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CHALLENGES IN NUCLEAR VERIFICATION:
THE IAEA’S ROLE ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

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MR. EINHORN: Good morning. My name is Bob Einhorn. I'd like to welcome you to Brookings and to today's event which is part of the Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders Forum Series. Our speaker today is Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Years when I spoke to groups or I briefed reporters I would simply use the initials IAEA, then I'd catch myself and remember to sound out, you know, the full name of the Agency. Today you don't have to do that anymore. The IAEA has practically become a household word. It's an indispensable effort; it's an indispensable player in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. It's a safeguard system. It's highly sophisticated monitoring system is an essential element for providing assurance that nuclear programs are truly peaceful and for detecting possible violations of non-proliferation obligations. The Agency has been at the center of compliance controversies with North Korea, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. And now it's heavily involved in the Iranian nuclear issue. The Agency has monitored Iran's implementation of the nuclear elements of the November 2013 interim accord between the P5+1 countries and Iran, the so-called joint plan of action. And since December 2011 it has sought Iranian cooperation in resolving serious concerns that at least in the past Iran carried out research, experiments, and procurement activities related to the development of nuclear weapons. But so far Iran has largely stonewalled the IAEA's investigation. And if an agreement is reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran on a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue the responsibility will fall to the IAEA to monitor Iran's compliance.

Yukiya Amano was elected Director General of the IAEA in 2009 and he is now serving his second term of office. Before becoming Director General Mr. Amano had a distinguished career in the Japanese Diplomatic Service. His last post as a
Japanese Diplomat was as Japan's Ambassador to the IAEA from 2005 to 2009. And as Japan's representative to the IAEA he served as Chairman of the Agency's Board of Governors in the 2005-2006 periods. And in that capacity he accepted the Nobel Prize on behalf of the Agency for its work in Iraq. During his tenure Director General Amano has done much to enhance the IAEA's reputation for professionalism, integrity, and objectivity. His predecessor in my view sometimes strayed into highly political matters, providing his personal advice on policies that IAEA member states ought to pursue. DG Amano has kept the Agency focused on its original technical mandate, its area of special competence, and it's been extraordinarily capable instrument of non-proliferation policy. And this emphasis on the Agency's technical mandate has restored and I think increased the Agency's credibility, and credibility is the IAEA's number one asset.

Director General Amano has made some tough calls on issues such as the Syrian nuclear reactor and the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. He called them the way he saw them as warranted by the information collected and analyzed by his very capable professional staff. Now it's predictable that governments that were identified by the Agency as having violated or likely violated their obligations would attack the Agency and its Director General, accusing them of bias and it being the tool of countries like the United States. But Yukiya Amano has made clear that he won't be deterred or intimidated by such tactics. He'll continue to follow the evidence wherever it leads. The DG has been a staunch supporter of the Agency's strength and safeguard system and a staunch defender of that system against efforts to weaken it by countries with not so hidden agendas. But the DG and his Agency are not only focused on safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation, they've boosted the Agency's technical cooperation program to ensure that member states, especially those just embarking on civil nuclear programs, can fully benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the
wake of the Fukushima Daiichi tragedy the IAEA has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety throughout the world. And with the worldwide terrorist threat continuing to grow and the worldwide increase in stocks of nuclear and radiological materials the Agency under the DG's leadership has significantly expanded its role in the area of nuclear security.

So the IAEA's agenda is full, its role is critical, and the challenges it faces are daunting. Fortunately we have Yukiya Amano at the helm. So Mr. Director General, we look forward to your remarks. (Applause)

DG AMANO: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am very pleased to be here today at Brookings. This institution has a well deserved reputation for the excellence of its research and the high caliber of its experts. For more than a century you have made a major contribution to public policy, both within the United States and internationally. It is a special pleasure to see Bob Einhorn, a distinguished veteran of arms control and non-proliferation with whom I have worked for many years.

I have been asked to talk about the challenges of the nuclear verification and in particular about the role of the IAEA with regard to Iran's nuclear program. Before talking about what the Agency is and does let me tell you what we are not. We are not a political actor as Bob explained well. We are not international nuclear police force and we do not take sides. IAEA is an independent technical organization within the UN family. One of our core activities is to verify that countries are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful activities to make nuclear weapons. We collect and analyze all relevant information and provide factual, impartial, objective reports to our Board of Governors to facilitate its decision making. The IAEA statute states that the Director General is under the authority of and subject to the control of the Board of Governors. Under the statute the IAEA's role in nuclear verification is, "Establish and administer
safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, and facilities are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."

In addition the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons requires all non nuclear weapon states to commit themselves to use nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes. These countries, non nuclear weapon states, under the NPT are required to conclude a comprehensive safeguard with the IAEA and submit a declaration fall nuclear material and facilities to us. Our inspectors visit facilities to verify that declaration made by countries are correct and inspectors continuously follow up.

The IAEA safeguard system appeared to work well until the 1990s; however the discovery of a secret nuclear weapon program in Iraq after the Gulf War of 1990--1991 and development with North Korea’s nuclear program showed that concentrating on their own facilities declared to use by countries was not enough. We needed tools that would enable us to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a country. In response member states approved the model additional protocol in 1997. When a country implements an additional protocol and the Agency acquires more tools to implement safeguards, including additional access to information, to people, and to sites in that country, the additional protocol is essential to the IAEA to be able to conclude that all of a country’s nuclear material remains in exclusively peaceful activities. The number of states with additional protocol in force has grown steadily and now stands at 124. This is good news.

Ladies and gentlemen, the world in which we implement safeguards today is very different to that of our founding fathers in 1957 as are the challenges we face. New technology and modern communications have made it easier to access knowledge, materials, and expertise that would have been much more restricted back then in 1957. That makes nuclear proliferation easier now. The number of nuclear
facilities coming under IAEA safeguards continues to grow rapidly by 12 percent in the past 5 years alone. So does the amount of nuclear material to be safeguarded. It has risen by about 14 percent in that period. IAEA resources are limited. Demand from member states for our services continues to grow and our budget is being squeezed. That means we must constantly find ways of working more effectively and more efficiently in all areas of activities including safeguards. We have developed important new instruments such as additional protocol as I mentioned. We also are making increasing use of modern technology such as remote monitoring and satellite imagery. We have dramatically improved our analytical capabilities by building new safeguard laboratories outside Vienna.

Safeguards implementation continues to evolve, including through what we call the state level approach. This involves considering a state's nuclear activities and related technical capabilities as a whole rather than focusing only on individual facilities. This helps to keep the frequency and intensity of routine inspections for states to that minimum level necessary to draw credible safeguard conclusions. If you are interested I can come back to this issue later. The important thing to remember is that the state level approach is implemented strictly within the scope of existing safeguards agreements.

I would also like to add that the assumption in the 1950s was that nuclear weapons would only be developed and possessed by governments. Today there are concerns about the possibility of non state actors developing nuclear explosive devices. We have therefore become increasingly active and important to related areas such as nuclear security which involves helping to ensure that terrorists and other criminals do not obtain nuclear or other radioactive material. The IAEA is now playing the center role in enhancing global nuclear security.

The main safeguards issues on the agenda in recent years have
concerned Iran, North Korea, and Syria. These are very different cases. What they have in common is the fact that these countries have failed to fully implement their safeguard agreements with IAEA and other relevant obligations. This makes it very difficult for us to do our job effectively. As far as the IAEA is concerned the Iran story began in August 2002 when media reported that Iran was building a large underground nuclear related facility in Natanz which had been declared to the Agency previously. Iran subsequently acknowledged its existence and put it under IAEA safeguards. Let me say at this point that it is vitally important that the IAEA and this Director General should be impartial. That means applying the same principles to all country. For me the fundamental principle is that all of the safeguards agreements which we conclude with our member states should be implemented fully, so should other relevant obligations such as resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

When I became Director General in late 2009 I applied this principle to Iran. I felt that spelling out the issues with clarity was an essential first step towards resolving the problem. My quarterly reports from February 2010 almost stated that nuclear material declared by Iran was not being diverted from peaceful purposes. But I also stated that Iran was not providing sufficient cooperation to enable the Agency to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. I urged Iran to implement the additional protocol and clarify the issues related to what had become known as possibly military dimensions to its nuclear program. The next important question was how to approach these possible military dimensions. Our technical experts has spent years painstakingly and objectively analyzing a huge quantity of information about the program from the wide variety of independent sources including form the Agency’s own efforts and from interim information provided by Iran itself, as well as from a number of member states. After carefully reviewing the issue I decided to present the
detailed report in November 2011. In that report I stated that the information assembled by the Agency was overall credible. It was consistent in terms of technical content, individuals, and organizations involved and timeframes. The information indicated that Iran had carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicated that prior to the end of 2003 these activities took place under structured program in that some activities might still be ongoing. I would like to be very clear on this issue because there have been some misunderstandings. The IAEA has not said that Iran has nuclear weapons; we have not drawn conclusions from the information at our disposal about possible military dimension to the Iranian nuclear program. What we have said is that Iran has to clarify these issues because there is broadly credible information indicating that it engaged in activities of this nature. In other words Iran has a case to answer. In response to my report both the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council adopted resolutions asking Iran to cooperate and to clarify their issues relating to possible military dimension in order to restore international confidence in an exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. On the basis of these resolutions the Agency had talks with Iran over the next two years; however, virtually no progress was made. At times we were going around in circles.

Last year we started to see some movement. In November I when to Tehran and signed the framework for cooperation with Iran under which it agreed to resolve all the outstanding issues, past and present. We agreed to take a step-by-step approach. Initially Iran implemented the practical measures which is agreed with the Agency under the framework for cooperation fairly well. However, since the summer of 2014 progress on implementing agreed measures has been limited. Two important practical measures which should have been implemented two months ago have still not been implemented. The Agency invited Iran to propose new practical measures for the
next step of our cooperation, but it has not done so. Clarifying issues to possible military dimensions is not an endless process. It could be done within a reasonable timeline, but how far and how fast we can go depends very much on Iran's cooperation. I have made clear that Agency will provide an assessment to our Board of Governors after it obtains a good understanding of the whole picture concerning issues with possibly military dimensions. It is then up to the Board to decide the future course of action.

As you may know there are two tracks of negotiation on the Iran nuclear issue. One is the IAEA Iran track, the other is the other so-called P5+1 and Iran track in which the IAEA is also involved. These six countries, China, France, Germany, Russia, Britain, and United States, agreed on a joint plan of action with Iran in November 2013. The aim was to achieve a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. All seven countries asked the IAEA to undertake monitoring and the verification of voluntary measure to be implemented by Iran which we are doing. The P5+1 negotiations with Iran are continuing. I should mention that Iran is still not implementing their additional protocol. This is contrary to the resolution of the Board of Governors and under Security Council. Implementation of additional protocol by Iran is essential for the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country. The current status of affairs is that Iran's nuclear material under IAEA safeguards is in peaceful purposes, but we cannot provide assurance that all material in Iran is in peaceful purposes. In order to provide that assurance Iran has to clarify the issues relating to possible military dimensions and implement the additional protocol.

What is needed now is concrete actions on the part of Iran to resolve all outstanding issues. I remain committed to working with Iran to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. But I repeat, this is not a never
ending process; it is very important that Iran fully implement the framework for cooperation sooner than later. The IAEA can make a unique contribution to resolving the Iran nuclear issue, but we cannot do this on our own. The sustained influence of the international community are needed, as is Iran's full cooperation to resolve all outstanding issues.

I will now be happy to take your questions. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. EINHORN: Director General Amano, thank you very much for your presentation. I have a few questions to pose to you. I'm sure our audience has many that it would like to pose to you.

I know Iran is going to be a big focus of attention so therefore I'll start off talking about the Agency and its role. And I particularly want to raise the concern that I and many others have about the growing politicization surrounding the Board of Governors and its discussions about the Agency's role. I remember when I used to attend Board of Governors' meetings, General Conferences; usually there was a consensus among Board members on any particular topic. It was very rarer that there was voting and a divided membership. Now it's almost the norm on lots of issues for there to be voting and differences. You mentioned the state level concept or state level approach. I think this is a very innovative approach to safeguarding. I think it would enhance the Agency's role, but yet you and the Secretariat have received criticism from a number of countries -- I can name them, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, some others, have raised questions about this innovate approach to safeguarding. Could you talk a little bit about what I've described as the growing politicization surrounding the Agency?

DG AMANO: I firmly believe that the IAEA is a technical organization and it should stay so. But the reality of that everything we deal with is very political.
Verification of non-proliferation is very political. We have the mandate on nuclear power. Use of nuclear power is a very political issue in any country. And so I think that IAEA is a technical organization which is operating under a very political environment. This is the irony. In order to make ourselves stay non political, technical, and impartial we should have objective standard and that is why I mentioned that use of standard which is the full implementation of safeguard agreement and other relevant obligations. As far as we stick to the principle we can be very impartial, neutral, and credible. I said fully and fully does not mean 100 percent or 0 percent. We are living in the real world. In the real world there's no zero percent or one hundred percent. So I repeated saying credible assurance. Credible assurance is a concept of ours. When I say fully it means the country has to implement the safeguard as possible. They should be as transparent as possible. And by sticking to the universal standard we can avoid that politicization. It is true that nowadays a lot of issues are put on vote compared to the past when a lot of issues were adopted by consensus. But if I compare the work in the environment in Vienna, then in Geneva, or New York, we are not in under bad shape. Important thing for the IAEA is that we are not a debate club. We deliver concrete results and we are delivering concrete results not only in non-proliferation area, but in nuclear security, use of nuclear power, application of nuclear technology for peaceful purpose and elsewhere. We have difficulties. We are living, operating in a very highly environment, but I think there are ways to make ourselves impartial, nonpolitical, and deliver concrete results.

MR. EINHORN: Let me just press you a little bit on this. If the IAEA is to meet the tremendous challenges that are in front of you it's going to have to be pretty aggressive, independent, strong, but there are those who seem to be challenging the Agency in a number of ways. You reached the conclusion I think on the basis of evidence that your staff had compiled that the Syrians very likely had a nuclear reactor.
Now that finding was challenged and it's challenged to this day. And there are those who really don't want you or your Secretariat to have a strong, independent voice. And I see this as a real problem for the future of nuclear non-proliferation. Are you concerned by the challenges you've been receiving?

DG AMANO: When I succeeded to this job from my predecessor there were three outstaying issues, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. North Korea is no longer a member so we keep on following this issue, but the main issue was Iran and Syria. On Syria we have had a visit to the site twice, we have collected our own information, and we have had quite good knowledge of the facilities which was destroyed. Then the option for me was to postpone the drawing of conclusions, Board by Board and perhaps forever, or to provide a conclusion based on the findings that we have on our own. And I thought that if I can do it it's better to do it. As Syria did not agree to give access to me and to the agency after I became the Director General, we did not have as much information as we wanted. Still we already have sufficient information to draw a conclusion. That is why I drew a conclusion on Syria and I do not regret it. Them refusing cooperation is not the best way. Even under such a situation if we have enough information and facts on our own we should be able to draw a conclusion.

MR. EINHORN: Let me turn to Iran. You mentioned a few moments ago how important the additional protocol is to providing confidence that a state is not engaged in undeclared activities inconsistent with its safeguards obligations. The Iranians have agreed with the P5+1 that if there's a comprehensive solution they will adhere to the additional protocol assuming their parliament agrees to it, but it seems to me that for many of the measures that will have to be monitored by your agency it will be necessary to go well beyond the additional protocol, something the Iranians have expressed reluctance to do. Now obviously we don't have an agreement, you don't know
the provisions, but if you could speculate whether the Agency is going to have to go well
beyond the additional protocol, do you expect that you're going to be asked to do that
and are you prepared to do that?

DG AMANO: We do not yet know the content of the comprehensive
solution if there is any, but we heard from time to time from various sources that in the
negotiations they are considering the measures beyond additional protocol. It is
foreseeable that the implementation task will be given to us. We need to see the content
of the agreement once it is agreed, but very important step is that they need to be
endorsed, adopted by the Board of Governors. We are operating under the authority and
control of the Board of Governors. And I just take up the case of plan of action. It was
agreed between P5+1 and Iran and the IAEA was asked to monitor and implement the
agreement. I convened a special Board of Governors and they agreed that the Agency
implements these measures. I appealed the member states to contribute necessary
funds and they responded very positively. Well, we have received the mandate to
implement the measures agreed under the joint plan of action and we have given the
means to implement it. So we are now implementing it. This case will be of good
reference where we consider the implementation of measures to be agreed under the
comprehensive solution.

MR. EINHORN: Mr. Director General, you discussed the Agency's
efforts to gain clarification on these possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear
program. And I think it's clear from your remarks and what's been reported in the press
that so far at least Iran has not provided much cooperation with your investigation. So
what happens if Iran continues to stonewall in this regard; you don't get the clarifications
you need? What do you in that circumstance? Do you simply report to the Board that
you haven't gotten the cooperation that you see, or do you draw some conclusions as
you did in the Syria case on the basis of the information available to you? Now, you know, Iran continues to argue that, you know, it's so called evidence -- it always says so called evidence is based on fabricated material, falsified documents and so forth. But I think on the basis of your analysis I think you called the information credible, indications of these associates with a military nuclear program. So what do you do? Do you simply report that we didn't cooperation or do you make an assessment based on information available to you?

DG AMANO: First regarding the measures with possible military dimension, we have agreed in November 2013 with Iran that all the outstanding issues of past and present should be resolved through cooperation. We understand that all the unresolved issues past and present include the issues with possible military dimension. It was a step-by-step approach and we have agreed to take up one other issue with possible military dimension, namely the explosive bridge wire detonators. And we have received some information from Iran and we are now analyzing it, so at least one measure was addressed. We agreed to take up two additional measures. Agreement was made in 20th of May. We started the clarification of these two issues with Iran but the progress is limited. We would like to clarify other issues that we have agreed. And we are encouraging Iran to come up with some other proposal on new measures to be taken, but so far we have not yet received the concrete proposal from them. This is where we stand now, but very important negotiation is ongoing. We have the Iran-IAEA path so we need to do everything to clarify the issues past and present.

The question is if the Syrian case is relevant to the Iranian case. I think from what I said in my statement that the Iranian case, the Syrian case, and the North Korean case are very different. They are non-proliferation issues but each case is different. The maturity of the issue is different, volume and nature of the information is
different, complexity of the issue is very different. So as far as that possible military
dimension issues of Iran I think the best way is to continue the dialogue with Iran. We
have already the basic understanding of the situation with clarity that it was included in
my first report in 2010 and I repeat the same, I provide the same assessment in my
quarterly report. We know where we stand now. In 2011 I provided my report in which I
identified 12 areas to clarify. So the questions to be answered are clear now. We have
now the tool to clarify it, the framework for cooperation. So the best way is to implement
it.

MR. EINHORN: Thank you. Why don't we open it up? When you have
a question please identify yourself and ask a concise question. David, did you?

QUESTIONER: If you do get cooperation in the list that you provided in
2011 on these issues is it important that the IAEA make public the history of Iran's work
on possible military dimensions and what you determined were not? There seems to be
some reluctance on the part of the Iranians to have a public accounting. And we've
heard some indications that they might be more willing to be cooperative if they thought
their answers to the questions would remain confidential within the system. And some
people say that is why they've been less cooperative with you even while it continued to
negotiate with the P5+1. Just wondering what your stance is about the need to make
public the answers to each of the 11 or 12 issues that you raised.

DG AMANO: All the safeguards are confidential information should be
kept tight between the countries and IAEA. But when I find it is needed I share the
information with the IAEA member states. I did it in my quarterly report. And with respect
to the possibly military dimensions I included relatively detailed information in the annex
in 2011. That is the confidential report but when and if it is agreed among the members
of the Board to make it public they can do so. And in reality that report of 2011 was
made public and all the quarterly reports of the IAEA are made public by the decision of the Board of Governors. In the future if I provide an assessment of the possible military dimensions then if the Board of governors agree that will become public.

MS. SLAVIN: Thanks. Barbara Slavin from the Atlantic Council and Al-Monitor.com. Does it surprise you that Iran is not providing this information given that it’s involved in very detailed negotiations with the P5+1 on a long-term agreement? And is it your feeling that a long-term agreement should somehow be contingent on progress on PMD or can that be something that is resolved over the course of a long-term agreement?

DG AMANO: I visited Tehran in August this year and I had an occasion to talk to President Rouhani. He repeatedly stated that Iran is willing to accelerate the process of the clarification of issues with a possible military dimension. For now the progress is limited, but I sense there is an intention on the part of Iran to accelerate the clarification of the issues. The important negotiation between P5+1 and Iran is now ongoing; now is not the best time to make rapid progress. But it doesn't mean there will not be progress in the future. I continue to hope that that this issue of possibly military dimension will be clarified as soon as possible. This is the intention of Iran to accelerate the process. It is also the intention of IAEA to accelerate the process. I repeatedly said that this is not an endless process and with cooperation we can clarify these issues within a reasonable timeframe.

MR. EINHORN: Let me just jump this PMD issue. There are experts who say that it's going to be very difficult to get Iran to provide a full confession of full past activities, especially activities that were directly related to a nuclear weapons program. And so it should be sufficient simply to have confidence that those activities are not continuing today and that we have monitoring measures in place that would enable
us to determine whether they have resumed in the future. What do you think about that approach?

DG AMANO: First about the reasonable timeframe. Reasonable timeline you can have some image by doing some simple arithmetic. We have identified 12 areas. We have the framework for cooperation and one step is normally for three months. If we address three majors in every step how long does it take? Two steps in one step, it's easy to foresee. It will not be 10 years, it will not be 1 month, but it will be reasonable timeline. You can do your arithmetic at home. (Laughter)

Your other question is about?

MR. EINHORN: PMD. Whether it's necessary to get Iran to confess all activities, even providing incriminating information that those activities were directed at a nuclear weapons programs and sufficient to have confidence that those activities have stopped and that we have monitoring measures sufficient to know whether they will resume. Is that sufficient in your view or do you need to really get clarity on what they actually did do in the past?

DG AMANO: First the IAEA is committed to do its best to clarify the issue. We also expect Iran to be as transparent as possible. I very much value the meeting among expats and when expats talk to their counterparts they can have good understanding of the activities. We would like to have access to people, to site, and to information. And I have full confidence in the expats of the Agency. They have been doing a good job and they will continue doing a good job. Then our next step will be to report the assessment after having a good understanding of the whole picture to the Board of Governors. And how to handle it, how to move from that point is the decision by the member states. We are guided by the Board of Governors.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. (Inaudible) from (inaudible) News. How
important for the future to make sure that it is a peaceful program? That your people from the Agency or any other agreement with P5+1 will include searches, unannounced visits to military sites?

DG AMANO: To?

MR. EINHORN: Military sites.

DG AMANO: Military sites.

QUESTIONER: I believe you mentioned earlier that we need to look at the country as a whole and I was wondering if it is so necessary to conduct this kind of unannounced visits and searches.

DG AMANO: I will like to give you an example of the additional protocol. In a case for the additional protocol if we have a good reason to believe that some activity are undertaken in the military site we can request access to that military site. The country can refuse that request, but then that country has to give a good reason why they cannot access. We also offer the so called managed access when we have access to the military site. You know they’re not to compromise their military interests. On this concept of managed access to military site is already existing on the existing safeguard scheme. The tight reason for military purpose is not the absolute reason to refuse access. In certain cases we want to have access and then they need to give access to us.

MR. MAFINEZAM: Thank you very much. Alidad Mafinezam on West Asia Council. Mr. Amano, I’d like to ask that you think in terms of the dialectic between non-proliferation on the one hand and nuclear safety on the other because recently a number of Iran’s neighbors in the Persian Gulf region have been talking about the very scary prospect of an earthquake or some kind of a nuclear meltdown on Bushehr which is not really an active nuclear proliferation per se, but equally dangerous to the future of
stability in that region. I'm wondering if in your work you are also focusing on that side of this debate. Thank you.

DG AMANO: Yes, we do. We are aware that many countries, in particular the neighboring countries, have interest in the safety for Iranian nuclear facilities. We have sent a mission to review that regulatory framework for Iran and we have given some recommendations. That will help to assure the highest level of safety in Iran.

This case for earthquake was also raised by some member states. We are ready to send two expert missions to review that seismic aspects for the facility, but ensuring the safety and security is the responsibility of each country, sovereign state and the role of the IAEA is to provide assistance upon request. Therefore if we have a request from Iran to address and review and give advice for enhancing the safety we are prepared to do so.

MR. EINHORN: Back there.

MR. RASHIDI: Rahim Rashidi from Kurdistan TV. What do you think U.S. would do if tomorrow Iran declared it is atomic bomb? Thank you.

DG AMANO: Too difficult question for me to answer.

QUESTIONER: Hi. Sharla Rustif from Persian News Network, Voice of America. Yesterday you had a meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry. Would you say he left the meeting happier, more confident? Because general feeling is such a comprehensive agreement that everybody has in mind is not going to be reached in November. But generally do you think he left happier and more confident toward a reasonable agreement yesterday, yes?

DG AMANO: I think both are very happy to exchange views on the matters of common interest. (Laughter)
QUESTIONER: Abraham Waseni from University of Maryland. I would like to ask you about the documents pertaining to the so-called alleged studies. Has the Agency independently verified the authenticity of these documents? And my second question is that what exactly is the reason behind not making these documents fully available to the Iranians? Thank you.

DG AMANO: Revision or sharing document was discussed in the negotiation between Iran and IAEA when we have discussed the structure approach. The structured approach is the name of the negotiation that we engaged after the Board of Governor’s resolution in November 2011. We have discussed the modality of sharing information during that negotiation, but that negotiation did not come to an agreement. There are some good progress in many areas, but in this area unless everything is agreed nothing is agreed. We have discussed the issue of sharing documents, but there was no agreement and there is not specific reference to the handling of documents in the framework of full cooperation. The basic position of the IAEA is that we are prepared to share the documents. I don’t say which one but share the documents when we consider appropriate and necessary.

Authenticity, it was quite frequently discussed before I came to the IAEA, but that authenticity was not that often discussed after I came to the Agency. We are asking questions to clarify the issues and we elaborate our questions. We have given the questions in writing and we have explained the background on the questions and I think our counterpart understands the questions well. The process on this other issue is to clarify the activities in Iran; this process is not to verify the authenticity of document.

QUESTIONER: I’m Olga Lutko from the Embassy of Ukraine and I have a slightly different question. Your Excellency, you were talking about the non-state actors and their possibility to acquire the nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and I would
like to know your opinion how should it work when this actually detected? Will it be the
government will be accountable for the terrorist group uprising on its territory or the actual
terrorists group would be targeted? Thanks.

DG AMANO: Sharing the highest level of nuclear security is the
responsibility of each government. So controlling the illicit trafficking is the responsibility
of each government. However, the international organization has an important role to
play to help them. For example the IAEA has a database that collects the information on
the illicit trafficking. We have thousands of cases of information already. And information
is very useful to analyze the trend and understanding the facts and trend is very useful to
establish the response. In order to react to the possible illicit trafficking countries need
detectors who are trained customs officers or border guards to use the equipment to
detect. The nuclear detectors are not big machines. Some of the them are the size of a
Blackberry and they can be very effective. There are much bigger facilities, more
complicated, to have the precise information. But these equipment should be provided
and should be trained. We need the guidance to establish good practice. We send peer
review missions to give recommendation to enhance the nuclear safety. The (inaudible)
to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear material is the responsibility of each state. But
there is some role to play for the international organizations including ours and the IAEA
is playing the central in enhancing the nuclear security.

MR. EINHORN: Yes, sir.

MR. KRAEMER: Good morning. Jay Kraemer; I'm a lawyer practice
focused on international nuclear trade and export controls. Mr. Director General, let me
turn you from the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT to the disarmament pillar. What has
the Agency learned in the last decade or so with respect to its investigations in Iran that
would help it to verify a general treaty on nuclear disarmament? And perhaps expressed
as a multiple of the Agency’s current resources what level of resources would it take the Agency to verify such a general treaty on nuclear disarmament? Thank you.

DG AMANO: The IAEA has some expertise in the area of verification and if requested we are ready to make our expertise available to implement the agreed nuclear disarmament treaties. But the IAEA is not a negotiating body for the nuclear disarmament agreement. In other words we do not replace the conference on disarmament in Geneva; we do not replace the First Committee of the United Nations either. The negotiation belongs to other bodies or other countries and once the agreements are reached and when we are asked to provide assistance by using our expertise in verification we’ll consider such assistance.

MR. EINHORN: Yes, sir.

MR. GILES: Thank you. Mr. Director General, Greg Giles, SAIC. You referenced your August trip to Tehran, I am wondering if in your discussions with Iranian officials, you mentioned President Rouhani, did you get the sense that the civilian leadership in Iran would perhaps like to be more forthcoming and help clarify the PMD issues, but that it’s the military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that stands in the way?

DG AMANO: I cannot generalize what I heard from the Iranian leader at that. They are willing to clarify the (inaudible) or doubt if there is any. And they would like to accelerate the process and are willing to cooperate with the IAEA. I think there is some political will to clarify the issue. In reality clarification is not making clear progress as we expect, but we continue to work with Iranian counterparts to clarify the issues.

MS. TURNERJ-LAFVING: Alexis Turnerj-Lafving, Virginia Wesleyan College. What do you think is the biggest challenge in achieving a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East?
DG AMANO: Dialogue is very important. I joined the IAEA in 2005 and there is a resolution for the General Conference in 2001 requesting me to host a forum to learn from the experience of other nuclear weapon free zones. Just hosting a forum looks like easy but in reality it is not that easy. It took 10 years before we could finally convene that forum. The IAEA hosted that forum in 2011 with the presence of Israel and as well as of course Arab states and despite the complexity of the issue and some difference of views we can have very constructive discussions. So I believe that we need to continue that dialogue and IAEA is in support the establishment of nuclear weapon free zone in Middle East, but it is not an easy issue and we keep on following this issue.

MR. EINHORN: Let me come back to the question of the Agency’s investigation of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. You mentioned access to individuals, you mentioned access to locations. You know, we know individuals that we believe were engaged in some of these activities. We know locations where we believe that some of these activities took place. How would you assess the relative importance of gaining access to sites, gaining access to individuals, you know, and how successful has the agency been? Obviously the access to access to the Parchin facility, there were two occurrences in the past where the Agency went there, didn't look exactly at the place that is of particular concern and it's been rebuffed constantly in recent years. But what about access to individuals? It would seem to me that one of the most effective ways of keeping tabs on Iranian nuclear activities is to have continuing access to individuals, not a one-time interview where the subject of the interview may be misleading, may not tell the truth and so forth, but continuing, follow on access to gain some confidence that people who have the greatest expertise in some of the military related aspects of nuclear energy are working on civilian programs and are not applying their expertise to a military program. How do you evaluate the relative
importance of these different forms of access?

DG AMANO: The IAEA is seeking access to site, people, and information related to the issues with possible military dimension, but these are very difficult issues. Just for example we have requested access to the site of Parchin from a very early stage, but that access has not yet to be granted. The access to people, scientists in some very sensitive form of issue in Iran because of their experience in the recent years. But we keep on requesting to have access to site, people, and information to clarify the matter.

MR. KASHANI: Hi. Thanks. Hanif Kashani, Brookings Institution. Mr. Director General I wanted to ask, you've had the opportunity to work with two different heads of Iran's atomic energy agency, Fereydoon Abbasi under Ahmadinejad administration, and then Ali Akbar Salehi under the current Rouhani administration. Could you maybe touch on the difference in approaches between the two heads and your relationship with both men? Thanks.

DG AMANO: They are very different type of people. But a type of different but it was very useful for me to have dialogue with both of them. Style is different but both of them have good understanding of the issue and I benefitted from the dialogue. The difference of type doesn't bother me. I'm ready to work with everyone.

QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Luanna Missinic; I'm a student at SAIS across the street. I have a question about what are the measures that the IAEA can take in order to prevent the misappropriated use of dual use material and what do you envision is the role of trade controls on this issue and how can the IAEA support that.

DG AMANO: Sorry, I didn't quite understand.

QUESTIONER: Yeah, sure. So my question is what are some of the measures that the IAEA can take in order to prevent the misappropriate use of --
MR. EINHORN: Use of dual use --

QUESTIONER: Of dual use materials. And what do you envision is the role that trade controls can play in this issue?

DG AMANO: We are not in charge of the trade of dual use technologies, but whether some technology or materials is dual purpose or not or only for military purpose can be diverted, our function and our responsibility is prevent the diversion of material, facility, equipment for the use other than peaceful use. It doesn't make a difference what is the technology, what is the material, but our basic function is to prevent the diversion for the use of material, equipment, facilities for military purpose.

MR. EINHORN: DG, I know you have other appointments. You've got to move on; you've got a busy schedule in Washington. I thank you. I thank our audience because I think they have come up with a range of questions that, you know, cover the waterfront. You've got a hard job and we wish you the best of luck. Thank you.

DG AMANO: Thank you. (Applause)
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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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