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THE EVOLVING RISKS OF FRAGILE STATES
AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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MR. JONES: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us here today. It's a delight and a privilege and a personal pleasure to welcome to the stage and to Washington Jean-Marie Guéhenno, very well known by my colleagues as a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings. Also has a minor other title as the newly minted president of the International Crisis Group.

They say that life is all about timing. And I was looking back, Jean-Marie, at the various job titles that you had, which for about 15 years you were working in fields that went by the label of things like peacekeeping, peace, mediation, dialogue, and now you've shifted to crisis right in the front of the name of the organization. And that seems probably relatively well timed, actually, given the events on the world stage.

Jean-Marie started his career at the French Foreign Ministry, became a very influential director of policy planning there, and then was plucked away from the French Government to serve at the United Nations as the Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, which he served for eight years. And I can say from personal experience that he was not only an extremely successful undersecretary general, he was a major figure at the U.N. and really drove the reconceptualization and the retooling of how we think about, how we conduct, and how we implement peace operations at the U.N. and beyond, and was a critical part of reestablishing the credibility of the organization which had suffered substantially in the decade before. And from friends and colleagues who are still at the U.N., I can say that you are very much missed.

Jean-Marie then turned to a more academic career, serving briefly as a senior fellow in the Center of International Cooperation at NYU when I was there, and then treacherously abandoned us for Columbia University, where he is a professor of practice in international diplomacy. And at the same time served as the chair of
humanitarian dialogue and major mediation. He then took leave from those practices to
serve with Kofi Annan in the Syrian mediation in 2012 and then came back to those
positions before taking up the mantle of International Crisis Group, which as we know is
really one of the world’s major jobs in terms of understanding the dynamics of crisis and
seeking to influence policy in a constructive direction. It’s very hard to imagine finding
anybody who knows as much about the topics of fragile states and how it intersections
with international security as Jean-Marie.

Fortunately, there is one other person who knows almost as much as
Jean-Marie about fragile states and international security, and that’s Sarah Cliffe, who will
join us on stage for discussion after Jean-Marie speaks. Sarah’s title right now is special
advisor to the World Bank, but what that masks is that for the past 20 years, Sarah was
really the person around whom the World Bank retooled its conceptual and policy and
practical approach to fragile states.

I could read the list of fragile states in crises in which she is read, but you
all have other things to do this afternoon, so I won’t. Essentially, all of them. And she
served very influentially as the head of what was very politely at the time known as the
low-income countries under stress unit, otherwise known as fragile states. And then as
the special representative and co-director of the World Development Report 2011, which
was really the place where the bank articulated its most far-reaching view on how to think
about the fragile states problems and development problems, as well as an international
security question. And I think the development and security questions will both come up
today in the presentations. And then served as a special advisor to the U.N. on its own
approaches to fragile states.

So two people phenomenally knowledgeable about the topic at hand,
and a great pleasure to welcome them today. So first, we’ll have some remarks from
Jean-Marie, and then we'll join him on stage for a conversation with Sarah Cliffe.

Jean-Marie, over to you.

MR. GUÉHENNO: Well, thank you very much, Bruce, for your kind words. I feel very much at home at Brookings. As you said, Brookings offered me a home when I left the United Nations, and I've kept that affiliation after and it's been, I mean, thanks to you, thanks to Strobe Talbott and the team there, to Martin Indyk, I feel very close to this institution, and I'm delighted that it's my first opportunity to speak in Washington and it takes place at Brookings.

And to have Sarah Cliffe as a discussant is -- love it but I'm a little worried because she knows -- I've known her for many years, both in the field and work in Washington, and in the U.N. And indeed, she won't cut any slack. And I know I have to be very careful in what I say.

This topic of international -- of fragile states and terrorism, I picked it because I believe -- not because everybody talks about IS today or all of them in the ongoing developments in Iraq and Syria, although of course they are relevant to the topic and I'm going to discuss them, but I picked it because I believe that this relationship between fragile states and terrorism in a way is an illustration of something fundamental which is the relationship between very local issues and very global issues. And I think it's someone in this town -- I think it was Tip O'Neill who once said that every parliament or politics is local. And he was right. In a more peaceful context, but I think he's also sadly right at the more global level of international politics. And it is this connection between the very local and the very global that makes the topic so difficult because of one terrorist action in some place that we never heard of before, based on grievances that we didn't even know before it happened, can have global repercussions. And we know how the terrorists are very good at managing the media. It can be a huge event like 9/11. It can
be the horrible beheading of one person. But through the media it becomes a world event. And I think we need to explore what that connection means.

I think this topic is important also because fragile states -- and I know there's a whole discussion on the very concept of fragile states, and we may explore that further late this afternoon. But I think what I would prefer to call ungoverned or weakly governed spaces, because sometimes it's a whole state; sometimes it's a part of a state. I think this is an issue that is going to stay with us, and for the next 10 or 20 years we were going to have to live with it. And it's a big issue.

If you look at a map of Africa, you can go all the way from Sudan, through South Sudan, through Democratic Republic of the Congo, so a kind of big axis of Africa. That axis remains an area of weak or absent government. In some parts, not all parts -- that's why I prefer to say "ungoverned spaces" -- we have a problem. Likewise, the horizontal axis from the Atlantic to the Arab Sea to the horn, that is also a big space. And there is a real strategic issue, whether such spaces at some point reach a critical size that changes the strategic nature of the threat they can represent.

And it matters because we still live in a world where the fundamental international order is based on the notion that the states are the benevolent custodians, so to speak, of their people. They are the first line of defense. And if that first line of defense cracks, we have a fundamental issue. It's our whole concept of managing international order that is at threat.

Now, I want to address, I mean, after explaining why I believe it's an important issue, I want to address two questions before trying to look at how we should respond to it. First question, why has it become such an important phenomenon today, the issue of fragile states? Why do we have so many places around the world where we see ungoverned spaces? And again, it's not just states. Sometimes it can be even a
suburb in a developed country where we’re not so sure that the writ of the police is there 24/7. And so one when we see also the urban violence like in some cities in Latin America, we see that question is much more subtle and complex than just the issue of states.

Well, I would say there are several reasons to that. The first is there is a kind of crisis of state legitimacy. In a number of countries it's linked to the time that has passed since the independence where the legitimacy acquired through the fight for independence is somewhat exhausted and you have leaders who are trying to shore up their legitimacy -- or not trying actually sometimes -- but certainly, the foundation that they had as leaders in the fight for independence is not there.

You have an erosion of the legitimacy of nationalist liberation movement. When you think of the evolution from PLO to Hamas to now movements that don't have a real national agenda the way that PLO had and has a national agenda for Palestine, you can see the transformation. When you look at the Polisario in Western Sahara, you see that it's a movement that has been anchored in a certain vision of nationalism, and today in the Sahara we see movements that act quite different from that with younger people and more of a transnational agenda than a national agenda.

You see that the traditional legitimacy of elections is -- we are becoming more aware that elections, they can be divisive more than anything else in a number of situations, and in Africa, for instance, when I look at the incoming cycle of elections in the Great Lakes where you will have in rapid succession you will have ruined at the beginning of 2015, I think in February 2015, you're going to have the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in 2016, you will have Ghana, you will have Rwanda. In all those countries, I mean, there are question marks on how the elections are going to work out. Whether they will be a moment of consolidation of state legitimacy or of challenge to
state legitimacy.

And maybe it is -- and there I will make an aside on the recent Afghanistan agreement. Many complain or are worried that this agreement that was negotiated between Mr. Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah in a way undermines the legitimacy of elections because now some say, is President Ghani president on the basis of an election he won or on the basis of an agreement he signed?

Personally, I think this is a bit of an academic debate because in reality, in a place like Afghanistan, there are many competing sources of legitimacy. And this agreement probably reflects in the trajectory of that country an evolution that is not necessarily a bad evolution, where the legitimacy of elections is recognized up to a point. Ashraf Ghani would not be the president if it were not for the election that took place. But at the same time, it's necessary but not quite sufficient. And we should not be too harsh on that. But it shows that this sort of self-evident idea that you have an election in that consolidated state, that is a much too simple view. There are competing ways of creating legitimacies.

And last but not least, in the crisis of the state, you have the provision of services. I mean, the erosion of the Bavarian state. When you see a number of countries in West Africa which delivered more services sometimes 20 years ago than they are delivering now in some cases. For a variety of reasons -- I would stray too far from the main topic if I went into that, but the basic contract that the state is there to provide basic services to its people, that contract is broken in a number of situations.

So with all those factors in play, both the history and the transnational forces that play now, in a way it's remarkable that there are no more fragile states than there are, no more ungoverned spaces. No more ungoverned spaces. And I think the ingredients are there for that phenomenon to continue to develop.
Now, the second question I want to ask is why is terrorism developing in that context? I was reviewing the history of terrorism, and certainly terrorism is not a new phenomenon. I was looking at the history of my own country when terrorists in 1893 threw a bomb in the national assembly wounding more than 50 people. I mean, it was quite shocking to the whole people of France. And you can think of the terrorism in Czarist Russia. Terrorism is an old phenomenon, and in a way there's nothing new there. And terrorism is always in a way the reflection. It's an asymmetrical threat to fight the asymmetries of the world. And so there's nothing surprising, and in the case of the anarchist who were throwing bombs in the late 19th century, a lot of historians say they were doing it before the unions got stronger presence in political life, and this was the outlet in the face of a society that they saw as profoundly unequal. And so the asymmetric response was to an asymmetric world. And in that sense, you can say today is in the face of enormous differences in power and wealth, the notion -- and more power than wealth in terms of terrorists -- that terrorism is a logical, practical response for those that don't have the power. And in that sense, there is nothing new. But at the same time, I think that answer would not do justice to the whole phenomenon. And I would want to point to what in my view makes today's terrorism so different from yesterday's terrorism.

First, I would point to what I think we could call a crisis of politics, because what's striking is that the terrorists of yesterday, including when Palestinian terrorism of 30 or 40 years ago was very much linked to a very specific national, political agenda. Today's terrorists don't -- if you look at their programs, they don't have much of a political program really, and that reflects the certain crisis of politics. And that makes today's terrorism quite different. And that explains in part why religion plays such a role in today's terrorism. But I would posit that it plays that role more by default than because suddenly it is the answer.
I'm struck when I look at, for instance, the recruit of the Islamic State. Many of them are former Saddam Hussein officers who were not particularly devout, but they found there an outlet to their grievances, and religion -- and many of our Middle East specialists tell me that it's more a marker than the fundamental cause of it. But it's a convenient marker, just like having a beard. It's a way to have identification with something broader than who you are.

I think a third -- and when you look, for instance, at the Central African Republic, that's another case in point. In the Central African Republic, you have at the moment a division of the country that opposes the Northern Muslim Séléka and the southern anti-Balika Christians.

Now, of course, it looks very much like a religious war, but when you drill deeper into that conflict, you see that, again, it's much more a marker reflecting different types of livelihood and competing economic interests at fundamental religious urging. Which doesn't mean that religion then does not become important, and that's where it gets very dangerous and perverse, is that it's not because of religion that the conflict develops, but religion gives it a staying power and an impact and it reverberates much more than if it wasn't there. And so I'm not saying that religion is irrelevant, but that as you analyze a conflict, it's a much more complicated picture than what you would imagine at first glance.

Thirdly, I think in today's terrorism, you have a continuum often between crime and the absence of politics, so to speak. The criminal agendas, and you can think of piracy in the Indian Ocean. You can think of the trafficking of drugs and human beings in the Sahel. All these agendas, they get mixed and confused, and they merge. And you have -- I mean, it's not -- it's quite symptomatic that you had a terrorist leader who was called Marlboro, and his business was to traffic cigarettes. And so, again, it qualifies the
notion that this is about ideological fights. And precisely, again, because the disappearance of politics makes for much more fluid organization and opportunistic movements.

Lastly, and maybe that's the difference that makes the whole thing more strategic, is the connectivity of this world, is that indeed, a terrorist action, both because of the media, and I already alluded to has, I mean, reverberates worldwide, but also indeed, in substance we see how, I mean, we see in every airport the cost of enhancing security. We see how our connected world can be vulnerable to asymmetric actions. And so that gives what in a less connected world would have had a much more local impact that creates a much more significant impact just because of the way our world is arranged.

So after all that, how should we respond? And my starting point is to say, looking at fragile states and international terrorism, that we don't have the luxury of addressing one or the other. We need to address both. And if we focus only on one dimension of the problem, we will fail.

I would make six or, I mean, seven recommendations. I would say, first, do not elevate the enemy. I think that's very important. Because of what I said that all these situations, they arise from very local grievances -- and I'll come back to that in another recommendation. If the Frenchman who joins IS in Syria, he comes from a suburb where he didn't find a job, he felt the impact of racism, and suddenly his failing life acquires a meaning that is much bigger than him, and that's a great recruiting tool, to tell people that if you join, you're going to be part of a very big, global fight. And we should not encourage that, I think. So we must take those threats very seriously, but at the same time, not pump up those who are that threat.

Second, I think because most of the terrorist groups, they start from very
-- I mean, they recruit on the basis of very local grievances, they have often a rather unpredictable and fragile alliance of people who join for a variety of reasons, sometimes just on an individual basis, like the Frenchman I was referring to a minute ago. Sometimes because they feel alienated because of the political situation in their country or their own economic situation. We need to peel away groups rather than aggregate them. And I don't think we always do that in our approach.

Let's think of Libya. Today, we are standing behind the House of Representatives, and I think we are right. But at the same time, can we ignore the general counsel? Not really. We need to -- and if we stick to all the (inaudible) people, just the Islamic label, which they are, we're just going to help them consolidate. I think it's smarter not to do that. The Shabab in Somalia. There was a time when the Shabab was actually relatively diverse. There were different trends within the Shabab. Engaging them might have been maybe wiser at some point.

What I'm getting at is I think talking is not a bad idea. In Washington, I'm happy to say that I think the policy of preventing this engagement with a variety of groups, and sometimes fairly unsavory ones, I'm not sure that is the right policy frankly. I think you cut yourself out of some possibilities. The idea that by talking you legitimize I think is wrong. I think it depends on how you talk. I mean, of course, if you publicize things, but there are many ways of talking where you don't necessarily legitimate your interlocutor. And I think there some hard thought must be given on how to engage a variety of movements that are on the fringe of very dangerous terrorist organizations and we need to peel away.

The third recommendation addresses local grievances. I look at the situation like Kenya where there are the dynamics of Kenya being involved in Somalia, the tense relationship that creates among various components of Kenya society. I look at
northeast Kenya where you have a number of Muslims in the Somali-dominated part of the country. That sense of alienation of part of the Kenya population is an element in feeding and helping the recruitment of terrorists.

The fourth recommendation, integrate regional dynamics. And I think now there's no better case in point than Syria where without de-escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the ongoing proxy war will continue and deepen. But I would add also the Kurdish dimension, which is of great relevance this week and in the past few days because we see that until recently, Turkey could in a way have good relations with the Kurds of Mr. Balzani, and so could reconcile its Iraq policy, its Syria policy, and its internal issues with the Kurds because now this is coming to an end with the PYD, that is the Kurdish fighters and Kurdish party in Syria, which is very close to the PKK, which is the organization that Turkey has been fighting for many years and with which it has, I mean, there has been some political engagement but no resolution. And PKK is the organization led by Ocalan, who is in jail.

Today, with the Kurdish enclaves on the border of Syria with Turkey under threat from the Islamic State, it's a very tricky question for Turkey, and you would not want then Turkey to move in a situation where it would be crushing those Kurds while protecting them. There are some very tricky political choices to be made.

The fifth recommendation, be aware of how anti-terrorist agendas can undermine a broader political agenda. And there, again, I would mention Syria and Iraq, because we see that they can be a narrative in Syria in particular. Iraq is different because as the bombing has developed against IS, there have been clear signs of pressure on the government of Iraq. I mean, the most clear being the replacement of Mr. Maliki, that showed that there was an interest in addressing the concerns of the Sunni community.
In Syria, any action against the Islamic State would need to be complemented by very clear signals that this is not going to reinforce the regime of President Assad, because if that is the message, then it creates actually -- it degrades IS, of course, but at the same time it helps it recruit more supporters because it would feed the narrative that we care about the region when Christians, when Yazidis, when Kurds are under threat, but we don't care about the Sunni majority. So the signals that will be sent to that Syrian-Sunni majority are, indeed, very important.

To be aware of the anti-terrorist agenda is also the way the troops behave. We have seen in Nigeria how sometimes the rough treatment of people in military operations can help Boko Haram recruit some supporters, so that is also a dimension.

Last, but not least, and that's where Sarah is going to challenge me, we need to shore up fragile states without being over-ambiguous. And I think it's a very typical issue today because after a decade and a half of engagement -- national engagement, like the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan, like the U.N. engagement in countries, like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Liberia, many others in Africa, there is a kind of bitter taste, a sense that we started with enormous ambitions and here we are with mediocre results. And there is a risk that the pendulum will swing too far; that after thinking we could rebuild the world to our image, we will retreat. It's just too complicated. Let's not touch it. And I think the challenge there is to find a sort of intermediate path, because I don't think we have the luxury of just ignoring those ungoverned spaces that otherwise will grow, and where some point it's a tipping point where they become a real strategic threat. So I don't think we can just look the other way.

But we probably need to draw some lessons from the efforts of the last
15 years where we did some things right and did a lot wrong. And I think the first is probably to have a much more focused approach on the limited number of priorities for reasons of resources, of commitment, of I would say almost conceptual understanding. If we want to, in a country that is not ours, if we think we can really retool the country, that is way too ambitious. We need to focus on a few critical issues which have to do with security sector reform, with the rule of law, so that some of the basic services that a state provides to its own people are provided. So that people can sleep at night without fear of being killed, raped, robbed, and all sorts of atrocities that happen to them when the state fails.

I think we need to figure out a way to stop massive corruption because, for instance, in the Arab Spring, I think a lot has been said on the urge for democracy, which is an important dimension of the Arab Spring. But I think the urge for justice was as important as the urge for democracy. And that urge for justice is very much linked to the sense that there is a small elite that really takes advantage of the country. That was very much why the difference between President Assad Jr. and his father. The father was a ruthless dictator but the country was run in a relatively honest way. There was no accusation of corruption of Assad Sr. There are certainly a lot of stories with Assad Jr. that have been much more in support of his own family and a limited circle of friends. And that has been part of the rebellion of the insurgency against Assad. So more focused.

More intrusive sometimes. I don't think we should be bashful about it. I think what was done in Liberia with the so-called Gem-Up, that Sarah knows well, which was a very intrusive program in the sense that you had internationals who would cosign both on the revenue and on the spending side, which builds up the sovereignty of a country, but which can -- because it means that the country begins to be able to have
resources in the state coffers, that it can pay the civil servants. But it can easily be presented as a neocolonial enterprise. And so the public information side of that is very important.

I was discussing that a couple of days ago with the president of the Central African Republic, where you certainly need something like that because of the state of this country where the state structures, for all practical purposes, collapse. So you need to be willing to be intrusive when it's needed.

You need, the third point in shoring up fragile states, you need to think of the use of force. I think on that one, again, one should find a middle-of-the-road approach, where if you don't have a robust force that can really close the option of creating facts on the ground for those who attempted to do it, to build the political process is much more difficult. And again, the Central African Republic is a case in point, and I have been advocating for the Europeans and my compatriots to stay longer in the Central African Republic because you need a robust presence to make sure that the various troublemakers in that country are not going to smell weakness and then abuse it.

Fourthly, get the sequence right. And there, this is something that the international community doesn't do easily. What I mean by that is that too often we play catch up. At the beginning, we go small because we think that we can do it with a very light footprint. And that was the case in Afghanistan. And then we realize a bit too late that we need actually much more. I mean, the crisis group advocated way before. I mean, Afghanistan was making the headlines that it was not working, advocated a much stronger true presence in 2002. And I think that would have been right. I think very often you have a window at the beginning of an intervention where everything is in flux. And you can take some decisive action, and then that window closes. And that is usually the time when we think, oh, this is not really working. Let's shore up. Let's reinforce. And
that is a bit late. It's much easier to downsize after having started strong.

Last, but not least, never forget that at the end of the day it's politics; that what keeps a country together is a political compact. It's not just some functional arrangement. And if you don't have your eye on the ball, if you don't focus on the politics of the country, and too often we are focused on the hardware, so to speak, and we ignore the software of politics. If you don't focus on the politics, we're going to be in trouble.

And so to conclude, I would say that President Obama said fighting IS was a generational task. I think what is a generational task is to shore up fragile states, because IS may be away, you know, a year from now. I don't know. Maybe, maybe not. But what is most likely is that after IS there will be some other organization and then some other until, and unless -- unless and until there is the resilience of a society that is sufficiently organized; that those sort of opportunistic movements that prey on the weakness of states, don't have that opportunity. It's closed for them. And I don't think there's any easy answer to that. I don't think we really have the full answer. The one thing I know is that it's going to take time.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. JONES: Jean-Marie, thank you very much.

I have to say that was not only an extraordinarily insightful presentation; it was very tonic in a town at a time when the debate is bombs or ground troops. And it's sort of as stilted and as limited as that right now. Obviously, this is a particular moment, but I do find in this city that the focus on the military dimension of CT operations tends to cloud out kind of a much wider political and legitimacy issues that you touched on.

I was also struck, by the way -- I'm not quite sure what to make of it -- that somebody else used a similar trope, although for a very different way today on a
different stage. Bibi Netanyahu at the U.N., talking about the relationship between KAISA and Hamas, stressed that all politics is global. So you had a rather different take on the relationship.

Sarah, you’ve worked with these issues, in away from a different angle, focusing more on the developmental questions and the economic questions. I suspect there is a lot you agree with in what Jean-Marie said, but you have a different perspective. So we’ll have your thoughts.

MS. CLIFFE: Thanks.

It’s a pleasure to have been invited by Bruce to this session. Bruce has been a fabulous collaborator on these issues for a long time, and to be able to comment after Jean-Marie speaks. I first met Jean-Marie when he was in charge of U.N. peacekeeping, with the thankless task of maintaining order in some of the world’s worst situations with less troops than the NYPD has police overall. And even in that job, he was more analytical and more thoughtful than many people whose full-time job was analyzing and writing. So I knew that in listening to him today, I, in fact, was going to agree with the points that he made. So I am just going to quickly add three things that I think expand on what Jean-Marie said.

First, on the connections between the way the development people think about fragility and what Jean-Marie talked about. Second, on what we know and what don’t about solving the problem at local levels. And third, what we know and we don’t at a global level.

So first, on the connections, I think first it’s clear that there is not a direct poverty connection. So everything we know about recruitment into violent extremist movements, terrorist movements, is that this does not necessarily come from either the poorest in one country or from the poorest countries. So that direct connection has not
proven to be there.

There is, though, quite clearly, an indirect connection, and Jean-Marie talked a lot about this, with exclusion and grievance. So whether it’s real or perceived, relative exclusion of a religious, a regional, an ethnic, a political group in their home country, or a grievance at seeing injustice or perceived injustice to other members of a community, that does operate.

And third, there is clearly a link with weak institutions. So, in two senses, I think. First, that they’re not able to provide the basic compact with society in terms of fundamental security and protection of citizens, social services, political inclusion, economic opportunities. And second, that they may actually exacerbate grievances by having institutions that are perceived to be corrupt or are committing human rights abuses on sections of the population. And here, I think, it is clear that ignoring these areas -- and I noted, Jean-Marie, you used weakly governed spaces again. I think it is good, in fact, to go back to that term because Northern Nigeria, in fact, is the last in a long list of areas where we’ve perhaps assumed that these could be contained by being ignored. And indeed, they have almost always come back to bite that assumption from the problem of Somali piracy and onwards.

Second, in terms of what do we know about this local level. So I think out of the humility of what has gone wrong in many cases, not only what has gone right in some of the international support operations in the last years, we know that you have to try to support local institutions to establish trust, basically to govern well in areas where you have this sort of risk, and that means establishing very, very basic goods, basic security, basic access to justice, jobs, some every basic services.

Second, we know that you also have to avoid the type of governance that can exacerbate grievances. So, Jean-Marie talked about corruption, and there is,
indeed, very good evidence that both corruption and human rights abuses store up problems for the future. Governments may sometimes think that these are good short-term ways to deal with security problems or political problems, but in the long term, they very definitely are not.

Next, we know those endeavors take time. So here, I think when we are impatient we forget very often our own history, looking at the 20th century, for instance, countries that went from a level of conflict and fragility to a level of having strong institutions, did it over many decades. They didn't do it over three years or five years. In fact, the fastest countries to make that transition in the 20th century took 15 to 20 years. No one did it faster than that.

We also know that it takes regional alignment. So the problems that are experienced in these countries, particularly countries that face border areas with a great deal of institutional weakness and security threats, really require alignment from regional actors.

What in here are we not so good at? I think Jean-Marie is right that we’re not very good focused. So we still have the tendency to try to do too much and to be overambitious in some of these situations. We’re not very good at dealing with setbacks. So all the evidence of how fragile states actually find a successful transition is that they don’t improve things month after month, year after year. They go through some periods of improvements and then some periods where everything seems to be going wrong. There’s an election that has an impasse. There’s a corruption scandal. There’s a problem of human rights, et cetera. Every country that has gone through a transition has gone through that kind of loop.

But in the international community we tend to go too quickly from great hope to great despair. So we treat South Sudan, for instance, as a darling during the
peace agreement or at the time of independence, and then we go to complete despair about its prospects. We react to the Arab Spring perhaps with too much blind optimism to some extent, and then we go to deep despair about what is happening in the region. So we have difficult I think in both identifying what is a setback that could be overcome and adjusting how we operate.

The last thing I wanted to mention is the global level. And here I was going to mention both financing and recruitment and the difficulties that I think are being faced in addressing both of those issues. On financing, although there have been huge advances made in anti-money laundering and different types of international cooperation, use of technology to monitor financing flows, we still have great difficulty in tracking what is happening with flows to extremists and terrorist groups. In some of these cases that we see now, this is very definitely the case.

On recruitment, I think there is a question to be asked here about how little, in fact, this appears to have to do with fragile states when we’re talking about it at a global level. So at a local level, I very much agree with what Jean-Marie said. The local grievances are crucial for this, and this is what you have to work on. But at a global level, if you look at the foreign fighters in Syria, for instance. So I understand at the moment, estimates are that there are around 12,000. This is, by the way, about a third of the number of volunteers who went to fight for the republican side in the Spanish Civil War. It’s probably the greatest example we have in the 20th century of a huge number of people volunteering to fight. So this is not an insignificant number. These people are not from what we would normally call “fragile states.” So there are quite a significant number from the rich world, the developed world, and a very significant number from middle income countries with stronger institutions.

So I think there is a real need to try to peel away what are the dynamics
underlying that? Where are the narratives being constructed that are facilitating that? What are the mixture of motives? I think Jean-Marie is probably absolutely right that there is a mix of motivations within that. And what are some of the issues of political and economic exclusion that could be acted on that would address that problem?

Let me stop there.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much.

I was struck by your comment about the way we swing from great hope to great despair. A number of critics have argued the Obama administration -- Obama ran the election on "Yes, we can," and governed foreign policy on, "No, we shouldn't" or "No, we can't." And, of course now there's a bit of course-corrective policy. I was struck by that.

I want to ask you each two questions. I want to ask, first, about two things that are happening simultaneously, and I want your perspective on whether they're the same phenomenon or they happen to be happening at the same time. One is that we are seeing a geographical shift in the fragile states problem. If you look back with the post-Cold War, we devoted a lot of our focus and attention on fragile states, essentially in sub-Saharan Africa. Plus fringes of Europe and Latin America, but there was a substantial body load of sub-Saharan Africa and there was little of this in the Middle East. And obviously now we're doing this in the Middle East. We're watching kind of under governed spaces and the breakdown of state authority in a variety of forms of challenge in the Middle East. That's one thing that's happening.

The second thing that's happening is we've gone from an era in which there was essentially a great power condominium to do this work, largely unified resolutions in the Security Council, feud tensions between the great powers in dealing with fragile states, every now and again disagreements on issues, but not major
differences. To amode, we're essentially at proxy war between the major powers in Syria and now we're seeing even in Iraq where you would think, for example, that the Russians would have no interest in the spread of ISIS, criticizing the American approach in terms of bombing. So we've seen a breakdown in great power condominium on the questions of fragile states and terrorism.

And are those just two separate phenomena that happen to be happening at the same time or are they linked? Is the fact of this problem in the Middle East very different than the problem in Africa? If either of you want to comment on that. And then I'll ask a second question.

MR. GUÉHENNO: Well, I think in Africa, there was and there is still an agreement between the major powers on efforts to shore up fragile states because there was not a sense that this was at the heart of their divide. And you've seen the adoption and the creation of the mission in Mali and Central African Republic at the time when on the issue like Syria there was zero agreement. So there was a real difference there.

I think in the Middle East, it raises a fundamental issue between Russia and Western countries because they fundamentally don't have the same vision of what is wise. I think for Russia, the Middle East is a problem because of the neighborhood, because of geography. I mean, Russia is close to the area, and they are very, extremely worried with the development of Islamists on their southern border and also in the caucuses and also in Central Asia. So they are very nervous about that. And they just do not buy the western narrative on that. I think they are convinced that we have not developed a convincing narrative on the day after, so to speak. Not that they're necessarily thinking that President Assad is the best thing for Russia, but they don't see the roadmap from the present situation to another dispensation of power. And I think there, frankly, everybody needs to have a hard look to try to find common ground, but in
the present circumstances, I'm not too hopeful. I think after the departure of (inaudible) -- both (inaudible) and Kofi Annan when they were in charge of the Syria file for the U.N., they tried to address first the broader circle, so to speak. The Security Council circle. That is to find an agreement between Russia, the United States, the P5, that will influence the regional circle, that will influence the Syrian parties. That was the approach I think both (inaudible) and Kofi Annan (inaudible), but essentially their approach. I think now the broader circle is unlikely to provide the impetus that would be needed, so you need to focus on the regional circle. And I think it's going to be a much more difficult issue.

MS. CLIFFE: Yeah. So the shift is definitely correct. The uptake in conflicts and people dying from violent conflict over the last five years does stem primarily from what has happened in the Middle East. So there has also been an increase in violence in places like South Sudan and CAR but that's largely been compensated by a decrease in violence and improvement in peace in other areas of sub-Saharan Africa. So it's mostly the Middle East which has caused the reversal.

I think one of the things perhaps in looking at the local dynamics there is that over the '90s and the early part of the 2000s, the international community was most accustomed to providing assistance after civil war. So that was the lens through which it often looked. In the Middle East, certainly at the point of the Arab Spring, these were much more post-authoritarian transitions or attempt at transition than they were civil war situations of the type that would be based in Africa. In the intervening years, of course, we now have the situation in Libya and Syria and they're all going to be situations which are very much looking at rebuilding eventually after civil war. But I think that that sense of very strong institutions are not necessarily the absence of the state but the presence of state institutions that were seen as not providing for their citizens is an important
difference with some of the conflicts that we were addressing in Africa.

MR. JONES: I'm going to turn to the audience in a minute. One last question from me.

If you think about the strategy that you laid out, which is a political strategy, it has a military dimension, it has an economic dimension, it has a developmental dimension over time, just very quickly, and I know you could speak at length of this, how would you grade the international system in terms of its ability, the tools that we have at our disposal to implement that kind of strategy? Do we have the essentials but we don't use them well? Or do we have a huge gap between what we need to do and what we have at our disposal?

MR. GUÉHENNO: I think I'll give it a C, if I was generous.

MR. JONES: A gentleman's C?

MR. GUÉHENNO: A generous C.

MR. JONES: A generous C.

MR. GUÉHENNO: A generous C. Generous C.

MR. JONES: Sarah?

MS. CLIFFE: Yeah, both within each area and in our ability to work across areas.

MR. JONES: We may come back to this point.

Let's turn it open to the floor. I suspect there are going to be lots of questions. I'm going to take a cluster in the middle of the room first. We'll take two or three and then come back. We'll do a few rounds. And please identify yourself, and please do keep it short and ask a question.

MR. ROSENBLATT: Yes, Stuart Rosenblatt. I work with EIR News. This concerns Saudi Arabia, and specifically, there's a bill in the U.S. Congress to
declassify a chapter of the original 9/11 report that purports to expose the role of the Saudis in financing and orchestrating the hijacking, the attacks. It includes potentially naming of the former ambassador, Prince Bandar, possibly his wife. A lot has spilled out since that in Florida and in Southern California. In fact, a federal judge just had 80,000 pages of documents turned over to him in Florida a couple of weeks ago on a Saudi-run cluster, including Mohamed Atta. Senator Bob Graham, who oversaw this, has said that it’s the failure to declassify this that has contributed directly to the growth of ISIS, IS, et cetera, and that he’s convinced that the Saudis, not necessarily “the king,” but various of the charities, princes, and others have been in the middle of this. And a lot of people have come out calling for the declassification. There have been a lot of media covering it.

My question is would you support the declassification of these documents to make public the role of the Saudis in this? Thank you.

MR. JONES: Great. We’ll take a couple more.

I want to just add onto that, just to notice the passage in the Security Council the other day of a binding resolution on foreign fighters -- the funding of foreign fighters requiring states to cut off funding flows and requiring states to take action domestically. So you might also think more broadly about the question of support from foreign states to foreign fighters.

The gentleman right there.

QUESTIONER: Hello. My name is (inaudible). I'm the correspondent for an Austrian newspaper called (inaudible). I have a question on Iraq and your proposal that it's always good to talk. Do you think it would be possible to open up talks with elements of the former Baathists that are within the IS movement? So, I mean, do you think it would be
possible? Would it be a good idea in terms of, you know, weakening IS? And do you think if it were possible to establish such a channel of talks, would that be useful in depriving them of tactical military leadership in the battlefield that apparently, according to news reports, IS has because it has all these former Baathists military leaders in its ranks? Thank you.

MR. JONES: Great. And we'll take one more for the cluster. The gentleman -- the first one in the back. The lady on the right. Very good. Thanks.

MS. VARGAS: Hello. Christine Vargas from Avizent.

There was a wonderful point made earlier about managing our expectations for what we can do, especially in Mina and South Asia regions per all the fun stuff that's going on right now. If we were to, let's say, build a global communications campaign, what are the three most important talking points that we need to communicate as the U.S. government to the populations in these countries in order to, for lack of a better term, build some sort of consensus or at least some sort of head nodding so that the populations understand what we expect from their governments and if we're even remotely success in aspiring that, then can support it and it have at least a better opinion of what we are trying to accomplish on their behalf with realistic expectations.

MR. JONES: And the gentleman right behind you, and then we'll come back to the podium.

QUESTIONER: I'm Kumar. I'm in manufacturing with an interest in foreign affairs. And again, I'd like to build on what was mentioned earlier about Saudi Arabia.

For example, their support of Wahhabism in Pakistan with the opening of several madrassas converted a moderate country with moderate views of Islam into what it is now, a fragile state with the government very limited or nonexistent in several parts of
the country. And also Hafiz Sayeed, who is now designated as a terrorist by the United States and has a militia of 300,000 people. So I'd like that question to be addressed.

MR. JONES: Thanks very much.

Jean-Marie, do you want to start? These are easy questions.

MR. GUÉHENNO: Yes.

Well, you know, on the position of Saudi Arabia, I think at the moment there is a great deal of nervousness in Riyadh on the ongoing negotiation with Iran, and what matters more than anything else is to have a sense of the two countries and they can work together and not to feed the extreme worriness in Saudi Arabia that will just harden their position. I think Saudi Arabia needs to be engaged a lot if one wants to have a stable region. The division between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which has led to the confrontation between Shia and Sunni, is a very destructive one, and there will not be a stable Middle East so long as that confrontation endures. I think that's the big picture issue that is essential.

Support, financial support, all that, I don't know more than what I read in the press. What I know is that the foreign fighters resolution is trying to do is precisely to stop that so that both movement of people and movement of money is monitored and stopped, and I think that is quite important because, again, when there is a connection between the local and the global or the individual and the global sometimes, people, individuals sort of hug a course far away from them because that gives them a sense of identity that they don't have otherwise. I think that needs to be stopped.

Which brings me to the question on the former Baathists. I think the real issue there is that indeed, the de-Baathification in Iraq was a mistake. Like today, and I want to draw your attention to that the law in the (inaudible) parliament (inaudible) all former Libyan Khadafy officials is also a mistake for the same reasons because the
number of people that you need in Libya have been excluded by that law. And it's a mistake.

So former Baathists engaged in IS, can you talk to them? Well, I mean, it's a brave man who will go see them. I think what is important is -- what is really important is for the Iraqi government to send clear signals that former Baathists who did not commit crimes during the Saddam Hussein period have a role to play in the country. That matters, so that also some can join -- the practical signals that will be given.

And that brings me to the third question on the communication campaign. I think a communication campaign is as good as the policies that underpin it. And so if, I mean, today there is no question that there is a perception by, as I said in my presentation, that there's a perception by many Sunnis that they are being victimized. That perception is indeed amplified by propaganda, manipulated by a various agenda. There's no question about that. Now, one needs to think of clear signals, practical signals that convince that Sunni majority that indeed we care about them and that we are not part of an agenda to crush the Sunnis. And, of course, again going back to the negotiation with Iran, which I hope will be successful, one needs to -- one will need to manage the impact of that so that it doesn't feed -- that the positive reintroduction of Iran in the scene does not -- in the Middle East scene, does not feed the paranoia that's now, I mean, the Shia are on the move and the allies of Iran are on the move and ready to crush the Sunnis. And one will have to address that. But it's the fundamental policies that need to underpin that communication.

Support of Wahhabism in Pakistan? Indeed. And I think there, when we have to -- I mean, this is an issue that both rich and poor countries have to focus on. As you look at education, which is a fundamental, national issue in a country. The collapse of national systems, the weakness of national systems allows extreme ideologies --
extremely conservative ideologies like Wahhabism, to fill the gap. And I feel the best answer to that is for the state of Pakistan to build the infrastructure of education that makes such inroads impossible.

And, you know, you raised the question of Pakistan, but I would say we have the same issues in a country like my own, where it's important to provide the public services, the basic services with the ideology of the French Republic and the basic values of the French Republic. That is for the state. Maybe I'm old-fashioned there, but that is for the state to provide that so it doesn't open opportunities for those who might otherwise abuse them.

MR. JONES: Sarah?

MS. CLIFFE: On the question about communications, when we looked at the World Development Report on conflict, security, and development, we had three main areas of security, justice, and jobs as highest among the popular expectations in situations of fragility and violence. There was a lot of controversy at the time about the inclusion of justice. So there were a lot of people who felt that if you had security and jobs, you basically had covered your bases and you didn't need anything else to create trust with the population. I actually think that it was incredibly important to have justice included in that and the perceived injustice of different types -- political, social, economic -- is very much at the root of some of these issues.

But I also think, and very much agree with Jean-Marie, thinking in particular about justice, you have to think now not just about your communication message but about how people perceive any inconsistencies between what you do in other spheres and what you say are the values that you are supporting.

MR. JONES: Great. We'll do a second round. So I'll start at the back and work my way to the front. So the lady in the middle in the purple sweater.
MS. WAYMAN: Hi, Carol Wayman with Congressman Ellison.

There's been a number of articles about remittances and financial institutions no longer wanting to send money overseas to Somalia or Yemen. How would the developed countries make a balance there to still allow humanitarian remittances without funding terrorism?

MR. JONES: Great.

There were a couple more in the middle.

Yes?

MS. MILLER: Lisa Miller from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

I know the desire is probably for a more nuanced debate, but the reality is that here in Washington it is about troops on the ground or not at the moment. When we're looking at Iraq, certainly, you said it was easier to go big and then downsize. Is it a questionable strategy for the White House to be completely ruling out American troops on the ground?

MR. JONES: And then all the way to the front.

Garrett?

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks very much.

I'm Garrett Mitchell, and I write the Mitchell Report.

I was struck by several things that Jean-Marie addressed, and but perhaps in a way that I hadn't anticipated coming in here. The first was when you were talking about the sort of de-legitimization of politics globally and the way in which religion is sort of moved into some of that space. And then later when you were talking about paying attention to local grievances. And I thought to myself, it is easy to sit in this room and have a sort of geographic perspective based on yours and Sarah's comments that take us to the Middle East and Africa and elsewhere. But when we apply them to our
own country, it's also pretty interesting because there's no question about the fact that a huge issue that we are dealing with domestically is a form of de-legitimization of politics in our own country and to a certain extent how religion has moved in to fill some of that space and taken up some of that.

And then second, as it relates to pay attention to local grievances, I think it is fascinating that the situation in Ferguson is as alive and potentially damaging as it is today. And I'm not quite clear how to convert this into a question except to say that I would appreciate the thoughts that both of you have about this global de-legitimization of politics and how you see it operating in various countries, including ours.

MR. JONES: We'll take one more.

MR. WARREN: Rob Warren for Darcor.

I would like to expand on a comment you made earlier, and that is why is it that we're having in the Western World such an attraction of people leaving to join ISIS and other groups? I think there was a chart today in the Wall Street Journal indicating several thousand who have left Western Europe. And what is it that's attracting them when there is such a great deal of risk involved?

MR. JONES: Great. Let's turn back to the panel. And Jean-Marie, on the question of U.S. military options, I didn't want to say it, but it is true that your opening remarks could be read, if not a direct criticism of U.S. -- of contemporary U.S. policy, at the very least a suggestion that there's quite a lot to be developed still in that policy. So maybe elaborate on that as well.

MR. GUÉHENNO: Yeah. Well, first, on the question of remittances, many countries now in the world would not live without those remittances. Sarah knows more about it than I do, but I think before you block such flows you really have to think twice. And I do see the security implication and that systems are being put in place to try
to stop that, but I think one would have to be very careful not to overshoot there because then you would plunge countries in crisis and actually you would push them in the direction that you want to avoid.

The whole question of troops on the ground and the broader question of (inaudible), I mean, to be honest, I do see the extreme difficulty in which the administration finds itself, and I don't think there is an idea answer. And I think one should be modest about it. I think it's true that probably, I mean, a couple of years ago, if there had been maybe more support to the few Sunni officers who had defected, it might have helped build up a component of the Syrian opposition that would have been more real. But I think there, all Western countries, frankly, focused more on the outside opposition, including the European countries, my own, focused more on the outside opposition than what was going on inside the Syria. And that was probably a mistake. And it was a widely shared mistake by I think the whole Western group of countries.

But here we are now. I do think that before, I mean, thinking of direct military engagements, one would have to be extremely careful because you know how those things start; you don't know how they end. And in the particular case of Syria, what really matters is nobody is going to win. The government is not going to win, but the opposition is not going to win either. There is an imbalance of interest because the more you engage, the more the other side may get support. So you may just escalate without really being decisive.

So what really matters to that is to have a political strategy to the endgame. And the endgame in Syria will be a lot about guarantees, reassurance for the various groups, because there's no question that if one group was to win, the others would be in real danger. And one has to see what kind of guarantees will be needed to allow people to come to the negotiating table. But for that to happen, there's probably a
need for the government to feel that he can't go on and on.

And so what exact military measures need to be taken for that? I mean, I think this is an operational issue on which I don't want to get into that. You need that, but then you need more political thinking on the guarantees. When you think of a war -- it's smaller, because Lebanon is a smaller country than Syria, but that otherwise has some similarities so that at the end of that war, the tariff agreement that ended that war, the heart of it is the guarantees given to the various groups so that they didn't feel that once the war was ended they would be killed. Admirably in a way, that agreement, everybody with the deepening Syrian crisis, has predicted the demise of Lebanon, and Lebanon is a very fragile situation, but it has more or less held together. And that's a tribute to that agreement, actually, that everybody understands that there is a precarious balance that was then established and that needs to be maintained. And we need to create that balance for Syria.

Now, your very interesting and difficult question on politics and religion. I think that after the end of the Cold War and the demise of ideology and the demise of socialism as an ideology, in a way politics took a big hit because there was not really an alternative ideology that won. There was more a sense that now market forces would take care of things and that government was just about adjusting things at the margin. And that is true in the United States. That is true in Europe. And you have seen the crisis in Europe of the Socialist Movement, Social Democrat Movement. It's all about managing at the margin. And that's not mobilized people. And so I do believe that there is going to be a return to values in politics, to more value-based politics. The question is whether those values will be the kind of values that we bore or values that allow for democratic society. But I do believe that political parties, if they don't occupy the terrain of values, are going to continue to be in a lot of trouble.
Why is IS so attractive? Probably a combination of factors. Values, as horrible as it sounds, because it sounds like a big cause. And people are in search of a meaning and that helps. I think if you add to that a mix of an appetite for silly things but that can be powerful. If you're out of a job in a place where you don't have much of a future, you're not necessarily, as Sarah said, among the poorest, but you're hanging on there with the support of the welfare system but you don't feel recognized and suddenly you become part of a fight that is much bigger than you, and your own failed life suddenly acquires a meaning that you never hoped for. And I think that is a powerful mix. And we have seen it for returnees from Syria, our French returnees when they go there and they see that fighting is not as exciting and pleasant as they thought it would be, and sometimes they just want to come back to be, when it works, arrested by the police, sometimes after a little hiccup.

So I think this is not a very political answer, but I think in an age precisely where politics don't matter that much, these psychological dimensions, which another time would have meant that this person might have joined a little urban gang and robbed the local bank and attacked the local bank, now it's more exciting to go to Syria and be part of that bigger fight. So I think there really we need both the kind of measures and monitoring that is envisaged by the resolution of the United Nations, and we need to work hard in our own societies so that that kind of dynamic does not exist.

MR. JONES: Sarah?

MS. CLIFFE: Let me start with that. I think that's absolutely right and I'm far from being an expert on this. But I got interested in this question of the last period we saw such a large number of young people volunteer. It really was the Spanish Civil War. So whether you can ask any questions about whether there are any similarities to that, there are lots of differences. Many.
But one question think might be worth asking here is whether there are some very different motivations at play. So I don't know, for instance, whether people who went two years ago to Syria versus people who went in the last two or three months, given the different news that they would have seen at that time, necessarily have the same motivations. And perhaps there's a need for some care in not assuming that those are the same motivations in all groups. That was definitely true in the 1930s; the people who went because they were committed Communist Party members, for instance, versus people who went because they felt they were fighting for a liberal democracy. Both existed in that period.

On remittances, definitely a need for some care. So there is obviously a risk, and I think acting globally on financing is very important. But for countries like Somalia, where remittances make up more than half of their economic activity, it's the difference, I think, between having a very narrow counterterrorism approach of the sort Jean-Marie criticized in his opening that looks only short-term at effects rather than a broader political and governance strategy that looks longer term. And to cut off communities' source of income perhaps has a very bad risk of creating grievances that may backfire on them.

I think also in relation to your question that there is a much broader issue of decline in political party membership worldwide, whether there is, in fact, some sort of broader crisis of politics exactly as Jean-Marie was talking of earlier. And I also think that it's very useful to reflect on the similar challenges or analogous challenges in our own countries, to have a sense of humility. This is not, in fact, about countries that are mysteriously unable to grapple with problems which we grapple with successfully. It's actually quite a similar set of challenges, and not all of them is the developed world grappling with that successfully.
MR. JONES: Okay. We're going to go into the lightning round. So we'll take two or three very brief questions. We'll come back to the panel for very brief answers. I want to add one question to the panel, so I'll give it to you.

What is the one thing -- you'll probably have 20 answers -- but what most important thing would you want to see us do to get us from a C to at least a B in the international responses to these phenomenon?

So the front. Very brief, please.

MR. KWA: Hi. My name is Tula Kwa. I'm a graduate student from the George Mason School of Policy Government and International Affairs.

I actually had a question about the C to a B. My question is since the international community has a C response, do you think that perhaps what we need is new international organizations or institutions that combine the expertise of conflict resolution, diplomacy, trade, security, and also corruption, to kind of get more deeper in addressing some of these problems and engaging more in civil society, creating better partnerships, both to help prevent terrorism and also to warn governments of their symptoms and also to apply the expertise to handle those situations? Thank you.

MR. JONES: Great. Thank you.

MR. RISEBERMR. GUÉHENNO: Richard Riseberg, a Brookings fan.

Does the continuing major increase in the world's population have any effect on your speculations about the structure of world states and international terrorism in the future?

MR. JONES: I'm going to go right to the back.

MR. LORD: Hi, I'm Rob Lord. I'm a research associate at the Public International Law and Policy Group.

Briefly, it's striking that there's been so little mention of the responsibility
to protect in a conversation about failed states in the 21st century. Could you talk a little bit about where you see that norm going in the 21st century?

   MR. JONES: And the gentleman right in the middle has been very patient. So, the last word goes to you. Or last question.

   MR. MILIKANI: V.J. Milikani.

   The question is the role of China. For a rising power, China has been very agnostic on a lot of this global instability, and they're investing more and more in Africa. So sooner or later they'll have to weigh in on it. And what role do they have and what are the expectations?

   MR. JONES: Great.

   I was actually recently in Beijing and somebody posed a question about whether they would play a role in response to ISIS and they got a look of shock that the question even came up. Who, us?

   Actually, why don't we start with Sarah this time and then that'll give you the last word, Jean-Marie.

   MS. CLIFFE: Let me just respond quickly on the question about population. There are quite a number of conflicts, many of them civil war, rather than necessarily with international spillovers where population and the pressure on land has played some role definitely in creating the stresses that eventually led to conflict. I'm thinking of Rwanda, Burundi, the Great Lakes, this kind of situation. But I think almost universally it has never been shown to be determined absent other factors. So if combined with political exclusion, other economic stresses, then yes, I think it can increase pressures.

   MR. JONES: Great.

   Jean-Marie?
MR. GUÉHENNO: International response?

MR. JONES: What was your one idea to move us from a C to a B in the international response?

MS. CLIFFE: Let Jean-Marie go.

MR. GUÉHENNO: I was waiting for her answer.

Well, you know, I think it will be tested in concrete cases first. It's hard to define the one thing institutionally that will make the difference, because at the end of the day, in U.N. peace operations, for instance, I think the single-most important decision is who you appoint to run that operation, because you can have the best organization that will go only so far. I concluded my remarks with the primacy of politics, and the primacy of politics means the primacy of the political judgments of the leader. And so I think if you want to move from C to B, you have to make sure that when there is the engagement of the international community on one issue, you put someone -- the best you can find to run that show, whether it's at the national level or in an international organization.

And what strikes me, frankly, is that in many situations, yes, we ring our hands on the difficulty of all these situations, but we haven't yet agreed that this is a strategic challenge of the first order. They say all the best minds were at some point focused on the Soviet Union and how to handle that. We still think, yes, we need to do something about it. It's very sad, but it's not seen as a strategic challenge. And I think -- I tried to explain why I think it is a strategic challenge, and if you want to move from C to B, you have to recognize it as such and put the intellectual resource -- intellectual and political resource to address it.

New international organization. You know, it was hard to negotiate the charter of the United Nations in 1945. After the end of the Cold War, which in a way was the end of the war, it was impossible to negotiate anything. So I think we have, as
pragmatists, we have to make due with these institutions as they are. It's very unlikely that there's going to be any fundamental institutional reform. For that to happen it would require a meeting of the minds of the United States and China in particular, and we are not there. So I think the best bet is to try to in the margin of those institutions, and that was my experience when I worked at the U.N., which was in some ways enormously frustrating, in other ways rewarding, because there is more capacity in those institutions if you are determined and persistent to make a difference than you think. But you have to work within the institution.

Growth of population. I think what we don't want to see is states with a booming population becoming states in crisis. Next year, there will be -- I mean, I spoke about the elections in the Great Lakes in the coming two years. Next year there is also going to be an election, for instance, in Nigeria. It's very important for the future of Africa that that election go well because really it's a question of the order of magnitude of the impact of when things don't go well in a major country.

R2P. I think R2P took a big hit with Libya, to be honest. I think the concept of R2P, which was developed by -- one of my predecessors, Gary Feverence has played a major role in developing the concept of R2P. It's an idea ahead of its time. And because it's ahead of its time, it doesn't mean that it should be abandoned. But like any new idea, it's going to take much more time to really consolidate than those who invented it would have liked it to be. I strongly believe that we are in kind of an intermediate stage in what we call a bit too optimistically the international community. There's probably no such animal at the moment. Yes, there are many nations. Do they form a community? No. Do they accept that there could be some rules? Yes. Do they respect those rules? No. But, you know, accepting that there be some rules is the beginning of wisdom. And so we are in a transitional period where we have to accept
that there is an enormous gap between actions and aspirations, between pronouncement and aspirations. But that doesn't mean that we should lose our aspirations.

And in a way that transitions nicely to the last question on the role of China. As I look at China, I look at the history of the International Crisis Group, which was founded almost 20 years ago now, and which was founded in a very different moment in the history of international affairs. It was a much more optimistic moment, even if it was founded as a response to the disaster of the U.S. (inaudible). But a much greater sense of self-confidence and self-confidence of the West. And the organization that I now have the honor to lead, it should not abandon in any way the values that are (speaking in foreign language). At the same time, in a way I go back to this notion of the international community, this uncompleted notion of the international community. At the same time, it has to try to embrace a number of countries that are not so completely convinced and that are nervous when they're asked to become active players in the international system. And that is the case of China as we were reminded by Bruce. And I think our job at Crisis Group is to engage those countries. And China is a very interesting case in point because China, as you all know, has invested massively in Africa. It's invested in a number of countries that are sometimes in somewhat precarious situations. It certainly has an interest in safeguarding those investments. It also has a political interest in safeguarding its image in those countries, and sometimes there has been a backlash against China in some cases. And so I think there's an ongoing discussion in China -- and I plan to go to China as soon as possible in my new position -- I think there's an ongoing discussion on what needs to be done by the Chinese. I think they certainly do not have the same concept of stability, let's say, that one would have in Washington or London or Paris, but they do want stability. They do see that stability that is not based on some institutions is very precarious. And so I think this is a good time to
have that conversation. And I do think that if we do not have that conversation, we will not be in a position to solve the problems that it is going to take a generation to solve.

Thank you.

MR. JONES: One brief reflection on China. At an earlier stage, when Jean-Marie and I were both at the U.N. in 2004-2005, at the period of time in which the R2P concept was being drafted, the backdrop, of course, was the first crisis, the first contemporary crisis in Iraq, the 2003-2004 War. But there was also the crisis of SARS. And at the time, China was as allergic to discussions SARS as it was to being thought of as being involved in any way in the response to Iraq or terrorism or anything else.

Fast-forward, 10 years and the big crisis is ISIS. And, of course, we also have Ebola and this kind of astonishing breakdown of public health in West Africa, to which we’re seeing, thankfully, a massive mobilization. And one thing that’s striking to watch is how far China has come in its thinking and its response. Very actively supporting a highly-intrusive, very major response to the public health crisis in Ebola.

And so perhaps -- I always like to end these things on an optimistic note. Somehow evoking Ebola as an optimistic note doesn't quite work. But with respect to China, the evolution of its thinking is not over, and I think we can't give up on this notion that there is still some space to find common ground on these issues.

I thought this was an extraordinarily rich session. I hope it will not be the last time that we’re able to host you in Washington, Jean-Marie, and I know that in your new institutional role with old friends with Mark, you’ll be having a major voice on those issues, and I hope it's heard loudly in this town where it is very much needed.

So can you join me in thanking both Sarah and Jean Marie?

(Applause)
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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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