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WHAT DOES A U.S.-IRAN RAPPROCHEMENT MEAN FOR THE MIDDLE EAST?

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MR. SHAIKH: Good afternoon. My name is Salman Shaikh. I'm the Director of the Brookings Doha Center. It's a real pleasure for me to introduce this particular event and the esteemed panelists I have to my left. Let me first also welcome distinguished ambassadors and friends of the Brookings Doha Center already here as well as the participants of the just finished Brookings US Islamic World Forum. And you are most welcome being here as well.

It's a great event we have, I'm sure you'll agree. The title, as you know, to discuss what does a US-Iran rapprochement mean for the Middle East? And in this regard I couldn't think of a better group of people who are to my left. First of all, Professor Abbas Maleki. He's Associate Professor of Energy Policy in the Department of Energy Engineering at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. He's Senior Associate, as well, at Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
Professor Maleki is Deputy for International Research at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Expediency Council as well. He has a focus particularly on publications, on energy policy, energy security, public policy and Iran's foreign policy. He was Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran from 1980 to 1997 and one of the members of the negotiating team that helped end the Iran-Iraq War which lasted a devastating from 1987 to 1992. It's a real pleasure to have you here Professor Maleki. I know this is the second time you are joining us. Thank you for coming from Tehran.

Next my great friend, colleague Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington where her research focuses on energy and economic reform and US policy towards the Middle East. More recently, she was a member of the State Department's Policy Planning staff covering Iran, Iraq, the Gulf States and the broader Middle East issues. Prior to governing the government, she was in the private

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sector working as a Middle East advisor at Exxon Mobile Corporation and she's also recipient of lots of international awards and fellowships, the Council on Foreign Relations. And she previously served at Brookings as an Olin Fellow and a Brookings Research Fellow.

Suzanne, it's great to have you here. Thank you for staying by and not catching the plane straightaway to Washington. Thank you.

And certainly not least we have Dr. Abdullah Baabood who is the Director of the Gulf Studies Centre at Qatar University. He has a particular focus on the areas of regionalism and globalism and his interests specifically focus on the Gulf States' economic, political security and social development as well as their external relations. He's of course, participated in numerous international conferences, workshops and seminars and has several publications to his credit.

He's a member of the academic and research institutions as well as business organizations.
Abdullah has held several positions in business and academia and his last post before joining Qatar University was as a director of the Gulf Research Centre at the University of Cambridge in the UK.

Abdullah, you're a friend of the Centre. It's great to have you on a Brookings platform, thank you.

Now, the subject at hand, what does the US-Iran rapprochement mean for the Middle East? Of course, we wouldn't be complete if we didn't first start discussing are we going to be able to get there. So Professor Maleki, I'd like to turn to you first.

Is there going to be a deal? Is there going to be a deal by July the 20th as things stand in your view?

PROFESSOR MALEKI: Thank you very much for your invitation. A 50/50 in probability to reach to the (inaudible) after 20th of July but I am optimistic to be done this case after maybe a second (inaudible) six months later which is accepted for (audio skip) I think, I mean, Iran and P5 plus 1. On 20th of July for six months, (audio skip) discussions and as both sides especially yesterday after talks between Iran
and United States, representatives both sides said, it is possible to talk because there are some divergent among the targets, goals and the way which we must reach to the agreement. In both sides there are some different views. Therefore, I am optimistic for the next six months, also, and then it is possible to reach to agreement.

MR. SHAIKH: Optimistic for the next six months, so we may need a little bit more time.

PROFESSOR MALEKI: I am optimistic for reaching to an agreement.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Suzanne, what do you think? How close are we to a deal?

MS. MALONEY: Thank so much Salman and thank you to the Brookings Doha Center for the privilege of being on a panel with such distinguished experts from both Qatar and Iran. I am very pleased to participate in this conversation.

I would like to start off the discussion actually by finding one small area of US-Iranian agreement which is I share Dr. Maleki's view that we
are in a difficult position to get to a deal prior to the July 20th deadline for the interim agreement that was signed last November. It's not impossible but I think that you can see by the fact that the A-team of American diplomacy, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and some of his colleagues from the Office of the Vice President and elsewhere in the US government who were part of a secret negotiating team that was reaching out to Iran many months before we saw the public diplomacy that led to the deal last fall, they were redeployed this week in a direct and this time public bilateral conversation with their Iranian counterparts. And I think that's a recognition of just how far the distance remains with only 39 days to go before the expiration of that interim agreement.

But I, perhaps more so that many of my colleagues who have a finer grasp of many of the technical details of the nuclear issue itself, remain optimistic that, in fact, we will eventually see a comprehensive permanent nuclear agreement between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council.
plus Germany. I'm optimistic for a variety of reasons but mostly because of what has happened within Iran, what we've seen from the administration of Hassan Rouhani since his election just about one year ago this week.

MR. SHAIKH: All right, Suzanne, I'll keep you on for a second. (audio skip) the United States wants or needs a deal the most?

MS. MALONEY: (audio skip) is an issue, of course. And it is clear that President Obama has been invested in diplomacy toward Iran really since he campaigned for office. Even in his primary campaign against his future Secretary of State, then rival Hillary Clinton, and perhaps a future presidential candidate, he was very outward leaning on the need for dialogue with adversaries. And I think he's remained committed to that view.

We see it in this, you know, sort of private diplomacy and the efforts to find a way to talk to Iran even when the domestic politics of Iran seemed least conducive to any forward progress. (audio skip)
a deal not so much for his legacy although it obviously would be one positive legacy in a foreign policy track record that is rather checkered at the moment. He needs a deal because he doesn't need a war. Because he doesn't need a protracted crisis and the potential fiscal implications of a conflict in this region. He doesn't need a deal so badly that he's likely to accept any deal.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Professor Maleki, are the Iranians united in pursuing this deal?

PROFESSOR MALEKI: Yes and no. Yes because this is the case of national interests of Iranians. Iranians, most of them or all of them, they have suffered from the (audio skip) of the lack of developments during these years especially in the previous government and administration. Most of them, they receive many, many limitations. For example, one limit which is really simple maybe in the first step is that if you want to go to Europe, it is about four to five hours by flight but now it's more than 10 hours because every Iranian airplane must go to --
when it is flying to London or Paris and others, they in return, they must go to one of the Eastern Europe countries to fuel, to do fueling and then return to Tehran.

It is very hard for Iranians which they are very, very active in relations with other countries. Most of them, they want to go to other countries. Iran is a country with 78 million populations. Most of them, they are in middle class or rich part of the society. Most of them, they want to have shrines, pilgrimage and other trips. Therefore, this is one case that I can say that they are happy to do that, to remove sanctions.

The other issues also are very important for Iranians. Iranians, they are proud. Iran, the regional role of Iran has been dismissed during these years. Now, they are willing to have again the role which Iran has had historically from 5,000 years ago in this region until now. Therefore, all of Iranians, they are ready to do that. Yes, but some Iranians, they have ideologically or economically, they receive

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something during the eight years ago some of them. But they are very few that they think it's better to not reach to an agreement and some of them, as Suzanne said, they believe bad deal is worse than not deal.

Therefore, they have some reservations. And Iran is a pluralistic society. They are talking, they have many interviews in radio, television and media. Thank you.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Dr. Abdullah, you, of course, are originally an expert from Oman. And of course, the sultanate of Oman has played a very important role but I want to ask you more broadly about the regional angle and the Gulf in particular. Where does the Gulf stand as we move to the, sort of the short point of whether we achieve a deal or not?

DR. BAABOOD: Thank you very much. And also I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Brookings for inviting me but also for jointly organizing this event which we are very proud to have the Gulf Studies Centre, Qatar University alongside with Brookings organizing these events. Thank you for that.
The question is where the Gulf stands regarding the deal? It's, of course, difficult to answer it in a few sentences but as you know, there is no common Gulf policies as such. We are talking about six Gulf States that are members of the GCC but with almost six different foreign policies. So it is difficult to explain that there is a common policy towards Iran.

Now, of course, Oman brokered and helped the deal and helped the secret negotiations and talks between Iran and the United States and also for, you know, good, obvious reasons and Oman diplomacy is known for this, avoiding any conflicts in the region, et cetera. Qatar has always had good relationship with Iran so there was no issue with that. The other Gulf States, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, which is the heavyweight within the GCC, they were, of course, shocked initially with the rapprochement, with the negotiations.

Because the deal or the negotiations came at a time when the whole region is in turmoil, when there
is a talk about the US leaving and departing from the region. Rightly or wrongly, but that was the perception at least.

There was the issue about, you know, the Asia visit. America and US Forces are redeploying or leaving Afghanistan, leaving Iraq and of course, it was kind of fear in the region that the US is leaving the area open without much security. But also the Arab Spring and the whole changes that were happening in the geopolitics of the region had scared the Gulf States when they saw that the Americans are not just leaving the region, in their own perception, which I think they were not but that's how it was perceived.

But also, it was they're not only leaving the region but also talking to the Iranians and therefore the idea of the grand bargain may have raised its ugly head again and here we're going to have a grand bargain at the expense of the Gulf States especially that the Gulf States themselves did not see that they were consulted on this or they were not brought into the negotiation tables.
And, of course, there are many issues that the Gulf States here have with Iran. And they would have like to have a say on those issues and maybe that's something we can come to later if you want to or if you press me I'll do it now.

MR. SHAIKH: Great, I just want to press you a little bit more on those who have shown some intrepidity, shock or fear of a nuclear deal in the region. How, you said a fear particularly of a grand bargain which would move things. How can those -- are those fears being alleviated as we now move into this current phase of, you know, of talks towards a deal?

DR. BAABOOD: Two issues when was there a fear? Because the Gulf States have always had an antagonist relationship with Iran with some episodes where there was some dialogue with Iran and during Khatami's time. But through the recent history even during the Shah of Iran there, the relationship hasn't been at its best even during the dual -- during the American policy of having Iran and Saudi Arabia as the two pillars in the region.
And of course, the relationship has over time deteriorated. There is a lot of misperception in both sides and there are a number of issues, whether they are the islands in the Gulf that UAE islands that both sides claim right to it, that Iran doesn't want to negotiate. There is of course the issue of -- the most important issue which is the nuclear issue that the Gulf States are extremely fearful of. Iran developing a nuclear capability but also Iran's policies in the region whether it's Iraq, Syria, Yemen and what they see and Bahrain and what they see as Iran meddling in the Gulf States politics or the Arab politics.

So that's the perception from their side. And of course, they were worried that Iran has been instead of continuing with the sanction and putting Iran down and forcing it to negotiate on these issues, that Iran has actually been awarded for being a pariah state. And there, you know, here is the United States and here is the P5+1 are awarding it a seat on the table, talking to it and not only that, the Gulf
States are excluded.

So that's their perception. And of course, they have to a certain extent, you know, some right in voicing it. But you can see that the reality has kicked in. Immediately after the announcement, you know, we saw that the GCC as a group welcomed the rapprochement at the GCC summit meeting and immediately the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates flew into Iran, to Tehran, to talk to the Iranians.

Following that, we recently saw a visit by the Emir of Kuwait which again signifies that the GCC states have changed their mind. But again, not only Kuwait but Saudi Arabia, in particular, has since signed an invitation to the Prime Minister, to the Foreign Minister Sharif to visit Saudi Arabia, to visit Riyadh. And you can see that the pendulum has shifted. Instead of trying to be against it, they are now trying to see that there are signs that perhaps we can talk to the Iranians. And instead of blaming Oman for instigating this, now people have realized that
Oman has actually played a very important role avoiding more conflict in the region because there are benefits that both sides of the Gulf can have by having a constructive dialogue and by overcoming their differences through that dialogue.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Okay, let's go a little bit forward now and let's hope that there is a deal which is struck which is acceptable to all. We still have the issues that you, Abdullah, mentioned in terms of not just a nuclear issue but other issues that regional states may have with Iran's policies. Let me ask you with regards to Syria. What does Syria look like after US-Iranian rapprochement?

PROFESSOR MALEKI: I think Iran and Levant has had relations, close relations in the history. Many Shiites theologies which they are -- they have been in Iran from 60 years ago from 400 years ago from Safavid empire until now. They are from Jabal and Lebanese regions, Syrian River. And there is many holy shrines in Syria which Iranians they love to go to Syria.
Regarding the geopolitics, even before revolution, Iranian government had good relations with socialist past government in Syria. After revolution it was the new arena for more cooperation especially after the Saddam Hussein initiative to invade part of Iran, parts of Iran. Hafez Assad, the then president of Syria, did support Iran and he stopped any flow of crude oil from Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline which was one million barrel per day, very crucial for Iraqi government.

From that time, Iran and Syria, they did more cooperation until now. The case of Syria, as Iran said many times, it is inside of Syria we must look at a compromise, a dialogue solution. It is not advisable to other parts of the world. If one government has some negative behavior to the people, it is permitted to others like countries like Turkey, Qatar or Saudi Arabia to intervene to that country.

Anyhow, I think Iran will have good relations with Syria. And in future, I think, yes, it is true that Syria needs a lot of reforms in
government, in social institutions but I think the total integrity of Syria also is very important for Iran. And as I know, as I understand, the American side wants to talk about Syrian issue also. But now Iranian leadership believes it is better to concentrate only on nuclear issue.

MR. SHAIKH: Just a little bit more on Syria with you, Professor Maleki. There would be some who would say that it's good to stance that you just said that there should be dialogue amongst Syrians that it is, in fact, the Assad regime which is not allowing that dialogue to take place or to flourish. And in this environment how is it looking forward one can generate that kind of space?

PROFESSOR MALEKI: Yes. I think Iran has a pivotal role in this issue that you mentioned. Yes, is it natural that the government of Syria doesn't permit those Salafis or extremists which has been accommodated by foreign countries to sit in table and talk. But I think Iran should mediate this case also as Iran has good relations with Syrian government.
And also Iran has access to a position. I'd say again, Iran has access to them. It is not -- it doesn't mean that Iran believes that they are in right position, no but has access to them.

Last week there was a meeting in Tehran, 32 countries which the name was friends of Syrian estate. They gathered, I think Iran can easily do the same between government of Syria and oppositions but it is related to the domestic issues in Syria also.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. I'd like to ask you the same but a little bit broader on terms, Suzanne, in terms of the regional issues both with regards to Syria and Iraq and the other sort of list of complaints we may well hear. What does a US-Iranian rapprochement mean for that basket of issues? And the still the gulf there is in terms of trying to resolve those issues?

MS. MALONEY: (audio skip) a little bit difficult here. I don't think we are seeing rapprochement at least not within the foreseeable future. I'm not even sure that we've seeing détente
although I think that that's possible and it ought to be the objective that both Tehran and Washington strive for. I think what we may have in an arms control agreement and hopefully it is a robust one that satisfies all of the concerns of the international community including the concerns of Iran's closest neighbors.

In the context of successful talks toward a really important arms control agreement on the nuclear issue, I think that there is room for a greater dialogue and cooperation between Iran, the region as well as Iran and many other world powers including Washington on the issues of greatest concern for the region. I think, in fact, it is incumbent upon all sides to try to facilitate that kind of a dialogue and what we heard over the course of the past few days at the US-Islamic World Forum that was held here is that Syrians, at least some elements of the Syrian opposition, in fact, are quite open to incorporating Iran into a regional dialogue about the future of Syria and ways in which the conflict can be resolved.
I'll be blunt. I see Iran as a combatant in Syria and therefore, there can be no durable peace. There can be no durable stable outcome to this horrific crisis in Syria unless Iran is somehow bought into that process. And it won't be bought into the process unless it has a seat at the table. And I think that is the message that we've been seeing very clearly, hearing very clearly from Foreign Minister Zarif, both in his response to Secretary Kerry when this issue was raised at Munich last fall as well as in his unavailability to attend the upcoming meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the first real overture from the Saudis to the Iranians since the election last June.

I think it's quite clear that the Iranians want to be part of a dialogue but they're not prepared to give a lot, at least not right away. And I think that what we're seeing take place in Mosul and what's been taking place across Iraq and Syria over the course of recent months is only going to reinforce Tehran's commitment to preserving its access, its
influence and its dominance in Syria. This is precisely the outcome that they're afraid of and it's only going to reinforce not just the position but the role of those who make the decisions in Tehran which we know extends well beyond President Rouhani to members of the revolutionary guard who, in fact, have a very different world view.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Just to follow up on that and thanks for difficult. Who -- we accept maybe there needs to be a regional dialogue. Who -- can it be the United States or what other body or entity can actually lead such a regional dialogue at this point in time?

MS. MALONEY: I wish I had a good answer to that. I don't think that there is a natural convener of such a dialogue. Obviously, we have an absence of a UN envoy on this issue right now. Whether or not someone who comes into that position might be capable of drawing the relevant parties to the table, I don't think it's a role for Washington. I don't think that it's a role Washington can play. And I think
ultimately it comes down to political will on the part of both Tehran and Riyadh and that political will has been intermittent and it has not coincided in the past.

But I'd also say that, you know, over the course of particularly the past 25 years since the end of war between Iran and Iraq, since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have endeavored to manage their tensions somewhat constructively. It took quite a while after the war to see a full reestablishment of diplomatic relations but there is a sort of orientation among Iran's foreign policy establishment and I think within the Saudi foreign policy establishment as well that they don't want to see this spin out of control. And obviously, what we're seeing, you know, with the horrific death toll in Syria and now the spread of that conflict and of those extremists groups into Iraq is something very close to a situation spinning out of control.

And so, I think that we're likely to see a
real drive on the part of both Riyadh and Tehran to find a venue, to find a mechanism for direct and sustained conflict on Syria or, I'm sorry, conversation on Syria.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Abdullah, on that question in terms of how do we get a regional process and a regional discussion going to take up some of those issues. Do you think it can be Iran and Saudi Arabia? Or could it be other -- are there other Arab organizations or even Islamic ones that could take up this challenge?

DR. BAABOOD: I think to have any kind of understanding between Iran and the Arab world you need to have Saudi Arabia as part of that. And Saudi Arabia and Iran have been, while they were at loggerheads with each other we have seen hundreds of thousands of people being killed in Syria and Iraq and affected and in Yemen as well. And it's basically a war that has been fought through proxies and they've got to stop this proxies war because it does not benefit anybody and at the end of the day neither Iran
nor Saudi Arabia are going to benefit from this.

How does it happen? I think I agree with Suzanne that what we are seeing here is going to be an arms control deal. But that in itself can give some confidence to the Gulf States that they can start talking to Iran on other issues because the deal with the P5+1 is only concentrating on the nuclear issue.

I think we are talking about a region where foreign policymaking is not generally through institutions. It's foreign policymaking is mainly due to one or two people making it and it's through the perception of those one or two people. So if you have a good will of the king and of Ayatollah and Iran the PM leader then you can get things going. And that is where this differs from other countries. So on one hand, you need a good will from both sides but also other countries and other actors in the region can help. Oman facilitated the deal but it needs someone else to also move on. Perhaps Oman now took -- keep that dialogue but perhaps even Kuwait now through the visit. Kuwait has vested interest in making sure,
ensuring that the relationship with Iran is improved.

The Islamic Conference is a good venue as well and I think there are a lot of other arrangements that we can think of that other countries in the world have done. Conflict in the Gulf, conflict in this region is not different from any other conflicts in the world. We've seen Europe devastated itself for hundreds of year. We've seen many people killed.

But then they manage to organize themselves through different organizations, whether it's the European Union, the Helsinki process, other security arrangements like that. So sometimes it needs the outside world to help and I think the arms deal is going to help because that takes away the fear that Iran is going to develop this nuclear arsenal and it's going to just spread its hegemony over the region which is, of course, resented in the Arab world.

So if you have that out of the way and Iran agrees to this arms control deal, then I think there are other issues that can be brought into the table and there are a lot of other actors whether regional
organizations or even individuals. The perception, as I said, of the leaders themselves that can change. This is a region where, you know, the king can decide to go and visit Tehran on one day without much preparation. We've seen this even in Egypt where Sadat just, you know, decided that he wants to go and give a talk at the Knesset.

You know, one day they were fighting and then the next day there was peace. So I think, you know, this is a region where personal perceptions of leaders play a very, very important part. And leaders have no constituencies to control them. They don't have democratic constituencies to tell them, you know, you can't do this or can't do that. So of course, they have a free hand to do so and I think that can be a plus in the sense that they can find a way to deal with it.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you very much. I'm going to turn the floor over in a minute but in a few minutes but before that Professor Maleki, I want to ask you specifically about Iraq and the new challenges.
perhaps that Iraq now poses to Iran, the region and of course, the United States. And specifically, of course, Iraq has a -- and Iran have a long history here. Not least the history of the Baath Party and Iran from the fifties till the turn of the century, till 2003.

Now you have a situation where some are, of course, it is a resurgent Al-Qaeda but also being joined maybe by remnants of the Baath Party and tribes and many seeing this as part of a continuing struggle, maybe even a new phase if you combine it with Syria of the Sunni-Shia struggle in the region. How does one and discussing issues and mechanisms with which to handle this kind of crisis, how does one do that in this current context?

PROFESSOR MALEKI: This is really interesting that you mentioned from 1958 until 2003. Iraq was the first threat in Iran's military doctrine and every year they design many maneuvers and games for this case. After 2003, Iran and Iraq, they reached together very soon and now there are many,
many cooperations bordered bilateral, trilateral, there are energy cooperation between Iran and Iraq, a gas pipeline from Iran to Iraq. It is going to be built easier and also from Iraq to Iran the pipeline for products and it is not only with the southern part of Iraq, as you mentioned, Shiite and it is with central government now and in Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan autonomous, (inaudible) Kurdistan. Many activities between Iran and Kurdistan also is going down.

I think the first issue between Iran and Iraq is the security in Persian Gulf which is very important. I want to propose maybe a dialogue between GCC and two other countries in this region, Iran and Iraq. Iran and Iraq, they have talked about Persian Gulf and they shared their views and they reached to some commonalities in this (inaudible) region. Historically, the case of the British soldiers particularly in this region it is not so successful for the countries and then American forces now, the strategy or policy of pivot in Washington, DC, it's
going to change the presence of American soldiers in this region.

Therefore, I think there is no need to any leader or any convener. It needs only as my friend Abdullah said, it needs only the correct perception for security arrangement in this region, in Persian Gulf. And one dimension which is very important is energy dimension of these activities. Saudi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, they are about 60 percent of proven oil reserves in this region and 25 percent proven gas reserves.

It shows that it is very important region therefore, if they cannot cooperate together, I don't know how it would be in the future regarding the shale oil and shale gas and other improvements to renewables and their technologies. I think now the leaders of these countries, they reach to this point that they must work together because of the future of this region.

And the last point, I think Iranian activities in Iraq, it is not only for Shiite as I
told you we have very good relations with Kurdistani part of Iraq, with government of Iraq. And we have common threads also with Iraq and in a framework with United States even. The case of Al-Qaeda which you mentioned, the first attack of Al-Qaeda was against Iran not against United States and other countries in 1996. One Iranian province, Iranian city in the (audio skip) province of Iran and Dawa-ish, (speaking in Arabic) which is I think another threat which Iran, Iraq, United States and other Persian Gulf States they share this danger.

Really, they are going to change this (inaudible) agreements in this region, the case of borders and other issues. It is, I think, the main danger with which we must work together to remove it.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. One more question for you. I notice we have the Palestinian Ambassador here. We also have some distinguished friends and guests who have come for the forum also from the Palestinian side. And this, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli
issue is something which Iran has also been seen as a player.

Now, let's assume maybe we don't get rapprochement. Maybe we get to an arms control agreement in détente. Are we likely to see any changes there in terms of Iran's support for certain Palestinian groups and its stance on the peace process more generally? And on the two state solution?

PROFESSOR MALEKI: Really from 1948, Iran had supported Palestinians until now. I want to say even before revolution, Iranian revolution, it was part of Iranian behaviors and if you remember, Ayatollah Khomeini for example, permitted his followers to give money to Fateh and PLO the money which is tax, religious tax in Shiite homes. He permitted and that was the first in Islamic world which one religious leader did.

After revolution also it was continued until now. Really Iran feels that all of Palestinians they must support -- Iran must support all of them and for Arab-Israeli issues I want only to say that Iranian
leader proposed a referendum in all of (inaudible) which was Palestine in the past. (audio skip) proposal from Iranian leader (audio skip) it is good way to do that for future of (audio skip).

MR. SHAIKH: (audio skip) you are free to comment on the peace process side but I also want to ask you with regard to sanctions. I know this is a question you are often asked is in the likelihood of a deal are we going to see the return of international business to Iran?

MS. MALONEY: I'll speak just quickly to the peace process issue which is that the tragic collapse of the recent set of talks and hope that existed until fairly recently that there might be some new progress actually helps to facilitate some of the regional diplomacy because it eliminates one area where Iran's activities tend to ramp up when there does appear to be some forward momentum on the peace process.

So it is, I think, a very tragic development for the cause of peace, for the cause of the

Palestinian people and for the security of the Israeli
state. But it paradoxically probably is a facilitating condition for regional diplomacy between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

On the issue of sanctions, we've already seen a rush of businesses back to Iran. They're back in Iran. They're filling up the hotel rooms but they're not taking out their checkbooks and their credit cards, in part, of course, because the sanctions make it impossible to use credit cards in Iran or to transfer any kinds of funds to Iran. And what we've seen over the course of the interim deal is that even the sort of modest sanctions relief that was provided as part of the bargain whereby Iran put a stop to some of its nuclear activities or at least put them on hold for a period of time and received some relief from particular sanctions measures, it has not yet produced significant new investment in Iran.

That was, of course, the intention of Washington and its partners in that process. To begin to show Iran what the possibilities are in a situation in which this crisis is put behind us, that there is
tremendous economic opportunity for Iran. It is, of course, much needed. The sanctions have had a devastating impact on the Iranian economy. Iran is still a very wealthy country. It has an incredible economic base and it is poised, I think, to take off at some future point at which sanctions are a distant memory.

But that will be somewhere well into the future. If and when we get a comprehensive deal, it's quite clear that any sanctions relief at that point will be staged. It will be tied to specific milestones on the Iranian side, commitments that Iran will have to fulfill and I think it will be limited in the respect that it will not include a wholesale removal of American sanctions on Iran because so many of those sanctions have been put in place as a result of policies other than the nuclear issue, whether it's terrorism, whether it's human rights abuses or other issues.

And so, I think that we may find ourselves, if we get a deal this year, looking in another year or
two at a period that looks a little bit like the late 1990s where European businesses were returning to Iran in force, where Asian and Middle Eastern firms were competing quite aggressively for opportunities in Iran, but where the US-Iranian economic relationship remains relatively anemic.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. My final question to Abdullah before I turn it over to the floor here, turn to the floor. And that is talk a little bit about the energy and other potential activities that could happen in the region with Iran. I notice that Oman and Iraq have signed energy deals. Dubai, of course, has traditionally been and still very much is a place for business, Iranian business activity.

Are we starting to see some of that right now or what do you see the potential? And then sorry for just throwing in a second question but the relationship between Iran and Egypt, it's -- to me it seems a little bit of an enigma at least and now with the President Sisi family in power, what is the potential there after the era of -- the short era of
Morsi where there seemed to be some coming together.

DR. BAABOOD: Thank you. (audio skip) mentioned something about the fact that there should be -- there could be some energy cooperation because of the fear of the revolution of shale gas and shale oil. I would go more than that and say yes, that is a challenge for the Gulf States generally including of course the Gulf States on both sides of the Gulf and oil producing countries.

But there is much more important issue than that and that is the fact that given the consumption trends in the Gulf, in the region of their oil and gas, this region could become energy deficient if they continue the way they were. And we can see that there are countries that are already experiencing some problems because of lack of certain kind of energy. Oman, of course, has issue with gas and of course we'll come back to that. But also Kuwait, Kuwait started to import energy especially liquefied LNG, liquefied natural gas from Russia.

And that is extremely expensive.

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States have also started to -- the United Arab Emirates for example have a lot of need for gas and of course, there are two countries in the region that have -- they are rich in gas, that's Iran and Qatar. And I was always thinking if there was going to be that kind of functional cooperation that glued and supported the integration process in Europe which was the coal and steel and because of that it had a spillover effect on other sectors. What is that sector in the Gulf, in the region, that is going to help further integration?

And I found it difficult because all the Gulf States were exporting one product and importing everything. But things have changed. We are now in 2014 and the energy scene has -- geopolitics has changed. There is a need for further gas and energy cooperation where Iranian gas could be exported to Saudi Arabia, to Kuwait, to Oman, to the rest of the Gulf States as well as Qatari gas to support the development of the region. And that could be the functional sector that can have a spillover to other
sectors where you can success in one sector where people start to work together, you can see it happening and other sectors start to emulate that success.

And this is precisely how it happened in Europe where the coal and steel community over time started to develop and integrate more and cooperate more and now we have something like a mature region and wider region and cooperation. So I think there is a great deal of interest and there is a great deal for opportunities that people start to think beyond antagonism and beyond confrontation. That we all live in one region and every country needs to develop. The youth are looking for opportunities. What are we creating for them? Not much unless the countries cooperate.

There are challenges and we can only face challenges together. And if we can have some kind of more further, deeper regional integration. Whether that brings in Iran into the GCC which I see as doubtful but there are other ways of doing it and
there are other mechanisms that brings Iran, Iraq and other countries in the region with the GCC to form some kind of a much wider, regional and prosperous and stable area.

Just to answer your other question very briefly. While I can say at the moment Egyptian foreign policy is very much controlled by certain countries in the region and you can see that the message was sent to the Egyptians, please invite the Iranian president because we want to talk to him but of course, he didn't turn up. And I think it is going to take time because in Egypt they do not see -- sorry, in Iran they do not see that the Sisi is someone who came through an elected government. They don't see that he's overthrown a legitimate government in Iran and at least this is their perception and at the moment they're playing hard to get with Egypt. And I think any Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement will have to go through the Riyadh and maybe Abu Dhabi.

PROFESSOR MALEKI: (audio skip) I want to add one sentence for (audio skip). Mr. Hamid
Abdollahyan who is a Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran attended to the ceremony of Mr. Sisi (audio skip) conversation with him about five minutes when they did shake hands (audio skip) the Egypt, future of Egypt it is related to many parameters and many factors for Iran foreign policy.

One of them is the Egyptian government. Egypt is a very, very important country (audio skip) civilization, geopolitic, it's geopolitic (inaudible) the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these issues, I think Iranians they are analyzing the situation and they will have their (audio skip) relations between Egypt and Iran.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. I'll now turn to the floor. I now there are at least 15 to 20 people in this audience who could probably ask better questions that I have. So and definitely let's see if we can take as many questions as possible and if you could, I could just ask you please just state your name and any affiliation that would be great, that would be very helpful.
I'll start with the gentleman right next to the microphone.

MR. KABALAN: Thank you. Thank you very much. My name is Marwan Kabalan and I want to talk about two main points. The first one is that there is this feeling in the region that the Fertile Crescent, i.e. Iraq and Syria have fallen victim to the animosity between the United States and Iran. The United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The Iranians initially assisted the Americans in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein but they later on turned against them in order to turn Iraq into another Vietnam for the Americans.

Now, the Americans are doing the exactly the same for the Iranians in Syria and we believe that this will be going on until the Americans and the Iranians agree on the nuclear issue which leads me to the second point, that the nuclear issue shouldn't be actually a matter of concern for the Arabs or the GCC countries except as much as it addresses Iran regional influence and its policies.
I think the Iranian nuclear program shouldn't be a matter of concern for the arms because it's not. It's a matter of concerns for the Israelis and that is why President Obama is actually trying to address the concern of the Israelis but using the plot of the Arabs in order to get the concessions from the Iranians in order to solve this issue. Nuclear weapons, in my opinion, are not made to be used. They are used as a deterrence as a tool to blackmail the other but it's not going to be used. What should concern the GCC more is Iran conventional weapons, Iran expansionist policies and Iran hegemonic inclinations.

Finally, I just wanted Mr. Maleki, this is my final point. I just wanted Mr. Maleki actually to speak more as an academic because what we have been hearing is Iran official policy line. It's more like, I mean, Mr. Zarif speaking rather than an academic from a university, thank you very much.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. I liked your questions better. The lady at the back? Yes, please.
QUESTIONER: (audio skip) question is to Mr. Maleki. Mr. Maleki, there has been some claims that Iran is using sectarianism in their foreign policy. Thus there has been some claims that Iran is escalating sectarianism in both Syria and Iraq for now. So I wonder what do you think about this? What do you think the Iranians are doing with these two governments in both Iran, I mean, Iraq and Syria, thank you.

QUESTIONER: (audio skip) my question is for Ms. Maloney. You said you consider Iran a combatant in Syria. Recently, there was news that United States is training fighters here in Qatar to go back and fight in Syria. Do you consider the United States also a combatant in Syria?

MR. RIEDEL: Bruce Riedel from Brookings. My question is both to Suzanne and to Dr. Maleki. With the fall of Mosul and the apparent advance of ISIS forces, do the United States and Iran now have an urgent need to collaborate to rescue their client state in Baghdad and more specifically to Dr. Maleki,
you mentioned that Iran was the target of the first Al-Qaeda. Could you give us a little more detail on that?

MR. SHAIKH: Okay, why don't we start there? We'll have surely another round or so. Dr. Maleki.

PROFESSOR MALEKI: Yes. Regarding my similarity of my views with Dr. Zarif, yes, it is similar because Zarif and me we are friends and we have worked together in foreign policy of Iran many years and now he is a minister and I am academic. Maybe a few years later it would be vice versa.

Anyhow, second case of sectarianism and Iranian activities, I want to say first Iran is a pluralistic country. There are many players in Iran. For example, many Iranians, they love to go to holy shrines in Syria and Iraq. It is not to Iranian government to tell them to invest there or not but there are huge investments in Karbala, Najaf, Damascus and other cities. Iranians, they love al-allahu bait and they want to do that and in other part of this region the Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, other
countries, they love to go to Mashhad, a holy shrine in Iran. And they have invested in Mashhad and northern part of Iran.

Therefore, I think the only responsibility of Iran and the other states and governments is to do the -- to design policies for such trade and interactions. But if you look at the region who sends troops to other countries? Was it Iran in the Persian Gulf or other countries? Who sent the combatants in other countries?

Really, Iran supported Syrian regime from, as I told you, from 1958 which Baathist party, Baath party raised power in Iraq. This is the case of geopolitics. It is not Eden. But the case of sectarianism means we supported some peoples in Syria against other people, no it is not true.

Iran supports government of Syria and Iraq also, as I told you, calls they are Sunnis, Iran has good relations with courts, with the government of Iraq which has a network of Sunnis and Shiites. It is not whiter who is Sunni, who is Shiite, who is
Muslim, who is not Muslim. Look at Iran's relations with Armenia. It is very good relations. Armenians they are (audio skip). Look at Iran's relations with Afghans, most of them they are Sunnis, with other countries also.

I want to say nationalist interest in Iran is more than other issues. But I believe if Iran has or if Iran had good relations with Islamic countries, it is also part of national interest of Iran. And Bruce asked about the first attack of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda did in 1996 an explosion in Mashhad holy shrine and it was about I think 30 peoples had been killed. It was the first and then they announced the attack against Shiites which they thought that they are out of Islam and something like that.

MR. SHAIKH: Suzanne, a couple of questions your way but also is this -- is there -- is this all about Israel when it comes to the nuclear is what (audio skip)?

MS. MALONEY: (audio skip) and I'll answer that somewhat extemporaneously because I couldn't
catch all of the phrasing of the question. Clearly, there's a close relationship between the United States and Israel on a range of regional concerns. And Iran often ranks very high amongst those. But I think we've also in a very public fashion over the course of the past year in particular that there are also very deep differences between President Obama, the rest of the American security establishment and the current Israeli government on issues of Iran as well as other issues.

And so, like all allies, we coordinate, we are very committed to supporting the defense and the preservation of Israeli survival but we are not in lock step and we're certainly not dictated to by the Israeli government. There can be no better evidence of that than the sort of policies this Obama administration has implemented both with respect to Iran and obviously with respect to the peace process over the course of the past year than that.

On the issue of sectarianism which I recognize was not addressed to me but I'll just say a
quick work about. I think it's quite clear that Iran would prefer a world without sectarianism. Ayatollah Khomeini couched his appeal to the Islamic world very broadly to the ummah. But it's also quite clear that Iran's message, Iran's efforts to provide support and find proxies across the Islamic world have always found greater resonance among Shia communities both here in the Gulf and of course, in Lebanon. And that is powerful influence and it's influence that I think it's unlikely the Iranian government will give up readily.

That said, I think that they recognize and have recognized for quite some time the threat of inflamed sectarianism in Syria. Before Syria became a counter terrorism issue for Washington which is clearly is today, you would hear in the Iranian press and from Iranian officials quite a lot of talk about the concerns about jihadist and salafist influence among the opposition.

And so, this is a longstanding and I think quite legitimate concern and we've seen it play out in
direct fashion over the course of the past few days. I don’t expect direct cooperation between Washington and Tehran on preserving the integrity, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state of Iraq. I can only hope, however, that both governments which have imperfect influence over the government of Prime Minister Maliki find a way to ensure that this government does not, in fact, collapse. That Iraq's borders are not, in fact, erased as a result of the rise of these groups. And that their efforts to do so are in some way harmonious if not entirely coordinated.

And just finally, on the issue of the United States, whether the United States is a combatant in Syria. I think it's quite clear that we are not today, although many in Washington and elsewhere would wish that we were. And I think that even at a point in which we may be more heavily involved in training and equipping the Syrian opposition, we are unlikely to see a scene as we have seen on several occasions in Tehran in recent years whereby senior military
officials attend the funeral of military fighters who were killed in Syria. That has happened in Iraq, in Iran in the case apparently defending the shrines informally.

But there's clearly a very direct conduit of support, of advisory role with the Bashar Assad government and as well in terms of direct contributions to the Syrian Army. And so, I think there's really no parallel between the Iranian role in Syria and the American role in Syria today.

MR. SHAIKH: Abdullah, just very quickly could you speak to this issue of sectarianism? And Iran being accused of actually escalating sectarianism from your perspective.

DR. BAABOOD: (audio skip) if I may also I want to come out on the issue about Israel. I think Israel is going to be against any state in the region developing nuclear capability. But I think it will be wrong to think that the Iranian nuclear capability is because of Israel or it could threaten Israel in the future.
I think where we should see and look whereby
Iran is trying to develop this capacity or this
capability is because of their need to protect
themselves. Iran the valai'it fakih in Iran is the
only one of its kind in the world. They've developed
it through the Shia thinking and they want to keep it.
And, you know, the down -- the call for the downfall
of that regime has got them to think seriously about
protecting it.

But also, Iran is surrounded by other
nuclear powers and they see that they need to develop
their own thinking. So I think we should look to the
reasons, the real reasons why Iran is developing this.
To this Iran could attack Israel or even contemplate
doing that is madness because, you know, if they do so
Israel is a very mature nuclear power that can take
the first strike and retaliate. Well, Iran cannot do
that. You know what is known as, you know, mad in
security paradigm. It's going to be madness to think
that Iran could attack at any point the Israel.

So I think there are other reasons and some
of them may be things that I have mentioned but there are other reasons as well maybe regionally hegemony that comes with it and the weight that nuclear power can bring in. I can see and I can hear here in this hall that people are accusing each other of starting, who started the sectarian war and sectarian conflict.

And we can sit until, you know, for a long time listening to these accusations. In my opinion, all have started it. Iran has started it but also other Gulf States and other people in the Gulf States have started it. Each one is a new retaliation for the other. The thing is, you do -- you start one and you get a retaliation and the other start to do the same and it's starts to get bigger and out of control and grow out of control.

Remember Al-Qaeda. Remember how it was started. Remember what it has done. What we are seeing now is even organizations that are worse than Al-Qaeda in terms of their brutality. They are not only threatening the states but they are threatening innocent people. And both sides and I mean it, from
both sides the Iranians and their allies in the region but also the Arabs and the Gulf Arabs are supporting this whether they are official governments or non-official governments. They are doing this. And what they are doing is they are creating monsters in the region that is going to come to haunt them as Al-Qaeda did in the past.

MR. SHAIKH: I'll take first Louie at the back here.

QUESTIONER: (audio skip) Brookings Doha Center. Mr. Maleki, over the past five, six years huge debate dominated this discussion in Parliament and Iraq and Parliament and also in public about the fact that Iraq has deprived access to international waters. And this is because of the issue of 1975 treaty, Algeria treaty pre-revolution and then followed by the issue of the post-1991, post-1990 the invasion of Kuwait and the UN Security Council resolutions that granted more lands and more water access to Kuwait.

This left with Iraq with very limited access
to international waters. And neither Kuwait nor Iran are very much desperate for the few kilometers that Iraq should have or historically had until even many years after the fall of the monarchy. The question is do you think Iran will ease such access to Iraq as unfortunately we don't have a Kuwaiti panelist to talk on this but like at least from the Iranian side, do you think a country like yours that enjoys over 2,000 kilometers of waterfront will ease few access of kilometers to give back to Iraq especially that the country enjoyed such an access for many years?

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. I'll take one more in the back and then I'm going to come here. Is there one more person in the back? Please.

QUESTIONER: (speaking in Arabic)

MR. SHAIKH: (speaking in Arabic).

QUESTIONER: My question is to Mr. Maleki. Daash has controlled north of Iraq. Do you think that they will declare a state of their own? What does the Iranian government think of that?

QUESTIONER: (audio skip) it is the issue of
legalist studies which maybe you are an expert on that case and I have worked on this treaty. Treaty of governmental borders, treaty of friendship and governmental borders between Iran and Republic of Iraq was signed in 1975 after meeting of Shah and Saddam Hussein in Algiers during the OPEC summit. It was signed in Sa'dabad Palace in Tehran.

This treaty has three major issues which is really important. First is the case of again demarcation of borders between Iran and Iraq which some of them has been changed during the time because of the many natural disasters and some other issues.

Second, it was the prohibition of supporting the opposition of each country in another country. For example, the Kurds which they have had good relations with Iran, Barzani, Mullah Mustafa Barzani and others. And on the other side, Ayatollah Khomeini and others in Niger fan carballah.

And the third one was the talveg or deepest line of Shatt al Arab or alvan route as Iran/Iraq border. Before that the border between Iran and
Ottoman empire and then Iraq state was the east coast of Shatt al Arab. Therefore, 1975 changed east coast of Shatt al Arab to the talveg line, tentatively median line something like that. Therefore, I don't think the access of Iraqi state to Persian Gulf has been limited because of 1975.

As you know, the terminals of Al-Baqara and Al-Ummiah and others they are in the front of in the northern part of Persian Gulf. But in the other side in Khor Abdullah as you mentioned after 1990 there are two decisions by United Nations about the demarcation of water boarders between Iraq Kuwait with it is related to Iraq and Kuwait to decide about it.

But the last point is that Iran is ready to do many facilities for Iraq as Iran does. Now trucks and tankers, they are going from Kurdistan and from Zubad and others to Iran and from Iran to Dubai and other by ships, tankers. Therefore, there are many other activities that two countries they are doing.

And Daash, Iran is opposing any geopolitical or any changes in the map of this region, the borders
and other issues and really Iran is concerned about these activities. And despite of the fact that one of -- one gentleman said that maybe Iran and United States don't talk about such threats about the territorial integrity of Iraq. I think they are, they will do in the future as they did in the past. Iranian Ambassador in Iraq Mr. Ohmi and I think Ryan Crocker something, ambassador of United States they did twice in Baghdad.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. Sorry, we didn't all hear the question so I'm glad you explained on the Daash question. I'm going to take three more questions. I know there's a lot of people who want -- the gentleman there, yeah, and then behind you.

MR. HUSSAIN: My name is Akram Hussain from the Central Strategic Studies. I have two questions. The first question to Mr. Maleki. Is it possible that there will be differences in the position between Bashar Assad regime and Iran especially after it is clear that there is an increase in the role of Iran in Syrian issue as was seen in different (inaudible) and
that Iran wants to lead the talks on behalf of Syrian and decide the fate of Syria and maybe bilateral negotiations with some of international bodies or regional bodies.

And the regime in Syria also wishes to say to its people that it has overcome the armed opposition by itself and not by the help of other countries or by Iranian help. And we have noticed that there was some irritation in the Syrian government of the (inaudible) of the office -- Iranian offices inside Syria and that are taking part in negotiations about disarmament of some groups in arms and elsewhere.

MR. SHAIKH: Can I please try and get a couple of more questions in? Yes? If I can get -- thank you. Thank you very much. And we can -- if I could ask you to have that discussion -- the gentleman there and then the gentleman in the front. Thank you.

MR. HANDY: Zohir Handy resource (audio skip) impact of an agreement not necessarily a rapprochement but an agreement on the nuclear issue on
the energy markets because an agreement which will most likely happen and I share the optimism of the speakers of the panel in that regard. Will allow for Iran to come back to its previous, you know, production capacities and maybe even increase its production capacities because the Iranian production capacities have been somehow hindered by not only the latest oil embargo but all the economic sanctions since, you know, the Iranian revolution and the Iranian oil industry didn't have the capacity to import equipments and technology and to, you know, manage properly its energy reserves.

So what is going to be the impact on the energy markets and how OPEC especially is going to deal with that knowing that Saudi Arabia is going to be the biggest loser when Iran will come back to its previous oil capacities. This is on the international oil markets. Internally, domestically, lifting the sanctions on Iran will, I think, have also implications on the domestic policy of Iran. We know that the sanctions have allowed for maintaining a kind
of relative unity within Iran. So what will be the implications on the domestic policy in Iran after the lifting of the sanctions in the mid to the long term? Thank you very much.

MR. SHAIKH: Thank you. And the gentleman just at the front here.

QUESTIONER: Syrian Ambassador in Syria, in Dohar. If Iran is to attack United States and the West as a whole saying that they use double standards about the nuclear issue. Now, Iran is falling in the same trap and helping the uprising in Bahrain at least in the media while they attack the revolution in Syria by all means even by men and weapons and media and there are so many evidence to that.

Isn't this a contradiction or is it just a sectarian project that Iran wants to apply in the region after applying it to Iraq and which years ago Ahmad Abdallah the second in Jordan had warned us off. This is also in the same contradiction, Iran is the same contradiction when it says that chemical weapons are rejected religiously speaking but accepts using it
in Syria. And falls into the same contradiction when Iran changes its government peacefully while as supports a dictator in Syria.

MR. SHAIKH: (audio skip) Ambassador. If we could just go down the line and address the questions that have been directed to you, particularly you Professor Maleki.

PROFESSOR MALEKI: Regarding the nuclear deal and its impact on energy market as you mentioned, rightly it has impact. But there are a few issues which I raise first, Iran capacity would be raised in the future and now it's about for example three million barrels per day as Minister Zanganeh said they are going to do it to five million barrel per day maybe there are the six, five year plan in Iran which is writing now, the experts they are writing it. Maybe 6.5 but at the same time this is a major debate in Iran. Is it really in favor of Iran to return to policies which Iran had in the past before revolution which Iran had 6-5 -- 6.5 million barrel per day production and competition between Saudi Arabia and
Iran on that time and Doha Summit in OPEC framework which the price of oil on that time in 1976 dropped after the conference because of the huge excess capacity of Saudi Arabia which pooled to the market.

Anyhow, therefore Iran I think Iran doesn't need 6.5 million barrels per day. Iran has two problems. One problem is the case of the technology which Iran is going have access more modern technology. Second Iran conversation policies are more important than production policy. We based about one million barrel per day of crude oil for products in Iran totally because of the lack of efficiency and productivity and issues like that.

Therefore, Iran's policy has shifted to those issues. But despite how all of these issues the demand in the world is rising sharply because of China, India, Belize, Brazil, Indonesia and South African and other countries, Russia. Therefore, I think it still demand is important and even after nuclear deal Iran's production, Iran export access to add -- if adds to the market, I think the supply
doesn't matter and demand is more important.

As Iraq also now is -- Iraq is exporting more than Iran now in OPEC framework. And Libya also is one country which would be added. At the same time in all of these issues, I think in the future, this shows that the countries in the region, they must work together because of the oil price which is the most important thing for these countries.

Regarding sectarianism, I think the only answer would be who sent troops to Bahrain if Iran is the country which is meddling in Bahrain, we must see some evidences. Which evidence shows that Iraq did such troops in Bahrain and other issues? Yes, Bahrain is -- they have relations with Saudi Arabia, with Iran, with Qatar and other because this is an Islamic world. All of them, they are the same. They have same religion and same destiny in their future.

MR. SHAIKH: And on Bashar?

PROFESSOR MALEKI: Yes, it is possible to have different policies in future. We did have similarity with Syria in the past and also some
different views, divergent. It is natural. But on chemical weapons, Iran is victim of chemical weapons because of the Saddam Hussein attack to Iranian troops and also to the people of Iraq in Halabcheh. And if you remember, the money of these attacks on that time were supported and were financed by other Persian Gulf States.

MS. MALONEY: On the question of energy policy, I think this is actually one of the areas that will drive some conversation between Riyadh and Tehran. It's actually an area where despite the fact that the Saudis have successfully used the oil weapon against Iran inadvertently in several cases but very successfully, repeatedly.

Because for the prerevolutionary during the war, after the war and now, of course, during this most recent sanctions Iran and Saudi Arabia have been able to achieve a reasonably constructive cooperation at different points in time within OPEC. And one of the individuals who is most responsible for that from the Iranian side is Bijan Zanganeh and I think that
was a deliberate signal with his return to the oil ministry under President Rouhani he is at least as important to Iran's regional diplomacy as Foreign Minister Zarif and he will be critical to managing the process of Iran's return to full production capabilities.

I would add a note of caution about the likelihood of ever seeing the 6.5 million barrels a day again. Iranian oil ministers have been projecting targets consistently since the end of the war with Iraq and have never achieved them and as Dr. Maleki said there is, I think, some energy around the idea in Iran that what has happened over the course of the past few years should be used as a bridge to an economy that is at least somewhat post-oil or less dependent on oil revenues. And it remains to be seen if that will actually be achieved.

One very quick point on Syria and I recognize the question wasn't addressed to me so I apologize for asking your indulgence. But I think it's important to note that despite the fact that the
copious support for Bashar, the intense involvement of the Iranian government in the conflict in Syria, I think it's also quite clear that Tehran and particularly important elements of the Iranian power structure have been hedging on Syria from the start.

I don't know that Bashar is well loved by even the members of the Iranian security establishment. And I think what we've seen with the Iranian efforts to broker ceasefires in various parts of the country is a determination by Tehran to ensure that it preserves it access and influence even at a time in which Bashar may no longer be part of the picture. I do think that it's almost inconceivable that we would see Tehran willing to give up the basic structure of the regime. But the individual himself may be expendable.

DR. BAABOOD: On the energy issue, I think that is one of the items on the agenda that can bring the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, to work together. There are, of course, many issues that bring them together. One of them is the
sectarian issue and so on which we talked about. But the energy issue is one of the most important ones because not unless Mr. Maleki has just explained that there is more oil coming in. Iran wants more share, lifting of the sanctions or partly lifting of the sanctions. They need to deliver to their people and they need foreign income.

Iraq is also doing the same thing. They need more to export more oil and (audio skip). Libya is also coming on the stream but also there are the challenge, the main challenge, coming from the shale gas and (audio skip) oil. Not only in the United States but perhaps even OPEC has another (audio skip) China and other places. So I think the oil price is going to be challenged.

And if the oil price is challenged, you can believe that the security of many of these countries are also going to be challenged. No longer can many of the Gulf States go back to the 30 and 40 dollars per barrel. Basically, that is totally unacceptable. They cannot even meet their break-even point. Because
of economic policies that they have pursued for a very long time, some of them an inefficient economic policies that now the break-even price is about 80 plus even 90 and in some of the countries some of them are 100.

Below that you are talking about these countries having some huge budget deficits that can affect their development. So they are bound by this to cooperate together and of course, Iran and Saudi Arabia being the two major countries in the region that produce that kind of oil and they need to cooperate together of course through OPEC.

I think I will stop there because the other questions have been answered. Thank you.

MR. SHAIKH: And I'm sure we can continue for a while but we started a little bit late but we must finish now. Before I thank the guests, I guess my sort of mini-conclusions at this point is there is some optimism for a deal, maybe not in -- probably not in the timeframe that has been set for now. Professor Maleki, you put it at 50/50 but long term you
expressed some optimism there.

But as our discussion showed and as certainly we heard from the audience, there are a number of other issues particularly Syria and Iraq and the general existential debate that comes up when it comes to the issue of sectarianism and the promotion of sectarianism or otherwise which will continue to present real challenges in terms of even if there is a détente or further rapprochement in the region. And this will require a lot of work and a lot of dialogue, communication and cooperation. The question is is how can that happen and will it happen moving forward?

So I guess the best I can summarize is that in this current phase there is opportunity but we must also look out for crisis and how to avert that at this point in time. Let me next just please thank our three esteemed guests for coming; Professor Maleki, Suzanne Maloney, Dr. Abdullah Baabood. If we can just give them a round of applause. Thank you also and there are some refreshments outside. Please do join us, thank you.
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