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PREPARING FOR DEEP CUTS:
OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING EURO-ATLANTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. PIFER: Okay. Good morning, and welcome to the Brookings Institution. I'm Steven Piper. I am a senior fellow here and I direct the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, and it would be my pleasure to introduce and moderate today's panel on Preparing for Deep Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic and International Security. First though, let me thank the Ploughshares Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for their efforts to support the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and make events like this possible, and then let me talk a little bit about the Deep Cuts Commission to just provide some background to this report.

The commission was formally established in 2013 to look at ways to promote deep reductions in -- first of all, American and Russian nuclear weapons. The commission is composed of 21 commissioners -- five of them are up on the panel here today. Seven each from the United States, Russia and Germany, and the organizations that support the commission are the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of University of Hamburg, the Arms control Association here in Washington, and then in Moscow, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

There's also generous financial support to the project, provided specifically by the German Foreign Office, and the City of Hamburg. The workshop -- the commission held its first major workshop in October of last year in Hamburg, and met for two days to look at a wide variety of issues, but the focus was to look at near term steps that might be taken to prepare the way for further reductions in nuclear forces, and to resolve or eliminate some of the problems that have arisen that might hold up those reductions. So, for example, what would be some idea for moving forward on the question is missile defense? And those ideas were discussed for two days. There were
then several months of exchanges back and forth via the internet, and we now have his report here, which I hope you all received on the way in, and the report contains 18 recommendations broken down into six basic areas.

First, what might the United States and Russia do in the area for their strategic nuclear reductions to move beyond the limits that are mandated by the new start treaty? A second -- what might the sides do with regards to tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons, and looking really at sort of initial steps in terms of transparency and confidence building issues. Third, looking at the American, Russian and NATO nuclear doctrines, are there steps that could be taken to update those doctrines, which still, in all three cases, seem to have a fairly heavy hangover from the Cold War. Fourth, are there steps that could be taken that would resolve differences on missile defense and promote operation between NATO and Russia. Five, what about the question of conventional precision guided weapons, which in some cases, because of their accuracy, can take on missions that used to be -- that used to require nuclear weapons, and then, finally, what about the question of conventional arms control in Europe, which has a particular impact on requirements for tactical nuclear weapons.

So, to discuss the report and the main conclusions, we have four excellent panelists. Just to outline how they’re going to speak, we’ll first turn to Eugene Miasnikov. He’s from the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Sciences in Moscow, and he’ll talk about strategic nuclear reductions and the question of conventional precision guided weapons. Second, we’ll have Götz Neunek, who’s from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, and he’ll look at the question of tactical nuke weapons and the recommendation of the report there. Our third speaker will be Greg Thielmann, from the Arms Control Association. Greg will discuss some of the recommendations regarding missile defense, and finally,
we’ll conclude with Ulrich Kuhn, from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg, and he’ll talk about conventional arms control. And then, after the opening comments, we’ll try to keep those to about 35 minutes. We’ll then open up the panel for discussion.

Let me just make a couple of other observations about the report and the current political climate. As I said, the report came out of discussions conducted last October, and then the recommendations were really finalized in January and February. That is, before the crisis in Ukraine changed from primarily an internal crisis between President Yanukovych, the opposition, and the protesters on the Maidan, into an international crisis between the United States and Europe on the one hand, and Russia over what’s going on in Ukraine. And certainly, that deterioration in relations between the west and Russia has caused a much more difficult political atmosphere, and a difficult political atmosphere for further arms control steps.

But by the same token, I think this crisis between the west and Russia also illustrates the value of arms control. Take for example, the New START Treaty, which is now in its fourth year of implementation, and despite a lot of tension between Washington, Moscow and Ukraine, the sides continue to exchange data, do notifications for conducting inspections, and I think the fact that they have the New START Treaty is assuring here in Washington, and also in Moscow, that if the relationship becomes more confrontational, at least there are clear bounds on the strategic nuclear aspect of the relationship, and that the various measures in the treaty continue to provide for transparency, predictability, and helps sustain confidence.

Likewise, you’ve had, used over the last couple of months, the Vienna document on Confidence and Security Building Measures, and the Open Skies Treaty, which you’ve had some applications with regards to Russia and Ukraine, and have
helped add a bit more transparency to those situations. And you know, one could suppose that actually, had there been more tighter arms control regimes in place, for example, the lower thresholds of the conventional forces and (inaudible), that also would have added to confidence in the current crisis.

So I think, looking forward, arms control has shown its value in the last several months, and the commission feels that ideas like this, it still is worthwhile to have these sorts of track two discussions to come up with ideas that can be useful to governments in the United States, Russia, and in NATO, and have ideas out there that could be useful when we get to a more propitious time for arms control. So with that introduction, let me open up the floor, and first turn to Eugene.

MR. MIASNIKOV: Thank you, Ambassador Pifer, for hosting this event, and for the introduction. It’s an honor and a pleasure to be here today, and I am grateful to the German Foreign Ministry for the opportunity to come. I’d also like to say some words of gratitude to our German Colleagues from the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy, who organized the work on the project in a very constructive manner. Whenever there was a difference in opinion, the commissioners always tried to find a common ground. I think this is something which is desperately needed these days, to resolve existing crisis in Ukraine.

Let me also add that on the Russian side, the work of the Deep Cuts Commission was coordinated by Professor Andrei Zagorski, but as far as I am aware of, he couldn’t come because of other commitments. Therefore, I was asked by organizers of the project to participate in this presentation, and describe recommendations of the commission regarding two related topics. Strategic nuclear forces, and long range conventional precision guided weapons.

The key recommendations regarding those strategic reductions can be
found on the page 11 of the report, in particular, we propose that Russia and the United States should initiate talks on the New START, follow on agreement mandating additional significant, and stabilizing cuts. For example, limits of 500 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 1000 deployed strategic warheads for each side could be established. In (inaudible), the sides could accelerate new START mandated reductions ahead of 2018 implementation deadline, and consider further independent reciprocal force reductions (inaudible) new START ceilings. Russia and the United States should reintegrate bilateral strategic stability talks. There is a goal of (inaudible) confidence building initiatives that helped to address concerns related to missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, conventional precision guided weapons, and outer space weapons.

In my view, this task is essential for paving the way for further strategic cuts. Facilitating (inaudible) reductions requires an intensive dialogue on a wide range of related issues. Deep Cuts Commissions’ report underscores that, and this is one of the things that makes the report valuable, in my view. They also propose that US and Russia should (inaudible) other nuclear weapons states, and encourage them to improve transparency, and eventually to freeze or reduce their arsenals. The topic of conventional long range precision guided weapons, sometimes they are called strategic conventional arms, is closely related to the theme of strategic nuclear arms, for two reasons.

On one hand, explicitly or implicitly, some types of long range conventional arms are subject to previous bilateral START agreements, and the (inaudible) regime covered such systems. The existing (inaudible) is making conventional systems subject to START provision to less extent, as apparently the case of B1, B (inaudible) proposed CPGS systems.

On the other hand, as capability of long range, precision guided weapons
improves, there is increasing concern that such systems may eventually pose a threat to smaller strategic forces of the other side. And if such conventional capabilities are not limited, that might undermine deeper cuts of nuclear arsenals. In this case, the logic is similar to the relationship between offensive strategic arms and missile defense.

The Deep Cuts Commission has proposed the steps outlined on page 21. Among our recommendations are, the United States and Russia should open up a dialogue on threat perceptions, definitions, and possible transparency measures for conventional precision guided weapons, including prompt and non-prompt weapons. Discussions could seek to address questions of strategic stability and concerns emanating from large scale deployments of conventional cruise missiles.

The sides should consider the option of additional confidence building for existing strategic conventional arms currently not accountable under New START. And (inaudible), let me make a few observations, irrelevant to our report. I think the United States and Russia remain committed to the ultimate goal of achieving a nuclear free world, however, one has to acknowledge that there is a fundamental disagreement in their understanding on how to get there. Therefore, it’s important to keep the nuclear reduction process moving progressively, so that transparency is improved, mutual confidence is transient, and new opportunities for the cuts are created.

The (inaudible) proposes concrete steps to facilitate deeper US Russia reductions. At the same time, it’s quite clear that the proposed agenda is very much dependant on political (inaudible). And unfortunately, as the crisis in Ukraine evolves, they are moving very (inaudible) to the point where the recommendations or our commission might become completely irrelevant. It’s true -- the Cold War history gives good examples that arms control can significantly contribute to normalizing relations between the sides. I completely agree that there is a value of arms control and we see
that value these days. However, one also has to admit that the nature of arms control has significantly changed since the times of the Cold War.

In the past, arms control vilification system mostly relied on national technical means. Today, the emphasis is at most on intrusive means, confidence building and transparency measures. Recommendations of all our report are based on the premise that there is a certain amount of trust among the parties, and this trust is strengthened as the proposed measures are implemented. The approach taken these days in the West, regarding Ukraine, and aimed at demonizing Russia doesn’t contribute to building up the required trust. Instead it undermines every positive accomplishment in relations between Russia and the west over the last 25 years. And unfortunately, we are very close to the point, after which we have to start building up our relations from scratch.

Is such a loss worth (inaudible) by some of the western political leaders? I don’t think so. We need to understand that fueling the propaganda war by blaming Russia for every real or imagined problem -- (inaudible) undermine the agenda we are discussing today. If it doesn’t make our recommendations completely irrelevant. Let me stop here, and I’d be glad to take your questions.

MR. NEUNECK: Yes, thank you first to Steven for putting this panel together, and it’s of course an honor and a privilege to speak here, and also, I’m happy to be in Washington, especially to see some other commissioners who helped very much, by bringing these recommendations to the world. The report is available also on the internet, and I think in the last one and a half years, we were quite fruitful in working out recommendations. I’m also happy to see some old friends from the arms control community here, and I’m looking forward to speak with the embassy people on our subjects.

As you know, non strategic, or technical nuclear weapons are remnants
of the Cold War, and should become obsolete sooner or later, especially as weapons for
the battlefield. They are no longer useful for warfighting purposes. They do not have a
valid military mission any longer, but the many remaining unconstrained numbers of
warheads cause (inaudible) also security and safety problems.

I would even say, under the current circumstances, it’s even more
necessary than ever to remove, withdraw and eliminate these technical nuclear weapons.
I am of course, aware that this can only be done in a good political framework, and this is
put into question under the Ukraine crisis. It’s maybe not necessary to remind you that
there have been several arms control attempts to reduce these forward deployment
weapon systems in the European context. The 1987 INF Treaty began to eliminate
medium, intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles, then the presidential initiatives
from 1991 and 1992 helped to withdraw and eliminate significant numbers of them,
mainly (inaudible) mines, but also sea based nuclear weapons.

We know, from some documents, that the U.S. might have reduced
about 3,000 of these systems. Russia also reduced around 50 percent, but we don’t
know the exact numbers. You are also aware that the NPT radio conference in 2010
wanted to, and I quite, “to address the question of all nuclear weapons, regardless of
their type or their location, as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament
process. So this is not only a trilateral issue, but it is a global issue, which concerns a lot
of other countries.

The Obama administration also stated that the goal of the U/S/ is to seek
further reductions in all types of U.S. and Russia nuclear weapons strategic and non-
strategic, deployed or non-deployed, following the conclusions of the 200 and 2010 New
START talks. Finally, NATO’s 2010 strategic concepts seek Russian agreement to
increase transparency on its technical nuclear weapons in Europe, and relocate these
weapons away from the territory of the NATO member states.

And then, the U.S. Congress has linked further negotiated reductions to successful talks with Moscow, that would also address the disparity of technical nuclear weapon holdings. Some European governments wanted to see their removal from the deployment countries. Others see their continued presence important for purposes of reassurances or seek to leverage reciprocal measures by Russia on technical nuclear weapons. Moscow itself, has identified pre-conditions for an arms control dialogue on the issue.

First, it is the removal of all U.S. technical nuclear weapons from Europe back the U.S., and second, it is (inaudible) of the military infrastructure. In the report, is often said that the goal, ultimate goal is deep cuts. And if there are any deep cuts, then I think it could be done on the basis of technical nuclear weapons. All of you know, also that there are several hundred, still several hundred U.S. systems, maybe 180 nuclear gravity bombs in five European Countries, and that Russia retains an estimated 2,000 usable technical nuclear weapons, of which it claims (inaudible) on Russian soil.

Unfortunately, both possessors of technical nuclear weapons, Russia and the U.S., have not disclosed exact data about the numbers, status, and locations of their weapons. I think also, the public is mostly not very much aware on that problem. I think the reason is very simple -- no one really thinks that these weapons can be used under any circumstances. Of course, under the auspices of the Ukraine crisis, there might be different voices on that, and we of course have to reconsider these political climates.

Then, there are several additional problems. What is technical, what is strategic? Russians say French and British Nuclear weapons should be included. And then, there is also a link between technical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons.
I will not talk about it, because the conventional arms control problem will be discussed by my colleague, Ulrich Kühn.

So, the deep cut commission made the following three recommendations, which I think are very realistic. There are different opinions, depending on the view, the location, the (inaudible) and the culture, but I think it was very good that we came, at least to some kind of common understanding.

Point one, the United States and Russia should re-confirm their mutual commitment to the 1991 and 1992 PNIs, President Nuclear Initiatives, undertaking confidence building measures such as exchanging data on the total number of nuclear warheads that were destroyed or that are slated to be destroyed (inaudible) VPNI. Both countries also can start conducting site visits to former, but now empty storage facilities.

Second, the United States and Russia should resume the U.S., Russian dialogue of nuclear experts in order to develop non-intrusive measures to provide for verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. The Afghani already said that the requirement for arms control is changing, so that we also have to develop new methods, non-intrusive measures, and confidence building measures on that field.

The U.S. and Russia could also allow reciprocal visits at Naval and Air Force storage facilities in order to provide reassurances that the technical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from them to centralize storage facilities, and no longer are available for quick redeployment. Another option would be for Russia and the U.S. to work toward a common understanding of the term, what is technical nuclear weapons.

The second recommendation, and the last one, Germany should take the lead with NATO to formulate a coherent NATO policy on the role of technical nuclear weapons in Europe, and terms for their withdrawal.

Very often, we simply talk about numbers and locations, but we don’t talk
about the conditions under which they could be removed. As a first transparency measure, Germany could offer joined visits by NATO and Russia personnel to formal storage and deployment sites in the former East and West Germany. This would permit the testing of procedures for future inspections. (Inaudible) have to train these executed inspections and verification measures.

Additionally, NATO needs to clarify its nuclear policy, coming to an agreement on the circumstances under which technical nuclear weapons can be withdrawn. By forging consensus among your (inaudible) NATO members, Germany could also could be helpful in getting Washington to re-consider any form of refurbishment that involves improving the military capabilities of those types of P61 bombs, currently deployed under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements.

Let me give a last remark about the current crisis in the Ukraine. We are fully aware that this overshadows any arms control, and I just was, for two days, in Moscow, and I’m not very optimistic in the, about the dialogue, and even, not about the understanding of both sides. It seems to be very, very severe discrepancies here. The Ukraine Crimea crisis, if not handled carefully, and wisely, could end with a massive re-armament of parts of Europe. We should be very clear on that.

There are really big chanced that the whole fundament and framework of European Security and arms control could be renewed in a very short time. In Russia, there are since (inaudible) voices in the military, which wanted to eliminate the requirements of the INF Treaty. You have heard that a cruise missile was tested. The SRBM East (inaudible) can be equipped with nuclear weapons. All these are very dangerous developments, which build up a new dividing line between East and West. So, a new arms control framework for Europe must not only include conventional forces, but must also bring restraint for new short range delivery systems, which can be
equipped with technical nuclear weapons.

This, once again, shows that the careful officiated arms control courts can help to cats a new security framework for Europe, raise predictability and prevent expensive and dangerous arms races. I think there is still time to do that. Of course, a pre-condition is to solve the Ukraine crisis. To stabilize the country, and to find ways to prevent further, very, very dangerous developments here.

MR. PIFER: Great, thank you. Greg, missile defense.

MR. THIELMANN: Thank you Steve, and thank you to all of the commissioners for all their hard work. Unlike some of the issues that have been described by my colleagues, a missile defense challenge to reducing nuclear arms has been around for a long time. It has of course taken many twists and turns over the years, as the rationale for U.S. strategic missile defenses has changed, with Moscow and Washington trading places and arguing their positions. Fortunately, my partners, in preparing last year's input paper on this issue, Sergay Rogov and Götz Neuneck, have also been around for a long time, as have I. And Götz is in a good position today to ensure that I report faithfully on the areas of agreement concerning missile defense.

I'm going to begin with a quick summary of our analysis, and a review of our recommendations, and I'll then offer some personal thoughts on how we should proceed post Ukraine. In my view of missile defense, we always seem to be living in the future tense. It's more about what these systems may be able to do in the future, than what they can presently do. Our report notes that the strategic defense systems deployed by both sides, are still rudimentary. That's the word we chose.

And the U.S. Systems, now in their early stages of deployment to Europe, are designed only to be able to intercept ballistic missiles below intercontinental range. So, from a U.S. perspective, the ideas to devise transparency and cooperation
measures, which will alleviate any misperceptions that U.S. missile defenses could threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Washington has therefore offered a number of initiatives to persuade Moscow that it need not worry.

Moscow’s reluctance to take advantage of these gestures convinces many in the west that missile defenses are more of an excuse than a reason to Russia’s current disinterest in reductions beyond New START. From a Russian perspective, the idea is to obtain a legally binding commitment that future advances in U.S. missile defenses will not enable them to be targeted against Russia’s strategic deterrent. Russia valued highly the ABM Treaty, from which the U.S. withdrew in 2002, as did Germany, and virtually every other country in the world.

Moscow would still like to see limits on interceptor numbers and capabilities. But any attempt to reconstruct legally binding limits are dismissed out of hand by the U.S. Government as infeasible, politically, whatever their hypothetical merits. Underlying the commission’s thinking on missile defenses, our concepts articulated in the report’s section on nuclear doctrine. The report calls for moving away from huge arsenals at high alert levels, and from preparing to retaliate immediately against a possible first strike towards smaller, but more secure deterrents that could ride out an attack.

The report recommends initiating dialogue on nuclear doctrines, and alert modes, and exchanging declarations of intent, regarding nuclear use. Convincing Russia that it can have a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent at significantly lower numbers means managing Moscow’s concerns about the U.S. missile defenses, among other things.

The commission has offered a number of ideas for intensifying efforts to achieve more transparency, and the technical capabilities of the sides respected ballistic
missile defenses, or BMD. Transparency could start with reciprocal exchanges of information about technical criteria of BMD systems, such as location of interceptors, their number, and speed. The sides could consider exchanging declarations concerning their missile defense capabilities, and program plans for the next ten years. Information exchange could be supported by joint annual exercises of tactical and (inaudible) missile defenses.

Over the long term, NATO and Russia should initiate discussions about a joint NATO Russia BMD study center, and a center for NATO-Russian surveillance and monitoring of missile threats and space objects. This effort could building the NATO-Russian cooperative air space initiative, CAI, which currently provides for a system of Air-space monitoring between Norway and Russia, Poland and Russia, Turkey and Russia, connecting through two coordination centers in Warsaw and Moscow.

Finally, on a particular relevance to the trajectory of P5 plus one talks with Iran, NATO should make more explicit the connection between Iran’s nuclear and missile threats, and the pace and scope of NATO’s European phased adaptive approach deployments. I would like to use this last recommendation, which the commission has made as a springboard for some personal observations on European missile sites and Middle Eastern threats.

Since the inception of U.S. proposals to deploy missile defenses in Europe, the focus has been on the Iranian threat. For president Bush, the principle rationale of putting strategic BMD systems at a third site, was to augment the defense of North America with an earlier shot at Iranian ICBMs, before they could be engaged by Alaska-based systems. Of course, there are no Iranian ICBMs threatening the United States. There are shorter range Iranian missiles, which can target the southeastern periphery of Europe.
President Obama’s EPAA approach was this more closely tied to the defense of NATO Europe. First, against the existing threat, and later, against potential threats from the Middle East, that could materialize in the future. But both Presidents, Bush and Obama, said again and again, that Russia’s large and sophisticated strategic arsenal was not and literally could not be a target of these systems. Obama’s substitution of the EPAA for the interceptors and radar in Poland and the Czech Republic provided evidence that the intended target was Iranian, not Russian systems.

Obama’s cancellation of EPAA’s Anti-ICBM capability in Phase four, provided additional evidence of U.S. intentions. With this as background, I would assert that some of the proposed missile defense responses to events in Ukraine are illogical, and counterproductive. Revisiting the third site plan, or accelerating EPAA deployments would be to confirm Moscow’s worst suspicions. These steps would be seen either as proof that Russia was the target all along, or that the EPAA was so flexible and elastic, that it’s original orientation could be quickly altered.

So I suggest leaving missile defense off the list of responses to events in Ukraine -- continuing a prudent and consistent path on the EPAA and the patient pursuit of dialogue between NATO and Russia. We have a real chance for continuing progress in the Iran nuclear talks. We have an encouraging lack of evidence that Iran is intending to deploy long range missiles any time soon. Taken together, these trends may very well create circumstances which would allow U.S. missile defense to be put in a slower and less expansive trajectory. This would encourage Russia to find common cause of the west in controlling nuclear threats from the Middle East, and removing obstacles to deep cuts in U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals. Thank you.

MR. PIFER: Thanks, Greg. Ulrich -- conventional arms control.

MR. KÜHN: Yes. Thank you, Steven, again, and the Brooking Institution
for hosting us here today. Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to make three general points when referring to conventional arms control in Europe, or CAC as we say. My first general point is, conventional arms control is in a very poor state. The treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe’s CFE is in a (inaudible) state. Some (inaudible) would even call it dead.

In 2002, NATO member states made the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty conditional on Russia, withdrawing forces and equipment from parts of Moldova and (inaudible). In 2007, Russia has unilaterally suspended the Treaty. Before the Ukraine crisis, NATO was still in the process of finding a common position on a mandate for talks with Russia on how to reengage on conventional arms control. The Treaty on Open Skies, and Steven mentioned it before -- a crucial transparency instrument -- is heavily under-funded, and was partially deadlocked in 2012 and 2013, due to disputes between Greece and Turkey about the in of the Republic of Cyprus on the one hand, and the Georgian-Russian controversy about the acceptance of observation flights.

The Vienna document, (inaudible) most important (inaudible) mechanism has been updated in 2011, after almost 122 years of stagnation. However, only on a very limited technical basis. Taken together, there is not much left in the realm of convention arms control in Europe.

My second general point is that there is a current need for CAC. The latest events surrounding Ukraine and Crimea underscore three problematic developments in the realm of CAC. First -- even though the involved states, and that includes Russia, continue to implement existing CSBMs, the level of transparency is not sufficient to impede possible misconceptions, and to establish a vigorous level of confidence. Some examples -- Russian airborne exercises of the 98th airborne division, close to the Ukrainian border, were split, so that they did not exceed thresholds under the
Vienna document, and were hence, not subject to any notification.

The Vienna document’s inspection quota for Russian territory is already not exhausted for this year, so no more inspections on the Vienna document on Russian Territory for the rest of the year. Ukrainian request for a visit of unarmed personnel to dispel concerns about the unusual military activities on the Vienna document, on the Crimean peninsula, did not succeed as inspectors were denied access to Crimea.

Second, there are no legally binding constraining instruments in place anymore, that could forestall a massive buildup of forces in certain sub-regions. The only constraining instruments are of a politically binding nature. These are the CFE Istanbul commitments, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act provisions about the, I quote, “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”, end of quote.

Third, no instrument addresses current complex capabilities of rapidly deployable and highly specialized forces. As another example, Russian (inaudible) in Crimea were not carried out by large scale military operations, but by small and specialized military formations. NATO member states as well, rely on small and rapidly deployable forces, instead of large contingencies.

I now come to my last remark about what the report recommends on conventional arms control in Europe. First recommendation, “NATO should arrive at an early proposal for CAC in Europe that opens the way for consultations with Russia on modernizing CAC”, end of quote. Even though the current political climate complicated perusing such consultations, latest developments have underscored a need for more transparency and confidence building measures. Such measures should not stand alone, but should be in integral part of a comprehensive European security agenda.

Second recommendation, “all parties concerned should strive to
elaborate an all European framework of conventional arms control that combines substantially lower ceilings for CFE limited conventional equipment, with limitations of new weapons categorized, and complex military capabilities, as well as a regime of very viable transparency measures”, end of quote. The current crisis has underscored that the transparency measures of the Vienna document are not sufficient. In addition, events have highlighted the need for mutual constraining measures, with regards to modern conventional capabilities, such as, I mentioned, rapidly deployable Special Forces.

Third recommendation from the report, “States could supplement such CAC framework by specific sub-regional arrangements, which combine earlier NATO-Russia pledges, such as not permanently stationing additional substantial combat forces, with new instruments, such as limitations on the quantity and type of conventional forces”, end of quote. Such sub-regional arrangements could come about in the form of reciprocal restrictions on the stationing and deployment of conventional forces in specific border areas. For instance, between Ukraine and Russia, between the Baltic states and Russia, and specifically, in the South Carcasses. Specific sub-regional arrangements could be tailored accordingly, both in terms of quantity, and quality. Thank you.

MR. PIFER: Great. Well, thank you very much. Let me go ahead and now open up the discussion to your questions. Please identify yourself, name and affiliation, and have a question mark at the end of your point. Alright, down here?

MS. GALAGER: Nancy Gallagher, the University of Maryland, and I’ve got a question for all the panelists, which is, how much of a difference, both politically and militarily, do you think it would make today, if the CFE was -- adapted CFE was enforced, and some of these other steps that Ulrich talked about, that haven’t been addressed had been? If conventional arms control in Europe has been made a higher priority? And, what is one concrete thing that you wish your own country had done differently in the
past, that would have left us in a different position today?

MR. PIFER: Ulrich, do you want to start?

MR. KÜHN: Yes. Thanks, Nancy. Good to see you again since Berlin.

Pertaining to your first question, what would be if the adapted CFE Treaty would be in place? I was just referring to that Vienna document, all that the transparency is that is established by the Vienna document is not sufficient at the moment, so the ACFE Treaty provided for a much more intrusive transparency and verification measures, such as large quotas for onsite inspections, and this is particularly what we’re missing right now. There are no instruments in place, particularly, and this would have been one of the big advantages of ACFE. There are no legally binding provisions that would establish for more transparency, particularly on states where inspection quotas are already exhausted these days.

To your question about what could have been done by Germany in the past -- I mean, Germany has always been the kind of, gatekeeper for conventional arms control in Europe. That dates back historically, even to the very early 1980s. What we would have hopes for would be that conventional arms control would have been pushed on a higher political agenda, also by Germany. Conventional arms control, in the last decade has always been delegated to the back seats of the strategic dialogue between NATO and Russia, and so I think a more high level push for CAC would have been needed and should be needed in the next years.

MR. PIFER: Okay.

MR. THIELMANN: I have no comment.

MR. NEUNECK: We don't want to have here, German dominance on the panel. I think it's -- you know, Germany is a NATO country, and Ulrich already made some good explanations of what could have been done better in the CFE framework. I
think -- let’s turn this very tricky question of Nancy around -- what could NATO do better? And I think there is a serious problem here, that NATO is too much concentrated on its own alliance policy, and it’s not really creative in opening a discourse about the security problems, especially also to Russia.

I think we should have been aware that Russia has a different thinking on security, but tried also, for some time, to find solutions. And I think we didn’t -- here, NATO didn’t -- very adequately on that field. So I think, as I said before, a -- the new strategic concept is very vague and could be interpreted as some kind of very quick armament, if you look to the numbers and the constellation, of NATO against Russia, then we missed to develop the European framework further. This not only consists of conventional forces. I think that’s a big mistake here.

I think there is time to do that again. I mean, in times of crisis, not -- I think we have to first solve the crisis, but to come back to the peak question of European security, how to integrate Russia, is absolutely important. And I think we really failed to do that. I would, as an excuse say that Germany tried, what has (inaudible) certainly an important member states, we have failed to convince others to go in the same direction, and this has much to do with other priorities states have. And Europe has not only eastern dimension, you know, it has also a southern dimension.

So, I think we need a good analysis, if the crisis has ended, terminated, to find new ways of how to deal with Russia, and we should come back to a dialogue, how that kind of security and damage control, a framework could be developed further.

MR. PIFER: I don’t want this panel to be dominated by Germany, so let me add a couple of comments. First, I would agree with Ulrich that I think the thing that is missing on the conventional side now is really the transparency measures that the CFE Treaty and the adapted CFE Treaty had. As far as I know, I think NATO -- NATO
members and Russia are all well below not only the CFE Treaty limits on -- treaty limited equipment, but also below that adapted limits. And with budgets the way they are, in NATO, those numbers look to be only going down, and my guess is that though Russia is putting increased spending into modernized niche conventional forces, it looks like it's more like replacing older equipment as opposed to adding to equipment.

So the thing that's missing -- in the near term now, is the sort of transparency confidence building measures that might have allowed more inspections, notifications with thresholds that were below that in the Vienna document. Also, I think that there's -- maybe an opportunity, and it's really a NATO issue and a Russia issue, to try to move to a bit more transparency with regards to tactical nuclear weapons. And here, Russia has not been prepared to talk about it, but I think NATO has also had a hard time discussing it. I mean, some of the idea, Götz, that you mentioned, I mean that, I think, would have struck us on the outside as fairly easy./

For example, organizing visits to former nuclear weapons storage sites to demonstrate the absence of nuclear weapons seem to be very difficult. NATO has been talking about such measures for some times now, but my understanding is that NATO in fact, has gotten bogged down with dealing with not only American and German and NATO's security requirements, but things that I think could have been done without too much trouble, seem to be running into a lot of bureaucratic problems. Okay, Darrel.

MR. KIMBALL: Darryl Kimball, Arms Control Associations. I wanted to bring us back to the question of further reductions, and I wanted to ask Eugene and Steve a question about a couple of the recommendations in the report, and ask you for your reflections on how feasible this may or may not be, given the current political climate. The report recommends, among other things, that the U.S. and Russia, or the
U.S., should accelerate New START mandated reductions, and the U.S. and Russia could consider further independent reciprocal force reductions below the New START ceilings.

That seems to many of us, of course, to be maybe the only feasible approach in the near term, to pursue further reductions below the New START level in the near term. I mean, could you just comment on how you see that idea being viewed from a military perspective, a political perspective, and taking into account the fact that today, the opening day of the NPT predatory committee meeting, there’s a lot of pressure on the P5 to take further steps on disarmament and you know, that might be one of the other considerations. At least, the United States has this in mind as it looks at this question. So, I’m interested, particularly in Eugene, your thought from a perspective coming from Moscow, and Steve. Thanks.

MR. MIASNIKOV: Well, good question. When START Treaty, New START treaty was signed, perhaps you remember that the Russian side (inaudible) many times. Let’s -- what, when they were offered -- let’s go the next step, let’s discuss further measures. They frequently said, let’s see how the New START will be implemented. And, I think the reason why the Russian side said so, could understand -- when you look at the text of the Treaty and you could see that many provisions of the treaty are quite weak.

In particular, the new treaty compares to previous START, doesn’t require certain procedures of elimination, of strategic delivery systems. It gives quite a lot of flexibility. How it could be done, and it gives a lot of flexibility -- it could be done, for example, reversibly. It’s not a costly procedure, and I think the recent announcement by the U.S. side, on how the U.S. will implement the New START Treaty gives some sense of what the reductions actually look like.
The emphasis, apparently on the measures that are reversible, cheap, and well, depending on the circumstances, everything could be reversed. I think, in this situation, it gives a little incentive to Russia to discuss further talks. But, on the other hands I should say that there is no common opinion in Russia on force reductions.

I know that military, for example, they lobby the position, mostly, now taken by the Russian government. They say that they need a certain number of delivery systems and weapons, and they cannot go (inaudible) below. There are also other opinions that support deeper cuts. In fact, the figure, which you can find in the (inaudible) 500, delivery systems that they propose, there were propositions, actually, to go even lower, from the (inaudible) site. And, I think there is still room for discussion inside Russia -- what to do next, and I think this is still an option that cannot be ruled out at all. But apparently, the existing political climate will have influence on that, and if it deteriorates so severely, that it would be very difficult to negotiate the next round of reductions in the near term, at least.

MR. PIFER: Let me break the question down in two pieces. First, accelerated new START reductions. The New START Treaty laid out three limits, and set the requirement that those limits be reached by no later than February of 2018. And I tried to argue for a couple of years that while there may be reasons why it was difficult for the U.S. to accelerate implementation of the launcher limit, because of the time it takes, for example, to convert four missile on each submarine so they can’t carry your launcher missile, that the United States certainly could accelerate the limit on 1,550 deployed warheads. We’d simply take warheads off of missiles.

And you might, if you couldn’t remove the missile, leave the missile in the silo or on board the submarine with the zero warheads. Now, that would be unusual, to have a deployed missile with no warheads, but it wouldn’t be prohibited by the treaty, and
the Russians could use the inspection measures, that if you declared at this minute man
base, you have 20 missile with no warheads, they could use the inspection procedures to
confirm that. So, this would be something that I think would have been useful in two
ways. One, two the extent that you wanted to encourage the Russians not to build back
up to 1,550, because Russia was actually fairly, early on below the limit, the U.S. coming
down quickly to 1,550 might help in that regard, and I think it also would have been a
deliverable that the United States could have used at the NPT review conference next
year, to show that in fact, it accelerated that implementation.

My guess is that, in the current political climate, it’s going to be really
hard for the U.S. government to come out and do something like that, so it was a good
idea, I think, that there’s still a certain logic for it, but my guess is that in the
administration, they look at that as now something that would be very difficult to do,
absent some kind of improvement in terms of the political climate with regards to Crimea.

Your second question about perhaps, even going below 1,500, and
certainly, when you look at President Obama’s speech last June in Berlin, when he said
that the U.S. could reduce by -- he proposed that he United States and Russia reduce by
one-third the 1,550 limit. So, that would bring U.S. and Russian deployed strategic
warheads down to about 1,000 on each side. And although the president did not talk
about it publicly, and administration officials have privately said that they would also be
prepared to entertain commencement reductions in the limit on deployed strategic
delivery vehicles, and also on the limit on launchers.

Those numbers were validated by the joint chiefs as sufficient for U.S.
deterrent plans, and also for war plans. So, my guess is that if the Russians were to go
below 1,550, that that’s something that the United States government could look at
matching. But the question right now is it’s not clear -- I mean, the Russians, as far as I
know, have not said what their ultimate number may be. And some of the production (inaudible) have suggested they may be coming back up to 1,550. But I’m thinking, at some point, for example, the Russian government were to say that, well, the limit was going to be, they were going to say at 1,400 or 1,350, that might well be something that the United States could match without even having to do anything, and keep the New START Treaty, the limit would be 1,550, but there would be no reason why the U.S. could not go down and say, match a Russian level of 1,300, 15, or 14,00, and you could still use all of the verification measures of the New START Treaty to confirm that number as well as the legal limit. Ed?

MR. IFFT: Edward Ifft, Georgetown University. There’s a view in this it, I think, that the damage to the CFE Treaty is so great that is really cannot be saved, and anyway, it’s obsolete, and even the adapted treaty is not the answer. I wondered if the panel agreed with that. I mean, a couple of you hinted at least, that what we need to do is move on, and go see a new agreement with broader participation, and different, more ambitious provisions. Is that your view, and if so, what would be the forum for doing that? And should we be charging ahead aggressively in that direction, or do we need a couple of years to think about it and let things cool off -- I don't know. Do you agree that CFE is dead? And what should we do about it?

MR. KÜHN: I'm going to start, and I'm just going to give you my personal view, which does not stand for the German government. In my view, the CFE Treaty from 1990 is in its form that -- and it’s not up to date anymore. It restricts large scale movements through the flank in Norway and the South, through either Turkey or Greece. This is a scenario that we are not facing these days, anymore. So it doesn't make sense anymore. However, you’re also right that ACFE, I mean, ACFE was negotiated from 1997 to 1999, and then signed in Istanbul in 1999, and has not been put in place until
today. There are only four states that signed and ratified the treaty, which I think is Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

So, NATO allies have their view and their opinion, why they should not sign and ratify that treaty -- no, why they should not ratify that treaty. Sorry. I think what we need to focus on today is particularly where do we have problems on the conventional level, and how could these problems be tackled. So, this is why this report refers quite often to these so called sub-regional arrangements, and by sub-regional arrangements, we mean regions in Europe where we have heightened tensions, or we have heightened chance for misperceptions.

This is due particularly in the case in countries that are involved in border disputes. Let's talk about Armenian and as (inaudible), and about the (inaudible) of (inaudible). This is when we talk about Georgia and Russia and the problematic areas of South (inaudible), and of (inaudible). And here, there needs to be a lot of creative thinking about how to tailor measures that could address the non-transparency that is existing there, so we, particularly Germany, always pledged for so called status mutual solutions. So, for instance, you have Russian troops being stationed in South Ossetia, but you cannot ask officially through a treaty of Russia to observe those troops because that would more or less mean that you accept that the troops are there on Georgian National soil.

So, we have to aim, I think, for status mutual solutions. We have to aim for specifically tailored solutions that fit the sub-regional problems, and then also fit to sub-regional problems that might arise between NATO and Russia. As another example, the conventional capabilities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not comparable at all to what the Russians have in their military (inaudible) of (inaudible), for instance. So, those (inaudible) aren't exceeded by far. On the other hand, what we heard from the Russians
during last year’s was always that they are kind of like, worried about rapidly deployable NATO forces with special capabilities that the Russians do not have yet, one might say.

So, how to engage on these problems, how to tailor solutions. One solution could be -- which was always floated around since a few years, also by the German government, to have so called thinned out military zones, where you’re not allowed to station specific special troops with a rapid buildup. So I think there needs to be a lot of creative thinking, probably this creative thinking will be limited in the next two years to think tanks and track two channels, so this is also one of the important reasons why we have that commission. But, nevertheless, it is clear now, through the Ukraine crisis, and also through the only projected conflicts that are pending in Europe, that there needs to be re-engagement on conventional arms control.

MR. COLLINO: Hi, Tom Collino, Arms Control Association. Thank you all very much for your presentations. In response to the Ukraine crisis, some on Congress and elsewhere have called for steps such as forward deploying U.S. nuclear weapons into Eastern Europe, and as Greg mentioned, accelerating European missile defense to points. Those things would presumably require NATO support, and would also elicit a Russian response, so I’m wondering if the panel could address what the NATO and Russian responses might be to moves like that. Thank you.

MR. PIFER: Eugene, you want to take a crack at that? How would Russia react if American Nuclear weapons were based in Estonia?

MR. MIASNIKOV: Well, it would be sad, and it would fuel the further de-escalation in this situation, I think. If the scenario goes that way, you suggestion, I think both sides need to restrain from such kind of actions. I think the first thing to do these days is to -- to cease this fire in Ukraine. I think, to create conditions at which the -- this is internal crisis. This is internal war, at which the sides could resolve the -- their
differences, and start to create dialogue.

And in response to the previous question, By Ambassador Ifft, I think that it will take some time. We have to rethink our approaches regarding conventional arms control, and perhaps we should also think, not mostly about tanks, artillery systems, aircraft, and so on, but those are also about other things, like maybe information warfare, and so on. I think these factors are becoming more and more influential to bring to matter, an insecurity in Europe and creating unrest in such a place. I think that's becoming more and more important.

MR. NEUNECK: Thank you. By the way, thank you also for questions from other people, like (inaudible), Ifft, and also our colleague (inaudible), so we had several people who helped the commission very much by giving their views on all the technical matters. So the commission is not only these 21 people, but others who were co-opted and helped and this brings me to the fact that the debate and the commission was really very constructive, and that we are looking forward to continue with that. And in times of crisis, even if we have very different opinions on these kinds of issues, is it absolutely important to use that thread, and this kind of confidence between these two, three groups of people to go forward.

So that would be, I think, a very constructive -- and Eugene also said, there is room for discussions, what to do next in Russia. I'm personally looking forward that the Russian groups is also making a presentation is Moscow about the deep cuts reports. So if it is true, that the debate in Russia is continuing, and it's certainly necessary, then I think it should be also done in the open, so I would really like to see that going on in Moscow. This was my first comment. The second is that, just coming back from Moscow, we had a briefing from a very high representative from the foreign ministry’s arms control department.
I see not much will from the Russian side really to seize the ceasefire. The (inaudible) is very heated here, and I don't say it's only Russia. It's also the west -- there are different opinions, how these things are going on the ground and interpreted, and I mean, there are four or even more, eight OCE military observers which are there under the Vienna documents, seized by separatists. And I don't see much rhetoric and much language on Russia's side, I must say, to help solve that situation. But maybe this is done on specific channels, which I would very much appreciate, but this leads me to the observation that the slope of the whole framework, the security framework, is really moving backward. And unfortunately, where are the tools, how to deal with that.

So I think the first tool is the OCE. So I think someone asked the question, what would be the right forum for these kinds of discussions. These kinds of discussions have been made in the OC frame, but I think the OC has not the high awareness of the heads of states ready to push forward for new solutions here. So in the long run, I think, what we'll see is very good, on doing it, but we should also, speaking of the (inaudible) we have in mind, that when the treaty was signed and came into force, it was clear that from the simple geographical and technical, military technical ground, the treaty could only be -- work for 30 years, because the military conflations are very different today.

Eugene just mentioned from (inaudible), I don't think this is really a big issue, but we, in a sense, it depends -- how do you interpret information warfare. I see propaganda warfare, actually, going on about the Ukraine crisis, and this is 90 percent of the debate. It has not much to do with conferential forces, but on the other side, we see marching Russian troops at the Ukrainian border, so I think there are things from the Western side, the impression that Russia even wants to get more involved, you know, and I think that is a dangerous situation and the Vienna document does not give the
concrete -- they give some opportunities, but they cannot solve the crisis. I think it can only be solves if the three, maybe four actors are coming together.

A chancellor (inaudible) proposal to establish a contact group, according to German mass media, President Putin agreed on that, but it didn’t happen. So we see, the slope is turning. And then, the fear really is that the governments are only erect by deploying troops. The (inaudible) say we have to arm, and this is also the case with Russia. It’s not only in the case of NATO’s side, it’s also the case in Russia. And I don’t see much interaction and some constructive will here, on both sides to solve that crisis, and as long as that has not been done, I fear that we are muddling through that kind of crisis, and this is, of course, quite dangerous and I think ways must be found to build a better system that such kinds of constructive dialogue is really established there.

MR. PIFER: I can just come back to your point -- I think the idea of revising NATO nuclear posture is very unwise. I mean, back in 1997, the alliance came up with the three no’s -- no plan, no intention, no requirement, to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. And my guess is that NATO will stick with that. First of all, moving nuclear weapons forward would be usually provocative, and I think, unnecessarily provocative.

Second, it would not be without cost, because when you have weapons stored (inaudible), there’s a significant cost for the infrastructure and the security requirements and such, and my guess is that the U.S. military and Europe is not keen to incur those costs. And (inaudible), from the military side (inaudible), by moving them forward, you actually in some ways make them more vulnerable to preemptions. So my guess is that that won’t change. I do think that there is a debate though, going on in NATO with regards there to the second commitment that was made back in 1997, which was, no permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new
countries. And I think, somehow (inaudible) have raised the questions that the circumstances now have changed. Does that self imposed limitation on NATO make sense?

I don’t think NATO has reached a conclusion on that. I think there are sort of arguments on both sides, but I think that discussion is going on with regards to conventional forces, in a way that you know, is not happening on nuclear questions. I’ll just make two other comments, and here I go.

This is not the commission’s view, this is just my own view. As I understand, I don’t think NATO ever articulated to the Russians what substantial combat forces (inaudible). And there may have been advantages that, I think one disadvantage of that is now of course, any kind of deployment that you see, and of course last week we saw the United States deploy four companies of paratroops, about 150 soldiers each into Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Lithuania. Now, my guess is that there will be some in Moscow who will say that is substantial. I think the American view is probably not.

My own view is that I think that’s about appropriate. I think that’s measured response that is intended to ensure countries which are a lot more nervous about Russia than they were, say, three months ago. But also, I think a company of paratroopers does not provide offensive capability. It’s not an armored brigade going into Estonia. But it does, I think, serve something of a trip wire function.  

MR. KÜHN: Just wanted to add something, quickly. Since I’m not an American Official, and I don’t plan to assume any post, I can freely say that from the WikiLeaks, we know that NATO has actually proposed to Russia, to say what our additional combat forces, what would be the numbers, but at that time, the Russians were simply not interested in it anymore. The point is that, in my view, the trick would be to combine this (inaudible). I mean, first find a common definition f what our additional
substantial combat forces, and then apply it to certain regions. Apply it to a geographical region, and this region must be designed on a reciprocal way.

You can't just limit NATO troops, for instance, in the Baltics, or in Poland, in specific border areas, and not demand the same from the Russians. So, that's I think, the trick.

MR. PIFER: Greg?

MR. THIELMANN: There are a number of statements by former U.S. military officials, NATO military officials, that acknowledge that they're basically is no military role for the attack on nuclear weapons in Europe, so if one of considering the different kinds of political measures that one might take to demonstrate NATO's resolve, or whatever, it seems like moving nuclear weapons forward would have no military role, but would be the most provocative of all measures.

From Moscow's perspective, that should be at the very bottom of the list. And we've already seen some of the measures that you mentioned, that surely cannot worry Moscow, in military terms, but apparently, provide quite a bit of reassurance to their NATO allies. And I got a sense, anyway, that the commission subscribed to the idea that these tactical nuclear weapons are in fact a remnant of another era, and our job is to figure out ways to get them out of Europe rather than moving forward in Europe.

MR. CHANDLER: Gerald Chandler. I'd like to go back to a remark earlier from you about legally binding elements of treaties. Could you elaborate on what you meant by legally binding, and especially how it would be enforced, and put that in the context of the problems with Ukraine and the 1984 Budapest agreement. Soviet Union, the UK, the U.S. agreed to respect the elements, the borders of the Ukraine. If there had been something legally binding, what would it have been, and how could it be enforced?

MS. NEUNECK: Yes. I raised that question to this mentioned high
Russian official, that I think, many, if not most of the people of the west, see at least one violation, which is the 1994 Budapest convention. And, he simply said, yes, but this is a political declaration memorandum. It’s not legally binding. I mean, this is obviously because it was a high official. The thinking of the foreign ministry. If I -- you would ask me to comment on that, I would say (inaudible) situation is what -- does it make things better, because even if it is a violation against a political commitment, I think that’s -- that trigger a lot of very important questions.

Daryl Kimball, for whom we are quite grateful for his support of the project, mentioned that the (inaudible) starts today, and this official also said that he blames the (inaudible) not being very active in putting the four issues in the CDE and Geneva forward, one of them is negative security assurances. So other countries, maybe not Germany, could ask the Russian government, and at least nuclear weapon states, why do they give some kind of assurances, politically, legally, whatever. If they don’t, abide to them. If they don’t apply.

So I think that is, for me, as a scholar, sever weakening, another severe weakening for the NPT Treaty. And I think we should be very careful, because the treaty is not in good shape, MPOT is not in good shape, and if other countries don’t want to mentioned names, but you can (inaudible) every day in the newspaper, would ask the nuclear weapons states if what they -- agreements in their memorandums are worth, then I think this is really severe here, because I think it’s a clear, for me, a clear violation.

If you look to the memorandum, you’ll see that there is very interesting wording there. It also speaks of the signatories, the U.S., Russia, Great Britain, and I think also Ireland, for some historical reasons, should not -- are not allowed to coerce with other economical means. The territory integrity of the Ukraine -- all the debates about energy is, for me, a question of coercing other countries by playing the economical,
that means the energy, as an instrument here. So I think that is quite irritating. Let’s put it like that.

And if we don’t find a solution for it, I see another big blow to the NPT. But we will see what other states -- how other states are reacting this week in New York, and next week, and of course, we must be very concerned about the 2015 NPT conference, because main issues (inaudible) six obligations, nuclear disarmament, conventional and strategic, is not going forward, point number one, the WMD free zone discussion and conference seems not to be happening. So, we will, 2015, come together again and would have a review of a treaty, which was always very clue to the heart of the Russians. So I’m quite sure that Russia -- quite sure to say that Russia was important, really an important supporter of the NPT, and I feel, that seems to me in doubt, at least in (inaudible), perhaps not so much in conception of thinking. I don’t think that the Russian government is planning, you know, to dismantle the treaty. It’s very much in favor for the nuclear weapons state. But they have to be asked very severe questions in the future.

MR. PIFER: I (Inaudible) who worked on the Budapest Memorandum, and what that document did was pull together the commitments that the United States, Russia, and Great Britain had to Ukraine, both under the UN charter, and also under the CSC final act. But it assembled them in a Ukraine specific way that was valuable to Ukraine. It was certainly to be sure a politically binding document, and a legally binding document. I do believe that Russia has violated a number of commitments it made in the Budapest memorandum, but in doing so, the invasion and the illegal seizure of Crimea, the economic pressure, it -- Ukraine -- Russia has violated not only it's Budapest requirements, but also obligations they undertook in the politically binding CSC final act, but also commitments is made in a bilaterally, legally binding treaty to Ukraine in 1997, who has agreed to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. So, my guess is
that had -- the Budapest Memorandum had a legally binding nature -- it probably would not have stopped Russia from the action that we've seen over the last couple of months.

MR. KÜHN: If I may add to that, I think your question -- actually it's more of a philosophical question, because politically binding or legally binding, you have -- there are many examples around. I mean, you have the IBM Treaty, and the U.S. withdrew from the IBM Treaty but on completely correct terms, which was a legally binding treaty.

Russian suspended the CFE Treaty, which is a legally binding treaty, but there were no terms and conditions under the treaty for suspending the treaty. So, the point is that it was always a special Russian position, and I'm actually quite keen to hear Eugene's view on that, that legally binding treaties, particularly in the security sphere would provide more security to Russia, and to the participants that signed the treaty, and so, it was always Russia that were kind of favoring legally binding treaties, and would always refer to other arrangements, such as the Istanbul commitments that were attached to the legally binding ACFE Treaty, and were of a politically binding nature, and were quite close to say oh, well this is only a politically binding document. But I'm not sure if this is still a Russian position today. So, is there like a (inaudible) still in Russia on legally binding instruments?

MR. MIASNIKOV: I'm not a lawyer. I think it's a very interesting question and subject of discussion. First of all, lawyers and, I think there will be discussions on (inaudible) on the issue. I know that the Russian side of preparing for that discussion, but as I understand the situation, Russia doesn't see any violation of the Budapest memorandum, because (inaudible), which we are discussing today happened, not because Russia occupied Crimea. Russian forces were there before the (inaudible), on legal terms. And the fact that Crimean people decided to join Russia, (inaudible)
decided to be part of Russia -- it’s a result of internal processes in Ukraine.

And, well, you know, when 19,000 Ukrainian troops, that presented in Crimea surrenders, with no shot. And 16,000 of them decided to serve as the Russian military. That tells something about who has actually occupied Crimea. It’s -- I think the matter should be discussed, of course. There should be discussion on that, and the legal explanation has to be found but, what I’m telling you -- it’s not that simple as some people might portray the situation, and I think the current view, which prevails, in particular, in the United States or in the west, it’s very biased. Thank you.

MR. PIFER: I don’t want to big this discussion down in an argument over this. I mean, I think the situation is, it’s perhaps more complex than it’s presented in any western press, but again, I think the explanations that you’ve just presented, I think there’s some major flaws in it, but I don’t want to hijack the discussion. We have time for one last question. Okay, well if there’s no last questions, please join me in thanking the panel. Thanks a lot.
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