return for saving DJ's life. The problem is that Ronald Reagan liked to use three by five index cards to give his talking points but on that occasion he forgot to look at the card.

And so, he just went off I guess thinking he was pulling the role of Douglas MacArthur or something. And so, he got a little bit carried away but that's a bum rap. I don't usually defend Ronald Reagan but in this case, it's a bum rap. Well, that's a comment. She was talking about that earlier.

I think someone mentioned this whole problem of asynchronous comparison that you could almost transpose North Korea back into the -- almost, back into the South Korea of the fifties or sixties. Actually, you could if you're talking about the Syngman Rhee era because you had gargantuan human rights including massacres of
whole populations under him.

All I'm saying is before we go charging off with Judge Kirby's report, I think it needs a careful debate and a careful scrub on facts. Now, Kathy, you were talking about human trafficking which brings to mind another little episode. When I was still working in the Department, there was a case of a brutal execution of some North Koreans and people were clamoring about what -- how terrible this was. There was a whole crowd assembled and they were gunned down by a firing squad.

But nobody bothered to listen to the audio. They were just looking at the video. And what these people were being executed for by the North Korean Security Services was for human trafficking to China for the purposes of prostitution. So I'm just saying, these are things that need to be gone over very carefully. I don't think they have been scrubbed and there are certain organizations that have an interest in hyping the human rights issue.

And we know who they are. I don't have to name them. But you have to make sure that the data that you're using is clean and accurate. And the other thing is how far back does Mr. Kirby's -- Judge Kirby's report go? Kim Jong-un has been in charge for a little more than three years and I know he machine gunned his uncle to death or something like that. But are we throwing in everything but the kitchen sink? These Gulags weren't established three years ago.

So we need to scrub our data. I don't have any objection to going to the court if we do that.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Well, first and foremost this is a 400-page report, extraordinarily well researched, well documented. Three very senior investigators with about 20 U.N. staff members who conducted interviews with practically hundreds of former North Koreans, conducted public hearings as well and as Justice Kirby has pointed out, this is not an indictment. This is just the first step.
The finding of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry is that crimes against humanity may have been committed in North Korea. How far back do we go? We go back to 2002 in their own statute because we can only discuss, we can only talk about crimes against humanity post-2002. Certainly, this system was established in the 1950s talking about the Gulag. And unfortunately, Kim Jong-un also has this opportunity to exercise his right to inhumanity which he has done ever since he took over North Korea.

And looking at the data, just a few examples, looking at the number of refugees successfully resettling in South Korea, that number declined by 50 percent from 2011 to 2012 and the subsequent years from about 2,800 to 1,500 which is an indication of the tough crackdown on attempted defections and this is just one trend that has been identified under the current regime of Kim Jong-un (audio skip).

Mr. Rob Warren?

MR. WARREN: I have a question for Mr. Bush and that is I'm interested in the parallel that's going on with the umbrella movement in Hong Kong. One could say that this will have an impact on human rights in Hong Kong if this movement is forcibly suppressed. At this time, that's not the case.

The U.S. Administration has said several times now we hope it will end peacefully but we haven't expanded on what we mean. Would you care to address that parallel?

MR. BUSH: The parallel between sunflower, oh, the sunflower movement and the umbrella movement? Well, I think that there is a real interaction between the leaders of the two movements in terms of exchanging experiences and learning techniques and so on. And a lot of the transmission went from Taiwan to Hong Kong because it occurred there first.

Hong Kong has had a protest tradition for about 11 years. This took it to a new stage and we're still in the middle of the protests and don't know how it will end. I
think there may be a difference in how this one is likely to start ending and the way the Taiwan one ended. In Taiwan there was, you know, first of all a government decision not to use force once the sunflower movements were entrenched.

What happened was that the speaker of the legislative, Wang JinPing essentially cut a deal with the student movement and probably the Democratic Progressive Party who were supporting it. And promised a certain piece of legislation concerning how future trade agreements would be reviewed by the legislature. My understanding, he didn't necessarily consult with other members of his party or his executive branch about that.

What is likely to happen perhaps as early as this week is that representatives of the Hong Kong courts supported by the police will seek to enforce a court order requiring the students or the protestors to vacate certain thoroughfares. Not all of the thoroughfares that are currently occupied. And what will happen when they try to enforce those orders is another question. But one has to credit those who are opposed to the protest with a certain amount of cleverness; sort of using the rule of law against those who say that they seek to uphold it.

MR. SCARLATOIU: The next question, please.

MR. BUSH: Mic, wait for the mic.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Just wait for the mic, please.

QUESTIONER: Just to follow-up on the conundrum, the human rights security conundrum that Professor Lee so eloquently raised and I'm thinking of specifically the ferry boat from Japan from Niigata. And there, you know, for decades all sorts of rumors about what was on the ship but in very real practical terms I've interviewed 25 family members who used to send really dangerous things like aspirin and small amounts of cash with their children who went on the obligatory visit North Korean bow to the fatherland school trips that ended all of this in 2006.
And so, it's somewhere in that the rub between the daily life at stake and yeah, maybe those big gold bars that were found Kane Marushin's house after he died. Who knows? But my point is this, is it -- I do have a point, I know I do.

It's just, it's in this rub that when we realize that the North Korean people we keep wanting to bring about the regime change and find their own leader are increasingly weakened on daily life levels. And here I'm thinking Barbara Demick's book. I find really a quite interesting way of understanding why it takes so long because the lights don't go out overnight. They go down slowly.

And so, it's just is there a way, I think as Professor Lee was saying, to make it appear at least less of an extreme choice? And yes, I am not defending the North Korean regime at all. But is there a way to like the Eugene Bell Foundation through channels such as that, to make it possible that tuberculosis doesn't run rampant? That aspirin can be delivered in small packages. Things like that, I know it sounds hopelessly lefty and, you know, big peace prize but it is how people live their lives.

And these are the people that we really do hope are writing the great Korean novel, are writing for the future but especially will be the ones who are the future of any unified Korea. And I don't know what to do, obviously so I'm really throwing it out.

MR. SCARLATOIU: And we take just one more question over there please before I open it up to the panel.

QUESTIONER: Excuse me, I have the mic?

MR. SCARLATOIU: Please, go ahead, yes.

QUESTIONER: Yeah. I just want to -- first let me thank these panels about human rights. But I just wonder, usually, there are some report aspires for instance, America would not disclose how many people they killed. And so, do we have any more comprehension study put all this human right violation together as a report or we can just pinpoint where to find all those reports?
You know, we don't like North Korea and that's why we have a report on that but there is no report on American human rights, how many they killed inside the United States. You know, so I wonder if anything, let's just human way a real issues.

MR. SCHNEIDER: We have an open society and we have lots of civil society organizations who document in great detail --

QUESTIONER: That's why I question about that since (inaudible) if they have, I would like to have all those human rights report together so we can see the credibility too.

MS. SCARLATOIU: Yes.

QUESTIONER: In (inaudible) amnesty they have member deny the real activist to join them because they don't want them to join them. They will disclose all this publicly and they don't want them to report this.

MR. SCARLATOIU: Well, thank you very much. We will take one more question.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. This is just maybe because you guy are so good and, you know, scholars so use it as future data or to expand on people like us. We do think about this but we never take action or it takes so much effort to put together, you know, just a small idea. So my question is from my observation, I'm a Tibetan so human rights is a big issue.

But let's throw that out on the side because I see even far, far more growth of, what do we call, I mean, that's something like violation of human rights action which is, I mean, because of that I see just like the same side of a coin whether we are at the victim's point or the ones who right now we are discussing and asking for action and help and solution to how to get rid of the bad guys and, you know, save the innocent ones specially.

So do you guys see that point or be able to bring this up because we are
in the most powerful country, United States of America? You know, I know I do complain but I know that bottom line we are the greatest. And I know Japan and Germany and France and over there but they are such small entities nowadays.

And second one is, okay, laugh at me, please, I'm totally, I will not get offended. Second one is do you see any day where the human rights are -- the true human rights activists or human rights upholders will be put up there as, you know, the higher most like the Supreme Court Justices I guess from my understanding in the world we have in the United States? So something like that. Would they ever be upheld one day or soon as some of those leaders, you know, in the world where they will have lots of power but at the same time have a lot of decision-making on these scary, scary things going on?

You know, we should be laughing at ourselves right now. I mean, I don't want to be cynical but yes. Okay? Thank you.

MS. MOON: Thank you very much. We have, we could have endless debates on these issues which is a good thing but we don't have enough time and I think many of our participants today are quite exhausted especially those of you who went at the end of the day. I am truly appreciative of the fact that you have been just stalwart and loyal throughout the whole day listening to other people.

So we need to close up but I do want to ask one question to Mr. Schneider and because I think what we've done very well today is weave the history and the policy and the politics together through every panel. And I think because you were in at the beginning of human rights policy as part of U.S. foreign policy in government, if you would have this last word on this roundtable and just describe to us the challenges of getting human rights in the United States Government placed squarely on the foreign policy table.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, let's just say that it's a continuing challenge. I
do think though that some of the mechanisms that came into being during the Carter Administration, the Deputy Secretary of State chaired a regular meeting on human rights and security assistance that reviewed all export licenses, all increases or de -- well, all military assistance budget proposals, all IMET to countries where the Human Rights Bureau said we consider these to be countries where the governments are engaged in rights abuses. Even if they happen to be, as South Korea at the time was, a significant security ally.

And in all instances, I think you have to say, yes, the U.S. foreign policy is going to have a series of other interests, economic, security, et cetera. What it needs to do is ensure that human rights concerns are at the same time taken into account. And to the degree possible and this is at least my view, that in every instance, in every instance, the U.S. Government has to find a way to convey to the people of the country that it is concerned about the same issues with respect to respect for human rights regardless of the country and regardless of the relationship.

And then, where it can, it takes -- it uses the tactics and tools available even recognizing that they're going to be different given the reality of other interests in the bilateral relationship.

MS. MOON: Thank you very much. I think Richard Bush's comments about Taiwan and China are also very important. South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines all benefitted from a regional trend toward democratization in the 1980s. And we don't have that phenomenon that adds as another pressure point or inspiration, whichever way you take it, for North Koreans and North Korea.

So it's a different time period. At any rate, I want to thank everybody very much. Members of the audience who have been with us pretty much all day long, I applaud you and we have a reception ready outside the doors. So feel free to participate in that and are you saying yes?
MR. SCARLATOIU: Why not?

MS. MOON: And you can carry on your conversations there or find other topics of communication. Thank you very much for a very rich day.

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