

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

ECONOMIC INSECURITY, RISING INEQUALITY, AND
DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE: FINDINGS FROM
THE AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY 2014

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: The Religion, Policy, and Politics project at Brookings. I want to welcome all our guests. We have had the pleasure of collaborating with our friends at the Public Religion Research Institute, Robbie Jones, Dan Cox, Yuham Nevara Rivera.

Now, this is our fourth year. But today, if I may weakly paraphrase President Kennedy, we observe today not only the unveiling of great data, but also a celebration of the fact that PRI turned five this year. This is the fifth anniversary of the founding of PRI, and this is the fifth American Values survey.

You know, you ask in Washington do we need another pollster? Do we need another research organization? In fact, PRI has filled on a gap that people didn't know existed, and Robbie's done some really amazing work, and we have been very privileged here at Brookings, my colleague Bill Galston and I, to be able to work with Robbie all these years, so welcome.

I never want to forget the thank-yous, and I really want to thank Darcy Cohan and Emily Fetsch at PRI who worked so hard to prepare this event, plus all the people I mentioned. Here at Brookings I want to thank Anna Goodbaum, Kristin Jacobs, Beth Stone, and Elizabeth Tom. This is the first of these events we have done without our colleague, Corrine Davis, who has moved on to an awesome job. But she still realized we need her, and she sent a wonderful email wishing us good luck at this event. Corrine did a lot of work on this survey.

This morning Robbie will present the findings of the 2014 American Values Survey. Then we are really blessed by a great panel of respondents that includes Joy Reed of MSNBC, Henry Olson of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and Alan Abramowitz, why do I forget your academic --

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Emory.

MR. DIONNE: From Emory University. I just think of Alan as a protean political commentator because I read all his things and all his emails.

Just so you'll have a sense of how the event is going I am going to introduce Robbie who will do his, always, his patented PowerPoint presentation. Then my colleague, Bill Galston, we are co-moderating this, I promised Bill I would actually be a moderator today and not yak a lot, even though I love commenting on Robbie's data, Bill will come up and introduce the panel. They'll each speak for 10 minutes and then we will open it up for conversation, both among ourselves and with you all. So thank you for coming.

Robbie is the CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute. He's the leading scholar and commentator on religion, values, and public life. He's the author of two academic books, numerous peer reviewed articles. He has a PhD in religion from Emory University, and a M.T. from the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. So I invite Robbie to preach on his data.

MR. JONES: All right. Thank you all for being here. I suppose I'll preach on the day that, E.J., if you'll come down for an altar call at the end of the session. All right. Well, thank you everyone for being here. I am happy to say that this is the fifth annual American Values Survey, PRI's annual look at religion and politics.

Each year we try to pick a theme, along with tracking some trends, and this year we're looking at economic insecurity and economic inequality along with some things around the mid-term elections. The other thing you'll see at the end that we're going to cover is a real dividing line among Americans about the public role of religion in American life, that's quite striking. We'll come to that at the end. We'll kick it off with economic climate, the political climate, and then come to that at the end.

First of all, I want to mention that the hashtag, if you're on Twitter we encourage you to tweet away while you're in here today, the Twitter hashtag is ads2014. And then just let me say one quick word of thanks to Brookings, E.J., and Bill, who have been our long time collaborators going all the way back to the 2010 American Value Survey which we released here at Brookings.

All along the way we do multiple events which the religion and politics program here at Brookings, and are extremely grateful for that partnership over the years, so thanks to E.J. and Bill.

Let me jump in here. So as you can see it's a little bit of a gloomy picture here, and you'll see why in just a minute. First of all, what are you looking at? This is the fifth annual American Values Survey. I've done one each year since 2010, designed and conducted by Public Religion Research Institute.

This is a very large survey. It's 4,500 interviews. One of the reasons why it's so large is because we're going to be doing a panel callback after the election. So we'll be calling back all the people we can get back on the phone. Also, if you've got your calendars out, be releasing that back here at Brookings on November 12th. So if you want to see what's changed between now and the election, and what happens after the election tune in and come back. We're going to be asking a number of questions to track changes, and also some new questions as well.

The margin of error for the total sample is 1.8 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence interval. I want to say also, thanks to generous grants from the Ford Foundation and the Nathan Cummings Foundation which made the data collection possible.

The current economic climate it looks a little gloomy. I want to start off with some data all the way back to our 2010 American Values Survey. At that time we

asked people this basic question, thinking about your current financial situation would you say you're currently in excellent, good shape only fair shape or poor shape. You'll see about half the country in 2010 said that they were either in excellent or good shape. About half said only fair or poor shape.

You'll see those numbers have dropped considerably. Now we have only about 4 in 10 Americans saying that we're in excellent or good shape compared to being in only fair or poor shape. This is kind of one of the themes we'll see throughout the slideshow. On a number of measures that we asked in this survey we saw very, sort of, pessimistic and, sort of, discouragement in a lot of the numbers here.

This is despite the fact that a lot of the kind of macroeconomic indicators are good, right? So the recession is officially over. We've just received some encouraging numbers, macro numbers, about the poverty level. Yet, in this survey we still see that Americans, a significant number of Americans are still struggling economically.

So here's one interesting take on this as well. We also see that there is something of some partisan lenses, especially when you ask questions about how the economy is doing, right? So when you say how is the economy doing look at the partisan gaps on this question, right? So Democrats, about half of them say the economy's gotten better over the last years. Only 15 percent of Republican, only 14 percent of those that identify for the Tea Party say the economy's gotten better over the last couple of years.

Now, when I put that together with Democrats and Republican's self-evaluations of their own situations you can see very different things happened here, right? So Republicans, despite the fact that a majority of Republicans report being in excellent or good financial shape only 15 percent of them say the economy's gotten better in the last two years.

Among Democrats you see a similar kind of effect, it's not quite as pronounced, but only 39 percent report being in excellent or good financial shape, but nearly half say that the economy's doing better. So you can really see the influence of, kind of, partisan lenses even as people are thinking about the economy and their own financial shape.

So one of the, I think, contributions that this survey makes is we wanted to get, certainly, those kinds of self-evaluations from people, but we also wanted to get some very concrete measures about what kinds of economic hardships people were experiencing in the country.

So we asked a series of questions that were very concrete. In the last 12 years have you or someone of your household experience any of the following six things? Reducing your meals or cut backing of food to save money, not able to pay a monthly bill, putting off seeing a doctor, lost your job, had your work hours reduced, or were receiving assistance such as food stamps or unemployment benefits.

You can see the distribution of these individual questions here. What I want to draw your attention to particularly is this top one. We have more than a third of Americans in this survey saying that they have either skipped a meal or cut back on food to save money. That's a pretty significant kind of hardship to experience here, and so it's a lot of Americans in that category.

Then what we did is we created a composite scale based on these six measures, gave Americans a composite score, and this is what it looks like when you aggregate all six measures across. We have nearly 4 in 10 Americans who end up living in what we characterize as either high insecurity or moderate insecurity households.

The way we scored these is if you were in a no reported insecurity household that means you literally, out of those six measures reported zero things that

you had experienced. Low was one, reported one experience. Moderate insecurity was two or three, and the high insecurity was actually reporting that yes, I or somebody in my household's experience four or more of these things.

So we have 4 in 10 Americans in these top two categories saying in high or moderate insecurity households, about 1 in 5 in low insecurity households, and about 4 in 10 in no reported insecurity households.

Now if we take this measure and we look at it across race we see some pretty dramatic differences here. So all Americans, again about 4 in 10, Asian Americans -- and one of the nice things about this survey is it's one of the few surveys, because we had 4,500 interviews, we actually have enough Asian Americans to break out in the survey, which is a pretty rare thing.

So again, Asian Americans looking slightly less. About White Americans there. Then you'll see higher levels among Hispanics. But look at African American here, 58 percent of African Americans reported being in either high or moderate insecurity households. So very big racial and ethnic gaps here in terms of experiences of economic hardship. There you can see just the full out scale there.

The other thing we asked is just a basic question. We've been asking this question for a number of years, and what we saw is kind of wavering belief in this basic concept of the American dream. In the survey we defined this as the idea that if you work hard you'll get ahead. Does it still hold true? Did it once hold true, but it's not true anymore? Or did it never hold true?

Among all Americans there's a fair amount of pessimism about whether this still holds true today. Only about 4 in 10 Americans say that the American dream that if you work hard you'll get ahead still applies today. About half say it once held true, but it does not anymore. About 1 in 10, 7 percent, say it never held true. Again, you'll

see some fairly stark differences here.

White Americans look about like the national population. Notably, Hispanic Americans look about like the American population, not a lot of differences here. But there are some fairly big differences among African Americans. Only 3 in 10 African Americans say it still holds true. Half say it once held true, not anymore, that's not much difference here. But the real difference here is 14 percent of African Americans say that it never held true, the American dream never held true.

Then among whites, these next two categories are among whites, and we divided whites into white working class and white college educated here, and you'll see, again, a little more pessimism among white working class Americans and white college educated Americans. The only sort of group that we have here by race and class that's in majority territory saying the American dream still holds true today.

So the political climate, that's a little bit on the economic climate, say a little bit about the political climate. So this survey was in the field in July through mid-August, so there definitely are more up to date horse race numbers here, but this is the climate and it hasn't changed significantly somewhat since then.

So this is the generic ballot, Democratic candidate, Republican candidate in your district, this is among registered voters. Here I just want to kind of load out. We had basically a dead even heat among registered voters overall. But the one thing I kind of really want to draw your attention to here is the voting patterns by religious affiliation.

It turns out, basically, they have not shifted that much since the 2012 or even the 2010 election. They look fairly stable. The pattern is basically this, I'm going to put three up here at once, basically white Christians, white Catholics, with mainline Protestants, white evangelical Protestants, you know, certainly leaning towards majority or plurality toward the Republican candidate in their district.

Then African American Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, Jew, and the unaffiliated actually leaning quite distinctly the other way. You see this basically this kind of ethnic break, particularly among Christians, here that's quite pronounced.

Just to kind of drive this home I pulled them out separately. Here is, again, among registered votes all white, non-Hispanic Christians, so 6 in 10 leaning toward the Republican candidate in their district. If I then take all non-White Christians and put it here this kind of makes it a little more pronounced. Only 20 percent of non-White Christian registered votes leaning toward the Republican candidate, 70 percent leaning the other way. So this kind of tells you something about continued, kind of, racial divide that runs right through Christian registered votes in the country.

The other thing I want to take is just the -- we took the temperature of the favorability of the parties. Now, the first thing to say here is that neither party is doing well very, and doesn't have overwhelming positive views. But there are some differences, and the Democratic Party has a slight advantage at this point in time.

So here are the Republican numbers. Favorable opinion of the Republican Party, again by race and class here. One thing you'll notice is that none of these numbers cross the 50 percent mark. That's, sort of, one notable thing.

Now, let me put up the percent with the favorable opinion of the Democrat Party. You'll see some pretty big differences. Among some more base groups of the Democrat Party, African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanics in majority territory, and Republican with a clear edge among whites, but you'll see that edge among white college educated whites is dead even with Republicans holding a considerable edge among white working class Americans nationwide.

Do the same thing here with just some different breaks, gender and age. You'll see some similar patterns. Here are the Republican favorability numbers. You can

see that -- not a huge divide by age here. About half of each young adults and seniors saying they have a favorable opinion. Little bit of a gender gap here, but if we put the Democrat numbers up you'll see some start differences.

So among women, for example, 55 percent have a favorable of the Democrat Party versus only 42 percent have a favorable view of the Republican Party. Then the gap here among young adults, particularly to 58 to 47, with the Democrat Party having an advantage there in terms of favorability.

Then the other thing we've done in conjunction with the Brookings Institution is to take a look at the Tea Party over time. One thing we found in the report is that we've actually seen a little bit a shrinkage with those who identify with the Tea Party over time. We had consistently found through 2010, 2011, and even into 2012 about 10 or 11 percent of the country said that they identified.

Our question is do you identify or consider yourself party of the Tea Party movement is how we asked the question. You get about 10 or 11 percent up through 2012. The last year we've seen that drop down. Our last survey has it a 7 percent. So some drop from 2010, around 11 percent in 2010 down to 7 percent.

Interestingly enough, as it's shrunk just a little bit the composition has remained fairly stable. So we haven't seen, like, an exodus in one particular demographic. It's been just a kind of overall shrinkage. Demographics are fairly stable as they were in 2010.

Here I've pulled out the, sort of, unfavorable side. I'll put the favorable side up in a minute, but it might be easier just to see this first. So those have an unfavorable view of the Tea Party. What we've done here is just pick the groups that have, sort of, the strongest on either end of the spectrum. I've got all Americans there in the middle.

Americans basically divided. Unfavorable view 46 percent, down to about 3 in 10 Republican and Conservatives. Not surprisingly, Democrat and Liberals down here with about two-thirds. Also, Jews, about two-thirds unfavorable view of the Tea Party.

I put the favorables up on the other side. The spread is a little less there, but it goes up to almost 6 in 10 for Republicans, a little more than half, a majority of conservatives. Also, a slim majority of white evangelicals. But again, you can see the pattern going both ways. So very polarizing in terms of views of the Tea Party in the American public.

Then finally, we'll put up this. This is one of the things we did in 2010. One of E.J.'s favorite charts from 2010, so I did -- this is an E.J. special slide right here. Did a reprise of this one. Interestingly enough, we were looking at the relationship between the Tea Party, the Republican Party, and the Christian Right. We also find no change between 2010 and today in the overlap between those two groups.

These numbers aren't up here, but if you look, the Tea Party is the dark, red circle. We're finding it now 7 percent. It was 11 percent before in 2010. But these overlaps are about the same. So if you look at just the overlap between the red circle and this more purple circle, the Christian Right, what you'll see is that it takes up about half the Tea Party circle.

We find that about half, 47 percent, of those who say they identify with the Tea Party also say they consider themselves part of the Christian Conservative Movement or the Christian Right. That's very consistent with what we've found. In fact, it's exactly the same as what we found before.

We find about 8 in 10, you'll notice that the Republican bubble takes up about 80 percent of the Tea Party bubble if you look at it the other way. We find that also

very consistent, 77 percent of those in the Tea Party also either lean toward or identify with the Republican Party. Again, about 8 in 10 is what we found in 2010 as well. So that kind of relationship also has not shifted over time.

Say a little bit about some attitudes towards economic inequality and economic policies before I get into that religion break at the end here. Concerns about economic inequality was a basic question about equal opportunity. It's not really that bigger problem is some have more of a chance in life than others or one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life.

I put this up here by those who live in, sort of, higher economic insecurity households versus no reported economic insecurity households. You can see the greens bar going up are the number of people who say that one of the biggest problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance in life. So those who are experiencing more economic hardships feel much more strongly about that than those who reported no reported insecurity, they actually split on this basic question.

Another kind of general question here, the government should do more to address the gap between the rich and the poor. By political affiliation, big partisan divides on this question. So Republican, those who consider themselves part of the Tea Party movement, less than a majority agreeing with this, Independents two-thirds, but Democrats nearly 9 in 10 agreeing with this statement. So just in terms of like a philosophy of what the government should be doing to address inequality in the country, big, big philosophical partisan divides on this question.

Then we had four policies, writing might be a little bit small for the back, but basically on the left is paid sick days. Next to that is policy to provide employees with paid leave for the birth or adoption of a child, so parental leave. The next one is raising the minimum wages, and the last one is increasing the tax rate on Americans earning

more than \$250,000.

You can see among all Americans there's fairly high support for all of these policies. Ranging from about 8 in 10 for the workplace policies, the paid sick days, and parental leave. Still about 7 in 10 support for raising the minimum wage, and about 6 in 10 support for increasing the tax rate on Americans earning more than \$250,000 a year.

Democrats are, not surprisingly perhaps, on board with all of these, 7 and 10, even here on the right for raising the tax rate on the wealthy. About 9 in 10 on the other policies. Republicans, you know, drop off a little bit over here, but one notable thing is pretty bipartisan consistency on these workplace policies here. Republicans divided on the minimum wage, and then only about 4 in 10 supporting tax hikes on the wealthy. Those in the Tea Party looking fairly similar on some of the workplace policies, and even more drop off, only 4 in 10 support, for raising the minimum wage, and look about like Republicans on taxing the wealthy, on the right.

Now, one of the things we see is that despite there was a fair amount of agreement on policies we've also found that even though Americans sort of think -- are on board with these policies they're fairly pessimistic and have a sense that the deck is basically stacked against them. You can kind of see this in these two questions.

One is the government is really run for the benefit of all the people. Now, there may be a snicker in the room just by the sound of that question, but two-thirds of Americans disagree with that statement. So by a margin of 2 to 1 disagree that the government is really run for the benefit of all the people.

The other question, the economic system in this country unfairly favors the wealthy. I flipped the colors here so that they go in the same direction, but this is agreeing with this statement, but look, this is almost identical. So if you think about the

government sort of being on the side of the common, every day person, the economic system working for the benefit of every day person, the country 2 to 1 says no, that's not the case. So a fair amount of pessimism here.

Want to talk just a little bit about racial inequality. This, I think, is relevant particularly to the shooting of Michael Brown this summer. One of the things that we noticed is that we were actually in the field before, during, and after the shooting. So what that meant is we collected about two-thirds of our interviews before the shooting, and about a third of the interviews after. We were in the field five day after the shooting.

So we picked up some effect there. These are the numbers from 2013 to 2014. The next slide I'm going to isolate just our survey pre and post the Ferguson shooting. So this is the drop off overall from 2014 to 2013. Well, I guess, the rise of those who disagree.

So the statement we had in the survey was blacks and other minorities receive equal treatment as whites in the criminal justice system, do you agree or disagree. This chart has the number who disagree in 2014, the number who disagreed in 2013. So you can see across a range of demographic groups there's been an uptick on those who disagree with that statement compared to when we asked this question in 2013.

You notice some big jumps among young adults. In particular, there, and 10 point uptick among African Americans. So that's kind of the overall picture.

Let me dial in to just our survey. We broke the sample up into interviews that happened before the shooting, interviews that happened after the shooting. Here are the set of interviews that we had before the shooting, 38 percent of Americans -- now, this is the side who agrees, so 4 in 10 agree blacks and other minorities receive equal treatment in the criminal justice system, 44 percent of whites agree with this statement.

We put all non-whites, only 29 percent agree with that statement. So you see the gap beforehand.

Now here's the set of interviews that happened after the shooting from August 10th to August 15th. So among all Americans just a little bit of a slide, but among white non-Hispanic Americans -- I should be clear this four point uptick is not statistically significant, so these numbers are basically the same here. But this downtick is significant. So we had a 13 point drop in all non-white Americans agreeing with this statement per and post Ferguson shooting in the sample.

I looked underneath to look and see, we didn't have enough African Americans to pull out just the African American sample there in the post-election thing. But I will say this, it's notable that we interviewed 51 African Americans after the shooting and we had zero agree with this statement after the shootings. So it's not statistically significant, it's kind of qualitative data because we don't have enough to really do a percentage, but it was absolutely zero that we had agreeing with that statement after the shooting.

All right. One other thing, I think for context here, we've been track this question a while too, that we're seeing -- that I think is also context for racial tensions and divides in the country. This is a statement kind of capturing the idea of 'reverse discrimination.' Today discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.

So this is all Americans and then divided by race and ethnicity here. See 29 percent of African Americans agreeing with this, but a slim majority of white Americans agreeing with that. I should point out there's huge breaks by education here, so if you look at white working class Americans significantly more of them agree with this statement, white college educated Americans look more like the all American, number

here.

If you look at it over here by party you'll see big breaks by party as well. So basically a 2 to 1 difference between Democrats and Republicans on this statement. Only 32 percent of Democrats agree with this statement, but 6 in 10 Republicans, and nearly three-quarters of the Tea Party say that discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities today.

So finally, I'm going to wrap with this. Concerns about the public role of religion in American life. One of the things we've seen over the summer from the Hobby Lobby decision, to a number of other things is the emergence of religious liberty as sort of a new front in the way in the culture wars. It applies to a whole range of issues.

We decided to try to get at, at least the kind of divide behind this, by asking a question that was a paired opposite question that said which worries you more the government interfering with the ability of people to freely practice their religion or religious groups trying to pass laws that force their beliefs on others.

What we see here is that basically the public is divided right down the middle here, 46/46, so dead even split on this question. You can see we've divided it here by religious affiliation, and you can see, you know, very clear sorting. White evangelical Protestants, Hispanic Protestants, which also tend to be evangelical, both strongly on the side of being worried more about the government interfering with people to freely practice religion.

White mainliners pretty evenly divided. Among white Catholics a plurality on that side, but fairly evenly divided. African American, plurality on the side of worried about religious groups trying to pass laws to force their beliefs on others. Then we see kind of stronger push on the other side among Hispanics, Catholics, Jews, and the unaffiliated with Jews and the unaffiliated about two-thirds saying their more worried

about religious groups trying to pass laws that force their beliefs on others.

I'm aware of the time here, I'm going to wrap it up quickly and just say I think we'll come back to this probably in the conversation. So with that let me turn it back over to E.J. and Bill.

MR. GALSTON: Well, good evening everyone. I'm Bill Galston, a Senior Fellow in Government Studies here at Brookings and a co-conspirator with E.J. and our religion project as assistants to PRI on the creation of these surveys.

Without further ado let me introduce today's all-star panel of commentators on this report. I will introduce them in the order in which they will speak which also happens to be the order in which they're seated here on the panel, funny coincidence.

First, Henry Olsen is a Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center where he studies and provides commentary on American politics. His work focuses on how to address, consistent with conservative principles, the electoral challenges facing modern American conservatism. This work will culminate in a book, we all hope soon, entitled *New Century, New Deal How Conservatives Can Win Hearts, Minds, and Elections*.

Next is Joy Reid who's the host of the Reed Report on MSNBC. Prior to this role she was the managing editor of TheGrio.com, and the Reed Report Political Blog. She was also a freelance columnist for the Miami Herald for several years, and produced and hosted a radio show called Radio One.

Final commentator, Alan Abramowitz, who holds the Alben W. Barkley Distinguished Chair in Political Science at Emory. For extra credit, those over 70 in the room get to identify Alben Barkley. Before this he taught at the College of William and Mary and at Stony Brook University. He's the author of several books, most recently, *The*

Polarized Public, Why is American Government So Dysfunctional.

If I may interject a personal note, I think I'm not alone in regarding Professor Abramowitz as the preeminent student of political polarization in the United States today. Although there's some dissent on the left coast, I understand.

So first Henry. Each commentator will speak for a maximum of 10 minutes, there's a timer in front. Ten minutes is a hard stop. Over to you, Henry.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you very much. I want to start by saying, as you can tell from my intellectual interests, I am a conservative. I am a Republican. I started volunteering at a young age, the week that Richard Nixon resigned, so you can't get more hardcore than I.

MR. DIONNE: Talk about buying at the bottom.

MR. OLSEN: Six years later with the election of Ronald Reagan I saw quite a capital return on my investment.

But, you know, if you're sincere about your beliefs you should not be polyanish about the situation in which you engage. What I think the data show is that the American populous is worried, is, at best, more people are treading water. At worse, some people are falling behind, and at really worse, some people are falling into real deprivation who had not experienced that before.

If you want to make an argument that's the background in which you have to make it. Nor can you make the argument against a tide of optimism. Perhaps five years ago or eight years that would have been possible. But as you can see, people are slowing losing hope that the American dream, that this can be turned around.

Again, for many people it's been well over a decade since they have received significant benefits from a growing American economy. In an article I'm going to be publishing out soon, if you take a look at Americans who don't have college degrees,

and you look during the growth period of the Bush Administration their incomes, at best, stagnated, and at worst, declined in real terms during the period when the economy was growing under the Bush Administration.

This is the background that a lot of Americans look at. That they have not benefited even during growing times of the American economy. That's a background for the pessimism that you see in the PRI survey.

So what does it mean for a conservative? If you want to win an election you have to put together a national majority. If you want to win a presidential election you have to pick up the swing states that the Democrats have been winning recently. They pretty much come into two groups.

They come into states in the southwest where the primary demographic challenge facing Republicans is the growth of the Hispanic community. In the same article that's coming out, if you take a look at Florida and Colorado and Nevada Mitt Romney got the same percentage or more of the white vote than George W. Bush. The reason he lost those states is that he not only lost the Hispanic vote by more, the Hispanic population has dramatically increased in size. This, of course, explains why Republicans are looking at Hispanics.

But the other group of states you need to pick up if you're a Republican are in the industrial Midwest, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Iowa are three swing states. But right behind are states like Pennsylvania and Michigan and Minnesota which are only a couple points more leaning Democrat, and also have a strong indication that they could vote Republican. Particularly like in Michigan where Republican held governorship and the legislature.

The primary demographic in these areas is the whites without a college degree. There is very little in migration of Hispanics that which there is remains minor in

the electorate. There's very little in migration of whites with a college degree. They tend to be flocking to the coasts or certain areas in Texas or North Carolina that are more attractive.

Between each of these states between 45 and 50 percent of the electorate are whites without a college degree. It's like you're still in 1950s America in that you got management in college degrees and you have workers who do not, and the Democrats do very well.

According to Ron Brownstein, Barack Obama carried whites without a college degree in Iowa, and then both Ohio and in Wisconsin he lost them by narrowly enough to offset his margin loss among whites with a college degree so that the non-white populations provided the margin of victory in both those states.

So if you're a Republican trying to win those states you have to look at the white working class. So for that in mind I want to take a look at what this survey shows for the white working class, and for what challenges that presents for the Republicans.

First, the white working class is not uniform. Thanks to some documents that Robbie provided us, white evangelicals are extremely different from other white working class voters. If you ask in 2014 do you favor the Republican candidate or the Democrat candidate, white evangelicals nationwide will back the Republican, this is before you allocate leaners, 54 to 19. Working class Catholics, on the other hand, are roughly split, 38 for the Republican, 35 for the Democrat.

If you look at how did you vote, in the Midwest, white working class split 39 to 40. If you look by religion white evangelicals voted for Mitt Romney over 2 to 1, but Catholics split roughly 50/50. If you look at Ohio, Wisconsin, and Iowa, Michigan, these are places that have many fewer white evangelicals and many more white mainline

Protestants, predominantly Lutherans and many more Catholics. This is why Republicans do not win those states.

Take a look at the favorability's among white working class who are evangelicals, 33 percent have a favorable view of Democrats. Among Catholics 47 percent, among white mainlines 48 percent. In the interest of time I'll skip forward.

So then the question is what is it that might be wedge issues or what is it that might be the grounds which you could bring these voters into the Republican coalition. At the abstract level they favor lower taxes on individuals and businesses, and paying for those tax cuts by cutting spending on some government programs by about a 5 to 4 margin. Again, it's more prevalent among white evangelicals, but even Catholics support that 51 to 44. White mainline Protestants actually oppose that 45 to 47. So the standard Republican playbook among these people has some appeal, but not an overwhelming majority appeal.

Then you take a look at the issues that Robbie talked about, the parental leave, the raising of the minimum wage, and you see very strong support for all of these. Very strong support for all of these.

I follow elections internationally, and I think it's notable that in the most recent Australian election the conservative candidate proposed to institute paid parental leave. In the most recent New Zealand election where the National Party won reelection with nearly a majority of the vote, that happened over the weekend, during its time in office it increased the minimum wage to 14 New Zealand dollars per hour, and its priority is not cutting taxes in the next term, but improving education, increasing affordable housing for the middle-class, and it pledges to increase paid parental leave from 14 weeks to 16 weeks.

They are in touch with this sort of less government, but not government

that doesn't work in my interest that seems to be the dominant idea among non-evangelical working class voters. Why then haven't Republicans jumped on board, besides the influence of the Tea Party? Although I'll note that even the Tea Party, as you can see, has large minorities, and in the case of family leave a majority of people who support these policies.

Let's take a look at the difference between whites without a college degree and whites with a college degree on what their experiences are like in the American economy. Because most of the decisions that get made in elections are made by elites. That's true in both the Democrats and the Republicans.

Whites without a college degree, 33 percent say they are in excellent or good economic shape. Whites with a college degree 63 percent. Food stamp receipt, 5 percent of whites with a college degree have either personally or someone in their family received food stamps. Twenty three percent of the whites working class.

Economic insecurity 20 point different. American dream, 54 percent yes, 37 percent -- among white college, 37 percent yes among whites without a college degree. There's simply a gap in experience, and when you combine that with the, sort of, experiences people have here, and combine that with philosophy it's simply an out of touch leadership that doesn't see what the voters they need to talk to actually want.

They tend to think that you can use religion to bring these people along as the Republicans did in the 1980s with the Democrats, but that's no longer true. Let's take a look at the interfering with the religious freedom question.

Among white evangelicals, working class, it's 65/28 concerned about religious liberty, among white working class. Everyone else it's a net negative. White mainline it's roughly 50/50. White Catholics it's roughly 50/50.

Same sex marriage, 71 percent opposition from white evangelicals, 48

percent support from white mainline, 44 percent among -- this is working class, among white working class. Catholics, 74 percent among the white working class unaffiliated. Same sex marriage does not bring your swing voter along.

Abortion, 54 percent legal in most cases among white mainline, 48 percent among Catholics, 67 percent evangelical. The Reagan Democrat no longer exists. Today's Republican conservative majority needs to take account, as successful conservatives have done elsewhere, of economic anxiety, and abandon the idea that government ought to do nothing, and favor the idea that Republican ought to be limited, but strong in its role in trying to solve today's problems with a conservative presence.

MS. REID: All right. Well, good afternoon, good morning. Is it still morning? I will start off by saying, by striking a blow for bipartisanship by saying that as a lifelong Democrat I agree with virtually everything Henry Olsen has just said.

MR. OLSEN: And my career just ended.

MS. REID: So did mine. I'll join you on the unemployment line afterwards. We'll be taking donations.

MS. OLSEN: What career?

MR. DIONNE: We keep trying to end Henry's career by inviting him here again and again.

MS. OLSEN: Thanks a lot, E.J. So --

MR. DIONNE: That was Henry.

MS. OLSEN: Oh, okay. Well, thanks a lot, Henry. I'll talk about this, sort of, from the opposite perspective. So if you look at what we're primarily engaged in after Labor Day, where I work, is looking at electoral politics, obviously. So the upcoming midterms are very much on my mind as I'm thinking about it. Having worked a little bit in Democratic politics I'll take, sort of, the other tack.

If you look at Presidential election years, Barack Obama holds, sort of, both the negative and positive record for performance of a Democrat with white voters. In 2008 he won a greater share of white voters than any Democrat since Jimmy Carter in 1976. But in 2012 he lost white voters by a catastrophic margin that had this been the election, let's say against Ronald Reagan or against George Herbert Walker Bush he would have lost in a landslide. Instead he won by nearly 7 million votes.

The Obama campaign's calculation of the way they approached the election was based on, and Ron Brownstein has done a lot of this work, the election being approximately 28 percent non-white in 2012. It having been 26 percent non-white in 2008. That approximately 2 percent increase in the non-white voting population every four years has held true. Such that if Barack Obama had had the exact same sort of composition of electorate but had been running 8 years or 12 years earlier he would have lost.

So Democrats understand that their electorate is, increasingly, a minority electorate added to a composition of college-educated white voters, particularly in the northern part of the country. So for mid-terms that actually doesn't hold true. As we all, I'm sure, know. That non-white voting population drops of markedly in midterms which is why you can actually, for Democrats, win a majority but still be able to govern because every two years you fall back in terms of Congress.

So I want to now look at the contrast between what Henry was talking about which is the dissatisfaction of white, working class voters as contrasted with the attitudes of African American voters. In my previous job at The Grio, we did before the 2012 election an over sample of African Americans because we were getting this narrative, this meme, even among media people, that African Americans were increasingly dissatisfied as white voters were with the Obama Administration and that it

would affect the reelect in a negative way.

What we actually found was that African American voters were consistently more optimistic than white voters, and more optimistic than Hispanic voters about things like the economy. I still do believe the economy is the greatest driver of electoral outcomes.

If you look at the numbers in this particular survey, and you look at close to half, 46 percent of African Americans saying the economy has gotten better despite the fact that as we was in Robbie's presentation, that African Americans are doing considerable, markedly worse than other populations on every scale, you wonder why that is.

Looking at the employment picture again, the experience of the economy versus the facts of the economy. As of the second quarter of this year we were at 6.1 percent unemployment. Historically, not very bad. For white Americans the unemployment rate is 5.2 percent. So think about now the marked dissatisfaction with the economy among white voters and 5.2 percent.

For African Americans, the unemployment rate is nearly double that. It's 11 percent. For Hispanics it's, I think, 7.3 percent. So you have African Americans consistently more optimistic about the economy despite the fact that they're experiencing the economy in a much more negative way. In a profoundly more negative way just based on the data that we were presented this morning.

So for a midterm electoral what Democrats' sort of conundrum is how to get midterm electorates to look more like the general election population. They're counting on that increased optimism. The, sort of, preferential attitude, and I think it is partly partisan among all of these groups, and the more positive attitude toward the economy among minority groups who they need.

The kind of big irony for Democrats is that having really lost white voters in the south, really lost them, they are now potentially going to be saved in their Senate majority by black voters who still, in a plurality, live in the South. So states like Georgia, Arkansas, Kentucky to a lesser degree, but states like North Carolina it's very important to get black voters out.

Outside the South, states like Wisconsin, very much states like Florida, going back to the South. Gubernatorial and Senate races, statewide races, really are going to turn on whether Democrats can make the composition of the midterm more like the composition of 2012 and 2008. Really more 2012, because we're dealing with the same economy. So getting those voters out is actually a current, sort of, \$60 million project that is being undertaken by Democrats to take advantage of this increased optimism.

I think it would be worth -- we were talking in the green room earlier about how I love focus groups. I would love to see a focus group to really sit down with minority voters as to why the level of optimism is higher. I think the straightforward answer is that for African Americans the Barack Obama Administration is still a source of personal pride, and they still support the Administration, and will see the economy through the lens of that support.

Whereas for white voters, you've seen this really marked turn against the Obama Administration, even by some Democrats that might have voted for it, and that, sort of, general dissatisfaction with the President and the President's party colors that attitude toward the economy.

So I will, just in the interest of being brief move it on from there, but I think it's important to look at that racial difference. Just one more point.

We've been doing a lot of reporting on Ferguson, and I was very

interested in this, sort of, upside down view of, sort of, the broader questions of fairness. Whether it's economic fairness or fairness in the justice system where you have African Americans really experiencing the country as fundamentally unjust toward non-white people, and a marked increase as white Americans experiencing the country as unjust toward them.

I think part of that is the field that I work in. You increasingly have a compartmentalized media that is speaking directly to an ideological group and reinforcing whatever attitudes that group has about the economy, about the state of the economy. The messaging, I think, is really part of the reason that you do have people experiencing the same economy, the same set of economic data in very, very different ways, and then taking those attitudes into the election.

So I think if the conundrum for Republicans is how to speak to working class white voters in a way that doesn't withdraw completely the support of the government, which traditionally going back to the New Deal, has been part of the underpinning for that economic cohort. The challenge for Democrats is taking the fundamental optimism, essentially, of minority groups and translating that into urgent voting behavior when there's no Barack Obama at the top of the ticket.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: First of all, I want to thank the Public Religion Research Institute for inviting me to be here today. I'm delighted to be here with this very distinguished panel. I'm going to make a few comments about, you know, the aspects of this survey that most interested me.

There's an awful lot in here that's of interest. We were sent, you know, reams and reams of cross tabs. So I kind of honed in a few things that really interested me as a student of political polarization in the United States.

Today's the first full day of autumn, so happy autumnal equinox to

everyone. That also means that we're now exactly six weeks out from the 2014 midterm election. I don't know exactly what's going to happen in that election. I think we're pretty sure Republicans are going to keep control of the House of Representatives, maybe pick up a few seats. We don't know how the Senate's going to come out. I think it's right on the borderline between switching over to Republican control.

But regardless of that, what I do think I can predict with a high degree of confidence is that the next two years we're going to continue to have divided party control in Washington, and that means we're going to continue to have gridlock, continue to have confrontation, and we're going to continue to have dysfunctional government. That's the good news.

You know, the big question about that is, you know, why has this been happening, and why is that likely to continue to happen after the election? I think actually that the Senate is going to be more polarized after this election if you look at the likely switches.

I think the explanation is in the data here. That it's not just a matter of division among political elites. You can't begin to understand what's been happening in Washington, and what's likely to continue going on here without understanding the fact that this divide between Democrats and Republicans that we see in Washington today, and in many of our state capitals as well, reflects a deep divide within the American public and in American society. So that's the message that I see in this data.

There's a handout with a few tables. Some of these points have already been covered in the PowerPoint presentation, so I'll just go over them very quickly. One is that, basically what we're seeing is that Democrats and Republicans represents increasingly diverging constituencies. The kinds of voters who support the two parties are becoming more and more different.

The first table that you see there just shows the demographic divide between the two parties. Just to highlight a couple of aspect of that. You know, everyone's, I think, familiar with the differences between -- Democrats and Republicans just look different today. If you go to a Democratic campaign event or a Republican campaign event or you see a photograph, you know, you wouldn't be confused about -- you'd be able to quickly pick out which is which, right? Unless you're in, like, North Dakota. I'm not sure there are Democratic rallies in North Dakota, but in most of the country the differences are stark.

The one that really stands out to me is the growing racial divide between the two parties. Which is, I believe, the single most important driver of polarization in American politics. This is not a top down phenomenon, this is a bottom up phenomenon. American society is changing. It's becoming more racially and ethnically diverse, and that's driving the two parties apart.

The remarkable thing that we see in this data is that the Democratic Electoral Coalition today, the Democrat Party today is a majority minority party. The Democrats are already a majority minority party. The Republican Party remains an overwhelmingly white party. That hasn't changed very much.

This division between the two parties is going to continue increasing. There's every reason to expect it to continue growing as American society becomes increasingly non-white. I don't see the Republican Party today, I'm sorry to give you the bad news Henry, I don't see the Republican Party doing anything today that's going to increase its appeal among non-white voters, among African Americans, among Hispanics.

It's actually doing everything it can to drive Hispanics away from the Republican Party as far as I can tell. So I see this divide continuing to get bigger as the

country becomes more diverse. That's the big one.

There are other big divides, obviously, also. Growing racial divides, in turn, contributing to a growing divide in terms of policy preferences, particularly on economic issues. You can see the data there on the second table showing the economic policy divide between the two parties, which is quite large on many of these issues, particularly on the Affordable Care Act.

So Republicans overwhelmingly want the Affordable Care Act, still, want the Affordable Care Act to be either repealed completely or repealed and replaced by an unspecified Republican alternative which, of course, doesn't exist. But that's what they want, overwhelmingly.

Democrats overwhelmingly are opposed to that. They want to keep it or maybe modify it somewhat. Maybe actually make it more generous. That's the Democratic perspective on this.

You see that across these economic issues. What's kind of interesting is that Republican voters are actually somewhat divided on some of these economic issues like raising the minimum wage. Democrats tend to be more unified on many of these economic issues.

So there's a big economic policy divide. There's also a big cultural divide, you know, which reflects the religious divide between the two parties. But there's a divide over issues such as same sex marriage, abortion policy, and these questions about religion in American life and whether there's, you know, the threat to religious liberty. You see a pretty big partisan divide on those questions as well.

You see, particularly among whites, I should say that this cultural divide is really something that is mainly evident among whites. Certainly among African Americans you don't see it all. That is you don't see a divide in terms of religiosity among

African Americans. You do among Hispanics to some extent, but among whites is where you really see the big divide between those who are, you know, more devout versus those who are less devout and more secular.

There's a big divide on racial attitudes. You know, we've already seen some evidence about that. The questions about, you know, do African Americans and other minorities, are they treated equally by the criminal justice system. I thought that was a factual question because the correct answer is no.

I mean, there's just lots and lots of evidence that shows that that's just not the case. But nevertheless, a lot of white people, and even some minorities, believe that that is the case. But there's a big racial divide. There's also a big partisan divide on that question.

Also, you know, on the racial attitudes, I thought the reverse discrimination question was very interesting. You have a big party divide on that question also. You know, of whether discrimination against whites is, you know, is a big of problem as discrimination against minorities.

So the only thing that hasn't been talked about yet is the media divide. There's a big divide between the parties in terms of what -- well, the question was about what TV network do you consider the most trustworthy, do you have the most trust in? Among Republicans the leader by a wide margin is Fox News, no surprise. Among Democrats it's divide among a whole bunch of things. Very few Democrats rate Fox News as the most trustworthy.

Democrats go for the ABC, NBC, CBS, MSNBC, Public Broadcasting, and, interestingly, the Daily Show and Colbert is popular among Democrats. Seven percent of Democrats named those as their most trustworthy news source versus 2 percent of Republicans. But among younger people overall it's 11 percent. I didn't see a

breakout separately for Democrats, but I'm sure among young Democrats it's quite a bit higher than that still.

So Colbert and the Daily Show are viewed as much more trustworthy among young Democrats than Fox News. So what's happening with this media divide, of course, means that these differences in opinions across issues is getting reinforced all the time by what people are seeing on the news.

I want to just touch briefly on one thing that's not in this data because these differences, these divides on issues, and these demographic divides are also leaning to a growing affective divide within the American public that's very significant. How we feel about the parties.

Someone mentioned earlier, I think in the original presentation, that, you know, neither party's very popular. The main reason for that is that we hate the other party. So what we're seeing as we look at these trends over time is that, you know, back 40 or 50 years ago most Americans we like our own party better than the other party, but, you know, the other party is not so great, but it's okay.

Now, what it is we like our own party okay, that hasn't changed very much at all. Our ratings of, you know, Democrats and Republicans rate their own parties about the same. Our ratings of the opposing party have gotten much more negative. We really dislike the opposing party.

The interesting thing to me is these attitudes are not just focused exclusively on elites. It's not just that we don't like the opposing party's leaders. We don't like the opposing party's voters.

So just to close I would mention one thing that, you know, kind of reinforces this is a finding I just saw reported in the news about peoples' feelings about how would you feel if your son or daughter married, and they asked about, you know, a

person of a different race. Most Americans are okay with that now. That's a huge shift in attitudes. The acceptance of interracial marriages, and actually interracial marriages are much more prevalent now. They're accepted wide enough by everyone, but they're much more widely accepted.

On the other hand, the idea of your son or daughter marriage someone from the other party. That is really unpopular. People really get upset about that. We see that reflected in actual behavior. In dating practices and in marriage, I mean, people are really -- partisanship is now a very strong influence.

Part of it has to do with, you know, similarity of values and things like that. It's not just, purely, about partisanship. But partisanship is highly correlated with these other things.

This party divide is deeply embedded in the American public. That's why the politicians in Washington can't get along. It's not that they don't trust each other, you know, Dana Milbank wrote this piece a few days ago about the problem is that they don't trust each other. I love Dana Milbank, but that's not right. That's not the main problem.

Saying, you know, we don't trust the other party is more a symptom or an excuse. You know, Republicans say, well, we can't support immigration reform because we don't trust Obama. That's not the problem. That problem is that they really disagree about what should be done, but more importantly the represent these different constituencies that have very diverging views, and the Republicans are afraid if they support Obama or go along with this they'll be punished. You know, their voters will be very unhappy because they don't have to worry about Hispanic voters. They don't have any. If there are any in their district they're not voting for them.

So there's this divide within the American public and the American society that's driving this divide that we see in Washington, and it ain't going away

anytime soon. So on that happy note I'll conclude.

MR. GALSTON: E.J. we have 25 minutes left. I have a proposal. You put one question to the group. We'll then go to the audience. If there's time at the end I'll put a question, and if not, no. Okay?

MR. DIONNE: Oh, good. I want to hear your question though, one way or the other.

First of all, thank you everyone, including Robbie, and I -- in a way I would like Robbie to comment on this, but I want to sort of direct it to our respondents. First to Henry, loyal conservative Republican, but every time I hear him he's really a European Christian Democrat or New Zealand conservative. It's great to have you.

Your focus on the working class, I think, is really important. I'm totally with Joy on this. I'd love you to talk about how -- it's one question slightly phrased differently for each of you. For Henry, I'd like you to talk about the impact of the Tea Party on all this. It was described as populist, but its views don't strike me as solving the problem that you are describing as the problem.

For Joy, by the way our household has been fans of yours ever since you appeared on TV.

MS. REID: Thank you.

MR. DIONNE: It's really true. I've had this argument with people over time about the, you know, what you might call if you're old enough, the John Lindsay Coalition, minorities plus upscale people. To me it's immoral if the Democratic Party gives up on working class whites because, as you saw from Robbie's data, you know, working class whites have really gotten hammered and feel hammered.

I'm curious, we talked once upon a time about biracial coalitions. Jimmy Carter actually won the South with a coalition of African Americans and working class

whites. How do you, sort of, get that conversation going?

The same question for Alan given that the cultural divides that you identify mean that many working class whites who once were, you know, for those who stayed up late and watched the Roosevelt series, you know, the real base of the Democratic Party. Something has happened. There are difference North and South, obviously.

So I'd like you all to deal with that, but with Henry in particular, I'd love you to take the Tea Party issue on.

MR. OLSEN: I think the Tea Party, as Robbie mentioned, is primarily a mobilization of certain elements of the Republican Party that claims to be something more, but the data have never supported that.

I think insofar as they have relation to the white working class who are not already Republicans, they strike some themes that would resonate, and they strike other themes that would not. They strike the theme of feeling left out and left behind that is very prevalent among white working class voters. They strike a theme that the government is working against the interest of the average person, which is another thing that is very common among white working class voters.

But being from the most conservative wings of the Republican Party they tend then also to talk about support -- the problem is being government programs, and increasingly government entitlement programs. This is something that, you know -- this is where I think you can see a difference between an elite of the Tea Party and the base of the Tea Party because as polls show if you actually ask people who identify with the Tea Party how much do you want to cut back Social Security, how much do you want to cut back Medicare they're actually not in lockstep with their leadership.

But to the extent that there is that element it is something that is distinctly

not supported by a number of white working class independents. The sort of people that you would need to win. Simply because it's more important to them. You can see that, in part, by what's going on Nationwide right now.

You know, what would you say one of the biggest Tea Party arguments is, don't expand Medicaid. Reject the Medicaid expansion is probably one of the biggest things that you see. But if you're a Republican governor in one of these swing states, every single Republican governor has now endorse Medicaid expansion.

Snyder in Michigan, Kasich in Ohio, Christ -- not Christ, he used to be a Republican. Scott in Florida. Branstad in Iowa, Corbett of Pennsylvania. Even Scott Walker who didn't take the money used a rejiggering of the extremely generous Wisconsin Medicaid program to increase coverage.

If you as the Republican lead who would you love to have as a Vice President. If you're not saying Marco Rubio you're saying Suzanna Martinez. Suzanna Martinez, without a doubt, just jumped on board with Medicaid and setting up a state exchange.

So what are these Republican governors in these swing states that have a large number of working class Hispanics or working class whites doing? They're actually not following the Tea Party advice. I think that's something that Republicans need to look at as the distinction between the populous and anti-government appeal of the Tea Party which is shared by the white working class, and the anti-government rhetoric, which is not shared by the white working class to the extent that the Tea Party has.

MS. REID: Interestingly enough you cited Florida, Henry, where Rick Scott, the governor who ran having formed a pack to fight the Affordable Care Act. Specifically his whole reason for being in politics was to fight to Affordable Care Act, a

former hospital executive, who left under some questionable circumstances from his former company.

Scott tried to take the money and was rebuked by the legislature in Florida which actually prevented him from taking the Medicaid expansion. That's an interesting case because Florida, of the approximately 5 million people being locked out of the Medicaid expansion, about 1 million of them are in Florida. Florida is, perhaps, the most uninsured -- one of the most uninsured states in the country besides Texas.

SPEAKER: Georgia.

MS. REID: Yeah, Georgia's bad too, but I think Florida's actually worse than Georgia.

But you have that imperative in those southern states to reject ideologically the idea of 'Obamacare' even at the peril of your own citizens. In Kentucky you have an interesting case where Mitch McConnell is trying to both run against the Affordable Care Act and run for Connect, which happens to be the Affordable Care.

So you have this disconnect that I think to get to E.J.'s question about cross-racial coalitions. There's a reason why southern -- why so many Democrats who are successful on a national political level were from the south. Part of that is because if you go back and look at Jimmy Carter, not when he was running for president, but when he was running for governor, part of the puzzle you have to put together as a Southern white Democratic, because these were unipolar regions. The Democratic Party was absolutely the dominate party.

Meaning that even if your voters were voting for Ronald Reagan at the national level, in the state level, really until 2010, most of the southern legislatures were still dominated by Democrats. So Democrats at the state level will still dominating actual state party politics.

Even in the '94 Republican Revolution, the majority of Southern legislatures, including Kentucky, North Carolina, remained in the hands of Democrats. So threading that needle meant that you as a Democratic politician, white Democrat in the South, you had to both balance working class white interests, especially rural voters interests, and still keep African Americans.

Meaning you had to give just enough winks and nods to the racial politics that oppose Linden Johnson's reforms, which were seen as a perversion of the New Deal. The New Deal was seen as helping their parents. Whereas the Great Society was seen as taking all of the things that were given to their parents and handing it to black people.

That experience of the Johnson programs as a betrayal of the white working class, of essentially not giving benefits like Medicare, Medicaid to all, but actually it was portrayed as a theft. That was part of the Republican marketing against Linden Johnson. He was seen as a traitor to the South. It's part what started the cascade away from the Democratic Party.

So the only politicians who still had the skill set of both balancing rural white voters, who still needed things, who still needed assistance from government, who still needed farm assistance. Remember Farm Aid in the 80s, the collapse of the family farms. This hit white rural America very hard, and they needed federal assistance.

So you have this balance where you had white rural voters who still needed government, but who hated the kind of government they thought Linden Johnson had imposed on the south, which they saw a second reconstruction. Southern white Democrats knew how to have that dual conversation. It's why Bill Clinton was successful. It's why Jimmy Carter was initially successful.

If you recall in 2004 Howard Dean got in some trouble trying to articulate

that by saying we still want to have the kind of voters with a Confederate Flag on their car. It was an inarticulate way of saying that Democrats need to recapture that dual conversation that Clinton really was the last Democrat who knew how to have.

One of the reasons that Barack Obama did so well in 2008 in having a dual conversation both with black voters who were excited about his presidency, and white voters who still had needs is because when Barack Obama was a state senator in Illinois he spent a lot of time in downstate Illinois. He was a downstate Illinois politician who happened to live in Chicago. So he spent a lot of time cultivating downstate.

Now downstate are full of sun downtowns. They're basically like the south. There's a big swath of Illinois where it's still not a good idea for African Americans to be out on the streets after dark. It's very southern in culture. But he cultivated relationships with those kind of downstate Democrats. He knows how to have that conversation, and he happens to have been raised by Midwesterners from Kansas. He grew up in that conversation, so he actually knew how to do that.

So I think for Democrats what they have to do is really what was done in Mississippi in that bizarre reelect where you had a white Republican reelected by creating a collation of African Americans and white voters who still recognized their needs. Democrats have to communicate that the government is capable of providing for the needs of white working class voters without, in their mind, taking something away. Giving with the right hand and taking something away from the left and handing it over to minorities. Because that is the message that's been given to the white working class, and it's the reason Democrats have lost the white working class.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Very briefly because I largely agree with what's already been said. I would say when you look at the white working class today, I mean, as has been said previously, it's a very diverse group. It makes a lot of difference

whether you're talking about Southern white working class or whether you're talking about Northern white working class. It also makes a difference if you break them down in terms of their religious orientations. There are really big differences.

Overall what I would say is that New Deal party system where the Democratic Party's coalition was really, you know, overwhelming based on the support of white working class voters, white Southerners, Northern white working class voters, white Catholic voters in the North, that was the Democratic coalition really because minorities were a very, very small part of the electorate in those days. That coalition's gone and it's not coming back.

You know, those groups are very divided, and actually social class is one of the least important divisions in American politics today. For example, if you look at attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act or just about any other question measuring support for activist government today and you control for race, if you look among white voters, in terms of income level there's almost no difference.

Low income whites are not more supportive of activist government than high income whites. Low income whites do not support the Affordable Care Act any more than high income whites. There's a huge party divide, regardless of income, it's all party. That, in terms, reflects a big ideological divide.

People are divided over what the role of government should be, but their attitudes towards the role of government are not influenced very much at all by their social class, by their income level. You know, it's surprising.

Even on the question of the Affordable Care Act I looked at some data on whether people have insurance, whether people are covered by health insurance, and whether there is support for the Affordable Care Act. It makes no difference. People without health insurance, who clearly would be major beneficiaries of the Affordable Care

Act, were no more supportive of it than people with health insurance coverage. What mattered was ideology and party. That's what determined their attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act.

MR. GALSTON: Well, doing all of our business in an hour and a half is the verbal equivalent of trying to fit a size 11 foot into a size 7 shoe. It doesn't fit. So with your permission, and if this collides with individual schedules, please feel free to vote with your fee, with your permission in order to allow sufficient time for questions from the floor I'm going to take 15 minutes onto this session. Does that produce heartburn for anybody on the panel.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: It works for me.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, good.

MR. OLSEN: That's fine.

MR. GALSTON: So it's over to you. Are there roving microphones? Okay. We have a roving microphone and I'm going to start at the rear and move forward. So the gentleman on the aisle there.

MR. DIONNE: If you could keep your brief so we could get everybody in that would be really great.

MR. GALSTON: You know, let me ask you to do that, and to identify yourselves and ask questions, don't make speeches.

MR. CHECKO: My name is Larry Checko. If somebody can clear something up for me. Realizing that there's a tremendous income gap, and people vote, basically for social and economic issues, it always astounds me how people vote against their own self-interests.

In other words, it always astounds me why Republican Party gets more than 1 to 10 percent of the vote at all. Does that mean -- given their mantra, I mean, it

was expressed earlier. But does that mean that people are mostly voting for religious, cultural American values when they vote Republican on the -- are they voting for the social aspects of the Republican Party versus the economic aspects? Why would you vote against your own economic self-interest is my question, I guess.

MR. OLSEN: Why do some people who make over \$250,000 a year, quite a lot of them actually, vote for the Democratic Party?

MR. GALSTON: Explain Bethesda.

MR. OLSEN: They're the ones whose taxes are going to be raised. Look at San Francisco, look at the Bay Area. All around the country, so I'm saying this it's not so much raw economic self-interest, you know, people don't perceive it that way.

When they think about which party's policies would be better for me their basing that on ideological grounds. Cultural issues matter somewhat, but even on the economic issues people's opinions don't reflect their socioeconomic status very much.

MR. CHECKO: Does no information voting have anything to do with that?

MS. REID: I'll just throw in very briefly, when my parents came to the country my mother almost immediately -- they immigrated in the 60s. My mother almost immediately became a Democrat and never voted for a Republican in her entire life, in this country.

Voting in some senses is cultural, and we were raised culturally Democratic. My father is not an American citizen, but he is a Republican, if he were an American, and he's just culturally attuned to that party. That's just the party he prefers.

So I think voting, to a large extent, has become cultural. If you look at the patterns, even of where people live, people are actually moving to communities to be around one another because they're culturally Republican or culturally Democratic.

So I think part of it is people are not parsing their economic interest as against this one guy who's running for Congress. They're saying that guy is culturally like me. I'm voting for him.

MR. GALSTON: Next question, please. Yes, the gentleman on the aisle.

MR. SKINNER: Hi. I'm Richard Skinner from American University. I noticed in the graph on peoples' attitudes there's religion in public life there was a really big gap between Hispanic Catholics and Hispanic evangelicals. I've also see a fair amount of data lately that you see, sort of, the two religious extremes of the Hispanic community growing. That you see more Hispanic evangelicals, who tend to be more conservative, and more Hispanic unaffiliated who tend to be more liberal.

I'm wondering if anybody there wants to talk about the future of cultural divides based on religion within the Hispanic community, and how that's likely to affect American politics.

MR. GALSTON: Robbie, please.

MR. JONES: I can take that one. So you're absolutely right to point to, actually two transformations, in the Latino community. So over time what we are seeing is a shift to being less Catholic over time. But it is going in two directions, so it's less Catholic and more Protestant, to be sure the Protestant sector is growing. But it's also becoming more unaffiliated.

In fact, those two flows look about equal. What we see is that Latino Protestants tend to be like white evangelicals. They look a lot like white evangelicals on cultural issues. They divide a little bit on the economic issues, but in terms of, like same sex marriage, abortion, they tend to be, sort of, culturally conservative in a way that Hispanic Catholics are not.

For example, Hispanic Catholics, 58 percent of Hispanic Catholics support same sex marriage. It's nearly 6 in 10 there, so it's a big divide between Hispanics, Protestants, Catholics. But the short answer is that if you're just looking at ideology or political leanings what it basically looks like is that the overall needle, if the flows are as they are today, doesn't move that much because there is equal numbers becoming unaffiliated as there are becoming Hispanic Protestant.

MS. REID: If I could just say one very quick thing, and it's a red flag for Henry's party, is that the Hispanic vote today is about where the black vote was in the 1960s, it's about 65/35 overall Democratic. The precipitous move of African Americans away from the Republican Party is starting to happen with Hispanics, and it's a huge red flag for the GOP.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: On the Hispanic Protestant question I wrote a piece for that recently for national review. Hispanic Protestants mirror white evangelicals on their views on social issues, but they do not at all on their views on the role of government and social policy.

If you look at voting patterns they are the most likely among Hispanics to vote for Republicans, but they still provide majority support for Democrats in most election, unlike white evangelicals. So it is not necessarily a strong positive for the Republican Party that more Hispanics are becoming Pentecostal or other evangelical denominations because on net it's still a Democratic constituency.

MR. OLSEN: My understanding was that white Protestants had actually moved toward the Democrats in the last election. I don't know if it was 2008 or maybe 2004 that there was a divide among Hispanics. I'm sorry, yeah Hispanic Protestants.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: In 2004 about a majority of Hispanic Protestants voted for George W. Bush, but it was still significantly less than white evangelicals. It

was like 56 percent to 79 percent. With Romney's election it was roughly split. I think the Latino Decisions Pole had Barack Obama winning. A slight majority, and white evangelicals were still 79 percent for Barack.

MR. OLSEN: I think the immigration issue is another one that united both groups.

MS. REID: Yeah. We should note that Marco Rubio only got 50 percent of the Hispanic vote in Florida, and he's Latino.

MR. GALSTON: I'm going to take another couple of questions over here, and then I'm going to move over to the other side. Yes, please.

MS. GROSSMAN: Kath Grossman, Religion News Service. You've been talking in terms of the mid-term elections, but I want to ask you to look 10 to 15 years down the road as the demographics continue to move towards a majority/minority nation and more millennials who are unaffiliated religiously are moving into the voting blocks.

What does this say for the divide? Is it all just going to -- is the teeter-totter going to shift even more heavily democratic? Where are the Republicans 15 years from now?

MS. REID: I've called the 2020 presidential election Armageddon for the Republican Party because they have a two-fold problem. One that current, present day Hispanics far under vote their share of the population. There are actually more Hispanics than African Americans, but Hispanics representing 15 percent of the population only represent 10 percent of the electorate.

Whereas, African Americans over vote or come very close to voting their population share, and it's only getting more. African Americans actually out voted in terms of their population share white voters in 2012

For Republicans the next big problem is that my son, I have a 14 year old who will be able to vote in 2020, his generation is more minority than my generation, and my generation is more minority than the next generation above mine. So you have the youth bulge. White, young voters still vote majority Republican.

People assume that white younger voters are voting majority Democrat. It's still very close, but they're still net Republican. But there are less of them, and there are less and less and less of them. So as the electorate becomes more minority laden, 2016 is going to be approximately 30 percent minority. Do the math. By the time you get to 2020 you're in a world of hurt if Republicans can't find a way to expand their electorate.

MR. GALSTON: I can't wait for Joy's new best-seller, six years to Armageddon.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: You've got to consider Hilary Clinton will be running for reelection.

MS. REID: Single white women. Single white women, that's it.

MR. GALSTON: We have two more over here, and then I'm switching to the other side, so the gentleman and then the woman on the aisle.

MR. BIRNBAUM: Thanks for designating me as a gentleman, Bill, I feel elevated.

MR. GALSTON: That was an effort to box you in.

MR. BIRNBAUM: I'm Norman Birnbaum from Georgetown University. I'm the senior member of the Editorial Board of the Nation. We keep a list of promising future contributors and even editors, and certainly I'm going to email immediately a good reference for Mr. Olsen.

The marvelous Roosevelt film by Ken Burns suffered, I think, a lot of respect. There was a certain underemphasize of the religious convictions underlying the

behavior about family, and, of course, their associates and electorates.

It's an interesting question to ask the panel, do they see in the data any hit, any possibility of the kind of religious revival that would reintroduce something like the religious basis of the New Deal Coalition, which had a very, very strong, diversified religious coalition including, at that time, evangelical, Protestants, Labor Protestants, large segments of American Catholicism, and a very, very different kind of Jewish community.

Is there some hint in the data somehow that this kind of thing could be revived as a wave, let's say, or amongst one of its consequences might be to alter the political behavior of the white Republican groupings. Particularly in the middle lower sections of the socioeconomic scale.

MR. GALSTON: Thank you, Norman.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: I would jump in and say I'm not sure that the New Deal Coalition could be revived, but as the white evangelical Christian movement comes to grips with the fact that on most of the issues that they have fought on they are not winning. Then they either need to go away as a political group that's self-identified or they need to have a new purpose that brings them together.

I think if you look at the data, white evangelicals tend to be significantly, if you define the question of economic life of should government be involved or not, a power question, they tend to be much more likely to be on the yes, government should be involved than the more libertarian elements of the Republican Party.

In the New Deal world that would have meant that they would have been part of the New Deal Coalition. The way the left has evolved they remain significantly at odds with the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. That gives an opportunity for a redefinition of Republicanism that would be more like the New Deal, but that would be

more authentically Republican and more individualistic in its implementation of a government involvement in the social safety net.

But I don't think that you're going to see a recreation of the New Deal coalition because of the shift that the left has undergone in the last eight years.

MR. GALSTON: Robbie, do you want to?

MR. JONES: Just real quickly, one notable thing I think I just want to throw out here is the shrinking size of the white evangelical cohort as a percentage of the population. You know, if we break down the current population by generation and by race and by ethnicity if you look among seniors white evangelicals make up more than 3 in 10 seniors. If you look among millennials they make up less than 1 in 10 of millennials.

What we've seen also is also is a sort of slight shrinking so that now, actually, white evangelical Protestants and the unaffiliated are equal in size in the current population. About 1 in 5 Americans are religiously unaffiliated, about 1 in 5 Americans are white evangelical Protestants, and they tend to serve as kind of ballast to one another on a whole range of issues. They are just mirror opposites these two groups. I think that's, sort of, a new dynamic in the American religious landscape.

MR. GALSTON: Robbie, on Norman's point could you just talk a bit about the findings among the millennials or the under 30s? Because I think that kind of militates against the possibility of a Democratic movement based more in religion.

MR. JONES: In terms of the unaffiliated?

MR. GALSTON: Yeah.

MR. JONES: So, I mean, the other thing about millennials is that they are more than a third unaffiliated. So while we have, you know, sort of shrinking numbers of evangelical and shrinking numbers of mainline Protestants, basically all the religious affiliation groups are shrinking among the millennial group because the unaffiliated

portion is growing. So I think that is a real challenge, especially if you're thinking about a certain 1950s, 1960s, 1940s style religious coalition the bodies just aren't there in the way that they were, you know, 50 years ago.

MS. REID: If I could just say very quickly, the George W. Bush Administration and Karl Rove, I think, was a big part of the planning with this. They did a very interesting thing in 2000, which was to bring mainline Protestant and evangelical groups into a relationship with government, into a financial relationship I should say, with government. By taking a lot of government function, using this philosophical idea and conservatism that it should be your local church, it should be charity that should be taking care of the poor. That a lot of these functions are better left to these kinds of entities. But then adding to that kind of a grant component, sort of creating a relationship.

The Obama Administration has coopted that to a certain extent. They have this, sort of, relationship with Protestant organizations that do social policy within communities that are in a grant relationship with government. It's an interesting twist that they've kind of coopted from the Bush Administration.

It's complicated by the fact that on the Catholic side, where you do have a strong social justice component that could, theoretically, form the basis of what you're talking about, because within Catholicism is this strong movement toward caring for the poor, toward openness to immigration reform. It's balanced out, though, by the real dog fight between the Catholic Church and the Obama Administration on contraception.

So there's been a push of pull of trying to draw religious groups into a relationship with government. It always meets, eventually, an ideological barriers.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: That's another reason why I think it's likelier to happen on the right than on the left.

MS. REID: Yes.

MR. DIONNE: Just on Joy's point, one sentence. There's a least one study that shows that the Obama Administration has actually given more money to religiously based charities than the Bush Administration. Now, a conservative would say that's because Democrats spend more money on such things, but it's a very interesting fact. Go ahead, Bill, I'm sorry.

O'CONNELL: Good morning. Thank you, all. I'm June O'Connell, a retired foreign service officer. Mr. Jones had a couple slides, sort of midway, two-thirds, which had Republican and Democratic breakdown on certain issues, but did not have Independents. Professor Abramowitz's handout sort of said, basically listed Republicans and Democrats, but didn't include Independents.

Yet there has been a lot said in many circles that Americans are less inclined to identify with a particular party. Now that's increasingly true in terms of demographics. The younger people get the less they are to say that they're a Republican or a Democrat.

My question is, really, what about the Independents? Is that, really, an illusion?

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Can I respond to that?

MR. JONES: Go for it.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: So what we know is that -- and the data here are broken down just be Democrat, Republican, Independent. It doesn't, in what we were given, breakout the Independents who lean toward the Republican or Democratic party. When you do that, however, we know from many other studies, including the 2012 American National Election Study, that independent Democrats think and behave just like Democrats. Independent Republicans think and behave just like Republicans. There's almost no difference.

So we know there's a reluctance among some segments of the American population at this point to outright say, yeah, I think of myself as a Republican or Democrat. For whatever reason it makes almost no difference in terms of behavior.

In fact, the electorate today, I think there's ton of evidence, that the electorate today is more partisan than it's ever been. Party loyalty and voting is greater than it has been at any time since we've started studying voting behavior with survey data. Split ticket voting is way down. People are voting straight party ticket. All the way down from president down to state legislature.

So we have a very partisan electorate that reflects these division in the American public. The idea that the electorate is becoming more independent is, frankly, just wrong. It's just not happening.

MR. JONES: Just one thing, what tends to happen, I mostly didn't include the Independent number just for space because I had four bars and already had 16 bars on the slide. I was trying to save some eyeballs here.

But what tends to happen is because of exactly the dynamic that Alan's describing you have a kind of, one part of the Independents lean one way, one part of the Independent's that lean the other way. It tends to be a wash. They look like the general population on almost all questions that we look at.

MR. GALSTON: In Robbie's defense, the report has a lot of charts that have Independents in them where it was easier to present them.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: The pure Independents, the Independents who don't lean toward a party are usually only less than 10 percent of the actual voters.

MR. JONES: Yeah, like 6 or 7 percent.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: They usually split pretty evenly. Those are the folks that are the least interest in politics, the least likely to vote.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. We have time for another couple of questions. I'm shifting to the other side of the room now. I see someone in the back and someone in the front. Yes, ma'am.

MS. HARTMAN: Good morning. My name is Emily Hartman, and I'm a student at Palm Beach Atlantic University in West Palm Beach, Florida, and I'm also interning at AEI, right down the street from here.

I just have a question about, Dr. Abramowitz, you mentioned the disparity between the Hispanic voting population and the Republican party. I'm just wondering if that's more of a candidate issue or a policy issue. Then, if Republicans could do something, maybe, in legislation to try to up their Hispanic population vote?

At the same time, with the rise in Asian immigrants I'm wondering if there's something that, maybe, legislation could do to help the Republican Party in that way?

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: If you remember there was a report issued by the Republican Party after the 2012 election, by the Republican National Committee, and one of the main points made in that report is that the Republican Party needed to do more to appeal to minority voters in general, but Hispanic voters in particular, and specifically, needed to address the issue of immigration reform. They have not done that.

In fact, they've gone in the opposite direction. So that's one thing that the Republican Party would definitely need to do. I don't think nominating a Hispanic candidate or putting a few Hispanic candidates in leadership positions is going to make much difference.

But Hispanics are concerned about issues other than immigration, and the other problem Republicans have with Hispanic voters is on economic issues. You know, as Henry points out, Hispanic, regardless of whether they're Protestant or Catholic

tend to be, generally, quite liberal when it comes to questions about the role and size of government.

So I think the current trend of the Republican Party being perceived as anti-government, and particularly in response to the Tea Party movement. This, I think, has actually pulled the Republican Party further away from Hispanic voters. The Tea Party movement, you know, has had its success, but overall I think it's actually been very destructive in terms of its impact on the Republican Party.

MR. OLSEN: I mean, as a Republican, I would agree with most of what Alan said which is that the Hispanic community, as it currently exists, is on that is largely in favor of an activist, if not a Center for American Progress progressive view of government. It's one whose social conservatism can be overstated, and the importance of which can be overstated. I don't think it's any accident that George W. Bush who intentionally was not a libertarian conservative is the one who's done best among Hispanic voters.

With respect to Asian voters, I'd also want to point out that Asian voters have a significant working class component too. We tend, on our classism, to think of Asian voters as all being Indian doctors or Chinese engineers, but, in fact, there are many more Filipino workers. There are Korean dry cleaners. You know, the people who are not at the elite. Asian Americans tend to have a very significant non-Christian component.

Outside of Filipinos, who are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic because of their colonization by Spain for over 300 years, Chinese are largely non-religious, because of their background. Japanese are either Buddhist or non-religious. Indians are very largely Hindu or Sikh or Muslim, as opposed to Christian. A party that is defined as the Christian church, is all too often the case for while Christianity is a pre-requirement for

admission, is one that is automatically telling Asian voters you need not apply.

MS. REID: By the way, the Asian vote was even more Democratic in the last election than the Latino vote. Very quickly on Hispanics, we tend to lump all Hispanic voters together, but keep in mind you're talking about a cohort that something like 60 to 65 percent Mexican American. If you look at the seven, I believe, senators, United States senators, who have been Hispanic in the entire history of the United States Senate, I think five of them are Cuban American.

Cuban Americans are 5 percent of the Hispanic population. You keep throwing Cuban Americans at Latinos, you'll telling them you don't even get them. That's a Caribbean Hispanic versus a mainland, you know, people who are largely drawn from Mexican American background. So the only, sort of, national figure of a Mexican American background is Bill Richardson, he's a Democrat.

So I think sometimes we make the mistake of, sort of, Marco Rubio's of the world for the Hispanic vote. Cuban Americans tend to be much more conservative. By the way, they too, are trending Democratic because they're in favor of healthcare.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Cuban Americans, you know, are more Republican in their voting habits, but even they are among the most liberal of Republicans. If you look at the Cuban Americans who resent that Miami area who are in the Republican caucus they almost always end up on the liberal wing of the House Republican caucus.

MS. REID: They're for immigration reform.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Right. Because, you know, the Hispanic philosophy is not in line with the sort of Anglo-American limited -- not even limited, you know, non-activist government perspective. That's not the perspective that even Republican voting Hispanics have.

If you look at, you know, the voting patterns of Mexican Americans or

Dominicans. Let's take Dominicans out because --

MS. REID: Puerto Ricans.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: Puerto Ricans are very largely Democratic, even in Florida, where they're beginning to go to Central Americans, 7 to 8 to 1 Democratic. South Americans are 7 to 8 to 1 Democratic.

Median income of a Hispanic family in America is \$38,000 a year. The median Hispanic hasn't even gone to college. This is an even more working class community, generally, and for a Republican Party think we're going to appeal to Hispanics by saying we're for immigration and then we're for tax cuts in the business class and entrepreneurship is, yet again, a case of disconnect, just like it is with the white working class.

MR. JONES: I'll be very fast. One thing we see over and over in our surveys is Hispanics rate three things as their top idea. Jobs and the economy, healthcare, and then immigration reform. Those three things are always at the top of Hispanics concerns.

Just on the ACA question, because I think healthcare's often overlooked as something that Hispanics really care about, on whether to expand the law, keep the law, 57 percent of Hispanics say that we should either expand the law or keep the law as it is for the 2010 health care law.

MR. GALSTON: We have time for one brief question. I will allow one person to answer the brief question, and then I'm going to wrap. If you can't ask it briefly don't ask it at all.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. I'm Garrett Mitchell, and I write the Mitchell Report, and the question will be very brief, but I want to preface it by saying --

MR. GALSTON: That's what I was afraid of.

MR. MITCHELL: By saying that as a seasoned ticketholder to these series that Robbie, and Bill, and E.J. have been doing it's really remarkably valuable stuff, and such a great panel today. I think we really all appreciate it.

MR. DIONNE: That's okay.

MR. MITCHELL: Now, to my three-part question. This is to Dr. Abramowitz. Looking at the day to day makes it abundantly clear how partisan we are. What it doesn't make clear, but which you've written about considerable is, why that means we are so polarized? The way I would frame the question is when did we start to hate the other party?

MR. DIONNE: Can we ask Robbie to close? Just let Alan talk, and then one last time from Robbie.

MR. ABRAMOWITZ: I'll be very quick on that. I think this has been a very gradual process. This is not something that happened overnight. So this pulling apart of the parties I think is something that has taken decades and, you know, I think is going to continue, at least, for the foreseeable future. For the next, you know, couple of election cycles, at least.

I'm sure that if Moe Fiorino were here in the room he would say everything I've just told you about could be described as sorting rather than polarization, and my answer to that is that's a distinction without a difference. That really, you know, when people become sorted over and over again across many different issues they're polarized. That's what's happened.

One of the interesting trends is that these divisions across economic and cultural issues increasingly, and racial issues, increasingly overlap. Not perfectly, by any means, but we're seeing increasing consistency in peoples' attitudes across these different issues. That's certainly true at the elite level in Congress. Social conservatives

are economic conservatives, and economic conservatives are social conservatives.

Within the public that's not as true, but it's increasingly true. It's especially true among the more politically engaged and active segment of the public. You know, when we're on the opposite sides on issue after issue after issue, you know, then we start to really dislike each other because we think the other side is not just wrong, but they're actually evil. They have bad intentions.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, Robbie.

MR. JONES: So I'm going to close, sort of, just by bringing up back around to the thing we've talked about maybe the least, but I think is the thing that may stay with me and haunt me a little bit more than anything else in the survey, and that is the racial divides in the country.

The thing, I think, that sticks out here is not only do whites and blacks see things like the Ferguson shooting in very different lenses, that are part partisan and racial, whites and blacks see questions about, you know, so called reverse discrimination, whether whites are discriminated against more than blacks. Big gaps on that question by class as well as race.

We had some other questions we didn't talk about, about whether the government's paid too much attention to blacks and other minorities in the question. Same kinds of, you know, just chasm divides. I'm going to tie that together with a piece I wrote in the Atlantic as a way of closing here.

One of the things going on is, from some other analysis we did, actually from last years' 2013 American Values Survey, was looking at the social networks of whites and blacks. The core social networks of whites and blacks. We asked people to name seven people that they would have close conversation about things that mattered a great deal to them.

What we found is that among whites, in particular, 9 in 10 had white social networks or they were 90 percent white, and three-quarters were all white in their core social network. That is people they would have important conversations with.

I think that data combined with this attitude data makes me quite worried, in fact, that we're having, sort of, two different conversations about fundamental things. You know, the issue of inequality, both racial and economic, in society.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Let me close with a religious reflection, going all the way back to the New Deal question. One of the most striking little episodes in that entire series was one of Winston Churchill's visits to see FDR where he had a feeling that he hadn't gotten through to FDR's heart. How did he deal with that? By arranging for three hymns to be sung, you know, from the Anglican hymnal.

At the end of which FDR remarked to one of his friends, yes, we are Christian soldiers, aren't we? Can you imagine David Cameron trying to persuade Barack Obama to go along with his policies by singing hymns? The mind reels.

Please join me in thanking this truly wonderful panel.

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