Thinking About Insurance Capital

A Public Interest Perspective

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'Conventional' Insurance

Diversified risk pooling.

Risky events uncorrelated with financial sector.

Clients cannot easily cash out on demand.

Property and casualty, conventional life.

Financial Guaranty and Investment Products


• Concentrate financial risk with the insurer. Not a diversified pool of event-based risk.

 Institutional and fund products: GICs, wraps, bond insurance, etc.

 Individual products: variable annuities, contingent deferred annuities. Many annuities accessible on demand.

ANNUITIES VS CONVENTIONAL LIFE

Annuity Share of Total Premiums for Life Insurers



Insurers as Asset Holders

- Insurers collectively own about a third of investmentgrade bonds.
- This implies potentially significant impacts when insurers must liquidate large amounts of assets.
- Insurers hold many illiquid assets appropriate <u>if</u> liabilities are reliably long-dated and diversified.
- Potential to become dealer-like intermediaries through securities lending.

Some Lessons of Crisis

- AIG was unique, but the <u>lessons</u> of AIG the ease with which a large insurer was able support a financial guaranty subsidiary with major impacts across the system -- are much broader and still hold.
- Monoline insurers, mortgage insurance show risks of undercapitalized direct financial guarantees.
- We need:
 - Appropriate group-level oversight.
 - No inappropriate arbitrage of risk.
 - To reexamine protection of policy holders.

The Response?

An alphabet soup of initiatives

- In the U.S. –
 NAIC changes to state-based capital regulation
 New FIO -- Federal advisory oversight for insurance
 FSOC designating insurance SIFIs
 Federal Reserve supervises insurance SIFIs, insurance
 BHCs
- Globally –
 IAIS developing BCS and HLA requirements for G-SIIs
 IAIS also developing risk-based ICS for IAIGs
 FSB is supporting global regulatory effort

Some Commonalities

- All parties claim to recognize the difference between 'non-traditional' and 'traditional' insurance activities.
- All claim that they will tailor regulation to these differences.
- International regulators and FSOC agree on the importance of group-wide regulation.

Basel II for The Insurance Industry?

- Will this process turn into a black hole?
 - Endless fine-tuning of risk adjustments distracts regulatory resources, extends for many years?
- The danger of a mechanistic reliance on risk based capital.
- At the same time, if properly conducted the process should force attention to the full range of insurance activities, their systemic connections, and to group structure.

A Broader Framework

1. Product Regulation

2. Firewalling and company structure

3. Recovery and Resolution.

4. Capital and reserves.

Product Regulation

- Poorly designed financial guaranty products induce risk-taking, permit inappropriate arbitrage, and make commitments that cannot be kept in a systemic event.
- Capital regulation is an effective tool to restrict inappropriate financial guaranties, but it can be easier to directly police product design.
- Consumer protection, investor protection, and systemic risk have a strong connection.

Firewalling And Company Structure

 <u>Real</u> firewalls can fundamentally alter needs for capital and reserves.

 But AIG case shows that something was very strange about investor belief in legal firewalls.

• Effective firewalling requires active informing of investors, clear resolution priorities.

Recovery and Resolution

 A capital and reserve framework requires a clear sense of who will be permitted to take losses and how liquidity will be provided when a company faces financial distress.

 State guarantee funds are not pre-funded, limiting their use for liquidity purposes, and there appear to be significant questions about their capacity to protect policyholders in a systemic crisis.

Capital and Reserves

 Capital and reserves clearly have a critical prudential role to play, and are a key tool for all of the previous areas of concern.

 We will be assessing capital regulation in light of how well and how clearly it addresses the lessons of the crisis.