

Recognising uncertainty

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A brief introduction to the OBR

- Independent, accountable to Executive and Parliament
- Four main tasks
 - Produce five-year forecasts for the economy and public finances
 - Judge progress towards the Government's fiscal and spending targets
 - Scoring of tax and spending policy measures
 - Assess long-term (50 year) fiscal sustainability and balance sheet

Differences from the CBO/JCT/OMB

- Analysis covers entire public sector
- Confined to current policy of current Government
- The Executive does not publish its own forecasts



Uncertainty and the OBR's work

- In UK Budget-making, the Executive is powerful relative to Parliament and the Treasury (in its OMB role) is powerful relative to Cabinet departments
- We were created to remove politically-motivated wishful thinking from the official forecasts, rather than to help Parliament consider options à la CBO
- Key objectives: increase transparency and emphasise uncertainty
- Forecast highly disaggregated, so transparency means a lot of detail
- But why emphasise uncertainty?
 - Policy should reflect uncertainty, not ignore it
 - Avoid the spurious sense of precision that comes with lots of detail
 - Offer a richer assessment of progress towards targets
 - Educate people as to what forecasts can and cannot achieve
 - Avoid tying success of institution to accuracy of central forecast



Illustrating uncertainty: narrative

Explain conditioning assumptions (and implied risks) e.g.

- Monetary policy in line with market expectations
- Fiscal policy as announced
- Credit conditions normalise gradually
- World economy evolves broadly in line with IMF forecasts
- Exchange rate, oil and equity prices move in line with market expectations

Identify specific economic risks e.g.

- Euro area instability
- Volatility as global monetary policy 'unloosens'
- Adjustment to ongoing fiscal consolidation proves difficult
- Productivity and real wage growth fail to pick up

Identify specific fiscal risks e.g.

- Effective tax rates
- Will central and local government spend more than they plan to?
- Policy delivery risks
- Uncertainty around scoring of policies



Illustrating uncertainty: scorings

 Every scoring we certify is given an uncertainty rating, based on the data, modelling and behavioural assumptions that underpin it

Example: Exempting children from Air Passenger Duty


| | Very high | High | Medium-high | Medium | Medium-low | Low | |
|-----------|--|--|---|---|--|---|--|
| Data | - Very little data - Poor quality | - Little data -Much of it poor quality | -Basic data, perhaps from external sources -assumptions cannot be readily checked | Incomplete data High quality external sources verifiable assumptions | -High quality data | -High quality data | |
| | | | | | | High importance | |
| Modelling | - Significant modelling challenges - Multiple stages and/or high sensitivity on a range of unverifiable assumptions | - Significant modelling challenges - Multiple stages and/or high sensitivity on a range of unverifiable assumptions | - Some modelling challenges - Difficulty in generating an up-to-date baseline and sensitivity to particular underlying assumptions | - Some modelling challenges - Difficulty in generating an up-to-date baseline Low importance | - Straightforward modelling - few sensitive assumptions required | -Straightforward modelling of new parameters for existing policy with few or no sensitive assumptions | |
| Behaviour | - No information on potential behaviour | - Behaviour is volatile or very dependent on factors outside the tax/benefit system | -Significant policy for which behaviour is hard to predict | - Considerable behavioural changes or dependent on factors outside the system | - Behaviour fairly predictable Medium importance | - Well established, stable and predictable behaviour | |
| Overall | Medium-low | | | | | | |

Illustrating uncertainty: quantitative

- We quantify uncertainty around central fiscal forecast...
- ...with particular reference to chances of hitting targets
- We use three main techniques for medium term forecasts
 - Probability bands implied by past forecast errors
 - Sensitivity to key economic determinants
 - Scenario analysis
- We try to explain how wrong the central forecast would need to be and in what sorts of ways - for the targets to be missed



Probabilities based on past errors



Size and distribution of past official forecast errors implies 80% chance of success on current policy



Mechanical sensitivity analysis


- Bigger / smaller output gap (i.e. higher or lower potential output)
- Faster / slower GDP growth

Table 1.1: Cyclically adjusted current budget in 2019-20

| | Per cent of GDP | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|
| | | Output gap closes | | | | | |
| | | 2015-16 | 2017-18 | 2019-20 | 2021-22 | 2023-24 | |
| Lovel of potential in | -2 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | |
| Level of potential in 2019-20 relative to | -1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | |
| central forecast | 0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | |
| (per cent) | 1 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | |
| (рег ості) | 2 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | |

- Higher / lower government borrowing costs
- Higher / lower cyclical adjustment coefficients

Potential output is the key uncertainty



Selected scenario analysis

- Used to highlight key debates/critiques
- Recent examples
 - Higher or lower productivity growth
 - Faster monetary tightening (for 'good' or 'bad' reasons)
 - Spike in oil prices
 - Impact of euro-zone crisis (took OECD scenario)
- Most boil down to identifying cyclical/structural impact



What can the balance sheet add?

- Whole of Government Accounts on commercial basis
- Includes assessment of contingent liabilities
 - i.e. those with non-negligible but less than 50% probability

Table 1.1: WGA quantifiable contingent liabilities

| | £ billion | | | |
|--|------------------|---------|------------|--|
| | 2011-12 restated | 2012-13 | Difference | |
| Financial Stability interventions | 9.9 | 9.9 | 0.0 | |
| Export guarantees and insurance policies | 9.9 | 12.7 | 2.8 | |
| Clinical negligence | 8.4 | 10.5 | 2.1 | |
| Taxes subject to challenge | 14.5 | 14.5 | 0.0 | |
| Supporting international organisations | 32.6 | 32.1 | -0.5 | |
| Oil and gas field decommissioning revenues | 20.0 | 0.0 | -20.0 | |
| Other | 5.5 | 8.2 | 2.7 | |
| Total quantifiable contingent liabilities | 100.8 | 87.9 | -12.9 | |



Unquantifiable contingent liabilities

Table 1.1: Non-quantifiable contingent liabilities in the 2012-13 WGA

Details of the most significant non-quantifiable contingent liabilities in the 2012-13 WGA

- Legal claims, compensation claims and tribunal cases against various WGA entities.
- Commitments made by several WGA entities to fund any deficits of individual pension schemes.
- HM Treasury guarantees for indemnities in relation to financial stability interventions.
- Compensation schemes set up by HM Treasury in relation to former shareholders of various banks taken into public sector ownership as part of the financial stability interventions.
- HM Treasury's contingent liability for risks associated with reinsurance arising from acts of terrorism.
- Various civil nuclear contingent liabilities in BIS resource accounts.
- Future increases in liabilities of the Financial Assistance Scheme beyond those recognised in the provision.
- Contingent liabilities arising from rail franchise agreements.
- Contingent liability in relation to the Channel Tunnel (to return the land to a suitable condition if the tunnel ceases to operate).
- Access to life insurance for Ministry of Defence personnel.



Uncertainty in long-term projections

- Central projection based on 'unchanged' policy
- Takes on board projected demographic change
- Calculate debt trajectories and fiscal gaps
- Sensitivity analysis
 - Fiscal position at end of medium-term forecast
 - Long-term relationship between interest rate and growth rate
 - Demography: ageing / net migration flows
 - Health spending / productivity
 - Overall productivity: less significant if taxes and benefits indexed to earnings
- Also selected issues in tax revenue sustainability
 - North Sea oil receipts: impact of different price and production scenarios
 - Motoring taxes: fuel efficiency scenarios



A postscript: ex post assessment

- We emphasise uncertainty ex ante
- So we try to show that we learn from it ex post...
- ...via detailed annual analysis of past forecast errors

Figure 1.1: June 2010 net borrowing and current budget errors for 2012-13

| | £ billion | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|-------|-----------|-------------|-----------|---------|
| | Forecast | Outturn | Error | of which: | | | |
| | | | | Fiscal | | Classifi- | |
| | | | | Economic | forecasting | Policy | cation |
| | | | | factors | errors | changes | changes |
| Receipts (a) | 621.9 | 586.5 | -35.5 | -31.8 | -4.7 | -3.3 | 4.3 |
| Spending (b) | 711.0 | 702.1 | -8.9 | 0.3 | -2.4 | -10.7 | 3.8 |
| of which: | | | | | | | |
| Current expenditure (c) | 664.5 | 657.1 | -7.4 | 0.3 | -3.2 | -7.5 | 3.0 |
| Net investment (d) | 24.0 | 22.5 | -1.6 | 0.0 | 1.4 | -3.7 | 0.8 |
| Depreciation (e) | 22.5 | 22.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Net borrowing (b - a) | 89.1 | 115.7 | 26.6 | 32.1 | 2.3 | -7.3 | -0.5 |
| Current budget (a - c - e) | -65.1 | -93.2 | -28.1 | -32.1 | -0.9 | 3.6 | 1.3 |