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THE CRISIS IN IRAQ: WHAT WENT WRONG?

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PROCEDINGS

MR. SHAIKH: Good afternoon. If I could ask everyone to take their seats, please. Hello. I am Salman Shaikh. For those of you that don't know me I'm the Director of the Brookings Doha Center. It's a great pleasure for me to welcome you here to, what I'm sure you'll agree, is a very special even on Iraq and what went wrong, what could go right. Let me add that bit to the title.

I thank you, first and foremost, for coming a little bit earlier to the advertised time. We're very grateful that you managed to make it, and I'm sure others will join us as we go along. In particular, we're starting earlier because we're extremely lucky to have the gentleman to my left, his Excellency, Nikolay Mladenov, the UN Secretary General Special Representative for Iraq and head of the mission of UNAMI in Iraq.

Nikolay will have to leave us some time soon after 6:00 to get on a plane. But again, it's wonderful for us, and wonderful timing to have him...
here at this particular time. He is, of course, as I said, the SRSG for Iraq and head of UNAMI, a mission which has been in operation since 2003. Its mandate was expanded in 2007 which particular mandate focusing on advancing inclusive political dialogue, national reconciliation, assisting in the electoral process, working and planning towards a national consensus, and other such things that such missions do. The protection of human rights, and judicial, and legal reform.

His Excellency, Mladenov, of course, served as Bulgaria's Foreign Minister from 2010 to 2013 after briefly serving as its Defense Minister the year before. He's also active in supporting transition in the Middle East and North Africa. I remember very fondly how Bulgaria and the Foreign Minister in particular was the first to support even our work on Syria and the more inclusive approach to a political process and a political resolution. Of course, he's worked closely to support a stronger European engagement in the world. Your Excellency, Nikolay
Mladenov, it's a real pleasure to have you. Thank you very much.

Then my great pleasure to introduce Dr. Alaa Makki, the member of the Iraqi-Islamic Party that participated actively in the secret opposition against the Baathist Regime. He currently serves as the head of Tajdeed Political Movement, Parliamentary Block, which is united with the Iraqiya Alliance headed by his Excellency, Alaa.

He is a staunch advocate for education as a critical foundation for social development, and he's been the Vice Chairman of the Education Committee of the Iraq Council of Representatives since 2010. Prior to that, he was a Chairman of the Education Committee from 2006 to 2010. Again, thank you very much for making the trip and thank you for being here at such a critical time. We very much look forward to hearing from your insights.

Certainly not least is Dr. Luay Al Khateeb, who is one of us. He's a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center focusing on the geopolitics and
political economy of the GCC and Iraq. He's the founder and Director of the Iraq Energy Institute, being Iraq himself, and serves as Senior Advisor to the Federal Parliament of Iraq for energy policy and economic reform.

He's, of course, got a long private sector career which has spanned more than 20 years, and is a frequent commentator on your television screens and print media, especially these days. So again, Luay, it's great to have you.

I will get straight into it given the shortness of time. Nikolay, if I may, I'll come to you first. Many have said that what has gone wrong in Iraq was that we didn't have a more inclusive Iraq political process. In fact, it wasn't working, and it wasn't working, certainly, as the United States signaled its intention to leave Iraq.

How do you rate the current efforts, and, of course, now the formation of the new Iraqi government?

MR. MLADENOV: First I want to thank you very much for the invitation, and thank you very much
for your interest in what is happening in Iraq today as I believe it affects everyone not just in the region, but beyond.

As you said in the beginning, you were phrasing your question what went wrong and what can go right. If I can say that over the last decade many things in Iraq went wrong, but even more things now need to go right for things to work. That is fair way, actually, of starting.

We have a new government in Iraq. A government that includes, more or less, the entire political spectrum that is represented in Parliament. One that includes all the communities that make up Iraq's complicated ethnic and religious structure. But that government is only in its first days. It is inclusive and representative of the political forces in Parliament. It now needs to prove that it is inclusive and representative of the people of Iraq.

That will be a very important challenge, particularly for the first steps of the new government. As we all know, a third of the country's
under the control of armed groups, ISIS and their affiliated armed groups. Serious problems have emerged over the last months between Baghdad and Erbil related to budget and oil revenue issues.

The country faces substantial financial challenges. The level of trust between the various communities is low. Terrorism has been on the rise over the last few years. So all of these things to be tackled. Really the first starting point in that would be the steps that the new government needs to take to show that it is actually reaching out to all communities, and is able to solve some of the valid concerns that many of the communities in the country have.

Now, on top of that, obviously, an important role must be played by the international community supporting Iraq in dealing with the terrorist threat. However, that support would not be effective without the government and its policies in place. If I can just leave it at that in the beginning I'm sure we'll talk more about that.
MR. SHAIKH: I'm going to follow-up with you for one more question, and then I will go back to the challenges, and particularly the issue of inclusivity in a political process that starts to really have an impact on the ground.

Of course, the thing that is on many people's minds today is in the early hours this morning President Obama is going to give an address to his own people on a strategy for dealing with ISIL or ISIS or IS or Daash, whatever we want to call it. I have a question for you since you are very much at the coal face in Iraq. How do we deal with ISIL?

MR. MLADENOV: Well, first we have to have a strategy. We can't do it without a strategy, and we can't do it without the full engagement of Iraqi society. So if the government is the first step, the second step is actually to have an inclusive Iraqi-led strategy which actually is supported by all components of Iraqi society and addresses not just their concerns, but looks at how the communities in the country can feel more represented and included in the
decision-making process related to their own security, to the distribution of wealth, to the provision of services. So that those groups that have joined in a temporary alliance, Daash ISIL, as you wish to call them, can be peeled away, and support can be built for the legitimate state institutions.

Now, that is possible if you have an inclusive security plan, if I can just briefly call it that, but it's not enough. What you need also is really a number of social, economic, and other policies that appeal to the core problems that the different communities have.

The UN mission in Iraq has spent a lot of time looking into great detail of what are the various demands throughout the last few years have emerged in Iraq's communities, on all sides of the ethnic and religious divide. It's quite a long list, but it is not an undoable list.

Many of these problems are in the, what we often refer to as the unfinished Constitutional Agenda, issues that could have been dealt with over
the last decade, but haven't been dealt with. Others are related to service provision. Others are related to justice, on all sides. How the judicial system functions. How the police or the armed forces function. So a lot of these things need to be tackled and they can be tackled together with a security strategy.

But a third element in this, obviously, goes beyond Iraq because the problem is not just in Iraq. We need to realize that ISIL is a threat not just to Iraq as a country, but to the region, but beyond the region as well. That demands stronger cooperation within the region. Stronger cooperation between Iraq and its neighbors, but also between the neighbors themselves.

It's quite encouraging that in his speech in Parliament with Prime Minister Abadi was voted in he made a specific point to focus that one of his first priorities, in terms of foreign policy, will be to reach out to Iraq's Arab neighbors, and to rebuild that relationship. Obviously, that will need to take
Of course, none of this can work without the international community having a consistent and coherent strategy on how to deal with Syria, because that's the other side of the equation, if you wish. But on the Iraqi side I think now we have a little bit more hope than before that things can come together. Firstly, on the ground and the politics of it in the social and economic part of it, as well as in the international/regional cooperation site.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. I'm going to ask you one more question.

MR. MLADENOV: Sure.

MR. SHAIKH: Just to take full advantage. Linked to the international community's role. Of course, the United States and others are now engaged in military intervention in Iraq, again. It has the support of the region. It has the support of the Iraqi government. But going forward, and you've laid out some more comprehensive strategy focused on Iraqis themselves, how is it that this military intervention
of the United States in Iraq, again, needs to be calibrated going forward?

MR. MLADENOV: Well, I supposed one way of calibrating it is from the very beginning admit that this problem cannot be resolved only militarily. It needs, obviously, security component to it, but it also needs a political component to it.

The security component of it needs an Iraqi armed force, Iraqi security forces, that are strong. That are well-managed. Also, representative of the people so that the people in the provinces where these forces would need to operate would not feel estranged from them, to say the least. That's an important part of it.

Second part is the cooperation between the government in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Authorities in Erbil needs to be strengthened. We've seen a good start to that already. That needs to be further developed.

Thirdly, the capacity of Iraqi's forces is not just a question of what are the weapons that you
have. That's, obviously, an important part of it, but it goes far beyond that in terms of how the armed forces are structured. How they are motivated in terms of the ideology, in terms of the belief and their role in protecting their own country, and the inclusivity of all the various components in them.

So another encouraging sign over the last few days has been this notion which the new government is putting forward of creating a national guard. A national guard that would, in fact mean, that the provinces themselves would be able to have more responsibility, as per the Constitution, for their own security. Obviously, this is an important part of it.

Then there's the international role. The international support for this process is very important. NATO has put forward ideas of a training mission to Iraq. The European Union is looking at how to support Iraq as well. But, obviously, a key component would be the air strikes and intervention from Iraq's allies.

Now that in itself needs to be extremely
well-calibrated so the targets that are picked are really the targets that are related to the infrastructure that supports the existence is ISIL, their supply routes, their bases, etcetera, and limits, very much, the civilian impact of that.

However, none of this can work without a truly inclusive political process in places. Otherwise the problem will perpetuate itself. It's not going to get resolved, and it will breed more anxiety among the people of Iraq. That is something we need to avoid, very much, from the beginning.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you very much. I'm actually going to take up where you left off to Dr. Alaa, about this inclusive, political process.

There's been a lot, it's become a mantra now, that there needs to be much more Sunni inclusion, Sunni demands met, but there also Sunni complexities in dealing with this. How would you rate, so far, the efforts to bring in the Sunni political classes as well as the Sunni communities on the ground into the political process? What is it that needs to be done?
MR. MAKKI: Well, thank you for this invitation. I'll try to speak in Arabic with all respect to the audience here. Because some 10 to 15 million people now listen to us through Al-Jazeera channel in Iraq. They're waiting from the United Nations, from us, to give solutions, at least accommodations to push the track.

In the name of God, the most compassionate, the most merciful, as you know that Iraq is part and parcel of the Middle East, and the Middle East witnesses a battle between international powers, and also there are competitions in terms of interest. What is the result of these battles is due to this interest problem in the region.

What is important for us is Iraq, so Iraq is part of the Middle East, and consequently the situation is reflected in Iraq due to the problem of interests, and the political situation is not stable since 2003. This is the reason why this is happening.

So this is the reason behind the situation and this is the title of the discussion that is taking
place today. For us to be able to have a step forward the Iraqi people is very much divided. The agendas are in contradictions, so some of the Iraq people are trying to implement one agenda when another part of Iraq is trying to implement another agenda.

So there is a kind of a political system that is a failure, I'm going to say it's such, and please excuse me for being too clear and blunt where maybe sometimes politics aims not to be too clear. But we are not in a political situation now. Fifty or 60 percent of Iraq is in a very bad situation. People have been forcefully moved from their areas to other areas. That is why we have to be very frank.

We can also reach a number of solutions here, so we have to do so. The different components of Iraq have been in this agreement with each other. When the Americans came Sunnis were not pleased with that, so the confrontation was very violent. After that, they understood the situation, and they entered the political process late.

Their entry into their political process did
not lead to a result until today. Until after we have seen today they have left their own governments, their houses were demolished, destroyed. Women and children were killed before men and there was a kind of a dislocation of people. We are in a situation in which Iraq is no longer a homeland. People say we do not live in our homeland. We do not live in our houses. So this is a kind of an uprising in these governments.

So the entry of Sunnis in the political process up to today, in truth, and I'm saying this for the international community directly, Sunnis have not yet really entered into a political process. Those who have entered were not successful in their entry. They have to be really, really successful and present a project and try to save those they represent.

People are a little bit optimistic in forming such a government. What is very important in this government are the two ministries which are the interior, and the defense. After today they are still pending. We haven't had a minister up to there.

There can be a number of mechanisms, and
NATO maybe would be waiting for having a kind of governmental resolution or decision. But the Iraqi people have gone and they have voted.

But the real problem now is the security problem. The Provinces, the governments are occupied by forces from outside Iraq. How can we reach these Provinces? So the brothers who are in Parliament and represent these Provinces how are they going to communicate with their people? Where are they? How can they communicate with them?

So the entry of Sunnis into this political process in an inclusive government they face a challenge. Yes, we have participated in the government. We were part of the negotiations, and we warned that without solving the security situation or problem, and without the return of the people who have been dislocated now to their places or origins, and the marginalization that took place in the last decade.

All these things have to be solved. We have to find a solution instantly. I think we have to a
have a surgical solution. I mean, this is to save Iraq. There is a difference between having a very critical and intricate surgery and trying to, maybe, find a solution for somebody whose leg is broken.

So this is the general impression about the entry of Sunnis into the Iraqi government. As my friend, Mladenov has says, he said what is very important is to have a real representation of the people on the ground because they have to participate in the decision-making process, and to decide about their own destiny. This representation has not been clarified yet.

If this is going to happen, and here I'm talking to the international community, if we're going to be late in that process in finding as we have done when we formed the government in 2010, and we waited for four years without a Minister of Defense. I think we're going to face more catastrophes, and I think Sunni's, they consider themselves dead.

It would be very easy for them to take a suicide decision since they consider themselves dead.
So we need to have clarity. We need to have credibility. We need to have a clear-cut strategy in dealing with this fight.

We, as Iraqis, as patriots, we always come up with positive proposals. We have participated in the government, and we have also told Mr. Haider, we congratulated him for his position, and we wish him success. We're going to support him in all means and methods that he's going to take for success, but we have to be realistic. Thank you very much.

MR. SHAIKH: To follow-up on that, and thank you for your frankness, that is with regards to the Sunni political representation itself. You have Sunni representation in government, in Parliament, and yet there is still a feeling that it is capturing the mainstream Sunni opinion, particularly in the Provinces. How does one achieve that now?

MR. MAKKI: In fact, the Sunnis are there thus far in the Parliament are there since 2003. In 2003 I wasn't a political party. By the way, you said that I'm Islamic Party.
now. I am now in the Wataniya Coalition, and I want elections in that capacity.

But I, as a Sunni, since 2003 I have been in the political process. They are there since 2003, all the Sunnis, but there really are, this is the result. The results is that they're still basically marginalized. Symbolic representation which does not lead to any action is something we don't even want to discuss.

Any issue that's not built on action and work would be just something that is superficial. So ask me how can the Sunnis get into the political process. In fact, they are prepared now to make an army and to arm themselves and to fight.

Many of them, frankly speaking, have joined Daash because Daash had killed many Sunnis right in front of their eyes, and this led to their fears. So they say to themselves, because the army is collapsing in a few minutes, and the security forces are not there. Daash is stronger than them all, so why should they not join them.
So those who are in principle refused that and went and migrated to elsewhere, especially the chiefs of the tribe and the academics, and the intellectual people, all the Syrian people. The helpless people had to say and had to accept this new situation they could not fight.

As for the youth, they have volunteered to join Daash, and they are now receiving monthly salaries, $1,000, $2,000 salary just by the army. This is something very dangerous. So how can the Sunnis get into the political process needs to be—we should take all these points into positions that the Ministry of Defense should be created and all decisions that were promised should be implemented.

It's not useful to raise hands in the Parliament to accept a decision so that it becomes an official agenda, and the international community waits for that. No, this is useless. Because this will lead to an even worse situation.

What is required is a real representation, and I see that representation so far is sort of
ambiguous. People can hear me now, and I told you, in fact all Iraq is hearing me, all the world is hearing me, but in particular there are about 10 to 15 million people listening to me now, and they are waiting for what will be decisions or resolutions taken by you or by the position of the Brookings Center or from the participants of this event, so that we might reach a solution.

MR. SHAIKH: Okay. Let me ask you one final question before I move on. What is your attitude towards the American military strikes now that are ongoing to push back Dashi?

MR. MAKKI: Well, Mr. Mladenov said something very important. The most important thing in fighting Daash is the air force. I disagree with him. The most important thing in this fight against Daash is the ground itself, the people themselves.

In fact, in the past there was Al-Qaida, which is something similar to Daash, one way or another, and Al-Qaida had controlled almost the same Provinces that are under the control of Daash now, and
we had said to the American side that there cannot be only air strikes and air force. There must be ground forces also.

The people of these Provinces accepted and volunteered to fight Al-Qaida with the support of the Americans, and, you know, we don't want to go into details, but we were very active in this issue, to solve Al-Qaida disappear.

But those who fight Al-Qaida were killed gradually one after the other. They were not given salaries, and they find themselves in a very difficult situation. I have met many of them in the past months, some of them are Army officers of the old Army, and some fighting factions of the Resistant.

We met them as politicians in Al-Wataniya. We understood their situation, and we supported them. We made many statements in this regard, and we did also in a clear way. They are all military people and they said that we could divided ourselves into divisions in the difference Provinces, but what we don't have is support, and we need American
understanding and the international community's understanding, the United Nations' understanding and support.

Then a cooperation with our colleagues, our brothers, especially the government of the Kurdistan Region. I thank them for that. They were very supportive. We can create such forces, and we can get rid of Daash just as we did with Al-Qaida four years or five years ago.

Somebody might say this is not logical or this is not possible in the political situation presently, but I say that history leads to geography. I'm speaking off of history, not a very old history, only four or five years ago, that led to the geography today.

So what I mean is that I'm speaking of practical, realistic things. I'm addressing the decision-makers, international decision-makers, the decision-makers also in Baghdad, and those in the Middle East in general. Because I began by saying that there are different and conflicting agendas, so
we don't want to challenge all these agendas, but we want to deal with them to have an understanding with them to reach some logical solutions that are in the interest of all the regions.

So we as politicians, I personally, think that there's not one country in the Middle East near Iraq or further whom we did not meet and did not talk with. We also went to the European Union more than once, and Washington, and New York, and we met people in the United Nations. We went everywhere, and we are still ready now to play the same role to reach a real solution.

MR. SHAIKH: Started off by talking about as well, and in terms of the budget, the oil, the agreements that have to be forged in terms of revenues, in terms of the more broader power sharing formula. Do you think when you look at -- of course, a pathway to a constitution or a pathway to a constitution which satisfies everyone.

When you look at this government, and it's a government of politicians as opposed to technocrats,
how do you see this playing out, especially given the expectations that there are, within certain communities, that things will change.

MR. KHATEEB: Thanks, Salman, for having me on this panel. Well, talking about the challenges I would like to highlight the word of inclusiveness, inclusive government.

Many people talked about the inclusive governments, and whether this government is inclusive enough. In a nutshell, every single administration came post-2003 is inclusive. Any future administration, if Iraq stays in one piece, as we see it, will continue to be inclusive. The question is how accountable these governments? How accountable these administration?

I've witnessed, from my personal experience, zero accountability, zero accountability. The Kurds talk about their ethnicity. The Sunni talks about their Sunni priority, and the Shia talks about their Shia priority. This has created a significant divide to basically talk about ethno-secretarian issues as
opposed to national issues.

This, unfortunately, deferred other priorities, which is how to define a neo-federal Iraq. There was a constitution, a federal constitution that passed in December 2005. But since the referendum on that constitution Iraq is still functioning not as a federal state. It's a federal state on paper, but the central state in practice and constraint by the legacy regimes and legacy law, and this is by the dictation of the constitution.

Because Article 130 clearly states the legacy laws will continue to be effective until a new laws are repealed. So we are thriving on a state pre-2003 with a major shift and change post-2003. This is where the conflict we have.

Parallel to this, we have a socio conflict, this ethno-secretarian issue which was, unfortunately and unnecessary, has been created by the governing council and the Paul Bremer administration.

One of the fatal mistakes that underpinned this whole mess that we are facing today are two
things. The dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the de-Baathification that really kind of, like, drove this whole mess, drove this country into significant problems that it's very difficult to challenge.

Added to this, Iraq is surrounded by six countries. Each country has a different foreign policy on Iraq, and each country wants to take an advantage out of Iraq. It is in the middle of a region where looking into a new democracy emerging while all the regional countries are sheikdom, kingdom, or basically it's not as European democracy as we see it, or something like that.

This has created that clash and everybody is worried about the future of Iraq and how this is going to lead. So what we are seeing is a significant clashes are yet to be understood to create that long-lasting resolve.

Now, everyone in the world observing Iraq over the past 10, 11 years waiting. Why is this democracy not functioning? Why is this country not practicing properly? They all forget about one thing,
that democracy doesn't happen by a press of a button. What's happened in Iraq is a significant shift, a significant change from 50 years of dictatorship followed by an absolute tyranny, sanctions and all, etcetera.

Into a complete system, it's a new language, but left us in absolute chaos. Now, if I would benchmark this change with any change that's happened in the world, in any timeline. Whether how Europe reached today's democracy or the United States and so on. Surely it's not in 10 or 11 years. It took them several wars. It took them many years, hundreds of years.

Now, I'm not suggesting that Iraq needs 100 years to reach democracy. No, no. But surely it's not a 10 year job or 11 years job.

Now, in terms of implementing the reform, if we want to develop a federal state we really need to look into the key legislation that really needs to underpin that federal state. This is to start with the supreme court, the federal court. We need to have
a court.

Without a federal court. Without an independent judiciary system that every single faction in this country confident to go and call for its rights and to defend its case, it's going to be impossible to move forward. So this has to be an immediate necessity that should have been done in the first month.

The other thing is the revenue sharing. Iraq is a renter estate. It thrives on oil, and it needs to diversify its economy and its income stream. Now, to reach that level of diversity they really need to, at least, establish a fair share between the various Provinces and so on.

But this is also linked to the hydro-carbon law, and so on. But it's not just laws. These are linked to establishing institutions. These institutions needs to be independent and accountable.

Now, back to the word accountability. To have this accountability in place Iraq really needs to restore that national identity. Iraqis needs to talk
Iraqis. The more the Kurds talk about their 17 percent the more they will push a Province like Basra that produces 90 percent of Iraqi oil to tell the rest of Iraqi good-bye. Then they will not be negotiating their rights with Baghdad, but with Basra.

The more the Sunni tribes not engage with the rest of Iraqi -- I mean, I would love to see Iraq like Southerners traveling to the western part of Iraq and have picnics without having that feeling, okay, my wife will be kidnapped. I'll be beheaded, and my children will be sold.

The same thing, Basra -- if somebody from Nasiriya should travel to Kurdistan without having a sponsor to sponsor them. For heaven sake, it's not another country within a country. So it's all about accountability. Once we have an accountability we have a country, or at least a step forward.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you very much. Nikolay, you have a few minutes so I'm going to come back to you and actually take up that point of national identity.
You were asked earlier, in a different meeting, about the lament of Iraq becoming a sort of a proportional, representative state between the sects, you know? Here, I’ve been talking a lot myself about Sunni, Shias, and Kurds. Is there no other way -- the factor that seems the political system rather like we’ve seen in Lebanon, or perhaps elsewhere, is become more based on those kinds of thinking rather than that broader Iraqi identity. How do we get to that?

MR. MLADENOV: I think the options are still there. You can have a state in which you have the ethnic and religious communities balance each other out in some form of, you know, quarters. All of this. You can have a state in which you have a civic concept of nationality which allows you to be Iraqi and Sunni, and Shia, and Yazidi, and Kurdish, and Christian or whatever.

That is, obviously, the more difficult path. But given Iraq's history I think there's plenty of reasons to believe why that should be the preferable path for the country. One sees, today, the
difficulties in getting to that.

Obviously, if you look at the political landscape the majority of the political parties in Parliament today, their constituencies are based on religious communities. As long as this continues this will keep replicating this process. So efforts need to be made to bridge those differences.

Again, one effort, perhaps, is as we talk about the legitimate concerns that the Sunni tribes, and communities, and provinces in Iraq have, took knowledge that the Shia problems of Iraq also have legitimate concerns, as well as the Kurds. You can't say, well, let's solve one groups' problems, but not solve problems of the other groups.

It's quite fascinating, Basra, indeed, is the city which produces more than 90 percent of the oil in Iraq. Yet, if you look at some of the UN studies, which we've done, the deepest and most difficult pockets of poverty in Iraq are particularly in the south still until today.

If you look at the indicators, the
Millennium Development goals, and various other international indicators, the City of Ramadi, before it was taken over by the rebels and ISIL had better indicators than Basra. So all of these inequalities exist and they need to be addressed. This is why I said in the beginning that yes, it's a political process, but it needs to look at the social and economic factors.

Now, two points I want to make on this particularly. We all need to understand that Iraq will never be the same as it was before the fall of Mosul. There is no way that the country can return to that status quo which was before the fall of Mosul. So a new balance will need to emerge.

Part of addressing that balance will need to come from how you deal with the constitution. I come from a transition country. Bulgaria, after the end of communism, put together a constitution very quickly. Now, 20 years later, we're still struggling with problems that this constitution presents. Any
way that protects you from the past, from the history, to make sure that what happened in the past doesn't happen again.

But now 10 years later you see different challenges. Challenges which you could not have imagined 10 years ago. So in Iraq you need to also look at the unfinished constitutional agenda. Federal court law would be a perfect starting point. You need to look at the Federation Council and all the various revenue sharing and other legislation.

But you also need to look at the constitution itself. What stage do you want to have? I think if people in Iraq would focus on this long enough and hard enough they will understand that they can have an Iraqi identity which allows you to be Shia, and Sunni, and Kurdish, and Yazidi and still have loyalty to the State of Iraq.

Rebuilding that loyalty is extremely important. That does not mean that you would not have, you know, the legitimate aspirations of the Kurdish people, for example, have all their wish for
more autonomy, etcetera, etcetera. But you can still be Iraqi and be whatever ethnic or religious group you belong to.

MR. SHAIKH: I have one more question and then I'm going to open it up to the floor so we can get a couple of questions in before you leave, and get everyone else to respond as well. That is the regional role. You've mentioned it already. I mean, many would say that the region has to be dealt with, and it has to build a new vision.

In Iraq we have, of course, seen sort of signs of regional cooperation here. Including the role of Iran within that regional situation. How, going forward, do you see that regional role being made even more constructive, more productive? Particularly here I'd ask you to speak to the role of Iran, and also the role of the United States in that regard.

MR. MLADENOV: Well, let me try to separate that into two parts. One is the regional role as far as the challenge of ISIL is concerned. But ISIL,
Daash, presents a challenge to everybody in the region, and there needs to be cooperation in dealing with that. So I leave that aside for a minute.

But as far as Iraq is concerned, I think a lot of Iraqis neighbors, particularly in the Gulf need also to understand that this is a new country. This is a different country. Part of the problems of the relationship between Iraq and its Gulf neighbors is because of this disengagement which happened over the last few years between the Gulf and Iraq. It have various reasons, political, others, but rebuilding that relationship will be extremely important.

Obviously, Iran, as Iraqi's immediate neighbor to the east, always will play an important role in this part of the world. However, that role does not need to be a controversial one. On the contrary, I think today you will see increasingly that Iran has a growing interest in stability in Iraq. That stability cannot come, and this is a clear realization by everybody, cannot come if one group dominates over another group.
It can only come if there's a balance between the difference groups, and there's, indeed, the inclusive approach that we've all been talking about. Any other option would bring more terrorism, more conflict, more problems, and these problems would, obviously, reflect beyond the borders or Iraq.

Secondly, you need to understand that, you know, Syria must always be on the back of everyone's minds. You know, we may be talking about Iraq, but there's a great, big pink elephant in the middle of the room and that is Syria. How we deal with the problem of Syria and hence the problem with Daash and Syria is a separate discussion, but that also needs to be addressed.

When borders are being challenged, when groups stand up and say, well, I disregard this border. I disregard the international border between Iraq and Syria, everybody in the Middle East, including Iraq's neighbors, must look very carefully because this problem can quickly spread and affect them.
Therefore, you know, stability in Iraq, agreement between the various components, a state that is strong and is accountable, and is democratic is actually in the interest of all its neighbors. This is one issue which I think slowly people are becoming to realize.

MR. SHAIKH: Very good. I will leave that question for both of you as we take some other questions as well. But I do want to open up the floor and see if people would like to ask questions. The SRSG, in particular, has about 15 minutes or so, so I'd like to get some questions in.

If you could clearly state your name and any affiliation that would be great. Sir?

QUESTIONER: My name is Graham. I had two questions. The first question is don't you think that the UN should refer the matter of arming going on state actors to the international criminal court? Don't you think that from the Libya experience, from the Syria experience, the arming non-state actors have always caused conflicts?
My second question is don't you think the U.S., as a former occupier of Iraq, should have the responsibility of facing Daash on the ground, not just by air strikes? Thank you.

MR. SHAIKH: Okay. Did I see a hand up there somewhere? Alexandra?

MR. ALEXANDRA: Justin Alexandra, former Yumani employee. What things could Haider Abadi do in the first few weeks of his government that could restore trust from the Sunni and Kurdish communities in the government, and galvanize the fight against Daash?

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. I'll take a lady, please. Name and affiliation.

MS. SANHALATA: Sanhalata from (inaudible) international coalition against Daash and how do you see it evolving? It is a question of months, of years?

MR. SHAIKH: I'll take the gentleman behind the lady, and then I'll come to the lady, please.

MR. DIAB: Hali Diab. The question is
related to arming Kurdish. What do you think the international community has to offer for Turkey to reduce their concern over arming PKK? Thank you.

MR. SHAIKH: Okay. I will come for another round in a minute. Let's quickly go through, starting with you, Nikolay.

MR. MLADENOV: Thank you for these questions. Very quickly on the first question on the role of the UN in the arming of non-state actors. This is new territory for the UN, if you wish, it is emerging as we speak because this is a new problem that needs to be tackled now.

If you see over the last few weeks a new resolution was adopted by the Security Council and the Chapter 7 specifically on ISIL. It has some very good text which, I think, points in the direction in which the international community is moving. Strengthening the sanctions, looking at all the various components that needed to be put in place to prevent the funding, the arming of the axis of terrorists groups to resources. Now, that's the first step.
Now, the second step should come within a couple of weeks, I believe. When the Security Council will be considering another resolution on foreign fighters, and on the responsibility of states to prevent their nationals and to participate as fighters in others conflicts.

The interesting thing about these two resolutions is they are both under Chapter 7. This is quite an interesting point because they cross national borders. They actually address an issue which you cannot pinpoint to one country, as you said yourself. I think they point in the direction in which the international community will be moving.

There will be responsibilities taken on by states to prevent activities that may arm terrorists groups or provide them with resources, including people.

On your second question, I think it's really a judgment of what is more effective in the situation today. Really, yes, you need boots on the ground to resolve the problem of Daash in Iraq, but it better
the Iraqi boots on the ground in their own country. Well-trained, obviously well equipped. Perhaps, supported from the air if they need to be supported by the Americans or the international community itself.

If the Iraqis themselves feel that more is needed it should be for them to ask and to decide whether that is needed. I think that's, sort of, the proper way of looking at it. Obviously, these troops in some locations they should be army, Iraqi Army troops, but quite often you would find that actually they don't need to be boots, but they need to be policeman. They need to be local security forces protecting their communities. I think that's the direction.

What can Prime Minister Abadi do? Many things. But there are quite a few things that would, perhaps, be a good start. One would be really living up to the commitment to have a defense and Interior Minister within a week. It seems that will be possible.

Secondly, to square away very quickly the
problems with Iraqi Kurdistan that have been piled up for more than half a year now. He's made, obviously, some commitments to that that can be useful.

Third, and an important step, would be a decision to stop shelling. For the Iraqi security forces to stop shelling cities, including Fallujah and other places where you can move forward more effectively in other ways.

So, obviously, there are a number of issues that can be done rather quickly. He has, in his speech, openly spoken about the need to reach out to the region, and to take to the neighbors of Iraq, in all directions, in order to find support. So these are just some ideas.

What can one expect from the Coalition? I wouldn't actually speak about one coalition. I would actually look at this as, sort of, multilayered coalitions. Because, obviously, some countries will look at how they can provide security related support to Iraq. But then there's a different constellation of countries that need to work together to prevent
financing getting to terrorist organizations and groups.

Then there's a third constellation that can address the, sort of the propaganda that ISIL is coming up with and challenge that. Perhaps there's a constellation to look at the problem of foreign fighters because many of them, you know, come from the region, but some of them come from Europe, from elsewhere.

So I wouldn't think of it as one, sort of, permanent coalition. It would be different coalitions that can do different things. Obviously, for the United Nations there's a great role in this to play. As far as Iraq, I think the United Nations could be very helpful reaching out to the Sunni communities within Iraq, reestablishing that connection there which would be also helpful, but also working with the region as well.

Lastly, on the question of Turkey and the PKK. I think Turkey has very legitimate concerns about arms reaching and the PKK. If you look
carefully at how the decision-making process on providing military support to Iraq has worked over the last few weeks you will see that there's a great insistence on coordination. Not just between those countries that are supporting the Peshmerga now with weapons and others, to make sure that support is provided with the consent of Baghdad and the Iraqi government. This is a very important, sort of, safety mechanism in this process.

In the medium run, I think what would be very important just would be for the international community to focus not just on providing, but to focus more on the security field on providing training, capacity building of the forces, strengthening the institutions so that they are capable on their own to handle the problem of Daash.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Yes, please.

MR. MAKKI: As an Iraqi, I just want to ask my colleague, Mladenov, although it's unusual, forgive me. We met a lot and we worked together to help the immigrants, internally displaced people in Iraq,
especially in Erbil.

The situation there is very vague. Aid came from people in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Many thanks to their brotherhood with us. But it still needs to be clarified. I tried to send a message with your Excellency to the situation, and I'm ready to meet there in Erbil to discuss the issue more. Thank you.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Luay, you can ask a question too if you'd like.

MR. KHATEEB: A couple of points I'd like to add to the list mentioned by Ambassador Mladenov. The regional countries can do a lot. Specifically a country like Turkey. At the moment, the southern corridor of Turkey is the gateway of foreign jihadists traveling into Syria and Iraq. This is the only gateway, regardless of all the nationalities.

It's been monitored that since the 10th of June the number of fighters, Jihadists affiliate with ISIS, has increased from 10,000 to triple, to nearly 30,000. Sixty percent of those are foreign fighters.
between 2,500 to 3,000, are people with European passports.

Just to show the significance, the serious threat that's posed not only to Iraq and Syria, but having a potential threat to Europe, for the national securities of these countries when those sleeper cells travel back. Those numbers have increased mainly because, number one, there is no serious clampdown on the inflow of those Jihadists into Iraq and Syria.

Number two, nobody has done anything to the black economy controlled and fueled by smuggled oil from Northern Iraq, north and west of Iraq, but predominantly from Northeast Syria, which is fetching around $3 million plus from the snuggled oil. This has created some sort of self-sufficiency to this transnational group to finance itself without even needing individual entities or state actors in the region.

This is a dangerous part of it. In fact, maybe one positive thing that came out of ISIS in Iraq, it has unified everyone to be scared of the
future. There was a saying, by the way, in 2003 that the Shia are afraid of the past, Sunni afraid of the future, and the Kurds are afraid of both. Now, they are afraid of the future, all of them.

This really needs to be done by paying attention by the International Coalition. The UN could really enforce UN Security Council Resolution 2170, and to really have every single state, entity, and individual accountable on these practices.

MR. SHAIKH: Great. Thank you very much. I'll take two quick questions before Nikolay leaves. Dr. Zachary.

MR. ZACHARY: My question to Mr. Alaa.

MR. MAKKI: Me.

MR. ZACHARY: Yes.

MR. MAKKI: Yes, welcome.

MR. ZACHARY: I want to know what is happening in Iraq, a peaceful revolution, again is secretarian government which turned into armed revolution to take the rights or this is aggression from Daash against the State of Iraq? This is one.
The second. You said that Daash is paying $2,000 for each fighter there. I think estimations say that there are about 65 southerns who finance Daash, who armed Daash. If you find a job there, please, can you (inaudible) for me? Thank you.

MR. SHAIKH: I don't think you want to say that publically. Do we have any more questions for the authority? Okay, sir, in the back.

MR. LATEAVE: My name is Lateave. As you have mentioned, the neighbors of Iraq have independent differences, but if they stand together and sit then will it help? Especially the Middle East countries and the neighbors of Iraq, will it help a solution for Iraq's terrorism?

I am asking this, is there any possibility for keeping U.S. the father of the destruction of Iraq from this issue because they are planning for a military exercise now. So is there any way we ask the U.S. to be away from the situation, from Iraq's current situation? Is there any way we can completely avoid U.S. getting into this resolution of Iraq's
problem?

What I'm asking is, neighboring countries of Iraq and the Middle East can lead to any resolution for this situation? That is one question. Then the second question is, does anyone have any communication or contact with this ISIS so that we can just guide them and drive them into the right track instead of getting into the massacre and the brutality of what they are doing today?

Is there any provision we can bring them into the development of Iraq? Maybe bringing them into the military or -- I don't know?

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Can we talk them into stopping at least chopping people's heads off? Please, and anything else you'd like to say in wrapping up?

MR. MLADENOV: I think really the decision of what role should or could the United States play in supporting Iraq in its struggle against this problem should be left to the Iraqi government and its Parliament and its people. It should be an Iraqi
decision.

If they feel that they need training they should get that training from their allies. If they feel that they need air support they should get that air support from their allies.

With all of its faults, problems, difficulties, the political process in Iraq, everything, Iraq has an unmatched capacity to get to the brink, to look into the abyss of disaster, to put one foot out and then step back. This country has done this quite a few times.

I'm hopeful that, you know, despite all of the hardships, despite all of the challenges and the difficulties that we face on the ground, the fact that an election took place, a government is in place, and that it includes practically everybody, a new president's in place, a new speaker of Parliament's in place, a new agenda has been put forward, a new approach is emerging within the neighbors. All of this should give us hope that actually the problem can be resolved. If the Iraqis feel they need to support
of their allies they should ask for it, and they should, obviously, get it.

On ISIL, please understand that ISIL is an irreconcilable problem. ISIL is like a cancer that breds off the body of Iraq and Syria and (inaudible). It can spread further beyond. It needs to be treated. It needs to be contained, and it needs to be, ultimately, resolved. Otherwise, it will continue to grow.

ISIL's philosophy's very simple. It seeks to dismantle the Iraqi state. It seeks to destroy the institutions that exist. It seeks to insert itself wherever problems are, communities, Shia and Sunni disagree, it inserts themselves in that disagreement.

It attacks schools. Forces women to become suicide bombers in schools. This is a very, very serious challenge to the order or things. It wants to dismantle borders. So really the people who we should be reaching out to are those who have tribes, other groups, who have different agendas, but don't necessarily agree with this radical agenda.
Bringing these other groups into the political process, seeing whether their demands can be resolved to the Constitution, where can this dialogue happen, and just isolate the problem in itself and seek how to resolve it. But this is really a task that has to be led in Iraq, within Iraq, but it does need wide international support.

Again, the region and everyone beyond can provide a lot of assistance in making sure that issue is challenged effectively.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you very much, Nikolay. I have to let you go. Otherwise, we'll have to keep all of the other people that are traveling with you on that flight from leaving as well.

I want to thank you very much. I also want to acknowledge two old colleagues and friends, Marn Ali, the political director of UMAMI, who is an old friend. We served together at the UN in Gaza and in Palestine. It's great to see you here. Mirislove Zevarov, former representative of Bulgaria here, now with UMAMI as well. Thank you all for coming.
wish you safe travels.

    I've got still Dr. Zachary's question for Dr. Alaa. Would anyone else like to make a comment or ask a question? The gentleman with the white hair in the back, and then the gentleman with the hat after.

    MR. EASTWOOD: Thank you. Charlie Eastwood. I'm with the Qatar Joint Command and Staff Cottage down in Al-Waka. Nobody's mentioned the Iraqi Army to any substantial degree. Can I ask the obvious question, where are they, and what contribution are they likely to be able to make? Or what do they need in order to make a substantial contribution to the IS problem? Thank you.

    MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Gentleman here.

    MR. SADIKI: I'm Ashaif Sadiki, a journalist. I have a couple of friends, someone told me some journalists who have been very regular visiting that area of Iraq and they have informed me a couple of months before, even last year, that this group is acquiring the weapons. They are having large gatherings of the people. They told me that they have
informed their friends in UK and America and no action was taken. These powers knew that this group is developing, but why was no action taken before?

    MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Do we have anyone else? Okay. Dr. Al.

    MR. KHATEEB: Lovely questions to me. How developed that began as peaceful demonstrating and people going out under democracy to express their concerns without answers and later on developed to where we ended now. Yes, you are describing the real events.

    It began as demonstrations. It began as political concerns, because I was part of it. No answer. On the contrary, insisting on not answering. Whether it is part of an external agenda or it's a reaction or whatever the cause, I don't know. But it happened.

    Later on it developed with all these circumstances. Marginalization, no services, no answering to any concern, no release of the Tunis, etcetera. Daash and the terrorist ideology is nearby...
the region. We had just, I told you at the beginning of my talk, we had just spent great efforts to kick out Al-Qaida from Iraq several years ago. But that doesn't mean we could kick them 100 percent. Still some sleeping sells was the nuclei for new development of Daash.

They entered inside the demonstrations. Me personally, and a lot of other politicians, told the decision-makers in Baghdad, the top decision-makers, without mentioning names. We threatened them, look, if you relive this situation it will be as such. This is an equation that's special in Iraq. Nobody listened.

So I took a trip to Washington to the State Department, and to explain in details all that is going on the ground at that time. It was at the beginning, and I told them, the people responsible on Iraq then. Look, I'm an Iraqi, simple, coming here and telling you there will be a sequence of events, one, two, three, four. The same people, after a year, they visited Baghdad and they said -- they invited me
to attend a lecture.

They said, look, you were right. I said, it's too late. So that's the answer. It's the people. Now, the concern is not the terrorist. The terrorist should be kicked out. The concern is the people living under those terrorists, under the pressure, you know?

Millions of people, the migrants, the internally displaced now constitutes about 1.5 million, but here there are other millions under the governance of them. So this is the concern. So I'm telling you. Now, if you are satisfied with this answer I come to the second question if you like to have a salary from IS?

Okay. I tell you because I'm living in a borderline area that's real. You heard about, you know, Daash affecting the nearby territories are real. I meet, daily, people escaping from Daash. They are coming having no money, no house, and no facilities, and they are living on the streets.

I told Mladenov, you heard me, because while
working there together to give humanitarian aids to them, and there is some, I mean, laziness anyhow. I just warned him about that. This is an important issue.

This situation led the young people going to Daash for living issue, for taking salaries. The sources of Daash, you know, they took all of the national banks in the provinces. They are controlling, sometimes, the Baiji Refinery. In Baiji, you know, in the middle of Iraq. They are taking taxes.

They have (inaudible), I don't know how much. They have headquarters. So they have a budget. You have to know it's not just news concerns and the media saying so. I'm coming from the ground.

The international community is really realizing some of that, and sometimes they are searching a way, as one of our friends said, a way to discuss them. So this is the situation, my friend. I am, maybe, from the total people here I'm coming from the land and I'm telling you the exact situation.
Thank you.

MR. SHAIKH: Where is the Iraqi Army, just quickly, in all of this?

MR. MAKKI: Me?

MR. SHAIKH: Please, yes. All of the questions asked. We're going to start summing up.

MR. MAKKI: Yes. The question about the Iraqi Army. The last three months I spent my time from the morning until evening meeting, my friend, members of the previous Iraqi Army. All high ranked officers, generals, field marshals, and they are escaping from being killed by Daash. So they want to fight.

They say, well, we're ready and we can recruit our old brigades, but we need support. We need help. We need to be dealt honestly because the previous trial and what we were engaged in deeply when we went to Washington went met President Bush and we asked his help to get rid of the terrorism occurred in 2006, '07, '08, you know? And there was a positive reply.
General Petraeus came to Iraq and we worked together. But the people, those people, when they worked, honestly, they fighter Al-Qaida they were rewarded badly. So this is the question. They want guarantees to be members of the coming Guards or the coming Iraqi Army. They are ready to sacrifice themselves because they will already be killed by Daash. They are having this support.

But, and this is strong but, the history of the previous Iraqi Army in the Middle East is not good, and we know that. Many of the neighboring country's leaders, and even some leaders inside Iraq, they are against this idea because they're saying most of those officers are Baathists and they have a bad history in the previous army.

I tell you from this point. Well, the Iraqi Army wasn't Saddam's Army. It was Iraqi Army. Maybe all or most of the pro-Saddam officers went out. Either they were killed or disappeared or escaped. This is the situation of them.
ISIS came to pick them out they are the people who want to be Iraqis, who want to be remaining in their Provinces on their land loyal to Iraq. There are presently few that want me to bring them some groups to meet them already. If we can help with Brookings help, sort of conference, to bring some of them to talk worldwide we're ready.

Me and Dr. Alawi and other colleagues who are supporting them politically, and we are working to cook, not food, but to cook a well prepared, I mean, action for including them for controlling them on the new basis after the 10th of June, as Mladenov say. Thank you very much.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you very much. Definitely we will continue our discussions to see how we can be of help.

MR. MAKKI: This invitation to Brookings to do and we're ready to do.

MR. SHAIKH: On live television. Now we can hold --

MR. MAKKI: We should work live all the
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time. Luay, I'll give you the last word, please.

Please address some of the questions.

MR. KHATEEB: Well, very much I would like to address the couple of questions about the alert of ISIS entering Iraq as well as the army issue.

I must say, I do command the statement of Dr. Abadi when he said pre being sworn in as Prime Minister in his first press conference when he said, we are not prepared to send people from the south to the front of the north or send Army, whatever. Within the context he said that I would like to see Mosul people defending Mosul, Anbar people defending Anbar. The army will be playing a supportive role as when it needs to be.

This should be the case because the Army should defend the border and defend from external threats while the internal securities need to be defended by the local police, by the intelligence services, etcetera. However Iraq is under attack from -- most of those ISIS are external threats. So the involvement of the Army is legitimate. That's why we
could see the Iraq Special Forces very much involved as opposed to the traditional tanks and so on, army artilleries.

So we have these special forces cooperating and working side-by-side with the Kurdish Peshmerga, and they have already established a joint operation room in Erbil, and are cooperating together to make some advances.

They've made some good, successful advances, including the takeover of Mosul. Just imagine what would have happened to the downstream of all these Provinces if that were to be blown up or whatever. They took over the fields of Anjali and Batma. These advances added value and moral success to all of the nation.

Again, for the future, Iraq should build an Army and national security on national doctrine as opposed to how many Sunni or Shia or Kurds or whatever. Once we have a national army this could be a step forward to restoring the national identity.

The other thing about the ISIS in terms of
why no one did anything about ISIS knowing that they are coming. Well, ISIS entry to Iraq was very much -- let me address them as Al-Qaida splinter groups.

Entry to Iraq was very much an inevitable entry. It was a result of the Syrian conflict.

If you would just do a small search on YouTube. Look into, for example, the various peaceful demonstrations. This is January 2013, let's be specific. Let's not go from the very first two months or so. But there were a lot of secretarian groups promoting a very aggressive language, parading Al-Qaida flags. Then becoming an ISIS flag and so on.

So the host was very much there to welcome such an entry, and no army on earth would have prevented such entry. Only the local would have done something. Just to give you an example, a small district, it's called Amirli, the population around 15,000 people.

It was under siege for 10 weeks. Left with no ammunition, women and children. Because there is no host there, majority Turkmen, they defended that
district. Al-Qaida splinter groups, insurgencies, and ISIS failed to penetrate that village with all their power, under 10 weeks. So when you have such momentum to defend a local territory, if we can replicate that sense of responsibility to other Provinces there will be no ISIS and Al-Qaida and no penetration.

So to conclude, I think I would refute the claim of many pessimists that no election, no cabinet, nothing. I think we've seen everything on track. We had an election on time. We had all the key positions being filled on time. We had a cabinet established on time within less than five months, this is a record. We have more of an inclusive cabinet, inclusive administration.

I don't like to prejudge the performance of this cabinet is yet to be tested. We should only look forward for a more accountable administration to deliver success story to Iraq. In cooperation, not only with the local content of Iraq, but with the neighboring countries to bring Iraq back as part of the regional powers of the Arabian Peninsula.

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MR. SHAIKH: Thank you very much. That's a good way to end. Just briefly summing up. Nikolay talked about the efforts of ISIL to dismantle the Iraqi State. You, as Iraqis, know, of course, that Iraqis have been contributing to that even before ISIL.

Now, post-Mosul maybe this is the time with the new government. But with the challenges it faces, the challenge is very much with Iraqis to see how they can rebuild that state and that identity that you talk about.

Also, I guess for the regional and international community to question is -- and for the United States in particular, how do you build a strategy which is initially talking about a surgical action against ISIL that becomes more comprehensive in contributing to assisting Iraqis in rebuilding this state?

Maybe in that, again, to leave on a more optimistic note, maybe there are the makings of a regional political deal as well. Which could,
perhaps, even include Iran in that context. And which is also a shining light of an example to how you can put Syria back together again as well as the wider region.

Let me thank you very much, Dr. Alaa, for making the trip. And, of course, to you Luay. Thank you for coming. At the back we have some sweets so you can add some calories to your diet. But for now let us thank you to our esteemed guests. Thank you.

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