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SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY:

HOSPITALITY UNDER PRESSURE

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Good afternoon, everyone. And welcome to Brookings. My name is Beth Ferris. I'm a Senior Fellow here at Brookings, and Co-Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

We are delighted to welcome you to this session on Turkey and Syrian Refugees, the Limits of Hospitality. And this is really to launch a report that my colleague, Kemal Kirişci has just completed, called Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges, Beyond the Limits of Hospitality. And Kemal will be presenting his report, and an amazing feat of doing this in only 12 minutes or so. And then we'll have comments from three esteemed colleagues from different sectors of those working on the issues of Syrian refugees in displacement.

Before we begin however, it's important to put this into a broader context, of what's happening in Turkey is certainly is of concern to all of us, with respect to Syrian displacement, but it's really just a part of a much larger phenomenon. Displacement in Syria right now is massive, it's rapid, it's dynamic, it's changing. Inside Syria and largely invisible, or at least 6.5 million internally displaced persons living within the borders of their country. As with IDPs, internally displaced persons everywhere, they are the responsibility of the national government.

And we know we've heard most recently in the U.N. Security Council, about the difficulties in accessing people in need inside Syria. Obstacles that include bureaucratic hassles of visas and vehicles, and countless signatures required on forms to deliver aid within the country, as well as ongoing fighting, disputes between warring rebel groups, and internally displaced in Syria, and a very large percentage of the displaced people in from Syria are often quite invisible.

In the neighboring countries I think the latest figures are that close to 3

million people have sought protection in all of Syria's neighbors. The rates going into Lebanon which now has over a million refugees of 50,000 people every month arriving in Lebanon. Smaller, but still significant numbers arriving in Jordan. Lesser numbers in Egypt.

You know, when you look at the number, the extent, the scale the dynamism of displacement, it's hard to get a sense of how this will all end. Even if for some reason, miraculously, the war were to end tomorrow, it would be a long time, before most of those displaced were able to find solutions. Whether going back, or being able to set up new lives in neighboring countries.

So even though we talk a lot in terms of numbers of those displaced, the sheer scale of human tragedy of what's happened in Syria, and the consequences on those who have been forced to abandon their communities is certainly a cause for concern for us all.

Kemal Kirişci, you all have the bios in the packets that were given to you; but Kemal, my colleague, is the TUSIAD Senior Fellow here, at Brookings, and the Director of the Turkey Project at the Center for United States and Europe. He has written extensively many books on Turkey. He has lectured at universities around the world, and certainly it's been a pleasure working with Kemal.

At Brookings we've been following issues of Syrian displacement for about the past year with some degree of intensity, I would say, and it's been a joint initiative between my work, or our work on displacement and humanitarian issues, with Kemal, whose expertise is politics and asylum and immigration policy, and Turkish politics, generally. And a third component, has been our colleague at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, who has been looking particularly at the role of Gulf actors vis-à-vis the Syrian humanitarian situation.

So following Kemal's presentation of his report, we'll turn to three commentators. We'll begin with Daryl Grisgraber from Refugees International who has worked on these issues for a long time. You were in Cairo for a while, and you come from a human rights background with Amnesty International.

We'll then turn to Burcu Erdoğdu, who is a Career Diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, here at the Embassy, serving as Political Counselor. She's has had various postings, but is particularly steeped in the Turkish political reality.

And then we'll turn to Joe Livingston, who is a Foreign Service Officer working on Turkey with the Bureau on Population, Refugees and Migration, who just spent the last three months in Turkey looking especially at issues around Turkish and Syrian refugees inside Turkey.

So we are delighted to have all of you, and we'll begin with you Kemal, and you've 12.5 minutes, so 15 minutes -- so go ahead -- to present your report.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you. Well, thanks for being with us this afternoon. I'd like to start by thanking Beth, because when I came to Brookings in 2013, January, I thought I was, to use a soccer expression, hanging up my boots as far as refugee issues, asylum went. Just a few months into my presence here, Beth came up to me and said, you know, you've all this work previously, why don't we put a project together.

And it's been a very enriching experience for me. We have had a chance to go together to the Syrian border with Turkey. Visit a number of refugee camps, as well as talk to a wide range of people. Government officials, intergovernmental organization representatives, civil society representatives, et cetera.

But on the other hand, Beth, I have to make a confession that it's a sad story. It's a sad story when you get exposed to the human dimension of it, and I think what is striking about this particular refugee crisis that we've been looking at, is the

children. That the children are in great numbers, and obviously to some extent, oblivious to what actually is going on, and oblivious to the future.

And this is where I'd like to start. This report is not about the causes of people fleeing into Turkey, it just accepts, very sadly, that a solution is not around the corner, and that a little bit like previous refugee crises in the region, from the Afghans to the Palestinians, I fear this one is going to be a lasting one as well. Most probably not very different than the previous cases.

And dare I squeeze in, here, that I've been working on this topic since I got started on a PhD thesis in London that was looking at the Palestinian refugee issue back in the early 1980s. And as the French expression goes, (speaking French), things stay really, unfortunately, the way -- the way they are.

So, what I've done in this report is look actually at the consequences and the implications of this particular reality and the challenges that Turkey is facing. Now, I'd like to start also by saying that this is not the first experience that Turkey is having with mass influxes of refugees. I have lived with a series of them, from the beginning of my career at Boğaziçi University. In 1988 I saw 60,000, what they call Pershmergers, because at the time Turkey could not use the word Kurds towards them.

And that was followed by a massive influx of mostly Kurds from Northern Iraq in 1991, March and April, close to 0.5 million, and another million fleeing to Iran. In between came 310,000 of Bulgarian Turks and Pomacs to Turkey, and I won't go into the details of those experiences but only flag out that this one is considerably different than the experiences that Turkey had with these earlier mass influxes.

Firstly numbers. Although the one in 1991 involved close to 0.5 million this one is now close to a million, and government officials together UNHCR, are expecting that this may well approach 1.5 million by the end of the year.

The second important difference, and this is if there is a pleasant story to this one, is the response that the government has given. Back in 1989 the Bulgarian refugees were received with open arms, legislation was -- special legislation was introduced very quickly, precipitously, to allow these refugees to bring in there, if you might recall, and their trabands, their (inaudible) and whatever they could save from Bulgaria without taxes, without much paperwork, they, in many ways were extended rights above what Turkish citizens could experience.

And the housing facilities were provided, credits were provided for them, much more importantly, citizenship was extended very quickly, and they were very lucky, very lucky, unlike the Middle East in this case, with a regime change in Bulgaria very -- within a few years Bulgaria setting out towards membership in the European Union, they went back and acquired Bulgarian citizenship. So they had the best of both worlds.

However, the Kurds, in both mass influxes were treated very differently and were referred to as guests. The Turkish state at the time shied from using the term refugee, thinking that the use of the term refugee would automatically engage them in obligations onto the international law, and though the world and some of us who tried very hard to say, it doesn't matter what turn you use, the reality speaks for itself.

And subsequently in 1994, the first internal, legislation was adopted in the form of a regulation, which very clearly states that in the face of mass influxes of refugees, refugees must be stopped on the other side of the border, unless there is a Government Cabinet decision to the contrary. And this is what happened in 2011, as Syrian refugees began to trickle in, by October 2011 the Interior Minister of the time, in front of the IOM, and UNHCR in Geneva, announced what they called the Open Door Policy with temporary protection.

These were music to the ears of human rights people, and people like

myself who had been involved in these -- in this issue for some time. So, the Turkish Government really has to be commended for adopting that. The unfortunate part of it is that the temporary protection details were only elaborated in a secret regulation, and that human rights people, that have had access to it, say very much abides with international law, and they fail understand why it is kept as secretly.

The third difference, beside the response one, is that it comes, meaning these decisions come at a time when the number of individual asylum seekers to Turnkey are also increasing. When you look at the UNHCR trends report, in 2010 Turkey was the 15th country with respect to individual asylums applications in Turkey. In 2013, Turkey had moved up to the fifth place. So it is this mass influx is coinciding with a time when individual asylum applications are also increasing.

And lastly, it is happening at a time when after many years of consultations and effort, Turkey has adopted a brand new, from scratch, law that addresses asylum issues beside immigration issues. And the law also created the first brand new bureaucracy in Turkey since the one that was set up in 2001, when Turkey's new relations had been -- had been launched. And the agency that the law sets up came into force last month and now is responsible to take over the Syrian refugee crisis as well.

I think I will, for the benefit of time, I will also spare you the details of the figures, they were distributed there. There are about 220,000 who are still in refugee camps. Camps continue to be referred to as five-star camps, and there, too, I think, the government deserves credit for the kind of services, and facilities they are providing. But the numbers who are outside camps is increasing, and this is where the difficulties lie. And it is with these difficulties that we come to the challenges.

I have a string of challenges that I have laid down in the report, and I go into considerable detail, however, here, I have just about six minutes or so, if I can see

the clock there correctly from here. So I will just pick up two or three challenges.

One challenge that I consider as being the most significant and relates to all the other challenges, is that Turkey has to brace for the long run. In other words, the refugees are here to stay.

Initially, the Turkish Government at the initial stages, was very generous and magnanimous in many ways, even told the international community that they did not need any help, and chose to be excluded from the first Syrian Regional Response plan in 2012. I think the expectation there, if I dare to say this publicly, was to kill two birds with one stone. Extend this generous treatment to the refugees with the expectation that within months they would be going back and that they would be a very grateful community in Syria, and would help to build strong bones between Turkey and this new Syria.

This has not happened, and during the interviews we had, especially the ones I had in January with MPs, MPs from governing party, as well as the opposition party, it became clear that they, too, are very conscious, and they pronounced years, like 10 to 15 years, so these are significant years.

So extending citizenship is an extremely controversial issue, would be extremely controversial and during the run up to the local elections, there were even growing speculations that the government was going to enable them to vote in the local elections, expecting that by and large, they would vote in favor. However, this -- it was never really the case, and the government has also provided statistics that between 2011 and the end of 2013, only 70 Syrian nationals were extended citizenship.

So the idea of a blanket extension of citizenship, is extremely unlikely because the law that governs these issues, the fundamental law of Turkey, dating from 1934, allows citizenship and settlement only for people who are known as coming from

Turkish descent and culture. And this is the context in which the Bulgarian refugees receive their citizenship.

However, integration is already taking place. Many of those who are outside camps, one way or the other with their means, sometimes with assistance from NGOs, sometimes from the municipalities, are trying to adjust, look for employment, arrange for education of their kids.

So, the second challenge I'd like to refer to is education. The figures for the number of children in Turkey, Syrian refugee children is very confusing to me; because both UNHCR and UNICEF puts it around 52-53 percent, but anyone who goes to the camps and walks the streets of the towns along the border, can immediately see that there's a huge imbalance between the number of grownups, and the number of children.

I feel that these figures somehow need to be revisited. Sixty percent, 65 percent of the refugees' children in camps have access to school, but it looks like the schooling diminishes as the age of the children begin to increase. The problem is much vaster outside the camps, and there, too, there are different figures, optimistic figures, put 25-26 percent having access to schools. Most of these schools are run by -- either by refugees themselves or Turkish and NGOs, and the curriculum that is followed, is the curriculum from Syria, except that it has been (inaudible) from any coverage or façade where he's being aggrandized, or whatever the appropriate term there is.

However, this creates a challenge in Turkey because we may go into this in questions and answers, right now Turkey is trying to address the issue of the Kurdish problem in Turkey, and one of the hot issues is, this very fine but politically important difference between teaching a language like Kurdish, and teaching a curriculum in Kurdish. So if you allow Syrian refugee children to be taught in Arabic, their curriculum,

this will become very difficult to reconcile with the government's reluctance to allow for a curriculum in Kurdish as opposed to just teaching of Kurdish, which is permitted.

From here, I would like to move to one last challenge, I'm keeping my eye -- I realize I'm going a little bit over time there, is what I call administrative challenges. That is the challenges that this new agency is facing and ought to be addressing, and I'm aware that there is an effort in that direction. The first challenge there is to develop a public, transparent regulation governing temporary protection. Lots of details have to be developed there, and it has to be public as far as refugees go, but also human rights organizations, et cetera, go.

Hand-in-hand with this, is the issue of voluntary returns. Though the government argues that they work very closely with UNHCR, and again, give them credit, this is very important detail, because Turkey, in the past, had made a nasty reputation for violating what is known as the " non-refoulement" principle. There's been hardly any refoulements forcefully returning refugees to Syria, but there needs to be a regulation that governs this and allows for monitoring by human rights organizations.

The last challenge, administrative challenge, is the issue of registration that Turkey has still not completely registered refugees outside camps, and what is somewhat disconcerting, but understandable given the nature of the crisis and the way in which the crisis has developed, is that there's been a number of different efforts at registration, duplications and waste of resources; and this will be -- will need to be addressed.

Lastly, it's international cooperation. I will very brief on that. In a refugee crisis, at the end of the day, is an international responsibility. Turkish Government regularly repeats that they have spent 2.5 billion on the refugees with another 0.5 billion coming on top of it from NGOs, compared to 3.6 billion by the European Union, for the

whole region, and 1.7 billion from the United States, Joe can correct me if I'm wrong there.

The Turkish Government says, we need help and it's -- and they are in the most recent Syrian Regional Response Plan, but the problem the problem there is that the return to appeals, the fulfillment of U.N. appeals for resources in the case of Turkey has been much lower than the neighboring countries. And imagine how this can easily be abused for domestic, political reasons, but also in terms of public opinion.

Last important aspect of international solidarity is resettlement. There's a very old tradition of the international community, resettling individual refugees from Turkey to the U.S., to Canada, and elsewhere. That tradition needs to be revitalized in the context of this particular crisis, and I suspect Joe will probably go into that as well as Burcu.

And I'd better stop there, and I apologize, Beth. I hope she won't fire me from this project, as I would like to continue.

MS. FERRIS: No. Thank you very much, Kemal. Before we open it up for questions, let's hear from the three of you. We'll begin with Daryl, from Refugees International.

MS. GRISGRABER: Yeah. Thanks, Beth. And thanks to Brookings, generally, for calling us together here, and for the report, Kemal, I think it's very timely --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you.

MS. GRISGRABER: -- and brings some important attention to issues we haven't been looking quite as much lately. I'm with Refugees International, and I cover the Middle East, and in practice what that meant for a few years -- it's all Syria all the time. So we've spent a couple of years going back and forth to all the host countries in the region as well as occasionally inside of Syria when we can get there, and one of the

things that we have found is that there is a similar pattern to all of the Syrian refugee situations in the host countries. And Turkey in some ways fit that pattern, and in some ways it does not. It's quite unique in a couple of aspects.

One of the things that I most appreciate about the report, Kemal, is that you talk a lot about the urban Syrian refugees in Turkey, but it's the Syrians who are outside of camps. It took a while for Turkey to catch up with recognizing that there was this huge population outside of the camps, and they are making a good concerted effort to start offering services and protection and to register people. But it was a bit slow in coming, it was one of the later responses, Lebanon and Jordan, for example, and even Egypt to some degree were recognizing out-of-camp refugees a bit sooner than they did in Turkey.

So as I said, in some ways Turkey is quite representative of what's happening in the region for Syrians. The numbers of people arriving began in a manageable enough way. Everyone thought it would be short-term, the influx started to create a strain on the host communities, there was competition for resources and, you know, we are talking about health care and food and shelter and education, and places like Jordan and Lebanon, you were talking about competition for water, in fact, so sometimes it is that basic in some places.

And as the tensions rose, and resources became more scarce, host communities became a bit less welcoming. You've probably heard what's gone in Egypt in the past few months in particular with the backlash against the Syrians. And the last time we were in Turkey as Refugees International we also noted that people were becoming much less friendly to the idea that they had so many Syrians arriving in the country.

And so aid from the international community was also quite slow to

arrive. Three years in, you know, all these appeals from the United Nations are still being funded quite slowly, and it's creating hardships in responding to refugees. One of the results of this has been, there's been more careful border management, because host countries feel like they can't keep taking in so many people, and so this is a pattern that has played out in all five of the major hosing countries.

It started a little bit more slowly in Turkey, because initially what we heard, right, was Turkey has set up all these fantastic camps for all of the refugees, they are doing the response by themselves, this is all going really well, and there wasn't a lot of attention paid, until we started to discover that there were all these refugees outside of camps who were not being served all that well.

Turkey is unique in the sense that when all these Syrians started arriving, Turkey itself, was a worldwide provider of humanitarian aid in fact, so it had some ability to provide for refugees as well as the responses that it carrying out around the world. And initially, because of a lot of its resources, it chose to handle the Syrian refugee response, mostly on its own. I think in 2012 there was a small donation, an in-kind donation of tents, or something like that, but for the most part Turkish Government has been handling it solo.

And the camps were acknowledged to be largely quite good, and so it was to sort of stop paying attention to that, and then we heard nothing about the urban refugees, so this is where it all starts now about the problems that they are having which are exactly like the problems they are having Jordan, and Lebanon and Iraq and Egypt.

One thing that is also interesting about Turkey, and I'll be interested to hear what you have to say about this, Kemal, is that in a couple of the southeast border provinces, we were told by local governments that, in fact, employment for Syrian refugees in Turkey was welcome and quite helpful, even though it was unofficial.

So it's an interesting aspect of this because we had not heard that in any other countries and it -- you know, it prompts to wonder what could be done in a useful sense with having so many refugees who need work. So our own experience in Turkey, actually, I've been thinking recently is quite comparable, in some ways, to what we saw in Egypt, but that's where I'm mostly-recently back from.

And I say that in the sense that the Government of Egypt, like the Government of Turkey has been putting certain restrictions on the agencies that could offer humanitarian aid, and this is part of what's impeding good response to the refugees, as well as some local governments that are maybe more or less welcoming to the refugees, and willing to help them out.

There are significant restrictions on operations for humanitarian NGOs, and even getting a registration is often difficult, and there are a number of both national and international organizations that have been trying, and who have planned for work with the Syrians. And in many cases, even have the funding to do it, but can't get the permission to operate. And while this is happening again, to some degree, in many of the hosting countries, in Turkey and Egypt it's been particularly pronounced.

And one of the things that we always talk about to the government is getting local civil society more involved in the response. So, the timing is great on the report, because it's really acknowledging that we've got this gigantic urban population, and I think a really big deal to have come right out and said, they are probably going to be here for a long time, and we all need to be prepared for that. The host communities, governments and the world in general.

Turkey is capable. Turkey is generous with its response. Turkey also needs to balance its security concerns about refugees with its humanitarian obligations. And again, this is something we see happening in all the hosting countries, but it's an

important thing to point out.

Burden sharing by the international community, by donors, and that includes both financial donations and resettlement. Again, I think the report acknowledge well that resettlement is not going to be sort of the largest solution for the greatest number of people. Annually, I think about 1 percent of all the refugees in the world get resettled, maybe a bit less.

QUESTIONER: Yes.

MS. GRISGRABER: Yeah. So if you bring that down into numbers not a whole lot of Syrians are going to be going anywhere. So, support for the refugee response and humanitarian response is really more important than it's ever been as the numbers get bigger and bigger.

Turkey has the chance, I think, to do something quite interesting here, that we heard the International Organization for Migration say recently, and that's that migrants should be incorporated into development plans, and they should be considered a benefit to a country's development. And in light of the fact that, in some places, Syrians have been quite welcome to work in Turkey, for example, they are looking more at education, and what they can do to integrate Syrian children.

And with Turkey's interest in being welcoming and responsive to the Syrians there's potentially good chance here to really be an example for the world of how migrants can be involved in development, and really beneficial to a country.

So I think, I'll leave it at that because I'm guessing you guys both have much more to say, but happy to take questions afterwards.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Daryl. We'll turn now to Burcu from the Turkish Embassy.

MS. ERDOĞDU: Oh, thank you, Daryl, also for giving some of your time

to me, since I have a couple of issues to mention. First of all, I'd like to thank Brookings Institution for the organization of this very timely event, and in particular to Professor Kirişci who draws attention to the challenges facing host communities by citing the Turkish example. And I believe that the challenges faced in other host countries are almost the same.

And particularly I would like to say that at a time when the crisis in Ukraine often hijacks the discussions on Syria, I hope that this -- today's discussions will get a heads up for decision-makers and the public opinion as well.

Professor Kirişci's report, I read it in full with deep interest, it was very comprehensive, detailed, well explaining the challenges Turkey faces, and it was thought-provoking, and raised many questions that need to be answered. And I think that it makes a very valuable contribution which will -- to discussions which will continue to occupy us in the days and months ahead. Hopefully not years, but unfortunately I'm not optimistic.

Just a few comments, and I will leave other issues for the Q&A session. I would like to start by asking this question of, whose reality? For Turkey this addressed a very timely question, how to deal with the refugee in the long run, in the long term, and the answer is that reality dictates us to focus more on each of the integration, rather than emergency humanitarian assistance, and I think Daryl also added her voice to that comment.

Yet, for the host countries, that disproportionately share -- shoulder the burden of the refugee influx and had become the main target of the spillover effects of the crisis in Syria, the perceived reality is different. From the standpoint of the five neighboring countries hosting almost 3 million Syrian refugees and whose resources stretched to a breaking point, the question is immediately focused more on how to ease

the burden on them in the short and near term, and as such how to put into effect internal -- international mechanisms to help them overcome the difficulties they face, we face now.

The fighting goes unabated in Syria, there is no political solution in the horizon, the regime is -- continue its -- continuing its indiscriminate attacks against civilians, the starve or surrender strategy, still keeps blocking international humanitarian aid excess to and within Syria. And we are talking about projections that soon, at the end of this year, the number of refugees in the region, we have reached the 4.1 million.

So all these factors are driving a very gloomy, a very dim picture for the neighboring countries, and also, in particular for Turkey, because this means, that there are conditions, driving conditions where the situation remains unchanged, based off flow of refugees from neighboring countries will hardly decrease, resulting in enormous pressure on already strained resources and capabilities.

Does the reality dictate to us to deal with immediate repercussions of the crisis which is of our own making? And I'd like to underline here, is that the crisis in Syria is no longer just a Syrian problem, not a problem either, it's an international problem requiring international response, and it's the responsibility international community to protect Syrian refugees.

So, the neighboring countries in Turkey are doing all these efforts on behalf of the international community as a whole, and Syria has become, as Director Ferris has mentioned, as the largest crisis of forcible displacement in the worlds, and a whole country is losing its population and this has very serious effects to the regional peace and stability.

Yet, so far, countries in the region, in a sense, absorbed the impact of refugee crisis, that’s containing the repercussions of the crisis in Syria within the region.

However, we believe that this is neither fair nor sustainable, even in the short term, and that's the reality facing the host countries. When we look at the Turkish example, the numbers speak for themselves.

I don't want to repeat what Professor Kirişci, and what Daryl has already mentioned in terms of the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, but I just would like to draw your attention to one fact, that when the first population movement from Syria to Turkey take place in April 2011, the number of Syrians in Turkey, in the camps, were 252, and today we are talking about 800,000 Syrians. Mostly living in urban settings, urban locations -- the so-called urban locations as refugees.

And it makes Turkey the second biggest host of Syrian refugees after Lebanon. And as was mentioned by previous speakers at the beginning, it was fairly manageable for Turkey because we were experiencing, in terms of mass refugee influx, and also we were also one of the major humanitarian assistance donors, so we had the capabilities, and we had the experience. Yet, despite all these, as Professor Kirişci just mentioned, the Syrian crisis, unlike any other crisis, unlike any other mass refugee influxes Turkey had in the past, posed very serious and very important challenges before Turkey, which was very difficult to manage just by ourselves.

I will not go too much into the detail what Turkey did and still does in order to cater to the needs of the Syrian refugees, I can give more information at the Q&A session if the need arises. Since Turkey is at risk, particularly for those inside camps that have often been praised at the international level, and also at this meeting, yet, as was mentioned by previous speakers, the momentous challenge for us now, are those living in cities -- urban locations.

This appears to be more critical, facing 60 percent of Syrians citizens taking temporary protection in Turkey are now spread across the country, not just in

border provinces, and it is not as easy to identify and reach to those people as the once residing in camps. So far we manage to register 500,000 of them in corporation with the UNHCR, yet the work is not complete, because the refugee flow is continuing, day-by-day.

Well, I mean, just to, maybe, outline a few things, without going into the detail, about things that we are doing to face this enormous challenge. First of all an inter-agency mechanism has been established. The state authorities are active in all 81 provinces of Turkey, they are working in close corporation with U.N. agencies, with local and international NGOs to cope with the demands of the Syrian population.

And the employment issues has been mentioned, a recent work, a study has been conducted. There is -- facilitated discussions, there are discussions on facilitated employment system, and also there is a plan to put more Syrian children into schools, but these are all in the pipeline, but of course it takes time to devise these plans.

And the new institution and the new law on foreigners and international protection which came into force very recently was mentioned Professor Kirişci. This is very important, and I just would like to underline that, because for more than 60 years, we were -- there was another law, the old law was in force, and that law had -- wrote very -- very much constraints and limitations on refugee issues, so the way the thinking in Turkey changed, I think this changed the law, the new law represents this important issue.

So, how the pressure on host countries might be eased? In your report, Professor Kirişci, you identified three options, and you also referred to two of them in your presentation. Voluntary return, resettlements, and integration into the host country as a last bit, inevitable option in the absence of a political solution. Well, I think that with the difficulty in terms of the first option under the current conditions, however, we must not

give up efforts in creating the conditions for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes.

I know that we are not discussing the causes of the Syrian refugee crisis here, but it's one of the important elements that shall not ignore or rule out.

With regard to the second option on resettlement, and certainly much more could be done. So far, 17 countries have agreed to participate in UNHCR Syria resettlement, Humanitarian Admission Program, the program aims 30,000 refugees to be resettled by the end of 2014. This represents only 1.5 percent of refugees, and only 0.4 percent of the total number of Syrian IDPs. I think the problem is that many countries are more concerned in keeping Syrians out rather than letting them in, and the Open Border Policy seems like an applicable criteria only for the neighboring countries, which shall not be the case.

So I think the call that Professor Kirişci makes in his report, has been a very timely one for the international community to shoulder the responsibility and share the burden.

What neighboring countries want? What Turkey expects from the international community? What we expect is an active engagement, a meaningful contribution in sharing the burden. We are grateful for the cooperation, we are grateful for the support given to us by friendly nations, by the U.N., several NGOs, however, the overall assistance and response of the international community unfortunately remain limited in scope.

When we look at the U.N. regional response plane, that is devised to ease the burden on the neighboring countries, unfortunately, it fell short of adequately meeting the demands on the ground. I will not give figures because Professor Kirişci already mentioned those figures. And in terms of the financial toll of the crisis on Turkey,

Professor Kirişci had mentioned $2.5 billion, and according to the latest projections, it has almost reached USD 3 billion and is continuing. So I'll leave that this cannot be considered as a fair share of burden.

Lastly, on integration issue, I mean, undoubtedly this is the most controversial issue, the most difficult one. Without full international solidarity, fair burden-sharing, effective regional as well as international mechanisms, which are missing currently, integration option would be deemed by host countries as a means to make the burden on them, permanent. And that's really leading the rest of the world of their responsibilities to protect refugees.

At a time when we still try to deal with the emergency assistance issues, and we believe that is not a medicine will ease the host countries' problems. And while the refugee flow is continuing incessantly, it's not a viable option either because when we speak about integrating, more than 3 million refugees, which will soon surpass 4 million, I think it's a huge number, and it's too much to ask from the neighboring countries only.

So I took a note here to my colleague Joseph, from the State Department, please correct me if I'm wrong, my memory might betray me, but the refugee admission ceiling that authorized by the U.S. Administration for 2013 was 70,000. So just only in Turkey's case we are talking about 800,000 Syrians, so that should maybe balance, in terms of the expectation from the host countries.

So what it is a durable solution? We'll, in addition to resettlement and international financial and development aid, the most important thing is the political solution to end the suffering but since there is no political settlement in the horizon, then what should be done is to find a solution to the problems, to the needs of the refugees inside Syria, within Syria.

So, the international community from the perspective of the neighboring

countries is that they should take resolute action for an increased humanitarian assistance to all Syrians through cross border and cross line operations, and should try to meet the needs of Syrian IDPs inside Syria. There has been a U.N. Security Council Resolution which was adopted last February, unfortunately, it fell short of expectations in terms of the implementation, we are still awaiting -- we are still awaiting some positive results, which is not the case, yet, that is very important issue for us.

I mean U.N. has been dysfunctional for almost three years, and this what we didn't expect while extending our hospitality. So I just wanted to give the perception of the neighboring and in Turkey, with regard to these issues. I will be happy to share my comments on other issues in the Q&A session. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much, Burcu. And now we'll turn to Joe Livingston from the State Department Bureau of Refugees -- Population Refugees Migration.

MR. LIVINGSTON: First of all, I want to thank you, Beth, and thank Brookings for hosting this, this is a really wonderful and important and timely opportunity to exchange ideas on this subject. And Kemal, I've read your report. I think it offers a tremendous amount to think about --

MR. KIRIŞCI: Thank you.

MR. LIVINGSTON: -- in terms of the social, economic, political impacts of hosting such a large refugee population for a protracted period of time. So I think what I'm going to do is, kind of, go through your major challenge areas, although I'm going to do it in slightly backwards order. I'm going to talk first about the urban contacts, and then talk about international burden sharing, and then kind of go through the line quickly on the rest, and hopefully we'll still have plenty of time for questions.

So I think Kemal's paper, and my colleagues have emphasized very

clearly that this is really, really very much an urban context, that we are working in. Estimates by the Turkish Government are 900,000 or more refugees, some project -- believe that the number already is quite more. There are gaps in the registration system, so it's impossible to know exactly what those numbers are.

But what we do know is that the situation is dynamic, and if we compare where we are now to where we were a year ago, things have changed really quite completely, whereas one year ago, almost all of the Syrians were in camps, and now we find that 75 percent or so, are in urban areas. In those last three months that I spent in turkey I got to get some flavor for what that context looks like and what the needs are, and it's those human stories that you're really left with and I think it's also that human, those -- is that me?

(Interruption)

MR. LIVINGSTON: So from that experience in being in Turkey, I think -- I'd like to identify a few of the needs in urban areas that really need attention. One of them is shelter. I had opportunities in Istanbul, in Kilyos, in Gaziantep, in Sanliurfa, ad a whole host of cities, to go talk to Syrians, talk to refugees in their homes and learn about their experiences. And the situation from city to city to city, universally Syrians are finding themselves without adequate housing, often three, four families in a single home, often living in shelters that are not adequate.

And this is something that will continually need to be addressed. In places like Kilyos, where the population by many estimates has doubled as a result of the refugee influx. It's often found -- very difficult to find an apartment at all, causing many Syrians who arrive to that border to seek shelter elsewhere. It's causing rents to skyrocket in places across the southeast, and Kemal notes that in his report.

Beyond shelter, education is really a pressing need throughout the whole

country. Our partners, including UNICEF believe, even at a conservative estimate, probably more than 70 percent of the Syrian population; that's camps, urban combined, are out of school. When you account for the fact that the rates are quite a bit higher in camps for enrolment, it gives you a picture of just how difficult that context is in the urban setting.

There are about 100 or so estimated community schools, these are schools run by Syrian local organizations, run by various nonprofits, and they help, but their curriculums are often unregulated. The standards are not always uniform between them, but more than anything, they are only meeting a very small fraction of the demand for quality education across the country.

Other needs, information gaps, this is something that we noticed in almost every city. I spent some time for example, at the Gaziantep bus station, and just talk to Syrians who were gathering there trying to figure out what they were going to do next. Some of them had just arrived from Aleppo the day before, and were trying to decide whether they'd go to Istanbul, or to Kilyos, or some other town, and uniformly the issue that the Syrians had, was they had no idea where to run for help.

They routinely said, that they didn't know where to go to register, or they didn't know how to register, or they didn't know where to go for health care or to get basic services at all. And this is very true across the whole country including places like Istanbul, where I came across a family on the side of the road, in the suburbs, the far suburbs with a sign saying in Turkish, essentially, you know, we need help, we don't know where to turn, and they really didn't. And the language barriers don't make this any easier.

Some governments, particularly regional governments, for example, in Sanliurfa, have made great efforts and strides try to educate the Syrians about what to

do. They've created a poster campaign, and pamphlets in Arabic, and Turkish, informing people where they can go for basic health care, et cetera. And this is something that we hope will increase moving forward.

The other on that, the urban side to keep note of is that this is only going to continue to grow, that if we do reach 1.5 million that percentage in the urban areas is going to just be a higher proportion. Camps are not likely a major part of the answer moving forward. If you look at the numbers from last July or August, there is an increase in the camp population, but it's 20-30,000 and that number is trickling upwards, there's very few spaces left in a few camps that have been opened in the last four or five months. And the plans to open up new camps from everything I've heard are very limited.

So, I should also say at this point that for the individuals who have been in the camps, Turkey's efforts have been nothing short of monumental. The quality and consistent care that Turkey has provided Syrian guests in those camps is really quite spectacular. And I had a chance to visit several of these camps, many of my colleagues have visited bereft, and almost uniformly the conditions are above and beyond international health standards, and what should be provided in terms of health access and education, and in many case, and provision of food and non-food items.

So Turkey's efforts are known by the community and they should be supported and acknowledged because they are really quite significant. And even in the urban area, Turkey has opened up its hospitals and medical system to Syrians and a lot of that 3 billion plus, that Turkey has provided, as we understand, it comes from footing the medical bills for so many Syrians including in urban areas, and we are very -- the international community is very grateful.

And as well, Syrians who I had a chance to meet, in many conversations,

acknowledged that, you know, while they often were lacking basic support for -- to find housing, where their children weren't in school, they were grateful for the protection that Turkey has offered, and for the fact that Turkey has kept open borders to allow Syrians to enter.

In terms of the international burden-sharing which is a topic that I think, Kemal, you touched on quite heavily in your paper, and we've discussed here, I'd like to make a few points. First Turkey's assistance as mentioned is tremendous but we also want to be a big part of the answer in responding to the needs of Syrians, and we stand with Turkey in their resolve to find solutions. Solutions both inside Turkey as well as solutions inside Syria, and I think it was mentioned that the U.S. has provided $1.7 billion of assistance, and we believe that assistance, much of which has gone to help vulnerable families, vulnerable individuals inside Syria as well as in host communities inside Lebanon and Jordan.

That assistance goes a long way. We are also providing 127 million in support to Syrians in Turkey. It is less than what's provided in Jordan and Lebanon, reflecting that Turkey has had the ability and means to do a whole host more. But we believe that that support does go a long way, and I'll just breakdown a little bit of what that does. In the camp setting, that's provided -- help to provide several hundred thousand tents, blankets, cook stoves, schools, health clinics.

We are doing a tremendous deal through supporting our major partners including UNHCR and UNICEF, and in urban areas where we are heavily focusing now, our partners, again, UNHCR and UNICEF being largely among them, and also U.S. Population Fund, World Health Organization, they are providing support in urban areas, and through international registered NGOs, increasingly, we are finding ways to provide support, and that includes opening up community centers, which we've done in several

communities to provide information, psychosocial counseling, opportunities for children to play and to find some solace and relief.

And we've helped, through our partners, to provide direct support in host communities throughout Southeast Turkey. That support includes funding to allow families to purchase food, to pay for housing, as well as support for medical needs, including clinics. And as well, youth programs, and we are hoping to do more. We have an outstanding request for proposals out, and we are constantly looking at ways that we can work with our international partners, and our NGO partners to boost the response.

And in that context, we look to Turkey, and the Government of Turkey to help us in helping you to meet the needs that we acknowledged together are growing and will continue to grow inside host communities throughout the country.

So, just to outline a few other points that Kemal made. Kemal, you talked about bracing for the long term, and we couldn't agree more that that is how we have to contextualize the problem. Almost every Syrian I spoke to, invariably, that there were a few exceptions, almost all said, you know, their priority is just returning home, and having a normal life. Being able to support their families, and just have what any family would want.

So, at this point I do believe that Syrians, by and large, are really posited on the idea of returning home. But even in the best-case scenario, as I think we've pointed out, that time scale is going to be protracted. Even if the war ended today, it could take three to five years, given the enormous development challenge. Rebuilding schools, rebuilding homes. This is, in the best-case scenario a long-term situation. And whether we talk about integration in the context of, you know, citizenship, as you mentioned, or we talk about it in smaller steps of expanding working rights in certain sectors, which is a discussion that's ongoing.

The reality is, Syrians are there, and as time goes the stresses on host communities are increasing and we'll need to look for solutions, practical solutions that help to facilitate cooperation between Syrians and their hosts. That can include language training, it can include opportunities for more Syrians to enter the workforce in a legal fashion. Currently Syrians throughout the country are working but many of them are working in factories and in agriculture, and are doing so far below the prevailing rates for Turks.

So if there are ways that we can facilitate greater participation in the labor market, in a way that's good for Turkish communities and good for Syrians, I think that will have a very positive outcome. Kemal, you talked about education and I think, after the immediate, perhaps housing, education was the thing that parents, over and over and over again talked about as the thing they wanted most. Parents are very well aware, and very keenly interested and emotionally involved in the importance of education in terms of the future of their families. And whether that means a future in Turkey, a future resettled to Europe or the United States, or a future inside, back in Syria, education is a critical component.

After several years of being out of school, it becomes harder and harder to integrate students back into a formal setting. So solutions that allow us to facilitate more of both formal and non-formal education will be critical. One of things we are doing to help is we are providing a significant amount funding to UNICEF, UNICEF is supporting Turkish Government's efforts through AFAD, the Emergency Directorate, and the Ministry of Education to build new urban schools across the country. This will not solve the problem on its own, but it does go a long way to finding solution for some of the most vulnerable families.

And then finally, you talk about administrative challenges, to which the

General Directorate for Migration Management, GDMM, is really at the center of that. And I should say that the General Directorate for Migration Management is a new agency with an enormous, daunting task ahead of them. That task is to coordinate assistance, to coordinate all the different entities and agencies that are providing assistance, but more than anything it's registration, and registration comprehensive needs-based registration that takes into account vulnerability criteria, is absolutely critical to identifying who needs assistance, where, and ensuring that that assistance can be delivered.

With one million or so Syrians it's not going to be possible to deliver assistance in a blanket fashion. So improving the registration system which I believe GDMM is quite focused on doing right now, and is quite interested in doing it with much support from UNHCR, I think that will be the way forward for truly finding and helping those in need. It's a daunting task at a time when there are new agency, when they are staffing right, when they are still building capacity, but our -- the U.S. Government position is to support GDMM in any possible. To help them have the tools and resources they need to mount the response that's necessary.

And just circling back for one more second in terms of international burden-sharing, I want to make a point about resettlement. I said earlier on that the majority of Syrians I spoke to, really are focused on returning home, and that's our priority goal, is having Syrians return to a peaceful, state in Syria, to eventually be able to have a normal life in Syria. But resettlement as well, will be one of the solutions, and we, as the lead resettlement country -- the lead resettlement agency, resettling 70,000, as you mentioned in the last year, we are committed to resettling Syrians. UNHCR has committed to referring 10,000 Syrians this year from Turkey.

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah.

MR. LIVINGSTON: Thirty thousand regionally, and those numbers are

going to increase in the years to follow. We respond to those referrals from UNHCR, we historically have responded by resettling the bulk of those referrals, and we will continue to look at ways that resettlement can be one of the durable solutions for some of the most vulnerable families. Obviously it's not going to be the solution for the majority and in the meantime, we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance in the neighboring countries and work with our strong partners like Turkey, and facilitating other ways to reach Syrians both in Syria and in Turkey.

MS. FERRIS: Okay. Thank you very much, Joe. And thanks to all of you for your comments. Let's open up now for some questions. If you all -- we have microphones that are coming, and if you could identify yourself, and I think we'll take three or four questions, and then ask you to respond. Well have Bill and then -- one, two, three, four, yeah.

QUESTIONER: Okay. Thank you. Hi, Kemal. I thought your title was particularly provocative, and I wanted to ask you about Beyond the Limits of Hospitality --

MS. FERRIS: Could you introduce yourself?

QUESTIONER: What do you mean by Beyond the Limits of Hospitality, because you mentioned as the guests as the terminology that had been used before, because hospitality refers to guests, and guests can be -- reach the limit of the hospitality and then be told to go home. In this case are we looking at a situation where the government is recognizing a binding, legal principle, of non-refoulement -- resist all political decision -- as magnanimous and as generous as it has been, is this something that could change even overnight depending on the change in government or a change in political decision. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Yes, please. If you could identify yourself, please?

QUESTIONER: Hi. Esgi Jamalot, from World Bank. I really liked the idea that Turkey can do something really unique, and can turn this into a kind of development. Look at the issue from the development paradigm. And Daryl, you also touched upon that potentiality, but I'm also wondering, what are the challenges? For instance, with respect to integration of the Syrian labor force to Turkish economy?

I came across some accounts mentioning the exploitation of the Syrian workforce. So what do you think -- like how we should address these issues and while we are moving forward to see this as a development challenge? Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. And we'll have the woman in the green, and then -- stand up, it's a little bit easier.

QUESTIONER: Sarah Hutchins, with Georgetown University. A similar question about integrating Syrians within Turkey, in terms of them being a part of the labor market, I read Turkish complaints, of then taking the services and money from the government as well as from in the labor market and dragging out the prices. I'm curious, from Burcu, if the Turkish Government considers this problem, and if so if there's any attempt to have a public campaign to change Turkish sentiment.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you.

QUESTIONER: One of my questions actually was regarding this labor market issue, because you said that it can be part of the development plan, but while you're comparing this situation in Turkey right now with, for example, Mexican issue in U.S. How can Syrian refugees -- can be part of the development in Turkey in the long run? Because you have still here, 11 million illegal Mexican workers, for example, and is part of the unemployment problem, as far as I know. How it can be a part of the development?

And the second question, and it's about the education is, as Professor

Kirişci, you mentioned, what is the long-run policy of Turkish Government on this issue when it comes to the integration of the children to education system, and when they stay, for example, 5 or 10 years in Turkey, it's obvious that it's beyond the humanitarian crisis to keep them away from crime, is one of the major issues for Turkish Government. What will be the legal base of this study in Turkey? When you compare, for example, with the Kurdish issues, what is the legal framework of this education, vision for -- Turkey for these Syrian refugees?

MS. FERRIS: Thank you. Would you like to take -- have a chance to respond? Maybe you'll want to start with the title question, Beyond the Limits of Hospitality?

MR. KIRIŞCI: Yeah. Bill Fralic, we go back a long time. It's part of human rights watch, and then before the committee -- I've forgot the of it -- very different world. Mid-'90s. I frankly, when I said, Beyond the Limits of Hospitality, I had in mind our previous report that focused on the limits of hospitality, and the title meant to capture that now it's just about hospitality, it's about going beyond it, and facing the actual realities as we brace ourselves for the long-term.

Now, whether the principles that have been adopted in the context of temporary protection which includes non-refoulement, will remain as permanent elements of Turkish foreign policy -- Turkish policy, asylum policy. I'd like to thinks that this is the case but, you know, Turkey these days is full of surprises. You know, we thought that Turkey had become one great member of the pluralist democratic community, and we seem to be slipping away from it. But in spite of all the bad news, let's say, that maybe coming out of Turkey, the good news is in this area.

And Joe has made references to the new agency, and that new agency is really headed by a unique person. But then, he's not that unique because he comes

out of the Turkish state apparatus, and he is deeply committed to human rights issues, and rule of law issues. So, I'm hoping that these new principles and new policy that has been adopted by the government, will be a means to protecting Turkey law -- or re-implanting Turkey's democratic credentials. And it has a link to this developmental issue.

There I really agree so much with Daryl, but how does one change a certain set of mind that is engrained in what I would call state habits? In one way, the Temporary Protection Policy is a surprising, extremely welcome development, but at the same time when I look at the reflexes of the Turkish State in this particular context, I also see old habits. And old habit is, Burcu don't misunderstand me, is to kick the ball back to the international community.

Whereas I think what we share in common with Daryl, is this idea that the international community, and to take up Joe's line, let us -- let us help you, whatever the line was there, that Turkey has to -- it's beginning to do it, Daryl, in all fairness, international non-governmental organizations were having great difficulties in getting themselves registered in Turkey. It is still not perfect, but from the conversations I have had with Turkish officials. I think with some confidence I can say that at least a good part of the state apparatus, recognizes that there's something rational in, you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours, that they need these organizations to address the problems and the challenges in Turkey, and that they need to make it easier for them.

But they are also recognizing that by making it easier for them, they will also address some of the security issues that have been referred to. So with a bit of an effort, with respect to this frame of mind, I realize I may be sounding terribly naive and unrealistic, but I do see an opportunity there to come up with a new exercise. An exercise that could set a model there.

What else did I -- Mexican workers, and there's and interesting parallel

there but, you know, I could argue that the U.S. is trying to address it, and maybe Turkey, what it could do, is to learn from that experience and respond to it in due course, and that has again, flagged out a very interesting point. In Gaziantep there is full employment right now, close to full employment, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute data, there are only three provinces in Turkey where unemployment has fallen in the year 2013.

One is Gaziantep, the other is Kilyos, so there's a very curious situation where there's complaint about Syrian refugees stealing jobs and pushing wages down, but at the same time, Syrian refugees are also providing a boost into the local economy, and this is something that maybe deserves close attention and close research. And I could see the link to development there. Maybe I should stop here.

MS. FERRIS: Burcu, do you want to respond to any of the questions about labor market and integration?

MS. ERDOĞDU: Yes. Thank you. First of all I'd like to start by the first question about whether Turkey will continue Open Door Policy, and non-refoulement principle would be binding or not in the future. And I think there is no room for surprise there, because I mean the past three years, record of Turkey is self-explanatory in that regard.

Despite that massive refugee influx, despite day-by-day increasing number of Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey, and despite the major security concerns, for example, the extremist and radicals' threat, next to our border, Turkey kept its doors open for all Syrians without any discrimination. Regardless of their ethnicity, or regardless of their affiliation. So I think our record is pretty much straight on that.

And the Turkish Government officials made clear several times that we are determined to pursue non-refoulement principle. And so far we've strictly observed

that principle, so in that regard I believe that, or there's no room for that surprise in the future.

I'd like to respond the criticism made by Professor Kirişci about old habits that Turkey still has. Well I think this is pretty unfair criticism, since, I mean, so many things have changed. As Professor Kirişci himself also mentioned, a new law on foreigners and international protection recently came into force in Turkey. This was a very important development, as I've also said before, for more than 60 years, there was another law which was much more restrictive one in place.

So with this new law, the situation of Syrian refugees will also be addressed. And as a matter of fact, one of the main reasons why this new law has been adopted was the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey. And in that regard Turkey has been doing its homework. I mean, we are not just asking from the international community to do everything on our behalf. Yet, as I said before, this is an international problem, requiring international response, and this is the responsibility of the international community as a whole.

So, not just Turkey, not just Jordan, or Lebanon, has to handle this whole burden by themselves but, on the other hand, we are doing the best we can. I will just make a few comments on the employment issue in relation to that, for example. Yes, I mean, the standards in the camps are unmatched, and we are often praised, but we also recognize, and increasingly acknowledge the presence of urban refugees, and the government is, you know, holding brainstorming sessions on these issues. How to, you know, meet this challenge.

How t put the relevant mechanism on the ground in order to, you know, prevent further aggravation of the problems, on the ground. And for example, for the employment, as I also made reference in my speech, that there is work currently,

conducted by the Ministry of Labor, to find answer to this question, to facilitate employment opportunities for the Syrians residing in the cities. And currently on the basis of the new law, those Syrians, who hold a residential permits can allow for employment opportunities without being asked for conditionality, without being asked for additional papers, or some of the things that we are asked for required in the law.

So there is already work going on, on this issue, and on the education as well. There are some efforts to put more Syrian children in schools. In addition to those private schools and those schools that are administered by the Syrians, the Syrian children can also be enrolled in public schools as well, as guest students. But I mean we acknowledged the daunting task, and we know that there is a lot more to do, but as I said, neither Turkey nor any other country can do this by itself alone. So this is why we make a call to the international community, why we ask for a fair share of burden.

I will not touch upon the Mexican issue, I will leave subject to Joseph. So there is another question that was raised by the lady, it was about integration of Syrians, and have the sentiment if I don't -- understand you wrong, how these sentiments in Turkish public opinion might be changed.

QUESTIONER: Yeah. Very good, yeah.

MS. ERDOĞDU: I think the way to change the Turkish public opinion is to make this fair share burden -- fair sharing of burden known by Turks, because currently the understanding in the overall population is that, you know, Turkey is doing everything by itself. That the Turkish Government has spent more than USD 3 billion, you know, to meet the needs of the Syrian refugees, whereas, if, if that the international community, if the international NGOs, United Nation Organization and European Union, and other Western partners, would do more to help Turkey in its efforts, then the public sentiment in Turkey will also change positively. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Thanks. We just have a few more minutes, are there a few quick questions? Yes, please?

MR. BECKER: My name is David Becker. First, thank you, for this presentation. It's been really informative. I've recently returned from serving as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Jordan, and during that I was researching the refugee issues over there as well, and one of the things that I heard from my neighbors, and from reading reports from some of your colleagues at places like Mercy Corps and RSC, where they were finding that a lot of refugees in Jordan didn't want to register, probably because out of fear that they might be put on lists back Syria or other issues. Have you found any ways to alleviate that kind of problem, where they don't want to be registered?

MS. FERRIS: Registration; Joe?

MR. LIVINGSTON: Sure. So in some ways -- first of all, I'll say that that is a problem in Turkey as well. It's a problem in the South to some extent, although more and more word-of-mouth campaigns, and the prevalence of mobile registration trucks that AFAD is using, and GDMM, is increasingly a part of it, and we help to fund these trucks, that has increased the prevalence of Syrians who are coming forward to register.

There are still fears by some Syrians, they are not well founded, but there fears that registration and somehow entering into a database controlled by government might make them more vulnerable, more susceptible. And outside of the Southeast, the registration efforts are still very nascent, are often not so coordinated and not feeding into the same system, a bit more ad hoc. So registration in places like Istanbul and Izmir and Ankara is far less prevalent, not always owing to a fear of registration, just because of the nature of the system, but the key to all of this is information.

Giving Syrians information about what registration tells, who has access

to the information, and also incentivizing the process of registration. So if a Syrian isn't clear on why they ought to register, whether that's receiving health benefits, or enrolling a child in school. Or at some point participating in the labor force, they are going to be less likely to do so.

And as we enter another iteration of the registration process with this new Genera Directorate, building new database and they will be attempting to re-register Syrians to get more data leading to vulnerability criteria and to enhance protection. When those efforts happen it will be even more incumbent to ensure that's couple with an information campaign for Syrians nationwide that says, this is why you ought to register and this is -- these are the tangible benefits connected to it.

MS. FERRIS: Thank you very much. Our time is coming to an end. Is there a final comment you'd like to make. Daryl, Burcu?

MR. KIRIŞCI: When I compare what's happening today in the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey with 1991, March and April, the two experiences are mountains apart. At the time, I remember the Turkish President, Turgut Özal, in front of CNN with a stick in his hand and a map of the region, trying to convince, and he did, successfully, that the refugees should be moved from the border area in Turkey as quickly as possible into Northern Iraq.

Few people know that the infamous Resolution 688, was actually drafted in Ankara at Bugu's Ministry. The instinct there was to push them out, and then events evolved in a very different way. Now we have Kurdish Regional Government and you could even argue that maybe it was partly conceived by Turkey inadvertently. But on this occasion, when you look at it very closely, in dependently of some of the things I've said about mindset, et cetera, I do see much greater corporation that is taking place.

It's taking place at the governmental level, maybe at the very early

stages for the reasons I cited Turkey wanted to take care of this on its own. But at the end of the day, I do see the will to cooperate with the international community. Maybe the will, the strength of the will differs from one agency to another within Turkey.

But I also civil society, we didn't talk about it, today, compared to 1991, there's a very lively Turkish civil society, and where I see, if there is a problem is the international civil society, having maybe some difficulties in relating and adjusting to this vibrant Turkish civil society that, incidentally, Joe, ought to be encouraged to also apply to funds that are being made available from the European Union, and the U.S. Government, elsewhere.

So the mindset I refer to also applies to the international community, that maybe the international community has to adjust to some extent that this is a very different Turkey that we were accustomed to work with 15, 20 years ago.

One last observation I'd like to do, is to invite you to have a look of the report, it is already on the Web. It has many more details that I think hints at possibilities of working together, Turkey and the international community. Just to give you -- I'd like to give you two concrete areas where I wish I could see much more in-depth cooperation.

One, there's been a lot of talk about education, but it's the issue of certification of diplomas, very critical for the parents that worry about the education of their children. But it's also very important in terms of the future, whatever happens to Syrian refugees.

The other very fascinating issue is again certification, it's for example, the registration of new births, especially outside camps. A very critical issue that I believe is not yet being addressed, and in many ways the Turkish authorities, I think, are somewhat at a loss as how to address this issue, and there must be experience out in the international community that would come forward towards addressing this particularly

issue there. Thank you.

MS. FERRIS: Well, thank you, Kemal, for those comments, and also for your report which is available online now. And I know that you'll all look forward to reading it.

Join me, please, in thanking our Panelists. (Applause) And thank you, all, very much for coming.

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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