How Should the ROK and US Prepare for Various North Korean Contingencies to Promote and Shape the Satisfactory Unification of the Korean Peninsula?

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Abstract

North Korea is a failed and a failing state. Under the circumstances, many are discussing the “North Korean Contingency” with specific focus upon “collapse of North Korea” and its consequences. There seems to be a social consensus over the necessity of cooperation between the ROK and the US, but potential disagreements have not yet fully explored between the

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allies. It is natural and undeniable that Seoul and Washington have different – therefore, conflicting – as well as common interests over the North Korean contingency. Like all of alliance members, they will try to take advantage of each other and will pass the bucks in order to maximize their interest even while pursuing the common interests. Under the circumstances, it is more important to accept the existence of conflicting interests and to manage the differences rather than to eliminate them.

The ROK and the US would find three issues difficult to reach consensus over the North Korean Contingency. First, who would lead the intervention? South Korea believes that Seoul will be in charge of the intervention, but Washington might disagree. Beijing would not be happy about Seoul’s leading role and its potential take-over of Pyongyang; and Washington is clearly aware of the unhappiness by the Chinese. Therefore, the American would not be supportive for South Korea’s ambition. Second, what to pursue? The ROK aims to stabilize North Korea and to integrate the Northern part of the Peninsula under its flag: therefore, Seoul will focus upon disarming – demobilizing – reintegrating the North Koreans, in addition to securing the social infrastructure in North Korea. In contrast, the United States is seriously concerned about possible WMD proliferation out of North Korea into the hands of terror groups. The Americans believe that the best way to prevent a nuclear terrorism is for the American soldiers to go deep into North Korea and to check out North Korea’s WMD facilities. Third, how many soldiers are to be required? The Americans want the ROK to build manpower oriented military power for pacifying North Korea, despite Seoul’s ambition to modernize its weapon systems.

The key to solve the differences is South Korea’s dilemma over the North Korean contingency. If well managed, the contingency would not require Seoul’s role but international institutions and regional powers would
stabilize the situation with South Korea’s minor assistance. But, the contingency would be over and Seoul would not take heavy burden. If poorly managed and unstable, the ROK is expected to lead the intervention since South Korea is the only country with political resolve for North Korea. However, the contingency would lead to further instability, which might exhaust South Korea’s resources altogether.

Also, the ROK and the US disagree over China’s intervention, Washington believes that South Korea’s intervention would encourage China to cross the border, while Seoul is afraid that a US-led WMD search would lead to Chinese intervention. Both - Seoul and Washington - do not want to see Beijing’s troops in North Korea, but they justify their fears and defend their positions with different logic.

The disagreements can be and should be overcome. This is cooperation. The ROK-US alliance is a priceless strategic asset for Seoul in unifying the Peninsula; given the different interests, South Korea and the United States should discuss their positions and try to build more agreements. And public and open discussions are required between scholars as well as policy-makers. To paraphrase Georges Clemenceau, the North Korean contingency is too important to be left only to diplomats and politicians.

I. Introduction

Over a decade, many have explored the collapse of North Korea — or "North Korean Contingencies" — on numerous occasions. In December 2011, Kim Jongil — Kim the 2nd — died and was succeeded by his son — Kim JongEun — as a young and inexperienced leader of North Korea. Ever since, the discussion of North Korea’s collapse have grown to a level of wish thinking and groundless conjecture rather than analysis. It is true that Kim
the 3rd is inexperienced and that North Korea has seen a power struggle within the governing circle, but it is not certain whether the recent turmoil would lead to regime collapse in Pyongyang.

However, it is essential to prepare for North Korea’s collapse. Its demise would present a series of complicated threats to the Korean Peninsula and East Asia, covering local instability to WMD proliferation to Sino–American conflict. If poorly managed, the collapse would escalate regional competition and undermine local stability. Cooperation – bilateral and multilateral – is desperately required in order to guarantee soft landing of North Korea’s collapse, even though it might be a controlled crash. Despite its significance, official analysis into the issue have been rarely cited for its political implications and most of the researches have been conducted by non–government agencies and scholars.

It is one thing to say the ROK–US cooperation is critical, but it is another to explore differences between the allies. Like all members of alliances, Seoul and Washington have different interests and conflicting positions over numerous issues; the alliance is not a product of harmony where the interests of the members are identical, but a product of cooperation – a mixture of common and conflicting interests. The ROK and the U.S would take advantage of each other and try to pass the buck in order to maximize their interests, even while pursuing the common interests. Under the circumstances, it is more important to accept the existence of conflicting interests and to manage the differences rather than to eliminate them.

Then, what would be the differences between the ROK and the United States, with regard to the North Korean contingency, in particular? The ROK–US alliance needs to figure out the differences and the allies should discuss their positions in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. As
a recent research admits, the North Korean contingency would lead to “conflict of interests between allies. Seoul and Washington will see a lot of difficulties in negotiating for influences over North Korea.”¹ For further cooperation, the allies – the ROK and the U.S altogether – should pay more attentions to their differences; blind trust might be convenient, but would lead to political and diplomatic disaster. The main question is simple: in case of the North Korean contingency, over which issues are the allies expected to disagree? What makes their interests apart? And, what would be the solutions?

The disagreements reside over three issues. First, who would lead the intervention? South Korea believes that Seoul will be in charge of the intervention, but Washington might disagree. Beijing would not be happy about Seoul’s leading role and its potential take-over of Pyongyang; and Washington is clearly aware of the unhappiness by the Chinese. Therefore, the American would not be supportive for South Korea’s ambition. Second, what to pursue? The ROK aims to stabilize North Korea and to integrate the Northern part of the Peninsula under its flag; therefore, Seoul will focus upon disarming – demobilizing – reintegrating the North Koreans, in addition to securing the social infrastructure in North Korea. In contrast, the United States is seriously concerned about possible WMD proliferation out of North Korea into the hands of terror groups. The Americans believe that the best way to prevent a nuclear terrorism is for the American soldiers to go deep into North Korea and to check out North Korea’s WMD facilities. Third, how many soldiers are to be required? The Americans want the ROK to build manpower oriented military power for pacifying North Korea, despite Seoul’s ambition to modernize its weapon systems.

The differences are from the strategic dilemma that the ROK and the

¹) Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea (Council on Foreign Relation, January 2009), pp. 16–21.
United States are faced with – independently as well as together. A well-controlled contingency would be blessing for everybody. However, when the contingency is well managed, the ROK would not be allowed to lead intervention, but have to pay the bills from regional powers and the UN. A leadership by Seoul would be possible when the contingency is getting out of control and massive efforts are required. Given that the ROK might be the only country with political resolve for stabilizing North Korea, a mismanaged contingency would lead to a ROK-led intervention with minor or nominal supports. When things are tough and rough in North Korea, the ROK would resort to the right of self-defense for intervention; however, such intervention would be costly and dangerous since the contingency is already out of control. A best scenario for the ROK might be a contingency whose risk is not too high and not too small. If the risk is small, Seoul would not be allowed to lead. If the risk is too high, Seoul could not put thing under control with its limited capability.

In this paper, I will neither discuss possibility of North Korea’s collapse nor the ROK’s effort to facilitate the collapse. Instead, I will explore intra-alliance differences when North Korea collapses and outside intervention is required. I aim to analyze the differences in the interests of the ROK and the U.S. and to figure out ways to find answers.

II. Subject of the Intervention: Who would lead the Intervention?

Outside intervention – intervention by military forces – will be inevitable in case of North Korean contingency and regime collapse. The question is not whether to intervene, but who will lead the intervention? For the ROK, the answer seems clear and self-evident, North Korea is renegade territory
and the ROK will take over the territory that it lost in 1948 to 1950. No outside powers – such as China, the United States, and the UN – has any claim over North Korea. They have no title and no right over the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s UN membership suggests that the UN recognize the existence of North Korea, but the ROK has not recognize North Korea. Seoul’s official position is that inter–Korea relationship is a “temporary status” and a “transitory relationship toward ultimate unification.” This is what the Basic Agreement ruled in December 1991.

The ROK will intervene into North Korea in case of the contingency and the ROK’s constitution rules for such bold actions. Moreover, Seoul would justify the intervention in following logics. First, the ROK’s intervention is a decision out of self–defense. When the contingency escalates into instability and potential civil war – in particular – the ROK has right to defend itself and to intervene into North Korea. Second, a civil war in North Korea would intensify humanitarian disaster, which invite the ROK’s intervention further. In addition, Seoul has historical title and constitutional rights to protect its peoples who happen to be borne in North Korea. Third, if North Korea invites the ROK to intervene and the UN approves the ROK’s unilateral intervention – though unlikely – Seoul’s intervention would be fully endorsed.

In contrast, the United States would not agree with the ROK’s positions. It is likely that Washington would support Seoul in case of the contingency, but it is also likely that Washington would resort to different logic. First, the Americans might define the inter–Korean relationship differently. The ROK’s legitimacy is technically limited in the part of the Korean Peninsula where the UN Commission was able to supervise a general election.2) In

2) In terms of legality, the ROK was not approved as the only state in the Korean Peninsula. The UN General Assembly passed the resolution with the article II, saying that the ROK
addition, the U.S. would regard North Korea as an UN member since 1991, a part to the Armistice Agreement of 1953, and an independent sovereign state. Considering China’s position as an ally to North Korea, the U.S. might have different positions other than the ROK’s official doctrine that North Korea is an integral part of Korea.3)

Second, Washington may not agree with Seoul’s right to defend itself. The self-defense has a lot of limitations, which would provide munitions for the Americans to stop the ROK’s unilateral action. Under the circumstances, Seoul aims to instigate instability in North Korea for the purpose of getting endorsed its actions, while Washington will be scared to see Pyongyang’s WMD lost out of control. Third, the humanitarian intervention and historical title are useful only under limited condition.

Fourth, the Americans would demand sanctions by a third-party, in particular a possibly UN Security Council resolution, for the ROK’s intervention. Washington would take Chinese interest into calculate and try to avoid unnecessary conflicts with China unless the issue is about WMD proliferation. A UNSC resolution would be essential, the Americans might suggest, but China’s veto would guarantee that Beijing’s interests will be well protected over Seoul’s. In other words, the ROK might be allowed to intervene, but it is not automatic but conditional. Also, Seoul’s action will need UN sanction.

3) The best example, is the NLL (Northern Limitation Line) over which the ROK and the U.S. differ in understanding. Washington sticks to the legal logic that the NLL is not a part of the Armistice Agreement and that the violation of the NLL is not a violation of the armistice. In contrast, the ROK argues that the NLL is a de facto, though not a de jure, border and that its violation is equal to a violation of the armistice agreement and threat to stability.
Table 1: The ROK and US Positions over the Subject of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>United States</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea is</td>
<td>Renegade Province</td>
<td>Independent UN Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic</td>
<td>Self-Defense</td>
<td>Limited Self-Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical Title and Law</td>
<td>UN Sanction is Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Objectives of the Intervention: What would be the Top Priority?

Apparently, the ROK and the U.S. have common interests in case of the North Korean contingency. They agree to the importance of stability in North Korea and elimination of WMD in North Korea. However, which is more important? Which has the top priority?

The critical issue is the American “commitment to eliminate WMD out of North Korea.” Seoul and Washington reach a consensus that WMD elimination is crucial, but they differ in how to achieve the elimination. The U.S. prefers direct intervention and WMD elimination by the American troops since it is the number 1 priority in case of the contingency. In contrast, the ROK is more interested in disarm – demobilize – reintegrate (DDR) North Korean troops and Pyongyang’s conventional weapons.

Table 2: The ROK and US Positions over the Objectives of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Priority</th>
<th>The ROK</th>
<th>The United States</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarm – Demobilize – Reintegrate</td>
<td>WMD Elimination</td>
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Federal concerns about WMD proliferation out of North Korea. First, the U.S. expects proliferation from North Korea to destabilize local and regional politics in many corners of the world. The Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa are already hot enough to pay for made-in-North Korea WMD and the technologies. Second, the Americans are seriously worried that terrorists would use North Korea’s WMD for blowing up New York, for instance. North Korea had sponsored terrorist groups for decades and exported weapons to the Middle East. The commercial networks might survive the North Korea contingency and contribute to WMD terror attack. Even without completed devices, North Korea’s engineers would manufacture WMD for their employers in the middle of Arabian deserts or jungles of Africa. Once spread, WMD terror will be a question of “when, rather than whether.”

However, WMD proliferation is not a life or death question for the ROK. It is truly a serious issue, but not the critical threat for the Koreans. Once the situation is stabilized in North Korea over a political threshold of desperate nuclear attacks against Seoul, for example, the WMD threat is gone forever. In other words, the WMD might be a critical threat only at the beginning of the contingency; if the contingency is guaranteed to be well managed, the regime collapse will be the best and the most effective tool of denuclearization. Furthermore, the ROK would find some virtue in WMD proliferation. Many elements of the Kim regime would escape out of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who Will Be in Charge</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>the U.S. (Only for WMD)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Concern</td>
<td>China’s Intervention</td>
<td>WMD Terror Attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Korea with their WMD assets, which ironically contributes to stabilizing Korea after unification. If they choose to leave rather than resist, it is easier to build a unified Korea. Instead, Seoul’s top priority resides in controlling weapons and conventional disarmament rather than stopping WMD proliferation, because the weapons in the hands of insurgents would be a critical threat to unified Korea.

The differences in priority would lead to other conflicts between Seoul and Washington even after the intervention. Terror-obsessed Washington will do its best to taking over WMD facilities and controlling technicians. It will not hesitate to bargain with regime elements and provide safe passage out of the Korean Peninsula. A small scaled CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) will be conducted, tool. Technicians and scientists will be under close watch for years and all of materials – physical and knowledges altogether – should be exported or destroyed. The American priority gives powerful leverage for North Korea’s leaders who are willing to trade their WMD for their survival.

In contrast, the ROK will aim to prevent armed resistance through disarming – demobilizing – reintegrating North Korea. Most of all, Seoul is afraid that Beijing would send its soldiers into North Korea when Washington deploys its troops for WMD hunting in Chinese border. Beijing has been an ally of Pyongyang since 1961: it is able to reverse the contingency and prevent unification with its influence. Therefore, Seoul would insist on Washington’s indirect and careful WMD hunt; it would offer the ROK forces, but the United States is not likely to accept the deal.

5) After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia collaborated for transferring ex-Soviet nuclear weapons from the successor states such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Also, the U.S. provided employments for nuclear technicians and specialists who used to work for the Soviet nuclear weapons industry, in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear technologies. John M. Shields and William C. Potter (eds.) Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).
Instead, the Americans would stick to the position that the U.S. troops will check the WMD facilities and eliminate the weapons and that American intervention is limited in scale and the ROK should provide the military manpower for the rest of pacification. And, some U.S. specialists suggest that the ROK’s armed forces should be built to have more manpower rather than hardwares.

**IV. Tools of Intervention: How Many Soldiers are Required?**

It is certain that stabilization of North Korea would require military intervention. Then, how many soldiers would be needed for pacification? Recently, scholars such as Bruce M. Bennett began to explore this issue and presented the following estimates.6)

### Table 3. Military Requirements for Stabilizing North Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Requirements (Number of Soldier)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability Operation</td>
<td>180,000–312,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Humanitarian Relief and Policing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Control</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD Elimination</td>
<td>3,000–10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Disarmament</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence/Defeat of Resistance</td>
<td>7,000–10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>263,000–405,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The core of the military requirement is the yardstick for troops density for pacification, which is a half of the conventional yardstick of 20 to 25 soldiers per 1,000 civilians. Bennett advanced the arguments in the 2013 study and presented 600,000–800,000 soldiers for stabilization and WMD elimination. Given that North Korea has 200 WMD facilities, he suggested that 200,000 troops are required only for guarding and eliminating WMD. In order to handle the situation, Bennett suggests, South Korea should increase the number of soldiers rather than decrease and purchase more weapons in the future. Instead of force reduction and military modernization, Seoul should pursue a path of more soldiers and less weapons: lengthening military services and recruiting more reserve forces are recommended, too.7)

However, it is not prudent for Seoul to follow the advice. First, the ROK aims to build its military posture in order to secure its survival, while the North Korean contingency is just one of many possible threats that South Korea should handle. Its long-term security depends upon changes in security environments in East Asia and the short-term security does not limit South Korea’s military postures only to the North Korean threats and contingency. The U.S. wants the ROK to take care of population control in North Korea and to build manpower intensive posture, which enables the American troops to hunt Pyongyang’s WMD facilities. The ROK is willing to provide military power for pacification, but it would not switch its own strategy for defense buildup.

Second, the conventional yardstick is not solid and recent studies present skepticism with regard to troop density ratio – 20/25 soldiers per 1,000 civilians. Jeffrey A. Friedman conducted a comprehensive survey of 171 COIN operations since 1919 and concluded that the ratio is groundless.8) As (Figure 1) shows, the standard 20 soldiers have scored 38% of successes, while 10 soldiers recorded a little higher ratio of success (40%) and 5 soldiers per 1,000 civilians had almost identical rate of success in pacifying areas. As the troop density increases, the rate of success also grows, but the margin is small. Even with doubling density – 40 soldiers per 1,000 civilians – the rate increased by 10% and reached 42%.

(Figure 1) Successes in COIN and Troop Density


Therefore, the conventional yardstick – 20/25 soldiers per 1,000 civilians – is not acceptable; neither is the suggestions for South Korea’s military manpower. Instead, the ROK should figure out other ways to compensate for the “military manpower shortage” in case of the North Korean contingency. For example, the United States kept Iraq stabilized after years of bloody adventures and finally conducted a honorable walk-out from the country that it had invaded in 2003. The American achieved the success – though it might be temporary – with less than 20/25 soldiers per 1,000 civilians. And, the ROK should learn the secret of the U.S. force employment rather than simple force density.

V. The North Korean Contingency, China, and the Dilemmas

Cooperation is necessary and required. However, the allies have different interests, which is quite natural, over the subject, the objectives, and the required manpower for the intervention. These differences come from dilemmas that the ROK and the United States face independently and together. The first is a stability/instability dilemma, which is unique to the ROK. A well managed contingency in North Korea is a blessing in that it spares financial and human costs, but it would not guarantee the ROK’s leadership in pacifying North Korea. A mis-managed contingency would lead to the ROK’s leadership, but Seoul will have to pay enormous costs. In other words, Seoul needs some risks – between a bottom and a ceiling – in order to take advantage of the contingency and achieve unification. The second is dilemma about a Chinese intervention, which daunts the ROK-US alliance. Seoul and Washington share identical fear about Beijing’s intervention for different reasons. Even with same concerns, therefore, the
allies will find it difficult to find a solution.

The ROK’s dilemma of stability and instability comes from its contradictory urges. A contingency would produce political chaos and military instability, if mis-managed. At the beginning of a contingency, North Korea’s leadership might unleash its WMD fires out of desperation. A civil war in North Korea would lead to humanitarian disasters and hundreds of thousands of refugees. Such consequences should be prevented and instability should be controlled. However, if everything is under complete control in North Korea, there will be no place for the ROK except for minor assistance. China would not allow its orbit to disappear and the U.S. troops deployed close to its border. Beijing would not welcome Seoul’s major role and Washington would respect – more or less – Beijing’s concern so long as Pyongyang’s WMD inventory is still tight. A well-managed contingency in North Korea would not justify Seoul’s resort to self-defense, but weaken its appeal to historical title.

If the contingency goes uncontrollable, the ROK has some chances. When hundreds of thousands of refugees escape from North Korea and Pyongyang decides to initiate a series of limited aggressions against Seoul, the ROK will be fully justified to act. Its appeal to self-defense will persuade many actors including the UNSC and the ROK’s intervention will be sanctioned. In other words, North Korea’s limited aggressions – only when it can be under control – might be a perfect cover for the ROK to act. Unlike China who will see refugees as the primary concern, the ROK will have to deal with refugees and limited aggressions; Seoul will be given broader mandate to protect itself. This is such a reasonable strategy only when the aggression is controllable, but it is in fact not possible.
For Seoul, instability is chance and challenge. If things are too stable, the ROK will not enjoy initiatives. If things are too unstable, the ROK cannot control the situation. For Washington, instability has no advantage and no dilemma is presented.

The allies have another dilemma with regard to China’s intervention. Seoul is concerned that the U.S. military deployment close to Chinese border and the consequential WMD hunts would instigate Beijing to send its troops into North Korea. Once the Chinese soldiers come to North Korea, they would not leave. The Soviet left Germany in 1995—fifty years after its occupation of East Germany in 1945. One of the nightmarish scenarios for Seoul is that China controls North Korea or even its parts as a puppet and the ROK fails to achieve a complete unification. Out of this fear, Seoul believes that Washington should restrain itself from sending troops into North Korea and the ROK will conduct WMD hunt on the behalf of its ally.
In contrast, the Americans expected the Chinese to intervene when the ROK begins to control all of North Korea. If Seoul is in charge of the intervention, it is likely that North Korea will be “absorbed into part of the ROK.” As a fifty year ally of North Korea, China would not give up its junior partner easily. It will take advantage of its influences including its veto power in the UN Security Council. What concerns the Americans is that the ROK initiates the intervention and the U.S. provides supports for Seoul’s ambition, which leads to China’s violent responses and unintended clashes between Washington and Beijing.\(^9\) Out of this fear, the United States will not be enthusiastic with the ROK’s initiative and would restrain itself from intervening except for hunting WMDs. But, Seoul believes that Washington’s efforts to eliminate WMD in North Korea would encourage Beijing to intervene, which might frustrate its nationalistic ambition.

Beijing’s intervention depends upon the actions of its partners rather than its own: a consensus is difficult to build and there is no perfect choice, therefore almost impossible to predict its ultimate outcome.

**VI. What to Prepare for the North Korean Contingency?**

Allies conflict even with mostly common interests, Free-riding is a common problem in alliances. What matters is not that the allies do the best to get rid of their differences, but that they have to talk with each other, share their positions, and bridge their differences.

First, the ROK and the U.S. needs to coordinate their interests after the collapse of North Korea. They have to expand common grounds with regards to Seoul’s urge for initiative and Washington’s concerns for WMD terrorism. Given that the interests diverge, the allies can cooperate with each other through give-and-take formula: the ROK provides manpower, while the U.S. handle Chinese intervention and mobilize financial resources, for instance.

Second, manpower requirements seem to demand more researches. Bennett’s estimates are highly problematic, therefore, cannot be accepted. Troop density is not the only determinant to pacification; as the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates, force employments and political strategy are also critical. The ROK needs to figure out relevant lessons from its ally.

Third, China demands more analysis. It is a regional power and ally of North Korea. It came to rescue for Kim Il-Sung in 1950 and it is likely to do so in case of the North Korean contingency. Its alliance with Pyongyang will be a priceless tool for the Chinese diplomacy and enormous obstacle for ROK-US diplomacy.
The 2\textsuperscript{nd} KRIS-Brookings Joint Conference

Last, not the least, more discussions are needed even in unofficial levels. Georges Clemenceau, the French leader during the First World War, said “war is too important to be left only to the generals. I will paraphrase his words. The North Korean contingency is too important to be left only to diplomats, soldiers, and politicians. We need more diverse contacts with each other.